Browsing Department of Mathematics by Subject "Game theory"
Now showing items 1-14 of 14
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Allocations to Discriminated Players in Discriminatory Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions
(University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1991-08)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions (stable sets) for cooperative sidepayment games are notoriously difficult to find. This paper provides guidelines on how to find ... -
An Average Per Capita Formula for the Shapely Value
(University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1992-09)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A new formula for the Shapley value is given which does not require the storage of the [see pdf for notation] values of the characteristic function in the computer, ... -
Banzhaf Permission Values for Games with Permission Structure
(University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 2000-05)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A game with a permission structure describes a situation in which cooperation possibilities in a cooperative game with transferable utility are limited because there ... -
Bargaining Sets with Thresholds
(University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1984-02)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A concept of bargaining set for cooperative n person games with side payments has been defined by assuming that a player could be attracted in a new coalition ... -
The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Big Boss Game
(University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1989-07)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The bargaining sets have been introduced as concepts of solution for cooperative n—person games with side payments by R.J.Aumann and M. Maschler (1964) and studied ... -
The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Cooperative N-Person Game with Side Payments
(University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1988-12)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The bargaining sets have been introduced as solution concepts for cooperative n-person games with side payments by R. J. Aumann and M. Maschler (1964). A further ... -
Discriminatory Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions
(University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1990-05)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The von Neumann-Morgenstern solution (vN-M solution) or stable set is arguably the most dynamic and flexible solution concept for cooperative games with ... -
On a Class of Bargaining Schemes for Points in the Core of a Cooperative N-Person Game
(University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1991-05)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: Projection methods of solving convex feasibility problems lead naturally to a class of bargaining scheme's for points in the core of cooperative n-person games. ... -
On the Computation of Weighted Shapley Values for Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 2008)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: This paper is considering the problem of dividing fairly the worth of the grand coalition in a transferable utilities game, in case that the coalition is formed. ... -
On the Semivalues and the Power Core of Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1999-09)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The Semivalues were introduced axiomatically by P.Dubey, A.Neyman and R.J.Weber (1981) as an important class of values for cooperative TU games. This class contains ... -
Potential and Consistency for Semivalues of Finite Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1998-01)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A new axiomatic characterization of the semivalues of finite cooperative n-person games with transferable utilities is given, by using a potential function. The ... -
Some Recursive Definitions of the Shapley Value and Other Linear Values of Cooperative TU Games
(University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1997)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: Let N be a finite set of players, |N| = n; a cooperative TU game in coalitional form is a function v : P(N) -> R, with v(ø) = 0. It is well known that the set of ... -
Tennis, Geometric Progression, Probability and Basketball
(University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1999-03)The following problem about a tennis match is well—known. See Halmos [1, 2]. Consider 2n tennis players playing a single elimination match. Ask the question: what are the number of games played? The answer can be obtained ... -
A Value for Digraph-restricted Games
(University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1997)**Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: Digraph-restricted games model situations where some of the players, due to the lack of communication among them, are unable to cooperate. A digraph-restricted game ...