Now showing items 1-10 of 14
An Average Per Capita Formula for the Shapely Value
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1992-09)
A new formula for the Shapley value is given which does not require the storage of the [see pdf for notation] values of the characteristic function in the computer, and avoids the search in the memory for such data.
On the Computation of Weighted Shapley Values for Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 2008)
This paper is considering the problem of dividing fairly the worth of the grand coalition in a transferable utilities game, in case that the coalition is formed. The computational experience for the Shapley Value, the most ...
The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Cooperative N-Person Game with Side Payments
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1988-12)
The bargaining sets have been introduced as solution concepts for cooperative n-person games with side payments by R. J. Aumann and M. Maschler (1964). A further study on the relationships between various concepts of ...
Tennis, Geometric Progression, Probability and Basketball
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1999-03)
The following problem about a tennis match is well—known. See Halmos [1, 2]. Consider 2n tennis players playing a single elimination match. Ask the question: what are the number of games played? The answer can be obtained ...
A Value for Digraph-restricted Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1997)
Digraph-restricted games model situations where some of the players, due to the lack of communication among them, are unable to cooperate. A digraph-restricted game v is defined as a function from the set of feasible ...
On the Semivalues and the Power Core of Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1999-09)
The Semivalues were introduced axiomatically by P.Dubey, A.Neyman and R.J.Weber (1981) as an important class of values for cooperative TU games. This class contains the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value, and many other ...
The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Big Boss Game
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1989-07)
The bargaining sets have been introduced as concepts of solution for cooperative n—person games with side payments by R.J.Aumann and M. Maschler (1964) and studied further by many authors. A comparison of various solutions ...
Potential and Consistency for Semivalues of Finite Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1998-01)
A new axiomatic characterization of the semivalues of finite cooperative n-person games with transferable utilities is given, by using a potential function. The semivalues are proved to be the unique functionals on the ...
Banzhaf Permission Values for Games with Permission Structure
(University of Texas at Arlington, 2000-05)
A game with a permission structure describes a situation in which cooperation possibilities in a cooperative game with transferable utility are limited because there are players that need permission from other players ...
Discriminatory Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions
(University of Texas at Arlington, 1990-05)
The von Neumann-Morgenstern solution (vN-M solution) or stable set is arguably the most dynamic and flexible solution concept for cooperative games with side-payments. Perhaps the most striking phenomenon is that ...