Now showing items 1-20 of 22

    • A BEHAVIORAL OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT STUDY OF MARKET POWER AND FUZZY RETURN 

      Su, Jingjie (2021-07-06)
      This dissertation studies the market power and the investment in the supply chain in the first two studies and the return policy of the retailer in the third study. In the first study, we study how the dominant market ...
    • A Behavioral Study of Supply Chain Inventory Management 

      Lang, Yan; 0000-0002-4764-081X (2022-07-15)
      **Please note that the full text is embargoed until 6/20/2024** ABSTRACT: This dissertation explores issues regarding inventory management in the domain of behavioral operations management by employing a combination of ...
    • A Game Theoretic Framework for Temporal and Agent Abstractions in Multiagent Learning 

      Clement, Danielle; 0000-0001-9711-0027 (2016-05-10)
      A major challenge in the area of multiagent reinforcement learning is addressing the issue of scale as systems get more and more complex. Systems with multiple agents attempting to explore and learn about the world they ...
    • Allocations to Discriminated Players in Discriminatory Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions 

      Heijmans, J. G. C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1991-08)
      **Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions (stable sets) for cooperative sidepayment games are notoriously difficult to find. This paper provides guidelines on how to find ...
    • An Average Per Capita Formula for the Shapely Value 

      Dragan, Irinel C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1992-09)
      **Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A new formula for the Shapley value is given which does not require the storage of the [see pdf for notation] values of the characteristic function in the computer, ...
    • Banzhaf Permission Values for Games with Permission Structure 

      van den Brink, Rene (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 2000-05)
      **Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A game with a permission structure describes a situation in which cooperation possibilities in a cooperative game with transferable utility are limited because there ...
    • Bargaining Sets with Thresholds 

      Dragan, Irinel C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1984-02)
      **Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A concept of bargaining set for cooperative n person games with side payments has been defined by assuming that a player could be attracted in a new coalition ...
    • BEHAVIORAL ASPECTS IN OPERATIONAL DECISIONS. APPLIED FACTOR INVESTIGATIONS ON THE MICRO (INDIVIDUAL) AND MESO (CLUSTER) LEVELS 

      Starostyuk, Lyudmyla; 0000-0002-5903-4171 (2020-06-22)
      Normative theoretical models in operations management have been widely utilized by businesses and scientists to explain multiple phenomena. They assume that operating systems are managed by fully rational decision-makers ...
    • BLOCKCHAIN: RESOURCE UTILISATION ANALYSIS WITH A GAME THEORY PERSPECTIVE 

      Soni, Vaibhav (2019-05-10)
      Major blockchain networks are using proof-of-work based consensus protocols to establish trust and decentralize resource management with different incentive mechanisms for the participants or nodes in the network. We ...
    • The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Big Boss Game 

      Gambarelli, Gianfranco; Dragan, Irinel C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1989-07)
      **Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The bargaining sets have been introduced as concepts of solution for cooperative n—person games with side payments by R.J.Aumann and M. Maschler (1964) and studied ...
    • The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Cooperative N-Person Game with Side Payments 

      Dragan, Irinel C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1988-12)
      **Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The bargaining sets have been introduced as solution concepts for cooperative n-person games with side payments by R. J. Aumann and M. Maschler (1964). A further ...
    • Discriminatory Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions 

      Heijmans, J. G. C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1990-05)
      **Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The von Neumann-Morgenstern solution (vN-M solution) or stable set is arguably the most dynamic and flexible solution concept for cooperative games with ...
    • FORMING COALITIONS AND SHARING PAYOFFS IN n-PERSON NORMAL FORM GAMES 

      Dwobeng, Emma Owusu; 0000-0002-1029-1505 (2022-12-19)
      For a given n-person normal form game, we form all possible sets of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive coalitions of the n players. For each set of coalitions, we define a coalitional semi-cooperative game as ...
    • On a Class of Bargaining Schemes for Points in the Core of a Cooperative N-Person Game 

      Censor, Yair; Butnariu, Dan (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1991-05)
      **Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: Projection methods of solving convex feasibility problems lead naturally to a class of bargaining scheme's for points in the core of cooperative n-person games. ...
    • On the Computation of Weighted Shapley Values for Cooperative TU Games 

      Dragan, Irinel C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 2008)
      **Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: This paper is considering the problem of dividing fairly the worth of the grand coalition in a transferable utilities game, in case that the coalition is formed. ...
    • On the Semivalues and the Power Core of Cooperative TU Games 

      Martínez-Legaz, Juan-Enrique; Dragan, Irinel C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1999-09)
      **Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: The Semivalues were introduced axiomatically by P.Dubey, A.Neyman and R.J.Weber (1981) as an important class of values for cooperative TU games. This class contains ...
    • Optimization of Heterogeneous Wireless Networks with Massive MIMO 

      Yuan, Shitong; 0000-0003-1310-3749 (2016-05-13)
      In the next generation wireless communication system, multi-layers of Heterogeneous Networks (HetNets) are required to provide high efficiency bandwidth usage and high speed data throughput. Users’ distribution and their ...
    • Potential and Consistency for Semivalues of Finite Cooperative TU Games 

      Dragan, Irinel C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1998-01)
      **Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: A new axiomatic characterization of the semivalues of finite cooperative n-person games with transferable utilities is given, by using a potential function. The ...
    • Some New Results for Equilibria of N-Person Games 

      Nahhas, Ahmad; 0000-0002-5073-6572 (2017-11-28)
      In this dissertation, we present four journal articles in the area of game theory. In the first article, we define a generalized equilibrium for n−person normal form games. We prove that the Nash equilibrium and the mixed ...
    • Some Recursive Definitions of the Shapley Value and Other Linear Values of Cooperative TU Games 

      Dragan, Irinel C. (University of Texas at ArlingtonDepartment of Mathematics, 1997)
      **Please note that the full text is embargoed** ABSTRACT: Let N be a finite set of players, |N| = n; a cooperative TU game in coalitional form is a function v : P(N) -> R, with v(ø) = 0. It is well known that the set of ...