IS SECESSION A RECIPE FOR POLITICAL INSTABILITY?

by

CHARU GUPTA

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ABSTRACT

IS SECESSION A RECIPE FOR POLITICAL INSTABILITY?

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Charu Gupta, M.A.

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In the last century, the world has seen the rise and fall of empires, two world wars, and the subsequent creation of new states. Very little attention has been paid to how well these seceded states fared at self-governance. This thesis proposes a theory to explain the behavior of the governments of seceded states and examines three variables to determine how politically stable seceded states may be. For a comprehensive study, cases that gained independence between 1900 and 2000 were chosen from around the world with eight cases used for qualitative analysis and twenty cases for quantitative analysis. There is strong evidence that for seceded states to be politically stable the governments must adhere to their constitutional structures and the public needs to participate in the political process.
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CHAPTER 1
SECESSION AND POLITICAL STABILITY

1.1 Introduction

In the last century, the world has seen the rise and fall of empires, two world wars, and the subsequent creation of new states. Today, the world faces challenges such as global terrorism and war in the Middle East. Fear of nuclear proliferation has led to many high level state meetings and outbreaks of ethnic fighting and even genocide keep international peacekeeping forces occupied around the world. What is the common denominator of all these dangerous and politically significant events? On the face of it, these situations appear to be connected to states that came into existence due to global events in the last one hundred or so years. Decolonization, partition, genocide, and revolution led to the formation of many states since 1900. The end of the Cold War has also contributed to changes in the political maps of Eastern Europe.

Overall, these seceded states were and continue to be at the center of important political events. Has there been a better time than the present to analyze these “younger” states? We have only to consider the aftermath of the partition of Vietnam, the instability in Afghanistan that led to Taliban rule, and the volatility of the Middle East to acknowledge that there is a need to study seceded states. Then there are a number of groups worldwide that desire secession. What would happen if the Basques of Spain, Tamils of Sri Lanka, Kurds of Iraq, and Chechens of Russia manage to secede
and form independent states? What is the likelihood that the resulting states would immediately gain peace and prosperity?

So many questions can be asked about seceded states. Why did they secede? How did they secede? What happened after secession? Did seceded states build the types of nations that they originally set out to? For this research, I have narrowed the questions down to one: what aspects of the governmental and political structures of seceded states make them more or less politically stable?

The question is an important one for many reasons. Most importantly, the idea all states need to maintain political stability is universally held. “Desirable international norms such as stability and predictability thus become difficult to achieve when so many of the globe’s new nation-states waver precariously between weakness and failure…” (Rotberg 2003, 1). We, as political scientists, assume that for a polity to prosper there must be stability. The people of a state must be able to rely upon the fact that there government will continue to function tomorrow, the day after that, and so on. When states cannot deliver goods and services, “Their governments lose legitimacy, and the very nature of the particular nation-state itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes and in the hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens” (Rotberg 2003, 1). What will people do when they consider their governments illegitimate? Will revolution follow like that of the Bolsheviks, the French Revolution, or the Revolutionary War that led to the formation of the United States of America? The potential for violent conflict is high and therefore, the political scientist’s ability to predict future outcomes is all the more important.
In this sense, we must know how well seceded states perform as independent states. Comparativists need an analysis of the way different governments tailor themselves to govern and meet the needs of their respective populations. Furthermore, when these states become unstable it provides terrorist organizations with a foothold. Regional peace and the ability of different ethnic and religious groups to live side by side are affected by these governments.

Ultimately, political science can only benefit from a discussion on the right to sovereignty. Where does a state draw the line for secession? How far or often can a group of people break away from a larger governing unit and still function as a state? Eventually, one realizes that the larger issue is whether or not secession was justified. A study of seceded states and political stability will help political scientists to see if seceded states were better at governing their people than the original states they broke away from.

1.2 Definitions of Major Terminology

Before continuing on, it would be pertinent to provide precise definitions of the two major terms driving this research. These terms are seceded states and politically stable. As listed above, there are many methods to secession making it a highly descriptive term. According to John R. Wood’s article titled “Secession: A Comparative Analytical Framework,” secession “…represents an instance of political disintegration, wherein political actors in one or more subsystems withdraw their loyalties, expectations, and political activities from a jurisdictional centre and focus them on a centre of their own” (1981, 111). It does not matter whether the seceded state began as a
province or a region within the pre-existing state. Additionally, how secession occurred does not matter, because this thesis is not concerned with why secession occurred. Wood also wrote that to call a secessionist movement anything else causes confusion with other descriptive terms (1981, 111).

It is central for historical studies to know that secession may have resulted from partition or even decolonization. That is not the case here. By following Wood’s advice and simplifying his definition further one arrives at a general and measurable term that is ideal for a comprehensive study. Quite simply, secession occurs when a state separates itself from a pre-existing state and receives international recognition. International recognition must be from more than one state and the United Nations membership is a good list to work off of. Finally, as it is quite possible that a group left one pre-existing state only to break apart again into another seceded state, such as Bangladesh, this thesis will only look at the most recent date of secession.

Equally important to define is the term politically stable. Goldsmith (1987) and Hurwitz (1973) both agree that political stability has always been a difficult concept to define. “Most writers, however, appear to believe stability is a multidimensional phenomenon and try to tap it by developing composite measures” (Goldsmith 1987, 474). Hurwitz wrote that political stability is most commonly studied in terms of: the absence of violence, governmental longevity, legitimacy, the absence of structural change, and effective decision-making (1973, 463). Political stability has also been described as a characteristic of strong states. Strong states are stable because they provide security from political and criminal violence as well as economic growth.
Thus, politically stable states do well on indicators like GDP and providing goods and services. Hurwitz also found that “A stable polity is seen as a peaceful, law-abiding society where decision-making and politico-societal change are the result of institutionalized and eufunctional procedures…” and not the result of violence or aggression (1973, 449-450). Ake put it more succinctly by stating that political stability is the regular flow of political exchanges and the more regular it is the more stability there is (1975, 273). By taking aspects of the attributes of political stability provided by all of these authors, I have a well-rounded definition that is measurable. For this thesis, politically stable is defined as when government officials transition in and out of office peacefully or as the exchange of power from one administration or group to the next without violence or the threat of violence all the while providing effective governance. Effective governance can be seen in the results of policymaking that promote education and economic growth (Rotberg 2003, 4). So, a politically stable state will have a literate population, rank well on the international list for GDP and GNI, and have a low unemployment rate.

1.3 Theory and Case Selection

With the two most important terms defined, I would like to explain the purpose of this thesis. The purpose of this thesis is to provide a theory based upon inductive reasoning that will explain the research question posited. My theory is that seceded states are politically unstable due to the actions they take to prove their continued right to sovereignty. It will be demonstrated in the next chapter that this theory is testable, logical, communicable, general, and parsimonious.
For now, one should know that this theory is not based upon a single school of thought. Rather, it shares aspects of institutionalism, systems theories, and structural-functionalism. This theory and research methodology will focus upon the structure of national institutions, their output, public participation, and with the expectation that governments function to provide stability. (Peters 1998, 112-117) Besides that political institutions are formal organizations made of political actors who are a part of the broader political system (Wiarda 2002, 189). In the past, theorists made the mistake of letting ethnocentric notions guide their research (Wiarda 2002, 191). That will not happen here as I am not assuming that a particular type of government, for example democracy, should be the goal of every seceded state. This research is not concerned with labels, but does examine whether seceded states govern well enough to provide stability and policies that are beneficial to their people.

Consequently, the research methodology and case selection must reflect the goals of the theory (Peters 1998, 56-57). A researcher’s case selection must demonstrate that no other theory will work to explain the phenomenon being studied. Geddes stated there are two criteria to case selection that must be met: cases need to be representative of the domains of the theories being tested and cases used for testing should be different from the cases that induced the arguments (2003, 132). As secession and political stability are global phenomena and theories should be as generalized as possible, my case selection is a reflection of that.

The cases were chosen to fit the definition of a seceded state articulated here and to control for any bias that may result from limiting oneself to a single region. Although
a popular method in comparative political studies, regional clusters would not work here. It would defeat any attempt at a global and general explanation because of its very nature. Regional clusters ignore major differences within each state unrelated to geography and are biased toward shared history. (Peters 1998, 75) My case selection incorporates states from around the globe that gained independence and international recognition sometime during 1900 to 2000. I did not check case histories, but relied upon my general knowledge to ensure case selection was not biased toward “not politically stable.”

The case study method can be the most efficient means of testing theory in comparative politics (Peters 1998, 3) and is the reason for why I have chosen to use multiple cases in a case study approach. Still, there may be pitfalls to a strictly qualitative research approach. As it can blind the researcher into believing the specificity of a case may incorrectly be generalizable (Peters 1998, 5-6). Also, “…the more an approach (such as statistical modelling) attempts to furnish generalizations and to test broad theories about politics, the less nuance about particular political systems it is able to permit in its analysis” (Peters 1998, 5-6). The problem of outliers “…points to the need for substantial descriptive knowledge of the cases being studied, even in a statistical analysis” (Peters 1998, 59). Thereby, an approach that uses both quantitative and qualitative aspects is the most desirable (Peters 1998, 21).

The eight cases that have been selected for quantitative and qualitative analysis are: Algeria, Bosnia, Cyprus, Eritrea, Guyana, Ireland, Pakistan, and South Korea. These eight cases provide a representative sample of seceded states from around the
world. The cases do not have a shared regional history and gained independence at different points in time. However, these eight cases were not enough to gain statistically significant results during the quantitative analysis. An explanation for why changes to this research design were made will be in the next chapter. To be able to conduct a test with numerical data and have statistically significant results, the sample had to be increased from eight to twenty. The additional twelve cases were only studied in the quantitative analysis section. Rather than going from quantitative analysis of a large sample and pulling out descriptive material to highlight the results, this thesis began with the qualitative analysis of the eight original cases and then relied upon the quantitative test of twenty cases to strengthen the case study results. Below, is a table that provides the official names for these states, dates of independence, independence from whom, and dates of membership to the United Nations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official Name</th>
<th>Date of Independence</th>
<th>Independence From</th>
<th>Date of UN Membership</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Islamic Republic of Afghanistan</td>
<td>19 August 1919</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Republic of Albania</td>
<td>28 Nov. 1912</td>
<td>Ottoman Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria</td>
<td>5 July 1962</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>3 March 1992</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Republic of Cyprus</td>
<td>16 August 1960</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>State of Eritrea</td>
<td>24 May 1993</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>6 Dec. 1921</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
<td>15 August 1945</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Islamic Republic of Pakistan</td>
<td>14 August 1947</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Republic of Panama</td>
<td>3 Nov. 1903</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>15 August 1945</td>
<td>Japan</td>
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<th>Date</th>
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<td>Republic of Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>31 Aug. 1962</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>18 Sep. 1962</td>
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1.4 A Review of the Literature

Reviewing previous literature on this topic will demonstrate that the type of study I am conducting has not been done before. What has been studied in the past does not include secession with political stability. Instead, these areas have been both examined separately. Under each area, theorists compete to provide an explanation for the phenomenon. Unfortunately, none of these works attempted to unite ideas to create a comprehensive explanation. Some of these works are attempts at disproving an earlier study. Undeniably, these earlier works lay the cornerstone for this research.

Beginning with the literature regarding secession, one will see that it is concentrated in the political science sub-field of international relations. Theories from state-centered schools of thought abound for why secession occurs and even ask whether or not secession should occur. Wood advocated that theories on secession
should incorporate: the preconditions of secession, rise of such movements, central government’s responses, direct precipitants of secession, and the resolution of such crises by armed conflict (1981, 109). Hechter’s theory concentrated upon the concept of “internal colonialism” whereby internal economic frustrations lead to secessionism (Wood 1981, 117). Strang in two different works (1990; 1991) looked at dependencies and why Western states became colonizers and when do colonies seek sovereignty. His answer lay in core-periphery exchange and global diffusion of institutions of political models, which gave colonies the desire to adapt the principles and institutions of sovereignty seen in the colonizer’s government. (1990, 846-848) Strang’s second work found that when dependencies become sovereign they must receive international recognition by a metropolitan power to be considered independent (1991, 433).

Such international relations theories led to case studies, such as Klieman’s work (1980) that specifically identified cases of partition. He lamented, “One finds partition often mentioned but rarely discussed in any detail by authors of texts on world politics” (1980, 281). Klieman demonstrated that history has shown the preconditions to partition determine its ultimate success or failure, especially in the case of Palestine (1980). Woodward (1996) differentiated between terms such as genocide, partition, and population transfers believing that political rhetoric was involved in the term applied for each situation and the resultant policy.

As for political stability, “Recent work on political stability almost always treats it as a dependent variable” (Goldsmith 1987, 471). Goldsmith (1987), Ake (1975), and Hurwitz (1973) all sought a definition of political stability. These studies saw political
instability as a factor of political unrest (Goldsmith 1987). Goldsmith found Mancur Olson’s theory ineffective in making political stability an independent variable that leads to dysfunctional economic conditions (1987).

Continuing from an economic standpoint, Rhoda (1978) operationalized Samuel P. Huntington’s model from 1968, where rapid social mobilization and political participation with slow economic development and slow formation of political institutions results with violence and instability (1978, 38). Rhoda’s fifty-one country sample provided general support for Huntington’s conclusion that political institutions can prevent instability. However, Rhoda said that if the results were broken down by geography then Huntington’s model failed to explain twenty Latin American countries. In order for Huntington’s model to work geography mattered. (1978, 43) Feng (2001) also used political economy to understand political stability. His article had a circular argument. The effects of aggregate private investment accelerate growth within states and improved stability and yet, the only way to get increased investment was to have stable institutions that promoted private investment through the execution of development programs.

Moving away from economics, Gates et al. (2006) determined the stability of the state by labeling the political institutions as autocratic, democratic, or inconsistent. Then they categorized the states by: the stability of a regime, consistency within a regime, and the relationship of a regime with its people. Lattimer (2005) chose comparative constitutional law as a means of predicting stability. The intensive constitution writing
in the last fifteen years, especially in former Soviet satellites, help predict stability by how well minorities are integrated in the electoral process.

Perhaps the study that has come closest to bridging the gap between secession and political stability is Robert K. Schaeffer’s book Warpaths: The Politics of Partition (1990). This book examined the cases of partition in Ireland, Korea, China, Vietnam, India, Palestine, and Germany to find that the new states were plunged into violent conflicts immediately after independence and continue to suffer from some instability. Schaeffer wrote that partition forced millions to leave their homelands and compromised the meaning of citizenship in the new countries, while it “…undercut the meaning of sovereignty for newly independent states and sharpened the competition between divided or sibling states” (1990, 3-4). Partitions around the world led to internecine war among divided states and brought superpower states into intractable regional wars. “Not only was partition an immediate failure…” it has become an enduring problem (1990, 3-4).

“And this is the dilemma. Violence is used to advance partition, which is seen as a solution to violence. But partition, in turn, produces new conditions that lead to violence and war, where partition can again be advanced as a solution” (Schaeffer 1990, 252). A current case to consider is Kosovo. Only a few weeks before I began to write a final draft of my thesis, Time reported that after eight years since the NATO allies put a stop to Slobodan Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo, efforts to integrate the two ethnic groups in that area have failed. Kosovo’s Albanians and Serbs cannot live together and neither can the territory be divided in such a way as to satisfy both
parties. By December 2007, envoys from the United States, Russia, and European Union will decide whether partition is the solution. “The proposal flies in the face of the conventional wisdom that splitting Kosovo would destabilize the region, encouraging other minorities-like Serbs in neighboring Bosnia-to demand a similar deal” (Purvis 2007, 17). The timeliness of this thesis and the need for this type of research design cannot be denied.

The literature review has proven that the type of approach I am advocating is necessary to further our understanding of secession and political stability. First and foremost, the literature can easily be delineated by competing theories. Followers of specific schools of thought are unable to unite their ideas with those of the competition. Clearly, an amalgamation of aspects of different theories, as I have proposed, is more likely to bring us closer to a general explanation. Secondly, both secession and political stability studies can benefit from combining the areas. The explanatory and predictive values of my theory increase by incorporating “new” states into a study on stability because it provides a point of comparison against “older” states. How well seceded states fare years after independence is vital to current policymaking, as the Time article showed. Third, in all of the past studies, institutions mattered. The structure of institutions and the actors in those institutions are keys to improving our overall understanding. Finally, case studies are still relevant to present day political science theory building.
CHAPTER 2
THE RESEARCH DESIGN

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the research methodology will be thoroughly discussed. The research design reflects the goals of this thesis to be a global and comprehensive study. The first section of this chapter is devoted to the operationalization and measurement of my theory and hypotheses. The data gathering method is the topic of the second section of this chapter. Earlier, I mentioned that changes had to be made to the research design to accommodate more cases in the quantitative analysis to improve the likelihood of obtaining statistically significant results. Those changes came after the qualitative analysis of the original eight cases had been conducted and had no bearing on the definitions or measurements used in this thesis.

2.2 Operationalization and Measurement

To operationalize something means to define a concept in terms of variables that may be measured. Additionally, for political science research to be empirical the research needs to be systematic and scientific. By adhering to a set of guidelines and writing everything down the researcher is able to be systematic, which aids in replication and provides evidence of how scientific the research design is (Geddes 2003, 100). A good theory, clearly defined variables, and clear measurements help a study reach the goal to “Maximize experimental variance, minimize error variance, and
control extraneous variance” (Peters 1998, 30-33). All of this is necessary in political science research because the studies are conducted after-the-fact.

The empirical process begins with a theory, which is used to explain a phenomenon. My theory is that seceded states are politically unstable due to the actions they take to prove their continued right to sovereignty. This theory passes the five standards for judging any theory as it is testable, logically sound, communicable, general enough that it will be applicable outside of just the one research question’s realm, and is parsimonious.

Using eight cases to examine the concepts of my theory qualitatively and twenty cases for the quantitative analysis demonstrate that this theory is testable. It is logical to assume that states after secession may fear the loss of sovereignty. Timor-Leste is just such an example. After declaring itself independent of Portuguese rule in 1975, Timor-Leste was invaded by Indonesia and was not internationally recognized as an independent state until 2002 (The World Factbook 2007). My theory is general enough to be used in other areas of research and in practical application to determine international reactions to new or seceded states and even if secessionist movements should be supported. This theory is communicable due to the simplicity of the idea. Finally, the theory is parsimonious because I am looking for certain traits in governments and politics of these seceded states that may lead to political instability. Since these traits are at the national level of governance, the unit of analysis is the state.

Recall the definitions outlined in Chapter One for the two most important terms of seceded state and politically stable. The definition of secession is when a state
separates itself from a pre-existing state and receives international recognition. Politically stable is defined as when government officials transition in and out of office peacefully or as the exchange of power from one administration or group to the next without violence or the threat of violence all the while providing effective governance. Having clear definitions of major terminology makes the study more systematic and helps to formulate hypotheses.

For a study to be truly comprehensive, it needs to test as many hypotheses as possible (Peters 1998; Geddes 2003). Comparative politics looks at the globe by comparing states and their traits. Usually, we see this in comparisons of constitutions, institutions, or laws. As this is a global study and about seceded states, foreign policy becomes an important point of comparison. Accordingly, two hypotheses are aimed at domestic policy or at internal affairs while the last hypothesis captures the international behavior of seceded states.

My first hypothesis is a direct directional type, “the more a seceded state adheres to its formal constitution in the functioning of government the more it will be politically stable.” This is the most basic level of comparison and is the building block for the next hypothesis. The second hypothesis is also a direct directional hypothesis that states “the more a seceded state allows for public participation in the formal political institutions the more it will be politically stable.” Again, my third hypothesis looks at foreign policy and is an inverse directional kind “the more a seceded state uses armed force to resolve international disputes the less likely it will be politically stable.” These hypotheses meet
the criteria for a good hypothesis by the identification and conceptualization of the variables used.

Hypothesis One states that “the more a seceded state adheres to its formal constitution in the functioning of government the more it will be politically stable.” The independent variable (IV) for this hypothesis is the government functions according to the formal constitution. To define the independent variable, we must know whether or not the case has a formal constitution and then, if the government in reality functions as the constitution defines. To operationalize this independent variable: one, need to see if the cases have formal constitutions; two, how do the constitutions structure the governments; three, how is power divided among institutions; and four, if there is the rule of law. The “rule of law” is measured by *Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006* and defines it as “...the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract and enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann et al. 2007). In this manner, one may render a complete picture of national governance in all of the cases.

The dependent variable (DV) is politically stable for all of the hypotheses. The definition of politically stable has been provided above. Operationalization of the dependent variable is to see: population literacy, the unemployment rate, how highly ranked on the World Bank’s list of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross National Income (GNI, Atlas Method), ranking for “peace-building capacity” by *Peace and Conflict 2005*, and the ranking for “government effectiveness” by *Governance Matters*.
VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006. Peace-building capacity is considered high when a state manages to avoid outbreaks of armed conflicts and provide reasonable levels of human security (Marshall and Gurr 2005). Government effectiveness is “…the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formation and implementation…” and government credibility (Kaufmann et al. 2007). Also, I will see where the cases rank on Governance Matters VI’s “political stability and the absence of violence.” This source defines political stability much as this thesis does, “…the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism” (Kaufmann et al. 2007). The similar definitions provide consistency and avoid a spurious relationship.

The independent variable passes the Alternative Form Test. How a government functions versus how the government is supposed to function are difficult concepts to measure using only one source. Therefore, I am using multiple aspects of national governance, constitutionalism, and the rule of law to find out if the national governments function according to their constitutions. This also increases the validity of my measurements when I apply the Content Validity Test. I will know if a state has a government mandated by its constitution after I take into account all of the aspects I listed as being necessary to know for this measurement. Politically stable is being measured reliably and validly. Since the measurement is from a source that compiles data from various organizations and the term is clearly defined it passes the Face
Validity Test and by asking redundant questions to gather core data it is reliable using the Test and Retest Method.

Hypothesis Two is “the more a seceded state allows for public participation in the formal political institutions the more it will be politically stable.” Here, the independent variable (IV) is public participation in formal political institutions. This variable is defined by what types of opportunities exist for the public, in each case, to affect the members of the formal political institutions. Operationalization of the independent variable is to find out: if there are formal political institutions, how members are chosen to these political institutions, can the public vote in elections, how the public influences the members of these institutions, and are there other political organizations the people can join to influence the political institutions. Another method employed to operationalize this variable is to use *Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006’s* measurement for “voice and accountability.” It measures “…the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media” (Kaufmann et al. 2007). Freedom House rankings from *Freedom in the World 2007* was also used to operationalize the independent variable in terms of political liberties and civil rights, “A Free country is one where there is broad scope for open political competition, a climate or respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media.” These rankings complete the operationalization of the independent variable.
Please refer to the first hypothesis for the operationalization of the dependent variable (DV), politically stable.

My independent variable is reliable by using the Alternative Form Test. The variable is operationalized in such a way as to measure the technical existence of political institutions, elections, and participation and the reality of public participation by using the ranking provided by *Governance Matters VI* and Freedom House. This ensures that the measurement also passes the Content Validity Test. Once all of the pieces are put together, a fair conclusion will be drawn. The dependent variable is the same as before so that it again passes the Test and Retest Method and the Face Validity Test.

Hypothesis Three is “the more a seceded state uses armed force to resolve international disputes the less likely it will be politically stable.” For this hypothesis, the independent variable (IV) is the use of armed force in international disputes. The independent variable is defined by how many international disputes the cases were involved in and the nature of those disputes. To operationalize this variable I will examine the number of international disputes from 2001 to 2007 and the nature of the international disputes from 2007 and limit the source of this information to *The World Factbook*. I will study the nature of the international disputes from 2007, because it is the most recent information available and includes older disputes that have continued over the years. Also, I will check the ranking for each case on “military expenditure, total armed forces, military/security alliances, and total international disputes” provided by *Country Indicators for Foreign Policy* (2007). According to *Country Indicators for*
Foreign Policy (2007): “military expenditure” is a percentage of the state’s GDP, “total armed forces” is per one thousand people in a state’s population, “military/security alliances” is based upon the number of organizations a state has membership in with a focus on military and security issues, and “total international disputes” is the number of international disputes a state is involved in per year according to The World Factbook.

To find the operationalization of the dependent variable (DV), politically stable, please refer to Hypothesis One.

Evidence of reliability for the independent variable is seen when I apply the Test and Retest Method. By asking multiple questions about international conflicts and military support, I improve the reliability of my results. The indicator titled “total international disputes” is a time series analysis from 1999 to 2000 based upon data collected from The World Factbook. For consistency and increased reliability, I am using only The World Factbook to collect data from 2001 to 2007 to continue the timeline analysis. Thus, the independent variable also passes the Face Validity Test, because my measurements are valid on the surface. Politically stable is the dependent variable and has been shown to pass the Test and Retest Method and the Face Validity Test.

One can see that these hypotheses pass the test for a good hypothesis. They are empirical, because the variables used to measure the hypotheses are tangible and observable. They are general enough that they can be applied to situations outside of this thesis, for example using the results to determine the likelihood of state failure or collapse in the real world. These hypotheses are plausible, because if one looks at
present-day Iraq one will see poor public participation in politics, a dysfunctional national government, weak relations with its neighbors, and political instability. My hypotheses are specific due to plainly defined variables. Consistency is evident in that the data as conceptualized measures my variables. All three hypotheses are testable with the right data.

2.3 Data Gathering Method

This research design is for explanatory research and so, will use a multimethod approach for gathering quantitative and qualitative data. It is a comparative case study using only cases that are considered having seceded.

A noted flaw of case study research is the possibility of “…unsystematic observations at multiple levels of analysis (for example, individuals, government administrations, and parties) and observations of multiple entities at the same level of analysis…as well as observations over time” (Geddes 2003, 117). To avoid this potential problem, I have incorporated statistical analysis in the form of collecting numerical data and analyzing it on SPSS. The “…statistical method is also attempting to achieve another of the fundamental goals of scientific enquiry-parsimony…” (Peters 1998, 58). As the research increases the size of the N, it is possible to reduce the number of causes studied leading to a parsimonious explanation (Peters 1998, 58). Table 2 lists the type of numerical data being tested for the quantitative analysis.
Table 2 Numerical Data Tested for the Twenty Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>DV</th>
<th>IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>percentile rank for Political Stability and Absence of Violence from <em>Governance Matters VI</em></td>
<td>percentile rank for Rule of Law from <em>Governance Matters VI</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>percentile rank for Political Stability and Absence of Violence from <em>Governance Matters VI</em></td>
<td>percentile rank for Voice and Accountability from <em>Governance Matters VI</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>percentile rank for Political Stability and Absence of Violence from <em>Governance Matters VI</em></td>
<td>rank on 1-9 scale for Total International Disputes from <em>Country Indicators for Foreign Policy</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, statistical analysis removes so much detail found in traditional comparative case studies that essential information can be lost. Such information can even explain any possible outliers that in reality may never have been anomalies. (Peters 1998)

For this reason, “…good case researchers accept complexity and multiple causation as a crucial characteristic of their research, rather than as a bother to be eliminated…” (Peters 1998, 141). Hence, I have utilized the best aspects of qualitative data by answering a set of questions to remain systematic in a narrative form. Table 3 lists the series of questions dictating the qualitative analysis.

Table 3 Series of Questions Posed for the Eight Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV ~What is the literacy rate?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~What is the unemployment rate?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~How high is its rank on the World Bank’s GDP list?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~How high is its rank on the World Bank’s GNI (Atlas Method) list?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~What is its rank for peace-building capacity from <em>Peace and Conflict 2005</em>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 - continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| One-IV     | ~Does the government have a formal constitution?  
            ~Does the government operate according to its constitution?  
            ~How does the constitution structure the government?  
            ~What is the division of power?  
            ~How does the government function in reality? |
| Two-IV     | ~Do formal political institutions exist?  
            ~Are there political organizations that the people can join?  
            ~Are there elections that citizens can vote in?  
            ~What is its freedom rank by *Freedom in the World 2007*?  
            ~Which formal institutions can the people directly or indirectly participate in?  
            ~How are the members selected to these institutions?  
            ~What types of opportunities exist for the public to influence members of these institutions? |
| Three-IV   | ~How many international disputes has the state been involved in from 2001 to 2007, as listed by *The World Factbook*?  
            ~What was the nature of the disputes in 2007, as described by *The World Factbook*? |

By using a combination of quantitative and qualitative data gathering methods, I am increasing the ability for anyone to replicate my research through how systematic it is. All of this will ensure that the information collected cannot be manipulated or biased in favor of positive results.

Moreover, having well defined terms, variables, a theoretical framework, and an increased N my research design will provide an explanation for the instance of seceded states and conditions that lead to political instability. The data for the quantitative side will reach the interval level and the nominal and ordinal levels for the qualitative half. Validity and reliability are increased by recognizing that only aggregate data for syntality indicators will be collected as my unit of analysis is a state.
As this research will be done through secondary analysis, there will be a variety of sources: scholarly works, independent media coverage, governmental data, legal sources, *The World Factbook*, United Nations data, World Bank data, *Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006*, Freedom House rankings, *Peace and Conflict 2005* rankings, and *Country Indicators for Foreign Policy*. For a complete list of sources, please refer to the Bibliography at the end of this thesis. To avoid spurious relationships I will check the sources’ surveys, Code Books, and bibliographies to ensure the data collected is what I am proposing to study. Please go to the Appendix for my Code Book for information regarding the numerical data I collected from secondary sources.
CHAPTER 3
THE ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHESIS ONE

3.1 Introduction

In this the analysis stage, all of the data that have been collected are presented and discussed. The three hypotheses are tested, as described in Chapter Two, using the original eight cases for qualitative analysis and then analyzing all twenty cases quantitatively. In this manner, the nominal and ordinal level data through qualitative analysis will portray all of the shades of gray or complexities (Peters 1998, 141) of governance for each case. Then I will utilize the complex illustration of the eight cases as a springboard for a parsimonious quantitative analysis of the extended list of twenty cases. After such an analysis, a judgment can be made for whether the null hypothesis can be dismissed.

Hypothesis One will be analyzed in this chapter. For the ease of comprehension during the narrative section, the cases will not be discussed individually. Rather, points of similarity or dissimilarity will dictate the discussion as they pertain to answering the questions (refer to Chapter Two) for this hypothesis. A good and useful theory can be seen as an umbrella encompassing as many aspects of potential explanations as possible. By organizing the analysis of the data in this method, the usefulness of my theory is put to the test and makes for more interesting reading.
For this study, the structures of the national governments are of importance. As the state is my unit of analysis, I am only concerned with how the national constitutions and national governments compare to each other. If the lower levels, such as provincial or local governments, are mentioned it is only to clarify the role of the national government in any given case.

A last piece of information before moving on to the analysis is that it is difficult to accurately spell a name originating from other languages using the English alphabet. I have tried to be consistent using the spelling that I saw the most used among my sources. However, when directly quoting a source I abided by the rules of citation and used the original author’s spelling.

### 3.2 The Constitutional Structures

Hypothesis One states that “the more a seceded state adheres to its formal constitution in the functioning of government the more it will be politically stable.” As part of the qualitative analysis, indicators were collected from various sources regarding the dependent variable and have been presented in Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Literacy Rate (%)</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate (%)</th>
<th>GDP (rank out of 184)</th>
<th>GNI (rank out of 208)</th>
<th>Peace-building Capacity</th>
<th>Government Effectiveness (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>87.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>91.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>82.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Peace-building capacity is ranked red=worst, yellow=middle, green=best
From the indicators in Table 4, it may be deduced that Ireland and South Korea are the most politically stable cases of the eight, because they consistently scored better than the rest across all of the indicators. Guyana and Cyprus are less politically stable than the first two states with Algeria, Bosnia, Eritrea, and Pakistan being the least politically stable.

To operationalize the independent variable for this hypothesis some questions were asked. Table 5 contains the answers to two of those questions.

Table 5 IV Indicators for Hypothesis One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Does it have a formal constitution?</th>
<th>Does it operate according to its constitution?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 5 shows all eight cases have official constitutions that dictate the structure of their respective governments. How the constitutions structure these governments may be best understood through delineating the branches of government and the responsibilities assigned to each branch. This is not to say that all eight cases are attempting to be democratic or that they should be democratic. It is only a method by which the structure of each government can be easily seen and analyzed. The second question from Table 5 was answered by the data gathered in the next section of this chapter. As will be shown by comparing and contrasting the constitutional structures of
these cases, there are a number of similarities across the states and a few unique differences. All of the information regarding the constitutional structures of all eight cases was gathered from each state’s most recent constitution and *The World Factbook* (2007) unless otherwise noted.

Six of the eight cases have a constitutional structure that combines presidential and parliamentary systems. These six cases are Algeria, Eritrea, Guyana, Ireland, Pakistan, and South Korea. For those cases, the legislative and executive branches are not completely separated as the prime ministers bridge the gaps between the presidents and the national legislatures. The remaining two cases of Bosnia and Cyprus are unique in that their constitutions have, what could be described as a, plural executive. Although Bosnia has a prime minister much like the other cases, Cyprus does not. The judiciaries for all of these cases are separate branches.

The presidents of Algeria, Ireland, and South Korea are elected directly by the people, whereas the presidents of Eritrea, Guyana, and Pakistan are indirectly elected. The National Assembly of Eritrea elects the president from its own membership while an electoral college comprising of Pakistan’s Parliament and Provincial Assemblies elect Pakistan’s President. During Guyanese parliamentary elections, the party lists notify voters in advance who their candidates for president are and then the majority winning party’s candidate becomes president. The term lengths and limits vary for all of these cases. In general, Algeria, Eritrea, and Pakistan provide the maximum of two terms of five years each. South Korea also has a five year long presidential term but the term limit is set at one term. Guyana requires a presidential election within five year
segments and there are no term limits. Ireland has the longest presidential term at seven years with the opportunity for one re-election.

The plural executive of Bosnia operates differently than that of Cyprus and differentiates the most from all of the other cases when discussing presidential terms. The Bosnian Constitution requires a three member presidency. Each member represents the three major ethnicities of Bosnia so that there is one Bosniak, one Croat, and one Serb who are directly elected by his or her respective constituency. All three serve in the presidency for four year long terms and are allowed to have one re-election each but then must wait for four years to pass before running again. The chairmanship of the presidency is rotated every eight months. Cyprus, on the other hand, has one president who must be a Greek Cypriot and serves for a single five year term. Cyprus can be considered to have a plural executive in that the vice-president must be a Turkish Cypriot who also serves one term of five years and shares the veto power with the president (will be discussed further).

The role of the prime minister is distinctive in that he or she is officially in the executive branch and yet works with the legislature more closely than the president on a day to day basis. Of these eight cases, only Cyprus and Eritrea do not have prime ministers. Bosnia calls its prime minister the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The prime ministers of Algeria, Bosnia, Guyana, Ireland, Pakistan, and South Korea are appointed by the presidents. Only for the cases of Bosnia, Ireland, South Korea, and Pakistan are the legislatures required to approve the appointment of prime ministers. In these six cases, the prime minister is responsible for leading all of the other ministers in
successfully passing the executive agenda through the legislature. Not all of the constitutions discuss whether the prime ministers must be elected members of the national legislatures. Guyana does require that the prime minister be a member of the legislature, so that in case he or she was not elected in time he or she can automatically become a legislative member without voting power until the next election.

The constitutions for all eight cases specify whether or not a particular religion will receive state recognition. The importance of this fact is that those cases which recognize a religion also require that the president practice that faith. Two cases, Algeria and Pakistan, have constitutions that declare Islam the state religion and that the presidents must be Muslim. Cyprus gives special recognition to the Greek Orthodox Church and Vakf or Islamic Mosques, but does not require elected officials to practice these religions or declare them the official religions of the state. At one time in its past, Ireland recognized the importance of the Catholic Church, but it has removed that statement from its constitution. Otherwise, Bosnia, Eritrea, Guyana, Ireland, and South Korea do not officially recognize any religion.

Moving on, the legislative branches illustrate some of the major differences in the constitutional structures of these cases. To make it easier to see the differences, please refer to Table 6 below.
Table 6 A Comparison of the Legislative Branches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Chambers</th>
<th>Term Length (years)</th>
<th>Elected By</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Bicameral: ~People’s National Assembly ~Council of Nation</td>
<td>5, 6</td>
<td>Directly, 2/3 Indirectly, 1/3 Presidential Appointment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Bicameral: ~House of Representatives ~House of Peoples</td>
<td>4, 4</td>
<td>Directly, Indirectly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Unicameral: House of Representatives</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Directly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Unicameral: National Assembly</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Directly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Unicameral: National Assembly</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Directly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Bicameral: ~Senate ~House of Representatives</td>
<td>5, 5</td>
<td>Indirectly, Directly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Bicameral: ~Senate ~National Assembly</td>
<td>6, 5</td>
<td>Indirectly, Directly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Unicameral: National Assembly</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Directly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some of these cases also utilize proportional representation for one or both chambers, while the other cases have the winner-take-all system in place. The Bosnian and Irish Houses of Representatives have proportional representation. South Korea’s National Assembly...
Assembly has proportional representation for only fifty-six of its two hundred ninety-nine seats.

Finally, the most important points of comparison for the eight judicial branches analyzed here are judicial selection methods and if there is a separate religious court. As can be expected, each case has a judicial hierarchy that deals with different types of cases and some are appellate courts and others are not. The names vary from Supreme Court to High Court but suffice it to say that the there is a court that is above the rest for each case. Additionally, Pakistan is the only case that has a Federal Islamic Court or Shari’a Court that has original jurisdiction over cases dealing with religious matters.

As for judicial selection methods, in all of these cases the president plays a role in the appointment process. Algerian magistrates and judges in Guyana and Pakistan are appointed by their respective presidents. However, Pakistan’s constitution specifies that the president must consult the chief justice when appointing judges of lower rank. The judges on the Federal Islamic Court must be Muslim. Eritrean and South Korean judges are appointed by their presidents with legislative approval. In Ireland, the president appoints judges with the advice of the prime minister and cabinet. The legislatures of the two entities of Bosnia select the judges for the highest national court, so that four members are chosen by the Bosniak-Croat Federation and two members by the Republika Srpska. Three non-Bosnian members are also chosen for the highest court by the President of the European Court of Human Rights in consultation with the presidency to maintain neutrality. Cyprus has a similar system in place for the highest court where there are a total of three judges. The president and vice-president jointly
appoint one Greek Cypriot, one Turkish Cypriot, and one neutral non-Cypriot to the court.

Judicial terms vary across the eight cases. When a judge is sixty-five years old, he or she must retire in Guyana and Pakistan. The age of retirement in Bosnia is seventy and sixty-eight in Cyprus. South Korean judges have six year long terms. The constitutions of Algeria, Eritrea, and Ireland allow the legislatures to pass laws to determine the term lengths for their judges. Unfortunately, I was unable to determine the term lengths for these three cases.

3.3 The Division of Power

Having outlined the constitutional structures for all of these cases, it is possible to discuss the division of power amongst the formal institutions. Overall, the legislatures across all eight cases are responsible for debating legislation according to their rules of procedure. In most of these cases, the balance of power leans toward the executive as the executive branch not only sets the agenda but may have additional enumerated powers. The judiciaries, like in the United States, interpret the constitutions and dispense justice. Table 7 outlines major powers as either executive or legislative.

Table 7 A Comparison of Major Executive and Legislative Powers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Legislative Powers</th>
<th>Executive Powers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Legislate in all areas</td>
<td>~sign bills into law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>~initiate referendum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>~ratify treaties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>~Supreme Magistrate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>~declare state of emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>~Supreme Chief of Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Legislative Powers</td>
<td>Executive Powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>~in state of war assume all powers</td>
<td>~executing legislative decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~legislate in: budgetary matters, non-Entities areas</td>
<td>~budget proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>or with their consent, carry out executive decisions</td>
<td>~ratify treaties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~consent to treaty ratification</td>
<td>~command national armed forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>~in state of war assume all powers</td>
<td>~executing legislative decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~legislate in: budgetary matters, non-Entities areas</td>
<td>~budget proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>or with their consent, carry out executive decisions</td>
<td>~ratify treaties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~consent to treaty ratification</td>
<td>~command national armed forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Legislate in all areas</td>
<td>Joint Powers:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>~veto legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>~implement compulsory military service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>~command security forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Individual Powers:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>~terminate ministers of same ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>~veto decisions by Council of Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>~legislate and enact laws in all areas</td>
<td>~introduce legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~ratify treaties</td>
<td>~sign bills into law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~approves declaration of war or state of emergency</td>
<td>~establish or dissolve ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>~declare war or state of emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Legislate in all areas</td>
<td>~proclaim legislative elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>~dissolve legislature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>~legislate in all areas</td>
<td>~sign bills into law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~raise and maintain armed forces</td>
<td>~supreme command of Defense Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>~legislate in all areas</td>
<td>~sign bills into law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~restrict presidential ordinances</td>
<td>~declare ordinances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>~declare state of emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>~legislate in all areas</td>
<td>~issue presidential decrees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>~consent to treaty ratification</td>
<td>~ratify treaties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~consent to declaration of war</td>
<td>~declare war or state of emergency or martial law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>~Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All in all, the executive branches of these eight cases are provided with greater power than the other branches by their constitutions. It was not always clear whether or not presidents signed legislative bills into law or if that right was reserved for prime ministers or completely unnecessary. For that reason, not all of the cases have that detail listed. Finally, only the Algerian constitution explicitly states that the prime minister “implements and executes the laws.”

3.4 To be or not to be Constitutional

Even with clear constitutional structures and the delineation of powers and responsibilities, the following analysis will show that in practice, many of these governments do not function according to their constitutional structures. In fact, the trend appears to be that individuals lead their governments away from constitutional governance as they strengthen their own positions at the cost of the legislature, judiciary, and the rule of law. Six cases suffer from corruption and circumvention of the law by political leaders. The complete abandonment of the constitutional structure so that one man can dominate the government is evident in four cases. Abuse of the electoral system through the legitimization of votes garnered through rigged elections is evidenced in four cases. Misuse of the military and security forces by governments to terrorize their own people has become common place in three cases.

To begin with, six of these cases have documented evidence that they are affected by corruption. The extent of the corruption and the ability of the governments and the people to appropriately discipline their political leaders vary across the cases. At the minimal level, where corruption has not affected the government’s ability to
function is Ireland and South Korea. News media in 2006 revealed that Ireland’s Prime Minister or Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, had accepted money by questionable means when he was the finance minister in the 1990s and that he never publicly declared the funds. Eventually, Ahern gave a public apology but no charges were brought against him. (*The Sinner Absolved* 2007, 54) However, the example of Ahern was not an isolated case. During the 1990s, all levels of the Irish government were affected by corruption (Hollis III 2001, 192). At the end of January 1992, Taoiseach Haughey resigned due to allegations that he knew about the tapping of journalists’ phones in 1982 (Hollis III 2001, 190). Later, Haughey was tried for accepting bribes in 1997 and indicted in 1999. By April 2000, the former Taoiseach agreed to pay one million pounds in back taxes on the bribes (Hollis III 2001, 192). The government rallied and the Irish Parliament or Dail passed the Ethics in Public Office Act in 1995 and the Prevention of Corruption Act of 2000 to ensure that government employees at all levels would face criminal charges for acts of corruption (Hollis III 2001, 193).

South Korea is another example of a case that has dealt with corruption without the government functioning outside of its constitutional structure. Up to 1998, former South Korean presidents and presidential candidates were discovered to have been involved in illegal activities. The ruling party in 1998, New Korea Party, had nominated Lee Hoi-Chang for the presidency before it was known that he had used his influence to help his two sons receive inappropriate exemptions from South Korea’s mandatory military service (McFarland 1998). After the 1998 election, president-elect Kim Dae-Jung was accused of getting campaign finance through illegal slush funds listed under
his wife’s family name (McFarland 1998). The 2007 presidential race was not without its own black sheep as the popular candidate, Lee Myung-bak, and his wife faced property speculation charges (Glorious Mud 2007, 48). South Koreans cheered when former presidents Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh-Taw Woo were convicted for corruption, mutiny, and treason (McFarland 1998). It appeared the system in place was handling the issue of presidential corruption except in the case of President Kim’s son who in 1998 was released early from prison on corruption and fraud charges. (McFarland 1998)

In the middle of the spectrum, are two cases that have their fair share of corruption in government and very little has been done to stop it. Eritreans have complained about the loss of honesty and rise of corruption in their country (Reid 2005, 474). Guyana’s President Jagan announced in 1996 that he was going to run for re-election. In doing so, he used his influence to hurt a leading newspaper, Stabroek News, known for criticizing him by preventing the Bank of Guyana from advertising in the paper and costing the newspaper a great deal of money (Griffith 1997). Guyanese officials look the other way as illicit cross border trafficking from Brazil of guns, drugs, and diamonds thrive (Looking South 2007, 36). Illegal drug trafficking by organized crime in Guyana makes up about twenty percent of its GDP (Apathy Rules 2006, 38). None of this could happen without the public officials’ knowledge.

Perhaps Bosnia is the case that faces the most rampant corruption that also affects the functioning of government. It is believed that the biggest obstacle to Bosnian success as an independent state is an inert and corrupt political system (Singer 2000, 31). The main reason for why Bosnia cannot fully achieve the goals of the Dayton
Peace Process “…is only a tightening vise of corruption and cronyism.” (Singer 2000, 31) The political parties are dominated by patronage increasing corruption and removing transparency in politics and business transactions. (Singer 2000, 32)

Cyprus is not doing much better than Bosnia as there is a lack of political accountability that has created an environment where public officials are not forced to resign for wrong doing (Ker-Lindsay 2006, 29-30). There have been a number of scandals as recently as 2006. Strong evidence exists that the ministers of defense and commerce provided illegal favors to their friends. Another example is that of the minister of health who did not resign from his position until after he was found guilty on charges of obstructing justice and mishandling sensitive security papers. He was found innocent on an appeal. Similar charges have been made against various other office holders for nepotism and corruption. (Ker-Lindsay 2006, 30) Cyprus and the other five cases affected by corruption in government cannot fully function as their constitutions have outlined. Although, none of the constitutions studied here allow public officials to commit illegal acts, only the governments of Ireland and South Korea have used their constitutional mandates to deal with the problem.

Corruption as described above may be considered a small digression on the part of political leaders when compared to the complete abandonment of constitutional dictates. Algeria, Cyprus, Eritrea, and Pakistan have governments that are clearly not operating according to their respective constitutions.

To begin with, Cyprus has completely abandoned its constitution which technically is still in force. Independent Cyprus was formed through an agreement
among the British, Greeks, and Turks with the leaders of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in 1959 (Uslu 2003, 11-12). All of the parties signed three treaties that are part of the constitutional mandate that is supposed to govern Cyprus. The Treaty of Establishment, Treaty of Alliance, and the Treaty of Guarantee ensure that Britain, Turkey, and Greece will respect and protect the Republic of Cyprus and its constitution. The treaties also banned any union of Cyprus with other states or the partition of the island. (Uslu 2003, 12) In November 1963, Cypriot President Makarios submitted a proposal for thirteen amendments to the constitution to Vice-President Fazil Kucuk. If passed, the amendments would limit Turkish Cypriot power, establish Greek Cypriot rule, and create more governmental unification of the island. Turkish Cypriots were angered by Makarios’ proposal and Vice-President Kucuk rejected it and soon after domestic violence began. (Uslu 2003, 20-21) The violence grew to the point that Greece and Turkey broke aspects of the three treaties and intervened in Cypriot affairs (Uslu 2003, 63-64). Thus, in 1974, Turkey invaded the island causing the de facto partition of Cyprus which continues today (Lindley 2007, 231). However, only the southern part of Cyprus that is still under the control of the Republic of Cyprus receives international recognition. The northern part of the island under Turkish Cypriot control is only recognized by Turkey.

The partition of Cyprus created the opportunity for a powerful executive functioning outside of the constitutional structure. Although, the Turkish half of the government had left, laws were passed in 1964, 1965, and 1967 to enable the Republic to continue to govern. The very powerful presidential system in Cyprus goes unchecked
as the unicameral legislature has little power over the executive and cannot impact executive appointments as it does not have a confirmation process. The legislature’s only power source is the national budget, but out of ethnic loyalty they will not use it against a Greek Cypriot president. Currently, the president of Cyprus has great control over domestic political affairs because there is not a Turkish Cypriot as vice-president to use the veto power, he is the national leader of the Greek Cypriots, and he handles all of the peace negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots. The continued international recognition of the Republic over the Turkish Cypriots adds to the executive’s power. (Ker-Lindsay 2006, 21-27)

Algeria has a history of not adhering to its constitutional structure. Since independence from France, Algeria has had a new constitution for each decade imposed by the head of government (Quandt 1998, 127). The most recent disregard for constitutional authority can be traced back to the early 1990s. “With the introduction of the pluralist constitution in February [1989] of that year, the old one-party political system was abandoned. The attempted transition to a new system was aborted in 1991” (Roberts 1998, 39). From the start of the Algerian state, there has been single party control by the National Liberation Front working with the army and the bureaucracy (Pierre 1995, 134). In January 1992, the unconstitutional presidency known as the High State Committee made of a panel of leaders began and ended in 1994 when Defense Minister Lamine Zeroual became president (Roberts 1998, 39; Pierre 1995, 135). The 1991 military coup took place because of the results of the 1990 municipal elections in which a new Islam based party called the Front Islamique du Salut won majority control
of the municipalities. Then the party leaders demanded national elections take place and the Front Islamique du Salut won the first round of elections as Algeria was using the French two cycle winner-take-all model. Military leaders fearing an Islamic take over of the government halted the elections before the second round could take place and forced then President Benjedid to resign by declaring martial law. Since then, the Front Islamique du Salut has been banned from participating in Algerian politics. (Pierre 1995, 135-136)

An unconstitutional presidency continues to this day. After Zeroual came another candidate supported by the military, President Bouteflika. Before leaving office Zeroual overseen the passage of a new constitution in 1996 which is still recognized by Algeria. However, it may not be long before the current constitution is replaced as Bouteflika has made public that he supports the idea of a new constitution or at least an amendment that would allow him to run for a third term as president in 2009 and still maintain a relatively weak legislature. (Sour and Prickly 2007, 48; Holm 2005, 121) All in all, regardless of the existence of a constitution Algerians are ruled by an executive led government. “The Algerian state has been reduced since 1992 to the core elements of the executive, namely, the army and the other security forces, the gendarmerie, police and intelligence services, plus the civil service” (Roberts 1998, 40). Not even the Algerian military and security forces can keep the president in check as the less powerful the military becomes the more presidential authoritarianism there is in Algeria (Holm 2005, 118). The 1996 Constitution makes the president the “Supreme Chief of all Armed Forces” so that he may appoint a high ranking general as the defense
minister. President Bouteflika has disregarded that requirement by appointing himself the “General Secretary of the Ministry of Defence” and appointing cooperative military personnel to all of the other ministry positions without referring to the Army High Command. (Holm 2005, 120)

Algeria is not alone in its history of military intervention in governance. Pakistan has had military coups intermixed with periods of civilian rule. Since 1958 and onward, military leaders used coups and quasi-legal maneuvering to justify their hold on state power (Haqqani 2007, 150). Today’s President Musharraf was a general who seized power through a military coup in 1999 and in June 2001 declared himself president unconstitutionally by dissolving the national legislature and four provincial assemblies (Kukreja and Singh 2005, 68). Before Musharraf approved new legislative elections in 2002, he held what is believed to be a rigged referendum which officially made him president. Then Musharraf gave himself a waiver from the constitutional bar on military officers holding public office, an act that was deemed “flawed” by international and U.S. watchers (Haqqani 2007, 149). Unlike Algeria, Musharraf is checked by the army because the army perceives “… itself as the country’s only viable institution, along with its deep-rooted suspicion of civilian political processes” (Haqqani 2007, 150). Civilian and military leaders have “…nearly always had to negotiate a working relationship with the army in which generals retained significant decision-making power” (Markey 2007). Unconstitutional acts continue to be practiced today by the executive as Musharraf unconstitutionally suspended Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry in the spring of 2007 (Markey 2007).
Cyprus, Algeria, and Pakistan have all been cases where the constitutions had been in effect for at least a short period of time before the executives took over. This last case has never seen its constitutional government function. Eritrea has from its inception been literally ruled by one man and the government exists at his pleasure. President Isaias Afwerki was one of the main leaders of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) since 1970. Afwerki learned his military and political tactics while in China during the Cultural Revolution and made use of them at home. Even before independence, Afwerki chaired a secret Marxist core within the organization and used his influence in 1987 to take formal control of the EPLF’s political party, the Eritrean People’s Revolutionary Party. Through secret meetings with other party leaders Afwerki positioned himself for the presidency and planned for post-independence governance. (Connell 2005, 72-73) Once independence was secured, Eritrea’s new government had the appearance of separate branches with an independent judiciary, but “…There was only one man and his personally selected advisers” (Connell 2005, 73). During the 1990s, Afwerki strengthened the president’s office by making loyalists his appointees to specialized departments that superseded matching ministries. Those officials who turned against Afwerki were removed from their posts and when they were considered to have been rehabilitated they were suddenly returned to their positions in Maoist fashion. (Connell 2005, 73-74)

Afwerki further consolidated control over Eritrea in 1993. Local governments were filled with EPLF cadre appointments to “guide” the locally elected assemblies. In 1996, the Proclamation for the Establishment of Regional Administration discontinued
the elected assemblies at the lower levels of administration but regional level assemblies were maintained. A new executive line of command was established from the president down to the villages where all of the appointments are made by the president or his representative. The new system leaves no mandate for the elected assemblies at the regional levels and candidates during the 1997 elections knew they were powerless to help their constituents. Moreover, the executive appointed local administrator can suspend any resolution made at the regional levels if it counters the government position. (Tronvoll 1998, 465-469)

It is not difficult to imagine the rigging of elections in states where men can ignore constitutions and run their own governments. However, the list of four states that have had electoral fraud is not identical to the list of authoritarian states. Opposition parties and voters have complained in Algeria, Bosnia, Guyana, and Pakistan that election results do not seem to match public opinion.

The administrations and political parties supporting Presidents Zeroual and Bouteflika of Algeria have been both accused of rigging elections (Roberts 1998, 40; Volpi 2006, 448-449). In the legislative elections of June 1997, Zeroual’s party was credited with thirty-five percent of the vote but they took more than forty percent of the seats. Opposition led protests finally forced the courts to compel Zeroual’s supporters to return two hundred fifty seats to the other winners of the election (Roberts 1998, 41). President Bouteflika won his second term in 2004 after claiming that he received about eighty-four percent of the vote when voter turnout was at about fifty-nine percent (Holm 2005, 117). Election fraud accusations were supported by one candidate’s
assertion that the names of the dead and migrants were included on voter lists in districts that were pro-Bouteflika (Volpi 2006, 448-449). “In effect, it seems that this flaw of Algerian ‘democracy’ ensures that an unstable and unsatisfactory political stalemate remains in the country despite the presence of an electoral process” (Volpi 2006, 446). The Algerian electoral process is unfair because the political field is organized to favor candidates that are acceptable to the ruling elite and the regime can arrange for the “right” polling results (Volpi 2006, 446).

Bosnian elections have been haunted by an unfair electoral system. One researcher wrote that Bosnia’s electoral system favors ethnically based political parties and not newly formed political parties (Belloni 2001, 166). This began in Dayton when the international community was intent upon peace and had to compromise with the same political leaders who had benefited from the war. Quick elections took place and did not leave time for new organizations to form and run campaigns. In the end, premature votes legitimized the political grip of the old leaders. (Singer 2000, 32)

Guyana has been troubled by election fraud since 1964. The racial politics that divide Guyana today began in the 1960s when the Afro-Guyanese supported People’s National Congress-Reform-One Guyana party rigged elections from 1964 to 1992. (Apathy Rules 2006, 38; Griffith 1997) Before 1992, “Guyana went through the motions of legitimacy without any real correlation between popular choice and political empowerment” (Griffith 1997). After 1992, the Indo-Guyanese supported People’s Progressive Party began to win and opponents rioted for months after the ballots were counted. International approval from the Commonwealth Secretariat (UK) and the
Carter Center for the 1997 election could not stop more racial violence by the supporters of the People’s National Congress. (*Apathy Rules* 2006, 38) The fear of violence was so great that during the elections in August of 2006 soldiers and police officers patrolled the streets while shops were closed and barricaded by the owners. Neighboring Suriname announced it would welcome refugees if there was violence. With all of the preparation, the election took place without any disturbances. (*Apathy Rules* 2006, 38)

Since 2001, opponents of Pakistan’s President Musharraf have accused his regime of electoral fraud. They point out that the referendum question he used to legitimize his presidency was loaded: “Do you want to elect President Musharraf for the next five years for survival of the local government system; restoration of democracy, continuity and stability of reforms, eradication of extremism and sectarianism and for the accomplishment of Jinnah’s concept?” (Kukreja and Singh 2005, 69) Additionally, the referendum had “Voting irregularities, assisted by the absence of formal identification requirements and of electoral rolls…” and the interference of certain military commanders and the Inter-Service Intelligence were documented (Kukreja and Singh 2005, 69). Moreover, few people expect the presidential election scheduled for 2007 to actually take place as Musharraf would not take a chance at losing. Instead, Musharraf arranged to be “elected” by members of the national and provincial legislature who won their seats through the “tainted 2002 elections.” (Haqqani 2007, 149)
Terrorism by military and security forces have become common place in Algeria, Eritrea, and Pakistan. To a minor degree this has also been true for Guyana. “Guyana has been one of the few Anglophone Caribbean countries to use the military as an instrument of political rule and an agent for the subversion of human rights” (Griffith 1997). Algerian security forces have been accused of human rights violations since before 1997 when the security forces stood by as domestic terrorists massacred people in Algiers’ hinterland (Roberts 1998, 39). In the fall of 2005, Algerian President Bouteflika presented a national plan for reconciliation which pardons Islamic militants if they lay down their arms and it shields the military and security forces from criticism for any actions they took in defending the people. The plan also offered money to the families of people who mysteriously “disappeared” after six to ten thousand arrests were made in the 1990s. (A Flawed Charter 2005, 55-56) The passage of the national plan for reconciliation by referendum did not stop the violence by suicide bombers in 2007 when thirty-three people in Algiers were killed. (Sour and Prickly 2007, 48)

A similar story comes from Eritrea where the military is used by the regime to maintain order. The “…EPLF is frozen by its own perception and interpretation of the past…In particular, the movement and thus the nation-state itself is governed by the notion of ‘destiny,’ usually, and increasingly, couched in militaristic terms…” so that Eritreans are taught to feel isolated by the world and cannot trust anyone (Reid 2005, 468). This belief is so strong that in the rural areas large numbers of youth enroll in the military service (Reid 2005, 478). Fear and terror reign in urban areas where people sometimes mysteriously disappear and conversations are held in hushed tones (Connell
The military was further glorified in 2004 during a celebration of the liberation movement’s “ideals” (Reid 2005, 479).

The security forces led by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency have been known to intervene in politics when they find it necessary to do so. The ISI has been credited with: assisting Musharraf in his referendum campaign, ousting Benazir Bhutto as prime minister, creating the Taliban, orchestrating terrorism in Kashmir in the name of Jihad, and for twenty years protecting militant Islamists (Weaver 2002, 262). Former ISI Director General Hamid Gul said the ISI did those things because “It needed a skilled and trained irregular force to battle and harass an Indian Army complement of 300,000 men posted in Kashmir—a military presence that was more than half the total strength of the entire Army of Pakistan” (Weaver 2002, 262). Most recently, the security and police forces stormed the Red Mosque where a religious school had built up an arsenal (The General and the Mullahs 2007, 12-13).

All of the above has demonstrated that many of these states have disregarded the dictates of their respective constitutions. For a few cases, the reality of the situation is such that constitutions are not even paid cursory attention. The data analyzed for this hypothesis can be summarized as that all eight cases have work to do to ensure that in practice their governments adhere to the constitutional structures. Parts of the reason why some cases need work include accountability, reforms, and social unification.

Algeria is a prime example of the need for greater accountability in governance. “The central shortcoming of the Algerian state has been and remains today the fact that the formal distribution of political responsibility does not correspond to the actual
distribution of power, a problem that has been greatly exacerbated since 1992” (Roberts 1998, 41). In the face of political, social, and economic crises, President Bouteflika has not delivered the reforms he promised in areas like justice and the investigations into the thousands of missing people (Holm 2005, 122).

Algeria is not alone in the need for accountability. All of Pakistan’s institutions and infrastructure are in decline: schools, universities, judiciary, economy, unemployment, and illiteracy (Haqqani 2007, 152). Land reform has been greatly desired in Pakistan and believed to be a means by which the economy could improve and thus, improve funding for infrastructure. But, Musharraf ruled out land reform which makes it easier for elites to capture local institutions and limit funds intended for the public good. (Kukreja and Singh 2005, 66-67)

For Bosnia, “An overall lack of good governance has stunted the political and judicial process…” (Singer 2000, 31). Bosnians need to urgently establish an independent judiciary and not just an independent high court (Singer 2000, 37). The Constitutional Court did its part by defining citizenship in a four part decision that in 2000 declared unconstitutional provisions of the Bosniak/Croat and Serb Entity constitutions that legalize ethnicity as the sole criterion for citizenship. (Mansfield 2003, 2052) “It eliminated constitutional approval of segregation through the two ethnically distinct Entities…and it preserved the legal fiction that the three peoples are different…” (Mansfield 2003, 2053). The decision split the country and made clear how much more work remains to create a real Bosnian state.
Eritrea is another case that has never exhibited accountability in governance. Eritrea must put into place the 1997 Constitution. Then it must deal with three major problems: economic development, stabilize the political system, resolve issues with neighbors especially Ethiopia (Reid 2005, 468). “Sacrifice, struggle, hardship, are the key concepts in the government’s ideological armoury” (Reid 2005, 480) and its excuse for not governing according to the constitution.

Besides accountability, some of these cases need reforms to improve their governments. South Koreans complain that their government is unresponsive due to the politicians (McFarland 1998). They feel that modern day Korea is facing economic instability and possible reunification with the North and yet, the candidates are not talking about the future (McFarland 1998). “Having historically given economic and industrial development higher priority than political development, the government itself is weak and burdened with insecurity, legendary corruption, and mercurial policies.” (McFarland, 1998) Reforming the electoral process would improve the responsiveness of the South Korean government to its people.

Finally, social unification is a must in three of these cases. The institutionalized division of the ethnicities in Bosnia as seen in the three part presidency and three part legislature has created a stalemate in policymaking (Mansfield 2003, 2058-2059). The Dayton Peace Agreement made Bosnia into two entities and each controls legitimate use of force “As a result, the fate of Bosnia oscillates between reintegration and partition…” (Belloni 2001, 164). “Ten years later, the internationally run institutions created by the DPA increasingly stretch their mandate…” and undermine governance in
Bosnia (Stewart 2006, 759). Cyprus faces the same trouble as Bosnia in that “The articles of the constitution of Cyprus set up structures and institutions which would encourage separation of the two ethnic groups” (Uslu 2003, 12). The de facto partition of the island only highlighted the many problems within the constitution.

Guyana, like Bosnia and Cyprus, must overcome its societal divide to truly follow its constitution. As members of society do not feel the government represents their interests voter apathy has set in and there was only 70% voter turnout in 2006 versus the 92% in 2001 (Mars 2001, 362; Apathy Rules 2006, 38). Constitutional reforms of the kind President Jagan promised would help Guyana get back on the constitutional track (Griffith 1997).

On the other hand is Ireland which is the oldest case in this sample and the closest to practicing constitutional government. It has seen the passage of a fiscally responsible budget in December of 2006 and has legitimately elected a Fianna Fail coalition for more than ten years. (The Sinner Absolved 2007, 54) In 1992, two constitutional amendments were passed regarding abortion and another amendment regarding civil divorce (Hollis III 2001, 196).

3.5 The Quantitative Test

The qualitative analysis of the data for testing the first hypothesis indicates that constitutionalism is necessary for a seceded state to be politically stable. This proposition must also be tested quantitatively with all twenty cases. As outlined in Chapter Two, the dependent variable was operationalized using the “political stability and absence of violence” indicator while the independent variable by the “rule of law”
indicator. Regression analysis was used to test this numerical data with a requirement of at least an $r^2 = 0.3$ to claim statistical significance and dismiss the null hypothesis. Table 8 has the correlations for the analysis.

Table 8 Correlations for Hypothesis One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Instability</th>
<th>Rule of Law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.810</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (1-tailed)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The hypothesis was statistically significant at $r^2 = .657$ at better than 95% confidence level. For more information regarding this quantitative test, please see the appendix.

3.6 Conclusion

Can the null hypothesis be dismissed for Hypothesis One? This hypothesis postulates a direct directional relationship between the independent and dependent variables. The questions pertaining to the qualitative analysis of this hypothesis were addressed for the original eight cases and the regression analysis of the extended twenty cases was conducted. Based upon the conclusions drawn from the qualitative analysis and the statistically significant results of the quantitative analysis, I may with confidence dismiss the null hypothesis. There is a direct relationship between how much a seceded state adheres to its constitution and how politically stable that state is. To avoid a Type I Error of rejecting a null hypothesis that is actually true, I would
increase the N in the quantitative and qualitative tests and review my data gathering and analysis.
CHAPTER 4

THE ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHESIS TWO

4.1 Introduction

This chapter analyzes the data collected for Hypothesis Two as described in the second chapter. Much like in the previous chapter, the narrative section of this chapter is organized according to where the cases exhibit similarities or dissimilarities. Again, analyzing the quantitative data last corroborates my findings in the qualitative analysis.

The previous section outlined the formal institutions of governance provided by the constitutions for these eight cases. It has been shown that the reality of the situation for four of the cases is that the governments do not function as required by the constitutions. Here, a very brief description of those formal institutions that the people of these eight cases can directly or indirectly participate in will be followed by an analysis of exactly the types of opportunities that do exist for public participation or for influencing the members of the formal institutions.

4.2 Participation at Whose Cost?

The second hypothesis posits that “the more a seceded state allows for public participation in the formal political institutions the more it will be politically stable.” Recall that in Chapter Three, it was determined that Ireland and South Korea were the most politically stable states in the sample of eight cases. In the middle were Guyana
and Cyprus followed by the least politically stable states of Algeria, Bosnia, Eritrea, and Pakistan. Table 9 reiterates the dependent variable indicators previously shown.

### Table 9 DV Indicators for Hypothesis Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Literacy Rate (%)</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate (%)</th>
<th>GDP (rank out of 184)</th>
<th>GNI (rank out of 208)</th>
<th><em>Peace-building Capacity</em></th>
<th>Government Effectiveness (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>87.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
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<td>9.1</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>Green</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4.3</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>91.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6.5</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>82.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Peace-building capacity is ranked red=worst, yellow=middle, green=best*

Questions and an indicator, see Table 10, were employed to better understand the independent variable for this hypothesis.

### Table 10 IV Indicators for Hypothesis Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Do political institutions exist?</th>
<th>Can the public join political organizations?</th>
<th>Can citizens vote in elections?</th>
<th>What is its freedom rank?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Beginning with the formal institutions that the people can participate in one manner or another are the legislative branches. All eight cases analyzed have national legislatures and many of the members of those legislatures are elected by the people. The executives
in all of these cases are either directly or indirectly elected, but in the end are in power due to a group that put them there. Although, the citizens of all eight of these cases may vote in elections not all of those votes are counted. The freedom rank for each case demonstrates the people are not always free to voice their opinions. The question of whether these formal institutions are responsive to the people has been explored before but further evidence will be provided in the following discussion.

Historically and in the present, a common mechanism for political participation is the joining of groups or factions. Political parties are an example of such a group and whether or not political parties and other such organizations can exist and the people can use them to participate in the system is worth considering. Also, governmental behavior towards groups not in themselves political, such as gender or ethnicity, highlights the ability of the people to influence governmental institutions. Lastly, the media is not a formal institution but a tool the people could use to reach their elected officials and so, the role of the media for certain cases will also be examined.

Perhaps it would be easier to demonstrate how responsive elected legislators are to the people by first examining the role of political organizations in all eight cases. In the six cases of Algeria, Bosnia, Eritrea, Guyana, Ireland, and South Korea political organizations have had major difficulties in participating in the political process.

In Algeria alone, “…opposition parties that could have helped to developed [sic] a more accountable and representative system of political rule are being kept in a subservient role or ignored altogether” (Volpi 2006, 453). Since the governmental ban of the Front Islamique du Salut, the party developed an armed wing that uses violence
to force the government to lift the ban (Roberts 1998, 41). The government passed new laws in 1997 further regulating all political parties: all members had to be registered, party platforms had to be approved, parties had to pass a one year probationary period, and there could not be partisan use of “Arabism, Islam, or Berberism [an ethnic group]” (Quandt 1998, 133). During the 2006 and 2007 elections, the Berber based Socialist Forces Front boycotted in protest of government regulations and the religious party, Islamists-of el-Islah, lost after their leader was prevented by the government for unknown reasons from running (Sour and Prickly 2007, 48). The presidential election campaign was biased in President Bouteflika’s favor when he used his access to the state machinery and media to campaign months in advance of other candidates (Volpi 2006, 448).

The military regime of Pakistan does not stop the people from joining political parties. However, it makes sure that the parties can never be successful. Musharraf exiled Nawaz Sharif who leads the Pakistan Muslim League and brought charges of corruption against Benazir Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party, who then went into exile. Both of whom have questioned the legitimacy of Musharraf’s presidency. (Haqqani 2007, 149) Before Musharraf took power, Islamic political parties had strong bases of public support but ignored addressing important issues, like the economy, which cost them elections. In the hopes of garnering greater support, the religious political parties backed military rule. The maneuver backfired as Musharraf’s regime became more and more unpopular and the public turned away from the Islamic parties that supported the military regime originally. The parties never benefited from
Musharraf as he ignored the role they played in organizing public support for military intervention. (Gupta 2002, 30-31)

Bosnian and Guyanese political parties have to deal with circumstances similar to Algeria. In Bosnia, the established political parties in all three ethnic enclaves have control over public funds and use this power to establish the rule of party over the rule of law. Under this system, public funds for projects to build infrastructure disappear in “schemes.” (Singer 2000, 32-33) “Ethnic nationalist elites are charged with having diverted up to $1 billion from the international aid that poured into the country since the war ended” (Belloni 2001, 165). These “old” political parties make it difficult for new parties to organize and rally support while “Internationally organized elections regularly ratify the status quo…” (Belloni 2001, 165-166). The situation was very similar in Guyana where until 1992, the ruling party demonstrated its strength by never losing and by not actually winning popular elections. While the opposition parties used tactics to demonstrate popular appeal through voter turnout at campaign meetings. (Griffith 1997)

Whereas older parties dominate the political landscape in the last three cases, there is a role for new parties in South Korea. It is common now for South Korean politicians to create their own political parties to fulfill their political ambition (McFarland 1998). Yet, traditional South Korean parties are regionally based which has been detrimental to the system (Park 2003, 812). “Since the early 1970s (more specifically, the 1971 presidential election), major political leaders and particular regions, and electoral outcomes have been significantly influenced by regionally divided voting trends” (Park 2003, 812). This regional divide grew from the practice of
“clientelistic politics” where regional favoritism by ruling elites caused differences to emerge in the political and economic interests between the southeastern and southwestern regions of South Korea. What began as territorial strategies to gather base support has developed into a corrupt patronage system of politics. (Park 2003, 814-836)

Irish political parties, unlike the other cases, are not divided by regions or by party age. Ireland’s political parties have lately been drawn into a debate regarding constitutionalism and morality. However, only the Progressive Democrats have actively participated in this debate. The other major parties have resisted taking sides. (Girvin 1996, 600) This debate began in 1997 when the Irish Constitution turned sixty years old. Historically, the constitution “…formalised and institutionalised many of the core values associated with a society which was Catholic, traditional, nationalist and rural” (Girvin 1996, 599). But by 1994, Irish society had already moved away from some of those core values and began to see the constitution as outdated. The 1994 elections brought a new government into power with a center-left coalition with the intent to update the laws and constitution to reflect the more liberalized stance on moral issues. A May 1995 poll reported that fifty-five percent of respondents wanted to keep the constitution and change it when necessary and only thirty-six percent of respondents wanted a new constitution (Girvin 1996, 600). The key issues became abortion, family matters, education, and religion. Once in power, the coalition became cautious and the debate stagnated. (Girvin 1996, 600-606)

So far, the cases have had political parties that for one reason or another could not participate in the political process or answer the needs of the people. In Eritrea, the
issue is less complicated in that the government does not allow for opposition political parties to exist. “‘Participation’ becomes a response to government dictates…” (Tronvoll 1998, 482). Those opponents from within the EPLF have been exiled for speaking against government policy, especially the new land reforms (Tronvoll 1998, 475). Opponents who attempt to form groups are exiled and can return to Eritrea if they renounce their former allegiances. If the government believes that these returned people lied they disappear into political prisons (Connell 2005, 74). Even non-governmental organizations providing aid have been thrown out of the country so that only organizations formed by the EPLF are allowed to operate. For example, “…the government shut down the university’s autonomous student union and replaced it with a chapter of the EPLF-run National Union of Eritrean Youth and Students” (Connell 2005, 77). The EPLF controls all, literally.

Political parties are not the only groups to face difficulties in organizing and having their voices heard by the formal institutions. Groups are relegated to minority status or unequal citizenship in many of these cases based upon language, education, gender, ethnicity, and religious affiliation. Algerians and Pakistanis have been marginalized by the official policy regarding language. Algerian regimes have sought legitimacy through the policy of “Arabization.” French, Berber, and other languages are not allowed to be studied in schools under the policy. Arabic is given primary status and government business is conducted in Arabic limiting the ability for many who are illiterate in Arabic from participating. It has become a method for social control that has instead created social unrest. (Benrabah 2004, 59) Pakistan is also a multilingual state.
Yet, English is the official language of the state and Urdu is the national language. Interestingly, in 1947 about seven percent of the Muslims from India could claim Urdu as their mother tongue. “The minorities have resented the power and status that has been given to English and Urdu…The use of alternative languages would have given power to others” (Kukreja and Singh 2005, 108). The availability of jobs is based upon fluency in English and Urdu. Fluency in Urdu can help a person get a low level job in the provinces and knowledge of English helps one find higher level work. (Kukreja and Singh 2005, 115)

Hand in hand with language comes education. Soon after independence, Algeria invested money in education and health care for the urbanized population. The result was an entire generation literate in Arabic and French who had a longer life span to look forward to but were unemployed. This led to greater job competition between the urban and rural populations. (Pierre 1995, 134) South Korean students faced an uncertain future in the late 1970s after the assassination of President Park. With political instability came economic decline and there were wide scale student demonstrations and labor disputes. (McFarland 1998) Students of Guyana were promised free public education under the constitution and a 1975 law. In the 1990s, students sued the University of Guyana when it began charging tuition. The High Court rejected the idea that students were protected by Article 27 of the Constitution in 1996. (Griffith 1997)

Around the world, women have had to fight for equality. This was true for women in Algeria, Eritrea, and Pakistan. During the time of secession and up to official independence women had made tremendous gains as participants in the revolutionary
movements of Algeria and Eritrea. The improved status, however, quickly disappeared once the fervor of independence had waned. Algeria’s “…eclectic and populist official ideological discourse melds socialism and Islam…as well as traditional communitarianism. As such it has provided a thriving source of legitimacy for later conservative claims against the modern ideal of citizenry” (Cheriet 1996, 23). The Family Code bill of the early 1980s, “…relegated women to a ‘minority’ status. In order to ensure that their access to citizenship did not affect the familial sphere, women were asked to sacrifice their full-fledged status within their family” (Cheriet 1996, 23). In fact, records of 1984 debates quote delegates demanding an unconditional provision for polygamy. Women are given access to education and health care on the condition that they will remain weak citizens. (Cheriet 1996, 24-25)

Eritrean women made up one-third of the ninety-five thousand members of the EPLF in 1991. Thirteen percent of these women were frontline fighters and all of the women worked in areas traditionally considered male jobs. After independence, men joined clandestine organizations to prevent women from gaining permanent gender equality. Since the 1997 Constitution was never implemented by President Afeworki, the rights of women do not receive legal protection. In an effort to show sympathy, reforms were passed requiring a quota of women be hired as government employees. Additionally, thirty percent of seats in the elected assemblies are reserved for female legislators. The EPLF set up the National Union of Eritrean Women as an approved vehicle for protecting women’s rights. It has as many as two hundred thousand members as recently as 2004. Nevertheless, it is weak as the only influential
policymaking group is Afeworki’s inner circle, and not a single woman is in the circle. (Connell 2005, 70-72)

Women in Pakistan must deal with conditions comparable to Eritreans and Algerians. State approved textbooks teach students to support the male dominated hierarchical Pakistani society (Kukreja and Singh 2005, 115). Domestic terrorists have targeted women in powerful positions. In February 2007, one week before US Vice-President Cheney visited Pakistan, terrorists attacked the district courts of Quetta, bombs exploded on the India-Pakistan Samjhota express train, and a female cabinet minister was killed for not wearing a veil. (Haqqani 2007, 148)

The classification of certain ethnicities of being less important as citizens can be seen in Algeria, Bosnia, and Guyana. (Cyprus could fall under this category, but will be discussed shortly under religion). President Bouteflika has had a policy of brutal oppression of an Algerian ethnicity called the Berbers (Holm 2005, 117). Berbers have withstood the government’s Arabization policy and continued to study the Berber and French languages. Berbers are considered to be more French than their Arab Algerian counterparts as a result. (Quandt 1998, 36) The regime of the 1980s would “…pit Berberists, Communists, women, and human rights activists against Islamists of both the conservative and radical variety” (Quandt 1998, 38) to ensure that the minority groups would fight amongst themselves.

Ethnic cleansing is part of Bosnia’s modern history. Although, the Dayton Peace Agreement and international watchers attempted to prevent further ethnic abuse, displaced persons or refugees are not treated well. People displaced by the war endure
limited access to education, health care, and jobs. Many refugees were not returned to their homes as they were promised. Those refugees who managed to return home find themselves in an area now controlled by another ethnicity, thus receiving minority status. (Belloni 2001, 166)

As early as 1969, a portion of Guyana’s population fell victim to racist politics. Amerindians demanded secession of the hinterland in 1969. The government response was a military repression that killed many and those who survived migrated to Venezuela. Venezuela had been complicit in the rebellion that became known as the Rupununi uprising. A public service strike in 1999 led to ethnic and political violence. Again, Guyana’s ethnically polarized politics gives the appearance that the ruling party represents only one-half of the population, increasing tensions. (Mars 2001, 355-361)

Religious groups have been discriminated by their governments in Cyprus, Eritrea, and Ireland. The tensions between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots can be labeled as ethnic but religion plays a greater role in the divide. The first president of Cyprus, Makarios, was a bishop of the Greek Orthodox Church and used his religious status to build a divide between the two Cypriot communities. After Turkish Cypriots left the national government to set up their own on the northern end of the island, Greek Cypriots merged the church, education, and politics to form a national identity. This was not done to a great extent by the Turkish Cypriots. (Lindley 2007, 228-229) The repercussion of separate identities can be felt today. All attempts at reunification, which is supported by the Turkish Cypriots and their Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat, either through the UN or EU have met with failure on the Greek Cypriot side. (Shadowed
Northern Lights 2005; Ker-Lindsay 2006, 21) Polls show that Turkish Cypriots have a more favorable view of co-existence. On the other side of Cyprus, polls show that due to the regime’s policies and education system, Greek Cypriots have a less favorable view of reunification. (Lindley 2007, 236-237) The problem lies in the fact that Turkish Cypriot votes are not counted in the internationally recognized Greek Cypriot controlled government. The voices of more than one hundred sixty thousand Turkish Cypriots are ignored by the Republic of Cyprus. (Shadowed Northern Lights 2005) The Cyprus Action Network, an international human rights watchdog, pointed out that one thousand Turkish Cypriots living on the Greek side were ineligible to vote on the reunification issue in 2004 by the government (Anastasiou 2007, 198).

Through its 1994 land reforms, the Eritrean government is creating conflict among Christians, Muslims, lowlanders, and highlanders. The reforms allow the state to own all of the land and lease it out to farmers for their lifetimes. The land cannot be sold or leased to anyone else. These reforms do not protect nomads or provide for grazing rights and therefore, can potentially lead to religious conflict. (Tronvoll 1998, 471-475)

Ireland is the final case to be examined here. The religious divide in Ireland is between the Catholic Church and everybody else, including the government. By 1922 the Catholic Church had consolidated its power over Ireland in the political sphere and through social services. It had enormous influence over the state, receiving a special status clause in the constitution. Taoiseach Costello promised Pope Pius XII that his cabinet maintained its loyalty to the church in 1948. (Fuller 2005, 41) Things began to
change in the 1950s when the state proposed providing free medical care to mothers and children under the age of sixteen years. The Hierarchy of the Catholic Church was angered by this perceived intrusion into social welfare and demanded the resignation of Minister of Health Noel Browne. A 1972 referendum removed the special status clause given to the Church in the constitution (Fuller 2005, 47-50). More recently, the Church raised objections against the abortion and divorce amendments to the constitution. Justice Rory O’Hanlon of the High Court (and a member of Opus Dei) denounced the legislation for not conforming to “Catholic teaching.” In response, Minister of Justice Nora Owen stated that in Ireland the church and state were separate. (Girvin 1996, 607-608) “The Hierarchy were effectively criticising the Court, the parliament and the electorate for not adopting a natural law position” (Girvin 1996, 608). The position of the Church along with a number of scandals regarding a bishop fathering an illegitimate child and pedophile priests have diminished the authority of the Church with the Irish public. (Girvin 1996, 606-615)

If weakened political parties and group discrimination prevents the people from participating in government directly maybe the media is a tool they can use. Unfortunately, the media cannot be relied upon in Algeria, Cyprus, and Eritrea.

The Algerian media is a tool not used by the people as much as it is used by the regime. President Bouteflika prevented his opponents in the last election from getting air time on the local television broadcasts. A few of his opponents used satellite channels based outside of Algeria to reach the people, but then the administration increased media censorship to stop the broadcasting. (Volpi 2006, 448) This was
detrimental to the Algerian press as Algeria was considered as having the most “free press” in the Arab world in the late 1980s (Pierre 1995, 135).

The situation is slightly different in Cyprus where there is extensive self-censorship by the media resulting with biased coverage (Anastasiou 2007, 201). Presidential preference is allowed to determine media coverage aside from two exceptions. These two publications have built a reputation on challenging the government but have low circulation and little influence with the public. The two state-owned media outlets, Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation and the Cyprus News Agency, rarely criticize the administration. Private sector news also shies away from public criticism. (Ker-Lindsay 2006, 30-31)

Unsurprisingly, Eritrea has since 1998 shut down private presses and detained critics (Connell 2005, 72). The government has claimed that it is fighting the terrorist group called Eritrean Islamic Jihad and needs to shut down the media (Reid 2005, 484). The media censorship was followed by student protests in 2001. The student protestors were arrested and sent on “work projects” for containment. When their parents complained about how their children were being treated they, too, were arrested. (Connell 2005, 76)

In this sample, there is only one case that has not used one method or another to limit political participation through political organizations and that is Cyprus. It is through political dominance of the system rather than governmental practice that some political parties are ineffective at bringing the people into the political process in Ireland and South Korea. Party competition is systematically eliminated by the established
political parties in Bosnia. Guyana faced the same problem in the past and less so, today. Algeria and Eritrea are examples of states where the government prevents any opportunity for political parties to form and rally support. Pakistan only ensures that competing parties cannot win.

That brings one to consider governments inhibiting certain groups from participating or being full citizens. Every case in the sample had at some point put down one group in favor of another. Still, Ireland and South Korea performed better than the rest of the sample as political participation has improved. What happened in those two states was not a permanent situation. The remaining six are guilty of continued deprivation of equality and rights of one or more groups within their borders.

Keeping all of this in mind, how do the people of these states feel about political participation through their executive and legislative institutions? For many of these cases, apathy sums up the situation very well. Barely one-third of Algerians voted in the legislative elections in May 2007. “Few people voted because they know that power is concentrated in the president’s hands and parliament has little influence” (Sour and Prickly 2007, 48). Earlier, in the years between 1992 and 1998, the masses stayed quiet as extreme political violence caused the deaths of about two hundred Algerians per week with the total being more than seven hundred fifty thousand dead (Quandt 1998, 66). One researcher visited Bosnia and found that “…there was a distinct lack of faith in the international community and in the Bosnian government. These feelings revolved around the lack of legislative progress (often blamed on the tripartite Presidency outlined in the Constitution), corruption and continuing questions of legality of the
DPA” (Stewart 2006, 755). The Office of the High Representative is unresponsive to the Bosnian people and enforces legislation that is highly unpopular (Stewart 2006, 758). Greek Cypriots are unlikely to question their president as “There is still a sense that the president speaks for the Greek Cypriot people. This further intensifies and reinforces the sense that speaking out against the president is not just disrespectful, it is an act against the community at large” (Ker-Lindsay 2006, 29). Moreover, the elected members of the legislature cannot force the president to listen to the will of the people. The president “…is under no obligation to accept the will of the House of Representatives or of the main parties acting conjointly.” (Ker-Lindsay 2006, 26) leaving all Cypriots without any power over the government.

The situation in Eritrea is far dire than in those above. The feeling of isolation cultivated by the government has intensified as modern technology, like the Internet and cellular phones, are found in urban areas with limited access (Reid 2005, 473). What little contact Eritreans had with foreign visitors has disappeared with new travel restrictions requiring visitors to get special permission to travel outside of the capitol (Connell 2005, 77). The government’s deliberate rejection of food aid as an estimated two-thirds of the population starves (A Myth of Self-Reliance 2006) has younger generations frustrated with the lack of improvement (Reid 2005, 474). They admit that they wish they could “get away” from Eritrea to find something better. The older generations have given up on expecting the government to change. (Reid 2005, 474) In the frontier villages, more local democracies function where local leaders are actually elected by the people but expectations are still low (Reid 2005, 476-477). All hope for
the national legislature to help ended after President Afeworki purged the National Assembly for criticizing his policy of one-party rule (Connell 2005, 76).

Guyanese live in fear of organized crime. Gangs motivated by race, politics, and cash terrorize citizens and the government. A popular newspaper’s office was attacked in July 2006 causing the deaths of five staffers. Three months earlier, the agriculture minister and two members of his family were murdered by gunmen. Voter participation, though high by other states’ standards, is still too low for Guyana. (Apathy Rules 2006)

The people of Pakistan face terrorist attacks everyday. Taliban led suicide bombings reached an all time high in January and February 2007. The people know the government is weak when they see insurgents, militias, gangs, and corruption ruling the country. The people who are members of opposition parties are led by politicians in exile. (Haqqani, 2007, 148-149) Fearing that he cannot win in a real election, Musharraf holds referendum and provincial and national elections that are “never free and fair.” These events are controlled and called historic to make the regime look like it is pro-civil government even with military rule. (Kukreja and Singh 2005, 65)

Much less than the other cases, South Koreans still feel apathetic. Voter turnout was at its lowest in South Korean history in the late 1990s at less than eighty percent versus previous records of ninety percent. (McFarland 1998) People in the rural areas distrust the state since voluntary rural organizations were replaced by state sponsored organizations. (Ha 2007, 369-370) Reforms enacted in 1988 improved governance and moved away from military-authoritarian control of the institutions (Shin 2005, 203). Yet, cognitive studies show that the people do not feel they have democratic citizenship
and have trouble differentiating between past authoritarianism from present day government (Shin 2005, 210).

Today, the Irish participate in government and are more likely to see their needs met than in the past. The people of Ireland have re-elected Taoiseach Bertie Ahern with the belief that his economic policies will continue to help Irish society and that reunification with Northern Ireland is still possible. (*The Teflon Taoiseach Rides Again* 2007, 50)

### 4.3 The Quantitative Test

So far, analysis of the data for the second hypothesis indicates that public participation indeed increases how politically stable a seceded state is. This idea will now be tested quantitatively using all twenty cases. The dependent variable was operationalized using the “political stability and absence of violence” indicator, while the independent variable by the “voice and accountability” indicator. Regression analysis was employed to test this numerical data with a requirement of at least an $r^2=0.3$ to claim statistical significance and dismiss the null hypothesis. Table 11 has the correlations for the analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Political Instability</th>
<th>Voice and Accountability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Instability</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice and Accountability</td>
<td>.839</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sig. (1-tailed)</th>
<th>Political Instability</th>
<th>Voice and Accountability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Instability</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice and Accountability</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This hypothesis was statistically significant at $r^2=.704$ at better than 95% confidence level. For more information regarding this quantitative test, please see the appendix.

4.4 Conclusion

Can the null hypothesis be dismissed for Hypothesis Two? This hypothesis postulates a direct directional relationship that states “the more a seceded state allows for public participation in the formal political institutions the more it will be politically stable.” The data was tested qualitatively and quantitatively where the statistically significant results of the regression analysis corroborate the conclusions made in the narrative section. Thus, I may with confidence dismiss the null hypothesis. There is a direct directional relationship between the independent and dependent variables. As before, to avoid a Type I Error of rejecting a null hypothesis that is actually true I would increase the N in the quantitative and qualitative tests and review my data gathering and analysis.
CHAPTER 5

THE ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHESIS THREE

5.1 Introduction

Hypothesis Three will be analyzed in this chapter. Unlike the previous two chapters, all of the qualitative data came from a single source, *The World Factbook*. It was explained in Chapter Two that to better maintain consistency, the qualitative analysis would apply the same data source as the indicator used for the independent variable during the quantitative test. The quantitative data was tested with all twenty cases after the qualitative data test of the original eight cases as a means to strengthen my results. Additionally, the narrative section will be organized by case and not by the method seen in the last two chapters.

The last two hypotheses tested domestic components of governance, whereas this final hypothesis looks at the international side of government behavior. It has been demonstrated that adherence to constitutional structure and opportunity for public participation in government impacts political stability. The following discussion will consider the number of international disputes the eight cases have been involved in from 2001 to 2007 and then in greater detail the types of disputes for 2007. The year 2007 was chosen for detailed study, because several of the disputes in 2007 carry over from preceding years.
5.2 The Grass is always Greener on the Other Side of the Border

The third hypothesis speculates that “the more a seceded state uses armed force to resolve international disputes the less likely it will be politically stable.” In Chapter Three, the most politically stables states from the sample of eight cases were Ireland and South Korea. They were followed by Guyana and Cyprus and the least politically stable states of Algeria, Bosnia, Eritrea, and Pakistan. Table 12 repeats the dependent variable indicators shown in the past.

Table 12 DV Indicators for Hypothesis Three

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Literacy Rate (%)</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate (%)</th>
<th>GDP (rank out of 184)</th>
<th>GNI (rank out of 208)</th>
<th>*Peace-building Capacity</th>
<th>Government Effectiveness (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>87.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>91.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>82.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Peace-building capacity is ranked red=worst, yellow=middle, green=best

The independent variable was partly measured using the indicators in Table 13.

Table 13 IV Indicators for Hypothesis Three

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>*Military Expenditure (1-9 scale)</th>
<th>*Total Armed Forces (1-9 scale)</th>
<th>Military/Security Alliances (1-9 scale, 1 = high and 9 = low)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1-9 scale indicates that 1=low and 9=high
All eight of the cases rank low for having military and or security alliances. Yet, Algeria, Cyprus, Eritrea, Pakistan, and South Korea spend more money on military expenses than Guyana and Ireland. Surprisingly, of all the states that ranked the highest for military expenditures only Pakistan did not rank nearly as high as the others for the total number of armed forces. Algeria, Bosnia, Cyprus, Eritrea, and South Korea ranked highest for total armed forces. Guyana and Ireland ranked the lowest for total armed forces.

Since the data in Table 13 does not cover events after 2000, it would be best to know if there were any international disputes after 2000 and how many. Table 14 lists the number of international disputes the eight cases were involved in from 2001 to 2007.

Table 14: A Comparison of the Number of International Disputes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>#2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*2007 data is from the On-line version of *The World Factbook*

Plainly, every case in the sample has had at least one international dispute per year except for Bosnia in 2001. Algeria, Guyana, Pakistan, and South Korea have seen a rise in the number of international disputes since 2001. Only Ireland saw a reduction in the number of disputes from four to three from 2002 to 2007. What remains to be seen
is the nature of the international disputes during 2007 as reported by *The World Factbook*.

Algeria has had a number of international disputes with Morocco. First of all, Algeria accuses Morocco for supporting armed militias on their shared border where militants hide and arms are smuggled. Secondly, Algeria rejects the Moroccan administration of the Western Sahara by sheltering the people of that area known as the Western Saharan Sahrawi, approximately ninety thousand refugees, in camps inside their country and by supporting the efforts of the Polisario Front which represents the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Third, the Algerian regime claims a right to the Chirac Pastures located in Southeastern Morocco. An old dispute with Libya over Libyan maps claiming Algerian territory remains unresolved.

Bosnia has had only two major disputes for 2007 versus the many Algeria faces. Since independence, Bosnia continues to dispute sections of the boundary between it and Serbia along the Drina River. The second dispute is with Croatia over the ratification of their 1999 border agreement which will not pass until a section of the boundary regarding maritime access is not clarified.

Similar to Bosnia, the de facto partition of Cyprus into two entities is the cause of all its international disputes. Cyprus is unhappy with the presence of the UN Peacekeeping Force that has been located in the buffer zone between the two communities since 1964. In 2004, the Republic of Cyprus joined the European Union even though it was still divided. Thus, the Turkish Cypriot community on the northern end of the island does not directly benefit by the membership creating tension.
Most of Eritrea’s disputes are related to Ethiopia. They are disputing the border between the two states and neither side has agreed to a final demarcation since 2006. The Eritrean government has attempted to restrict the UN Peacekeeping Mission located on the Temporary Security Zone between Eritrea and Ethiopia since 2000. It is believed by Sudan that Eritrea has been harboring Sudanese rebel groups.

Guyana, like the other cases, has been involved in a number of disputes involving its neighbors. A maritime boundary disagreement has persisted for years between Venezuela and Guyana around the Essequibo River. The Guyanese government will go before UNCLOS for two separate claims. The first one is to join Barbados in contesting the maritime boundary Trinidad and Tobago has with Venezuela that extends into their waters. The second claim is for possibly oil rich waters in a disputed sea boundary with Suriname. Another dispute with Suriname is about claims to land found between two major rivers.

Of all eight cases, Ireland and South Korea have the least number of disputes at three. Ireland disputes Denmark’s argument that the continental shelf by the Faroe Islands extends more than two hundred nautical miles and claims made by Iceland and the United Kingdom for the Faroe Islands. South Korea’s disputes are with North Korea and Japan. The Japanese dispute is over the Liancourt Rocks which both states claim. There have been incidents over the years with North Korea regarding the Northern Limiting Line that South Korea uses as a maritime boundary in the Yellow Sea. Then there is the continued tensions regarding the Demilitarized Zone that separates the two Koreas along the Military Demarcation Line.
Pakistan has the most international disputes at ten involving two of its neighbors. The majority of Pakistan’s international disputes are with India. Some disputes have erupted with Afghanistan since the United States military presence in the region after September 11, 2001. The disputes with India center upon Kashmir and the status of the state as well as boundaries. It is a highly militarized zone as it also involves a Chinese military presence. A small group of UN Peacekeepers have also been deployed to the area since 1949. There have been armed stand offs and some peace talks. Water rights are also an issue with Pakistan protesting Indian construction of the Baglihar Dam and a maritime boundary involving an estuary and the Arabian Sea. Pakistan’s maps also show claim to an area located within India’s state of Gujarat. The Afghanistan disputes deal with the more than two million refugees that entered Pakistan. With the UN’s help about one-half have been returned home. Pakistan would like to build a fence on that border with land mines against Afghanistan’s protests.

For these eight cases, 2007 was a busy year in terms of foreign policy and international disputes. As expected for a sample of seceded states, all of the cases had disputes involving neighbors with shared borders. This was partially due to the fact that not too long ago the cases and one or more of their neighbors were ruled under the same flag. Algeria, Eritrea, and Pakistan were the only cases that used some form of armed force to settle disputes. The forms of armed force used were the harboring of militants and providing weapons or actual military stand offs.
5.3 The Quantitative Test

Up to now, qualitative analysis of the data for the third hypothesis indicates that there is not a very strong relationship between the use of armed force and how politically stable a seceded state is. The three states that exhibited armed force to settle international disputes have all along been the least politically stable. To determine if there is strength to this argument the proposition will be tested quantitatively using all twenty cases. The dependent variable was operationalized using the “political stability and absence of violence” indicator, while the independent variable by the “total international disputes” indicator. Please take note that the indicator is not testing armed force but all international disputes. Regression analysis was employed to test this numerical data with a requirement of at least an $r^2=0.3$ to claim statistical significance and dismiss the null hypothesis. Table 15 has the correlations for the analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 15 Correlations for Hypothesis Three</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Pearson Correlation</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total International Disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (1-tailed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total International Disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This hypothesis was statistically insignificant at $r^2=.198$. For more information regarding this quantitative test, please see the appendix.
5.4 Conclusion

Can the null hypothesis be dismissed for Hypothesis Three? Disappointingly, it cannot be dismissed. This hypothesis postulates an inverse directional relationship that states “the more a seceded state uses armed force to resolve international disputes the less likely it will be politically stable.” The data was tested qualitatively and the results indicated that rather than the use of armed force it was the number of international disputes that affected the dependent variable. However, the regression analysis in the quantitative test demonstrated that perhaps even the total number of international disputes did not have a statistically significant impact on a seceded state being politically stable.

Nevertheless, I hesitate in completely rejecting the potential of the argument behind this hypothesis. In the sample of eight cases, only Bosnia for 2001 had zero international disputes. That leaves seven cases for where there was at least one dispute per year for seven years. If one refers to the appendix, one will see that in the sample of twenty cases, none of the cases earned a rank of 1 for the independent variable which equals the least amount of international disputes.

Although, the test for hypothesis three conducted here failed to dismiss the null hypothesis, I recommend certain steps be taken to prevent a Type II Error of accepting a null hypothesis that should have been rejected. Primarily, the data should be revisited and improved upon. More data sources and better indicators with an increased N will provide for a more rigorous test of the hypothesis.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH

This thesis began with the question: what aspects of the governmental and political structures of seceded states make them more or less politically stable? After much time spent theorizing, defining terms and variables, and collecting and analyzing data what answers have been found? I may confidently say that with the successful testing of hypotheses one and two that my theory is general and useful in the study of secession and political stability. The disappointing results of the third hypothesis do not undermine the usefulness of my theory instead it shows a great deal of promise.

First and foremost, let us revisit the five criteria for judging theories. My theory is testable as I was able to test it using twenty cases and study the governments, political participation, and foreign relations of eight of those cases in depth. This theory is logically sound because it was applied to real states and their situations. It is communicable and can be explained to anyone. Undoubtedly, this theory is general enough to be practical in other comparative political studies or even in determining foreign policy. Since this theory does not incorporate complex ideas and examines the most basic traits of governments it is parsimonious.

Secondly, the data analyses for all three hypotheses verify the strength of my theory to explain the phenomenon of political stability or instability in seceded states. The first hypothesis confirmed that for a seceded state to be politically stable it must
adhere as closely as possible to its constitutional structure. Constitutions establish the
rule of law and without a system of rules and regulations any government can run
amuck with unlimited power. The second hypothesis corroborated the first by adding
the role of public participation to the political scene. If the people of a state cannot
make their voices heard and affect policymaking then public policy will most likely not
reflect the public will. Just as importantly, is the role of public participation in checking
government abuse of power.

Unlike the first two hypotheses, the third hypothesis did not have statistically
significant results. It was discussed in Chapter Five that the failure to dismiss the null
hypothesis should not be interpreted to mean that the argument behind the hypothesis is
unworthy of further study. There is something to the belief that a seceded state’s
involvement in many international disputes relates to political instability. The question
is how and to what degree? Algeria, Eritrea, and Pakistan were some of the least
politically stable states in my sample of eight cases and were also involved in a high
number of international disputes with some use of armed force. Flip the coin and one
will see that Ireland and South Korea were the most politically stable states in the same
sample and had the lowest incidents of international disputes. Perhaps the issue is not
the use of armed force but just the fact that there are international disputes and that the
disputes vary in their intensity to cause instability. Even more telling, is that so many of
the disputes counted involved the cases and the states or territories they were formerly a
part of.
Third, one must consider the implications of this theory and data analysis. In the future, researchers can build upon my results. More cases, indicators, and sources of data will strengthen these results. Definitely, one can learn from my mistakes and find better indicators to improve the testing of the third hypothesis. As comparativists, we should strive to study secession and political stability as a global community of researchers. Such collaboration would allow for more independent variables, like state ideology and economics, to be examined. Moreover, a global study will make it easier to collect primary source data, for example elite interviews of elected officials and cross-sectional surveys of the public, for a richer understanding of governance in seceded states. Of course, time and expense play an important role in the design of a study. A larger study with more people involved may mitigate the costs associated with detailed and time consuming work. Certainly, the limitations inherent in being a graduate student affected my research design.

Fourth, this theory and research touch upon the bigger debate about the right to sovereignty. Where does a state draw the line for secession? How far or often can a group of people break away from a larger governing unit and still function as a state? An expanded study of seceded states and political stability will help political scientists to see if seceded states were better at governing their people than the original states they broke away from.

Finally, the predictive value of this theory has improved our understanding of the hurdles newly formed states will face as they learn to govern independently. This is a timely study as the world faces the potential break up of Iraq and Kosovo. The
importance of this study should not be lost upon foreign policymakers and the international community. We know that it takes time for new states to stabilize, that constitutions and governance must unify the people and be tailored to fit the unique needs of the population, the people must be involved in the policymaking process, and that seceded states may continue having conflicts with the governments of the states they separated from. In the end, we must decide whether secession can continue to be offered as the solution to stemming domestic conflict among groups within a state.
APPENDIX A

CODE BOOK
All Hypotheses: Dependent Variable

Population Literacy Rate—*The World Factbook*
(www.cia.gov accessed on June 19, 2007)
Definition: age 15 and over can read and write

Unemployment Rate—*The World Factbook*
(www.cia.gov accessed on June 19, 2007)
Definition: percent of the labor force that is without jobs

Gross Domestic Product—World Development Indicators
(www.worldbank.org accessed on May 1, 2007)
Definition: sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products, calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources, data are in current U.S. dollars

Gross National Income (Atlas Method)—World Development Indicators
(www.worldbank.org accessed on May 1, 2007)
Definition: sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad, data are in current U.S. dollars, to smooth fluctuations in prices and exchange rates, a special Atlas method of conversion is used by the World Bank where a conversion factor that averages the exchange rate for a given year and the two preceding years, adjusted for differences in rates of inflation between the country, and from 2001, the Euro Zone, Japan, the U. K., and the U. S.

Peace-Building Capacity—*Peace and Conflict 2005*
(Center for International Development and Conflict Management)
Definition: summarizes the seven component indicators (human security, self-determination, discrimination, regime type, durability, societal capacity, neighborhood), weighted values are assigned to each of the indicators (-2 for red, -1 for yellow, +1.5 for green) and averaged, an average less than -1=red, yellow=-1 and 0, green=greater than 0

Government Effectiveness—*Governance Matter VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006*
Definition: measuring the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies

Political Stability and the Absence of Violence—*Governance Matter VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006*
Definition: measuring perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Actual Data (percentile rank)</th>
<th>Year of Data</th>
<th>Coded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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</table>

The data reaches the interval level and was coded to remain on the original scale of 0-100 where 100=highest score possible.

Hypothesis One: Independent Variable

Does the government have a formal constitution?-self determined by consulting various sources
   Definition: assigned yes or no if the state has ratified a constitution at any point in time

Does the government operate according to its constitution?-self determined by consulting various sources
   Definition: assigned yes or no if the government operated according to its constitution

Rule of Law-Governance Matter VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006
   Definition: measuring the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence
## Rule of Law Indicator

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The data reaches the interval level and was coded to remain on the original scale of 0-100 where 100=highest score possible.

**Hypothesis Two: Independent Variable**

- **Do formal political institutions exist?**-self determined by consulting various sources
  - Definition: assigned yes or no depending upon the existence of these institutions
- **Are there political organizations that the people can join?**-self determined by consulting various sources
  - Definition: assigned yes or nor if the people can join organizations
- **Are there elections that citizens can vote in?**-self determined by consulting various sources
  - Definition: assigned yes or no if the people can vote in elections

**Freedom Rank**-*Freedom in the World 2007*
(Freedom House)
Definition: three broad category designations for each of the countries and territories included in the index: Free, Partly Free, and Not Free, categories calculated by averaging raw points for two indicators (political rights and civil liberties), a Free country=average of 1.0 to 2.5
and there is broad scope for open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media, Partly Free=average of 3.0 to 5.0 and there is limited respect for political rights and civil liberties, suffer from an environment of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic and religious strife, and often a setting in which a single political party enjoys dominance despite the facade of limited pluralism, Not Free=average of 5.5 to 7.0 and basic political rights are absent, and basic civil liberties are widely and systematically denied

Voice and Accountability- Governance Matter VI:

Governance Indicators for 1996-2006

Definition: measuring the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Actual Data (percentile rank)</th>
<th>Year of Data</th>
<th>Coded</th>
</tr>
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<td>10.6</td>
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<td>50.0</td>
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<td>Algeria</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>86.1</td>
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<td>17.8</td>
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<td>Eritrea</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>13.5</td>
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<td>Guyana</td>
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<td>2006</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>93.3</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
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<td>Trinidad-Tobago</td>
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</table>

The data reaches the interval level and was coded to remain on the original scale of 0-100 where 100=highest score possible.
Hypothesis Three: Independent Variable

Military Expenditure-Country Indicators for Foreign Policy
Definition: uses SIPRI military expenditure figures as a percentage of GDP, expressed in U.S. dollars at constant 1995 prices and exchange rates, where possible include expenditure on: armed forces, peacekeeping forces, defense ministries and agencies, paramilitary forces, military space activities, personnel, retirement pensions, social services for military personnel and their families, operations and maintenance, procurement, research and development, construction, and military aid, in a time series analysis from 1990-1998

Total Armed Forces-Country Indicators for Foreign Policy
Definition: calculated per 1,000 people based on IISS Military Balance and Population data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, includes active forces and reserves, in a time series analysis from 1998-2000

Military/Security Alliances-Country Indicators for Foreign Policy
Definition: number of organizations having a mandate primarily on military and security matters as listed in The World Factbook, the index of membership was constructed from “Total Armed Forces” data and organization totals were summed for each country in a single measure test for 2000

Total International Disputes-Country Indicators for Foreign Policy
Definition: number of international disputes listed in The World Factbook per year per country, in cases where a country claims a territory that is also claimed by a number of other countries disputes are counted for each of the countries individually, if a country has multiple disputes with another country, again these are counted separately, in a time series analysis from 1999-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
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<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>4.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
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<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>4.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Year</td>
<td>Score</td>
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<td>Panama</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
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<td>Suriname</td>
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<td>Trinidad-Tobago</td>
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<td>1999-2000</td>
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</table>

The data reaches the interval level and was coded to remain on the original scale of 1-9 where 1=no disputes and 9=many disputes.
APPENDIX B

REGRESSION ANALYSIS
### Frequencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Instability</th>
<th>Rule of Law</th>
<th>Voice and Accountability</th>
<th>Total International Disputes</th>
<th>Case</th>
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<td>20</td>
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### Hypothesis One: Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>N</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Instability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
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### Hypothesis Two: Descriptive Statistics

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<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>N</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Instability</td>
<td>32.665</td>
<td>24.2023</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice and Accountability</td>
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### Hypothesis Three: Descriptive Statistics

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<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>N</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Instability</td>
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<td>Total International Disputes</td>
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### Hypothesis One: Model Summary*

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<th>R Square</th>
<th>Adjusted R Square</th>
<th>Std. Error of the Estimate</th>
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</thead>
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*Predictors: (Constant), Rule of Law
*Dependent Variable: Political Stability

### Hypothesis Two: Model Summary*

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<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Predictors: (Constant), Voice and Accountability
*Dependent Variable: Political Stability

### Hypothesis Three: Model Summary*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>Adjusted R Square</th>
<th>Std. Error of the Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Predictors: (Constant), Total International Disputes
*Dependent Variable: Political Stability
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BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Charu Gupta earned an Honors B.A. in Political Science-International Studies in 2003 from the University of Texas at Arlington. Her Honors Thesis was titled “The States behind the Mask of Terrorism: A Theory on State Sponsorship of Terrorism.” There are many areas of research that interest her, including: nation-state building, terrorism, colonialism, and the global rights of women.