

PERCEPTIONS OF TERRORISM  
REGARDING FEAR OF  
VICTIMIZATION

by

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ABSTRACT  
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The purpose of this study is to measure perceptions of terrorism in regards to fear of victimization by terrorist organizations among college undergraduates. A quantitative measure of levels of fear of victimization and its possible effects on student behavior will be obtained through the use of a survey instrument. The 120 students will be confidentially surveyed at The University of Texas at Arlington. The experimental group will have several media photos of major terrorist events attached to their survey. The research team hypothesizes that female undergraduates will have higher rates of fear of victimization than male undergraduates in both groups ( $H_1$ ).

After completing statistical procedures, it became apparent the exposure to the experimental variable may have affected the respondents. There were many significant differences in the response means of males and females in the experimental group, and far fewer significant differences in the response means of males and females in the control group. Therefore, this necessitates that the null hypothesis is partially accepted and the alternative hypothesis is partially rejected in regards to the control group. Conversely, then, the null hypothesis ( $H_0$ ) is partially rejected and the alternative hypothesis ( $H_1$ ) is partially accepted in the experimental group.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is a crime that has plagued society for many generations. In contemporary society, the threat of terrorist activity has transformed many aspects of daily life. Air travel security is now far more robust and extensive than in the past. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the shuffling of various law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and the new affirmation of the global War on Terror are but some of the subsequent byproducts of the terrorist attacks on September 11<sup>th</sup>. Militaries have transformed into experts on asymmetrical warfare as opposed to the conventional warfare practices of the past. The very nature of terrorism needs to be understood in order to grasp how society has arrived at this point in time.

Terrorism relies on the creation of fear in order to achieve goals, either religious or political. Terrorism is unique in its targeting of non-military populations in order to force action/inaction by a government. The creation of fear is done through a variety of nefarious means, including bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, etc. Indeed, terrorism is quite a central subject in today's society. Media coverage of these events is prevalent. The average person is often inundated with exposure on a daily basis. Research is needed to fully measure the impact of the threat of terrorism on perceptions of persons.

There have been several studies that are somewhat related to this topic. Earlier studies have focused on middle-school populations and high school populations. Other earlier research has focused on qualitative interviews in order to obtain a description of fear levels. The amount of literature regarding perceptions of terrorism is very sparse; therefore, this study will attempt to address that issue.

The use of this quantitative instrument will ensure a standardization of responses that cannot be obtained through the use of a qualitative survey.

The students will be surveyed in an introductory core class in order to ensure a greater sample diversity and randomization. The 120 students in this sample will be confidentially surveyed at The University of Texas at Arlington. Sixty of the 120 subjects will serve as a control group, while the other sixty will be the experimental group. The experimental group will have several media photos of major terrorist events attached to their survey. This will be the only difference between the two groups. The survey will be administered at the beginning of class. The survey will consist of five-pointed Likert Scale questions that seek to accurately measure perceptions. There are also numerous screening and demographical questions that will be used in order to identify possible covariance between variables. Statistical manipulations will be performed on the data set obtained to identify possible correlations.

It has been shown in numerous studies that males, who are more likely to be victimized than females, have lesser levels of fear of victimization. Females, on the other hand, are far less likely to be victimized yet are often more fearful of said victimization. In order to ascertain whether this is true among the target population, the responses of males and females will be compared within both control and experimental groups.

Accordingly, the researcher hypothesizes that female undergraduates will have higher rates of fear of victimization than male undergraduates in both groups ( $H_1$ ).

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 2.1 Definition of terrorism

Terrorism is an issue that societies have encountered since early times. Terrorism has always been difficult to define due to the inherent issue of perspective. A state-labeled terrorist may be viewed completely differently by other persons. The operational definition of terrorism varies for each respective agency that defines it. There are well in excess of one hundred definitions of terrorism, which all slightly vary by defining agency. The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (Miller, 2006, p. 121). This is compared to the United States Department of Defense definition, which defines terrorism as “the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear, intended to coerce or try to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological” (Miller, 2006, p. 121). The general description that seems to be universal to law enforcement agencies globally; violence against non-military targets in furtherance of a goal.

#### 2.2 Social perspectives on terrorism

History is rife with examples of guerrilla tactics and asymmetrical warfare aspects utilized by persons or groups against larger governments in order to achieve goals. However, whereas some groups have been labeled terroristic in nature, other groups who carry out identical acts are not. Butler (2002) gives certain examples that illustrate how people’s perceptions of terrorism can vary due to time and place. For example, John Brown, the abolitionist who advocated armed insurrection against slavery,

was executed for treason by the State of Virginia. Brown, who attempted the unsuccessful raid on the Harpers Ferry arsenal and armory, is viewed controversially in history. His intent was to end slavery, and his use of violence was intended to be instrumental in this regard. Contemporary definitions of terrorism can arguably be used to define John Brown's actions as terroristic in nature. However, decades later, his actions are seen in a more acceptable light. As Butler (2002) states, "men like Nat Turner and John Brown may not exactly be heroes, but they are not exactly "terrorists" either" (p.10). As Lankford (2010) states, controversial historical events such as the use of atomic weaponry on Imperial Japan in World War II also have some characteristics that could be likened to terrorist acts by nonproliferation activists. The use of a weapon of mass destruction against a civilian population in order to influence a government to surrender has called terroristic in nature.

This inherent issue of perspective is one that holds true even today. Recent polls taken of the Middle East populations showed a declining support for terrorist groups such as al-Qaida while support for groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah have stayed relatively high. Groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, which offer support services to communities, are seen as beneficial and altruistic among certain communities, yet are seen as vicious terror organizations by numerous governments worldwide and indeed have committed atrocities in furtherance of organizational goals. The social support that Hamas and Hezbollah offer, however, may not be representative of the reasons that people approve of the groups, however. Tessler and Robbins (2007) conducted a survey of Jordanian and Algerians to measure the level of approval and disapproval for terrorist activities against the United States. Algerians had a majority of persons who disapproved of the September 11th terror attacks, while Jordan had a majority of persons who advocated for armed jihad against Americans. They found that personal circumstances are often not as conducive towards support of terrorist groups as previously thought. Tessler and Robbins (2007) found that disapproval of American foreign policy and perceptions on responsibility for the state of their country were very strongly linked with perceptions and attitudes towards terrorism. This is similar to what Lankford (2010) states, citing a survey that indicated anti-American sentiments in regards to counterterrorism and antiterrorism efforts.

### 2.3 Motives for terrorism

A very relevant question then presents itself; why do terrorists terrorize? While the motives can vary, researchers have stated several possible answers for this question. Butler (2002) defines two different motives for the commission of terrorist acts; instrumental and retributive. Instrumentally-motivated terrorism is defined by Butler as terrorist acts that are committed in order to force a target group to perform some desired act. This is contrasted with retributionally-motivated terror, which is committed due to target group's mere existence. Butler (2002) states that instrumental terror is the more common variant that is seen in contemporary society. (Butler, 2002, p.4). Laquer, however, states that the very nature of terrorism has changed over the decades. He states that the new norm is that of the retributive nature mentioned by Butler, in that the new terrorism "is different in character, aiming not at clearly defined political demands but at the destruction in society and the elimination of large sections of the population" (as cited in Danzell, 2010, p. 88). His viewpoint is that the instrumental-type terror of the past has become far less prevalent in favor of the indiscriminately destructive retribution-type. Enders and Sandler (2000) agree with this viewpoint, stating that terrorism has become far more lethal in recent years, with terrorists attempting to achieve greater casualties than in years prior. Enders and Sandler (2000) warn that the increase in violence and casualty is not due to improved equipment or technologies, but rather due to the increased willingness of said terrorist groups to kill members of mainstream society. They attribute this to a gradual evolution or change in motivational factors among terrorist groups. Enders and Sandler (2000), state that terrorist groups in the 1960s to the 1980s were more likely to be motivated by "nationalism, separatism, Marxist ideology, racism, nihilism, and economic equality" (p. 310). They attribute the decline of the majority of these instrumentally-motivated groups to the increased enforcement and the failure of several communist countries. They state that religious extremism has grown exponentially in place of the instrumentally-motivated leftist groups and in doing so, has created a new brand of increasingly violent terrorist. Indeed, the media image presented of the Islamist terrorist is not entirely without some truth; it somewhat reflects the majority of terrorists worldwide. The old type of terrorist tended to attack specific targets, which were often government institutions such as military bases. This terrorist also was attempting to change the government stances or policies regarding an issue and

therefore declared war on the government, not on its civilians. The new orders of terrorists see the entire nation as guilty in the government's crimes, and therefore are more likely to promote violence for its own sake. This type of terrorist does not care about the perceptions of the group in mainstream society as the older instrumental terror groups did. The contemporary religious terrorist often views terror as a means of salvation. As Levin and Amster (2003) suggest, the goal of terrorism has now become an effort to kill as many persons as possible in the sending of a message.

However, Horgan (2008) suggests that the reasons for the proliferation of terror could be other than simply religious motivations. He states that in interviews with imprisoned militants, both religious and secular, there was a prevalent mention of role models for these men. These role models tended to be persons who advocated and or executed violent uprisings against a perceived aggressor. Horgan (2008) also notes that among the families of the militants, especially among groups such as Hamas, there was a similar sense of reverence towards the militants themselves. This reverence was extended to the social circles of the militants and often led to the militant being held in deep respect. The status that the perpetrators enjoyed could be one of many factors leading to the recruitment of more personnel. Another view that Horgan (2008) espouses is that of the current model of a conscious rational choice-type decision to engage in terrorism is dangerously erroneous. He stresses that a combination of factors is what causes the shift in thinking to a more radical perspective.

#### 2.4 Transnational and domestic terrorism

Terrorism can also be classified into foreign/international terrorism and domestic terrorism. Arguably, the Islamic extremist is the image often portrayed on media as the universal archetype for terror (Tessler and Robbins 2007). Indeed, as referenced above, the majority of terrorist groups referenced in the media deal with the prevalence of religious transnational fundamentalist groups. Foreign/international terrorist groups include al-Qaida, Hamas, Hezbollah, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, etc. These terrorist organizations may commit acts against many nations. For example, the terrorist group al-Qaida was founded by the Saudi Arabian Osama bin Laden. They have been known for incidents such as the 1993 attacks on U.S. special operations troops in Somalia, the US Embassy bombings in Kenya and

Tanzania, the attacks on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, and then the most notorious, the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks (Enders and Sandler 2000). Al-Qaida is obviously an international organization that operates in numerous countries worldwide. Many of the international organizations are also extremely violent due to this inherent international quality. Where members of domestic terrorism must also live within the countries they attack, international terrorism can be perpetrated in a host of countries.

This is contrasted with groups known as domestic terrorist groups, which operate primarily through the actions of a country's own citizens. The Ku Klux Klan may have been one of the earliest terror groups in the country, according to Mullins (1988). Usually, these groups are not possessing of the resources, training, and contacts that the international organizations have. However, the threat posed by domestic terrorist groups is also a very relevant one, as illustrated by the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City by Timothy McVeigh. This terror attack was the worst act of domestic terror in United States history. The recent attacks in Norway also highlight the capabilities of domestic terrorists that operate in isolation; even without a large terror network and support from other members, one person can wreak extreme havoc and create casualties in their attacks.

There are several articles which detail the prevalence of terrorist organizations in the United States. According to Mullins (1988), the majority of law enforcement agencies in the country were unaware of the scope and breadth of terrorist prevalence. The majority of the groups that Mullins (1988) details are domestic in origin, and not international groups. He states that within domestic terror groups, there are ideological differences; as he divides them into leftist and rightist viewpoints. Mullins (1988) states that rightist organizations usually are more likely to have racial or religious superiority beliefs. This is evidenced by the existence of organizations such as the Aryan Nations and even the Ku Klux Klan. Left-leaning organizations, meanwhile, are more likely to argue for violent government change with socialist or communist replacements.

### 2.5 Demographics and characteristics of terrorist organizations

In addition to origins of the terrorist groups and classifications, a question that presents itself is the demographics of the terrorist groups themselves. Are the popular media portrayals of the Islamic

fundamentalist uniformly representative of all terrorists? Research shows that it is only a part of the history and current demographics of terror. Victoroff (2005) discusses the gradual shift in terrorist group member demographics over the past fifty years. He divides these years into certain eras of terrorist typologies. The terrorists in the 1960s to 1970s were generally singles in their twenties, from middle-class backgrounds, and with high levels of education. The survey used interviews with various European terrorist groups and socio-political movements to accumulate the profiles. Victoroff (2005) stated that right-wing terrorists in this era were more likely to be men, while females were more likely to have leftist affiliations. Even though the terrorists tended to be well-educated, they worked at average-income jobs, according to Victoroff (2005).

Victoroff (2005) states that this demographic profile soon gave way to the extremist Islamist groups of the 1980s and beyond; the archetypal Middle Eastern Islamic terrorist in the 1980s was a young adolescent male from a lower-class background and low levels of education. This has once again given way to the current terrorist profile; the unpredictable one. Victoroff (2005) assesses the terrorist attacks of recent years and states that the terrorist perpetrators have come from a varying socioeconomic backgrounds, family structures, ages, and genders. This defies many theories that originally stated that terrorism was a byproduct of poverty or socioeconomic hardship. Tessler and Robbins (2007) stated that in interviews with over 250 terrorists and their families, it was seen that many of the offenders were actually quite financially stable. Victoroff (2005) states that many of the terrorists of recent years have been married with children, highly educated, and in one of the newest twists, female. Therein lies the inherent danger of this new type of terrorist, argues Victoroff (2005); an attacker that fits no profile. This is also supported by the work of Horgan (2008) through his interviews with terrorist suspects and imprisoned convicted terrorists. He suggests that there is no empirical evidence to suggest that there is a profile that can be applied to terrorists as a whole, and also that there is no root cause of terrorism itself. He argues that a combination of factors leads a person into joining terrorist organizations.

As evidenced, there are numerous attempts to classify terrorists groups and members into certain typologies, classes, etc. Miller (2006) classifies terrorists in an additional way that was originally proposed in the 1970s. This was a sort of class-based system, labeling terrorists as “crusaders,



criminals, and crazies” (p. 258). The crusaders, he argues, are the terrorist who are the most committed rationally to their cause, unswerving in their beliefs, and fanatically devoted to the group and leaders. Miller (2006) argued that these crusaders are often the core members of the group, actively planning attacks and operations against perceived enemy targets. The next class, the criminal terrorist class, is a type of terrorist that is almost mercenary in nature. These individuals are usually not as fanatically devoted as the crusaders to the group ideology, and rather, are usually seeking an outlet/excuse to commit criminal acts. These terrorists are often utilized as low level enforcers or operatives. The third class, the crazies, is persons with mental illnesses who are used for various roles within the terrorist organization. Often, these persons are suffering from extreme lack of direction, anomie, etc. and the extremist religious or fundamentalist philosophies of terrorist organizations allow them to have a sense of direction in their lives. When studying terrorists, however, many scientists argue that terrorists in the majority are not suffering from any major mental illness that causes them to perceive hallucinations, delusions, commands from deities, etc. Kruglanski and Fishman (2006) argue that the great majority of terrorists are not suffering from any major mental disorder. Rather, terrorism is simply a tool for the group or person’s ends.

## 2.6 Tactics of terrorism

The tactics that terrorist groups utilize in furtherance of their goals can greatly vary. Kidnappings, robberies, hijacking, murders, etc. are all tools of the trade. Enders and Sandler (2000) state that terrorist specifically target liberal democracies due to the inherent media attention that accompanies it. The resulting media furor serves to bring attention to the terrorist organizations’ cause, allowing civilian populations to be discontent and feel insecure, leading to pressure against government policies that terrorists want changed. In authoritarian regimes, control of the media may prevent widespread recognition of terrorist acts and organizational demands. The suicide terrorist is a notorious example of one of the most devastatingly effective strategies that these groups use. Butler (2002) states, “the Western emphasis on individuality...makes it difficult for us to understand how any cause...could be worth losing one’s life. There are, however, those whose faith in their cause makes them willing to die for

it” (p. 6). The difficulty of defending against a motivated suicide terrorist is one of the reasons that terrorism is effective at creating a sense of helplessness and fear among a civilian population. Often, terrorist attacks can strike a myriad of targets without warning, their targets seemingly random and haphazardly chosen.

However, Elango, Graf, and Hemmasi (2007) state that terrorist attacks may seem random, but in reality are carefully and methodically planned. Elango, Graf, and Hemmasi (2007) state that in order to effectively reduce chances of victimization, measures such as target hardening should be undertaken in order to discourage attacks. However, Enders and Sandler (2000) state that as governments secure official sites, civilian targets will be substituted by terrorist groups due to their [civilian infrastructure] inherent lack of comparable security. This can eventually become very expensive to the defending society. The asymmetrical warfare tactics of terrorist groups are very effective, state Enders and Sandler (2000). This may somewhat be true, as many government buildings, especially in the wake of the terror attacks on September 11<sup>th</sup>, have begun to fortify themselves in the “target hardening” process. The additions of extra walls, obstacles, cover points, etc. have all begun to be silently and aesthetically integrated into the buildings and their surroundings. The process may be not even be apparent to the untrained eye, according to Coaffee, O’Hare, and Hawkeworth (2009).

### 2.7 Terrorism and weapons of mass destruction

The fear of the use weapons of mass destruction is an issue that is associated with fear of terrorism as well. The mere thought of a terrorist group possessing these types of weapons may be deeply unsettling to some, while others dismiss the risks as unlikely. Indeed, the use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons in the commission of a terrorist incident is a sort of nightmare scenario that government agencies and politicians strive to avoid at all costs. The likelihood, however, of terrorist being able to acquire weapons of mass destruction, however, is not very high. In regards to nuclear material specifically, Bunn (2006) states that there are three feasible avenues for terrorists to obtain it; theft, black market purchases, or purchases from rogue states. However, Bunn (2006) also says that attempts to steal nuclear materials have been almost non-existent. He notes that even though

many nuclear reactor sites globally are heavily guarded, there are still many that fail to adequately provide protection for the sensitive materials located within. In regards to black market purchases, Bunn (2006) states that the few attempts to sell on the black market are usually unsuccessful due to various factors. The final avenue, the purchase of nuclear material from states that support terror, is also extremely unlikely according to Bunn (2006). He states that the likelihood of massive retributive action by nuclear-armed countries and their allies is likely a stiff deterrent against rogue states allowing terrorist to obtain control of traceable nuclear materials. This is also the viewpoint of Levin and Amster (2003) who state that due to the considerable technical and scientific capabilities required to obtain and detonate a nuclear weapon, this remains an unlikely scenario. However, unlikely as it is, this scenario is a concern to governments and societies worldwide.

The fear of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction is not entirely unfounded, however. The 1996 Aum Shinrikyo attacks on the Japanese subway system used sarin, a German-developed neurotoxin, to inflict numerous casualties on the civilian population. The form of sarin used was apparently not a very high quality, but nonetheless, managed to injure 4,000 persons and kill 12. Even after the thorough raids conducted by authorities on Aum Shinrikyo facilities, the cult attempted to use anthrax spores and botulin toxins on several occasions. The group had also previously made attempts to manufacture weaponized Ebola virus and cholera but was unsuccessful, according to the CDC. Chemical, biological, and radiological weapons present a much larger threat than the nuclear weapons in terms of likelihood of success. The attacks using the chemical weapon sarin illustrate this, in addition to the increase of anthrax mailings in the year following the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks.

Levin and Amster (2003) state that the threat of radiological terrorism, in particular, is very much a dangerously plausible scenario. The combination of high explosives with some form of radiological contaminant unleashed in a population would be devastatingly effective, they claim. These materials are not especially secured, they claim, and could be far too easily accessed and subsequently utilized by terrorist organizations .

## 2.8 Psychological effects of and fear responses to terrorism

Terrorism is primarily intended to terrorize, hence the origin of the name. Terror, being a human emotion, is not as easily measured as the physical and monetary damage that is associated with terrorism. Dekel's (2005) work mentions the rising prevalence of studies that attempt to measure the psychological toll that terrorist attacks exact. Dekel (2005) discusses how studies of adults in various war-torn locales have shown the greater prevalence of anxiety issues, major depressive episodes, phobic fears, fear of risk and victimization with a lessened perception of personal security, and greater substance use and abuse issues. This makes logical sense; persons who are living in fear for their safety will present various psychological symptoms as well. As Laufer and Solomon (2010) state, "exposure to terror and war... may have a variety of psychological consequences for children and adolescents...posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and anxiety ...and a vast array of psychological symptoms of distress as well as health and somatic complaints" (p. 415). These persons will often resort to alternate methods of coping with the stress that is caused by terrorism. However, this study also suggests that women are often more seriously affected by the adverse events than men are. This will be further discussed in the section regarding gender differences in perceptions of terrorist victimization that will follow. Dekel's (2005) qualitative study was performed by interviewing Israeli mothers and recording their self-reported responses to living in fear. Israel, which is surrounded by hostile countries, faces constant threats of terrorist activities within its borders and possible state-sponsored attacks from outside its borders. Indeed, the First and Second Intifadas are examples of the extreme violence that characterize the country. Terrorist groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, the former PLO, etc. have been known to attack large civilian targets such as public transportation centers, schools, synagogues, etc. Thus, in a country under constant siege, the residents of the society may be adversely affected by the constant stress. In Dekel's (2005) study, an overwhelming majority of the Israeli participants expressed the debilitating feeling of helplessness in the face of danger. The mothers mentioned how they would often change their family's daily routines in an attempt to prevent victimization by terrorists. The notion of the attacks on the wellbeing of their families, physical and psychological, was something that caused the mothers severe psychological and mental stress. They also reported

uncertainty on how to provide a life of happiness for their children, and also how to explain terrorist attacks to said children.

This is also similar to the work of Shamai, Kimhi, and Enosh (2007), who explored the impact of social systems such as the family and the community on reactions to war or terrorist threats. They found that living in a resilient community, positive familial responses, and increased family cohesiveness increased likelihood of reduced stress and lessened fear responses to terrorist activities. A community that was resilient and unwavering in the face of constant terror attacks was inspiring of hope and gave residents a sense of collective strength in the face of adversity. The communities that allowed the stress of living in such dangerous situations to break the community bonds between each other were far more likely to report negative states and increased fear responses and greater stress levels.

In contrast, Quillian and Pager (2010) discuss the irrationality of the average perceptions about the risk of victimization by terrorism. They state that people tend to frequently overestimate the risks to themselves regarding crime victimization in general, but in this specific instance, Americans seemed to perceive victimization by terrorism as an impending threat. This was the case even when compared to far more prevalent risks such as influenza. As a matter of fact, the perceived threat of anthrax was seen as higher than the threat of influenza, even when there were no recorded deaths on file.

West and Orr (2005) found that peoples' perceptions can be adversely affected by reason or emotion, especially when it comes to terrorist events. They found in their study that persons who talked with others regarding the September 11th terrorist attacks were more logical or reasoning in their response to terrorism, while persons who didn't discuss the attacks were more likely to have emotional responses to terror. (West and Orr, 2005) They also discovered that persons who described their responses as between logical and emotional, a moderate response group of sorts, were more likely to be affected by inherent personal characteristics in regards to levels of fear of victimization.

### 2.9 Media coverage effects of terrorism

In the days after the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks in New York City, there was intense media coverage and commentary on the perpetrators of the act. Indeed, analysts and experts were utilized to

help explain to the public the nature of the terrorist threat that the United States now faced. Persons who had previously considered terrorism as a problem for the rest of the world were forced to confront the grim reality that American perceptions were gravely erroneous. West and Orr (2005) noted the effects of mass media on the levels of fear for the respondents of the study. Indeed, the impact of the mass media is noted in much of the literature in regards to fear of victimization. It was found that this suggestion is also supported by the work of Fischer and Ai (2008), who state that the exposure to horrific images of death and destruction on September 11<sup>th</sup> caused extreme negative states emotionally and also led to incidences of post-traumatic stress disorder, e among persons who were actually present during attacks and even among persons who only watched the attacks on television. Persons who have been exposed to negative images and emotions portrayed in media coverage regarding terrorists, terrorist attacks, etc. are more likely to have strong emotional responses thereafter than persons who are not similarly exposed. West and Orr (2005) state that this can also work in the opposite direction; they state that September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks caused intense emotions among viewers due to the media coverage being “nationalistic and patriotic in nature” (p. 103). Gross, Brewer, and Aday (2009) also state this to be the case, arguing that television news media was a major influence on confidence and emotions in the aftermath of September 11<sup>th</sup>. Altheide (2007) discusses the effects that media coverage of terrorism in the wake of the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks; namely, the central role of the media in creating a major fear of terrorism. Altheide (2007) states that politicians used propaganda messages within the ensuing time period after the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks to rally support for American interests such as the War on Terror and the Iraq War.

#### 2.10 Gender differences in fear responses to terrorism

The difference between genders in regards to fear of crime is well noted. Women tend to be far more fearful of being victimized yet are less likely to be victimized than men, who exhibit lower levels of fear. Nellis (2009) found in her study that women were far more likely to be fearful of victimization by terrorists than men were. They also were more likely to perform avoidance behaviors associated with the fear. Nellis (2009) also found that minorities were more likely to report an increased fear of victimization

as well as compared to whites. Another major factor that seemed to influence fears of victimization was exposure to mass media involving terrorist acts. This was also supported in Wilcox, Ozer, Gunbeyi, and Gundogdu's (2009) study involving high school students in Turkey. They postulated that due to women exhibiting higher fear of crime than men, the sample of high school students would reflect this as well. Indeed, their study also showed significant differences in fear responses to terrorism by gender. This study controlled for numerous variables such as geographic origin, income, and differences in exposure to mass media. Lerner, Gonzalez, Small and Fischhoff (2003) also found that there were significant gender differences in regards to emotional responses which influenced perceptions of risk. Their study was on the presence of positive or negative emotions and the subsequent impact of risk perceptions. The men in the study experienced pessimism at consistently lower rates, leading to lesser perceptions of risk in a variety of crimes, including terrorism. The women in the study were far more likely to be affected pessimistically, increasing their risk perceptions. This is consistent across many crime categories, not simply terrorism. Women present the victimization paradox; they have perceptions of being extremely likely to be victimized. However, in reality, they are less victimized than men are by crime. The research team proposes that due to the majority of females in the student body population at the University of Texas at Arlington, there will be majority of perceptions that indicate a high fear of victimization. The surveys may reflect this high level of fear of victimization, and accordingly the research team has controlled for gender, and proposed this gender effect in our hypothesis.

#### 2.11 Effects of religion on fear responses to terrorism

Another variable that can have an effect on fear of victimization by terrorists is religion. Indeed, religion has been a source of personal inspiration and serenity for many throughout history. When persons are exposed to extreme tragedy, stresses, or trauma, religion may have an impact on the ability of a person to cope with the events. The impact of religion on the mediation of extreme emotional responses was explored by Fischer, Greitemayer, Kastenmuller, Jonas, and Frey (2006), who compared the reactions religious persons with non-religious persons when exposed to high salience levels of possible terrorism. Their study showed that religious persons had less of a negative impact on mood

than did nonreligious persons. The intrinsic faith of the religious participants served as a sort of buffer against the traumatizing effects of major terrorism attacks and helped them cope. This was also affected by the levels of religious affiliation of the respondent. Accordingly, persons who identified themselves as strongly affiliated with religion tended to be the most able to cope somewhat with the horrific tragedies.

#### 2.12 Effects of political ideology on fear response to terrorism

The ability of a personally held belief to serve as a buffer or coping mechanism as noted earlier does not only extend to religious beliefs. A person's political ideological identifications were found in several works to be effective at mediating emotional responses to terrorism somewhat. Laufer and Solomon (2010) conducted a study in Israel of high school students that dealt with political ideological commitment as a possible coping mechanism to terrorist incidents. The study found that both right-wing and left-wing ideological persons were less likely to be as negatively affected as persons with more of a mainstream centered approach to politics. In addition, the level of commitment within a particular political ideology was also correlated with a respective level of distress. This is also similar to the coping mechanism of religion discussed earlier, and is also affected by levels of self-identification with the ascribed political ideology. West and Orr (2005) also stated that political ideology, age, and education played a large role in the fear responses and perceptions of individuals.

#### 2.13 Conclusion

This literature review notes that there are many different factors that affect perceptions of terrorist organizations, especially in regards to fear of victimization. The proposed study measures perceptions of victimizations by terrorist organizations among the college demographic. The researcher hypothesizes that the surveyed college group will have high levels of fear of victimization by terrorists among females in comparison to males. The perception of terrorism that college undergraduates have is an area that has seen relatively little research. The studies undertaken prior to this one have concentrated on high school students and middle school students. Therefore, as suggested by the review of the literature, there is a current need in the literature to address the perceptions of college students regarding terrorism,



particularly in terms of fear of victimization, relying on a survey instrument as a vehicle for self-report. Thus, the proposed study will attempt to address this current need in the literature.

## CHAPTER 3

### METHODS

#### 3.1 Operationalization of survey variables

Measuring perceptions involves a self-report of some kind, whether via personalized interview or survey instrument. The use of the survey instrument will be advantageous in the research setting itself; the classroom environment. By standardizing the responses through the use of a quantitative survey, statistical manipulations can be efficiently performed on the data to identify possible covariance.

The use of students in a college setting allows for a population which has some fundamental understanding of world events, the threat of terrorism, and a general ability to think critically. The use of this population, who are generally in their late teenage years, also allows for a window into the perceptions of a group who has had to deal with the repercussions of the devastating September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks. This may also be the most effective and efficient way to obtain the perspectives of these respondents, as they will be harder to obtain once they have graduated and started working at careers. As these attacks occurred when the majority of the subjects were still children, the perspective gained will be unique. The students were assured of their anonymity in order to elicit honest responses. Due to this anonymity, the students will be less hesitant in answering the survey questions truthfully.

#### 3.2 Survey and statistical procedures

The students were surveyed in an introductory core requirement class. This was done to ensure a diverse representation of the student body. Enrollment in this class is mandated by all majors at the University of Texas at Arlington in order to graduate, ergo, sample variety would be guaranteed.

Dr. Rebecca Deen's Political Science 2311-009 Tuesday/Thursday class was surveyed on 10/13/2011. Students who were enrolled in Dr. Rebecca Deen's class and who were at least eighteen years of age and who signed the informed consent documents were the only ones allowed to complete the survey. 120 survey packets (sixty controls and sixty experimental) were distributed to the class. The control and experimental survey packets both had identical questions. The only difference between the two types of survey packets was the addition of several pages of media images of various terrorist attacks to the experimental packets. The survey packets were distributed down the middle of the classroom, with sixty control survey packets on the left side and sixty experimental survey packets on the right side. 120 informed consent documents were also passed out to the class. The information on the informed consent document was read aloud to the class, who was then instructed to sign the bottom line.

The principal investigator passed out 120 survey packets in total to the class. 60 of these were control survey packets and the other 60 were experimental survey packets. The principal investigator received 52 completed control survey packets and 51 completed experimental survey packets from respondents. The demographics of this sample survey group can be seen in the following tables.

The birth years for the respondents in both the control survey group (n=60) and the experimental survey group (n=60) can be seen in the table below.

Table 3.1 Birth years

|         | Control     | Experimental |
|---------|-------------|--------------|
| Year    | Percentages | Percentages  |
|         |             |              |
| 1969    | 1.7%        | 0.0%         |
| 1976    | 1.7%        | 0.0%         |
| 1978    | 1.7%        | 0.0%         |
| 1981    | 1.7%        | 0.0%         |
| 1982    | 1.7%        | 0.0%         |
| 1984    | 1.7%        | 0.0%         |
| 1985    | 1.7%        | 0.0%         |
| 1987    | 1.7%        | 1.7%         |
| 1988    | 1.7%        | 5.0%         |
| 1989    | 1.7%        | 1.7%         |
| 1990    | 6.7%        | 6.7%         |
| 1991    | 13.3%       | 20.0%        |
| 1992    | 28.3%       | 26.7%        |
| 1993    | 21.7%       | 23.3%        |
|         |             |              |
| Total   | 86.7%       | 85.0%        |
| Missing | 13.3%       | 15.0%        |

In regards to sex of the respondents, in the control survey group (n=60), there were twenty-five males for 41.7% and twenty-six females for 43.3%, respectively. There were nine missing responses for 15.0% as well. In the experimental survey group (n=60), there were twenty-three males for 38.3% and twenty-eight females for 46.7%, respectively. There were nine missing responses for 15.0% as well. These figures can be viewed in the table below.

Table 3.2 Sex

|         | Control     | Experimental |
|---------|-------------|--------------|
| Sex     | Percentages | Percentages  |
|         |             |              |
| Male    | 41.7%       | 38.3         |
| Female  | 43.3%       | 46.7         |
|         |             |              |
| Total   | 85.0%       | 85.0%        |
| Missing | 15.0%       | 15.0%        |

In regards to ethnicity of the respondents, the information for both the control survey group (n=60) and the experimental survey group (n=60) is as follows. In the control survey group, there were three Asian/Asian-Americans for 5.0%, seven Black/African-Americans for 11.7%, eleven Hispanic/Latinos for 18.3%, twenty-seven White/Caucasians for 45.0%, one Pacific Islander for 1.7%, and two Others for 3.3%, respectively. There were nine missing responses for 15.0% as well. In the experimental survey group (n=60), there were five Asian/Asian-Americans for 8.3%, twelve Black/African-Americans for 20.0%, twenty Hispanic/Latinos for 33.3%, thirteen White/Caucasians for 21.7%, one Other for 1.7%, respectively. There were nine missing responses for 15.0% as well. These figures can be viewed in the table below.

Table 3.3 Ethnicity

|                        | Control     | Experimental |
|------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| Ethnicity              | Percentages | Percentages  |
|                        |             |              |
| Asian/Asian-American   | 5.0%        | 8.3%         |
| Black/African-American | 11.7%       | 20.0%        |
| Hispanic/Latino        | 18.3%       | 33.3%        |
| White/Caucasian        | 45.0%       | 21.7%        |
| Pacific Islander       | 1.7%        | 0.0%         |
| Other                  | 3.3%        | 1.7%         |
|                        |             |              |
| Total                  | 85.0%       | 85.0%        |
| Missing                | 15.0%       | 15.0%        |

In regards to religious affiliation of the respondents, information for both the control survey group (n=60) and the experimental survey group (n=60) is as follows. In the control survey group, there were thirteen Protestants for 21.7%, eight Catholics for 13.3%, one Islamic for 1.7%, two Buddhists for 3.3%, twelve Others for 20.0%, fifteen No religious affiliation/no preferences for 25.0%, respectively. There were also nine missing responses for 15.0% as well. In the experimental survey group, there were thirteen Protestants for 21.7%, eighteen Catholics for 30.0%, one Islamic for 1.7%, one Hindu for 1.7%, two Buddhists for 3.3%, ten Others for 16.7%, six No religious affiliations/no preferences for 10.0%, respectively. There were also nine missing responses for 15.0% as well. These figures can be viewed in the table below.

Table 3.4 Religious affiliation

|  | Control     | Experimental |
|--|-------------|--------------|
| Religious affiliation                  | Percentages | Percentages  |
|  |             |              |
| Protestant                             | 21.7%       | 21.7%        |
| Catholic                               | 13.3%       | 30.0%        |
| Islam                                  | 1.7%        | 1.7%         |
| Hindu                                  | 0.0%        | 1.7%         |
| Buddhist                               | 3.3%        | 3.3%         |
| Other                                  | 20.0%       | 16.7%        |
| No religious affiliation/no preference | 25.0%       | 10.0%        |
|  |             |              |
| Total                                  | 85.0%       | 85.0%        |
| Missing                                | 15.0%       | 15.0%        |

In regards to level of religious affiliation of the respondents, information for both the control survey group (n=60) and the experimental survey group (n=60) is as follows. In the control survey group, there were five Very Highly affiliated persons for 8.3%, sixteen Highly affiliated persons for 26.7%, nineteen Moderately affiliated persons for 31.7%, six Lowly affiliated persons for 10.0%, and four Very Lowly affiliated persons for 6.7%, respectively. There were also nine missing responses for 15.0% as well. In the experimental survey group, there was one Very Highly affiliated person for 1.7%, fifteen Highly affiliated persons for 25.0%, eleven Moderately affiliated persons for 18.3%, ten Lowly affiliated persons for 16.7%, and four Very Lowly affiliated persons for 6.7%, respectively. There were also eight missing responses for 13.3% as well as one valid skipped response. These figures can be viewed in the table below.

Table 3.5 Level of religious affiliation

|                                | Control     | Experimental |
|--------------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| Level of religious affiliation | Percentages | Percentages  |
|                                |             |              |
| Very high                      | 8.3%        | 1.7%         |
| High                           | 26.7%       | 25.0%        |
| Moderate                       | 31.7%       | 18.3%        |
| Low                            | 10.0%       | 16.7%        |
| Very low                       | 6.7%        | 6.7%         |
|                                |             |              |
| Total                          | 83.3%       | 68.3%        |
| Missing                        | 15.0%       | 13.3%        |



In regards to the length of religious affiliation of the respondents, information for both the control survey group (n=60) and the experimental survey group (n=60) is as follows. In the control survey group, there were three people who were affiliated for less than one year for 5.0%, seven people affiliated for 1-5 years for 11.7%, three people affiliated for 6-10 years at 5.0%, thirty-five people affiliated for more than 11 years for 58.3%, respectively. There were eight missing responses for 13.3% and four valid skips for 6.7%. In the experimental survey group, there were four people who were affiliated for 1-5 years for 6.7%, four people who were affiliated for 6-10 years for 6.7%, and forty-one people who were affiliated for more than 11 years for 68.3%. There were also nine missing responses for 15.0% and two valid skips for 3.3% as well. These figures can be viewed in the table below.

Table 3.6 Length of religious affiliation

|                                 | Control     | Experimental |
|---------------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| Length of religious affiliation | Percentages | Percentages  |
|                                 |             |              |
| Less than one year              | 5.0%        | 0.0%         |
| 1-5 years                       | 11.7%       | 6.7%         |
| 6-10 years                      | 5.0%        | 6.7%         |
| More than 11 years              | 58.3%       | 83.7%        |
|                                 |             |              |
| Total                           | 80.0%       | 81.7%        |
| Missing                         | 13.3%       | 15.0%        |

In regards to the political affiliation of the respondents, information for both the control survey group (n=60) and the experimental survey group (n=60) is as follows. In the control group, there were twelve Republicans for 20.0%, thirteen Democrats for 21.7%, three Others for 5.0%, twenty-two Independent/no affiliation persons for 36.7%, respectively. There were also ten missing values for 16.7%. In the experimental group, there were ten Republicans for 16.7%, nineteen Democrats for 31.7%, two Others for 3.3%, and twenty Independent/no affiliation persons for 33.3%, respectively. There were nine missing responses for 15.0% as well. These figures can be viewed in the table below.

Table 3.7 Political affiliation

|                            | Control     | Experimental |
|----------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| Political affiliation      | Percentages | Percentages  |
|                            |             |              |
| Republican                 | 20.0%       | 16.7%        |
| Democrat                   | 21.7%       | 31.7%        |
| Other                      | 5.0%        | 3.3%         |
| Independent/no affiliation | 36.7%       | 33.3%        |
|                            |             |              |
| Total                      | 83.3%       | 85.0%        |
| Missing                    | 16.7%       | 15.0%        |

In regards to level of political affiliation of the respondents, information for both the control survey group (n=60) and the experimental survey group (n=60) is as follows. In the control survey group, there were two Very Highly affiliated persons for 3.3%, eight Highly affiliated persons for 13.3%, seven Moderately affiliated persons for 11.7%, fourteen Lowly affiliated persons for 23.3%, and fourteen Very Lowly affiliated persons for 23.3%, respectively. There were also nine missing responses for 15.0% and six valid skips for 10.0%, as well. In the experimental survey group, there were three Very Highly affiliated persons for 5.0%, five Highly affiliated persons for 8.3%, twenty Moderately affiliated persons for 33.3%, nine Lowly affiliated persons for 15.0%, and seven Very Lowly affiliated persons for 11.7%, respectively. There were also nine missing responses for 15.0% as well as seven valid skipped responses. These figures can be viewed in the table below.

Table 3.8 Level of political affiliation

|                                | Control     | Experimental |
|--------------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| Level of political affiliation | Percentages | Percentages  |
|                                |             |              |
| Very high                      | 3.3%        | 5.0%         |
| High                           | 13.3%       | 8.3%         |
| Moderate                       | 11.7%       | 33.3%        |
| Low                            | 23.3%       | 15.0%        |
| Very low                       | 23.3%       | 11.7%        |
|                                |             |              |
| Total                          | 75.0%       | 73.3%        |
| Missing                        | 15.0%       | 15.0%        |

In regards to the length of political affiliation of the respondents, information for both the control survey group (n=60) and the experimental survey group (n=60) is as follows. In the control survey group, there were twelve people who were affiliated for less than one year for 20.0%, nineteen people affiliated for 1-5 years for 31.7%, eight people affiliated for 6-10 years at 13.3%, twelve people affiliated for more than 11 years for 20.0%, respectively. There were eight missing responses for 13.3% and one valid skip for 1.7%. In the experimental survey group, there were four people who were affiliated for less than one year for 6.7%, twenty-nine people who were affiliated for 1-5 years for 48.3%, four people who were affiliated for 6-10 years for 6.7%, and eight people who were affiliated for more than 11 years for 13.3%. There were also nine missing responses for 15.0% and six valid skips for 10.0% as well. These figures can be viewed in the table below.

Table 3.9 Length of political affiliation

|                                 | Control     | Experimental |
|---------------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| Length of political affiliation | Percentages | Percentages  |
|                                 |             |              |
| Less than one year              | 20.0%       | 6.7%         |
| 1-5 years                       | 31.7%       | 48.3%        |
| 6-10 years                      | 13.3%       | 6.7%         |
| More than 11 years              | 20.0%       | 13.3%        |
|                                 |             |              |
| Total                           | 85.0%       | 75.0%        |
| Missing                         | 13.3%       | 15.0%        |

In regards to the employment status of the respondents, information for both the control survey group (n=60) and the experimental survey group (n=60) is as follows. In the control survey group, there were eleven persons Employed full time for 18.3%, fifteen Employed part time for 25.0%, twelve Unemployed/looking for work at 20.0%, and thirteen Unemployed/not looking for work for 21.7%, respectively. There were nine missing responses for 15.0% as well. In the experimental survey group, there were four persons Employed full time for 6.7%, twenty-four Employed part time for 40.0%, seventeen Unemployed/looking for work at 28.3%, and six Unemployed/not looking for work for 10.0%, respectively. There were nine missing responses for 15.0% as well. These figures can be viewed in the table below.

Table 3.10 Employment status

|                                 | Control     | Experimental |
|---------------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| Employment status               | Percentages | Percentages  |
|                                 |             |              |
| Employed full time              | 18.3%       | 6.7%         |
| Employed part time              | 25.0%       | 40.0%        |
| Unemployed/looking for work     | 20.0%       | 28.3%        |
| Unemployed/not looking for work | 21.7%       | 10.0%        |
|                                 |             |              |
| Total                           | 85.0%       | 85.0%        |
| Missing                         | 15.0%       | 15.0%        |

In regards to the academic classification of the respondents, information for both the control survey group (n=60) and the experimental survey group (n=60) is as follows. In the control group, there were twenty-eight freshmen for 46.7%, nineteen sophomores for 31.7%, and five juniors for 8.3%, respectively. There were also eight missing responses for 13.3% as well. In the experimental survey group, there were twenty-eight freshmen for 46.7%, seventeen sophomores for 28.3%, five juniors for 8.3%, and one senior for 1.7%, respectively. There were nine missing values for 15.0% as well. These figures can be viewed in the table below.

Table 3.11 Academic classification

|                         | Control     | Experimental |
|-------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| Academic classification | Percentages | Percentages  |
|                         |             |              |
| Freshman                | 46.7%       | 46.7%        |
| Sophomore               | 31.7%       | 28.3%        |
| Junior                  | 8.3%        | 8.3%         |
| Senior                  | 0.0%        | 1.7%         |
|                         |             |              |
| Total                   | 86.7%       | 85.0%        |
| Missing                 | 13.3%       | 15.0%        |

In regards to the approximate annual family income of the respondents, information for both the control survey group (n=60) and the experimental survey group (n=60) is as follows. In the control survey group, thirteen persons responded with an approximate annual family income of below 25K for 21.7%, seven as 26K-46K for 11.7%, ten as 47K-67K for 16.7%, six as 68-88K for 10.0%, and fifteen as above 89K for 25.0%, respectively. There were nine missing responses for 15.0%, as well. In the experimental survey group, eleven persons responded with an approximate annual family income of below 25K for 18.3%, thirteen as 26K-46K for 21.7%, seven as 47K-67K for 11.7%, six as 68-88K for 10.0%, and eleven as above 89K for 18.3%, respectively. There were twelve missing responses for 20.0%, as well. These figures can be viewed below.

Table 3.12 Approximate annual family income

|                                  | Control     | Experimental |
|----------------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| Approximate annual family income | Percentages | Percentages  |
|                                  |             |              |
| Below \$25,000                   | 21.7%       | 18.3%        |
| \$26,000 to \$46,000             | 11.7%       | 21.7%        |
| \$47,000 to \$67,000             | 16.7%       | 11.7%        |
| \$68,000 to \$88,000             | 10.0%       | 10.0%        |
| Above \$89,000                   | 25.0%       | 18.3%        |
|                                  |             |              |
| Total                            | 85.0%       | 80.0%        |
| Missing                          | 15.0%       | 20.0%        |

In regards to the UTA Major of the respondents, information for both the control survey group (n=60) and the experimental survey group (n=60) is as follows. In the control survey group, two persons were Architecture for 3.3%, one was Urban and Public Affairs for 1.7%, ten were Business for 16.7%, six were Liberal Arts for 10.0%, three were Education and Health Professions for 5.0%, four were Engineering for 6.7%, six were Nursing for 10.0%, nine were Science for 15.0%, three were Social Work for 5.0%, three were Undecided for 5.0%, and two were Others for 3.3%, respectively. There were also eleven missing responses for 18.3% as well. In the experimental survey group, nine persons were Business for 15.0%, eleven were Liberal Arts for 11.0%, one Education and Health Professions for 1.7%, eight were Engineering for 13.3%, nine were Nursing for 15.0%, four were Science for 6.7%, one was Social Work for 1.7%, five were Undecided for 8.3%, and one person was Other for 1.7%, respectively. There were also eleven missing responses for 18.3% as well. These figures can be viewed in the table below.



Table 3.13 UTA major

|                                  | Control     | Experimental |
|----------------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| UTA Major                        | Percentages | Percentages  |
|                                  |             |              |
| Architecture                     | 3.3%        | 0.0%         |
| Urban and Public Affairs         | 1.7%        | 0.0%         |
| Business                         | 16.7%       | 15.0%        |
| Liberal Arts                     | 10.0%       | 18.3%        |
| Education and Health Professions | 5.0%        | 1.7%         |
| Engineering                      | 6.7%        | 13.3%        |
| Nursing                          | 10.0%       | 15.0%        |
| Science                          | 15.0%       | 6.7%         |
| Social Work                      | 5.0%        | 1.7%         |
| Undecided                        | 5.0%        | 8.3%         |
| Other                            | 3.3%        | 1.7%         |
|                                  |             |              |
| Total                            | 81.7%       | 81.7%        |
| Missing                          | 18.3%       | 18.3%        |

In regards to the GPA of the respondents, information for both the control survey group (n=60) and the experimental survey group (n=60) is as follows. In the control survey group, four persons had 1.0-1.9 for 6.7%, twelve had 2.0-2.9 for 20.0%, thirty-five had 3.0-3.9 for 58.3%, and one had 4.0 for 1.7%, respectively. There were also eight missing responses for 13.3% as well. In the experimental survey group, there were twenty persons with 2.0-2.9 for 33.3%, twenty-nine with 3.0-3.9 for 48.3%, and one with 4.0 for 1.7%, respectively. There were also ten missing responses for 16.7% as well.

Table 3.14 GPA

|         | Control     | Experimental |
|---------|-------------|--------------|
| GPA     | Percentages | Percentages  |
|         |             |              |
| 1.0-1.9 | 6.7%        | 0.0%         |
| 2.0-2.9 | 20.0%       | 33.3%        |
| 3.0-3.9 | 58.3%       | 48.3%        |
| 4.0     | 1.7%        | 1.7%         |
|         |             |              |
| Total   | 86.7        | 83.3         |
| Missing | 13.3        | 16.7         |

### 3.3 Measurement of variables

The “Perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of general victimization in the next year” variable is to measure the perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization in the immediate year. With the death of Osama bin Laden, retaliatory terror attacks have been promised by various fundamentalist extremist groups. In addition, the Norway attacks highlight the danger of domestic terrorist groups. This variable will attempt to measure the perception of likelihood of terrorist attacks that respondents possess, especially in light of these recent events.

The “Perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of personal victimization” variable will attempt to measure the perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization that respondents possess. The earlier variable attempts to measure the likelihood of terrorist attacks in general. This variable, however, seeks to measure the levels of fear that respondents have towards being victimized by domestic or international terrorist groups.

The “Perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization and the federal government inability to protect public” variable attempts to measure perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization in respondents in regards to the inability or ability of the United States federal government to protect the general population from terrorist attacks by domestic and/or international groups. The federal government is well-funded and equipped with the most anti-terror and counter-terror capabilities, so an agreement with this statement will indicate a level of fear and lack of confidence in safety from terror.

The “Perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization and the state and/or local inability to protect public from terrorist groups” variable attempts to measure perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization in regards to the inability or ability of the various state and local governments to protect their general populations from terrorist attacks by domestic and/or international groups. The state and local governments are not as well funded as the federal governments in terms of anti-terror and counter-terror capabilities and in some ways represent both the first and last lines of defense against terrorist attacks. An agreement with this statement will indicate a level of fear and lack of confidence in safety from terror.

The “Perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization in comparison to levels of fear of other violent crime” variable attempts to measure the respondent’s perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization by terrorist groups, both domestic and international, in comparison to the respondent’s perceptions in regards to victimization of other violent crimes. Statistically, respondents are more likely to be victimized by other forms of violent crime than terrorist activities, so high levels of fear may affect perception of likelihood of victimization. This was supported in the study that Quillian & Pager (2010) undertook. The average American perceived the risk of victimization by bio-terrorism as more relevant than the influenza epidemics.

The “Likelihood of observing news media involving terrorism” variable attempts to measure the perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization by measuring the likelihood that a respondent will observe news media in order to be informed about terrorist attacks, both domestic and international. Persons with high levels of fear of terrorism may accordingly, watch more television news media coverage of terrorism. Gross, Brewer, and Aday (2009) found that television media was major influence on confidence and emotions in the wake of the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks.

The “Perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization on airline flights” variable attempts to measure perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization that the respondent possesses about traveling on airline flights. The September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist hijackings were known to have been calamitous to the airline industries, as people simply avoided air travel afterwards. The level of agreement with this statement will indicate levels of fear of victimization of the respondent.

The “Perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization and impact on behavior regarding airline flights” variable attempts to measure the perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization and what effect this has on the behavior of the respondent. This variable is somewhat linked to the variable above, as fear of victimization may affect behavior of the respondent so that they avoid air travel altogether.

The “Perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization and impact on behavior regarding public transportation” variable attempts to measure the perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization and the behavioral effect it has on the respondent. The 1996 Aum Shinrikyo subway

attacks, the 7/7 London attacks, etc. all were incidents that took place on public transportation. The respondent's fear of victimization may affect behavior of the respondent so that they avoid public transportation altogether.

The "Perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization and impact on level of alertness in public places" variable attempts to measure the measure perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization and the behavioral effect it has on the respondent. Persons are indeed encouraged to be vigilant at airports for suspicious packages, persons, etc. The respondent's fear of victimization may affect behavior of the respondent so that they are constantly paranoid or hyper vigilant in public places.

The "Perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization and satisfaction with government anti/counter-terrorism" variable will attempt to measure perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization that respondents have in regards to fear of the government not doing all it can to prevent terrorism. Confidence in government has been shown to affect emotional responses to terrorism.

The "Perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization by WMDs" variable will attempt to measure perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization that respondents have in regards to being attacked by terrorist armed with weapons of mass destruction. This encompasses the chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological threat spectrum.

These are often regarded as the worst case scenarios by many persons, so the belief in the likelihood of attack using one of these will be reflected in the corresponding levels of fear.

The "Perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization in the next five years" attempts to measure perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization of the respondent in regards to victimization in the next five years. With the death of Osama bin Laden, retaliatory terror attacks have been promised by various fundamentalist extremist groups. In addition, the Norway attacks highlight the danger of domestic terrorist groups. This variable will attempt to measure the perception of likelihood of terrorist attacks over the next five-year period that respondents possess, especially in light of these recent events. Changes from the respondent's response to the victimization variable about terrorist victimization in the next year will be noted as a way to test reliability. This variable also seeks to measure perceptions

of terrorism regarding fear of victimization in regards the possibility of worsening terrorist attacks in the future. This variable will give an indicator of the respondent's outlook on the future of victimization.

The "Perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization and impact on behavior regarding emergency plans" variable attempts to measure perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization and the impact on behavior of the respondent. Persons who exhibit high levels of fear of victimization may have emergency plans premade in the event of a terrorist attack. Emergency plans include stockpiling of food or water in preparation for supply shortage, first aid kit compilations in case of emergency care necessities, purchase of weapons or ammunition for self defense or hunting reasons for food, designated safe houses or other locales in order to meet family, etc. These emergency plans may indicate a high level of preparedness for a terrorist attack due to higher levels of fear of victimization.

The "Perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization by domestic terror groups compared to international/foreign terror groups" variable attempts to compare the measure perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization of respondents in regards to domestic terror groups against the levels of fear of international terror groups. Again, the predominant media image of terrorism is the radical Islamic, however, domestic terror is also a grave threat. As evidenced as recently as the Norway terrorist attacks, domestic groups are capable of wreaking havoc on countries as well.

The "Perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization and impact of victimization of known person" variable attempts to measure perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization and the personal impact of terrorism on the respondent. This variable is a control variable, which will screen the persons who have been previously victimized indirectly by persons never victimized indirectly. Persons who have been previously victimized through the loss of someone they know may be affected by fear levels of a higher nature.

The "Effects of exposure to military service or culture on perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization" variables attempt to serve as a control variable in order to measure perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization due to exposure to military culture, exposure to insurgents in military operations, etc. Perceptions and levels of fear may be affected through this military culture or experience.

The “Effects of exposure to law enforcement service or culture on perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization” variables attempt to serve as a control variable in order to measure perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization due to exposure to law enforcement, exposure to suspects in law enforcement operations, etc. Perceptions and levels of fear may be affected through this law enforcement culture or experience.

The “Perception of necessity of racial profiling for terrorist attack prevention” variable attempts to measure if the respondent sees racial profiling as necessary to stop terrorist attacks. Persons with high levels of fear may support such extreme measures.

The “Perception of targeted killings” variable attempts to measure if the respondent sees targeted killings as necessary to stop terrorist attacks. Persons with high levels of fear may also support such extreme measures due to their perceptions.

### 3.4 Control variables

The “Age” control variable is to determine if age affects perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization. In West and Orr (2005), age had an effect on levels of fear.

The “Gender” control variable is to determine if gender affects perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization. In Nellis (2009), women reported higher levels of fear of terrorism. This was also supported by Wilcox, Ozer, Gunbeyi, and Gondogdu (2009) survey of high school students. Indeed, in much of the academic literature presented, this has been shown to be consistent regarding other categories of crime in general. Women present the victimization paradox; they exhibit high levels of fear of victimization yet are at reduced risk of victimization compared to other groups.

The “Race” control variable is to control for race/ethnicity. It will indicate whether race/ethnicity has any correlation effect with perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization.

The “Religion” control variable is to see if religion has an effect on perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization. Persons with religious affiliations have been shown to have been affected less negatively than persons who were nonreligious, according to Fischer, Greitemayer, Kastenmuller, Jonas, and Frey (2006).

The “Level of religious affiliation” control variable is to see if religion has an effect on perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization. Persons with religious affiliations have been shown to have been affected less negatively than persons who were nonreligious, according to Fischer, Greitemayer, Kastenmuller, Jonas, and Frey (2006). This variable will also highlight the differences between persons who identify themselves as highly affiliated with religion and persons who are not as highly affiliated.

The “Length of religious affiliation” control variable is to see if length of time affiliated with a religion has an effect on perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization.

The “Political ideology” control variable is to measure if political ideology has an effect on perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization. Persons with political ideologies that leaned towards a particular side (i.e. left versus right) were found to be less negatively affected by instances of terrorist attacks (Laufer and Solomon, 2010)

The “Level of political ideology affiliation” control variable attempts to measure if political ideological affiliation levels have an effect on perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization. Persons with strong political ideological affiliations have been shown to have been affected less negatively than persons who were more mainstream or weakly ideological, according to Laufer and Solomon (2010). This variable will also highlight the differences between persons who identify themselves as highly affiliated with religion and persons who are not as highly affiliated.

The “Length of political affiliation” control variable is to see if length of time affiliated with a political ideology has any effect on perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization.

The “Employment status” control variable attempts to measure any possible effect of employment status on perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization.

The “Undergraduate academic classification” control variable attempts to measure any possible effect of undergraduate academic classification on perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization

The “Annual family income in the year 2010” control variable attempts to measure any possible effect on perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization in undergraduates that are surveyed. Various articles mentioned the effects that income and socioeconomic status have on perceptions of fear of terrorist victimization.



The “Major area of study” control variable attempts to measure whether college major has an effect on perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization.

The “Grade point average” control variable attempts to measure the effect of scholastic achievement on perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization.

Afterwards, the survey responses were entered into IBM SPSS for processing, were double-checked for accuracy, and then various statistical procedures were undertaken. Frequency tests were completed to determine the compositions of the respective control and experimental groups. Cross-tabulations were performed while controlling for the demographic variables; birth year, sex, ethnicity, religious preference, level of religious affiliation, political ideology, level of political ideological affiliation, employment status, academic year classification, family income, college undergraduate major, and grade point average (GPA). In addition, various screening questions were also factored into the cross-tabulations; whether the subject knew any victims of terrorist attacks, the weekly hours of news media consumed, past or possible military/law enforcement service, and association with friends/family in military/law enforcement. In addition, t-Tests were performed in order to check for the possibility of differences in response means between males and females. This was performed in order to help prove or disprove the alternative hypothesis,  $H_1$ , that female respondents in both control and experimental groups would have higher levels of fear of victimization than male respondents.

## CHAPTER 4

### FINDINGS

#### 4.1 t-Test significance results

The study has shown that there are some significant differences in response means between men and women. Only the significant differences at either the 0.05 or 0.01 levels will be discussed below.

For the control group, in regards to the variable “I worry about being victimized by terrorist organizations,” there were no statistically significant differences between male and female response means. The majority of males and females disagreed with the statement.

For the experimental group, in regards to the variable “I worry about being victimized by terrorist organizations,” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.01 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear. These figures expressed in percentages can be viewed in the table below.

Table 4.1 Fear of personal victimization by terrorist organizations

|  | Control |          | Experimental |          |
|--|---------|----------|--------------|----------|
|  | Male %  | Female % | Male %       | Female % |
| I worry about being victimized by terrorist organizations. |         |          |              |          |
| Agree  | 12.0%   | 7.7%     | 17.4%        | 35.7%    |
| Neutral  | 16.0%   | 23.1%    | 17.4%        | 35.7%    |
| Disagree   | 72.0%   | 69.2%    | 65.2%        | 28.6%    |

For the control group, in regards to the variable “I fear that the United States federal government cannot protect us from terrorism,” there were no statistically significant differences between male and female response means. The majority of males and females disagreed with the statement outlined above.

For the experimental group, in regards to the variable “I fear that the United States federal government cannot protect us from terrorism,” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.01 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement outlined above, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear of victimization overall. These figures expressed in percentages can be viewed in the table below.

Table 4.2 Fear of federal government inability to protect from victimization

|  | Control |          | Experimental |          |
|--|---------|----------|--------------|----------|
|  | Male %  | Female % | Male %       | Female % |
| I fear that the United States federal government cannot protect us from terrorism. |         |          |              |          |
| Agree  | 24.0%   | 23.1%    | 8.7%         | 32.1%    |
| Neutral  | 32.0%   | 11.5%    | 26.1%        | 35.7%    |
| Disagree   | 44.0%   | 65.4%    | 65.2%        | 32.1%    |

For the control group, in regards to the variable “I fear that the state and local governments cannot protect us from terrorism,” there were no statistically significant differences between male and female response means. The majority of males and females disagreed with the statement outlined above.

For the experimental group, in regards to the variable “I fear that the state and local governments cannot protect us from terrorism,” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.01 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear. These figures expressed in percentages can be viewed in the table below.

Table 4.3 Fear of state/local government inability to protect from victimization

|   | Control |          | Experimental |          |
|---|---------|----------|--------------|----------|
|   | Male %  | Female % | Male %       | Female % |
| I fear that state and local governments cannot protect us from terrorism. |         |          |              |          |
| Agree   | 40.0%   | 30.8%    | 17.4%        | 35.7%    |
| Neutral   | 20.0%   | 15.4%    | 30.4%        | 28.6%    |
| Disagree  | 36.0%   | 53.8%    | 52.2%        | 35.7%    |
| Missing   | 4.0%    | 0.0%     | 0.0%         | 0.0%     |

For the control group, in regards to the variable “I fear victimization by terrorism more than I fear victimization by other forms of violent crime,” there were no statistically significant differences between male and female response means. The majority of males and females disagreed with the statement. Males were more likely to agree with this statement.

For the experimental group, in regards to the variable “I fear victimization by terrorism more than I fear victimization by other forms of violent crime,” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.01 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear. These figures expressed in percentages can be viewed in the table below.

Table 4.4 Fear of victimization by terrorism in comparison to other forms of crime

|   | Control |          | Experimental |          |
|---|---------|----------|--------------|----------|
|   | Male %  | Female % | Male %       | Female % |
| I fear victimization by terrorism more than I fear victimization by other forms of violent crime. |         |          |              |          |
| Agree   | 8.0%    | 0.0%     | 4.3%         | 14.3%    |
| Neutral   | 4.0%    | 11.5%    | 4.3%         | 25.0%    |
| Disagree  | 80.0%   | 88.5%    | 91.3%        | 60.7%    |
| Missing   | 8.0%    | 0.0%     | 0.0%         | 0.0%     |

For the control group, in regards to the variable “I follow news media closely in order to be informed about possible terrorist attacks in the DFW Metroplex,” there were statistically significant

differences between male and female response means at the 0.01 significance level. Males reported higher levels of agreement with this statement, while females reported higher levels of disagreement.

For the experimental group, in regards to the variable “I follow news media closely in order to be informed about possible terrorist attacks in the DFW Metroplex,” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.01 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear of victimization as compared to male respondents. Interestingly, where the control study showed no female news media consumption, in the experimental group, this figure dramatically increased. These figures expressed in percentage form can be viewed in the table below.

Table 4.5 Consumption of news media for staying informed

|  | Control |          | Experimental |          |
|--|---------|----------|--------------|----------|
|  | Male %  | Female % | Male %       | Female % |
| I follow news media closely in order to be informed about possible terrorist attacks in the DFW Metroplex. |         |          |              |          |
| Agree  | 20.0%   | 0.0%     | 21.7%        | 25.0%    |
| Neutral  | 24.0%   | 19.2%    | 30.4%        | 35.7%    |
| Disagree   | 56.0%   | 80.8%    | 47.8%        | 39.3%    |

For the control group, in regards to the variable “I have a fear of being victimized by terrorists while traveling on airline flights,” there were no statistically significant differences between male and female response means. The majority of males and females disagreed with the statement outlined above.

However, for the experimental group, in regards to the variable “I have a fear of being victimized by terrorists while traveling on airline flights,” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.01 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement outlined above as compared to male respondents, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear of victimization overall. These figures expressed in percentage form can be viewed in the table below.

Table 4.6 Fear of terrorist victimization on airplanes

|   | Control |          | Experimental |          |
|---|---------|----------|--------------|----------|
|   | Male %  | Female % | Male %       | Female % |
| I have a fear of being victimized by terrorists while traveling on airline flights. |         |          |              |          |
| Agree   | 32.0%   | 19.2%    | 17.4%        | 50.0%    |
| Neutral   | 12.0%   | 15.4%    | 17.4%        | 28.6%    |
| Disagree  | 56.0%   | 65.4%    | 65.2%        | 21.4%    |

For the control group, in regards to the variable “I tend to avoid taking flights due to fear of terrorist victimization,” there were no statistically significant differences between male and female response means. The majority of males and females disagreed with the statement.

For the experimental group, in regards to the variable “I tend to avoid taking flights due to fear of terrorist victimization,” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.01 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear. These figures expressed in percentages can be viewed in the table below.

Table 4.7 Avoidance of air travel due to fear of terrorist victimization

|   | Control |          | Experimental |          |
|---|---------|----------|--------------|----------|
|   | Male %  | Female % | Male %       | Female % |
| I tend to avoid taking flights due to fear of terrorist victimization |         |          |              |          |
| Agree   | 0.0%    | 3.8%     | 4.3%         | 14.3%    |
| Neutral   | 16.0%   | 3.8%     | 4.3%         | 32.1%    |
| Disagree  | 84.0%   | 92.3%    | 91.3%        | 50.0%    |

For the control group, in regards to the variable “I tend to avoid other public transportation other than flying due to fears of terrorism,” there were no statistically significant differences between male and female response means. The majority of males and females disagreed with the statement. No males or females agreed with this statement.

For the experimental group, in regards to the variable “I tend to avoid other public transportation other than flying due to fears of terrorism,” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.01 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear of victimization of terrorism. These figures expressed in percentages can be viewed in the table below.

Table 4.8 Avoidance of non-air public transportation due to fear of terrorist victimization

|  | Control |          | Experimental |          |
|--|---------|----------|--------------|----------|
|  | Male %  | Female % | Male %       | Female % |
| I tend to avoid other public transportation other than flying due to fears of terrorism. |         |          |              |          |
| Agree  | 0.0%    | 0.0%     | 0.0%         | 7.1%     |
| Neutral  | 8.0%    | 7.7%     | 0.0%         | 17.9%    |
| Disagree   | 92.0%   | 92.3%    | 95.7%        | 71.4%    |
| Missing  | 0.0%    | 0.0%     | 4.3%         | 0.0%     |

For the control group, in regards to the variable “I am very alert in public places for possible terrorist attacks,” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.01 significance level. More men agreed that they were alert for possible terrorist attacks in public places. Female agreement with this statement was far less common than the male responses.

For the experimental group, in regards to the variable “I am very alert in public places for possible terrorist attacks,” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.01 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear of victimization of terrorism as compared to male response means. These figures expressed in percentage form can be viewed in the table below.

Table 4.9 Alertness in public for terrorist victimization

|  | Control |          | Experimental |          |
|--|---------|----------|--------------|----------|
|  | Male %  | Female % | Male %       | Female % |
| I am very alert in public places for possible terrorist attacks. |         |          |              |          |
| Agree  | 40.0%   | 7.7%     | 13.0%        | 21.4%    |

Table 4.9 - *Continued*

|  | Control |          | Experimental |          |
|--|---------|----------|--------------|----------|
|  | Male %  | Female % | Male %       | Female % |
| I am very alert in public places for possible terrorist attacks. |         |          |              |          |
| Neutral  | 24.0%   | 19.2%    | 39.1%        | 32.1%    |
| Disagree   | 36.0%   | 73.1%    | 47.8%        | 42.9%    |
| Missing  | 0.0%    | 0.0%     | 0.0%         | 3.6%     |

For the control group, in regards to the variable “The government is not doing enough to protect me from terrorism,” there were no statistically significant differences between male and female response means. The majority of males and females disagreed with the statement.

For the experimental group, in regards to the variable “The government is not doing enough to protect me from terrorism,” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.05 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear. These figures expressed in percentages can be viewed in the table below.

Table 4.10 Satisfaction with government counter/anti terrorism efforts

|  | Control |          | Experimental |          |
|--|---------|----------|--------------|----------|
|  | Male %  | Female % | Male %       | Female % |
| The government is not doing enough to protect me from terrorism. |         |          |              |          |
| Agree  | 8.0%    | 11.5%    | 4.3%         | 10.7%    |
| Neutral  | 40.0%   | 11.5%    | 26.1%        | 35.7%    |
| Disagree   | 52.0%   | 76.9%    | 65.2%        | 53.6%    |
| Missing  | 0.0%    | 0.0%     | 4.3%         | 0.0%     |

For the control group, in regards to the variable “There is a good chance of terrorist attacks with biological/chemical/nuclear/radiological weapons,” there were no statistically significant differences between male and female response means. The majority of males and females disagreed with the statement.



For the experimental group, in regards to the variable “There is a good chance of terrorist attacks with biological/chemical/nuclear/radiological weapons,” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.05 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear. These figures expressed in percentages can be viewed in the table below.

Table 4.11 Probability of terrorist attacks with WMDs

|  | Control |          | Experimental |          |
|--|---------|----------|--------------|----------|
|  | Male %  | Female % | Male %       | Female % |
| There is a good chance of terrorist attacks with biological/chemical/nuclear/radiological weapons. |         |          |              |          |
| Agree  | 36.0%   | 46.2%    | 43.5%        | 60.7%    |
| Neutral  | 28.0%   | 23.1%    | 39.1%        | 35.7%    |
| Disagree   | 36.0%   | 30.8%    | 13.0%        | 3.6%     |
| Missing  | 0.0%    | 0.0%     | 4.3%         | 0.0%     |

For the control group, in regards to the variable “I have prepared any type of emergency plans in case of a terrorist attack (stockpiled food or water, designated safe areas, bought weapons/ammunition),” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.05 significance level. More males reported agreeing with the statement than females. No females reported agreeing with this statement.

For the experimental group, in regards to the variable “I have prepared any type of emergency plans in case of a terrorist attack (stockpiled food or water, designated safe areas, bought weapons/ammunition),” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.01 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear. These figures expressed in percentages can be viewed in the table below.

Table 4.12 Preparation of emergency contingency plans in terrorist event

|  | Control |          | Experimental |          |
|--|---------|----------|--------------|----------|
|  | Male %  | Female % | Male %       | Female % |
| I have prepared any type of emergency plans in case of a terrorist attack (stockpiled food or water, designated safe areas, bought weapons/ammunition) |         |          |              |          |
| Agree  | 16.0%   | 0.0%     | 0.0%         | 3.6%     |
| Neutral  | 16.0%   | 19.2%    | 4.3%         | 17.9%    |
| Disagree   | 68.0%   | 80.8%    | 91.3%        | 78.6%    |
| Missing  | 0.0%    | 0.0%     | 4.3%         | 0.0%     |

For the control group, in regards to the variable “I am more likely to be a victim of a domestic terrorist organization than a foreign/international group,” there were no statistically significant differences between male and female response means.

For the experimental group, in regards to the variable “I am more likely to be a victim of a domestic terrorist organization than a foreign/international group,” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.05 significance level. More males responded as agreeing that domestic terrorist organization were a threat, while females responded worrying about foreign/international terrorist groups. These figures expressed in percentages can be viewed in the table below.

Table 4.13 Fear of domestic terrorist group vs. international terrorist group

|  | Control |          | Experimental |          |
|--|---------|----------|--------------|----------|
|  | Male %  | Female % | Male %       | Female % |
| I am more likely to be a victim of a domestic terrorist organization than a foreign/international group. |         |          |              |          |
| Agree  | 44.0%   | 34.6%    | 34.8%        | 10.7%    |
| Neutral  | 32.0%   | 23.1%    | 34.8%        | 42.9%    |
| Disagree   | 24.0%   | 42.3%    | 21.7%        | 46.4%    |
| Missing  | 0.0%    | 0.0%     | 8.7%         | 0.0%     |

Table 4.14 t-Test comparison of control survey response means controlling for gender

| Variable   | Male means | Female means | p-value |
|--|------------|--------------|---------|
| 1. I fear that terrorist attacks will occur again in the United States in the next year.   | 3.16       | 3.40         | 0.278   |
| 2. I worry about being victimized by terrorist organizations.  | 3.84       | 3.81         | 0.848   |
| 3. I fear that the United States federal government cannot protect us from terrorism.  | 3.28       | 3.50         | 0.349   |
| 4. I fear that the state and local governments cannot protect us from terrorism.   | 2.96       | 3.35         | 0.132   |
| 5. I fear victimization by terrorism more than I fear victimization by other forms of violent crime.   | 4.22       | 4.42         | 0.153   |
| 6. I follow news media closely in order to be informed about possible terrorist attacks in the DFW Metroplex.  | 3.56       | 4.19         | 0.00**  |
| 7. I have a fear of being victimized by terrorists while traveling on airline flights.   | 3.52       | 3.62         | 0.662   |
| 8. I tend to avoid taking flights due to fear of terrorist victimization.  | 4.36       | 4.31         | 0.765   |
| 9. I tend to avoid other public transportation other than flying due to fears of terrorism.  | 4.52       | 4.50         | 0.876   |
| 10. I am very alert in public places for possible terrorist attacks.   | 3.04       | 3.88         | 0.000** |
| 11. The government is not doing enough to protect me from terrorism.   | 3.60       | 3.92         | 0.090   |
| 12. There is a good chance of terrorist attacks with biological/chemical/nuclear/radiological weapons.   | 2.92       | 2.88         | 0.868   |
| 13. I fear that terrorism will only get worse in the next five years.  | 2.96       | 3.31         | 0.080   |
| 14. I have prepared any type of emergency plans in case of a terrorist attack (stockpiled food or water, designated safe areas, bought weapons/ammunition) | 3.84       | 4.23         | 0.015*  |
| 15. I am more likely to be a victim of a domestic terrorist organization than a foreign/international group.   | 2.80       | 3.27         | 0.067   |

Table 4.14 – *Continued*

| Variable   | Male means | Female means | p-value |
|--|------------|--------------|---------|
| 16. Do you believe that targeted killing will stop terrorist attacks?                  | 3.44       | 3.69         | 0.178   |
| 17. Do you believe that racial profiling of persons is necessary to prevent terrorism? | 3.56       | 4.00         | 0.058   |

(\*significant for 0.05, \*\* significant for 0.01)

Table 4.15 t-Test comparison of experimental survey response means controlling for gender

| Variable  | Male means | Female means | p-value |
|---|------------|--------------|---------|
| 1. I fear that terrorist attacks will occur again in the United States in the next year.                      | 3.00       | 2.71         | 0.088   |
| 2. I worry about being victimized by terrorist organizations.   | 3.83       | 2.89         | 0.000** |
| 3. I fear that the United States federal government cannot protect us from terrorism.                         | 3.91       | 2.89         | 0.000** |
| 4. I fear that the state and local governments cannot protect us from terrorism.                              | 3.57       | 2.86         | 0.002** |
| 5. I fear victimization by terrorism more than I fear victimization by other forms of violent crime.          | 4.39       | 3.68         | 0.001** |
| 6. I follow news media closely in order to be informed about possible terrorist attacks in the DFW Metroplex. | 3.43       | 3.14         | 0.114   |
| 7. I have a fear of being victimized by terrorists while traveling on airline flights.                        | 3.78       | 2.50         | 0.000** |
| 8. I tend to avoid taking flights due to fear of terrorist victimization.                                     | 4.43       | 3.52         | 0.000** |
| 9. I tend to avoid other public transportation other than flying due to fears of terrorism.                   | 4.59       | 3.93         | 0.001** |
| 10. I am very alert in public places for possible terrorist attacks.  | 3.52       | 3.15         | 0.052   |
| 11. The government is not doing enough to protect me from terrorism.  | 3.86       | 3.43         | 0.025*  |

Table 4.15 – *Continued*

| Variable   | Male means | Female means | p-value |
|--|------------|--------------|---------|
| 12. There is a good chance of terrorist attacks with biological/chemical/nuclear/radiological weapons.   | 2.68       | 2.29         | 0.011*  |
| 13. I fear that terrorism will only get worse in the next five years.  | 2.77       | 2.86         | 0.625   |
| 14. I have prepared any type of emergency plans in case of a terrorist attack (stockpiled food or water, designated safe areas, bought weapons/ammunition) | 4.32       | 3.89         | 0.003** |
| 15. I am more likely to be a victim of a domestic terrorist organization than a foreign/international group.   | 3.00       | 3.54         | 0.011*  |
| 16. Do you believe that targeted killing will stop terrorist attacks?  | 3.45       | 3.75         | 0.085   |
| 17. Do you believe that racial profiling of persons is necessary to prevent terrorism?   | 3.82       | 3.64         | 0.352   |

(\*significant for 0.05, \*\* significant for 0.01)

4.2 Pearson's R correlations for control survey group

After checking the Pearson's R value for the first seventeen questions with the screening and demographical questions, there were no variables found with a strong covariant relationship, either positive or negative (defined as 0.7 to 1.0 or -0.7 to -1.0).

In regards to a weak covariant relationship, (defined as 0.5-0.69), there was a weak positive correlation between the variables "Do you plan to serve in the armed forces?" and "I have prepared any type of emergency plans in case of a terrorist attack" (stockpiled food or water, designated safe areas, bought weapons/ammunition) with  $r=0.546$ ,  $n=50$ , and  $p=0.000$ .

Table 4.16 Pearson's R correlations for control survey group

|  | I fear that terrorism will only get worse in the next five years. | I have prepared any type of emergency plans in case of a terrorist attack (stockpiled food or water, designated safe areas, brought weapons/ammunition). | I am more likely to be a victim of a domestic terrorist organization than a foreign/international group. |
|--|---|--|--|
| Have you ever served in the armed forces?  | -0.019<br>0.896<br>52   | 0.072<br>0.611<br>52   | 0.067<br>0.637<br>52   |
| Do you plan to serve in the armed forces   | 0.376<br>0.007<br>50  | 0.546**<br>0.000<br>50   | 0.345<br>0.014<br>50   |
| Do you have any family members or friends who are in, or were formerly in, the armed forces? | 0.136<br>0.336<br>52  | 0.046<br>0.748<br>52   | 0.032<br>0.823<br>52   |

(\*significant for 0.05, \*\* significant for 0.01)

In regards to a weak covariant relationship, (defined as 0.5-0.69), there was a weak positive correlation between the variables "Level of political affiliation and "I have prepared any type of emergency plans in case of a terrorist attack" (stockpiled food or water, designated safe areas, bought weapons/ammunition) with  $r=0.587$ ,  $n=45$ , and  $p=0.000$ .

Table 4.17 Pearson's R correlations for control survey group

|                                 | I fear that terrorism will only get worse in the next five years. | I have prepared any type of emergency plans in case of a terrorist attack (stockpiled food or water, designated safe areas, brought weapons/ammunition). | I am more likely to be a victim of a domestic terrorist organization than a foreign/international group. |
|---------------------------------|---|--|--|
| Political affiliation           | 0.061<br>0.675<br>50  | 0.241<br>0.092<br>50   | -0.140<br>0.331<br>50  |
| Level of political affiliation  | 0.378<br>0.011<br>45  | 0.587**<br>0.000<br>45   | 0.213<br>0.159<br>45   |
| Length of political affiliation | -0.012<br>0.935<br>51   | 0.055<br>0.703<br>51   | -0.096<br>0.503<br>51  |

(\*significant for 0.05, \*\* significant for 0.01)

#### 4.3 Pearson's R correlations for experimental survey group

After verifying the Pearson's R value for the first seventeen questions with the screening/demographical questions, there were no variables found with a strong covariant relationship, either positive or negative (defined as 0.7 to 1.0 or -0.7 to -1.0) There were no variables that managed to meet this criteria.

There were also no variables that met the criteria for a weak covariant relationship, either positive or negative (defined as 0.5 to 0.69 or -0.5 to -0.69).

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

#### 5.1 Discussion

This quasi-experimental design has led to certain conclusions. After obtaining the raw data from the surveys themselves, and entering them into IBM SPSS, and performing statistical manipulations, there were several different results.

Additionally, the use of Pearson's R correlations revealed no strong covariance relationships between the demographical/screening variables and the actual survey perception questions. The threshold for a strong relationship was set at least 0.7 to 1.0 for a strong positive relationship, and at -0.7 to -1.0 for a strong inverse relationship. There were no values that met or exceeded this criterion.

For the control group, in regards to the variable "I worry about being victimized by terrorist organizations," there were no statistically significant differences between male and female response means. The majority of males and females disagreed with the statement.

For the experimental group, however, in regards to the variable "I worry about being victimized by terrorist organizations," there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.01 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear. This difference may be due to the influence of the images on the test subjects. West & Orr (2005) stated that exposure to mass media can have a large impact on the emotional responses of persons. Fisher and Ai (2008) found that exposure to images of death and destruction had the potential to cause extremely negative emotional states. Persons who were exposed to such images were more likely to have an emotional response than persons not exposed. This is supported by Lemer et al. (2003), who found that women were more likely to be affected



by pessimism than men in the same study. Quillian and Pager (2010) also stated that people tend to overestimate their own risk of victimization by terrorism. Therefore, it is possible that the images in the experimental group's packet caused negative emotional states in the subjects, especially among females. Once this negative emotional state was reached, perhaps the females tended to have more pessimistic states. This could be a possible reason for the differences between males and females in the control and experimental groups.

For the control group, in regards to the variable "I fear that the United States federal government cannot protect us from terrorism," there were no statistically significant differences between male and female response means. The majority of males and females disagreed with the statement. For the experimental group, however, in regards to the variable "I fear that the United States federal government cannot protect us from terrorism," there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.01 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear. In the wake of the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks in the United States, many citizens felt that the CIA and FBI had not adequately done their duties in protecting the nation. Indeed, the 9/11 Commission was set up to investigate these claims. Perhaps the exposure of the experimental variable may have produced a similar emotional reaction as the ones triggered after the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, albeit on a smaller scale. The fear that terrorists will somehow find a way to victimize the respondent despite government efforts is part of the strategy of fear employed by terrorist groups, indeed (Elango, Graf, and Hemmasi, 2007). This variable's responses can also be linked to the studies of West and Orr (2005) and Altheide (2007) regarding fear amplification through mass media coverage.

For the control group, in regards to the variable "I fear that the state and local governments cannot protect us from terrorism," there were no statistically significant differences between male and female response means. The majority of males and females disagreed with the statement. For the experimental group, however, in regards to the variable "I fear that the state and local governments cannot protect us from terrorism," there were statistically significant differences between male and female

response means at the 0.01 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear.

This fear may be due to the fact that the federal government, which is the best equipped and funded to combat terrorism, has been unable to stop certain attacks; the most notable of these unstopped attacks being the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorism acts. If the well-funded/equipped federal government is vulnerable, perhaps citizens will be even more uneasy after viewing the experimental variable which reminds them of the dangers of terrorism. This is also somewhat related to the variable “The government is not doing enough to protect me from terrorism.” In the control group, there were no statistically significant differences between male and female response means. The majority of males and females disagreed with the statement.

For the experimental group, however, in regards to the variable “The government is not doing enough to protect me from terrorism,” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.05 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear. This is supported by the work of Gross, Brewer, and Aday (2009), who state that American confidence levels in government are linked with emotional states. If the females’ emotional states were affected negatively, this could in turn impact their confidence in government institutions.

For the control group, in regards to the variable “I tend to avoid other public transportation other than flying due to fears of terrorism,” there were no statistically significant differences between male and female response means. The majority of males and females disagreed with the statement. No males or females agreed with this statement. For the experimental group, however, in regards to the variable “I tend to avoid other public transportation other than flying due to fears of terrorism,” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.01 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear. These fearful responses in the experimental groups may all have been directly due to the negative states that mass media (the set of nine pictures) can induce in persons (Fischer and Ai, 2008; West and Orr, 2005). As some of the pictures included depictions of public transportation, i.e. planes, trains, cars, etc., the

respondent may have associated these images with the risk of victimization by terrorism. Also related to this group of variables is fear of victimization on airline flights. For the control group, in regards to the variable "I have a fear of being victimized by terrorists while traveling on airline flights," there were no statistically significant differences between male and female response means. The majority of males and females disagreed with the statement. For the experimental group, however, in regards to the variable "I have a fear of being victimized by terrorists while traveling on airline flights," there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.01 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear.

As the variable above, avoidance behaviors due to fear of victimization are also related to the literature discussed above. For the control group, in regards to the variable "I tend to avoid taking flights due to fear of terrorist victimization," there were no statistically significant differences between male and female response means. The majority of males and females disagreed with the statement. For the experimental group, however, in regards to the variable "I tend to avoid taking flights due to fear of terrorist victimization," there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.01 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear. . The September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks could very well be the most notorious use of airplanes as terrorist instruments. Air travel has forever been changed with the advent of the robust security procedure implemented afterwards. Indeed, in the period after the attacks, companies offered extremely discounted air rates in order to revive consumer participation. For many, the fear of terrorism eclipses any other fear related to flying. The September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks, combined with the high levels of security of airports, may have all been contributing factors to the dramatic upswing in female responses. The exposure to the experimental variables may have been responsible for this increase. This could be a possible explanation for the difference between control and experimental survey groups.

This factor may also have had an effect on the fear of victimization in public places, mentioned below. There were several images that showed very public places and the aftermath of a terrorist incident in its midst. For the control group, in regards to the variable "I am very alert in public places for

possible terrorist attacks,” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.01 significance level. More men agreed that they were alert for possible terrorist attacks in public places. This seems to contradict the usual victimization paradox. Perhaps the threat of terrorism and/or violent events in large public places could have caused an elevated caution among persons in general. Many events such as the Mumbai attacks, Fort Hood shooting, the Norway shooting sprees, etc. have been in the media very prominently. Due to the prevalence of coverage on these traumatic events, perhaps persons are somewhat more cautious when in large public places. Terrorists, especially the retributionally-motivated types of the present, are more likely to choose targets with potentially high numbers of casualties (Enders and Sandler, 2000; Levin and Amster, 2003) For the experimental group also, in regards to the variable “I am very alert in public places for possible terrorist attacks,” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.01 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear. This seems to fit in more with the victimization paradox, yet, the same reasons as above could apply. Lemer et al., (2003) study about female pessimism and West and Orr’s (2005) study could also play a large factor in this. Perhaps females are more fearful once exposed to the actual traumatic stimuli.

For the control group, in regards to the variable “I fear victimization by terrorism more than I fear victimization by other forms of violent crime,” there were no statistically significant differences between male and female response means. The majority of males and females disagreed with the statement. Males were more likely to agree with this statement. For the experimental group, however, in regards to the variable “I fear victimization by terrorism more than I fear victimization by other forms of violent crime,” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.01 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear.

This could be related to the fact that young males are most at risk for other forms of violent crime, yet have lower levels of fear than females/elderly adults. The victimization paradox could explain why females are more likely to fear victimization than males.

For the control group, in regards to the variable “I have prepared any type of emergency plans in case of a terrorist attack (stockpiled food or water, designated safe areas, bought weapons/ammunition),” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.05 significance level. More males reported agreeing with the statement than females. No females reported agreeing with this statement. This variable may be caused by the fact that gun owners are largely men. Perhaps the men are simply more likely to purchase weapons or ammunition than females in general without exposure to traumatic stimuli. For the experimental group, in regards to the variable “I have prepared any type of emergency plans in case of a terrorist attack (stockpiled food or water, designated safe areas, bought weapons/ammunition),” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.01 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear. Men are more likely to be gun owners. No men in this group reported even owning a weapon. Perhaps there were spurious third-party variables that affected this variable. Also, food/water stockpiles may be what females have prepared in terms of contingency plans as opposed to weapons/ammunition. The effect of the pictures may have caused females to take these items into account when planning for emergencies whereas they may not have considered them in the control group.

For the control group, in regards to the variable “I am more likely to be a victim of a domestic terrorist organization than a foreign/international group,” there were no statistically significant differences between male and female response means. For the experimental group, however, in regards to the variable “I am more likely to be a victim of a domestic terrorist organization than a foreign/international group,” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.05 significance level. More males responded as agreeing that domestic terrorist organization were a threat, while females responded worrying about foreign/international terrorist groups. The subjects are generally in the late teens to early twenties. The worst domestic terror attack in recent times was Timothy McVeigh’s bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. The majority of the survey respondents would have been far too young to remember this. However, the discrepancy between variables may not be that men see domestic terrorism as a larger threat, but rather that more females see

foreign/international terror as imminent due to the exposure to the pictures. Also, many of the thwarted attacks against the United States are plotted by recruits of foreign terrorist organizations (often referred to as “homegrown” terrorists in the media) who are born in the United States. Perhaps this could have affected the response rate in such a manner.

For the control group, in regards to the variable “I follow news media closely in order to be informed about possible terrorist attacks in the DFW Metroplex,” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.01 significance level. Males reported higher levels of agreement with this statement, while females reported higher levels of disagreement. This seems to contradict the victimization paradox, as it seems plausible that persons with high levels of fear are more likely to be more concerned about terrorism.

For the experimental group, in regards to the variable “I follow news media closely in order to be informed about possible terrorist attacks in the DFW Metroplex,” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.01 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear. Interestingly, where the control study showed no female news media consumption, in the experimental group, this figure dramatically increased. This does fit with the victimization paradox.

For the control group, in regards to the variable “There is a good chance of terrorist attacks with biological/chemical/nuclear/radiological weapons,” there were no statistically significant differences between male and female response means. The majority of males and females disagreed with the statement.

For the experimental group, in regards to the variable “There is a good chance of terrorist attacks with biological/chemical/nuclear/radiological weapons,” there were statistically significant differences between male and female response means at the 0.05 significance level. Females reported higher levels of agreement with the statement, thereby suggesting higher levels of fear. The difference could have been caused by fears of WMDs in Iraq, the anthrax terrorist attacks in Washington, the fears of rogue state nuclear proliferations, etc. (Levin and Amster 2003; Bunn, 2006). All these incidents may have been contributing factors after exposure to the experimental variable.

The researcher gave the alternative hypothesis as females in both control and experimental survey groups would differ in their levels of fear of victimization in their perceptions of terrorism; females would have higher levels of fear. The null hypothesis was that females would not significantly differ from males in either group. There were significant differences in the response means of males and females in the experimental group, and far fewer significant differences in the response means of males and females in the control group. Female undergraduates in the experimental group were shown to have higher levels of fear with regards to certain questions as compared to men through the use of sex-controlled cross tabulations. The females and males in the control survey group were far more uniform in their responses as evidenced by the use of sex-controlled cross tabulations.

## 5.2 Hypotheses

Therefore, the null hypothesis ( $H_0$ ) is partially accepted and the alternative hypothesis ( $H_1$ ) is rejected in regards to the control group. In the control group, the males and females did not significantly vary in terms of responses. Regarding the experimental survey group, however, the response means of males and females varied dramatically concerning certain questions. Therefore, the null hypothesis ( $H_0$ ) is rejected and the alternative hypothesis ( $H_1$ ) is accepted.

This partial acceptance will further add to the body of literature that asserts gender differences in fears of crime, especially in terms of fear of victimization. Thus the often-quoted victimization paradox; females often have the highest fears of crime, yet the lowest victimization likelihood. This is in contrast to males, who generally have the higher likelihood of victimization, but lesser fear of victimization.

There is a general lack of literature in this area, especially for studies of college undergraduates or students in general regarding perceptions of terrorism regarding fear of victimization. The use of students in a college setting allows for a population which has some fundamental understanding of world events, the threat of terrorism, and a general ability to think critically. The use of this population, who are generally in their late teenage years, also allows for a window into the perceptions of a group who has had to deal with the repercussions of the devastating September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks. This may also be the most effective and efficient way to obtain the perspectives of these respondents, as they will be harder to

obtain once they have graduated and started working at careers. As these attacks occurred when the majority of the subjects were still children, the perspective gained will be unique.

### 5.3 Limitations and suggestions for future research

Limitations of this study include the small sample size of 120 students. This weakens statistical conclusion validity and the ability to generalize these statistics to a population. Therefore, a suggestion for following studies is to allow for far larger samples sizes, which will drive down the margin of error greatly. The use of several different introductory classes is also recommended as a possible benefit to variety and diversity of sample populations. Also, another issue is the one of generalizability. These findings may only be applicable to midsize universities in the southern United States. Further studies may address this issue by surveying a number of campuses in varying geographical areas. An additional way to improve the effect of the experimental variable is to allocate more time to the survey itself, allowing the experimental variable to be introduced to the subjects in a quasi-controlled manner; this would facilitate the gradual exposure that would present the greatest treatment effect. Additionally, perhaps a qualitative element should be introduced in order to obtain the most complete picture of the respondents' perceptions.

The differences in men and women's response rates after exposure to these images of terrorist events may be indicative of similar responses subsequent to other stimuli. As the literature suggested earlier, perhaps this increased level of fear in women can lead to decisions that are based on emotional states. While the author had discussed the responses to the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks being used to funnel support to the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, perhaps there are other applications as well. Future research could possibly show that psychological counseling programs for men and women need to be tailored to fit each sex's needs, especially after such traumatic events. This may mean that victims of violent crime need to be treated according to sex, perhaps female law enforcement officers experience emotional responses to violent crimes at a higher rate than male officers due to exposure to traumatic events, or perhaps there are possible effects on women in the armed forces after exposure to combat stress. Government institutions and private employers would be interested in seeing if this could



contribute to job burnout and low employee morale, undoubtedly. This population surveyed is tomorrow's employees in government, business, etc. Do women in the older population range also exhibit these tendencies? Could this affect their decisions and behaviors when they are in positions of power, affecting their constituents or family members? Further research to verify whether this phenomenon holds true across various populations is also recommended. Do these behaviors and perceptions continue even in middle-age or elderly women?

This study is but a cross-sectional snapshot of a particular population in time. Therefore, due to the lack of literature and the limitations discussed above, the researcher encourages the further in-depth exploration of this topic in the future.

APPENDIX A  
PERCEPTIONS OF TERRORISM  
REGARDING FEAR OF  
VICTIMIZATION  
SURVEY

Perceptions of Terrorism Regarding Fear of Victimization Survey - C  
Rufus Abraham  
The University of Texas at Arlington

Perceptions of Terrorism Regarding Fear of Victimization Survey - E  
Rufus Abraham  
The University of Texas at Arlington

Perceptions of Terrorism in Regards to Fear of Victimization Survey

**SECTION ONE**

Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements. Please choose only one answer.

| Please indicate your single response.   | Agree strongly | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Disagree strongly |
|---|----------------|-------|---------|----------|-------------------|
| 1. I fear that terrorist attacks will occur again in the United States in the next year.                      |                |       |         |          |                   |
| 2. I worry about being victimized by terrorist organizations.   |                |       |         |          |                   |
| 3. I fear that the United States federal government cannot protect us from terrorism.                         |                |       |         |          |                   |
| 4. I fear that the state and local governments cannot protect us from terrorism.                              |                |       |         |          |                   |
| 5. I fear victimization by terrorism more than I fear victimization by other forms of violent crime.          |                |       |         |          |                   |
| 6. I follow news media closely in order to be informed about possible terrorist attacks in the DFW Metroplex. |                |       |         |          |                   |
| 7. I have a fear of being victimized by terrorists while traveling on airline flights.                        |                |       |         |          |                   |
| 8. I tend to avoid taking flights due to fear of terrorist victimization.                                     |                |       |         |          |                   |
| 9. I tend to avoid other public transportation other than flying due to fears of terrorism.                   |                |       |         |          |                   |
| 10. I am very alert in public places for possible terrorist attacks.  |                |       |         |          |                   |
| 11. The government is not doing enough to protect me from terrorism.  |                |       |         |          |                   |

|  | Agree strongly | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Disagree strongly |
|--|----------------|-------|---------|----------|-------------------|
| 12. There is a good chance of terrorist attacks with biological/chemical/nuclear/radiological weapons  |                |       |         |          |                   |
| 13. I fear that terrorism will only get worse in the next five years.  |                |       |         |          |                   |
| 14. I have prepared any type of emergency plans in case of a terrorist attack (stockpiled food or water, designated safe areas, bought weapons/ammunition) |                |       |         |          |                   |
| 15. I am more likely to be a victim of a domestic terrorist organization than a foreign/international group.   |                |       |         |          |                   |
| 16. Do you believe that targeted killing will stop terrorist attacks?  |                |       |         |          |                   |
| 17. Do you believe that racial profiling of persons is necessary to prevent terrorism?   |                |       |         |          |                   |

## SECTION TWO

Please answer all questions. Clearly circle your single response.

18. Do you know anyone who has been the victim of a terrorist attack?
- Yes
  - No
19. Approximately how many hours of news media do you watch weekly?
- None
  - 1-5
  - 6-10
  - 11-15
  - 16-20
  - 20 +
20. Have you ever served in the armed forces?
- Yes
  - No

21. Do you plan to serve in the armed forces?  
a. Yes  
b. No
22. Do you have any family members or friends who are in, or were formerly in, the armed forces?  
a. Yes  
b. No
23. Have you ever served in law enforcement?  
a. Yes  
b. No
24. Do you plan to serve in law enforcement?  
a. Yes  
b. No
25. Do you know any family members or friends who are in, or were formerly in, law enforcement?  
a. Yes  
b. No

### **SECTION THREE**

Please answer all questions completely. Remember, this is a completely anonymous survey.

#### **DEMOGRAPHICS**

26. In what year were you born?  
a. 19\_\_\_\_\_
27. What is your sex?  
a. Male  
b. Female
28. Would you describe yourself as:  
a. Native American  
b. Asian/Asian-American  
c. Black/African-American  
d. Hispanic/Latino  
e. White/Caucasian  
f. Pacific Islander  
g. Other
29. What, if any, is your religious preference?  
a. Protestant  
b. Catholic  
c. Judaism  
d. Islam  
e. Hindu  
f. Buddhist  
g. Other  
i. Please specify \_\_\_\_\_  
h. No religious affiliation/no preference (please skip the next question)

30. How would you describe your level of religious affiliation?
- Very high
  - High
  - Moderate
  - Low
  - Very low
31. How long have you been affiliated with the previously mentioned religion?
- Less than one year
  - 1-5 years
  - 6-10 years
  - More than 11 years
32. What is your political affiliation?
- Republican
  - Democrat
  - Other
    - Please specify \_\_\_\_\_
  - Independent/no affiliation (please skip the next question)
33. How would you describe the level of your political affiliation?
- Very high
  - High
  - Moderate
  - Low
  - Very low
34. How long have you been affiliated with the previously mentioned political ideology?
- Less than one year
  - 1-5 years
  - 6-10 years
  - More than 11 years
35. How would you describe your current employment status?
- Employed full time
  - Employed part time
  - Unemployed/looking for work
  - Unemployed/not looking for work
  - Retired
36. What is your current academic classification?
- Freshman
  - Sophomore
  - Junior
  - Senior
37. What was your family's approximate income for the year 2010?
- Below \$25,000
  - \$26,000 to \$46,000
  - \$47,000 to \$67,000
  - \$68,000 to \$88,000
  - Above \$89,000




38. What is your major area of study at UTA?

- a. Architecture
- b. Urban and Public Affairs
- c. Business
- d. Liberal Arts
- e. Education and Health Professions
- f. Engineering
- g. Nursing
- h. Science
- i. Social Work
- j. Undecided
- k. Other
  - i. Please specify \_\_\_\_\_

39. What is your current grade point average (GPA)?

- a. 1.0-1.9
- b. 2.0-2.9
- c. 3.0-3.9
- d. 4.0



The Pentagon, Virginia: The United States of America, 09/11/2001



Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, Oklahoma, 04/19/1995



Cercanias, Madrid: The Kingdom of Spain, 03/11/2004



World Trade Center, New York: The United States of America, 09/11/2001



World Trade Center, New York: The United States of America, 09/11/2001



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