Shareholder activism: Does gender diversity among hedge fund managers affect activism returns?

Abstract

Divergent and often contradictory arguments appear in organizational research on the relationship between gender-diverse top management team and performance. In the present study, I integrate several distinct literatures to test a theoretical model that examines the influence of gender diversity among hedge fund executives on the performance of the target firm. Specifically, I argue that gender diversity among hedge fund executives weaken the performance consequences because females are perceived to possess traits less suited for the leadership position, which in turn influence their performance. I further argue that because of stereotypes gender-diverse hedge funds are perceived negatively and hence are more likely to face resistance from the managers of the target firms and are less likely to gain support from other shareholders, as compared to all-male hedge funds. Finally, I propose that gender-diverse hedge funds act differently as compared to all-male hedge funds, i.e., they are less aggressive in their activism campaign and they fail to target the “right” firms. I test my theory using 924 activism campaigns in the U.S. between 2010 and 2017 and find supporting results. I find that gender diverse hedge funds have lower activism returns as compared to all-male hedge funds. A significant and positive support was found for resistance, which implies that gender diversity leads to more resistance from the managers. The results also show a significant and negative support for wolf pack, indicating that gender diversity among the hedge fund executives fail to garner support. Furthermore, the results suggest that gender-diverse hedge funds are less likely to employ more aggressive tactics, as compared to all-male hedge funds. Finally, I find that both gender-diverse and all-male hedge funds target firms with similar characteristics, contrary to what I posited.