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dc.contributor.author | Robertson, Christopher | |
dc.contributor.author | Winkelman, D. Alex | |
dc.contributor.author | Bergstrand, Kelly | |
dc.contributor.author | Modzelewski, Darren | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-08-25T22:25:57Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-08-25T22:25:57Z | |
dc.date.issued | May 23, 2016 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Published in the Journal of Legal Analysis 8(2): 375–438, 2016 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | EISSN: 1946-5319 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2161-7201 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10106/26883 | |
dc.description.abstract | The Supreme Court says that campaign finance regulations are unconstitutional unless they target “quid pro quo” corruption or its appearance. To test those appearances, we fielded two studies. First, in a highly realistic simulation, three grand juries deliberated on charges that a campaign spender bribed a Congressperson. Second, 1271 representative online respondents considered whether to convict, with five variables manipulated randomly. In both studies, jurors found quid pro quo corruption for behaviors they believed to be common. This research suggests that Supreme Court decisions were wrongly decided, and that Congress and the states have greater authority to regulate campaign finance. Prosecutions for bribery raise serious problems for the First Amendment, due process, and separation of powers. Safe harbors may be a solution. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | The Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University provided funding for this research. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | Oxford University Press | en_US |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 United States | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/us/ | * |
dc.subject | Campaign finance regulations -- Supreme Court | en_US |
dc.subject | Campaign spending | en_US |
dc.subject | Campaign finance -- bribery | en_US |
dc.subject | Safe harbors | en_US |
dc.title | The Appearance and the Reality of Quid Pro Quo Corruption: An Empirical Investigation | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.publisher.department | Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Texas at Arlington | en_US |
dc.identifier.externalLinkDescription | The original publication is available at Article DOI | en_US |
dc.identifier.externalLinkDescription | | |
dc.identifier.doi | doi:10.1093/jla/law006 | |
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