MAPPING THE “RED MENACE”: BRITISH AND AMERICAN NEWS MAPS IN THE EARLY COLD WAR PERIOD, 1945 TO 1955

by

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Finally to my mother, Virginia A. Simien, and my brother, Johnny W. Stone, both of whom supported me in countless ways when I needed it the most. I love you both.

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ABSTRACT

BRITISH AND AMERICAN NEWS MAPS IN THE
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This study examines maps published by the national news press in Britain and
the United States from 1945 to 1955. The author analyzes these maps to discern
similarities and differences in how British and American news journals put foreign
affairs into geographic perspective. Such maps were a valuable medium for educating
news readers of developing Cold War geopolitical events, while simultaneously shaping
public opinion of foreign places. And they reveal much about a country’s world view.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In the introduction of his book *Great Britain and the United States* Robert M. Hathaway quoted a leading British statesman who, in 1987, said that Englishmen should not assume that “Americans see their interests and objectives as always identical to ours…We should never take it for granted that Americans see what we see.”\(^1\)

Hathaway used the quote to argue that the perceived “special relationship” between the two countries has, more often than not, been a strained one despite both nations’ growing closer in their mutual fight against Communism since 1945.

This quote, however, is more applicable to this dissertation because it is relevant in three important ways. First, in the figurative sense that Hathaway intended, the quote warns of the often dissimilar foreign policies of the two nations despite the idea of the “special relationship.” Second, the quote implies that Englishmen and Americans who follow Cold War foreign politics often have very different world views—views often best portrayed in maps. Third, and most importantly for this study, the quote can be used to describe the reality that English and American news journals, through articles, photos, ads and especially news maps, usually portrayed Cold War international developments in different ways.

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This means that American and English magazine readers, who relied then as now on news journal maps to help shape their perceptions of foreign places and international events, literally saw very different portrayals of the world than their counterparts across the Atlantic Ocean. These differing map portrayals fostered powerful and often conflicting notions of Cold War geopolitics and national security in the minds of American and English citizens even though both nations’ governments were strongly unified to thwart Communist expansion all over the world.

For example, in October 1949 a political cartoon appeared in the *London Daily Express*, one of then several Tory-controlled English news journals (fig. 1.1). The cartoon lampooned Tory Lord Beaverbrook’s overconfident and simplistic solution to England’s declining international status. It showed Lord Beaverbrook addressing leaders of the English government before a room-sized map of the world with the caption “The Shadow Cabinet meets, and solves the crisis in the twinkling of an eye.”

According to the map, entitled “Map Of The World (Up To Date),” the world consisted only of Great Britain, its colonial holdings and the United States. Conspicuously absent from the map were all nations that did not have favorable political or economic trade agreements with Great Britain. Most notably absent were the Soviet Union and China—Communist nations whose recent post WWII rise to superpower status threatened British claims to Middle Eastern oil reserves and lucrative Chinese trading port colonies. The Beaverbrook cartoon offered a good example of how Western maps were often employed in the Cold War to devalue and de-legitimize areas under Communist control or influence. Omitting nations to devalue them on maps
is one of the more obvious ways mapmakers have, through the centuries, used maps to alter map reader’s perceptions of the world and in the early stages of the Cold War this practice was taken to a high art in English and American news journal maps.

![Cartoon Image](image)

**Fig. 1.1.** An updated map of the world according to a cartoonist at the *London Daily Express* in 1949.

But the omission of Communist nations was not the point of the Beaverbrook map; it was just a side effect. The main subject of the map was the United States, a nation whose borders were dotted rather than solid, and whose interior was colored pale white compared to the solid black demarcation of the British Empire. The cartographic point made here was clear: the United States was disappearing from the English world view. To English Tories, and indeed to all major English political parties of the period, the humor of the cartographic cartoon was evident. Given the conflict between postwar British and American foreign policy goals, whereby American ideas of international
universalism often ran counter to Britain’s plans to preserve her pre WWII empire, Lord Beaverbrook’s humorously simplistic solution was a new English map of the world that no longer included the United States and its troublesome policies.\(^2\)

Contrast the Tory British world view in the Beaverbrook cartoon with an American map that appeared in *Time* magazine scarcely three months later (fig. 1.2). The *Time* map, labeled “Two Worlds,” was a multi-colored portrayal of the Containment policy in action and it depicted the world in a very different way than the Beaverbrook cartoon map.\(^3\)

![Two Worlds 1950 map](Image)

Fig. 1.2. By 1950, most American news maps portrayed global geopolitics in terms of “Two Worlds.” This map was published by *Time* magazine.

*Time* magazine, a Republican-leaning journal, used the early 1950 map to describe the perceived bipolar struggle of the Cold War and in doing so it placed
England as a valuable lynch pin in the effort to surround the dangerous advances of the Soviet Union. The placement of England within the realm of U.S.-dominated “European Barrier,” through suggestive coloring and text labeling, ran counter to Lord Beaverbrook’s vision of an English-dominated world with the U.S. conveniently disappearing. More striking was the American portrayal of the Soviet Union which was the dominant feature of the map, very unlike the Beaverbrook map which omitted all Communist nations. The “Two Worlds” map sought not only to highlight the threat of Soviet Communism. It also portrayed Chinese Communism as merely a puppet extension of Soviet power. But the “Two Worlds” map had its share of omissions, too. The “Two Worlds” label, for example, referred to the capitalist nations’ (colored blue) and the Communist nations’ (colored red) struggle for global politics, thereby excluding the majority of non-aligned nations (various colors) that would eventually become known as the Third World. Also omitted, and hence devalued, were most of the world’s nations that lay in the Southern Hemisphere; nations that, at the time, had no noticeable part to play in the rapidly unfolding Cold War.

Although English and American news journal maps were not always so disparate in their depictions of world politics, this comparison shows how dramatic English and American world views often were in the early stages of the Cold War despite the “special relationship” harkened to by both nations’ foreign policy makers in the fight against Communism. This comparison more importantly illustrates several ways Cold War American and English news journal maps dealt with the post WWII

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3 Map by R.M. Chapin, Jr., *Time* v.60, no.1, pp36.
Communist threat; the Beaverbrook cartoon omitted all references to Communist nations, thereby devaluing them, while the “Two Worlds” map vilified all Communist nations by portraying them in wholly negative imagery.

These news journal maps graphically illustrate how national news journals, which usually have a noticeable political bias, often use maps for political rhetoric. It also speaks to the ability that maps have to relate complex geopolitical concepts with relatively simple cartographic imagery. The Beaverbrook cartoon, for example, circulated at a time when British leaders across the political spectrum were lamenting the decline of England’s once vast empire after World War II; a decline that was, according to many liberal Tories like Lord Beaverbrook, caused by Britain’s alliance with the U.S. The implication of the cartoon was that U.S. foreign policy—which in the early stages of the Cold War promoted national self-determination for peoples in war-torn Europe and the developing world—was in conflict with Britain’s attempts to reassert its dominion over colonial holdings jeopardized by WWII. Lord Beaverbrook’s solution, a solution lampooned by his own party’s journal here, was to simply exclude the U.S. and its troublesome foreign policies from the British world view.

This dissertation is chiefly concerned with showing how news journal maps of the early Cold War period were used to describe and promote changing world views held by American and English news journals; journals which were themselves extensions of national political parties, and the parties’ attempts to reach public readers and educate them on the dangers of the Communist threat. Weekly news journal maps, rather than maps appearing in daily national newspapers, were selected for review for
three reasons. First, weekly news journals regularly have more detailed and colorful maps because the cartographers employed by weekly journals have much more time to design, draw and paint their maps. As a result, weekly news journal maps tend to display more artistic license, which usually correlates to a more heightened political bias in the cartographic imagery. Therefore these maps display a more versatile palate, both literally and figuratively, by which cartographic propaganda can be recognized and dissected. However, several examples of American and English daily news maps will be used for comparison.

Second, weekly national news journals almost always have an abundance of maps portraying foreign places as these journals try to summarize a week’s worth of geopolitically newsworthy items in a relatively small amount of space. In this way, weekly news maps tend to be much more narrative both politically and culturally, playing off of certain national political fears and hopes especially in times of international crises. Daily newspapers use maps regularly, too, but these maps tend to be simple “locator” maps of more regional or local scope to illustrate local daily news articles. And third, only national news journals, not local or regional papers, are unencumbered by local or regional political concerns; focusing on national and international political issues most prevalent in Cold War international history.

This study will use a relatively new historical approach best described as transatlantic history, as explained below, which recognizes certain transnational cultural influences that transcend political borders and tie all the nations around the Atlantic Ocean together. Although this study will employ many scholarly works on English and
American foreign policy it will not attempt to settle the disputes between the three historical schools of Cold War history described below. Ironically, and for reasons that will be discussed later, the differences between these schools are not pertinent to this study.

The significance of this study is manifold as it crosses several academic disciplines including Cold War politics and culture, journalism and news media, propaganda, and cartography. Obviously, Cold War era studies will benefit most here. Most notably, and with the exceptions noted below, Cold War political and cultural studies have yet to fully realize the importance of national news journals in cultivating American and English public opinion. Journalism and news media studies have recognized the close relationship between politics and supposedly objective news media for quite some time, but serious studies of journalistic cartography are almost nonexistent. Studies of national propaganda efforts have largely focused on official state propaganda programs while ignoring more informal interrelationships between national governments and private (but politically biased) news journals. Historians of cartography have been equally deficient in discussing Cold War era maps in general, with only a handful of scholars even recognizing a separate Cold War cartographic trend. The reason for this general lack of attention to Cold War map propaganda is probably that the Cold War, as an era, has only recently (ca. 1991) come to a close. Although Cold War political historians have debated the causes and effects of the Cold War since its beginning in the mid 1940s, knitting together multidisciplinary studies of
Cold War cultural topics seems to take more time and perspective. This dissertation seeks to place multidisciplinary Cold War studies within a transatlantic perspective.

**Transatlantic History**

Transatlantic history, or Atlantic history as it is sometimes called, is a new approach to doing history and it differs from more traditional historical schools both in its subject matter and methodology. Subjectively, transatlantic studies examine the history and interaction of peoples living in and around the Atlantic Rim; people who, through their mutual interactions, comprise the Atlantic Community. As such, transatlantic scholars recognize that human interactions within this community are two-way, cross-cultural, and transnational across traditional political boundaries. This is a departure from traditional historiography which equated the colonization of the Americas as a one-way process of Europeanization; a replacement of native cultures with European cultures. Similarly, transatlantic scholars value the term “encounters,” rather than “conquests,” when describing the interactions of Europeans and New World natives. The former term relates a process of mutual cultural exchange and cohabitation rather than, as the latter term describes, a process of European discovery and settlement into a *tabula rasa* of New World lands.

Methodologically, transatlantic studies are comparative, transcend political borders, and deal with human interactions that cross the Atlantic Ocean in both directions. The main value of this new approach is to produce histories that use innovative new sources and approaches that yield a more comprehensive picture of the Atlantic Community. In general, transatlantic studies devalue the concept that
European culture, as a product of the newly-established European colonies in Africa and the Americas, remained intact and unchanged as it replaced native cultures. Rather, these studies hold that European colonial activities (exploration, trade, slavery, migration, etc.) facilitated New World encounters that affected repercussions which reverberated through all of the cultures involved. Similarly, transatlantic historians promote the idea that New World native cultures were not simply people waiting to be conquered and replaced by European colonies, and later nations, but that they comprised dynamic and interconnected societies which formed frontiers of intercultural exchange.

Harvard University was the first major university to begin, in 1995, an annual international history seminar dedicated to the Atlantic studies. Directed by one of the founders of transatlantic history, Bernard Bailyn, Harvard’s seminars have since set the methodology and subject matter for the new field. Today graduate courses in transatlantic history are taught in many universities besides Harvard including Columbia University, University of Washington, Georgetown University, the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of Texas at Arlington. Following Harvard’s lead, virtually all transatlantic scholarship has defined the Atlantic Community as a product of European colonization into the Americas and Africa which began around 1500 and ended in 1800, or as Bailyn put it, “from the first encounters of Europeans with the Western Hemisphere through the Revolutionary era.”

Transatlantic studies have centered on topics linked to European imperialism and
expansion; these include migration, religious thought, colonial society, slavery and to a lesser extent, commodities, within this time period. But the transatlantic approach has also been applied to such topics as intellectualism during the colonial age, such as Jack Fruchtman, Jr.’s 2005 study of Benjamin Franklin entitled *Atlantic Cousins: Benjamin Franklin and His Visionary Friends*, which recognized “an atmosphere of steady transatlantic communication” between European intellectuals; the transatlantic community defined here included America, England and France.⁵

Virtually all of the few books dedicated to transatlantic imagery deal with materials from the 1500 to 1800 period. In 1976 Fredi Chiappelli, Michael J.B. Allen and Robert L. Benson edited a two volume series of essays entitled *First Images of America* which discussed the impact of New World imagery on imperial Europe.⁶ This book included an essay by the influential cartographic historian Norman Thrower on cartographic imagery. In 1993 Jerry M. Williams and Robert E. Lewis edited a series of essays entitled *Early Images of the Americas: Transfer and Invention*, which recognized the “notion of a transatlantic encounter (rather than discovery),” to show that the generation of cultural imagery and perceptions of foreign peoples is always two-way when unfamiliar cultures interact for the first time in the Atlantic Community.⁷

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Bailyn’s definition of the transatlantic era is very traditional and chronologically limited. It precludes studies of historical eras before and after the noted endpoints, 1500 to 1800, much to the detriment of the transatlantic field. Transatlantic historians have largely ignored, for example, the encounters between the Vikings and the New World natives which began in the late tenth century A.D. and lasted over two hundred years. This omission contrasts sharply to the archaeological studies which have long recognized the activities of Vikings in the New World. Although the Vikings did not differentiate between North American natives they encountered, labeling all natives pejoratively as “skraelings,” their oral histories, and modern archaeology, reveal that transatlantic encounters indeed began over five hundred years before 1500. Similarly, by Bailyn’s delineation, post 1800 eras are ignored by transatlantic historians; a strange exclusion since the frequency and volume of transatlantic migration, commerce, war, politics, etc, increased dramatically after 1800. Relatively narrow, definitions of the transatlantic era seems to be changing very recently, however. In 2005, an encyclopedia of transatlantic relations was published, the first encyclopedia for the transatlantic field, and it offered an expanded timeline of transatlantic encounters which began with the Viking voyages and ended in the modern day.

That transatlantic studies have, until recently, been confined to the European colonial era (and hence ignored the Cold War era) is somewhat ironic when one considers that the concept of an Atlantic community originated with one of America’s

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most celebrated Cold Warriors—journalist Walter Lippman. As early as 1917, Lippman’s editorial columns in the American magazine *The New Republic* began to argue that the United States was part of a transatlantic community that included Britain and most of Europe, excluding Germany and the other WWI era Axis power nations.\(^\text{10}\) Later, in his 1944 book, *U.S. War Aims*, Lippman dedicated an entire chapter to the “Atlantic Community,” as he called for U.S. intervention in World War II.\(^\text{11}\) He argued that since two of the three Atlantic Community superpowers, Great Britain and France, were threatened by WWII, the third power, the United States, should join the war effort.\(^\text{12}\) Through his prestige as a journalist, author and political commentator, Lippman’s Atlantic Community was based on the transnational power of Western Christendom, and the perceived threat to it did more than serve to endorse a more interventionist U.S. foreign policy. He put forth a basic precept of transatlantic studies which holds that cultural and societal forces pervade the political borders of the Atlantic world.\(^\text{13}\) According to Lippman, “the Atlantic nations remain separate sovereign nations but they form a living community.”\(^\text{14}\) Lippman’s writings were influential in later works by eminent early Cold War historians such as Ross Hoffman and American


\(^{10}\) Ibid, pp 7.


\(^{12}\) Ibid, pp 73-4.

\(^{13}\) Lippman also referred to the Atlantic Community variously as the “Atlantic World,” the “Atlantic Sphere” and the “Ocean Community.”

\(^{14}\) Ibid, pp 77.
Historical Association president Carlton J. Hayes.\textsuperscript{15} Both historians recognized that the Atlantic Community had its roots in Judeo-Christian religious traditions and that it was still a “current political entity” in the mid 1940s.\textsuperscript{16}

Lippman held to his definition of the sovereign nations bordering the Atlantic as a “living community” with few alterations throughout his very public career, and especially during the formative years of the Cold War. So too, did the political leaders of Western Europe and the Americas who signed the various post WWII anticommunist treaties focusing on the military and economic solidarity of Atlantic Rim nations. Consider the Atlantic Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan: All played heavily off the notion that a distinct Atlantic community existed and needed to be defended from Communist (and fascist) expansion.

Why, then, do the few transatlantic academic programs, following Harvard’s lead, not recognize the existence of the transatlantic community after 1800? One possible reason is that they adhere to the idea presented by historians Jacques Godechot and Robert R. Palmer, in a 1955 paper, that Europe and America, despite their common religious and cultural values, had grown apart after 1800.\textsuperscript{17} Transatlantic scholars have ignored, though, the importance of Godechot’s and Palmer’s prophetic caveat:

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, pp5.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, pp8-10. For the original essay see Godechot, Jacques and Robert R. Palmer, “Le Problème de l’Atlantique du XVII\textsuperscript{ème} au XX\textsuperscript{ème} Siècle,” \textit{Relazioni del X Congresso Internazionale di Scienze Storiche} (Florence, 1955), V (\textit{Storia Contemporanea}), pp175-238, \textit{passim}. 
“if the asymmetry between the United States and Europe in the sphere of economics could be reduced...if the USSR continues to live apart, if the great Asiatic civilizations develop their nationalisms and their hostile dispositions to the West, then there will be a renewal in the future and a development not only of an Atlantic diplomatic alliance but also of a western or Atlantic civilization.” 18

This dissertation adheres to the idea that the Atlantic Community did in fact survive the end of the colonial era and the rise of nationalism as Godechot and Palmer predicted. The post colonial era Atlantic Community, it will be argued, was very different from what existed in the past. In the colonial era, the United States played a decisively minor role to Great Britain and France, for example. Beginning with the Spanish American War in the late 1890s the United States began to assert itself as a major player in transatlantic politics. Between 1900 and 1945, the United States became the most powerful citizen of what might be called the modern Atlantic Community. Conversely, and by the same timetable, England’s prestige as a colonial world power diminished sharply. Therefore, as was the case with the colonial era, the modern Atlantic Community was very dynamic in its power structure but it was founded on many of the same precepts as that of its predecessor. Although the aforementioned Western Christendom was probably the most pervasive element, now ideas of Western democracy, capitalism, military allegiance, and finally anticommunism, came to fore by the late 1940s.

This dissertation will show examples of the interrelationships between the United States and England in the modern Atlantic Community as those
interrelationships were presented in popular national news journal maps. As the main two anticommunist nations in the Cold War, England and America constantly collaborated to thwart a perceived Communist threat. It was in 1945, after all, that Winston Churchill coined two geopolitical phrases that came to symbolize the need for a continued Anglo-American cooperation in the terrifying age of the Cold War: the Anglo-American “special relationship” and the “Iron Curtain.” This idea of a “special relationship” between England and the U.S. will be shown to be one of the founding concepts of the modern Atlantic Community.

The concept of the Iron Curtain, which predated 1945 but was first popularized by Churchill’s speech at Fulton, Missouri, was one of the many impetuses for anticommunist collaboration between the two great Western nations even after 1989. Although official foreign relations documents from both nations readily reveal the diverging geopolitical agendas of both nations, it is in popular news journal maps that the day-to-day geopolitical changes were sold to the public. Moreover, the national governments of both nations regularly relied on their respective news journals as barometers of public opinion and often as official sources of intelligence on Communist activities. News journals were also used as conduits to propagate changing national political foreign policy goals as international developments occurred. And, as was demonstrated by the opening example, English and American news journals regularly reprinted each other’s Cold War political rhetoric; a practice which constituted another layer of Anglo-American dialogue in the modern Atlantic Community. Lastly, U.S. and

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16 This excerpt from Godechot’s and Palmer’s essay was, ironically, taken from Bailyn’s “The Idea of
English foreign policy makers often measured their national and international anticommunism efforts on what the other nation was doing.

News journals were used by American and English politicians to describe a complex, dynamic, and often competitive set of political world views in the early years of the Cold War. Primarily, in the U.S. and England, two competing ideas of post WWII international power structure emerged and found voice in map forms. Following President Woodrow Wilson’s ideology, American politicians such as presidents Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and former ambassador to Russia Averell Harriman promoted what has been labeled a “universalist” view. This view, the majority view in the White House, saw post WWII Europe in need of a unified system of international peace whereby all war-torn European nations would become self-determinant, democratic societies that arbitrated international disputes through mutual cooperation in the new United Nations.

A minority of American foreign policy experts, though, endorsed the “spheres of influence” ideology of post WWII international order which recognized the need for hegemonic geopolitical realms governed by superpower nations to repress fascism and maintain international peace. Adherents to this view included Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, American ambassador to Russia George F. Kennan, and Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace. English Prime ministers Winston Churchill and Clement Atlee were in the “spheres” camp as well. American and English foreign policy makers had to grapple with these often contradictory, but by no means mutually exclusive,
world views in order to protect their nations, and Western Europe, from the threat of Communism.

In all these examples of Anglo-American anticommunism collaboration and conflict, national news journal maps played a crucial role. Certain Cold War map themes emerged to categorize and polarize the world along political lines, and to label certain geographic regions and peoples as either good or bad. Although this polarization appeared some time before the Cold War, it did not gain popularity until after 1945. But map iconography specific to the Cold War did develop, and its popularization helped transform the mental maps of English and American citizens concerned with geopolitical affairs. This dissertation will examine how Cold War map iconography differed in England and America, and what these differences reveal about the often competing Anglo versus American world views. In this way, this study will follow the recommendations of noted cartographic historian J. B. Harley and David Woodward, and later echoed by Denis Cosgrove, who argued that studying a society’s maps can offer powerful insights about societal culture.¹⁹

Five national news journals from England, and five from America, were selected because they present the widest scope of national political views that existed in the ten years after WWII. Conveniently, and for the purposes of this dissertation, the selected journals also represented some of the most widely distributed news journals in both countries. The 1945 to 1955 time period was chosen because by 1955 the Cold War had reached the end of what many scholars consider to be its first major phase. Charles
S. Maier, for example, argued that by 1955 the Cold War had reached its first “thaw” due to a combination of factors. Stalin’s death in 1953, coupled with his successors’ attempts to reverse many aspects of Stalinization in Eastern Europe, followed by the two monumental Geneva Conferences in 1955 and 1956, brought the first period of international relaxation. Similarly, D.F. Fleming has written that Western powers were compelled to attend the 1955 Geneva Conference because the Cold War had reached its first stalemate. The United States sought to escape from the Formosa (Taiwan) crisis while British Conservatives hoped to use the peace conference to win support for their candidate, Winston Churchill. But both England and the U.S. attended the summit conference with the general goals of ending the global fear of atomic war, especially since the international nuclear arms race had, by 1955, also reached a stalemate.

By 1955 England and the U.S. had become disillusioned with postwar international cooperation as it included the Soviet Union, and they had settled into their relatively stable and respective foreign policies and world views; anticommunism was at the heart of both. Although major international events occurred fairly consistently throughout the Cold War, the first ten years saw the events that solidified American and English public opinion about world affairs, the value of fellow capitalist allies, and the perceived threat of Communism. The Stalinization of Eastern Europe, the Greek civil

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war, the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, the Berlin Blockade, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Containment policy, the rise of NATO, the development of the nuclear arms race, the “fall” of China, the Korean War, the rise of McCarthyism and the death of Stalin all caused increased levels of anxiety over the fate of world affairs.

These events were framed by the many international treaties, both before and after 1945, dealing with the settlement of WWII; a process which also largely ended in 1955. Postwar treaties included the Rio Pact Treaty (1947), the North Atlantic Treaty (1949), the ANZUS Treaty (1951), the security treaties with Japan and the Philippines (1951), the heretofore permanent partitioning of Korea (1953), and finally the SEATO Treaty and the bilateral settlement of the Taiwan question (1955). These treaties belied, and were largely a product of, the growing mutual hostility between the Soviet Union and the major Western powers, however. And from 1945 to 1955 Western nations, especially the U.S. and England, experienced their most rattling waves of anticommunism. Stalinization of Eastern Europe, the Greek civil war, the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, the Berlin Blockade, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Containment policy, the rise of NATO, the development of the nuclear arms race, the “fall” of China, the Korean War, and the death of Stalin all caused increased levels of anxiety over the fate of world affairs. By 1955, then,

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22 The only major international treaty after 1955, from the Western perspective, was the 1959 CENTO Treaty, of which the U.S. was never a full member. However, in 1959 the U.S. did sign separate defense treaties with Pakistan, Turkey and Iran. But only the Iran treaty was significant because Pakistan was already a member of SEATO and Turkey was a founding member of NATO.
England and the U.S. had, through a combination of unfolding political events and home-bred anticommunist propaganda, already formulated a more or less stable image of the Communist threat as expressed in political speeches, popular media, and in national news journal maps.

The year 1955 is also relevant endpoint for this study because it marks what many historians claim to be the end of the “special relationship” between England and the U.S. as it had existed since 1945. Although major geopolitical differences existed between the two nations at the signing of all the major WWII settlement treaties, it was not until 1956 that the U.S. publicly distanced itself from England’s foreign policy goals. In that year the Suez Crisis drew the two nations, and France, into a heated political debate as the U.S. condemned England’s and France’s attempts to thwart Egypt’s nationalization of the Canal Zone. From 1956 on, and with British capitulation to the U.S. position on the Suez, England’s subordination to U.S. foreign policy was solidified. Until that time, English foreign policy makers’ anxiety over becoming a junior partner in the developing perception of an American-Soviet-led settlement of WWII was almost always restricted to official foreign relations documents and was not, by and large, publicly discussed.

The American national news journals selected for this study are *Time, Newsweek, Life, Christian Science Monitor, and Look*. Other journals used for comparison include *American Legion, Junior Scholastic, Nation, Saturday Evening Post* and *Stars and Stripes*, although many other weekly and daily journals will be consulted as well. English journals chosen are *The Economist, John Bull, Punch, The Spectator,*
and the *London Tribune*. Unlike their counterparts in the United States, the English weekly news journals suffered drastically low print runs, as did English daily newspapers, and relatively few weekly journals existed due to the damage of WWII and the ongoing paper rationing. Consequently, more daily newspapers are used in the English sampling comparisons than in the American case. The *London Daily News* and the *London Herald Tribune* will be cited frequently for comparison.

**Maps and Mapping**

Many excellent scholarly works have been produced on the power and role of maps in modern societies. Edward Lynam’s 1944 study entitled *British Maps and Mapmakers* is one of the few works that outline British cartographic trends before WWII.\(^{23}\) Norman Thrower has written several influential works including the 1972 book *Maps and Man*, which analyzed how maps can graphically relate the cultural and philosophical values of the societies doing the mapping.\(^{24}\) This book was expanded and its themes elaborated on in a revised 1996 edition renamed *Maps and Civilization*.\(^{25}\) In 1974 Peter Gould’s and Rodney White’s book *Mental Maps* discussed how sampled demographic groups in England and the United States, among other places, used mental maps to evaluate their surroundings both near and far.\(^{26}\) The main value of this book, especially in its revised edition published in 1986, was that it demonstrated how people construct and use mental maps to form ideas about unfamiliar places. John Noble

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Wilford’s 1981 book The Mapmakers, revised in 2000, discussed how mapping techniques, particularly map projections, have served to aid societies in laying claim to an ever increasing world of cartographic data.\(^{27}\)

Mark Monmonier has written extensively about the use of maps in modern society. His 1989 book Maps with the News, revised in 1999, showed how journalistic maps have tremendous legitimacy in the public mind, and he acknowledged “the evolutionary links between the British and the American press.”\(^{28}\) Monmonier’s 1991 book How to Lie with Maps, revised in 1996, discussed the many ways map conventions can be used to mislead map readers. It remains the only major work to discuss Cold War era maps in this regard.\(^{29}\) Gerald A. Danzer’s 1991 teaching aid for U.S. history, entitled Discovering American History through Maps and Views, included several useful examples of Cold War U.S. map propaganda.\(^{30}\)

Much information from Denis Wood’s 1992 book The Power of Maps will be used in this study.\(^{31}\) Wood’s discussion of how maps serve society through the interests they serve, by selective representation and iconography, is most useful. In 2001, a series of previously published essays by the late (1991) and influential scholar J.B. Harley were published in The New Nature of Maps.\(^{32}\) These essays investigated, with

much borrowed from Michel Foucault’s notions of power-knowledge relationships, how maps have served as active powerful agents of conquest and dominion by royal and national empires. Susan Schulten wrote an enlightening book entitled *The Geographical Imagination in America, 1880-1950*, in 2001, which discussed many of the journalistic cartographers to be examined in this essay.33 She focused on how popular maps, affected by contemporary local and international developments, helped educate and shape public perceptions of foreign places during the rise of American global power. Denis Cosgrove’s 2001 book *Apollo’s Eye* traced the idea of the spherical globe, as expressed in maps and models, in Western societies from classical Greece to the modern era.34 Edward Tufte’s influential 2001 book *The Visual Display of Quantitative Information* discussed many trends in graphic advertising which were shown to apply to maps and journalism.35

None of these authors, with the exceptions of Monmonier and Schulten, dedicated any material to journalistic cartography. Monmonier argued that the dearth of research in this area is probably due cartographic historians’ penchant for “visually complex data maps, aesthetically impressive atlases and thematic maps” while these authors generally ignore “the cumulative importance to society of individually unimpressive news maps.”36 He points to a single article, written by Walter W. Ristow, which addresses this subject of maps in journalism. Ristow’s article, entitled

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“Journalistic Cartography,” appeared in the October 1957 issue of *Surveying and Mapping*. It included much information about journalistic cartography, and journalistic cartographers, who helped changed news cartography during and after WWII and into the early Cold War period. But Monmonier must have missed the 1985 article written by Patricia Gilmartin in the journal *Cartographica*, entitled “The Design of Journalistic Maps / Purposes, Parameters and Prospects.” The article elaborated on many of Ristow’s general themes with more modern examples, and included more analysis on basic cartographic methods. The only other essay of note in this general field would be Alan K. Henrikson’s essay entitled “Mental Maps,” which appeared in Michael J. Hogan’s and Thomas G. Paterson’s 1991 book *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*. That mental maps, too, are underappreciated in Cold War historiography may be evidenced by the fact that this helpful essay was omitted from later editions of this book.

**Cold War Historiography**

Cold War historiography can be divided into three successive schools. The first is called the “traditionalist” or “orthodox” school. It emerged in the late 1940s and sought to justify the U.S.-led militarization of Western Europe and the nuclear arms

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race as necessary to counter an expansionist Soviet empire. These historians, who often had close official or unofficial ties to the federal government, argued that Joseph Stalin, through his supposed influence in the world’s significant Communist parties, sought to overturn national democracies. Postwar Communist party growth in Iran, Greece, China, Turkey and even France was offered as proof of Stalin’s ambitions. Traditionalists emphasized that Stalin’s deceitful and paranoid personality stymied all American overtures for international cooperation in the postwar rebuilding of Europe. All traditionalists generally supported the Containment policy as they agreed that the militarization of Western Europe was only a defensive response to Stalin’s isolating and militarizing Eastern Europe from 1945 to about 1948.

George F. Kennan, then head of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, offered the first traditionalist interpretation of the Cold War in his now famous 1947 Foreign Affairs article entitled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” Thomas A. Bailey’s 1950 publication, America Faces Russia, was a largely diplomatic history of Russian-American relations since the American Revolution. Bailey relied heavily, as did many of this school, on U.S. State Department documents for historical sources, and he blamed Stalin’s military expansion into East Europe as the cause of the Cold War. Herbert Feis, a former State Department advisor, also relied chiefly on State Department documents. In his 1957 book Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, Feis argued that Truman’s break with Roosevelt’s policy of Soviet amity was only in response to

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41 Kennan, George F. (under the pseudonym “Mr. X”). “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” in Foreign Affairs (1947), vol.25, no.4, 566-82.
Stalin’s aggressive actions after WWII. Feis wrote several other books with the same general allegations, including Between War and Peace (1960), The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II (1966) and From Trust to Terror (1970). Kennan’s 1961 book Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin blamed Stalin’s expansionism for the onset of the Cold War, although he did caution against anti-Communist hysteria. In an influential 1967 *Foreign Affairs* article entitled “Origins of the Cold War,” Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. similarly blamed the Cold War on Stalin, whose paranoia Schlesinger named as the spoiler of post WWII Soviet-U.S. relations.

The second school of Cold War historiography, called the revisionist school, began in the late 1940s and was largely a product of a liberal reaction to American military involvement in Southeast Asia. Unlike the traditionalists, most revisionist historians placed the majority, if not all, of blame for the Cold War on the United States. They were more critical of President Truman’s foreign policy and they generally viewed the Containment policy as an official vehicle to promote American economic interests abroad. Revisionists likewise saw Stalin’s eventual “Stalinization” of Eastern Europe as a logical and understandable reaction to fundamentally anti-Communist post WWII American programs like the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine; that these Cold War international programs were mere continuations of

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42 Bailey, Thomas A. American Faces Russia (Gloucester, MA: P. Smith, 1950).
45 Kennan, George F. Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: Little Brown, 1961).
American colonizing efforts that dated back to the 1890s. This school tended to view Truman’s words and actions as basically brash and provocative, and claimed that Truman’s personality, not Stalin’s, was a major cause of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{47}

The revisionist school, by definition, began with the first major academic challenge to the Containment policy—Walter Lippman’s 1947 book \textit{The Cold War}, which challenged the rationale for Containment.\textsuperscript{48} William Appleman Williams was the first historian to argue that the U.S. got involved in the Cold War largely for economic reasons. His three books—\textit{American-Russian Relations, 1781-1947} published in 1952, \textit{The Tragedy of American Foreign Policy} written in 1959, and \textit{The Contours of American History} in 1961—set up the argument that American economic interests abroad motivated the creation of the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe, and the Truman Doctrine to fight the spread of Communism.\textsuperscript{49}

The 1961 publication of D.F. Fleming’s \textit{The Cold War and Its Origins} laid the blame for the Cold War at the feet of Truman, who was accused of reversing Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s practice of downplaying Soviet-American foreign policy differences.\textsuperscript{50} Gar Alperovitz echoed the perceived Roosevelt-Truman discontinuity as a major cause of the war in his 1965 book \textit{Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and

\textsuperscript{47} These generalizations of the revisionist school are useful but have garnered notable criticism. See Michael Leigh’s article, “Is There a Revisionist Thesis on the Origins of the Cold War?” in \textit{Political Science Quarterly}, vol. 89, no. 1 (March 1974) 101-116.
In that same year David Horowitz’s book *The Free World Colossus* noted Truman’s unnecessarily harsh treatment of Soviet Ambassador Molotov as the major cause of the breakdown in Soviet-American relations. In 1967 Walter La Feber’s book *America, Russia and the Cold War* similarly labeled Truman’s foreign policy, and his personality, as unnecessarily provocative in the early stages of the Cold War. Gabriel Kolko argued, in his 1968 book *The Politics of War: The World and the United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*, that a U.S.-led settlement of WWII was designed chiefly to create an economic *Pax Americana*; to which Stalin’s isolation and militarization of Eastern Europe was a last and logical resort. These ideas were expanded and elaborated on in Gabriel and Joyce Kolko’s 1972 publication *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954*. More recently, Michael Hogan’s 1987 book *The Marshall Plan* placed American capitalist corporations, not foreign policy makers, at the helm of post WWII rebuilding efforts in Europe.

The third and most recent historiographic school, called the post revisionist school, finds unilateral blame for the Cold War insufficient. Rather, post revisionists seek to grant more or less equal blame on the U.S. and Soviet Union. The most influential author of this school is John Lewis Gaddis, whose *The United States and the

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Origins of the Cold War, written in 1972, and The Origins of the Cold War, in 1982, blamed the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union, through naturally differing and competing world views, for the onset of the Cold War. Gaddis argued that Truman’s aggressive foreign policy was not chiefly concerned with economic expansion overseas, but was founded on the need to hastily assemble an international military alliance to contain Communism.\textsuperscript{56}

Similarly, Daniel Yergin argued in his 1977 book Shattered Peace that although American foreign policy makers intended the best, they were confused over Stalin’s post WWII motives and actions, and blame for the Cold War can be found on both sides.\textsuperscript{57} Thomas G. Paterson’s 1979 book On Every Front similarly blamed the Soviets and the Americans for the Cold War.\textsuperscript{58} Although Paterson recognized the role of American enterprise in rebuilding post WWII Europe he saw a basic conflict between the U.S. “spheres of influence” world view and Stalin’s more narrow concerns over protecting Russian borders. Melvin P. Leffler’s 1992 book A Preponderance of Power likewise saw U.S. and Soviet world views as incompatible, and that both nations sought valued the idea of assuming a leadership role in their respective geopolitical realms.\textsuperscript{59} Leffler argued that the U.S. probably spent too much on militarizing Western Europe,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Leffler, Melvin P. A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).
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\end{footnotesize}
but that the Soviet Union would have done the same in Eastern Europe if it had the resources. Gaddis’s latest book, *We Now Know*, written in 1997, benefited from recently published memoirs of former Soviet leaders after the fall of the Soviet Union. Gaddis highlighted the irrationality of Stalin’s personality and foreign policy in Eastern Europe, which forced Americans to accept the invitation of Western Europe to form a confederation of nations for Containment purposes.

This dissertation will not attempt to validate any of these schools of thought, however, for two reasons. First, given the high degree of anticommunism in England and the U.S. from 1945 to 1955, made more powerful by the onset of the nuclear arms race, the only school of thought that mattered at the time was the prevailing traditionalist school. The only notable exceptions to the traditionalist view were the few United States and English politicians and historians who challenged the practicality of the Containment policy, but every influential political and historical source from this period saw the Communist threat in largely the same way. Second, despite the aforementioned differences between the three schools, they all tend to agree on the major political and cultural concerns present in England and the United States in the early Cold War period. The U.S. was concerned with leading the coalition to rebuild Europe, and eventually to contain Communism with British help. England was concerned, earlier than the U.S., with thwarting Communism in Europe, and with losing its status as a first rate world power—largely through the dwindling of its world colonies and its being kept out of the loop in U.S. and Soviet post WWII negotiations.
The following list of historiographical sources confirms the reality that studies of Cold War culture, journalism, propaganda, and public opinion overlap heavily. As such, the academic sources listed here are not necessarily sorted by their main focus, but rather by the subject matter drawn from them. Cold War cultural studies, for example, often recognize the mass media as a tool to shape public opinion. Similarly, studies of Cold War journalism usually show ties between journalistic agencies and national political concerns. And propaganda studies often touch on politics, mass media, public opinion and even foreign policy as it applies to state-media relations.

**Cold War Cultural Studies**

Cultural historians studying the Cold War have traditionally focused the impact of capitalist expansion, from the West outward and overseas to other regions. Given the preeminence of the United States in the postwar capitalist world, most cultural studies have focused on the effects American capitalism, culture and politics abroad; what has been termed “cultural imperialism” or “cultural diplomacy.” In 1997, Walter Hixson’s *Parting the Iron Curtain* showed the effects of official U.S. cultural exchange programs with the Soviet Union from 1945 to about 1960. In her 1999 book *Transmission Impossible*, Jessica Geinow-Hecht argued that the U.S. sought to retool postwar Germany’s journalism in the image of the American press in an effort to

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61 For a summary of these works see Akira Iriye’s “Cultural and International History” in Michael J. Hogan’s and Thomas G. Patterson’s *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (2nd ed.) (Cambridge, 2004), 241-256.
engender pro-Western democratic and anticommunist values. The following works, distributed among relevant topics, are recognized as being extensions of British and American culture as well.

Cold War Journalism and Public Opinion

One of the earliest studies of American public opinion was Walter Lippman’s 1922 book Public Opinion which argued that American democracy was largely a product of a malleable public influenced by large interest groups. James Aronson’s 1970 study The Press and the Cold War, examined the American press’s reactions to changes in U.S.-Soviet relations from the end of WWII to 1970. Aronson’s focus on the press’s reaction to McCarthyism in the 1950s makes this study more relevant to this dissertation than broader studies. Two years later, John Lewis Gaddis’s book The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 had no chapter dedicated to the role of the press, but it did show the importance of the American press in cultivating public opinion. Similarly, in 1976, Ralph Levering’s American Opinion and the Russian Alliance, 1939-1945 discussed newspapers as one of several media of government-public discourse which tied American foreign policy to public opinion. Thomas G. Paterson dedicated a chapter of his 1979 book On Every Front to the role of

American public opinion in shaping national foreign policy. Paterson argued that the Truman administration courted American news moguls to sell an interventionist foreign policy to the masses. The British also used the American media, according to Paterson, to cultivate public favor for larger postwar American loans to Great Britain. One of the most useful works dealing with Anglo-U.S. relations and public opinion is the aforementioned 1990 book by Robert M. Hathaway entitled Great Britain and the United States: Special Relations since World War II. Hathaway generously addressed both nations’ public sentiment trends for many major Cold War events.

**Propaganda Studies**

In 1988 Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman published their influential study *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* which outlined five media “filters.” Among them was the “religion of anticommunism,” which kept American Cold War news journals biased after 1945. Also in 1988, Louis Liebovich’s *The Press and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-1947* examined *Time* magazine, the *San Francisco Times*, the *Chicago Tribune* and the *New York Herald Tribune* for their views on the early Cold War period. Any historiography of general propaganda studies must include Garth S. Jowett’s and Victoria O’Donnell’s widely used text entitled *Propaganda and Persuasion*. First written in 1989, it has been

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reprinted three times by 1999.  

Although the differences between propaganda and persuasion are noteworthy, they do not apply to this dissertation as all the maps discussed here fall plainly into the former category. The main value of this book is its dissection of propaganda. Richard M. Perloff’s *The Dynamics of Persuasion*, from 1993, outlined many subtleties involved in mass persuasion.  

Studies of U.S. propaganda efforts include Leo Bogart’s *Premises for Propaganda*, written in 1976, which remains the best examination of the U.S. Information Agency’s Cold War operations in Europe after WWII. The WWII propaganda activities of the Office of War Information were covered in Allan M. Winkler’s 1978 book *The Politics of Propaganda*. Alvin A. Snyder’s 1995 book *Warriors of Disinformation* revealed an insider’s account of many U.S. multimedia propaganda programs on both sides of the Iron Curtain throughout the Cold War. In their 1997 book *The Press as Public Educator: Cultures of Understanding, Cultures of Ignorance* authors Colin Lacey and David Longman discussed links between Lippman’s ideas of a malleable American public, and Chomsky and Herman’s media filters theory. Lacey and Longman also compared U.S. and British press media to show a high degree of similarity between them. Walter Hixson’s 1997 book *Parting the Iron Curtain* examined the many official

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U.S. State Department propaganda programs in Western Europe between 1945 and 1961.\textsuperscript{77} Michael Kahan’s 1999 book \textit{Media as Politics} showed the importance of the American media in legitimizing new nation states in the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{78} Shawn J. Parry-Giles outlined how the Truman administration courted national news magazines to promote American interventionism in post WWII Europe in his 2002 book entitled \textit{The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955}.\textsuperscript{79}

Studies of British propaganda are not as numerous as those dealing with the United States, however, several books have been helpful in this dissertation. Michael Balfour discussed several British propaganda agencies that existed during WWII in his 1979 book \textit{Propaganda in War, 1939-1945}.\textsuperscript{80} In his 1998 book entitled \textit{The British at War} James Chapman discussed British WWII film propaganda and its ties to the state.\textsuperscript{81} Similarly, Robert Calder’s 2004 book \textit{Beware the British Serpent} examined the collaboration of British and American propagandists during the WWII period.\textsuperscript{82} British propaganda efforts in the Cold War era, to 1960, were discussed in several chapters of John M. Mackenzie’s 1984 book \textit{Propaganda and Empire}.\textsuperscript{83} William Croft’s book

\textsuperscript{76} Lacey Colin and David Longman. \textit{The Press as Public Educator: Cultures of Understanding, Cultures of Ignorance} (Luton, U.K.: Luton University Press, 1997).
Coercion or Persuasion? (1989) dealt specifically with British Cold War era propaganda and how it related to similar programs in the U.S. Links between early Cold War British propaganda organizations in the 1930s and the 1960s were shown in Tony Shaw’s 1996 book Eden, Suez, and the Mass Media. It is interesting to note that none of these books made any reference to the role of cartography in journalism or propaganda. However, several early Cold War era maps were included in Michael Barson’s and Steven Heller’s 2001 pictorial Red Scared.

The sources cited above will be used in this dissertation to contrast and compare American and English news journal maps as instruments of anticommunist propaganda in the formative years of the Cold War. These maps, it will be shown, formed a medium of political and cultural discourse which itself was part of the modern Atlantic Community; a community not recognized as yet by most transatlantic scholarship. This dissertation will not try to gauge the impact these journal maps actually had on public opinion; that issue is not only difficult to gauge but also beyond the scope of this work. Rather, the activities of these news cartographers, and their employment by national news journals with proven ties to national politics, can—primarily through an examination of the maps they drafted—offer another layer of insight into Cold War studies.

Before an analysis of British and American news journal maps can begin it is necessary to define some terms. Whenever the terms *postwar* or *early Cold War* appear they refer to the period that began with end of WWII in mid 1945 and ended in early 1947. During this time the former WWII Allies—Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union—began to drift apart and into polarized camps of capitalism versus Communism that characterized international Cold War relations for the next forty years. As noted in the first chapter, although many historians label 1947 as the beginning of the Cold War mainly due to the Containment style legislation passed in the United States in that year, the two and a half years that proceeded WWII saw the formation of political, journalistic and cartographic rhetoric that characterized the Cold War in Britain and the United States.

Unless otherwise noted, the terms *British press* and *American press* refer to national news services in newspaper, news journal and popular journal formats. This does not include book publishers but, for the purposes of this study, it does include private map publishers. In ways described later that deal with map production and advertising, American and British national presses had very close ties with private map houses—ties that spanned the postwar Atlantic World. In fact, the term *Atlantic World*
has often been controversial for other reasons than those discussed in the introductory chapter. This term has no preferred definition as its public conception changes throughout this study, as do many geopolitical labels. The examination of these changes in public discourse, and especially in maps, is one of the goals of this study.

The act of linking terms, or ideas, to political entities has always been controversial. However, it is exactly what news mapmakers regularly do, and they did it with great enthusiasm in the British and American press in the early Cold War. The labeling of political entities in this study will follow the labels of the postwar British and American press although many of them are technically incorrect by modern standards. Even though the United States and Britain were the closest of the Allied nations during WWII, by 1945 they comprised very different political entities with similarly different geopolitical outlooks. The postwar political boundaries of the United States, which will be equated with the term America for the purposes of this study, are easy to describe relative to those of Britain. Although the synonymous use of United States and America is not currently fashionable, it is based on the undisputed fact that the nation is officially named the United States of America [as distinct from the United States of Mexico]. In both nations’ public discourse for the period of this study, the United States and America were used interchangeably. By 1945 the United States consisted of the forty-eight contiguous states, the large territory of Alaska, and various Pacific island possessions including Hawaii, Puerto Rico and Guam. Although American territory in the Pacific sometimes did get coverage in both nations’ weekly
news maps, these maps usually portrayed the United States as the forty-eight states and Alaska while the inclusion of American lands in the Pacific only appeared occasionally.

Defining the boundaries of Britain by 1945 is a bit more complicated given the history, size and complexity of the British Empire. The many geopolitical names associated with Britain hint at this complexity. The term British Isles refers to all the regions shown in the first map (fig. 2.1). Within this group of islands is a host of political and cultural realms that both connect and delineate the peoples living there and in the British Empire abroad. The largest island of the British Isles is called Great Britain, which is dominated by the nation of England, and also contains the sovereign nations of Scotland and Wales. The United Kingdom (U.K.), also called the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, describes the political union of the Great Britain nations, Northern Ireland, and fourteen overseas island territories comprising the British Commonwealth. Ireland, fiercely independent from England since 1922, was neutral in WWI and WWII. As will be shown, virtually all post WWII American and British news maps portraying the British Isles and the British Empire graphically delineated Ireland from all things British.

87 The oceanic possessions of the U.S. by 1945 were Hawaii, Wake Island, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines and American Samoa. The U.S. also had control over the Panama Canal Zone.
Meanwhile, the term *British Empire* encompasses the U.K. and the British Commonwealth nations including Canada, India, Palestine (later Israel), South Africa, Australia and the Anglo Egyptian Sudan. But as with the British Isles, the British Empire was a multilayered and complex assembly of political entities by 1945 that were linked by a multilayered set of trade and political treaties. British-made maps of the empire illustrated this complexity with multilayered colors and symbols “arranged in a series, to show gradation of governmental forms from direct military administration, through full responsible government by universal suffrage, to complete self-government.”

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*Serial Map Service* described no less than five levels of affiliation between the British Isles nations and the Commonwealth (fig.2.2).\(^{89}\)

This study will use the term *British* as a generic cultural label for all imagery and political ideology that emerged from London which was the capitol city of England, the home of Fleet Street, and the control center for the British Empire. Moreover, the Fleet Street national press, the American press, and both national governments usually preferred the term *British* rather than *English, Anglo-Saxon* or any other hegemonic cultural label. These political labels notwithstanding, the British and American presses differed somewhat in their labeling of British lands.

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\(^{89}\) See map 352 and 353 entitled “The British Empire,” in *Serial Map Service*, v.7 n.7 (April 1946).
The British press was naturally more conscious of the many political combinations involved in the British Empire, but it relied on a few standbys. Even though the seat of postwar British political and cultural power resided in London, England, the British press most often labeled its cultural and political ties as British rather than English. Similarly, the term British Empire was most often used by both presses to describe all British overseas possessions.

**British and American National News Journals by 1945**

By the end of WWII, British and American news journals were more different than similar. Both nations’ major news journals were privately owned by politically active, wealthy entrepreneurs. Both nations’ journals were designed chiefly to make a profit while making a political statement, even if that statement was a claim of political nonpartisanship. And both nations’ journals operated in a free market economy with virtually no direct intervention by their national governments. That, however, is where the similarities end. In terms of volume of publications, use of graphics and maps, distribution and sales levels of journals, and political affiliation the two presses were very dissimilar. The pace of news was much faster in Britain given the nation’s relatively high number of news publications per capita—competition that kept news debates livelier than anything in America, except during the McCarthy Era of the early 1950s.⁹⁰ But the American press was much more powerful, commercially successful

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and technologically superior. Although both presses had access to roughly the same printing equipment by 1945, economic conditions favored America but kept British printing a step behind in terms of imagery reproduction and capacity.

After the war the most difference between British and American news journals was economic. Simply put, the British economy was in ruins while the American economy soared. The British war effort bankrupted the great empire and by 1945 its 2.7 billion pound war debt, largely to the United States, forced a sale of almost all its foreign assets totaling over 1 billion pounds. In that year the United Kingdom became the world’s largest debtor nation. National rationing of almost all commercial goods during and after the war, especially of newsprint paper, negatively impacted most British news publications.

British newsprint rationing was imposed by the Control of Paper Orders, from 1940 to New Years Day 1959, which amply encompasses the period of this study. The British press had been dependent on imported wood pulp since the 1920s and by the early postwar period journalists lamented that “Nowadays we cannot afford adequate supplies of the better Scandinavian wood-pulps and North African esparto grass….Home-produced straw…must suffice.” Most daily London newspapers were reduced from an average of twenty pages to ten or twelve pages as national newsprint

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93 Heren, pp 57 and see Aled Jones’ essay “The British Press, 1919-1945,” pp 53; both in Griffith.
consumption was reduced to twenty percent of prewar levels. Weekly news journals such as the Conservative Spectator, one of the five British weekly titles examined in this study, were reduced from around ninety pages to twenty pages. Newsprint rationing was more than a national economic reform to support the war effort, though. It was also a way for the British government to control the press well into the postwar period. Keeping print runs low kept criticism of national foreign policy down. Indeed during the entire rationing period (1940 to 1958), while national newspapers suffered, British-made newsprint was consistently exported. Both major British national parties were often hostile to the press during and after WWII and indirect government censorship was common and will be discussed later in this chapter.

Newsprint rationing did not affect all English newspapers equally, however. The larger weekly news journals focused on by this study, also called “the heavies,” suffered most as they were forced to reduce their page numbers and shrink ad space in an attempt to maintain circulation levels. But smaller daily papers, which could never compete with the vast prewar circulation levels of the heavies, actually experienced circulation increases as consumers began buying more than one paper to get more comprehensive news after rationing began. Many smaller circulation left-wing papers consequently generated greater advertising revenue and hence became more competitive. The leftist Daily Worker, for example, increased its 1939 circulation of

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95 Heren, pp 57.
96 Heren, pp 57.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
1.75 million to 3 million by 1946.\textsuperscript{99} In general, though, the English war effort was devastating to the press and it caused shortages of more than paper. By 1944 over a third of British journalists were stationed overseas in the armed forces.\textsuperscript{100} Material and labor shortages combined to reduce English journalism to what one 1947 critic called an “air of prefabricated impermanence.”\textsuperscript{101}

World War II British paper rationing reduced the frequency of news maps in two important ways. First, the scarcity of newsprint forced all editors to sacrifice graphics space in favor of text space. As British journals have always been more text oriented than image oriented, especially in comparison to American journals, this was not too much of a shock to British news style. Second, and more importantly, rationing forced editors to give up precious revenue-generating ad space to accommodate news text. Still, this study will show that after WWII British journal advertisements often exhibited more maps and cartographic imagery than proper news articles. These ad maps were almost always tied to contemporary news events, and as such, they offer insights about how British news readers perceived the world cartographically especially in the postwar era when British news maps became scarce. However, to date no cartographic historians have discussed ad maps in any historical context.

Another liability of the British weekly press, and of news maps, imposed by rationing was the inability to produce color imagery. However, it must be said that historically the British press has never been as inclined to use color graphics as the American press. In fact, no British news journal regularly used color graphics before

\textsuperscript{99} Jones, pp 55.
WWII. This was, in part, due to the “ingrained tradition, especially among elite newspapers, of verbalizing the news, rather than illustrating it” with multicolored inks or black ink.\textsuperscript{102} However, by 1945 the British press was looking ahead and trying to compete with the phenomenal sales of the graphic-rich American journals and lamented its inability to employ colored inks. But the lack of color imagery and maps was not due to inferior British printing techniques. In 1947 British journalist James Shand noted that the British “lack neither competence nor skill in any department of printing technology” and indeed British news graphics, which includes news maps and ad maps, has been on par with American printing since before WWII.\textsuperscript{103}

Since the 1920s, however, the British press had been dependent on American printing technology to stay modern. As Shand’s article observed, “English printing owes much to America….The Linotype and Monotype are \textit{both} American in origin and development….At the other end of the production line most specialized binding machinery in this country…is American in origin.”\textsuperscript{104} Similarly, American cartographic historian Mark Monmonier noted the evolutionary links of the British and American presses but that “principal recent developments are almost wholly American.”\textsuperscript{105} But after WWII the newest American-made high speed color rotary presses were not yet available in Britain. Nor were they available in 1947, when Shand stated that “…in

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{101}] Ibid, pp 53.
\item[\textsuperscript{102}] Shand, pp 858.
\item[\textsuperscript{105}] Ibid.
\end{itemize}
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typesetting, colour-photography, process engraving and duplicate rotary plate-making.

[the Americans] show no standards we cannot match for quality.” 106 Shand added that “…in these American periodicals rotary letterpress four-colour printing at high speeds…is now commonplace…[but] there is little English letterpress rotary magazine production worthy of comparison.” 107 The liability of the British press, then, was not inferior color reproduction techniques but a lack of high speed equipment that could produce the high volumes of color imagery necessary for national weekly circulation.

As the above example illustrates, the British press was keenly aware of its comparative shortcomings in the field of color printing and it constantly measured itself by other national presses. By 1945 British dependence on American, and to a lesser extent German, printing technology compelled British editors to constantly compare their news coverage with that of their American counterparts. 108 But despite American dominance in the field, or perhaps because of it, English newsmen did not always look favorably on the new printed media trends being exported by the United States. Although Shand admired the color content of “American mass-produced periodicals” he acknowledged a British press bias against “the contents of American ‘glossies’ as they are cynically referred to in Fleet Street.” 109 Indeed, the British and American presses compared each other, and each others’ respective geopolitics, in their respective news journals quite frequently throughout WWII and the early Cold War, as this study will

106 Shand, brackets added, pp 906.
107 Ibid, brackets added.
108 Shand, pp 906. Shand’s article noted that “the two principle large circulation illustrated weeklies in this country are both printed indifferently by rotary photogravure, one on presses imported from prewar Germany and the other by a licensed process from America.”
109 Ibid.
show. These geopolitical comparisons promoted the use of maps in news articles, travel ads and political cartoons as vehicles for rhetoric and imaging the “Special Relationship” partner across the Atlantic Ocean. These topics will be elaborated on in the following chapters.

Although the British press may have been a “casualty of the Second World War,” the contemporary American press soared to new heights along with the American economy.\textsuperscript{110} Even before the United States entered the war in late 1941 the national economy had already rallied for the war effort. Under president Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “arsenal of democracy” program American exports, chiefly to Britain, rose from 3.2 billion dollars in 1939 to over 14.3 billion dollars by 1944.\textsuperscript{111} After 1941 the economy grew at a more accelerated pace until 1945. By 1944 real weekly manufacturing wages, for example, rose over 53 percent from prewar levels.\textsuperscript{112} The national mobilization of American industry was coordinated by the creation of the National Defense Mediation Board in 1941, and like in Britain, rationing was common.\textsuperscript{113} But unlike in Britain, American rationing programs never had a major impact on the national printed media. The number of rationed items, which began in January 1942, was long and included tires, gasoline, shoes, sugar, coffee, and various other consumer goods needed for the war effort.\textsuperscript{114} The only item on this list that may have impacted the operation of news agencies was typewriters, but since they are not

\textsuperscript{110} Heren, pp 56.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid, pp 551.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid, pp 550.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid, pp 554-5.
consumable commodities, and hence do not need constant replacement, their rationing had no major negative consequences in the American press.

On the contrary, the American press benefited tremendously from WWII. Before the advent of television in the 1950s the only source of timely images and maps of the war effort were issued by newspapers and news journals. The three most popular weekly news journals in this period—Time magazine, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report—met the public demand for war imagery and cartography and they all experienced large circulation increases. From 1940 to 1945 Time’s circulation increased from 759,520 to 1.18 million; Newsweek increased from 327,838 to 585,897; and U.S. News and World Report increased from 86,523 to 207,257. By sheer popularity and prestige, Time was America’s leading weekly news journal as its yearly circulation was more than that of Newsweek and U.S. News and World Report combined. Given this situation, Time maps will be given special attention as they reached more Americans than any other news maps while they set also the tone for cartographic style in national journalism.

Rationing kept British weekly circulation levels much lower than their American counterparts, but the British national press boasted twice as many major weekly titles. WWII and postwar circulation figures for the six British weekly journals are hard to come by since the British Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC) records are inconsistent for those periods. The postwar circulation figures quoted here were taken from a summary of a 1947 Royal Commission inquiry into the ownership and political
orientation of the British Press. The *Economist* began in 1843, and by 1947 it was described as being in a “field of its own…read in many countries, particularly in America” with circulation at about 70,000 and increased to over 105,000 by 1955.\textsuperscript{116} *New Statesman and Nation* had the largest circulation of all the weeklies, though, at over 153,000 in 1947 but it lowered to 130,000 by 1955.\textsuperscript{117} First published in 1828, *Spectator*’s circulation was one of few to decrease significantly after the war from about 100,000 in 1947 to just over 75,000 by 1955.\textsuperscript{118} Figures for *Time and Tide* and *London Tribune* are limited to 1947 when both journals sold about 80,000 copies. The final national weekly, *Truth*, was described by Camrose but no circulation stats were given, nor did the ABC list such figures. It is likely that *Truth* sold fewer than 80,000 issues per year.

Media historian Bernard C. Cohen has noted that most news agencies assume that their publications will be read by a wide demographic spanning from the common man to national politicians.\textsuperscript{119} But only elite national newspapers and news journals, such as the ones examined in this study, specialize in news about foreign affairs. Smaller local newspapers, by contrast, do not normally cover international events and their editors assume people seeking such coverage will turn to national news.

\textsuperscript{115} All U.S. circulation stats were taken from the respective year volumes of N.W. Ayer and Son’s *Directory of Periodicals* annual series printed in Philadelphia.

\textsuperscript{116} Camrose, William Ewert Berry (First Viscount) *British Newspapers and their Controllers* (London: Cassell Press, 1950) pp 145-6 and British Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC), v.8. Camrose’s circulation summaries are assumed to be six-month totals since his stats correspond to six month totals from corresponding Audit Bureau of Circulation records.

\textsuperscript{117} Camrose, pp 147 and ABC, v.8.

\textsuperscript{118} Camrose, pp 148 and ABC, v.8.

publications.\textsuperscript{120} By 1945 British and American weekly national news journals targeted largely the same cosmopolitan audience in their respective nations. Whether it was \textit{Time}'s promotion of a “statesman’s view of the world”\textsuperscript{121} or the \textit{Economist}'s addressing the “concerns of businessmen dealing in commodities, railroads, and other investments,”\textsuperscript{122} both nations’ journals sold mostly to well educated white collar, middle to upper class white males interested in international affairs.

**Political Orientations of the British and American Press by 1945**

The British and American presses are extensions of their respective national political systems and traditions, and they were very different by the end of WWII. British politics has always been more heterogeneous and fractured than American politics and the British press reflects this diversity. By 1945 the six weekly news journals operating in Britain spanned the national political spectrum. The independent press included the radical \textit{New Statesman and Nation}, the nonpartisan journals \textit{Economist} and \textit{Time and Tide}, and the conservatives \textit{Spectator} and \textit{Truth}.\textsuperscript{123} The only official weekly British party paper, or non independent, was the \textit{Tribune} which billed itself as the “voice of the left.”\textsuperscript{124} Contrast this diversity with the smaller lineup of postwar American weekly news journals which was dominated by the Republican-

\textsuperscript{121} Fox, Matthew. \textit{Religion USA: Religion and Culture by way of Time Magazine} (Dubuque, IA: Listening Press, 1971) pp. 15-17.
\textsuperscript{122} Monmonier, pp 63.
\textsuperscript{123} See David Butler and Gareth Butler’s \textit{British Political Facts, 1900-1985} (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986) pp 498-9; and Camrose pp 145-152.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
leaning *Time* magazine, the Democratic-leaning *Newsweek*, and the (then) largely independent, but conservative, *U.S. News and World Report*. The comparative diversity of the British press, however, is best seen with the various daily and Sunday edition papers that, in terms of numbers of titles available at any given corner market, dwarfed the American press. Although the American press had many more daily papers by 1945 these papers usually dominated the small towns in which they were printed. For many English press historians, then, “the land of the free [was] also the home of one-newspaper towns.”

Another major difference between the two national presses by 1945 was their links to their respective political parties. Without exception every American national weekly news journal, and virtually American all newspapers, claimed to be independent. This claim is understandable because representing the news without the influence of any political party ideology was considered wholesome, while the printing of obvious political propaganda is generally seen as a negative activity in the United States. Not so, however, in Britain where many reputable news journals publicly announce their political orientation on the front page. As mentioned above, *Time and Tide* is subtitled “The Voice of the Left.” One of the most influential press barons of the postwar period, Lord Beaverbrook, shamelessly announced to a Royal Commission on the Press that his *Daily Express* was chiefly a propaganda journal for the Conservative party—an announcement that never would have been made in the United States.

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125 Monmonier, pp 62-3.
126 Heren.
States by such a media mogul. Rather than discrediting the British press, acknowledged political partisanship has been the basis for political debates in the press that not only sold more papers but also made American news coverage seem bland by comparison. Interestingly, that blandness may be true in terms of textual dialog but not visual dialog. However, this study will show, somewhat ironically, that the political leanings of both nations’ journals were relatively unimportant in the early Cold War period in terms of foreign policy as all national parties sought largely the same ends overseas—the containment of totalitarian Communism.

The British national press may have been more diverse and numerous than its American counterpart by 1945, but it had long been centered in one part of one major city—the Fleet Street district of London. The apparent provinciality of this centrality contrasts sharply with the international flavor of British news journals that have been concerned with the workings of the far-flung empire since well before WWI. The American press, although less diverse but more numerous, had no such news center. Although New York City is the traditional American publishing capital, and the location of Newsweek corporate headquarters, many influential news journals were located in other urban centers. For example, U.S. News and World Report was centered in Washington, D.C. Both Time and its counterpart popular photography journal, Life, operated out of Chicago. Two of the most popular journals of the era, Saturday Evening Post and Look were published in Philadelphia and Des Moines, Iowa, respectively. And unlike the British press, the American press historically has tended to

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127 Heren, pp 57.
vacillate, along with public opinion, between international isolationism and interventionism. By 1945, as will be shown, the American press was returning to isolationism while the British press remained strongly international in flavor and news coverage.

**News Maps in Britain and America, 1945-1947**

Now that the political, economic and journalistic factors have been established, a comparison of British and American news maps can commence. It must be noted that the majority of journalistic map trends prevalent in the early Cold War period were variations of map conventions that date back to WWII and even earlier. This is not to say that Cold War era maps offered nothing new—they absolutely did—but even their more innovative developments have origins in WWII mapping. Predictably, though, British and American news maps transitioned from the WWII era to the Cold War in different ways that highlighted each nation’s particular world view, geopolitical place and cartographic style. The most obvious difference was the high frequency of American cartographic imagery versus a relative dearth of it in British journals by mid 1945. While “more Americans came into contact with maps during the Second World War than in any previous period,” British citizens looking for detailed news journal maps of the war were usually out of luck. 128 It was not uncommon for 1945 American weekly journals to publish three or four two-column, multicolored maps of various war

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fronts while contemporary British journals such as *Spectator* had no news maps of the war whatsoever in 1945 and 1946.

Given this difference in map production it is no surprise that the American press dominated the field of news cartography by 1945. The most important development in American news cartography was brought about by the advent of the Air Age which began in the 1920s and reached maturity during WWII. The Air Age caused a sort of revolution in news cartography by the end of the war mainly by promoting the use of long forgotten map projections that deviated from convention, which facilitated a rethinking of spatial orientation and world geopolitics. This “challenge to American cartography” was led by a new generation of news cartographers, such as Richard Edes Harrison, who were trained not as professional cartographers but rather as architects, interior designers and advertising illustrators who brought graphic innovation to a relatively cloistered news map profession.\(^{129}\) This revolution, and its proponents, will be discussed in the following chapter; however, although its roots extend back before WWII its legacy was not fully realized in American news journals until after 1945. What follows, then, is a brief summary of British and American cartographic trends present at the end of WWII that held sway over the majority of news publications before the revolution fully took hold.

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\(^{129}\) Ibid.
British and American News Cartographers and their Methods

It must be stated at the outset of this section that to date there have been precious few studies, published or otherwise, discussing news cartographers and the methods they employed during and after WWII. This is largely due to the fact that modern scholarship has only recently begun to realize the importance news maps, and their makers, have had in shaping public opinion. Notwithstanding the few cartographers who achieved some measure of fame during and after WWII in the United States (see chapter 3), most British and American news mapmakers have gone unacknowledged even by the publications that employed them. Much of the information in this section was taken from a telephone interview with Paul Pugliese conducted by the author in the summer of 2004. Pugliese was a full-time staff cartographer at *Time* magazine in the 1960s and served as the journal’s last Chief of Cartography from 1975 to 1990.

As discussed earlier, Mark Monmonier has shown that by WWII news cartography methodology and technology emanated from the United States over to Britain, although the latter could not capitalize on much of the color printing technology due to war rationing. But many generalizations of news map ordering, design and construction still apply to both nations’ presses. The first is that unlike mapmakers at daily journals, weekly news journal cartographers had more time to design their maps, which were usually ordered at the beginning of the week by managing news editors.¹³⁰ There were no computers used in the designing of these maps as they were all hand drawn and lettered. News maps were usually ordered to accompany specific articles,

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but it was up to the mapmaker to decide how relevant the map would be to the accompanying news text.\textsuperscript{131} This could lead to some obvious discrepancies between articles and maps, as will be shown in later chapters, but for the most part news maps in the 1940s and 1950s did not function to literally illustrate news articles but rather to offer supplementary location and detail information to news text. This gave news cartographers wide latitude for employment of map icons, lettering, projections and labeling.\textsuperscript{132}

But American weekly news journals had more departmentalized and professional cartography divisions by 1945 than did British weeklies. \textit{Time}, \textit{Newsweek} and \textit{U.S. News and World Report} all had separate Departments of News Cartography, largely due to \textit{Time}'s organizational model. These map departments dealt directly with the managing news editor to decide what types of maps should be run, how big they should be, if they should use color, etc. Only American news journals employed titled Chiefs of Cartography who oversaw their Department of News Cartography. These map chiefs, and many of their underlings, often did contract and consulting map work for private organizations, state and federal governments, and other news publications in addition to their weekly news map projects.\textsuperscript{133}

If American news cartographers are underappreciated, their British counterparts are virtually anonymous. This is due to more than the British penchant for prioritizing

\textsuperscript{131} Author’s interview with Paul Pugliese.
\textsuperscript{132} Pugliese interview.
\textsuperscript{133} Pugliese, for example, did contract atlas work for the State of Arizona and Harcourt Brace and World. He noted that his boss at \textit{Time}, Robert Chapin, Jr., contracted with the U.S. Army and many corporations. Noted mapmaker from \textit{Fortune}, Richard Edes Harrison, did contract work for the U.S. Army during WWII as well as numerous private atlases and maps. See Schulten, pp 174-87.
words over imagery in their news publications by 1945. It is largely due to the fact that, given the historically low frequency of maps in British news journals, they could not be produced in-house economically. In Britain, the rapid and tremendous public demand for war maps during WWII forced most journals to outsource their news maps to private mapmakers, thereby crediting each map with a generic corporate title instead of a mapmaker’s name. The few weekly news maps that are credited to individuals are sporadic, and they do not offer any real body of reference. This was also true of British daily newspapers, which regularly ran maps in their Sunday editions. There were no notable British news cartographers to match the prestige of Americans Richard Edes Harrison and Robert Chapin, Jr.

The lack of professional staff cartographers at British news journals left news editors with two choices for their news maps. The first, and most expensive, was to pay for the reproduction of sections privately-made atlases for use as locator maps. The second was to have a staff artist, untrained in cartography, to draw a simple locator map with pen and ink. What resulted, then, were two very dissimilar categories of British news maps—professional looking reprinted maps versus crudely drawn in-house maps. These dissimilar processes imparted idiosyncratic characteristics to their maps that will be discussed in the following chapters.
Projections Used in the News

One of the most prevalent trends on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean was the common use of certain types of map projections to relate images of empire.134 A mapmaker’s choice of projection, which is defined as how the round globe is transposed onto flat paper, is one of the most deterministic of the map’s features. Projection forms the framework, scope and distortions inherent in the resulting map. Many different map projections have been used since the time of the Greeks, but American and British professional map orthodoxy of the 1930s was dominated by the Mercator, or flat projection.

Named for the famed sixteenth century Flemish cartographer Gerardus Mercator who invented it, the Mercator projection dominated western cartography for a long period. From the Age of Discovery to WWII, Mercator projection maps were valued as navigational aids because they were most accurate in their representations of land near the equator where major Atlantic shipping lanes existed, and because they showed directions properly (fig.2.3).135 The “long-standing devotion among the military, naval and teaching professions” to the projection was probably due to its preservation of strait lines over great distances, and its wide, expansive presentation of the world’s continents.136 Although the popularity of Mercator maps has occasionally been

134 Whenever possible, map examples from WWII and early Cold War news journals will be used even though better quality examples are available in scholarly publications. This is done to illustrate the prevalence of maps in news publications.
136 Quoted from Shulten, pp 175. See also Wilford, pp 90.
threatened by the rise of other projections to be discussed later, flat projection maps remain widely used to this day.

Fig. 2.3. Mercator projection in *Life* magazine, August 1942, which described the decline of this projection as a result of the Air Age in an article entitled “History Makes New Maps.”

But the Mercator projection, like all projections, involves inherent distortions. In the Mercator projection, those distortions involve the size of land masses, which are most accurate near the equator, and become exponentially exaggerated towards the higher latitudes near the poles. Many Mercator maps, like this one, contained no depictions of either Polar Regions since the resulting exaggerated polar landforms would cover the entire top (northern) and bottom (southern) edges of the map. But even with the Polar Regions omitted, higher latitudinal landform exaggeration is still very evident and will be elaborated on in subsequent chapters.
Before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in late 1941 “challenged isolationist notions about the impregnability of the Western Hemisphere,”\textsuperscript{137} the American Lend-Lease Act (March 1941) “brought out the world maps” in popular news journals to explain national involvement in the war effort.\textsuperscript{138} During WWII the Mercator projection was easily the most popular type used in American news journals because its wide spacing of the continents provided an analytical space to illustrate the outflow of the national war effort to far-flung overseas locations. All American national weekly news journals strongly supported the war effort, so it is no surprise that WWII era news maps were very nationalistic. What is surprising is how frequently, and similarly, news war maps and official government war maps employed the Mercator projection. For example, notice the similarities between the “Forecast: Weather and War” map that appeared in \textit{U.S. News and World Report} in October 1941 (fig.2.4) with a government map featured in \textit{Life} magazine promoting the Lend-Lease program two years later (fig.2.5).\textsuperscript{139}

In both examples the United States was centered on the map which necessitated placing the bisected halves of the Eurasian continent at opposite ends. This centering visually put the nation in the middle of the war effort. The wide oceanic gulfs on either side of the American Hemisphere—gulfs that were exaggerated in the higher latitudes by the Mercator projection—were ideal \textit{tabulae rasae} to chart the American war effort.

on the Atlantic and Pacific fronts. These maps reassured Americans that the war was far away but still a threat. The exaggeration of the size of Soviet Union, then a valuable ally, was beneficial as American logistical lines of support rendezvoused with the hulking Allied landform. But the wide oceans still seemed reliable barriers to direct American involvement in what started out as a foreign war. These WWII Mercator
maps usually omitted the Polar Regions altogether since they were not viable avenues for Allied shipping.

It is curious that during the entire WWII period, which for Britain lasted six years (1939-1945), not a single Mercator projection war map of the world is known to have appeared in any weekly news journal. Neither did such a map appear in the *Sunday Times* for the sampled war years 1939, 1942 or 1945. Moreover, of the six British weeklies surveyed only *Spectator* produced a map—one map—of the Pacific theater which appeared in September 1939.\(^{140}\) This is probably due to the fact that English news readers, unlike those in the United States, were more concerned with the more local European fronts than with the global war effort. Given the close proximity of the British Isles to Germany and its virtual immunity from a direct Japanese attack, it is no wonder that all British weekly war news maps were regional or local in scope rather than global.

The smaller scope of British WWII era news maps classifies them more as what cartographic historians call *locator maps*, or maps that serve simply to show locations of news events and, hence, do not exhibit many of the expository contents of *thematic maps* designed to make an argument.\(^{141}\) Locator maps are the most common type of news map because they are easily processed by the map reader and their small size allows them to be injected almost anywhere on the news page.\(^{142}\) Although virtually all locator maps are on flat projections their smaller scope usually negates the distortions

\(^{140}\) See map entitled “Asia” in *Spectator*, v.163, n.5801 (Sept. 9, 1939): 340.


\(^{142}\) Ibid, pp 2.
evident in similar projections depicting larger regions or the world. But the limited space of these maps can severely limit the inclusion of helpful map icons, symbols and text. Regardless of their spatial limitations locator maps were the preferred vehicle for relaying cartographic information in British news journals and newspapers throughout WWII and the early Cold War period. This was mainly due to the fact that these smaller maps literally fit well into the space-conscious news publications still restricted by national rationing after WWII.

However, beautiful, multicolored maps of the world were available to British weekly news readers throughout WWII and the early Cold War through several privately owned, London-based map publishers. In a highly symbiotic relationship, daily and weekly news journals made up for their lack large, detailed maps by advertising where the cartography-hungry British public could buy detailed map sets. In that way, news journals could claim to focus on analyzing foreign affairs events with text while leaving the cartographic imagery to privately published map collections like those for sale from the journal Serial Map Service. Or, as a 1941 ad for Economist stated in the November issue of Serial Map Service, “Just as the Serial Map Service records the physical changes in the international situation, so the Economist provides an analysis and interpretation of current events….”143 Begun in 1939, the monthly Serial Map Service was the only regular British cartographic journal available during WWII and it produced all manner of political, economic and military maps until its run ended in 1948. With each map it presented commentary on the implications of recent

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geopolitical events by British military officers, foreign policy experts, staff cartographers, and even diplomatic correspondents from London newspapers. As such, this journal offers critical insight into British cartography and geopolitics in transition during and after WWII.

The lion’s share of WWII commercial maps, though, did not come from cartographic journals but from professional map houses such as those operated by J.F. Horrabin and George Philips and Son, Ltd. Also known as “the man who makes maps speak,” Horrabin placed ads in *Spectator* throughout the war that offered detailed, colorful maps of recent war developments.144 Fleet Street’s own George Philips and Son was the oldest commercial mapmaker of this group with publications that date back to the early nineteenth century. Philips’ “maps, atlases, globes and books” sold so well in journals such as *New Statesman and Nation* that by 1945 the company was overwhelmed with backorders.145 Daily newspapers such as the *Daily Telegraph* cashed in more directly on the lucrative war map market by offering its own line of maps, through London-based mapmaker Geographia, which “achieved a phenomenal sale by 1940.”146

London’s private map houses employed many different types of projections, as will be illustrated in later chapters, but the Mercator map was most common. The large, colorful, flat projections maps provided by these private mapmakers were heavily advertised in both daily and weekly news journals. These maps usually highlighted

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145 See ad for George Philips and Son, Ltd. in *New Statesman and Nation*, v.29, n.745 (Jun. 6, 1945): 360.
wartime political borders, trade routes, war logistics and international alliances, as did contemporary American news maps. But unlike the American cartographic practice of placing itself in the center of the map during WWII, British Mercator maps of the world usually placed the British Isles to the left and above the center, thus highlighting the importance of the Indian and Pacific regional trade routes linking the British Commonwealth (fig. 2.6).\textsuperscript{147} And, technically speaking, most of these were not maps of the world but maps of the \textit{British World}, which very often was depicted as a strictly Eastern Hemispherical world even though several British colonies existed in Latin America.

After WWII, before the United States became directly involved containing Communism, Americans drifted toward isolationism. Mercator maps that formerly rallied American interventionism during the war were now retooled to convey a sense of geographic isolation from the world’s geopolitical hotspots. These maps often did this by placing the Americas on either the left (West) or right (East) side of the map while locating all the other continental landforms at the opposite end. One such map, entitled “Three Worlds and their problem spots”, appeared in early February 1946 and conveyed a very different image of America’s geopolitical position than was presented in Lend-Lease maps (fig.2.7).\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{146} See ad for \textit{Daily Telegraph}'s War Map No. 5 in \textit{Spectator}, v.165, n.5 (Aug. 16, 1940): 173.
\textsuperscript{147} See map entitled “British Trade Routes” in \textit{Serial Map Service}, v.1 n.2 (October 1939) map 5-6.
Although this map labeled several hot spots that concerned the United States, the wide Pacific Ocean safeguarded the area of “U.S. Influence” from foreign instability. The exaggerated size of Greenland, Alaska, and Canada bulked up the geostrategic appearance of the American-controlled area denoted with a prominent flag. The selective use of flags corresponded to the (then) three recognized “policemen” of the world—the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union. But the placement of the British and Soviet flags near the hotspots implied that the instability was Russia’s and Britain’s problem even though the text labeling indicated direct U.S. involvement. It is interesting that although French-controlled lands were denoted, no French flag was shown which de-legitimized French international prestige in an era when her imposed
Nazi collaboration had only recently ended. As with the WWII Mercator maps, no representations of the Poles were given.

Fig. 2.7. Early Cold War Mercator projection in *U.S. News and World Report*, February 1946.

The isolationist map symbology evident in the “Three Worlds” map meshed neatly with overriding contemporary American concerns of being pulled against its will into foreign disputes after WWII. As historian C.J. Bartlett has pointed out, as early as July 1945 when the Potsdam Conference briefings began coming back to the U.S. State Department, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Vice President Truman and Senator James Byrnes all voiced fears of being drawn into the developing quarrel between Britain and the Soviet Union over the rehabilitation of Europe and the Mediterranean
region.\textsuperscript{149} And all the attention to the “Special Relationship” notwithstanding, immediately after WWII most American foreign policy experts were weary of fostering closer Anglo-American ties for many reasons. Of utmost concern was the fear of alienating the Soviet Union and its reluctant, but steady, cooperation in dismantling the German war machine if the U.S. sided with Britain in disputes over Anglo versus Soviet oil claims in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{150} But the U.S. was also generally suspicious of Britain’s new Socialist Labour government that was elected in mid 1945, its designs of colonialism, and a general distrust of London’s policies in Palestine.\textsuperscript{151} As will be seen in later chapters, however, once the Cold War began heating up, American Mercator news maps were once again retooled to promote interventionism via closer Anglo-American ties to thwart Communism.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor (1977-1981) to President Jimmy Carter and current Professor of Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University, is one of few politicians to recognize the importance maps like these have had in international relations. In his 1986 book, \textit{Game Plan: A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the U.S.-Soviet Contest}, Brzezinski showed how maps can “foster a false sense of the true distribution of power by distorting relative size and by creating a misleading sense of geographic centrality” in the minds of civic leaders.

\textsuperscript{149} Bartlett, C.J. \textit{British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century} (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989) pp 68.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.
and citizens. Surely the British and American Mercator news maps presented here do that. On American news maps the United States was centered during WWII but not during the immediate postwar years, which corresponded to a return towards international isolationism.

British maps, by contrast, kept the same geopolitical center—the diffuse British Empire—throughout WWII and into the postwar years which relegated the empire’s power center (England) to the maps’ extremities. As such, British maps more closely resembled Soviet government maps, which put Moscow at the center and placed the entire Western Hemisphere far to the left, than American maps (fig. 2.8 and 2.9). Both British and Soviet maps placed the Soviet Union at the center. The Soviets did it to center the capital city of Moscow; the British did it to highlight important trade routes in the Pacific Ocean. And both nations’ maps split the United States, and indeed the entire Western Hemisphere, into two unequal halves at the maps’ periphery. Notice that the British Overseas Air Routes map (fig. 2.9) included an inset map of England centered at the top to remind map readers of the hub of British air traffic and to offset the peripheral placement of the governing region in the main map. It also included a north polar projection map inset in the lower right corner illustrating the centrality of London in the future of air travel when transpolar flights would be available.

153 The “Global View from Moscow” map was taken from Brzezinski, pp7. The BOAC map was taken from *Serial Map Service*, v.7 n.6 (Mar. 6, 1946): 63-4.
Fig. 2.8. The standard Soviet world view centered Moscow, as presented by former National Security Advisor (1977-81) Zbigniew Brzezinski in his book Game Plan.

Fig. 2.9. This 1946 map of British air routes in Serial Map Service looked very similar to the Soviet world view illustrated by Brzezinski (see fig. 2.8).

Although Mercator maps were the most common type of projection used in news articles they were usually not global, but rather regional or local in scale. These
smaller scale news maps allowed for a concentration of the map reader’s focus on key events and places that shaped the larger context of international relations. During WWII most American and English news journals used smaller scale Mercator maps to depict the unfolding war effort on a regular basis which resulted in a staggering number of maps that has not been equaled in any subsequent war period. But given the vastly different national economic conditions of the British and American presses it is no surprise that even their smaller scale maps were very dissimilar.

**World War II Maps in the News**

WWII era British news maps were dull and repetitive compared to their American counterparts. Their most obvious deficiency was their absence of color which American news maps had in abundance. But British news journals compounded their poor cartographic depiction of the war effort by frequently recycling the same map several times—a practice American journals almost never employed. The journal *Spectator* did this more than any other British weekly. Between July and September 1939, for example, it reprinted the same map of Europe four times as a supplement to its war news articles (fig. 2.10).154

This map was created by making a black and white detail copy of a section of a larger, full color map, originally printed by George Philips and Son, and which showed no map icons or anything indicating military fronts or conflict. One week later an even smaller detail of this already copied map was published as the journal described the
front in greater detail—a detail of a detail of a copy. The Spectator map seems dull compared to a 1943 map printed in the now defunct American newspaper *PM*.155

Fig. 2.10. Two very different portrayals of the Eastern Front during WWII. The *Spectator* map on the left ran four times during 1939, and was relatively devoid of icons. The map on the right, from American journal *PM*, ran only once in 1943 and was full of artistic embellishments.

Many British news maps, though, were hand-drawn by anonymous staff cartographers and lacked the professional polish of American news maps. And even hand-drawn maps were often reprinted; some with no changes, some with progressive embellishments to illustrate changing war fronts with added details. *Spectator* and *Time*

155 Ristow, pp 72.
and Tide often did this, for example, with news maps of European battle fronts between France and Germany throughout WWII (figs. 2.11 and 2.12).  

Fig. 2.11. Spectator reprinted adjusted war front maps on October 6th (left) and 13th (right) in 1939.

Fig. 2.12. Time and Tide reprinted similarly adjusted maps on March 3rd (left) and 10th (right) in 1945.

Given the British need for weekly maps of the war effort, coupled with the aforementioned shortages in newsprint and labor during WWII, it is not surprising that

British journals reprinted maps in this fashion. This is one practice that did not survive the war era, however. By the mid 1940s, with the impetus for war maps subsiding, British news journals returned to their usual habit of focusing on textual news and news map usage dropped back to the precipitously low prewar levels. The widespread repetition of these hand-drawn locator maps during the war, though, literally illustrates the level to which British news journals were unprepared to handle the huge public demand for war-related maps.

American news maps during WWII were different from their British counterparts in almost every regard. As mentioned above, the most striking difference was the use of color, which gave their news maps a vitality not found in Britain. American WWII era maps were usually broader in scope and included many powerful icons not found in British maps. These distinctions, and others, put American maps out of the category of simple *locator maps* and into what has been called *thematic maps*, or maps designed to make a point—whether that point is scientific or political.157 Judith Tyner has argued that thematic maps, or what she calls “persuasive cartography,” can be distinguished from simpler maps that “may approach total objectivity” by seven guidelines.158 These criteria include a high degree of generalization, a lack of scale, the absence of projection labeling, simple layout, colors and symbols with high emotional impact, and a minimal use of descriptive text.159 WWII era American news maps certainly had all these qualities.

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157 Gilmartin, pp 1-3.  
159 Ibid.
Contrast the appearance of British news maps of the war with two American examples from *Time* and *Newsweek* (fig. 2.13). The “Steps to Berlin” map, published by *Newsweek* on July 17, 1944, made many of the same cartographic statements as the “Cracks In The Fortress” map issued by *Time* one week later although each map used different iconography and coloring. Both maps described battle areas larger than those found on most British locator maps of the war. Both maps presented Europe as a fractured region but in different ways. The *Newsweek* map did it with stark, jagged red lines of military conflict that progressed from west to east denoting the advancing Russian troops while the *Time* map portrayed the region as a literal cracked surface with underlying red wounds. Both maps used colorful arrows to denote Allied troop movements with no distinctive negative labeling of Communist forces—such distinctions always appear on later Cold War American maps. Although the *Newsweek* map caption indicated movement of the “Red Army,” the advance of the Russian forces was portrayed as a positive, liberating force. Neither map denoted its projection while both maps used simple layout and labeling. And again, the use of color in these maps conveyed a strong sense of urgency to the war effort.

These two maps illustrate the colorfully expository nature of the average American news map during WWII—a quality which continued into the early Cold War era. The maps’ prominent size, on average at least two columns wide, bold, often square form, coupled with their placement on the same page as the textual coverage of the war, drew readers’ attention. With their large size, powerful colors and meaningful

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icons, American maps were attention getters. British locator maps of the war, by contrast, were less conspicuous, often placed as afterthoughts on the back page of journals and, as such, did not as heavily factor into the news readers’ experience.

Fig. 2.13. Two American maps of WWII fronts. The “Steps to Berlin” map (left) appeared in *Newsweek* in mid July 1944. The “Cracks In The Fortress” map (right) appeared in *Time* magazine one week later.

**British Waterways and American Lands**

Although much has been presented to show that British news maps commanded less interest and attention, they were certainly not inferior. As compared to American maps by the end of WWII, the British press could actually claim one distinction of superiority—their cartographic portrayal of the world’s waterways. In general, British news cartographers paid more attention to detailing and labeling coastal areas, rivers, lakes and oceans than did the Americans. This tradition, no doubt, can be traced back to the maritime orientation of the British Empire which still dominated news cartography by the end of WWII despite the onset of the Air Age that began in the 1920s. It was not that British maps downplayed land and political features. It was that
their daily and weekly maps focusing on land-based and political-based issues usually depicted waterways in very detailed and rich fashions that gave the otherwise dry, black and white locator maps a considerable measure of artistic quality.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, WWII British news maps were usually small scale, Mercator maps of European, land-based battlefronts. But British news cartographers tended to leave mapped lands un-shaded and sparsely labeled to give clear, but plain, illustrations of battlefronts and associated place names (toponyms). The darker, richer areas of these maps were usually depictions of waterways that contrasted greatly with the nearby, relatively empty landforms. Oceans, seas and lakes were often located on the maps’ periphery but were heavily embellished with hatch marking or shading which gave the regions a more textured look. Even Time and Tide which, it may be recalled, had some of the simplest hand-drawn locator maps of the war employed this method on many maps. Its map of Greek Macedonia which appeared in December 1945 portrayed the Aegean Sea with rich line shading while the nearby important Greek-Yugoslavian border (the focus of the map) was shown as a relatively unimpressive dotted line.\textsuperscript{161} The map was included at the request of one H.S. Paynter in an op-ed response to a previously published letter from the Director of the Greek Government Department of Information. Although Paynter hoped the map would offer a “more accurate picture of Macedonia” most of the ink on the map was dedicated illustrating to the Aegean waters.\textsuperscript{162} Other examples of this theme appeared in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[161] See \textit{Time and Tide}, v.26 n.48 (Dec. 1, 1945): 1006.
\item[162] Ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Spectator’s April 1939 map of the Mediterranean and the Sunday Times front page war map of Europe published in August of the same year.¹⁶³

Many British locator maps displayed rich waterway depictions not because they were hand-drawn that way by anonymous staff cartographers, but because they were black and white copies of small sections of full color maps previously published by private London map houses. When these full color maps were copied and reproduced in black and white the original light blue oceans and lakes became dark, textured hatch prints or dot matrices in weekly news publications; this gave the water bodies an unusually textured look not found on the original map. This conversion process was neatly illustrated in a black and white ad for the full color “Daily Telegraph War Map No. 5” that appeared in Spectator in June 1941 (fig.).¹⁶⁴ The originally light blue oceans appeared doubly textured by the resulting dot matrix shading coupled with a wave effect produced by the conversion process. The formally multicolored nations, now reduced to white landmasses with black political borders, made the oceans appear more detailed by comparison. By contrast, American news maps of war fronts usually showed textured portrayals of landforms but not with portrayals of bodies of water, which were rendered very sparsely, as all the examples in this chapter illustrate.

¹⁶⁴ See ad for “Daily Telegraph War Map No.5” in Spectator, v.166 n.5894 (Jun. 13, 1941): 635.
Fig. 2.14. Reproducing full color maps into black and white British journals made oceans appear unusually dark and textured as in this 1941 Spectator ad.

The British maritime tradition had other expressions in news maps besides textured oceans by the end of WWII, and it may relate to Britain’s long and rich tradition of canal and waterway development. Foreign bodies of water, often including large lakes and smaller rivers, were usually labeled prominently in maps even when these bodies were not integral to the map’s purpose. This labeling, like the textured oceans, was usually seen on maps that were copied from very detailed atlas maps produced in London. In 1941, for example, a simple Spectator locator map, copied from an atlas made by George Philip and Son, portraying the Battle of Leningrad.
labeled no less than twelve rivers, two canals and the Russian Lake Ladoga. Waterways were so integral to the British world view that bodies of water sometimes dictated map projections—projections that were often unconventional. *Serial Map Service* printed a map in 1941 of the English Channel, for example, which oriented the channel to run the length of the map from left to right, thereby offsetting the normal North Pole orientation by a considerable degree. The resulting map had no indication of true north and made England appear to be directly north of France.

**Conclusions**

By 1945, American and British news journal maps portrayed the war effort and the world very differently. Most of these differences were imposed by the contrasting economic factors in each country, but differing cartographic traditions were also evident. American news maps with their flashy colors and dramatic icons may have been grudgingly envied in Britain, but more staid British journalistic traditions downplayed such seemingly garish imagery. Dependence on flat projection maps, though, united both nations’ cartographic trends as did a phenomenal upsurge in the use of maps during the war. When the war was over American-made Mercator maps readjusted their positioning of the world’s continents to favor the postwar public mood of isolationism, while British maps retained their world view—a view that deemphasized the Western Hemisphere while centering on the British Empire in the Eastern Hemisphere. All of the features of American news maps were products of staff

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165 See *Spectator*, v.167 n.5907 (Sept. 12, 1941): 253.
166 *Serial Map Service*, v.2 n.2 (October, 1941): map 105.
cartographers while many of the distinguishing British map features resulted from copying previously published, privately made maps. And lastly, American news maps usually detailed land areas while leaving water bodies unremarkable, whereas the British tradition of maritime trade was evident in their maps’ textured portrayals of seas and oceans.
CHAPTER 3

AIR AGE PROJECTIONS

“...Now the Yank, Yank, Yankees crash the gate
And they hoist the Stars and Stripes on British ground,
While Britain’s standing sentry against illegal entry
By the chilly, chilly, Chileans cruising round.

For we were the first that ever, ever burst
On the Weddell and the Bellingshausen Seas—
Britannia rules the blizzard, and it sticks in Britain’s gizzard
When foreign ensigns violate the breeze…”

—Excerpt from a 1947 poem entitled “Antarctic Chanty”
by Sagittarius, published in New Statesman and Nation

The Air Age began in the 1920s, reached maturity during WWII, and profoundly changed how Britain and the United States portrayed the world on maps during the Cold War. The ability to envision, and more importantly to map, the spherical earth from high altitudes compelled foreign policy makers, cartographers, and advertisers to depart from using Mercator projections that framed the earth as a flat plane with far-flung landmasses. One of the most prevalent trends in British, and especially American, news journal cartography in the early Cold War era was the use of map projections that illustrated the sphericity of the earth and the close proximity of landmasses in the northern hemisphere. This new world view has assumed many names in modern scholarship. Denis Cosgrove called it the “Apollonian View,” which links the modern

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Air Age conception of a round globe to a cartographic tradition dating back to classical Greece. Richard Edes Harrison called his innovative maps “perspective maps” since they sought to illustrate the world from the high altitudes. But the most common name for the new perspective in the Air Age was the “airman’s view,” as opposed to the “mariner’s view” promoted by Mercator maps. Although many different types of map projections can achieve this effect, British and American news maps relied on a few standbys that became popular during the height of the Air Age in WWII and remained common throughout the Cold War period.

Most Air Age projections were not new—indeed many of them were as old as Mercator himself—but they were retooled for WWII and Cold War geopolitical concerns. Higher latitudinal regions formerly exaggerated or ignored by Mercator maps found new popularity beginning just before WWII. Air access to the long isolated and cartographically neglected Polar Regions, for example, made these areas hot topics for Air Age politicians and cartographers. But as the opening excerpt reveals, although Britain and the United States were the closest of Cold War allies, they often possessed conflicting views of these newly mapped regions.

Mapping the Globe in the Air Age

As discussed in the previous chapter, the Mercator projection was invented to serve the maritime Age of Exploration and European colonization. And as long as ships were the dominant vessels of world trade and travel, flat projection maps were the most helpful way to see the world. Although Mercator maps described the world, they did
not relate the roundness of the globe, nor could they offer any useful depictions of the Polar Regions. The Air Age simultaneously signified the end of the dominance of the mariner’s, or navigator’s, world view and the birth of the “airman’s view,” as WWII era cartographers, and politicians, recast world geopolitics in light of Air Age technological advances. The following are examples of British and American maps that were designed to illustrate the sphericity of the globe and foster the perception of a shrinking planet resulting from the advent of powered flight.

Any map that seeks to depict the round surface of the globe on a flat plane is called an azimuthal map in the United States, or a zenithal map in Britain. Azimuthal maps are named after the technique of projecting a grid on the surface of a globe onto a map surface by drawing a series of radii, or azimuths, from some arbitrary point through the globe surface and onto a map.169 Azimuthal maps differ fundamentally from Mercator maps, which seek to project the globe onto a cylinder that is tangent to the equator. There are an infinite number of possible azimuthal maps, which are distinguished from each other by the position of the “light source” for the projection. Most azimuthal projection maps fall into three general categories. Orthographic projections result from the light source being placed at infinity outside the globe, or at some great distance from the map surface (fig. 3.1).170 Gnomonic projections place the light at the center of the globe. If the map touches the globe surface at a point of

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168 See Denis Cosgrove’s Apollo’s Eye: a Cartographic Genealogy of the Earth in the Western Imagination (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Press, 2001).
tangency opposite the light source, a *stereographic* projection results. These azimuthal projections were developed by Greek mathematicians between the fifth and second centuries B.C., and had been thought about occasionally from time to time in the last two hundred years, but they found new popularity in the Air Age due to their ability to relate a round globe.

![Fig. 3.1. The three general categories of azimuthal projections as illustrated in Norman Thrower’s *Maps and Civilization.*](image)

In fact, it was not until WWII that American news cartographers began to use Air Age projections with any regularity, and they did this much more frequently than did their British counterparts. The Air Age prompted a stark reevaluation of international relations. Global imagery, which includes globes and global maps, was the best medium to visualize the new world order brought on by powered flight. It was also an effective way to suggest the closeness of a dangerous enemy—or enemies, notably Communists. Political analyst Walter Lippmann observed in his 1944 book *U.S. War Aims* that “When we put away the maps of the age of sailing vessels and use a

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171 Ibid. See Appendix A for illustration of azimuthal projections.
172 Ibid.
globe for our geography, we realize that to the heart of China the direct routes from the United States by air are over Russian territory. This turning away from Mercator’s “squaring” of the globe and towards global map projections began before WWII, though, in American news journals.

Susan Schulten has traced the rise of Air Age maps to famed American cartographer Richard Edes Harrison, who began making maps for *Fortune* in 1935. Harrison, who was trained not in cartography but in interior design and architecture, grew up during the Air Age and was dissatisfied with the Mercator projection as a framework for viewing the world. He disliked not only the distortions inherent in Mercator maps, he also criticized the cartography profession for becoming too academic and out of touch with the average man who interpreted the Mercator view of the world as reality.

Harrison preferred visualizing the world literally as one would see it from high altitude or space—as a sphere, not as a flat map—in what have come to be called “perspective” maps. Freed from the shackles of map convention, he often presented global landmasses from unusual orientations, hardly relying on the standard North Pole orientation used on Mercator maps. His emphasis was on landforms and their spatial relationships as viewed from any arbitrary point above the earth’s surface. During WWII Harrison reexamined the vulnerability of the United States which had, until then,

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175 Ibid, 175.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid.
held to the assertion that the nation was safely located across wide ocean barriers. For example, Harrison’s “Three Approaches to the United States” map that appeared in *Fortune* in September 1940 illustrated what foreign invaders from Berlin, Tokyo and South America would see as they neared the United States from the air (fig. 3.2). These perspective maps highlighted geostrategic weaknesses in American defenses as they described a possible Nazi “pincers movement extending from Newfoundland down the New England coast.”

Perspective maps represented a new direction in American cartography that was at once very popular with the average news reader and highly criticized in traditional American cartography circles. Harrison probably did not mind that a staff cartographer at the National Geographic Society labeled his work as “artistic rather than cartographical” since Harrison viewed himself more as an artist anyway. But he vehemently countered Charles Colby, Chairman of the Department of Geography at the University of Chicago, who blasted Harrison’s maps for their lack of clear coordinates, north-south orientation and color gradations. For Harrison, all these traditional criticisms reinforced his conviction that American professional cartographers were more concerned with making maps for academic readers rather than for informing the general public. After all, his perspective maps became top sellers in the popular market during WWII for the same reasons that academics dismissed his work.

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178 See *Fortune*, v.22, n.3 (September 1940): 58.
179 Schulten, pp 179.
180 Ibid, pp 185.
181 Ibid.
Harrison’s perspective maps sold phenomenally well during WWII because they were geared towards the average news reader who was hungry for maps of the war effort but who had no formal training in cartography. His commercial success peaked during the war, in 1944, when his Fortune maps were collected into an atlas entitled Look at the World which sold almost 25,000 copies before it even reached stores.\(^{182}\) City boosters from Atlantic City, New Jersey and Nashville, Tennessee, among others, requested perspective maps to promote tourism and citizenship by showing the global position of their cities.\(^{183}\) Harrison’s maps were also very popular with the federal government. Perspective maps by Harrison were used by the U.S. Army to train war pilots, while other maps were reproduced in the nationalistic journals Newsmap and Yank.\(^{184}\) More than this, Harrison’s works in Fortune, Life (both owned by Time, Inc.) and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch influenced an entire generation of American news cartographers who mapped Cold War geopolitical concerns in all major weekly and monthly news journals.

Easily the most influential American news cartographer after Harrison was Robert M. Chapin, Jr. who studied under Harrison and who was Time’s chief cartographer during the early Cold War period. Scarcely a Time issue exists from 1945 to 1955 that does not display a map, table or airbrushed image produced by “R.M. Chapin.” Although he never achieved the notoriety of Harrison, Chapin’s works were far more numerous. His maps were also far more politically and graphically

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\(^{182}\) Ibid, pp 180.  
\(^{183}\) Ibid, pp 185.  
\(^{184}\) Ibid.
propagandistic, for they were designed to warn of the dangers of Communist expansion and rally American support for Containment.

Harrison’s perspective maps relied on aerial perspectives and text to describe the nearness of the Axis powers during WWII. Aside from these conventions, however, his maps were largely devoid of embellishments. They portrayed landforms as anyone would see them from a high altitude. Chapin often employed Harrison’s perspective projection, but he seldom used text blocks to explain geopolitical threats. Instead, Chapin heavily embellished his maps with bright colors, labeling and icons to relate Cold War threats to the United States and its allies.

For example, in January 1950 Time published a Chapin map entitled “Three Faces of Europe.”¹⁸⁵ This map closely resembled the perspective and layout of Harrison’s “Three Approaches to the U.S.” from 1940 (fig. 3.2), but Chapin’s perspective map did more: it sought to link Communist expansion in Eastern Europe with the aggressive expansion of the Central Powers in WWI and the Axis Powers in WWII. With characteristically Chapin flair, it did so using brightly colored international blocs and flags. Gone were Harrison’s focus on landforms, terrain and text blocks; replaced with Chapin’s more alarming symbology. According to cartographic historian Walter Ristow, the sheer volume and popularity of Chapin’s work, which began in Newsweek in the late 1930s before he transferred to Time in 1938, comprised “one of

the major pillars of American journalistic cartography” that lasted well into the 1950s. 186

British news journals never used perspective maps for news coverage to the extent that American journals did. Nor did the British journals feature maps like those popularized by Harrison and Chapin. As described in the previous chapter, this was because British news maps during WWII and the early Cold War period were usually in the form of smaller scale, flat projection locator maps that did not lend themselves to alternate projections. Neither did the Serial Map Service use perspective maps. However, examples of perspective maps did appear in several travel ads in British news journals in the early Cold War period when British and American air corporations were heavily competing for postwar air travel revenues. The American based Pan American (Pan Am) Airlines and the British Overseas Airway Corporation (BOAC) were the most prolific advertisers with both companies placing ads in both nations’ journals.

Although Harrison’s perspective maps were merely inspired by the Air Age, air travel ad maps were direct products of it. These ad maps were not designed by iconoclastic mapmakers experimenting with new projections as did Harrison and Chapin. Rather, air travel ad maps employed projections that best imaged routes taken by their aircraft—projections that showed the curvature of the earth with unconventional directional orientation that matched a pilot’s course. In October 1946, for example, Pan Am ran a series of ads in Time and Tide and Spectator for transatlantic

Richard Edes Harrison’s perspective map entitled “Three Approaches to the U.S.” that appeared in *Fortune* in September 1940 (left) was an obvious inspiration for R.M. Chapin’s “Three Faces of Europe” map that appeared in *Time* in January 1950 (right).

In January 1947, BOAC ads in *Truth* also used a perspective map with an odd directional orientation and continental placement to highlight the expanse of the corporation’s air routes across the British Empire (fig. 3.3).  

Perspective maps popularized by Harrison and Chapin in American journals, and by air travel ads in British journals, were innovative departures from the Mercator world view as the political world shifted from WWII to the Cold War. These maps portrayed the world not as a flat plane with omitted or grossly distorted sections, but as

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an observable sphere that imparted a smallness and sense of community to international affairs. Called *polar projection maps*, perspective maps that featured the Polar Regions became very common due to the geopolitical and commercial uncertainty associated with these Air Age frontiers. As a result, many types of polar projection maps came into vogue in Britain and the United States by the early Cold War period.

Fig. 3.3. Although British news articles did not employ perspective maps, many air travel ads in British journals did. The ad on the left appeared in *Time and Tide* in October 1946; the ad on the right is from *Truth*, January 1947.

**Polar Projection Maps**

One of the greatest legacies of the Air Age was the ability to fly to any point on the earth’s surface for the first time in world history. This opened up entire regions long neglected by Mercator maps which only focused on areas frequented by maritime navigators. As discussed earlier, the world’s Polar Regions were the most neglected areas on Mercator maps due to their historical inaccessibility and their concomitant lack
of strategic importance in world colonial affairs. But in a matter of a few decades, from WWI to WWII, Air Age accessibility to the poles compelled British and American mapmakers to rediscover and chart these regions for the first time in the modern era. Moreover, starting in WWII cartographers and foreign policy experts began to see the poles as new, viable frontiers for science, territorial expansion and geostrategic importance.

Much blame has been placed at the feet of Gerardus Mercator for inventing a projection that distorted the world by overemphasizing the size of land masses distant from the equator. But Mercator projection maps from the Age of Exploration often displayed polar projection maps as insets to help visualize the higher latitudinal regions. *Life* magazine noted this bygone characteristic of Mercator maps in a 1942 article entitled “History Makes New Maps” (fig. 3.4).\(^{189}\) Cartographic negligence of the Polar Regions on Mercator maps, then, is a more modern trend. Polar projection maps have appeared in many British and American atlases through the centuries but only as rare supplements to the more popular flat maps of maritime regions. It would be up to news cartographers in the United States, and private cartographers in Britain, to bring polar projections back into vogue in the Air Age.

\(^{189}\) See “History Makes New Maps” (no author) in *Life*, v.13, n.5 (Aug. 03, 1942): 58.
As noted previously, Richard Edes Harrison’s perspective maps of the Polar Regions became popular during WWII because these regions were rediscovered, and hence became geopolitically viable, with the advent of the Air Age. But the war itself also made these maps popular because they, unlike Mercator maps, portrayed all lands in the Northern Hemisphere as a ring around the North Pole—a projection that lent itself well to visually unifying the previously far-flung Allied nations. During WWII, Harrison produced many polar projection maps in *Fortune* magazine. These conveyed a sense of global interconnectedness to mobilize American hearts and minds for the Allied war effort. The collection of these maps into a single 1944 volume entitled *Look at the World: The Fortune Atlas for World Strategy* included several interventionist
polar projection maps with titles such as “Eight Views of the World” and “One World, One War.”¹⁹⁰

At the same time that Harrison was popularizing these new projections, though, he often had to correct public misunderstandings about them. In February 1943, for example, an op-ed piece appeared in the New York Times entitled “Airplanes and Maps” which detailed how Air Age cartography was outdating the Mercator world view in favor of map projections that more accurately portrayed true global land relationships.¹⁹¹ In a reply letter published five days later, Harrison commended the op-ed piece for its “general sense” but corrected its erroneous statement that “you would never guess from a Mercator projection that San Diego…is no nearer Japan than Minneapolis or that the shortest route to Moscow from New York lies through Greenland.”¹⁹² Harrison lamented that “through lack of understanding of its limitations, the prophets are misusing the north polar…projection in the same way that Mercator has been misused for centuries….“¹⁹³ He then corrected the anonymous author by stating that a true reading of the projection reveals that “Minneapolis is about 340 land miles (or 16 per cent) farther from Tokyo than San Diego…” while “…the shortest route from New York to Moscow misses Greenland cleanly to the south….“¹⁹⁴

Well before America entered the War Harrison’s first perspective maps appeared showing American vulnerabilities to Axis attack. Meanwhile, British polar

¹⁹⁰ Schulten, pp 175-6.
¹⁹³ Ibid.
¹⁹⁴ Ibid.
projection maps of the North Polar Region, or *north polar projection* maps, were linking the great Western nation to the Allied cause. In January 1941, for example, the *Serial Map Service* published a full color north polar projection map entitled “Proximity of War to America,” which examined the close proximity of the United States to both WWII theaters.\(^{195}\) Although military maritime and air routes were depicted, it was the air routes over the Arctic Circle that provided direct links between American cities and WWII hotspots that heretofore had never appeared. The linking of San Francisco to several cities in the Soviet Union, as this map did, was new and it was only possible by a new direct flight path over the Arctic Circle.

Ironically, during WWII most British and American polar projection maps did not deal with the war effort, but rather with the future of international civil air service. This was partly because the air transportation market in both nations was seen as the next big economic boom that was on hold as long as war hostilities continued. But it was also because Britain and the United States had very conflicted designs for the postwar international air services market and polar projection maps were the most popular medium for illustrating the debate. Despite these differences, the wide usage of these maps in Britain and the United States underscored the perception that the Air Age was primarily an Anglo-American affair.

\(^{195}\) See map entitled “Proximity of War to America” in *Serial Map Service*, v.2, n.4 (January 1941): map 64.
Mapping the Anglo-American Air Age

Although the Air Age had international origins that date back to before WWI, by the end of WWII the United States and Britain dominated world’s skies. This dominance was in part due to the utter destruction of the German and Japanese national air forces during the war. But it was also a product of the close, cooperative development of the British and American military air forces which accelerated the pace of aeronautic science to support the Allied war effort. The most important aeronautical development in the Allied cause was the achievement of global flight, and as cartographic historian Denis Cosgrove has noted, it was an Anglo-American achievement.\textsuperscript{196} The combination of the superior American air industry with the far-flung island airstrips that connected the British Empire realized the ability to reach any point on the globe for the first time in human history.

It must be noted that although Britain and the United States both established commercial international flight services before WWII, the war forced an indefinite suspension of these services. While the war raged, air travel corporations from both nations eagerly looked to the end of the war when lucrative air services could be renewed. While commercial air services in Britain all but ceased under the threat of Nazi air dominance, the number of American air passengers increased from 1.5 million in 1939 to 6.6 million by 1945.\textsuperscript{197} During the war both nations’ national news journals

\textsuperscript{196} Cosgrove, Denis. \textit{Apollo’s Eye: a Cartographic Genealogy of the Earth in the Western Imagination} (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001) pp 254-5.

published innumerable ads for air travel that employed innovative maps designed to jump start the air travel industry as soon as the war was over.

Maps and cartographic imagery in British and American air travel ads utilized innovative projections of the earth’s surfaces throughout WWII. As noted previously, British air travel ads used perspective maps at least as early as Harrison introduced them to news journals in the United States. Contemporary American air travel ads were equally innovative. For example, American Airlines ads during the war usually included global perspective maps of the world, while companies such as the Garrett Corporation used north polar projection maps to show the range of their aircraft (fig. 3.5). These Air Age ad maps, like Harrison’s perspective news maps, imparted a sense of global unity not found on Mercator maps. Ad maps did this by depicting the globe from great distances, by omitting political boundaries, and by not using any cartographic symbolism of the ongoing war.

One of the most notable similarities between British and American air travel ad maps was the Anglo-American conception that the new Air Age world was shrinking and borderless. That is, the Air Age inspired British and United States airlines to deemphasize distances, land features and political borders on maps precisely when regular news maps, which focused on wartime struggles, emphasized these features. In November 1944, for example, the Saturday Evening Post published an ad for an American Airlines “Air Globe” inspired by global flight which presented a globe with no land features or political borders whatsoever—only destination cities around the
A similar British ad for Bristol Aeroplane was published throughout the war in *Truth* which described a world where “national boundaries are losing their significance in this age of flight” and was accompanied by an image of a featureless globe (fig. 3.6).²⁰⁰

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²⁰⁰ See *Saturday Evening Post*, v.217, n.19 (Nov. 11, 1944): 80.
Fig. 3.6. These two WWII era ads show a common Anglo-American view of a borderless world inspired by the Air Age. But while the American Airlines ad (left) highlighted the absence of political borders, the British Bristol Aeroplane ad (right) noted the absence of coastlines. The American ad is from *Saturday Evening Post*, November 1944. The British ad was taken from *Truth*, July 1945.

It is interesting to note that American images of a borderless globe deemphasized political borders but similar British imagery often highlighted an absence of coastlines. The American Airlines “Air Globe” ad, for example, noted the omission of “innumerable boundary and dividing lines” while the British Bristol Aeroplane ad was titled “World without coastlines…” The British cartographic proclivity for coastlines, it will be recalled from chapter 2, was evident in news journals maps of WWII fronts. Similarly, the *Serial Map Service* often portrayed the British Empire as a world of highlighted coasts (see fig. 2.2 in chapter 2) while that journal’s maps of the French Empire showed no such distinction. 201 This is probably due to the fact that British international air services, unlike their American counterparts, were WWII era

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201 See map entitled “The French Empire” in *Serial Map Service*, v.7, n.8 (May 1946): map 356-7. An accompanying essay entitled “A Contrast in Empire-Building” stressed the strictly British colonial practice of “extending arteries of sea-borne trade by concentration of land and sea power at strategic points” while “colonial France, on the other hand, has rested on a basis of assimilation.” See page 91.
extensions of maritime services that existed since the Age of Exploration. In fact, many British air travel ads linked air service with colonial maritime tradition throughout WWII. In 1945, for example, *Truth* published several ads for Bristol Airplanes that superimposed a plane over a colonial era ship with the title “Trade Winds” cleverly altered to read “Trade Wings.”

Imagery of borderless globes in travel ads during WWII were somewhat of an anachronism given contemporary British and American geopolitical concerns of Axis invasion. Often these optimistic, forward looking ad maps appeared next to war maps that depicted the world as dangerous and war-torn. But the ad imagery outlasted WWII and continued well into the Cold War. American news cartographers, caught up in the geopolitical bipolarity of the era, often depicted Communist regions with political borders while leaving the rest of the world borderless on polar projection maps. This gave the impression that the peoples of the “Air Globe” were aligned in an effort to thwart the Soviets, and the Chinese after 1949. Such a map appeared in *Fortune* in May 1954 entitled “The Massive Retaliatory Power” which clearly displayed the Soviet Union and China in bright red, clustered in a ring around the North Pole. The rest of the world contained no borders, only city locations as in the travel ad maps, while arrows indicating air strikes proceeded from the exterior (non Communist) regions inward.

Before the war ended, the British and American governments found themselves at odds over conflicting designs of postwar international civil aviation. Simply put, the

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United States favored a liberal, unregulated postwar air market while the British sought to divide international air routes between nations along political lines. Britain hoped that heavy regulation of air services would offset American dominance in the private air market and allow the British to rebuild their private air fleet.

During WWII, Britain had an agreement to prioritize the production of military aircraft, while the United States agreed to supply all transport aircraft needed by both nations. As a result, British officials lamented the predicted postwar private travel boom for which their military planes were ill equipped to handle. Meanwhile American airlines, with their cutting edge transport planes that could be easily converted to civilian use, looked more favorably to the competitive future. Or as a 1944 Newsweek ad for Pan Am stated, “Some day soon peace will come...And with it, once again, competition with...twenty or more foreign nations...Pan Am is ready for that competition.”

But Britain was not prepared for the inevitable postwar competition, especially with the United States. WWII era British maps of international civil aviation routes were nevertheless optimistic in their predictions of the postwar air market, which rested almost solely on a continued strong alliance with the United States. The Serial Map Service published several maps immediately after the war that portrayed British and American air routes as a unified system of transportation although heated debates raged between the two nations over this issue. In October 1945 a polar projection map

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205 Ibid.
entitled “Air Junctions Map” was published showing London-based flights extending nonstop into American airspace and comprising a single network of transpolar air routes that spanned the globe. A similar map, this one with a modified oblique Mercator projection that accommodated both Polar Regions, appeared in November of the same year with even more unified Anglo-American routes (fig. 3.7).

These early postwar British aviation maps recognized the importance of linking London, a major hub of European international service, with New York City which was then still a growing international air center. For Britain, New York was the main gateway for British flights to the Far East via overland routes across American airspace. It was assumed by the British that the Americans would continue to grant Britain the same privileges of air rights after the war that had characterized the wartime Allied Air Command. That, however, would not be the case.

As mentioned above, the critical Anglo-American debate over postwar civil air services actually outlasted the war itself. This was partially due to both nations’ leaders agreeing to table the debate until the war was over. But it was also because Britain had only recently adopted a protectionist stance, whereby postwar international air routes would be divided along political lines, which would curtail free competition among carriers.

206 See ad for Pan American Airlines in Newsweek, v.23, n.8 (Feb. 2, 1944): 44-5.
British Serial Map Service maps of postwar world air routes, like this one from November 1945, assumed American air carriers would cooperate and form a unified Anglo-American network of global commercial flight. Later British maps were not so optimistic.

British airline moguls were furiously trying to convince the international community (against American designs) to follow this policy. Indeed as recently as WWI Britain lobbied heavily for minimal, not protectionist, regulations on air travel at the Versailles Peace Conference and the Paris Convention on Civil Aviation.209 Britain then soon moved toward a protectionist stance in the interwar period when it realized that its greatest rival, the Dutch airline KLM, was undercutting it in productivity and pricing.210 By WWII, Britain and the United States agreed to loosen prewar

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209 Dierkx, pp 796.
210 Ibid.
protectionist restrictions on air travel in lieu of a 1942 agreement that neither country would make third party contracts that would restrict British or American traffic.\textsuperscript{211}

While WWII raged, the spirit of Allied cooperation downplayed ingrained differences between British and American plans for postwar civil aviation. Nevertheless, these differences caused considerable discord between the two nations—discord that also involved many other nations around the Atlantic Rim. In clear violation of the 1942 Anglo-American agreement not to make third party air service agreements, the United States independently approached Spain in mid 1944 to obtain landing rights.\textsuperscript{212} The British were angered by this violation, but also because they had a similar pending application with Spain for the same rights.\textsuperscript{213} In fact, Britain lobbied the Soviet Union and France independently to foster support for its plans of postwar airline protectionism against American wishes.\textsuperscript{214} In the face of overwhelming American commercial power the British tried in vain to establish an international regulatory body to parcel airline services along political lines. The United States quashed this plan at the international Chicago Conference on civil aviation in November 1944.\textsuperscript{215}

The greatest strain of Anglo-America relations in this debate occurred when the United States signed—against British wishes—a bilateral agreement for landing rights with Ireland in February 1945.\textsuperscript{216} The British were further incensed when the United

\textsuperscript{211} Ibid, pp 799.
\textsuperscript{212} Dierkx, pp 805.
\textsuperscript{213} Ibid, pp 806.
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{215} Ibid, pp 808.
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid, pp 816.
States went on to sign bilateral agreements for the same rights with Egypt, Greece, Iran and Lebanon—all areas where Britain traditionally had key interests. The British only acquiesced to American postwar civil aviation plans after the United States cut off Lend-Lease aid abruptly in August 1945. In January 1946, however, the United States and Britain reached a somewhat amicable resolution at the Bermuda Conference on Civil Aviation. The United States agreed to regulate international fares so as not to bankrupt the beleaguered British airlines, which allowed Britain to accept the idea of liberal, free competition among international airlines. But, it must be noted, the British steamed at the American insistence on stopping all international flights at American borders while all American air services could fly over virtually all British lands unimpeded.

By 1946, Serial Map Service maps of world airways looked considerably different than they had scarcely a year earlier. British hopes of a unified, global Anglo-American civil air network were gone. The American insistence on stopping all foreign air traffic at its borders cut off direct British air access across North America. The March 1946 map of British Overseas Air Corporation (BOAC) air routes from the Serial Map Service, shown earlier in chapter 2, best illustrates the cartographic implications of these ideological changes in British air services (fig. 3.8). The 1946 BOAC map was presented on a Mercator projection which centered on the British Empire, not on the Air Age globe. Gone, too, were the Air Age global projections that

217 Ibid.
218 Ibid, pp 838.
219 Ibid.
formerly typified these maps. The United States was cut off the main map almost entirely since British flights could not traverse the nation. The air links between London and New York were downplayed now. The north polar projection map that inset to the lower right labeled London the “air junction of the future” but its Arctic air routes carefully avoided American airspace. British air services over the Arctic Circle that had been so proudly displayed in maps a year before were now gone since these routes depended greatly on American airports and aircraft. It would take many years for Britain, on her own, to build the requisite aircraft suitable for transpolar commercial flight services.

Fig. 3.8. By 1946, British maps of overseas air routes lost their global, unified, Anglo-American themes after the United States cut off all international flights at all American borders. This BOAC routes map, from Serial Map Service in March 1946, was regional, not global, and the United States was cut off the main map. The polar projection inset map to the right showed no British flights over American soil.
The Polar Regions in the Air Age

Maps of the Polar Regions increased dramatically during the Air Age for several reasons. The first and most important of these was technological. Powered flight of the Air Age allowed mankind to fully map the Polar Regions for the first time. Conceptions and maps of Polar Regions date back to antiquity, in the maps of Anaximander of Miletus (610-546 B.C.) and Aristotle (4th century B.C.), but the poles were not visited by man until the 20th century. Second, the Air Age coincided with WWII and profoundly changed how the Allies fought the war in terms of war logistics. And third, in the early stages of the Cold War the Polar Regions, especially the North Pole, became the newest theaters for any future world war.

The North Polar Region on Maps

Air Age maps of the North Pole far outnumbered those of the South Pole in British and American news journals. Since most of the world’s landmass is above the equator, and much of the world’s population lives above the equator, air access over the “top of the world” profoundly affected most nations’ world views—these included all the superpower nations in WWII and the Cold War. Similarly, as discussed earlier, most industrialized nations cared more for the North Pole due to its new importance in postwar commercial aviation. A spirit of international competition was predicted for the new Arctic theater in countless journal articles and advertisements before WWII was over. It is somewhat surprising, then, that some of the most popular imagery

221 Cosgrove, pp 35-6.
associated with the north polar projection maps during the Air Age dealt with world unity rather than international competition.

The consolidation of the Allied war effort after 1941, the drafting of the Atlantic Charter, and the formation of the United Nations between 1942 and 1945 were the driving forces behind the idea of a world peace dominated by northern latitude nations. The United Nations adopted a north polar projection map as its official logo by 1945, and its assembly met in front of a similar, but much more striking, three-story tall map shortly thereafter. When the United Nations first met in October 1946, the *New York Times* published a front page photo of the impressive wall map with President Truman at its base (fig. 3.9).  

Although the use of news maps dropped off considerably in British and American news journals immediately after WWII, British journals were almost completely devoid of them. Cartographic images in British ads, such as the map logo of the United Nations, were often the only maps to appear in a given issue (fig 3.9).

The spirit of international cooperation and world unity relayed by these north polar projection maps was quickly overshadowed, however, by the breakdown of relations between the United States and Britain on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other. The Soviet Union, once the reassuring ally across the Arctic Circle during WWII, became a menacing Communist threat over the horizon by the late 1940s. The fear of a Communist attack from across the Arctic Circle was much greater in the American press than it was in the British press for several reasons. First, the British

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press was less concerned about a Soviet invasion from the Arctic for simple geographic reasons. A surprise Soviet invasion of the British Isles would most likely take a route through Eastern Europe or southern Scandinavia—an Arctic invasion route would be relatively circuitous. Second, in the years immediately after WWII, the British press was preoccupied with Soviet threats to colonial possessions in lower latitudes, such as Greece and Iran. And third, American fears of an Arctic invasion were more pressing since such an act was more of a geographical reality than it was for the British. The United States, unlike Britain, was bordered by the Soviet Union on two Arctic fronts in the Air Age—to the north across the Arctic Circle and to the west of Alaska.

Fig. 3.9. The large, three-story map on display at the opening of the U.N. was captured on the front page of the New York Times in September 1946 (left). The U.N. logo map was similar and appeared often in ads, such as this one from New Statesman and Nation in February of the same year.

Although the British did have disputes with the Soviet Union dealing with areas near the Arctic Circle, these concerns were usually more commercial than military. Most north polar projection maps appearing in the *Serial Map Service* in the late 1940s dealt with postwar commercial aviation as described above. Similarly, in July 1946 a north polar projection map was used to illustrate the fact that Russia had outbid the British for Icelandic fishing rights.\(^{224}\) One of the very few military-themed maps, published in February 1947, dealt with Russian desires to build military bases on Norway’s Spitsbergen Islands (fig. 3.10).\(^{225}\) The map’s accompanying narration made clear, though, that this was a concern for the “United States and most European countries,” not for Britain. The map itself excluded all the British Isles except northern Scotland but showed Alaska and Canada prominently close to “Soviet Russia.”

As in journals, north polar projection maps in Air Age British atlases were few, and they often portrayed the Arctic Circle as a nothing more than a blank space. Some British cartographers used the area inside the Arctic Circle to place map legends and text. In 1947, for example, London-based map maker George Goodall published the *Cartocraft Geography School Atlas* which included several north polar projection maps with title blocks covering the area above eighty degrees north latitude (fig. 3.10).\(^ {226}\) Polar projection maps in general were rare in British atlases dating back well before WWII, though. George Philip’s 1934 atlas, *Philip’s Record Atlas*, contained 128 maps, but only two—the last two in the atlas—were polar projection maps.\(^{227}\)

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\(^{224}\) See *Serial Map Service*, v.7, n.10 (July 1946): 113.

\(^{225}\) See *Serial Map Service*, v.8, n.5 (February 1947): 76.


Fig. 3.10. Unlike the Americans, the British tended to view Soviet access to the Arctic as a minor threat to national commerce, not security. Military-themed maps of the region, such as this February 1947 *Serial Map Service* map concerning Russian bases on the Spitsbergen Islands, usually portrayed Soviet presence as a North American problem (left). In the same year George Philip’s *Cartocraft Geography School Atlas* contained several maps with text covering the North Pole (right).

Although Mercator projection maps were always more popular in British journals and atlases, British cartographers in the Air Age nevertheless continued a tradition of innovative north polar projection design that dates back several hundred years. As discussed in chapter two, British cartographers have historically been more concerned with global cartography than their American counterparts due to the global scale of the British Empire. British cartographers may be guilty of neglecting the Polar Regions, but they devised and used myriad types of polar projection maps to chart the far-flung empire from the Age of Exploration to the Air Age.
One of the most prolific British cartographers in the Air Age was John Bartholomew, who published several atlases that popularized many self-named polar projections. Bartholomew’s 1950 *Advanced Atlas of Modern Geography* displayed three different self-named polar projections: Bartholomew’s Nordic Projection, Bartholomew’s Regional Projection, and Bartholomew’s Atlantis Projection. His Atlantis Projection was a self-described “novel application” of Mollweide’s Homolographic projection invented by German cartographer Carl B. Mollweide in 1805. Although it centered on the North Pole, Bartholomew’s Atlantis Projection was popular because it showed both poles in a sinusoidal fashion. Many British and American cartographers used the Atlantis Projection throughout the Air Age and the Cold War. In 1955 *U.S. News and World Report* published an article entitled “Secret Cruise of a Russian Submarine,” by an anonymous government source. That article was accompanied by an Atlantis Projection map with the description that “This map [was] designed by the author of the accompanying article…” but the map clearly employed Bartholomew’s Atlantic projection (fig. 3.11).

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Fig. 3.11. John Bartholomew’s Atlantis projection (left), as it appeared in his 1950 *Advanced Atlas of Modern Geography*, typified British innovation of polar projections in the Air Age. Many Americans used the Atlantis projection, but an anonymous author did not credit Bartholomew for using his projection in a 1955 article in *U.S. News and World Report* (right).

Many north polar projections popular in Britain during the Air Age were directly inherited from earlier times. The Tetrahedral Projection resembled a three-petal flower, with the North Pole at the center, and the Americas, Africa and Australia featured on the “petals.” The projection illustrated the idea of a tetrahedral arrangement of the continents first proposed by British geographer J. W. Gregory in a 1908 article entitled “Recent Literature on the Plan of the Earth” in *Geographical Journal*.\(^{230}\) Lambert’s Azimuthal Projection, named after eighteenth century French cartographer Johann Heinrich Lambert, resembled a view of the earth from outer space and preserved large

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land areas. This projection, which was actually a variation of oblique orthographic maps dating back to second century B.C. Greece and Egypt, gained popularity in the Air Age because it resembled the “Airman’s View” of the world.²³¹

As discussed above, American cartographers used north polar projection maps much more frequently than did the British. Popularized in the Air Age by Richard Edes Harrison in *Fortune* and *Life* magazine in the late 1930s, these maps ushered in a new American awareness of the outside world. Even before the U.S. entered WWII, while British mapmakers still portrayed the Arctic as a blank space, American cartographers used north polar projection maps to analyze the new mobility of the nation’s military air forces in the Allied effort. Air Age American airplanes could, for the first time, take advantage of the Arctic shortcut to Europe.²³² In May 1941 a map appeared in *U.S. News and World Report* entitled “New Approach To Convoy: 1,000-Mile Air Patrol From U.S.-Canadian Bases” that illustrated American air patrols protecting shipping lanes from Boston to Greenland to Britain.²³³ A similar map, designed by R.M. Chapin, Jr., was published by *Time* in August 1944 entitled “America’s Front Door” showing American and Canadian air forces flanking the Arctic Circle as they departed towards the Pacific and European war theaters (fig. 3.12).²³⁴

Before WWII ended, many large, colorful north polar projection maps were published in American news journals that glorified the vast expanse of the Soviet

²³¹ See the United States Geological Survey website: www.3dsoftware.com/Cartography/USGS/MapProjections/Azimuthal/Orthographic/
Union, along with articles lauding Joseph Stalin as man of the Russian people. One such map, entitled “One-Sixth of the Earth,” appeared in *Life* magazine in late March 1943 (fig. 3.12).\(^{235}\) The map closely resembled Harrison’s style, and it included dotted lines showing the expanse of the Arctic Circle occupied by the Soviet landmass. Scarcely three years later, as Cold War tensions heated up, the Arctic became the major corridor for a possible third world war with the Soviet Union. The North Polar Region, previously a celebrated gateway to the Soviet Union, was now a hostile theater for an unthinkable atomic war.

![Fig. 3.12. The map on the left, taken from an August 1944 *Time* magazine article, typifies many north polar projection maps that appeared during WWII that viewed the Arctic as a valuable link to the Soviet Union. The map on the right similarly celebrated the size and closeness of the Soviet Union over the North Pole, from *Life*, March 1943.](image)

It must be remembered that America and the Soviet Union, as the two most industrialized nations inside the Arctic Circle, had a unique history of competition there dating back to the turn of the century. In the three decades after Robert Peary’s
controversial claim to have reached the North Pole first in 1909, American and Soviet researchers flocked to the Arctic. For the Soviets, the area provided a \textit{tabula rasa} for socialist progress.\textsuperscript{236} For the Americans, any Communist presence in the Arctic was a threat to the capitalist way of life. In the early Cold War period the United States conducted two major military operations near the Arctic Circle named Operation Nanook and Operation Frostbite, both in 1946.\textsuperscript{237} These operations generated considerable reaction in the Soviet press. In 1947 the Soviet humor magazine \textit{Krokodile} published several cartoons that warned of American interests in the Arctic Circle. Several of these were reprinted in the \textit{New York Times} in October of the same year (fig 3.13).\textsuperscript{238}

It is not surprising, then, that very suddenly after WWII American news maps began using north polar projections to speculate about the possibility of a future air war with the Soviet Union over the North Pole. Typical of these was an orthographic projection map published in March 1946 in \textit{Newsweek} entitled “Over the Top” which charted possible missile routes mainly between the United States and the Soviet Union, although other nations were involved (fig. 3.14).\textsuperscript{239} The ability to strike the Soviet Union over the Arctic Circle with American bombers was colorfully illustrated by \textit{Time}’s R.M. Chapin, Jr. in late 1950 with a stereographic map entitled “Bomber’s

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Cosgrove, pp 218.
\item See \textit{Newsweek}, v.27, n.11 (Mar. 3, 1946): 40.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Reach. These alarmist maps, which contrast starkly with the idea of Allied cooperation with the Soviet Union, illustrate the significance of the North Pole in the escalation of the Cold War—a process that was accelerated by Air Age technology.

Fig. 3.13. These two cartoons appeared in the Soviet journal *Krokodil* in mid 1947 and were reprinted in the *New York Times* in October of the same year. The cartoon on the left showed Uncle Sam, labeled “Wall Street,” making a grab for Western Europe but his gaze was over the Arctic Circle, while the American general warned of Soviet Aggression. The cartoon on the right criticized American imperialistic designs in the same region.

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Fig. 3.14. By the early Cold War period American news maps began portraying the Arctic as the main theater for a future war with the nearby Soviet Union. Gone were the reassuring images of the former Soviet Ally so popular during WWII. The map on the left came from *Newsweek*, March 1946; the map on the right is from *Time* magazine, October 1950.

**The South Polar Region on Maps**

A discussion of the South Polar Region in a dissertation on the importance of popular maps in the Cold War may seem irrelevant, but I shall show that it figured in the broader relationship between the United States, Britain and Russia during this period. The South Polar Region has a unique place in this discussion.

If the Arctic was “America’s Front Door” during WWII and the Cold War, the Antarctic was Britain’s back yard during the same period. Britain claims to this day to have discovered Antarctica with the voyage of Captain Edward Bransfield in late 1820, although the United States and the Soviet Union also claim this distinction.²⁴¹ By the 1840s, explorer James Clark Ross’s charting and naming of the Ross Sea was a significant step towards “restoring [to] England the honor of the discovery of the
southernmost land.” 242 British officials laid claim to a slice of the southern continent in 1908, and by 1920 the claim temporarily expanded to “the whole of Antarctica.” 243 Historically, the British colonies of Australia and South Africa also pulled the empire’s concerns towards the Southern Hemisphere as most other European colonizers prioritized the equatorial and northern latitudes. As the opening excerpt reveals, though, by the late 1940s the British were at odds with several nations, including the United States, over territorial claims in the Antarctic.

It is surprising, then, that popular British maps of the Antarctic were almost nonexistent during the Air Age. No known maps specifically of the Antarctic Region are known to have been published in any of the weekly British news journals surveyed for this study. Only the Serial Map Service and British atlases included depictions of the southern pole, and then only infrequently. This may be because at the same time that the nations of Chile, Argentina and Norway were establishing science and weather stations on Antarctica, in the late 1940s, the British news maps were preoccupied with more pressing geopolitical concerns in warmer climates. The Greek Civil War, the rebuilding of postwar Europe, independence movements in India and Pakistan, and Soviet encroachment in Iranian oil fields among other developments, dominated maps in the Serial Map Service and weekly news journals. Although concerns over postwar civil aviation drew British map readers to the North Pole, it was never an issue in the South Pole because no major air service, then or now, traversed its great expanse.

241 Mulvaney, pp 84.
242 Ibid, pp 90.
The few British maps of Antarctica that were produced during the Air Age were all on south polar projections. They were centered on the pole and they usually were on a scale small enough to exclude all other landforms except the southern tip of South America. So unlike contemporary maps of the Arctic that usually included nearby nations, maps of the Antarctic continent portrayed the landmass as a remote wilderness. And unlike the North Pole, which is an imaginary point on a floating ice mass, the Antarctic is actually a landmass—the seventh continent. Although it is the most remote continent there were several international disputes over Antarctic land rights by the late 1940s that found expression on British maps.

A map of Antarctica published in 1954 in The Columbus Atlas by John Bartholomew typifies many British south polar projection maps that appeared in the Air Age (fig 3.15).\textsuperscript{244} The polar projection map indicated the territorial claims of six nations: Britain, United States, Norway, New Zealand, France and Australia. But there were actually eight territorial claims to Antarctica—the claims of Chile and Argentina were suspiciously omitted. Rival Antarctic claims by Norway, France and Germany by the 1920s compelled Chile and Argentina to formally cast their lot into the polar arena by 1940.\textsuperscript{245}

Britain had several objections to these claims. She did not want to cede any land to Argentina, which had a history of sympathizing with the Axis powers in WWII.\textsuperscript{246} Also, Britain was concerned that Chile and Argentina were trying to form a “Latin

\textsuperscript{244} Bartholomew, John. The Columbus Atlas or Regional Atlas of the World (Edinburgh: John Bartholomew and Son, Ltd., 1954) map 152.
\textsuperscript{245} Mulvaney, pp 124.
\textsuperscript{246} Ibid, pp 129.
front” of solidarity on the southern continent. In fact, Argentina based its claim partially on the 1493 Treaty of Tordesillas papal grant of the Americas (sans Natal) to Spain. The fact that the Chilean and Argentinean claims overlapped Britain’s claim worsened the situation (fig. 3.16, map on right). Finally, rival Argentinean claims in the Arctic reinforced the ongoing controversy with the British over sovereignty of the nearby Falklands Islands. The Falklands issue outlasted the Air Age and most recently resurfaced in the 1982 Falklands Crisis. So as the Argentineans habitually destroyed British science stations in the Antarctic, the British habitually omitted the Argentinean and Chilean presences on maps of the region.

American interests in the Antarctic date back to the Revolutionary War, when, in 1775, British Captain James Cook’s first report of finding seals in the region prompted American hunters to go there. For most of American history, though, the Antarctic has been a realm for unofficial commercial interests rather than an arena to win national prestige. In fact, the first federally sponsored expedition to the region did not commence until 1838, under the command of Lieutenant Charles Wilkes. It was in the Air Age, though, that the United States took the lead in Antarctic exploration. After WWI, Britain’s leading role in the area waned along with the nation’s postwar economy, and would-be Antarctic explorers turned to the United States for financing.

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247 Ibid.
249 Mulvaney, pp 119-20.
251 Mulvaney, pp 130-1.
252 Bowman, pp 96.
Indeed the last exploration phase in the southern continent’s history was financed mainly by American money and carried out by American airplanes in the Air Age.

American Navy pilot (later Admiral) Richard Byrd was by far the world’s greatest Air Age explorer. He barely missed being the first to fly over the North Pole in 1926, and he was the second person to fly solo across the Atlantic Ocean the next year.253 His first Antarctic expedition in 1928 was by all accounts lavishly equipped and funded by the United States Navy with three aircraft operating from “Little America”—a prefabricated settlement with electricity and telephone service.254 Byrd’s 1929 flight over the South Pole was the first in history and earned him a second tickertape parade in New York City—an honor that has never been repeated in

253 Ibid, pp 97-100.
American history. In a little over a year’s time, with Air Age mapping, survey and flight technology, Byrd was able to accomplish what several hundred years of maritime expeditions had failed to do.

In the 1920s, the United States adopted an official policy of not recognizing any Antarctic territorial claims, while unofficially it surveyed potential claims sites. The strongest push for continental ground was the 1946 U.S. Naval Operation High Jump, led by Admiral Byrd, who overflew the South Pole a second time commanding a massive aerial survey that mapped over 1.5 million square miles. Amid this fervor for territory, news maps of Antarctica reached their peak popularity, and they were mainly used to chart American survey efforts and claim overtures. In January 1947, an orthographic polar projection map of Antarctica entitled “Location of Byrd’s Groups” accompanied an article on “Exploration, Training Our Aims In Antarctic” (fig. 3.16). On the map Antarctica was devoid of all non-American land claims. Despite the article’s contention that “Britain, Australia, Russia, Chile, Argentina and Norway” were conducting exploration and whaling expeditions in and around Antarctica, the map only showed the “Byrd-Ellsworth Claim,” which was dominated by the “Little America” station.

254 Ibid, pp 97.
255 Mulvaney, pp 132-3.
256 Ibid, pp 135.
257 Bowman, pp 141. See Mulvaney, pp 135.
259 Ibid.
Fig. 3.16. These two *New York Times* news maps of the Antarctic were largely identical except for how they portrayed land claims. The map on the left, from January 1947, showed a large, American claim with no hint of any rival national claim. In a similar map (right) that appeared in February 1948, however, the American claim area was labeled “UNCLAIMED” and all rival claims were shown.

Renewed Soviet interest in gaining Antarctic territory in the late 1940s prompted the U.S. government to lobby for an international trusteeship of the region. As the 1940s progressed, the *New York Times*, and most American news journals, began omitting indications of American territorial claims while focusing on the claims of the international community. While a February 1948 article stated that the United States would seek to “prevent a possible enemy from gaining a foothold on the frozen continent,” the only claims on the accompanying map were those of Norway, Australia, France and New Zealand (fig. 3.16). The land occupying the former “Byrd-Ellsworth Claim” was now partly covered by the New Zealand claim, and partly by a zone labeled “UNCLAIMED.”

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260 Mulvaney, pp 137-44.

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It is somewhat surprising that although British maps of the Antarctic usually endorsed American land claims there, contemporary American maps seldom returned the favor. Bartholomew’s 1954 atlas map (fig 3.15) contained roughly the same depiction of the “Byrd-Ellsworth Claim,” which it labeled “(To U.S.A.).” This was long after American foreign policy makers abandoned any designs on land in the southern continent. But neither of the New York Times maps shown above depicted any legitimate British land claims; the 1948 map only acknowledged areas in dispute between Britain, Argentina and Chile. American news maps that did show British land claims almost always gave equal legitimacy to rival Chilean and Argentinean claims, such as a map entitled “Who Owns Antarctica?” that appeared in the Saturday Evening Post in December 1947.262

When cartographic historian Denis Cosgrove noted that “the Cold War was aptly named,” due the importance of the Polar Regions in Air Age geopolitics after WWII, he emphasized Soviet-American animosity across the Arctic.263 But the Antarctic has a longer history as a competitive arena for Cold War antagonists Britain, the United States and Russia. These were the three nations that simultaneously claimed first having sighted the southern continent in the early 1800s. Russian explorer Fabian Gottlieb von Bellingshausen, American sealing captain Nathaniel Palmer and British Captain Edward Bransfield all claimed to have sighted the Antarctic mainland in late 1820.264 Competition in the Arctic had to wait until the Air Age since the area contains

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263 Cosgrove, pp 219.
264 Mulvaney, pp 84-7.
no land to be sighted or claimed, and it cannot be circumnavigated by sailing vessels. And compared to the bipolar nature of American and Soviet animosity in the Arctic, Antarctic geopolitics included many more nations by the beginning of the Cold War. This competition was nullified in the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 which officially classified the continent as a “global wilderness” and, hence, all territorial claims were void.\textsuperscript{265}
CHAPTER 4

CARTOGRAPHIC SPHERES, ZONES AND THE “SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP”

The complex series of political events that marked the transition from World War II to the Cold War were represented many ways in British and American weekly news journals. News articles, political cartoons and advertisements all carried their own levels of political and cultural rhetoric. But news maps were the most effective way to affix weekly news events to geographic locations, and hence shape news readers’ world views. Though historians have disagreed on the causes of the Cold War, the most prevalent geopolitical trend of the era was the transition from a polycentric, European-based colonial power structure to a bipolar, global struggle between forces of Communism and capitalism. As chapter 1 described, this process began during WWII and reached its first era of bipolar, nuclear power-based stalemate by the time of the Geneva Peace Accords of 1955.

During this period, British and American politicians, regardless of party affiliation, agreed that international politics was moving from the last vestiges of European colonialism toward a world dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. British and American news journal cartographers had the daunting task of visualizing an increasingly complex geopolitical world that grew more dangerous after

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265 Cosgrove, pp 220.
the nuclear arms race began. By 1945, the United States had a long history of visualizing the world in terms of “spheres of influence”—a term that found new importance in the Cold War. As outlined in chapter 3, British politicians relied on the idea of a colonial “worlds” such as the “British World” or the “French World.” This concept lost influence in the decolonization that followed WWII, replaced by the British concept of “zones of influence.”

Though the American “spheres of influence” concept sounds similar to the British “zones of influence,” there were fundamental differences between them. While British and American politicians progressively confronted Communism after WWII, their idiomatic and often contradictory world views strained the “special relationship.” These differences found graphic expression in news journal maps from the period, especially as Cold War rhetoric heated up between the two allies. On the front lines of this Cold War debate were news cartographers who used imagery of cartographic “spheres” and “zones” to report and comment on the latest Cold War developments.

American “Spheres of Influence” by 1945

Historian Edy Kaufman defined a geopolitical sphere of influence as “the high penetration of one superpower to the exclusion of other powers and particularly of the rival superpower.” By the end of WWII, a sphere of influence usually described larger sections of the globe—for example, the Americas, the “Communist World,” or

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any large colonial power in American political rhetoric and in the national press. In this way, it was similar to the British, and in general, European concept of a colonial “world” which brought to mind all lands dominated by a colonial power. Following the post WWII trends of decolonization, multinational stewardship of nations, and Cold War political bipolarity, the idea of colonial “worlds” became increasingly outdated. Conflict between the main two spheres of influence—the “Communist world” and the capitalist “free world”—amalgamated formerly separate European colonial worlds in treaties, political speeches, news articles and maps. This transition happened more rapidly in the United States than in Britain.

The American idea of spheres of influence began in 1823 with the Monroe Doctrine, which repudiated European colonialism in the Western Hemisphere. This State Department doctrine, endorsed by President James Monroe, stated that no more European colonies could be created in the Americas, protected newly independent Latin American nations from European control, and proclaimed the United States would mediate disputes in the Western Hemisphere.267 Furthermore, the Monroe Doctrine declared that the Western Hemisphere was an official sphere of influence of the United States. Moreover, it distinguished the democratic societies of the West from the perceived chaos brought on by warfare associated with European colonialism. And since the 1820s, the Monroe Doctrine has been the longest standing foreign policy in United States history.

267 For the wording of the Monroe Doctrine see http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/monroe.htm.
From the early nineteenth century to the beginning of WWII, American politicians used the Monroe Doctrine to justify national territorial expansion and dominance in the Western Hemisphere. Acquisition of the Mexican Cession, after the Mexican-American War (1846-1848), was seen as fulfillment of Manifest Destiny, but also as a repudiation of a perceived antislavery movement that originated in Britain and Spain.\textsuperscript{268} Acquisition of Alaska and Midway Island in 1867 hinted at an increasing American interest in Pacific trade.\textsuperscript{269} In 1895, Secretary of State Richard Olney invoked the Monroe Doctrine when he imposed American arbitration in the border dispute between Britain and Venezuela.\textsuperscript{270}

Victory in the Spanish-American War (1898) resulted in the greatest expansion of American territory to date. Ostensibly fought to liberate Spanish colonies from imperial tyranny, the United States emerged from the war as a truly global empire. The Caribbean islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico came under direct American control.\textsuperscript{271} More significantly, the American empire now included the Pacific islands including the Philippines, Guam, Wake Island, American Samoa, and Palmyra Island.\textsuperscript{272} In 1904, control of naval access between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans was acquired with the Panama Canal treaty, but at the expense of Colombia, which opposed Panamanian independence.\textsuperscript{273}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{268} Lester D. Langley. America and the Americas: the United States in the Western Hemisphere (Athens, Georgia and London: University of Georgia Press, 1989) pp 57-8, 60-1.
\item \textsuperscript{269} Ibid, pp 90.
\item \textsuperscript{271} Ibid, pp 66.
\item \textsuperscript{272} Ibid, pp 66-7.
\item \textsuperscript{273} Ibid, pp 80-1.
\end{itemize}
Occasionally, Latin American nations unified to challenge the Monroe Doctrine. For example, in 1910, Argentina, Bolivia and Chile formed the “ABC Alliance,” which briefly served as a mediating party between President Woodrow Wilson’s administration and Mexico.\textsuperscript{274} Wilson’s Good Neighbor policy denounced “the right…of the United States to intervene alone” in the affairs of Latin American nations in 1928.\textsuperscript{275} But this idea was challenged by Wilson’s deployment of Marines to occupy Veracruz in 1914 to thwart the German-backed regime of General Victoriano Huerta.\textsuperscript{276} The multilateral flavor of the proposed Pan-American Pact, in 1915, was soured by Wilson’s intervention in Mexico. Also, according to the House of Representatives, the pact was a thinly veiled attempt “to broaden the Monroe Doctrine so that it may be upheld by all the American republics instead of by the United States alone.”\textsuperscript{277}

The Monroe Doctrine has been reinterpreted by each new generation. It’s two main tenets—that the United States was the \textit{de facto} peacekeeping power in the Americas, and that the Americas should be protected against European political instability associated with colonization—have remained intact. These themes have lent themselves well to cartographic imagery. President Theodore Roosevelt’s eponymous corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which emphasized using the new U.S. Navy to enforce American foreign policy in the Americas, found expression in countless

\textsuperscript{274} Ibid, pp 140.  
\textsuperscript{275} Ibid, pp 285.  
\textsuperscript{276} Langley, pp 114-15.  
\textsuperscript{277} Callcott, pp 141-2.
political cartoons in the early 1900s (fig. 4.1).278 In the early years of WWI, when the
American public and Congress were still isolationist, many political cartoons portrayed
the Monroe Doctrine as a barrier between the peaceful West and the war-torn East.

Fig. 4.1. Cartographic depictions of the Monroe Doctrine in early twentieth century
political cartoons (left) validated American intervention in Western Hemispherical
politics. But by early WWI, the doctrine was mainly valued as a barrier to European
wars (right). The cartoon on the left, from 1904, appeared in a collection of Granger
cartoons; the cartoon on the right appeared in the Nashville Tennessean in 1914.

However, the settlement of World War I brought the concept of spheres of
influence into question, especially in American society. Spheres were negatively linked
to the European imperialism and “power politics” seen to have caused the war.279
President Woodrow Wilson promoted international liberalism in his designing of the
Fourteen Points, which favored “universalism” of democratic ideals designed to be
protected in the League of Nations.280

278 Both images in figure 4.1 were taken from online archives located at:
280 Elizabeth Spalding, The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of
But President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s WWII-era internationalism saw spheres of influence, each maintained by a superpower “policeman” nation, as the most effective way to guard against fascism after the war. The American-led United Nations granted only the five policemen nations of the world—United States, France, Britain, Russia and China—permanent membership on the Security Council, as well as veto power.\footnote{281} Article twenty-one of the United Nations charter recognized that “the Security Council should encourage the settlement of local disputes through…regional arrangements or…regional agencies.”\footnote{282}

By the end of WWII, American politicians, journalists and news cartographers viewed spheres of influence very subjectively. They reconciled universalism with Monroe Doctrine ideology by claiming that the American sphere was an “open” sphere in which American supremacy did not violate the sovereignty of Western Hemispheric nations.\footnote{283} The European colonial worlds, and later the “Soviet sphere,” were seen as “exclusive” spheres, which described a “direct control of policy, the suppression of civil liberties, and the intrusive management” of member nations by the dominant nation.\footnote{284} For example, even before WWII ended, the American press labeled Eastern Europe part of the “Soviet sphere” or the “Russian sphere”—a conceived monolithic, Communist, fascist region dominated by Stalin’s will to power.


\footnote{282} Originally quoted in Hoffman, pp 25-6. See United Nations charter, Article 21, Chapter VIII, Section C.

\footnote{283} Ibid, pp 52-3.

\footnote{284} Ibid, pp 53.
Needless to say, these distinctions of “open” and “exclusive” spheres of influence were somewhat hypocritical given the America’s history of intervention in Western Hemispherical affairs. As historian Thomas G. Paterson pointed out, Latin Americans familiar with American dealings in Panama and Cuba in the early twentieth century probably would not agree they were living under an “open” sphere of American influence.  

British officials were aware of the hypocrisy as well. After WWII, in response to expanding American power in Eastern Europe and Asia, British Tory Minister Harold Macmillan commented that “these Americans represent the New Roman Empire.”  

But Americans have always been reluctant to acknowledge they have anything resembling an empire. It is not surprising, then, that from 1945 to 1955 no news maps were made describing an American empire. The Atlas of World Affairs, published in 1946, included one of the few maps of the “United States Empire” known to exist from this period (fig. 4.2). It illustrated the centrality of the Pacific Ocean in the empire after WWII, and connected the United States with the Far East. Latin America, and the Western Hemisphere in general, were relegated to the western border of the map which rendered irrelevant any claims that the Monroe Doctrine only applied to the Americas.

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285 Ibid.
286 Ibid, pp 42.
British “Zones of Influence” by 1945

Though the British refer to the “British World” to this day, the importance of colonial worlds was slowly overshadowed after WWII by the idea of geopolitical “zones of influence,” or “zones,” in the British press. For the British, a zone described any nation’s political or industrial interests in an area—a concept that differed from the American sphere of influence in two fundamental ways. First, whereas a “sphere” described larger regions of the globe in the American press, a “zone” had no restrictions on the size of region it described for the British. Eastern Europe was called the “Soviet Zone” as often as Britain’s oil concessions in Iran were called the “British Zone” of Iran. The British colonial world was often seen as a collection of zones of varying size.

Fig. 4.2. A rare map of the “United States Empire” published in the 1946 Atlas of World Affairs stressed the importance of Alaska and the Pacific Islands in American colonial power. Courtesy of the Special Collections Department, University of Texas at Arlington Central Library.
Second, while Americans viewed spheres very subjectively by 1945, the British viewed all national zones of influence as the same—namely, as arrangements of more indirect control by the dominant nation. Whereas Americans feared a monolithic Soviet sphere by 1945, the British press generally viewed the Soviet “zone of influence” in Eastern Europe in gradations of allegiance to Stalin from country to country, and it was usually seen as separate from the Soviet Union proper. But this relatively simplistic world view was overshadowed by the complex power politics settlements of WWII.

For example, in the various treaty negotiations of WWII, British leaders were compelled to frame their postwar agenda in terms of spheres of influence or risk being alienated by the two postwar superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—both of which saw spheres as a viable paradigm for postwar peace. Understandably, the transition from notions of zones to spheres was not without friction in British political circles.

During WWII, British leaders generally assumed they would retain their prewar empire. In fact, Prime Minister Winston Churchill (Conservative-Tory) believed a close alliance with the United States was the way to achieve this given the British war debt and ravaged economy. But as postwar negotiations proceeded, other Conservative ministers began lamenting a perceived American insistence on international treaties with spheres ideology. Minister Lord Halifax stated in 1945 “the trouble with these [Americans] is that they are so much the victim of labels…‘Power politics,’ ‘spheres of influence,’ ‘balance of power,’ etc…As if there was ever such a
sphere of influence agreement as the Monroe Doctrine." Halifax was reacting specifically to American insistence on expanding the system of multilateral trade that dominated the Monroe Doctrine-controlled Americas to the European colonial realm after the war. But he was also reacting to a perceived naïveté and inconsistency in American foreign policy from WWI to WWII.

Although British foreign policy was largely deemed a success from 1945 to 1955, British officials often voiced concern that they were being left out of spheres of influence negotiations between the United States and Russia during and after WWII. This realization sometimes compelled Churchill to broker bilateral spheres of influence agreements with the United States and Soviet Union separately, and without consulting other superpower nations until after the fact. The most notable of these agreements occurred between Churchill and Stalin shortly after the Teheran Conference of 1943 in which the “Big Three” (U.S., Soviet Union and Britain) had resolved to let the Soviets have military dominion over Eastern Europe.

After the Soviets liberated Bulgaria and Romania by late 1944, however, Churchill sought to protect nearby Greece and Yugoslavia from Stalin’s influence with the famous “percentages” deal with the Communist leader. In October 1944,
Churchill and Stalin unceremoniously agreed that the Soviet Union should have 90 percent control in Romania and 75 percent in Bulgaria, in exchange for Britain retaining 90 percent control in Greece. The two leaders agreed to divide their interests in Yugoslavia and Hungary equally.\footnote{Ibid.}

For all its import, the “percentages” agreement was strictly an oral one with no resulting treaty or official record. Churchill thereafter referred to the dubious arrangement as the “naughty document” given its almost flippant ambiguity and informal establishment.\footnote{Robin Edmonds. The Big Three: Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin in Peace and War (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 1991) pp 388.} And it was received differently by Soviet and American leaders. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov held British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden to the agreement throughout the rest of 1944.\footnote{Ibid, pp 389.} But American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Averill Harriman, who also owned \textit{Newsweek} magazine, wondered why Churchill made such an agreement especially since it was never brought up at the later Yalta Conference of 1945.\footnote{Ibid, pp 388.}

By the time Churchill’s Coalition government was voted out of office in mid 1945, the British were witnessing an eclipsing of their international influence by the Americans, who favored the spheres political paradigm. The new Labour government’s Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, predictably lamented in late 1945 that “this sphere of influence business” seemed irreversible.\footnote{Thomas G. Paterson. On Every Front: the Making and Unmaking of the Cold War (2nd ed.) (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1992) pp 42.} Indeed, though out of office, Conservative
leader Churchill’s now famous “Iron Curtain” speech the following year was one of the first overt examples of British statesmen employing “spheres” terminology:

“From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent…Behind that line lie(s)…what I must call the Soviet sphere…”

It must be remembered, though, that Churchill was speaking in Fulton, Missouri with President Harry S. Truman in attendance, and his rhetoric was designed to appeal to American, not British, fears of Communism.

Spheres and Zones on WWII and Early Cold War News Maps

Since almost all the WWII warfronts were located outside the Americas, and since the United States remained tenuously neutral during most of the war, Allied and Axis powers alike generally endorsed the Monroe Doctrine as a precedent for their newly proclaimed spheres of influence. Nazi Germany, for example, developed very specific notions of spheres of influence that were illustrated in propaganda journal maps published in the United States in the early 1940s. Continuing the tradition of using maps “to define and popularize the ‘just’ extent of the German nation” that developed

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299 For the wording of this speech see http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/churchill-iron.html.

300 Japan’s expansion in the Pacific is the major exception to this statement. Her WWII military attacks on the U.S. possessions of Alaska and Hawaii underscored this exception.
during the Weimar Republic, Nazi mapmakers brought propaganda maps to a high art by WWII.\textsuperscript{301}

In April 1941, for example, the New York City-based Nazi journal \textit{Facts In Review} published a Mercator projection map of the world divided into four spheres of influence (fig. 4.3).\textsuperscript{302} In the map, the Americas were shown to be the domain of the United States while Europe, Scandinavia and Africa were depicted as the European sphere. The Russian sphere consisted of the Soviet Union, which is noteworthy since the map did not acknowledge any Nazi designs for invading the area. The Far East was seen to be the dominion of fellow Axis power Japan—a claim that overlapped British colonial possessions in India, China and the South Pacific, and French Indochina.

![Fig. 4.3. WWII era Nazi news journal maps showing spheres of influence endorsed the American Monroe Doctrine claim of sovereignty over the Western Hemisphere as a justification for the creation of German “Lebensraum” in Europe. This map appeared in the Nazi journal \textit{Facts In Review} in 1941 and it divided the world into four spheres.](image)


Supporting the Monroe Doctrine on Nazi propaganda maps helped the German cause in many ways. First, despite criticism from American president Franklin Delano Roosevelt over Nazi expansion in Europe, German news journal maps could portray national expansion as simply a necessary step in the creation of a German sphere of influence modeled after the United States’ own precedent. Second, validation of German expansion could be found in the Monroe Doctrine’s assumption that the most industrialized and powerful nations in a region have a right to protect the region from outside instability and encroachment. It must be remembered that at the onset of WWII the United States and Germany were arguably the two most industrialized nations in the Western Hemisphere, which made German-American parallels of hegemony easy to argue. And third, illustrating the Monroe Doctrine on Mercator maps such as this one gave ample space between the Americas and the rest of the world to delineate the extent of the doctrine’s hemispherical boundaries. The more evident this delineation the more convincing was the argument that the United States should stick to its own Western sphere and not impede in European matters during WWII. 303

It is interesting to note, then, that at the same time Nazi journal maps were supporting the Monroe Doctrine in its original form, American news journal maps were illustrating the need to revise it in lieu of WWII. When the Monroe Doctrine was issued it described “the Americas” in very general terms—no longitudinal delineations for the Western Hemisphere were given. Most interpretations of the doctrine over time saw the Americas consisting of, and restricted to, North, Central and South America,
and the Caribbean Islands. By 1941, however, as the Battle of the North Atlantic raged, the United States began establishing naval military bases progressively eastward to protect Lend-Lease era shipping routes to and from the British Isles. A new interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine was needed; otherwise, the United States would appear to be meddling outside its own sphere of influence.

In early April 1941, the United States brokered a deal with the Netherlands to establish military naval bases on the southern tip of Greenland to repel German naval attacks. Concomitant with this move was a new American assertion that the Western Hemisphere now included Greenland. It may be recalled that the Nazi map in Facts In Review excluded Greenland from the American sphere that very same month. American national news journals immediately illustrated the expanded claim with numerous maps. In April, U.S. News and World Report published a map inked in black and, appropriately, green showing the new hemispherical line that now put Greenland under the aegis of the Monroe Doctrine (fig. 4.4). The new line, placed at twenty-five degrees west longitude, was painted green, as was Greenland, which linked Western hemispheric defense to the large landform. An icon of Uncle Sam pointed to the line with the text “U.S. Warns: Western Hemisphere Begins Here.” The map illustrated many French, Dutch and British colonies to be protected in the Caribbean with text and point of interest icons although, curiously, the absence of a map legend detracted from the impact of these.

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In July 1941, American forces began replacing British and Canadian troops further east in Iceland—a Danish protectorate lying just east of (hence, outside) the new Monroe Doctrine line. That same month U.S. News and World Report covered the maneuver with a colorful, full page map in the “National Week” section which accompanied several articles on Allied strategy in the North Atlantic (fig. 4.4). This map (the “July” map) was a reprint of the previous map (the “April” map) in most respects, but telling changes were made. Both maps shared the same Mercator projection and placement of continental landmasses, although the July map was slightly larger in scale. But the July map showed no indication of the new Monroe Doctrine line. If it had, it would have appeared that American forces had crossed over the line to get to Iceland, which could be viewed as a violation of a recently publicized limit to national authority.

Instead, the July map replaced the recently touted new Monroe Doctrine line with military shipping and supply lanes that now linked both hemispheres. The April map had been careful not to show any American military presence east of the line. The July map, however, now portrayed the North Atlantic as a borderless, open theater that, with American naval and air dominance, protected the many European colonies in the West while it liberated Iceland and the British Isles from the ominous “War Zone By German Proclamation.” The implication was clear. Military necessity had extended the American sphere of influence so far past Greenland as to render any delineation of the Monroe Doctrine a mute exercise during the remainder of the war.

305 Ibid, 17.
Fig. 4.4. These two maps, which appeared in *U.S. News and World Report* in 1941, illustrated the American desire to expand the Monroe Doctrine sphere of influence to include Greenland.

The “New U.S. Barrier To Axis Raiders,” illustrated in the July map as a chain running north and south, was east of the Azores and Cape Verdi Islands; moreover, it was no longer a straight line—it curved eastward toward the higher latitudes. This curvature further invalidated—or rather expanded—the previously drawn Monroe Doctrine line. The July map also hinted at future American expansion eastward in the map legend. The red, circled star icons denoting “Outlying U.S. Bases” in the Caribbean and off the coasts of Canada, Greenland and Iceland were joined by several similar black icons marking “Future U.S. Bases?” Two of these proposed bases were indicated at the Azores and Cape Verdi Islands—inside the previous Monroe Doctrine line—but other bases were shown across the line in Ireland and Scotland.

306 See *U.S. News and World Report*, v.11, n.3 (July 18, 1941): 11.
For their part, British leaders generally approved of a stronger American military presence outside the Western Hemisphere during WWII since the fate of Britain was seen to depend on American intervention. They had no qualms about Americans expanding the Monroe Doctrine jurisdiction. In fact, British leaders have a history of disregarding the idea of spheres of influence in international politics. The tremendous size of the British Empire insured that her colonial possessions overlapped virtually every imagined sphere of influence on the planet.

Given this, the British could never realistically assert it had a sphere of influence for it would encompass virtually the entire colonial world. On British maps, the “British World,” which stretched from the Middle East to Australia (see chapter 3) by WWII, actually excluded all British colonies in the Western Hemisphere. Even outside the Monroe Doctrine area, in places where British colonies were in close proximity with other European colonies such as in Africa and the Far East, British leaders have traditionally not claimed hegemony to any larger regions.

Churchill’s few spheres of influence negotiations notwithstanding, British press favored the zones paradigm, rather than spheres, well after WWII. As a result, British and American news maps often portrayed geopolitical developments very differently. The aforementioned Teheran Conference of late 1943, for example, was the first meeting of the Big Three during WWII, and it occurred amidst great concern over the future of tri-partisan occupation of Iran, especially given the abundance of oil there.

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307 British colonial areas in the Americas by 1945 included the Bermudas, Jamaica, the Windward and Leeward Islands, Barbados, Trinidad, Tobago, the Bahamas, British Guiana and British Honduras. This is excluding the contested areas of the Falklands Islands and a short-lived claim to a section of Antarctica.
But American and British news maps portrayed Soviet oil interests in Iran in very different ways.

Even during WWII, when the Soviets were still celebrated allies in the American press, national news maps often viewed “Russian sphere” in Eastern Europe and the Middle East much more suspiciously than the British press saw the “Russian zones” there. In October 1944, *Newsweek* published a map of international oil concessions in the Middle East (fig. 4.5).³⁰⁸ The oil claims of Britain, America, Iraq and Kuwait were denoted by differing line patterns of identical black ink. These geographic claims were similarly labeled as “concessions” in a map legend in the lower left corner. The Soviet oil claim, however, was colored with attention-grabbing light green ink and was labeled part of the “Russian ‘Sphere Of Influence’.” The Russian oil concession was likewise not listed in the map legend with the non-Communist concessions. With the “U.S.S.R.” shown bordering Iran to the north, the Russian “sphere of influence” label effectively singled out Soviet oil concessions as an attempt to claim Iranian soil.

Contemporary British news maps, however, portrayed Iranian oil fields much less ideologically than did the American press. On these British maps, the oilfields were mutually divided between “Big Three” and local Arab economic concerns. This is partly because the British press emphasized the economic benefits of the empire’s zones of influence while Americans focused on the political implications of expanding Communism. And although the British presence in Iran was stronger than that of the

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³⁰⁸ *Newsweek*, v.24, n.17 (Oct. 23, 1944): 68.
Americans, the newly elected Labour government under Clement Atlee sought better relations with the Soviets in general.\footnote{Morrell, Spheres of Influence, pp 92-3.}

About the same time that British Conservatives, led by Churchill, were starting to use spheres of influence rhetoric in foreign policy negotiations, and later speeches, the party was voted out of office and replaced by the Labour Party in mid 1945. The Labour Party was elected in large measure on its promise to end the war-torn economic devastation through socialist reforms, but also because of its promise to offer better relations with the Soviet Union. One of the party’s 1945 campaign slogans, after all, was “Left can speak to Left,” which drew a connection between British socialism and Soviet Communism—a philosophical position that contradicted, or at least downplayed, any idea of competing international spheres of influence.\footnote{F.S. Northedge and Audrey Wells, British and Soviet Communism: the Impact of a Revolution, (London: Macmillan Press, 1982) pp 103.}

In June 1946, the British Serial Map Service portrayed Middle East oil concessions in a much more even handed way than did Newsweek three years earlier. In a map entitled “Middle East Oil Map,” all major international oil operations were illustrated as similarly drawn pipelines, not as oil fields as in the 1944 Newsweek map (fig. 4.6).\footnote{Sydney Morrell, Spheres of Influence (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946) pp 92-3. Morrell argues that although outgoing Prime Minister Churchill pressed for continued hegemony in Iran, the British presence there was largely commercial and not heavily regulated while the British government’s involvement continued to be indirect.} This made the multinational oil concessions seem less like land claims, which in turn downplayed the geopolitical implications of claims to territory in the region. In fact, it is impossible to tell from the map which pipelines were owned by which nations. Moreover, although the British map denoted the area of Soviet
concessions in northern Iran, the area was labeled “Soviet-Persian Oil Company Concession.” Absent were any symbols or text relating to a perceived Soviet sphere of influence, much less, threat, here.

Fig. 4.5. This WWII era news map, which appeared in Newsweek in late 1944, legitimized all international oil concessions in the Middle East except those of the Soviet Union, which were portrayed as an extension of the Russian “sphere of influence.”

Generally speaking, Communism was much more palatable in Britain than in the United States throughout the early Cold War period. Although not a major political force in this period, the Communist Party of Great Britain (GBCP) existed from the 1920s to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The GBCP gained popularity in British

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311 See map entitled “Middle East Oil Map” in Serial Map Service, v.7, n.9 (June, 1946): map 360.  
312 GBCP membership was 12,000 in 1941, and rose to 65,000 in 1942. See Northedge and Wells, pp 152.
trade unions during WWII, and it supported Atlee’s Labour Party in its victorious “Left Can Speak To Left” campaign of 1945.³¹³

Fig. 4.6. British news maps of Middle East oil concessions were less politically charged than American maps of the same area. This 1946 Serial Map Service map labeled all international pipelines identically, and no attempt was made to link Soviet oil interests in northern Iran to Communist territorial expansion.

Despite growing British anticommunism after WWII, British news journals published Soviet-friendly material throughout the early Cold War period. In 1953, the Sunday Times saw the United States House on Un-American Activities Committee’s search for Communists as “witch-hunts.”³¹⁴ As late as 1955, London’s News Chronicle promoted travel to the Soviet Union, while the New Statesman and Nation sold over fifteen Soviet journals including Krokodil, Izvestia and Pravda.³¹⁵

It is telling that in the more Soviet-friendly British press no news map is known to exist from 1945 to 1955 that labeled any part of the world a Soviet “sphere of influence.” Although British maps from this period did recognize Soviet “zones of influence” in places such as Eastern Europe and the Middle East, these maps were careful to denote boundaries between the Soviet Union proper and regions of Communist control. For example, in August 1945, the London Tribune published three maps from J.F. Horrabin in a collection entitled “The European Chess-Board, 1925-1945,” the last of which addressed Soviet expansion since 1939 (fig. 4.7).316

Although the map imagery and key described the “Russian Zone of Occupation in Germany” and the “Countries in U.S.S.R.’s ‘zone of influence,’” it carefully delineated these areas from the Soviet Union with differing hatch mark patterns. And a bold black border separated Russia from the areas under its dominion. The implication was clear. Russian presence here was less of a threat than a resolution to Germany’s terrifying expansion in WWII.

Contemporary American news maps, however, were much more purposeful in their linking of Soviet wartime presence in Eastern Europe to the idea that Stalin was seeking to expand the Soviet Union itself. In May 1945, U.S. News and World Report published a map of Europe showing all areas under Soviet military control, including parts of the Baltic Sea, as a singular “red blackout” (fig. 4.8).317 This presented Europe as a bipolar realm with Stalin on one side and Britain and the United States on the other—a notion underscored by the placement of each nation’s leaders on the top border.

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of the map. The border between Russia and Eastern Europe was upstaged by the
dangerous red coloring that stretched from the Elbe River in Germany to the eastern
extent of the map.

![Map of Soviet expansion](image.jpg)

Fig. 4.7. WWII era British maps of Soviet expansion were careful to delineate Russia from its “zone of influence” with line shading and bold borders. This map appeared in the *London Tribune* in mid 1945.

A similar map created by R.M. Chapin, Jr. appeared in *Time* magazine that same month entitled “Trouble Spots.” It described the “Soviet Sphere of Influence” as an extension of Stalin’s personal grab for territory (fig. 4.8). Stalin himself, literally facing westward, was superimposed over Russia, from which lines of power thrust to the western border of Eastern Europe and terminated into Soviet stars. Areas of Soviet expansion were shaded only slightly lighter than Russia itself. Whereas the *U.S. News and World Report* map showed British and American leaders opposing Stalin atop the

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map, the *Time* map visualized Anglo-American resistance to Stalin’s advance with a “British-U.S. Chain of Interest” arcing from southern Norway to Syria. This chain symbolism is reminiscent of the “New U.S. Barrier To Axis Raiders” evident in the 1941 *U.S. News and World Report* map discussed above (fig. 4.3, right side). Moreover, it presaged Containment policy symbolism so popular in American news maps by the late 1940s.

![Map](image)

**Fig. 4.8.** As WWII closed, Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe was seen as a new threat to world peace in American news maps—much more so than on British maps. The map on the left appeared in *U.S. News and World Report* in May, 1945. The map on the right was published in *Time* magazine the same month.

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Polarization and the “Special Relationship” on News Maps

Historian Richard H. Ullman has noted that “the Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’ has been about security—specifically, about the threat to security posed by the Soviet Union.” Indeed, the term “special relationship,” as applied to Anglo-American relations, was coined by Winston Churchill in his “Iron Curtain” speech designed to rally Americans to fight Communism in British-controlled Greece, among other places. But although the “Iron Curtain” speech was delivered in March 1946, most historians agree that the “special relationship” began with the Anglo-American cooperation in the Allied cause of WWII.

Toward the end of WWII, American news journal maps envisioned the world with the same Anglo-American unity and interventionism that characterized maps of the Allied war effort. Gone were most cartographic references to Monroe Doctrine hegemony, American exceptionalism and anti-colonialism that were so prevalent on maps years before the war. Whereas the Western Hemisphere used to be portrayed as the protected sphere of the United States, as the war drew to close, news maps saw the hemisphere as yet another part of a larger international society.

One of the most influential daily newspapers on the East Coast during this period was the New York Herald Tribune, which had a long tradition as an

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internationalist paper with a pro-British attitude.\textsuperscript{320} Star columnist and noted author, Walter Lippmann, worked for the paper and in 1944 he released a book entitled \textit{U.S. War Aims} which was reviewed in \textit{Newsweek} that July.\textsuperscript{321} Lippmann, whom the \textit{New Statesman and Nation} called “the most instructed of American columnists,” included a map to illustrate some points of his book for \textit{Newsweek}’s review column (fig. 4.9).\textsuperscript{322}

Fig. 4.9. In 1944, noted American political analyst, Walter Lippmann, envisioned a postwar world divided into four spheres of influence. The concept of multilateral spheres followed the ideals of the new United Nations, but soon gave way to Cold War era bipolar politics in the American press. This map was published in \textit{Newsweek} in July 1944.

The 1944 Lippmann map was an interesting blend of cartographic imagery that, on one level, separated the Western Hemisphere from the rest of the world, but also promoted internationalism. The map employed Goode’s projection, which separated the Western Hemisphere from the rest of the world. But Lippmann’s coloring of the

Western Hemisphere the same green as Africa, Western Europe, Greenland, Britain, Norway and Australia emphasized the scope of his conceived “Atlantic Community.” This was a graphic linking of the United States with most Western European nations and their colonies. Although France was included in this community, its pre-WWII colonial holdings in French Indochina were shown as part of the “Chinese Orbit.” But when Lippmann wrote his book in early 1944, France was still under the Vichy government and its Southeast Asian colonies were in serious question.

At this time, too, the United States and the Soviet Union were still nominally allies. Separate recognition of the “Russian Orbit” and “Chinese Orbit” followed the ideology of the nascent United Nations—they were two of the four “policemen” of the new world order—but it was also a religious distinction. The “Potential Hindu-Moslem Orbit,” which included all lands south of Russia and China, stretched from Turkey to India and underscored the religious criterion. Linking Southeast Asia with China was also religiously convenient. The importance of religion in Cold War power politics grew stronger as the Christian Anglo-American “special relationship” coalesced to confront Communist atheism.

But Anglo-American relations cooled somewhat immediately after WWII as Americans, tired of four years of war, drifted back into isolationism. Moreover, as evident in State Department briefings of the July 1945 Potsdam conference, American leaders were weary of being drawn into Anglo-Soviet disputes over empire in the

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Middle East and Greece, among other places.\textsuperscript{323} American suspicions of British imperialism, Atlee’s new Socialist government, and British intentions in Palestine also hurt the “special relationship” in this period.\textsuperscript{324}

American news maps visualized these new concerns. The international unity evident in Lippmann’s 1944 map was quickly replaced with world maps with isolationist themes after WWII. It may be recalled from chapter 2 that \textit{Newsweek}’s “Three Worlds and their problem spots” map of February 1946 divided the world between the “Big Three,” with the Western Hemisphere once again portrayed as a separate realm of “U.S. Influence” (fig. 2.7). The map was a catalog of politically unstable areas of decolonization which, on its Mercator projection, showed the United States being pulled into matters outside its geopolitical responsibility. One week prior, \textit{Time} magazine published a map by R.M. Chapin, Jr. entitled “Reshuffle,” which featured the African landmass and parts of the Middle East with similar isolationist themes.\textsuperscript{325} Chapin painted all “World War I Mandates” bright red which made them appear dangerous against the otherwise gray African landmass. Next to Palestine was a text block that candidly read “Britain wants U.S. to share this headache.”

As American foreign policy drifted back towards isolationism and Monroe doctrine rhetoric, British politicians, journalists and news cartographers reacted negatively. Although the Labour government promoted better Anglo-Soviet relations in early 1945, by the end of the year Atlee was pushing for a stronger stance from the

\textsuperscript{323} Bartlett, pp 68.
\textsuperscript{324} Hathaway, pp 12-13.
Americans toward the Soviets. In fact, many American foreign policy practices frustrated the Labour government and British news analysts from the end of WWII to early 1946. These included America’s refusal to share atomic secrets, the rapid termination of Lend-Lease aid, the insistence on multilateral trade in the Sterling Areas, and a perceived American irresponsibility over the Palestine question.

These political concerns were founded largely on the British realization that its economic recovery, which was always seen to be tied to unilateral trade in the “British World,” was being thwarted by American insistence on multilateral trade for all colonial nations. In geopolitical terms, the British were lamenting a perceived American extension of Monroe Doctrine trade ideology, through international trusteeships, to traditionally exclusive British trade access in China, Greece and the Middle East. When British politicians and news journals discussed foreign policy in this era, they usually couched their rhetoric in terms of what it meant for the British economy.

It is not surprising, then, that during this period most British news maps were more concerned with economic, rather than political, aspects of the British Empire and world politics. The Serial Map Service published several maps assessing the economic state of the postwar British Empire, and other empires, throughout 1946. The journal’s maps of the British Overseas Airways Corporation, the British and French Empires, and

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326 Hathaway, pp 13.
European Passenger Transport were explained largely in economic terms. The aforementioned 1946 “Middle East Oil” map (fig. 4.6) was more about the importance of oil than international competition.

Mapping the world in economic terms was nothing new for the British, of course. British cartographers have a long history of portraying colonial lands in terms of trade goods found there. Even during the darkest days of WWII, when most maps concerned the war effort, the Serial Map Service produced economic maps of Commonwealth areas with icons denoting industrial products for export to the British Isles. The end of the war brought a precipitous decline in the frequency of news maps in general, but this was countered by a revival of advertising maps promoting international economic expansion to benefit the beleaguered British Empire. Compared to ad maps in the WWII era, British postwar ad maps were relatively apolitical as they sought to downplay the many international crises facing the Foreign Office, while they promoted overseas travel, investments in Commonwealth trade, and a general sense of world unity.

Chapter 3 examined how British air services began omitting national boundaries in ad maps to promote a sense of accessibility to foreign places in the postwar Air Age. Ads promoting business in specific British colonies often included maps describing only the colonies themselves, and the British manufactured products sold there, with no description of nearby non-British colonies. One of the more prolific advertisers in this

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regard was Barclay’s Bank of London, which produced cartographic ads throughout the early Cold War period in Spectator magazine. Barclay’s Bank ads promoted investments in its “dominion, colonial and overseas” branches, in places such as South Africa and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, with maps of the colonies, tables of goods sold there, and images of native inhabitants (fig. 4.10).  

![Cartographic Ad from Barclay's Bank](image)

**Fig. 4.10.** After WWII, British news journals promoted trade within the empire with cartographic ads like this one that appeared in Spectator magazine in October 1949. These ads reversed the colonial trend of illustrating native products imported to the British Isles on map borders. Now British manufactured items exported to the colonies were the focus.

The disparate trends of British and American news maps in the immediate post WWII period, with the former promoting international economic activism and the latter endorsing geographic isolationism, began to converge in light of a perceived Communist threat by early 1946. Heightened American and Soviet economic interests in Iran, Stalin’s consolidation of the East German and Soviet economies, and a Soviet

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330 A good example is the economic map of Australia in Serial Map Service, v.2, n.5 (February, 1941): map 67.
push for governance of the Turkish Dardanelles promoted a tougher anti-Soviet line from American and British leaders.\(^{332}\) It was these events, or more importantly, the American and British interpretations of them, that began the closer Anglo-American unity and gradual process of bipolarity that characterized the rest of the Cold War. But an analysis of 1946 political rhetoric shows that British and American foreign policy experts still interpreted this process of bipolarization in different ways, which caused differences in how they visualized the world on maps.

Easily the most influential American foreign policy document of 1946, and the entire early Cold War period, was the “Long Telegram” sent by George Kennan, the American ambassador to the Soviet Union. Kennan, who had served in the Moscow embassy since the 1930s, composed the 8,000 word telegram on Soviet foreign policy at the request of American officials, who were recently convinced that Stalin could no longer be trusted.\(^{333}\) In February, Kennan concluded that the Kremlin’s recent aggressiveness was the product of Marxist-Leninist ideology, but also it was evident in older Russian traditions.\(^{334}\) Although the Soviet Union was fundamentally weak and insecure, it would seek to expand in the future to combat a perceived encirclement by capitalism.\(^{335}\) Kennan’s telegram was well received by American foreign policy

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\(^{332}\) Paterson, pp 62-6.

\(^{333}\) Gaddis, pp 301-2.


\(^{335}\) Ibid.
planners for its insight, timeliness, and clear recommendation to contain Communism abroad.336

Kennan’s ideas, which eventually matured into the American policy of Containment, were echoed less than two weeks later in Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech, which saw Containment as best achieved by a closer Anglo-American alliance.337 Kennan’s and Churchill’s early 1946 rhetoric has been addressed by virtually every Cold War historian. Much less known, though, is the appearance of the British version of the “Long Telegram,” issued by Frank Roberts, British ambassador to the Soviet Union, less than a month after Kennan’s missive. Though largely ignored by modern scholarship, the “Roberts telegram” offers keen insight into differences between American and British world views at the beginning of the Cold War—differences eclipsed by a preponderance of American power after 1946.

Roberts and Kennan were constituents who served together at the Moscow embassy, and Roberts was aware of Kennan’s ideas before composing his own summary of Soviet intentions for the British Foreign Office.338 Kennan and Roberts agreed that aggressive Soviet foreign policy was a continuation of pre-Communist Russian tradition, and that more recent Marxism gave new impetus to Soviet insecurities about their capitalist neighbors.339 But unlike Kennan, Roberts stressed the importance of Anglo-American unity to protect British interests.340 And whereas

339 Ibid, pp 111.
Kennan predicted an inevitable future dominated by spheres of capitalism versus Communism, Roberts more optimistically held that zones of British, American and Soviet interest could be maintained. In general, by endorsing zones of influence rather than spheres, Roberts’ “presented a picture with softer edges than that projected from the American embassy.”

Roberts’ world view at the onset of the Cold War, composed of multilateral zones of influence, more closely described the imagery and ideas expressed on British news maps than did Churchill’s bilateral spheres rhetoric that so appealed to American leaders. But as America began to assume a leadership role in world affairs, and especially in Anglo-American relations, British politicians, journalists and news cartographers slowly adopted the spheres terminology. However, the British interpretation of geopolitical spheres of influence remained more complex and multilateral than in the American mind. Long after Churchill’s 1946 speech, British news journalists and cartographers usually distinguished gradations of Soviet control in Eastern Europe. But they often used anti-Soviet catch phrases popularized by Churchill, and by the American press, when distinguishing grades of Communism. The result was news articles and maps with titles as provocatively bipolar in nature as those in the American press, but with text and maps that described Soviet power as complex and polycentric.

For example, in July 1947, the Serial Map Service published a map of Eastern Europe with commentary from Sebastian Haffner, a diplomatic correspondent for The

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341 Ibid.
Haffner’s essay, entitled “The Communist Curtain: ‘Russian Sphere of Influence in Europe,’” implied a monolithic Soviet threat. But the essay described Eastern Europe as divided into “three degrees of Communism.” Finland and Czechoslovakia, in the first group, were not occupied by the Russian Army. They had parliamentary democracies, free elections and press, and Communist parties.

The second group, consisting of Yugoslavia and Albania, were “the most completely Communist states outside Russia.” Under fanatical regimes that were products of native Communist struggles against WWII Germany and Italy, these nations squashed all political opposition. Yugoslavia’s Marshal Tito was recognized as a frequent “embarrassment of the Kremlin.” The third group included Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. They were under a “less complete” form of Communism which was based on Russian military occupation. Haffner then described the differing states of affairs in each of the four countries of this group.

The accompanying map was, in many ways, a color version of the 1945 London Tribune map (fig. 4.11). “Soviet Russia” proper was colored green (not a menacing red as on most colored contemporary American maps) with a dark border between it and Eastern Europe. Eastern and Western Europe were colored the same—white with light green symbols indicating surface features. Text labels for all European nations.

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342 Ibid, pp 115.
344 Ibid, pp 162.
345 Ibid.
346 Ibid, 163.
347 Ibid.
348 Ibid.
349 Ibid, map 416.
were the same as well. Only the darker green Russian occupation zones of East Germany and eastern Austria denoted a Russian presence in Eastern Europe. No spheres of influence label appeared on the map, but four zones of influence were shown. And most notably, there was no cartographic reference to the “Iron Curtain.”

It is important to note that, despite the influence of Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech in the United States, from 1946 to 1955 only one British news map is known to exist which depicted that conceived barrier. In April 1949, *Time and Tide* published an article entitled “Ports and Politics” that was accompanied by a black and white map of central Europe. But the article and the map were actually used to describe the permeability of the “Iron Curtain,” not its significance as a European barrier. Journalist Aldo Cassuto described a “deep rift” between the Soviet Union and Marshal Tito which allowed Marshall Plan aid to cross the “Iron Curtain,” through the Yugoslavian port city of Trieste, to reach Czechoslovakia and Hungary, among other places. On the article’s map, the “Iron Curtain” appeared merely as a dotted line.

In American press maps, however, “Iron Curtain” symbolism was much more popular and explicit. As noted previously, Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech was delivered on March 5, 1946. The first news map with “Iron Curtain” symbolism appeared thirteen days later. On March 18, *Time* magazine published a map by R.M. Chapin, Jr. entitled “Behind the Iron Curtain” which portrayed Europe as divided by a menacing red chain curtain with a hammer and sickle in the center. The cable that controlled the curtain was tethered in Moscow. As the Cold War progressed, the “Iron

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“Curtain” became a powerful symbol for visualizing a progressively bipolar world order on American news maps.

Fig. 4.11. In the essay accompanying this 1947 Serial Map Service map, Eastern Europe was described as the Soviet sphere of influence behind the “Iron Curtain.” However, no “Iron Curtain” appeared on the map, and Eastern Europe was portrayed the same as Western Europe.

Beginning in June 1946, the New York Times began publishing so many “Iron Curtain” maps that it developed a standard base map that was simply reprinted with different hatch mark patterns and text blocks to suit different news articles. The 1948 Berlin Crisis prompted a shift in the “Iron Curtain” westward to include East Germany, and was symbolized by a large chain on a Newsweek map entitled “Playing With Fire”

351 Ibid.
353 See map entitled “How The Communist Vote Has Varied In Europe’s Elections” in NYT, v.95, n.32,278 (Jun. 6, 1946): E5; see also map entitled “The Split In Europe Between East And West” in NYT, v.97, n.32,796 (Nov. 9, 1947): E1.
published in July of that year.\textsuperscript{354} American magazine, a popular nationalist monthly journal, published several large, colorful maps with “Iron Curtain” symbolism in the late 1940s and early 1950s.\textsuperscript{355}

Arguably the most popular and visually striking way American news maps portrayed the Cold War process of geopolitical bipolarization, though, was through their depiction of competing spheres of influence. Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech and Kennan’s “Long Telegram” predicted that multilateral international politics would soon give way to a bipolar struggle between forces of Communism and capitalism that would divide the globe into two ideological worlds. For politicians, journalists and news cartographers, the concepts of “spheres of influence” and geopolitical “worlds” became interchangeable as concepts of bipolarization crystallized in the American mind.

The idea of a bipolar world was not new to the American press, though. This chapter has already shown how early WWI-era cartographic political cartoons divided the world into two camps in the Monroe Doctrine tradition—the peaceful, democratic American sphere and the war-torn, European colonial sphere (fig. 4.1). But when American news maps began visualizing a bipolar world in mid 1946, they did so according to Churchill’s recent characterizations.

Churchill had insisted that Communism would best be thwarted by stronger Anglo-American unity, which he viewed primarily in military terms. But the underlying concerns for Churchill, and the British press, were always more economic than militaristic. Simply put, the British could not afford a world spanning military

\textsuperscript{354} Newsweek, v.32, n.4 (Jul. 26, 1948): 30.
after WWII. And while Churchill was rattling sabers in the United States, the British press was touting a stronger economy to fight Communism. As an anonymous British journalist noted in 1947, “…power these days means…industrial power…If Britain could produce enough to raise the economic level on the Continent, then the present division of Europe…might be replaced by a united Europe.”

The first news map to characterize Cold War bipolarity appeared shortly after Churchill’s speech, and it divided the world along economic lines. In late May 1946, *U.S. News and World Report* published a map entitled “Two Worlds” which divided the world between the “Soviet Sphere” and the “Anglo-American Sphere” (fig. 4.12).[357] The map was a vision of two economic worlds, as it accompanied an article entitled “Line-up of U.S., Soviet Blocs: Greater Resources of the West.”[358] The Soviet Sphere, colored deep red, included Russia, Finland, Eastern Europe and Mongolia. Manchuria, where the Soviets were extracting Japanese-made heavy machinery, was colored pink. The rest of the Mercator map landforms were labeled the “Anglo-American Sphere”—a misleading term since it encompassed all the multinational lands without Communist economies.

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The idea of an Anglo-American sphere of influence did not last very long in the American press, however. This was partly due to an innate American distaste for all things colonial, as evidenced by protesters shouting “Don’t be a ninny for imperialist Winnie!” when Churchill appeared in New York ten days after his “Iron Curtain” speech. But it was also due to an American preference for geopolitical “universalism”—meaning liberal international trade and an open political world—rather than spheres of colonial interest.

It is not surprising, though, that between 1945 and 1955 no American news map is known to exist that labels any part of the world as an American “empire.” Nevertheless, many news maps were published cataloging the affairs between the American sphere and other spheres. An analysis of these maps produces a sort of cartographic barometer of Cold War hostilities in the international arena. The 1946

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359 Gaddis, pp 309.
“Two Worlds” map notwithstanding, American news maps generally progressed from a period of multiple spheres of influence at the end of WWII to a bipolarization of world affairs by 1955.

Walter Lippmann’s 1944 map predicted a postwar world divided, along religious lines, into four spheres—the Anglo-American dominated Atlantic Community, the Russian orbit, the Chinese orbit, and the “potential Hindu Moslem” orbit. Cartographic multilateralism reached its height three years later when a *New York Times* map, entitled “Focal Points on the World Map,” claimed there were five spheres—those of the American, Russian, French, British and Dutch powers. Most early postwar maps, however, saw the world dominated by the three victorious Allied nations of Britain, Russia and the United States. Three of the most influential news journals—*Newsweek*, the *New York Times* and *Time* magazine—followed this trend until the late 1940s.361

While American news journals frequently published world maps to put power politics into a global perspective, contemporary British maps preferred to examine political hot spots on a case by case basis. As previously noted, the frequency of British news maps dropped dramatically after WWII. The few maps that were produced continued the WWII tradition of describing national or smaller regional areas. Aside from the *Serial Map Service*, no regular weekly or monthly British news journal is known to have published any maps of the world from 1945 to 1955. Nor did any such journal publish a map of the entire British Empire during the same period.

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360 *Paterson*, pp 52.
The result was British maps in such small scale they were unable to convey any larger picture of spheres of influence, competing worlds, or global bipolarity so prevalent on American maps. Although chapter 5 will examine cartographic portrayals of Cold War Germany, a brief comparison of how the British and American press saw the Berlin crisis reveals the importance of scale in news maps.

After Germany was divided among the victorious Allies following WWII, the nation remained a sort of test case for Cold War tensions. The first major rift between Western capitalist powers and the Soviets began in mid 1948. In June of that year the Western powers introduced a new German currency in their zones of occupation which seriously undermined the value of the older money still used in the Soviet zone.\textsuperscript{362} Stalin answered by introducing a new East German currency, while simultaneously blockading all land access to Berlin.\textsuperscript{363} The American-led Berlin Airlift nullified Stalin’s attempt to use the blockade as a bargaining tool for more control over German affairs, and he reopened access to the city by May 1949.\textsuperscript{364}

The fate of Germany after WWII was always more important to the British than to the Americans.\textsuperscript{365} Not only was Britain geographically closer to the former Nazi, and now Communist, threat than the United States, but the British zone of Germany was also a source of economic recovery for the war-torn empire. Although British news articles frequently warned of a Stalinist threat in the Soviet zone of eastern Germany, contemporary news maps almost never made that connection. Moreover, the small

\textsuperscript{362} Ladrech and Wegs, pp 17.  
\textsuperscript{363} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{364} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{365} Greenwood, pp 117.
scale of British news maps during this period depicted most political events as local or regional issues—not as facets of a larger struggle between the “free world” and the “Communist world.”

In April 1949, just as roads between the British and Russian zones were reopening, London’s Daily Express published a front page article and map describing the state of affairs in Germany. The map was very small in scale and described only the border immediately between the British and Soviet zones (fig. 4.13). No cartographic imagery linked the Soviet zone to Russia proper, or to any larger Soviet empire. Nor could the economic unification of the three western zones of Germany be portrayed at this scale. Although a broad black border separated the two zones, a major highway and four rail lines were shown to traverse it and converge in Berlin. This was only the second British news map published depicting the Berlin crisis. The first was the aforementioned “Iron Curtain” map that appeared in Time and Tide two weeks prior, which, although it portrayed all of central Europe, it was devoid of all national boundaries.

A striking contrast, both in frequency and style, is evident between British and American maps of Germany and the Berlin crisis. Despite American isolationism after WWII, the nation’s press published numerous news maps of postwar Germany. Between 1945 and 1946, maps recounting the Allied push for Germany, postwar economic relations there, and the growing Soviet presence in East Germany were

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popular themes.\textsuperscript{367} As discussed above, Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech inspired many maps depicting Germany as the front line between the capitalist and Communist worlds. The Berlin crisis caused a similar wave of news maps centering on Germany as the latest Cold War hot spot.\textsuperscript{368}

![Map of Berlin Crisis](image)

**Fig. 4.13.** The larger scale of British news maps usually portrayed Cold War clashes with the Soviet Union as local events between British and Soviet zones of influence. This map of the Berlin Crisis was published in London’s *Daily Express* in April 1948.

Typically, American news maps of the Berlin crisis were larger in scale than contemporary British maps. This gave ample room to link the Soviet zone to Stalin directly with icons, text and color. For example, in late July 1948 *Newsweek* published a map entitled “Playing With Fire?” which portrayed Berlin as a dangerous powder keg of possible war between the four occupied German zones (fig. 4.14).\textsuperscript{369} A large arm


entering from the East, and holding a torch under Berlin, was implied to be Russian in origin. The question mark in the map title consisted of a sickle and Soviet star.

The international importance of the crisis was underscored with flags representing the British, French, American and Russian zones. But this was seen as a bipolar struggle, as the three western zones’ airlift planes converged in Berlin—across the “Iron Curtain” symbolized with a large steel chain isolating the Soviet zone. Chapter 6 will show, in very similar fashion, how British news maps portrayed the 1949 Communist revolt in China as a local (i.e. Chinese national) problem while contemporary American maps saw it as an extension of Soviet power in Asia.

In fact, the year 1949 saw many events that furthered the notion of a bipolar Cold War world. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created in April and guaranteed that an attack on any one of the twelve founding nations would be met with response by all. The Soviets detonated their first atomic bomb in August which ended the American monopoly on nuclear weapons. And by early October, Germany was formally divided into two separate states. But, predictably, British and American news cartographers expressed this increasingly bipolar world in very different ways.

By the late 1940s, the American press was quick to link any Communist regime, no matter where it resided, to Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union. The rise of Communist China affirmed in the American mind that Stalin’s promise to start a world revolt against capitalism was more than rhetoric. By 1950, many American leaders, and
a majority of the public, saw Communist China as an extension of Stalin’s power.\textsuperscript{370}

Despite the many differences between Soviet and Chinese models of Communism, and a strong tradition of Chinese nationalism, numerous news maps were published from 1949 to 1950 portraying the Soviet Union and China as a unified “Communist World.”\textsuperscript{371}

Fig. 4.14. Unlike smaller scale British news maps, American maps of the Berlin Crisis were larger in scale. This allowed ample room to portray Cold War Germany as a battleground between “free world” nations and the Soviet Union. This map was published in \textit{Newsweek} in late July 1948.

Although all weekly American news cartographers had access to a wide palette of colors, they usually employed only red coloring on “Two Worlds” maps by the late 1940s and early 1950s. Graphic design expert Edward Tufte has noted the


exceptionally high reflectivity of red coloring on maps and displays. And for the American public in the late 1940s, attention grabbing red ink usually denoted threatening areas of Communist control. The Soviet Union was usually colored the darkest red while nearby Communist areas including China and Eastern Europe were lighter shades.

“Two Worlds” maps in this fashion found new popularity following Kennan’s 1947 Containment policy because they presented multinational Communism as a unified threat to be confronted. In December 1948, a Time magazine map by R.M. Chapin, Jr., entitled “Lost Horizon?” linked Communist victories in China to Stalin with a unifying red Soviet star, and with railroads linking northern China to Moscow. A map entitled “War of Two Worlds: Results of the Summer Campaigns,” published by Newsweek in late October 1949, colored the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China the same, despite article text differentiating between these locations, and between Yugoslavia.

The onset of the Korean War prompted American news cartographers to begin lumping North Korea into the Soviet sphere as well. A map entitled “What We’re Up Against,” published in Newsweek in July 1950, represented the Korean War as one of “a dozen Communist threats all around the borders of the red-inked Eurasian landmass” (fig. 4.15). Eastern Europe, China and North Korea—all colored pink—appeared as

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Soviet provinces. Arrows indicating Communist expansion, colored dark red to match the Soviet Union, appeared in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and along the southern border of China. This gave the impression that Soviet influence traveled unimpeded through all Communist nations as it sought to expand into “threatened areas.”

Despite the fact the most American politicians agreed that the Soviet Union did not seek war, by the 1950s, “two worlds” maps were frequently used to illustrate the theoretical military might of the Communist world. These were usually polar projection maps which implied a closeness of the perceived monolithic, Soviet-dominated Eurasian landmass to the United States. In September 1952, the *Saturday Evening Post* published a large polar projection map that accompanied an article entitled “Stalin’s Secret War Plans.”376 The map was centered on the Soviet Union and showed the air strike radii of over sixty “Red Air Bases” on the periphery of the Soviet-Sino-Eastern European landmass. A similar, but reciprocal, polar projection map showing the “massive retaliatory power” of NATO forces upon the Communist world was published by *Fortune* in May 1954.377 *U.S. News and World Report* added Tibet and Finland to the Communist world in a polar projection map illustrating Soviet submarine maneuvers in near the South Pole in September 1955.378

As mentioned above, British news maps of the world were very rare, possibly nonexistent in the early Cold War period. But many contemporary political cartoons containing cartographic imagery were published which reveal British conceptions of the Cold War world. But British cartoons did not employ cartographic symbolism as often as their American counterparts. British cartoonists have a tradition of representing foreign nations, and the British Empire, with animals and political caricatures more often than with cartographic imagery. British Commonwealth nations were often depicted with symbols of exotic animals found there. Cold War nations comprised of multilateral zones of influence, such as Germany and China, usually took the form of indecisive women being wooed by foreign leaders.

The few political cartoons with cartographic imagery show that by the early Cold War period British newspapers were very concerned about the effects of
geopolitical bipolarity on the empire and the world. Absent were any images depicting Stalin or the “Communist World” trying to conquer the globe as were popular in the American press. Rather, the Stalinist threat was one of destabilization of world trade and peace. In January 1948, for example, *Time and Tide* published a cartoon showing Stalin feeding box of “suspicion” to two fish named “East” and “West” in a fishbowl fashioned from a transparent globe.\(^{379}\)

But with the formation of NATO and the first Soviet atomic detonation, both in 1949, came a renewed British allegiance to American foreign policy. Waning ideas of an exclusive British World were now lampooned in news cartoons. In October 1949, outspoken Tory Lord Beaverbrook was criticized by his own paper, the *Daily Express*, with a cartoon poking fun at his outdated world view.\(^{380}\) The cartoon showed Beaverbrook speaking to a Shadow Cabinet, comprised of his clones, before a “Map of the World (Up to Date)” (fig. 4.16).

On the Mercator map the entire world’s nations were omitted except the United States and those in the British Commonwealth. But while the Commonwealth nations were inked in solid black, the United States was colored white with fragmented borders—it was disappearing from the map. The Colonial Secretary addressed the Shadow Cabinet with his arms raised and the caption read “The Shadow Cabinet meets, and solves the crisis in the twinkling of an eye.” Beaverbrook’s simplistic solution to American insistence on free trade in the Commonwealth was to erase the nation from the world map. While this cartoon was humorous in light of a renewed British need for

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\(^{379}\) See *Time and Tide*, v.29, n.3 (Jan. 17, 1948): 65.
American military support in the late 1940s, Beaverbrook’s map of the world resembled *Serial Map Service* maps from the mid 1940s that centered on the British Empire and often excluded the United States. The caricature of Beaverbrook was no doubt humorous to Americans, too, when the cartoon was reprinted in *Newsweek* roughly two weeks later.381

![Image of a cartoon showing a meeting of politicians with a map in the background.](image)

The Beaver's own newspaper kids him about the way he lays down policies...

Fig. 4.16. By the late 1940s, British fears of Soviet destabilization of world peace and trade prompted closer ties to U.S. foreign policy. Ideas of an exclusive British Empire became outdated, and were often criticized in cartoons with map imagery. This cartoon appeared in the *Daily Express* in October 1949.

**Conclusions**

British and American news map portrayals of the early Cold War world were shaped largely by their idiomatic conceptions of global hegemony. American foreign policy, dating back the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, saw the world divided into relatively large, unilateral spheres of influence. The American sphere consisted of the Americas, or the Western Hemisphere, and was seen to be a harbor from European colonial

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instability despite frequent American intervention there. The Monroe Doctrine gained new importance in the Allied struggle of WWII, but was largely eclipsed by the development of the “Anglo-American sphere,” and later the “free world,” in news maps in the early Cold War period.

Meanwhile, American news maps saw the Soviet sphere as a dangerous extension of Stalin’s will to power even during WWII. The postwar Stalinization of Eastern Europe, the Chinese Communist revolution of 1949, and the Korean War convinced most Americans that all communist forces in Eurasia were mere puppet regimes controlled by the Soviet Union. News maps lumped all Communist nations together as a monolithic “Communist world” by the late 1940s, which bolstered the idea of Cold War bipolarity in American rhetoric.

British preference for zone of influence, which were generally smaller and more multilateral than conceived American spheres, were less anti-Communistic and less alarmist. Despite Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech, British foreign policy was dominated by multilateral economic concerns after WWII. The British press gave equal treatment to Communist and capitalist interests on news maps, as Soviet presence in the Middle East was never seen as a geopolitical threat. The Soviet zone of influence in Eastern Europe was usually portrayed as separate from Russia and consisting of varying degree of Communism. While American maps portrayed Germany, China and Korea as battlegrounds between East and West, smaller scale British maps addressed these hotspots more regionally.

CHAPTER 5  
COLD WAR GERMANY ON NEWS MAPS

The primacy of Nazi Germany as an enemy of the Allies during WWII transferred to the importance of postwar occupied Germany in the early Cold War period. But while British and American news journals acknowledged that “a study of the map of [postwar] Europe must…begin with a study of Germany,” their respective national political leaders had very different ideas about the place and importance of divided Germany after 1945. And British and American news journals expressed these differences in their own idiomatic ways on maps.

Four major themes characterized, and differentiated, British and American views of Cold War Germany on news maps. First, the very shape of the mapped image of Germany was far more important in the American press. Second, the advent of Iron Curtain rhetoric profoundly changed how both nations perceived the occupied zones of Germany. Third, both national presses, in their own way, sought to link sections of Cold War Germany to Nazi heritage. And fourth, by the late 1940s and early 1950s, American and British news journals found ways to link East Germany to geopolitical events in the Far East.
One or Two Germanys—Not Three

Germany underwent an astounding series of territorial changes in the five years between the end of WWII (when Nazi Germany was a large monolithic threat) and 1949 (when East and West Germany were officially created as separate states). These changes have been discussed in previous chapters. In general, Germany was transformed from a large, monolithic nation in the Nazi era, to a bipolar occupied region symbolizing Cold War tensions between East and West. Though American and British news cartographers followed the transition from “one Germany” to “two Germanys,” they did so in very different ways.

By the end of WWII, American news mapmakers had a rich history of equating the mapped image of a Nazi Germany with danger and aggression. Unlike the Japanese threat, which actually reached American soil at Pearl Harbor and the Aleutian Islands during the war, the distant German threat was more obscure in the American mind. Throughout the war, the Allied campaign against Hitler, fought in the North Atlantic Ocean, Europe and North Africa, were not seen as threats to the American homeland. To rally support against Hitler, however, news cartographers found creative ways to convince Americans that although Germany was far away it still represented a threat to America.

The simplest way to bring the Nazi threat across the Atlantic Ocean with news maps was to literally superimpose a map of Nazi Germany over map of the United States. For example, in February 1945, *U.S. News and World Report* published a map entitled “Suppose Pittsburgh Were Berlin” which showed the eastern half of the United
States covered by a map of Germany (fig. 5.1). The eastern United States was white with black borders, which contrasted with the menacing red German nation that stretched from Tennessee to New Hampshire. As the accompanying article stated, “Germany…is a small country that could be set down in one corner of the United States.” Comparing a map Germany to a full map of the United States would have made the Nazi nation seem overmatched and non-threatening. The mapmaker compensated for this by omitting the American states west of the Mississippi River Valley. Similarly, the long, peninsular state of Florida, and northern New England, were left off from the map because they would have presented large landforms free from the shadow of the Nazism.

Fig. 5.1. *U.S. News and World Report* often manipulated maps to make the size of a unified German state seem threatening during WWII. This map was published in early 1945.

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Equally interesting, too, was what was portrayed as Germany on the map. The map’s portrayal of Germany was flawed: Although by the time the map was published, the German region of East Prussia was under Allied control, the mapmaker’s inclusion of this region greatly exaggerated the extent of Nazi power. The placement of East Prussia over New York City—the most populated city in the United States—certainly made the map more alarming. Interestingly, this positioning also placed Germany over the most industrialized portion of the United States; this was yet another way of implying the threat that Germany posed. Also, the inclusion of non-German fronts in Budapest and Bologna, which overlapped southern Georgia and Cape Hatteras, respectively, made Germany appear to extend two hundred miles south and west of its actual borders.

This mapped image of Nazi Germany would have been much larger, and more intimidating, if the mapmaker had included all areas acquired by Hitler since 1936. After militarizing the Rhineland in that year, Germany had taken control of Austria and the Sudetenland by late 1938. The following year Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia, Poland, Danzig and Memel fell under Nazi control. Moreover, a map of Nazi military power, which eventually stretched from the Soviet Union and Scandinavia in the north to North Africa and the Mediterranean Rim in the south, would have dwarfed a map of the United States.

But American news cartographers generally followed the national political preference of not recognizing Nazi political or territorial expansions as legitimate. For

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383 Ibid, see article “Tightening Noose on Berlin: Nazi Fight Against Panic,” 19.
American news readers, the shape of the Nazi menace on maps was bound by the 1936 German borders throughout the war. The designers of the *U.S. News and World Report* map, thus, reduced the area of the underlying United States map so that the overlaid map of 1936 Germany, with added warfront extensions, would look more dangerous by comparison. By equating the size of a mapped region to its inherent power, cartographers employed a practice that is always misleading and very subjective. Although WWII German leaders would take issue with the cartographic manipulations evident in *U.S. News and World Report*, Nazi propaganda maps frequently used the same tactics to defend German expansion throughout the war.

For example, in early February 1940, *Facts In Review* published two black ink maps entitled “A Study in Empires” which compared the apparent size of Nazi Germany with that of the British Empire (fig. 5.2). The German state, colored solid black, included the Rhineland, the Saarland, the Sudetenland, Austria and northwest Poland. The protectorates of Central Poland, Bohemia and Moravia were delineated with black borders.

Still, Germany appeared very small compared to the numerous nearby landmasses controlled by Great Britain, which were noted to cover “26% of the World.” The mapmaker colored all areas of Great Britain, colonial regions, and the British Commonwealth identically in solid black, but labeled the map “Great Britain” above the British Isles. This technique centralized, and legitimized, British empirical power at the British Isles, and echoed Nazi territorial claims on the nearby map. The island of

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384 See map set entitled “Territorial annexation, 1935-9” in Mary Fulbrook’s *The Divided Nation: a*
Ireland was properly shown divided between the Protestant Northern Ireland (allied with Great Britain) and the independent, and Catholic, Irish Free State (IFS). But although the IFS was officially neutral in WWII, it was outlined in the same fashion that signified Nazi protectorates on the map on Germany.

Fig. 5.2. The WWII-era German news journal *Facts In Review* manipulated the scale of maps to make the British Empire seem threatening to a relatively smaller German nation.

Nazi Germany may have been dwarfed by the British Empire on maps, but it was much larger than the British Isles. During WWII, British news cartographers could have overlapped maps of Germany and the British Isles to alert citizens of the Nazi threat. But there was no need to warn news readers of something they dealt with every day. Whereas Americans had to be convinced to join the war, the British were drawn into it to survive. For them, the Nazi threat was not an abstract foreign concern but a domestic one, especially after Hitler began bombing Britain in late 1939. It is not

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surprising, then, that no cartographic comparisons between Great Britain, or her empire, and Nazi Germany have been found in the British national press during WWII.

As outlined in chapter 2, British wartime news maps tended to detail small areas in large scale, which precluded any size comparisons of warring nations. British maps catered to a public already familiar with European and German regions and place names, so smaller scale maps of larger regions were seldom needed to put German warfronts in geopolitical perspective. Consequently, unlike in the United States, the cartographic image of Hitler’s Germany apparently never became an alarmist symbol of anti-Nazism in British society.

During WWII, it was beneficial for American news journals to exaggerate the size of Nazi Germany on maps to heighten the American fighting spirit. This cartographic tactic worked so long as Germany itself was a perceived as a monolithic threat. However, the end of the war saw a defeated Germany carved up among the four victorious Allies—Great Britain, the United States, France, the Soviet Union and Poland. At Yalta and later at Potsdam in July 1945, Germany was divided into four occupied zones, as was Berlin. The former German territory of East Prussia was also divided—the northern zone went to the Soviet Union, the southern zone to Poland. Poland’s borders were shifted two hundred miles westward, at Germany’s expense, and the new Polish-German border followed the Oder and Neisse Rivers. Did a postwar German threat exist? If so, how could American news mapmakers portray this threat, especially since the victorious Allies now controlled the divided nation?
The postwar German threat to the United States was (although it took a few years to develop) the communist, Soviet-controlled zone of Germany. In the anti-communist fervor that developed in Western nations after WWII, Germany was seen as the crux of developing Cold War bipolarity. American anti-Soviet sentiment, which never disappeared during WWII, surged in response to Joseph Stalin’s territorial ambitions in Iran in 1946, and to the Stalinization of Eastern Europe that proceeded WWII. The beginning of the Greek Civil War, Winston Churchill’s subsequent Iron Curtain speech, and George Kennan’s famous “Long Telegram” spurred many American news journals by 1947 to reassess the vulnerability of Germany to communist influence.

Unlike similarly divided Austria, the four Allied zones of Germany had been moving toward an east-west polarization since the end of WWII. Great Britain transferred its financial dealings in the British zone to American control in late 1946; France did the same by February 1948. The American and British zones were combined into “Bizonia” in January 1947. But it was not until the 1948 Berlin Crisis that Americans began seeing the Soviet zone of Germany as a serious threat to postwar

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peace, and as a sort of barometer of Cold War tensions. The introduction of a new West German currency in 1948 threatened to seriously undermine the economy of East Berlin and Stalin responded by blockading all land access to all of Berlin (located in the Soviet zone). The resulting Berlin Airlift by the Western powers was celebrated in the American press, especially after Stalin, apparently recognizing the futility of his strategy, reopened access to Berlin the following year.\textsuperscript{391}

Stalin’s blockade of Berlin quashed all hope in the American press that the Allies could work together on the German question. Germany was partitioned into two states in October 1949. The Western capitalist zones now comprised West Germany, or the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and West Berlin. The Soviet zone became East Germany, or the communist German Democratic Republic (GDR), and East Berlin. For the rest of the Cold War almost all American news maps would portray Germany in terms of its bipolarity—FRG versus GDR—or the “two Germanys.”

Unlike during WWII, when the mapped image of Nazi Germany was a symbol of Nazi aggression, maps of the GDR never held the same importance in the early Cold War American press. Given that the FRG was roughly three times larger than the GDR, size comparisons of these states on maps would have made the GDR appear to be the weaker of the two. Consequently, the American press made no comparisons of the two Germanys. But if American news cartographers had been more sensitive to how West Germans portrayed Cold War Germany—that there were “three Germanys,” not two

\textsuperscript{391} Wegs and Ladrech, pp 9-11.
size comparisons between capitalist and communist Germanys would not have cast East Germany as the underdog.

The “third” Germany consisted of all the lands east of the Oder-Neisse line taken in 1945 from Nazi Germany and given to Poland and the Soviet Union. Since the majority of these lands were transferred to Poland, this area has been called “Polish Germany” on maps. This label ignores the northern section of East Prussia given to the Soviet Union. Although Allied leaders embraced the transfer of these lands to Poland as just compensation for Nazi aggression, and to balance eastern Polish lands given to the Soviets, the FRG government staunchly resisted the concept that Germany’s western border ended at the Oder-Neisse line.\(^{392}\)

In 1953, FRG Chancellor Konrad Adenauer vowed that the German people would never accept the Oder-Neisse line as the eastern boundary of Germany.\(^{393}\) This statement was based partly on the long history of German occupation of Polish Germany. After 1945, this occupation was reversed with the forced westward evacuation of millions of ethnic Germans. Adenauer was also voicing a general FRG adherence to a 1937 German law that defined citizenship in the Reich as including all of Polish Germany.\(^{394}\)

\(^{392}\) GDR officials traditionally have not voiced concerns over losing “Polish Germany” since doing so would conflict with Soviet state policy.


As late as 1955, official FRG atlases relied on the 1937 citizenship law to define German borders (fig. 5.3). On the map, the FRG, GDR and Polish Germany were clearly defined from each other with dark borders. Berlin was divided and the Saarland excluded from the FRG. But similar yellow coloring of the “three Germanys” linked them across border lines, as did a wider, light brown border that circumscribed the original 1937 German state. Text labels describing Polish Germany as German lands under Polish and Soviet administration, and the appearance of a unified East Prussia (no longer divided between Poland and the Soviet Union), contrasted sharply with contemporary American, British, and Soviet maps which adhered to Allied partition treaties.

Despite the importance of the FRG as a bastion against the GDR after 1949, the FRG idea of “three Germanys” was never endorsed by the American or British governments, or by their respective national presses. All of Allied nations (including the Soviet Union) held firm to German borders established at Yalta and Potsdam for the duration of the Cold War. In the American press, only one map is known to exist from 1945 to 1955 that described “three Germanys.” Entitled “Three Germanys,” this map was published by Time magazine in August 1953 but it did not accompany any particular news article (fig. 5.4). It was published, with an extensive caption, to highlight differences between how Americans and West Germans viewed Cold War Germany. But telling differences emerge in a comparison of the American and FRG map of the “three Germanys.”
The most striking difference between the 1955 FRG atlas map and *Time*’s 1953 “Three Germanys” map is the way each was colored. The FRG map used shades of yellow to denote all German lands recognized under the 1937 citizenship law. These made the “three Germanys” appear to have survived the post-WWII partitioning at Potsdam. *Time*’s map, however, colored the GDR a menacing red to denote communist occupation, and to link it to Eastern Europe which (sans Poland) was colored a deeper red. Polish Germany and Poland were colored a lighter red, but were still seen as part of the Communist bloc. Only on *Time*’s map did large fractures separate all “three Germanys,” as well as the two sections of East Prussia. Unlike the FRG map, the American view of the “three Germanys” did not preserve the ‘Germanness’ of the

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395 See *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Stuttgart and Köln: W. Kohlhammer, 1955).
regions but rather viewed them in terms of Cold War anticommunist rhetoric by mapping them in a framework of European bipolarity.

Fig. 5.4. In the only map of “three Germanys” known to exist in the American news press, published in *Time* magazine in 1953, primacy was given to Cold War geopolitics that downplayed pan-German heritage.

Since the Soviets controlled East Germany and Polish Germany, American news cartographers could have easily lumped them together on maps as a singular communist German landmass. The resulting region would have offered a larger, and hence more menacing, threat to West Germany and Western Europe than did East Germany alone. Polish Germany, located between East Germany and Moscow, could have provided an alarming land bridge between the center of Soviet power and the Iron Curtain. Moreover, “Polish Germany” maps could have reinforced preexisting American notions

that Nazis and Soviet communists were more alike than different. But these pan-German concepts contradicted prevalent Cold War trends of a bipolar Germany and Europe. They detracted from the conceived monolithic Soviet threat centered in Moscow, not Berlin.

The Iron Curtain falls across Germany

Arguably the most powerful concept to shape Western ideas of post-WWII Germany was the Iron Curtain. Popularized by Winston Churchill’s “Sinews of Peace” speech (popularly known as the “Iron Curtain” speech) in early March 1946, the Iron Curtain described the menacing “Soviet sphere” as the land east of a line “from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic.” This description was somewhat misleading since the Soviet sphere, according to Churchill, included the Soviet zone of East Germany—an area directly west of Stettin. Nevertheless, Churchill’s Iron Curtain concept eventually became one of the most recognizable metaphors for the division of Cold War Germany, and Europe, in the American and British news presses.

Churchill’s speech was delivered in Fulton, Missouri with President Harry S. Truman in attendance, and was couched in alarmist terms that appealed more to American, rather than British, fears of communism. The idea of an Iron Curtain, however, was not received favorably in American political circles. While moderates and conservative agreed with Churchill’s evaluation of the Soviet threat, they contended his negative rhetoric and his plan for closer Anglo-American military ties were not

397 For a full text of Churchill’s speech see http://www.historyguide.org/europe/churchill.html.
beneficial. Left wing politicians saw Churchill’s comments as unduly antagonistic and lampooned the idea that the American military should support British imperialism.

The American press, however, immediately embraced the concept of an Iron Curtain in Europe. Lord Halifax, responded to Churchill’s speech in March 1946 by observing that the term ‘Iron Curtain’ “has given the sharpest jolt to American thinking of any utterance since the end of the war.” News journalists also used Churchill’s catchy anticommunist phrases, such as “Iron Curtain” and “Soviet sphere,” in the headlines of countless articles. Consequently, news agencies quickly employed new Iron Curtain symbolism on maps that illustrated the growing communist threat in Europe.

Two weeks after Churchill’s speech, *Time* magazine published a map entitled “Behind the Iron Curtain” which gave a Soviet perspective (fig. 5.5). The mapmaker, R.M. Chapin, Jr., cleverly oriented the map with Moscow at the lower right, and with Europe extending westward toward the top. He also symbolized the Iron Curtain as a red, chain-linked barricade fronted with a large hammer and sickle and controlled (tethered) in Moscow. But what Chapin possessed in artistic flair he lacked in accuracy to both Churchill’s concept and to reality. Chapin’s Iron Curtain linked Trieste and Stettin in a straight line that put over ninety percent of the Soviet zone of Germany, and a good portion of western Czechoslovakia, outside the Soviet sphere. To put the city of

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399 Ibid.
400 Ibid.
Berlin behind the Iron Curtain, Chapin relocated it to the border between East Germany and Poland—fifty miles east of its actual location. But aside from the Iron Curtain, no other map features distinguished the Soviet sphere from the rest of Europe. Polarization of the region had not yet fully developed on news maps.

Furthermore, Chapin’s early 1946 map did not present the Iron Curtain as an impenetrable barrier between East and West. Rather, it focused on Czechoslovakia as the weak point of the Iron Curtain. Historian Radomir Luža has noted that, from 1945 to mid 1947, Czechoslovakia’s successful democratic coalition government framed Western hopes that the nation could be a “bridge between East and West.”

Czechoslovakia was shaded lighter than the other nations to denote this reality. Chapin imaginatively utilized the nation’s east-west orientation to make it appear as the only break in the chain links of the Iron Curtain. This portrayal of Czechoslovakian exceptionalism departed from Churchill’s description of a Soviet empire in Eastern Europe.

Between Churchill’s speech in early 1946 and the beginning of the Berlin Crisis in mid 1948, many American news cartographers vacillated between placing the Soviet zone of Germany outside or inside the Soviet sphere. Indeed, most news journals mapped the Soviet zone as a neutral region, outside the Soviet sphere. This changed in July 1947 when Stalin rejected Marshall Plan aid for Eastern Europe that included the

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401 Radomir Luža. “Czechoslovakia between Democracy and Communism” in Charles S. Maier’s The Cold War in Europe: Era of a Divided Continent (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1996) pp 94. Stalin’s intention to solidify his control over Eastern Europe became known in the summer of 1947 and ended any Western ideas of East-West cooperation through Czechoslovakia.
Soviet zone of Germany. Thereafter, the Soviet zone was almost always shown behind the Iron Curtain on maps.

Fig. 5.5. The first American news map known to portray the Iron Curtain, published in Time magazine two weeks after Churchill’s speech, relocated Berlin to preserve a straight line.

The cartographic migration of the Iron Curtain westward to include the Soviet zone of Germany is best illustrated by news maps printed in the New York Times. Unlike weekly news journals which rarely republished maps, the Times relied on a relatively standard set of maps to illustrate foreign news events. These maps remained the same through time except for subtle changes that reflected recent news items.

In early June 1946, a map entitled “How the Communist Vote has Varied in Europe’s Elections” illustrated the percentage of parliamentary seats won by Communist parties in the 1945 general elections (fig. 5.6). The Times symbolized the

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Iron Curtain as a raised, jagged wall labeled with a prominent text block. The Soviet zone of Germany was in front of the Iron Curtain—outside the Soviet sphere of influence. But the curtain’s iconic impermeability was challenged by the mapmaker’s method of illustrating the national Communist vote data.

In general, nations were shaded progressively darker to represent higher vote percentages. Non democratic nations were shaded light gray, which made Romania and Poland—nations inside the Soviet sphere with Soviet-controlled governments—appear as non Communist as Spain and Portugal. The numerical criteria of the shading key made France, with 27.2% Communist seats, look like a far-flung satellite of the Soviet Union. Although French-controlled regions of North Africa had no parliamentary elections, these regions were shaded like France, which gave the impression that Communism had spread there, too.

Stalin’s denial of Marshall Plan aid to all areas controlled by the Soviet Union (sans the Soviet zone of Austria) in July 1947 compelled New York Times mapmakers to tweak their map of Cold War Europe. In early November 1947, the New York Times published a map entitled “The Split in Europe Between East and West” which placed the Soviet zone of Germany behind the Iron Curtain (fig. 5.6). Although the same base map was used from the June 1946 map, the Soviet sphere, now defined in economic rather than political terms, appeared much more threatening. Curiously, the

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403 By this time, the Polish and Romanian democratic governments were not freely elected under Soviet direction, since such elections would surely have ousted the dominant Communist parties in both nations. See Wegs and Ladrech, pp 30-3.
July 1947 map placed the Soviet zone of Austria *behind* the Iron Curtain even though it appeared to receive Marshall Plan aid.

Fig. 5.6. These two *New York Times* maps, one printed in June 1946 (left) and the other in November 1947 (right), were made from the same base map and show how the Iron Curtain migrated westward as Cold War tensions increased.

The Berlin Crisis of 1948-9 cemented the Soviet zone of Germany firmly within the Soviet sphere of influence on American maps. The formal partitioning of Germany, in 1949, merely changed mapmakers’ labels from the “Soviet zone” to “East Germany.” The inclusion of this region behind the Iron Curtain remained the same throughout the duration of the Cold War.

Mapping the Iron Curtain to include East Germany had a major drawback. The Polish city of Stettin was now too far east of the western limit of the Soviet sphere to serve as the northern endpoint of the Iron Curtain. Although Greek and Yugoslavian interest over Trieste kept that city popular on news maps throughout the early Cold War period, Stettin declined in importance (and in frequency of appearance on maps) after
the Iron Curtain included East Germany. Notably, the June 1946 map included both cities; the November 1947 map omitted them.

Churchill’s Iron Curtain rhetoric was not generally embraced by British Parliament. As previously noted, his party did not control Parliament at the time of his speech. Nor did the British press support Churchill’s world view. By early 1946, most British news journals, regardless of their political leanings, still rejected the idea that post-WWII Europe had devolved into a bipolar realm of power politics. For example, Two weeks before Churchill’s speech, the New Statesman and Nation criticized “the whole power politics bag of tricks, leaving out all possibilities of a better solution.”\(^{405}\) Even Conservative journals such as Truth, that recognized the danger of yielding “the soul of Germany as ‘danegeld’ to Communism,” promoted friendly relations with the Soviet Union to maintain peace months after Churchill’s speech.\(^{406}\)

Unlike the American press, British news cartographers rarely depicted the Iron Curtain on maps of Germany or Europe. From the time of Churchill’s speech to the end of 1955, the British national press published eight maps of Europe and three maps of Germany. Only one of those maps—published by the independent “non-party” journal Time and Tide in 1949—depicted the Iron Curtain (fig. 5.7).\(^{407}\) This occurred for two surprising reasons. First, the Iron Curtain map was not published by a Conservative news journal, such as Spectator or Truth. Second, the map was published while the

\(^{405}\) Quote was taken from an anonymous journalist reacting to Walter Lippmann’s promotion of balance-of-power treaties between the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States. See article “Mr. Lippmann at the Ringside” in New Statesman and Nation, v.31, n.783 (Feb. 23, 1946): 131.


Labour controlled Parliament. Furthermore, no Iron Curtain maps were published during Churchill’s second term as Prime Minister (1951-1955).

The British press often used provocative anticommunist terminology such as “Two Worlds” and the “Iron Curtain” in headlines and article titles about Europe to sell more journals. But these titles usually belied the more politically and economically multilateral world described by article text and maps. The 1949 *Time and Tide* map, and its accompanying article, described the Iron Curtain in terms of its permeability—not its importance as a European barrier in the Churchillian sense.

Fig. 5.7. The only British national news map of the Iron Curtain known to exist from 1946 to 1955 was published by *Time and Tide* in April 1949. It was less politically charged than contemporary American news map portrayals of the Iron Curtain.

The article’s author, Aldo Cassuto, described Eastern Europe not as a communist monolith, but as a fractured sphere where “a deep rift has divided Tito from
On the map, the Iron Curtain was a mere dotted line through which railroads passed unencumbered between East and West. The map’s absence of national boundaries emphasized connectivity, by river and rail traffic, across Europe and the Iron Curtain. Though the author described how Stalinization stifled river trade in the northern Danube Valley, Eastern European nations near Yugoslavia benefited from the Tito-Stalin rift through trade with the West via the Mediterranean port cities of Trieste and Fiume. This was yet another example of how the British press viewed the Cold War in economically multilateral terms, rather than in politically bipolar terms popular in Churchill’s speech and in the American press.

Although the Iron Curtain was not depicted as an impenetrable barrier on British news maps, the fate of Czechoslovakia in the Soviet bloc garnered special attention. In the first American map of the Iron Curtain discussed above (fig. 5.5), the mapmaker capitalized on the east-west orientation of the nation. Czechoslovakia was portrayed as an island of democracy in Eastern Europe that pierced the Iron Curtain at a perpendicular angle. After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1948, however, the nation’s east-west orientation, and the protrusion of its western borders into the FRG, made the nation a symbol of Soviet aggression in the British press.

For example, in March 1948, *Time and Tide* published a political cartoon with the image of Stalin superimposed over Eastern Europe (fig. 5.8). Czechoslovakia was seen as Stalin’s machine gun with a sign hanging from it that read “To The West.”

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408 Ibid.
The only other nations labeled on the map were the U.S.S.R and Poland—to link the “fall” of Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Ironically, mapmakers in Nazi Germany had also used Czechoslovakia’s directional orientation on maps of Europe to cast the nation as a “Slavic fist” that challenged German land claims.\footnote{Guntram Henrik Herb. \textit{Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda, 1918-1945} (London and New York: Routledge, 1997) pp 173.} In 1936, a map was published in Berlin entitled “The Eastern Front of German Cities outside the German State Territory” with a caption that read “This drawing is done in anger…” (fig. 5.8).\footnote{Martin Ira Glassner. \textit{Political Geography} (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) pp 228-9.} The image of a Czechoslovakian “Slavic fist” was part of the larger Nazi conception of a “beleaguered eastern front,” visualized by a bold black line on the map. Though similar in directional orientation to the Iron Curtain, the Slavic “eastern front” was a conceived \textit{ethnic} line of eastern European cities heavily populated by Germans but outside Germany.

\section*{Linking Communism with Nazism}

American news cartographers began conflating Nazism and Communism during WWII with retrospective map sets that linked the recent Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe with past Prussian and Russian territorial gains in the same area. In this exercise, Poland was a favorite subject. Although Poland garnered no special attention in news articles early in the war, the Soviet occupation in 1942 made the nation “a touchstone for the ominous Soviet threat.”\footnote{Liebovich, pp 46.} Other news maps criticized the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 1939, which divided Poland between Germany and the
Soviet Union. These maps identified encroachments on Polish territory dating back to the late eighteenth century to show a tradition of German and Soviet aggression.

Fig. 5.8. *Time and Tide*’s portrayal of the “fall” of Czechoslovakia to the Iron Curtain in a 1948 cartoon map (left) was similar to Nazi map portrayals of the nation as the keystone of a Slavic front in Eastern Europe before WWII (right). Both maps capitalized on the nation’s east-west orientation as a challenge to a perceived north-south oriented barrier.

For example, in January 1944, *Newsweek* published two maps that showed “How the eighteenth century and the Nazi-Soviet Partitions sliced up Poland” (fig. 5.9).⁴¹³ Late eighteenth century claims on Poland by Austria, Prussia and Russia were linked to the Nazi-Soviet Pact. More importantly, by using similar shading patterns for Russia and the Soviet Union, and for Prussia and Germany, the maps presented a history of German-Russian cooperation to oppress Poland. A similar set of six maps that covered the first three partitions of Poland (in 1772, 1793 and 1795), the Polish

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⁴¹³ *Newsweek*, v.23, n.3 (Jan. 17, 1944): 29.
Republic (1921-39), the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact, and post-WWII Poland were published in *U.S. News and World Report* in March of the following year.\(^{414}\) In this map set, Prussian, German, Russian and Austrian encroachments on Polish soil were colored or shaded to link them symbolically.

![Maps of Poland's partitioning](image)

**Fig. 5.9.** By early 1944, many American news maps saw the 1939 Nazi-Soviet partitioning of Poland as the continuation of a Prussian-Russian empirical cooperation dating back to the late eighteenth century. This map was published by *Newsweek* in January 1944.

Despite a short-lived Red Scare among British Conservatives in 1942, which prompted many national cartoonists to portray Stalin and Hitler as “virtually the same person,” wartime British news maps generally did not strongly link Nazism with Soviet communism in Europe.\(^{415}\) Rather, in retrospective map sets published at the war’s end, Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe was often seen as simply the latest example of power politics that dated back to the Versailles Treaty of WWI.

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In a three-map set published in the *London Tribune* in mid August 1945, cartographer J.F. Horrabin summarized the “European Chess-Board: 1925-1945” with maps entitled “the 1920’s,” “the 1930’s” and “1945.” The “1920’s” map of Europe showed “domination of the continent from the West” by France’s “cordon sanitaire” of Eastern European nations against the Bolshevik threat (fig. 5.10). The “1930’s” map featured “domination from the center” of Europe as the Berlin-Rome Axis with no mention of the Nazi-Soviet Pact featured on contemporary American maps. Horrabin’s “1945” map, already discussed in chapter 4 (see fig. 4.6), did not treat Eastern Europe as a Soviet monolith. Although the map’s caption described Soviet influence as “dominant in all the Balkan countries except Greece,” the map clearly defined the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe with prominent borders and varied shading patterns.

![Fig. 5.10. “The European Chessboard, 1925-1945,” according to the *London Tribune* in 1945.](image)


Unlike their American counterparts, British mapmakers saw the history of European politics as a history of domination from eastern and western nations; capitalist and communist, fascist and democratic. In short, the British view was much less ideological than the American, and more multilateral in its considerations. Nonetheless, after 1945 Cold War tensions brought British foreign policy, and public opinion, closer to the American point of view that drew more ties between Nazism and Soviet communism over time.

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had made a sharp distinction between Nazism and communism.\textsuperscript{417} President Harry S. Truman, however, linked Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in American foreign policy after U.S.-Soviet relations began to deteriorate in 1946. President Truman blamed the Greek Civil war on a perceived “Hitler-like fifth-column intrusion by the Russians.”\textsuperscript{418} In 1947, he stated that “[t]here isn’t any difference in totalitarian states…Nazi, communist or fascist.”\textsuperscript{419} The American ambassador to the Soviet Union, George Kennan, felt the same way.\textsuperscript{420}

Numerous news articles were published highlighting similarities between Nazism and Soviet communism in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In February 1948, \textit{Look} magazine labeled Soviet communism as the “heir to fascism” by noting that the Soviets and the Nazis both believed in the infallibility of their leaders, promoted a

\textsuperscript{419} Ibid, pp 1046.
\textsuperscript{420} Ibid, pp 1047.
single ruling party, had a militarist history, and even saluted the same way.\textsuperscript{421} \textit{Look} magazine also illustrated the Nazi threat with a photo of Hitler \textit{and} Mussolini. This amalgamation of former Axis powers as a Nazi threat simplified recent European history for American readers and offered a clear, if inaccurate, portrayal of Nazi-Soviet expansion.

In 1950, \textit{Time} magazine cartographer R.M. Chapin, Jr. played off these simplifications in a map entitled “Three Faces of Europe” (see chapter 3, fig. 3.2).\textsuperscript{422} As with the WWII-era map retrospectives on Poland, Chapin’s map sought to put European history into context dating back to WWI. His “Three Faces of Europe” map summarized WWI, WWII and the Cold War in three maps that blamed European instability on the Central Powers, Axis Powers and the Soviet Union. Separate flags distinguished WWI era Germany from Austria-Hungary, and WWII Germany from Italy. Nonetheless, monochromatic coloring of the regions conquered by these countries blurred national boundaries. The singular red landmass occupied by the Soviet Union on the third map appeared as merely the latest manifestation of a legacy of Central and Axis power aggression.

In the dearth of British news maps that characterized the early Cold War period, cartographic links between Nazism and Soviet communism were rare. Previous chapters have argued that British politicians, and the press, generally viewed early Cold War politics in more multilateral terms than the Americans. Moreover, British international concerns were dominated by economic matters, rather than political

ideology, for the first ten years after WWII. Tellingly, many political cartoons with cartographic or geographic imagery were published that showed how the British linked Hitler and Stalin.

The British Conservative Party regularly linked German fascism to Soviet communism throughout the early Cold War period. Beginning with his Iron Curtain speech in March 1946, which compared the appeasement of Stalin to the 1938 Munich Agreement, Winston Churchill became iconic in the British press for his staunch anticommunism. But, as discussed previously, most national news journals reacted negatively to the Iron Curtain speech. The only news imagery that linked Nazism to Soviet communism was political cartoons. Most of these cartoons were humorous jabs at Churchill’s rhetoric, not indictments against Stalin or East Germany.423

A few cartoons linked Stalin to Hitler with geographic or cartographic imagery. *Time and Tide* cartoonist “Gilchick” often lampooned Churchill’s linking of Stalin to Hitler. But the tenth anniversary of the beginning of WWII compelled him to portray Stalin and Hitler in an ominous fashion. In early September 1949, *Time and Tide* published a cartoon showing a giant Stalin, fist raised, stomping towards the hills of Yugoslavia (fig. 5.11).424 With the ghost of Hitler over his shoulder, a pocket of Soviet files on Finland, and a speech balloon reading “My patience is exhausted,” Stalin’s approach went unnoticed by the sleeping rooster labeled “Tito.” A distant sign pointing towards the Mediterranean rounded out the British concern that the Stalin-Tito rift could

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424 See *Time and Tide*, v.30 n.36 (Sept. 9, 1949): 883.
spur Stalin to invade Yugoslavia, as he did Finland ten years earlier, then the Mediterranean Basin. The real fear was a modern Soviet blitzkrieg.

Fig. 5.11. The few British political cartoons that linked Stalin to Hitler usually did so with cartographic or geographic imagery. Ten years after WWII began, *Time and Tide* feared the Tito-Stalin rift would make Stalin invade Yugoslavia as he did Finland after the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact (left). But some cartoons saw a Nazi threat in the West. The *London Tribune* predicted in 1951 that rearming the FRG would lead to a revived Germany war machine (right).

But the British press often associated the Nazi menace with Western nations in the early Cold War period. In late 1945, for example, the *Serial Map Service* lamented the American no-fly zone for international commercial flights over the United States. It stated “even Nazi Germany, before the war, agreed to the passage of international air traffic along approved routes.” Among Western political talks over the rearmament of West Germany in early 1951, the *London Tribune* published a cartoon that predicted the Krupp family of industrialists, who supplied arms for Germany in WWI and WWII, would be back in business (fig. 5.11). As several Nazi officers looked on, Krupp hovered over a map and gestured to portraits of German leaders William I, Otto von

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Bismarck and Adolf Hitler. The cartoon caption read “Krupp: Business as usual, gentlemen!”

One of the most compelling connections made between Nazi Germany and Soviet communism in the American press was the portrayal of Soviet ‘slave labor’ camps as continuations of Nazi concentration camps. Historians Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson have argued that, although Americans were aware of Soviet labor and exile camps before WWII, the publicized horrors of Nazi concentration camps after the war “stamped the image of the concentration camp…on the Russian camps.”\footnote{Adler and Patterson, pp 1053.}

Clare Boothe Luce, Congresswoman and wife of *Time* magazine owner and editor Henry Luce, spoke out in 1946 against Soviet labor camps.\footnote{Ibid.} Other influential American politicians, such as United Nations representative Willard Thorp, Senator J. Howard McGrath, and American Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane, also publicly associated Nazi and Soviet labor camps in the early Cold War period.\footnote{Ibid, 1053-4.}

American news journals made the connection as well. In early 1948, conservative *Look* magazine described ten links between fascism and communism—number seven was the “widespread use of slave labor.”\footnote{Look, v.12, n.3 (Feb. 3, 1948): 28-9.} *Look* also made this point with maps. In October 1947 it published “The Truth About Russia’s 12,000,000 Slave Laborers.”\footnote{Ibid. v.11, n.16 (Oct. 28, 1947): 35-6.} The map described a “network of slave camps” throughout the Soviet
Union. To put the large number of slaves into perspective, an inset map of the United States was included with fourteen western states colored black. These had a combined population of approximately twelve million people. But only states with very low population-to-area ratios were used (Texas and California were omitted) to generate an alarmingly large bloc of states that covered about half the United States. The mapmaker could have chosen a single state—New York, with a 1947 population of about twelve million—to make the same point, but this would not have made such an effective cartographic comparison.

Several news maps singled out East Germany as a communist slave state in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The most common way to denote areas of slavery, industrial or political, was to enclose them with barbed wire. The Berlin Crisis prompted many news journal maps to visualize the divided city as a captive slave nestled in an enclave of barbed wire. A map on the cover of Time magazine, in July 1953, included a portrait of GDR General Secretary Walter Ulbricht (fig. 5.12). All of East Germany (except West Berlin) was painted red, which contrasted against the pale grey surrounding areas of Europe. Barbed wire ringed the GDR, and Ulbricht looked on indifferently with East Berlin in flames. This image which described life in the GDR did not correlate to any article in the magazine.

Other maps pointed to rural areas of the GDR as locations for slave labor camps. In November 1954, Newsweek published a map entitled “Communism’s Atomic Slave State” that singled out a region on the border of East Germany and Czechoslovakia.
where slave labor was allegedly being used to mine uranium (fig. 5.12). As with the above *Time* cover map, aside from the large text block, the only symbol denoting the area as a slave labor camp was a ring of communist-red barbed wire around several mining locations. An inset map reminded American news readers how close the slave camps were to West Germany.

![Map showing slave labor camps in East Germany](image)

Fig. 5.12. American news maps played on public associations of barbed wire with concentration camps after WWII to portray East Europe as a communist slave state. The *Time* cover (left) was published in mid 1953; the map on the right appeared in *Newsweek* in late 1954.

**Germany: the Line between East and West**

By the end of WWII, concerns over Europe and a divided Germany dominated the peace talks at Yalta and Potsdam. However, the breakdown of Allied cooperation in the rebuilding of Europe by early 1946, as exemplified by Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech, led many British and American politicians to lament the development of a

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monolithic Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. Also in that year, the Greek Civil War, and Soviet interests in Iran and Turkey drew Anglo-American attention away from Germany. From a Western perspective, the communist menace formed in Eastern Europe had expanded toward Asia.

As early as 1944, Western leaders acknowledged that the Soviets had a legitimate security concern in Europe and the Far East. So it was not surprising that Stalin’s post-WWII foreign policy was dominated by fear of being invaded by Germany and Japan. Nonetheless, the breakdown between Anglo-American and Soviet camps after WWII brought new Western suspicions of Stalin’s motives. It was Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech that first labeled the Soviet Union a “ruthless, totalitarian power...seeking domination in both Europe and Asia.” The British and American presses quickly employed provocative Churchillian catch phrases and concepts of global bipolarity. The Western conception of the Soviet sphere of influence grew from an Eastern European Communist bloc to include a Eurasian landmass that stretched from the Soviet zone of Germany to the Sakhalin Islands of Northern Japan.

As noted above, the American press embraced Churchill’s ideas of the Russian communist threat in Europe with news maps that showed Eastern Europe as a singular, red bloc dominated from Moscow. By mid 1946, news cartographers applied the same generalizations about Soviet communism in Eastern Europe to areas under communist control in the Far East. For example, in May 1946, U.S. News and World Report

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436 Adler and Paterson, pp 1056.
published a map entitled “Two Worlds” which linked events in Europe, via the Soviet landmass, to the Far East (fig.5.13). 437

This map was discussed in chapter 3 as an early example of Cold War spheres of influence. Here it illustrates the linking of East and West in the American mind. Eastern Europe, “Russia” and Mongolia constituted the Soviet sphere and appeared on the map as a deep red juggernaut. This map’s Mercator projection exaggerated the size of Asian landmass which made the Soviet sphere look more impressive. The reader’s attention was drawn to areas of recent Soviet expansion in Manchuria and North Korea with pink coloring. 438 The Soviet sphere, already firmly established in Eastern Europe, was expanding in the Far East. The inclusion of Finland—a noncommunist nation with a history of war against the Soviet Union—in the Soviet sphere was highly questionable, though.

By mid 1946, the British press, too, was keenly aware that events in Europe were tied to Soviet interests in Asia and the Far East. For Great Britain, linking East and West was nothing new. As discussed in chapter 3, one of the chief postwar concerns of the British Foreign Office was reasserting control over its crumbling empire in the Far East and elsewhere. Despite American trade competition in China and Japan immediately after WWII, British interests in China and the predicted independence of

India kept British news readers familiar with Eurasian affairs. Moreover, the British press was generally sympathetic to Soviet interests in the Far East by the end of WWII. The new American military presence in the Pacific Ocean was seen by the press not only as a legitimate British concern, but also a challenge to Soviet dominion over eastern Asia.

Fig. 5.13. The lumping of all Eurasian communist movements into the Soviet sphere, coupled with the sheer size of the Soviet landmass, compelled American mapmakers to link Eastern European and the Far Eastern affairs very early in the Cold War. This map was published by *U.S. News and World Report* in mid 1946.

The idea that the Iron Curtain symbolized the division not just between Eastern and Western Europe, but also between Europe and Asia, gained prominence in British journals shortly after the Churchill’s speech. British concerns about the Soviet Asiatic threat raised the stakes for occupied Germany. In August 1946, a journalist for *Truth* commented on the uncertain fate of postwar Germany. He stated that “[t]he choice lies

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between accepting Germany back into the comity of Europe or driving her to...the Asiatic press-gang.”

The Asiatic Soviet menace was not expressed in map form in the British press immediately after WWII. As discussed in chapter 3, postwar British news maps generally did not portray areas large enough to describe the entire Soviet Union, let alone a Eurasian Soviet threat. The only press maps that portrayed larger sections of the Eastern Hemisphere were featured in air travel ads. While ad maps reinforced British commercial ties with the Far East, they were usually devoid of national boundaries and overt political commentary. But the absence of national boundaries itself was a tacit political statement—commerce was more important than Cold War politics for British travel companies immediately after WWII.

American news maps began to visualize a Eurasian Soviet menace shortly after Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Communist revolts in China and Korea also fueled American fears that Stalin intended to destabilize Western influence in the East. The 1949 “fall of China” to communism was by far the most important issue for American cartographers.

Under the leadership of the American-backed Chiang Kai-shek, China’s enormous population and square mileage served as a buffer between the Soviet Union and the political instability of French Indochina. In 1941 at Yalta, Chiang’s Nationalist Party government was identified as the “fourth policeman” of the new postwar world.

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442 Gaddis, pp 10.
Aside from the American presence in Japan, all of the Far East was in China’s sphere of influence. The Soviet Union’s sphere was confined to Eastern Europe during WWII. China’s value to the United States in the Far East was similar to Czechoslovakia in Eastern Europe. It was a showpiece of positive East-West relations. Lastly, the communist revolt in China, though slow and intermittent since the 1920s, erupted again in 1947 and coincided with the development of the Containment Policy in the American State Department. 

After 1949, American news maps often portrayed Eastern Europe and the new People’s Republic of China as Soviet satellites. The onset of the Korean War in June 1950 increased this trend. Subsequently, mapmakers employed many innovative techniques to cultivate a Soviet Eurasian communist world in the mind of American news readers. In July 1950, a Newsweek map entitled “What We’re Up Against” illustrated a “red-inked Eurasian landmass” with clever design (fig. 5.14). The familiar Eastern European communist bloc fragmented, because Yugoslavia was recognized as outside the Soviet sphere (so was Finland). The nations of China, Mongolia and North Korea were colored the same as Eastern Europe. Dark red arrows indicated “threatened areas” in Eastern Europe were identical to arrows that emanated from China and North Korea into non-communist areas of Southeast Asia and Indonesia. Also, the uniform grey coloring of all nations outside the Soviet-controlled landmass supported the idea of a bipolar world.

The Eurasian landmass, dominated by Soviet communism, was seen to stretch from East Germany to Southeast Asia by the time of the Korean War. This map, published by Newsweek in July 1950, treated Eastern Europe, China and North Korea identically as Soviet satellite nations.

The Newsweek mapmaker emphasized the Soviet Union’s dominance over its satellite regions by large and bold script spelling of “U.S.S.R.” The manipulation of place names on maps was not only used to portray a Soviet Eurasian threat; it was also used to differentiate the FRG from the GDR. After the formal partitioning of Germany in 1949, the FRG was often referred to as the democratic “German Federal Republic,” “West’s Germany” or the “Republic of Germany.” East Germany was portrayed as a puppet state of Moscow with terms such as “The Soviet Zone,” “Stalin’s Germany” or “Russia’s Germany.”

Map icons were also used to link East Germany to the Soviet Union. For example, Time magazine’s Chief Cartographer, R. M. Chapin, Jr., did this with a

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selective use of flags. In a map published in December 1949 entitled “West’s Germany,” the FRG was identified with the appropriate flag (fig).⁴⁴⁸ The flag, which blew towards the west, was larger than the complimentary flag in the GDR to signify FRG power. “Russia’s Germany” was signified not with the proper GDR flag—which was almost identical to the FRG flag—but with a red flag with a white star in the center that blew eastward. This icon did not correlate with any known East German, Soviet or Chinese communist flag. Instead, it was used as a generic symbol of communist domination on maps depicting all three regions.⁴⁴⁹

The cartographic devices used to link the Soviet sphere in East Europe to China and the Far East remained popular in the American press throughout the early Cold War period. They complimented a general American political and public assumption that Chinese communism was simply an extension of Soviet power.⁴⁵⁰ Chiang Kai-shek drew the same conclusion.⁴⁵¹ But this ideological assumption overlooked the many factors recognized by the British press that separated Chinese and Soviet communism.

This American perception was somewhat illusory. Joseph Stalin and Chinese communist leader Mao Tse Tung were not the best of friends. On the verge of the communist rebel victory in 1948, Mao was refused a personal meeting with Stalin on

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⁴⁴⁸ See *Time*, v.54, n.23 (Dec. 5, 1949): 30.
⁴⁵¹ Ibid.
the border of China and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{452} In January of the following year, and although CCP forces dominated most of China, Stalin sent a representative to arbitrate a truce for fear of future American military involvement on Chiang Kai-shek’s behalf.\textsuperscript{453} Mao’s victory rallied Chinese nationalism and reinforced his declaration, made in the early 1940s, that the CCP would be independent of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{454} The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) generally followed the Soviet model of socialism as long as it accommodated Chinese culture and society.\textsuperscript{455}

Fig. 5.15.  \textit{Time}’s selective use of flags legitimized the FRG while tying the GDR to the perceived communist Eurasian monolith. The icon for the FRG flag (leftmost) was accurate. But the proper GDR flag was replaced by a generic flag used for Soviet and Chinese communism (second from left). This same flag represented the Soviet Union (third from left) and Chinese communism (rightmost). These flags appeared on \textit{Time} maps from 1949 to 1950.

Even after the Korean War began, British politicians generally dismissed American notions of a Soviet-controlled CCP. And the American press took notice of this British dismissiveness. In September 1950, an anonymous \textit{Newsweek} journalist lamented that “British officials are now very dubious of reported good relations

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{452} See Shuguang Zhang’s essay “Threat Perception and Chinese Communist Foreign Policy” in Melvyn P. Leffler’s and David S. Painter’s (eds) \textit{Origins of the Cold War: an International History} (2\textsuperscript{nd} ed.) (London and New York: Routledge, 1995) pp 279.
\item \textsuperscript{453} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{454} See Roderick Mcfarquhar’s and John K. Fairbank’s (eds) \textit{The Cambridge History of China} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) vol.14, pp 64.
\item \textsuperscript{455} Ibid, pp 64-5.
\end{itemize}
The British press recognized the irony of Americans portraying China as part of a Eurasian Soviet empire. For the Chinese, even the CCP, the Russians were not an ally. They had long represented a threat across the Asian land bridge. As a journalist for *Time and Tide* noted in December 1950, “the belief that the Chinese will…become a vassal of…Russia seems hardly tenable…[because] the Russians represent the ancient danger from the steppe….”"457 It is somewhat surprising, then, that many British journalists found direct links between Germany and the Far East.

For the British press, issues concerning the division of Germany were metaphorically and practically tied to the Korean War. In mid 1952, a journalist for the *New Statesman and Nation* feared that Anglo-American talks on rearming West Germany could create “a new and more dangerous Korean parallel in the middle of Europe.”"458 Stalin’s death in March 1953 caused widespread unrest in East Berlin in June—one month before the Korean War ended—and prompted the same journal to state that “[a] resumption of normal trade across the Iron Curtain would be the best way of creating a favorable…political conference on Korea.”"459 However, news maps that illustrated German-Korean ties did not exist in the national press from 1945 to 1955.

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456 See article “Key to Conflictand its Significance” in *Newsweek*, v.36, n.11 (Sept. 11, 1950): 25.
458 See *New Statesman and Nation*, v.43, n.1,107 (May 24, 1952): 600.
Conclusions

News maps in the early Cold War era constituted a vital medium for legitimizing or de-legitimizing sections of occupied Germany. This chapter has illustrated that although Britain and the United States led the coalition to unify and reform West Germany in the face of a common communist enemy, their respective politicians and national presses envisioned Germany in very different ways. There was much more emphasis in American news maps to bolster West Germany’s image as a democratic bastion against East German communist oppression. The main American trends were to define Germany by its Cold War halves, link East Germany to Nazism and a Eurasian Soviet bloc, and highlight the importance of the Iron Curtain.

The relative dearth of British maps reflected the nation’s preference for text over imagery. On occasions when the British press mirrored American cartographic portrayals of Germany, they did so with text and not maps. But the available maps portrayed Germany more by economic trade criteria rather than political ideology. East Germany was not seen as an extension of any sort of Eurasian Soviet threat. Nor did the British link the Soviet Union strongly with communist China or North Korea. Moreover, British society was attuned to many of the ironies of American generalizations about Soviet communism. For example, the Serial Map Service reported that American claims of a Soviet slave state in East Germany were countered by Soviet accusations of British and American “economic enslavement” of Italy in mid 1946.460

The maps discussed here, and the world views they connote, offer valuable insight into the differences in American and British perceptions of Germany’s place in world affairs in the early Cold War period.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS

Cartographic historian Dennis Reinhartz has argued that news journal maps are examples of “ephemeral maps.”461 This term describes maps not made for long term use, but for “transient use,” and includes maps in travel brochures, political cartoons and advertisements.462 But Reinhartz rightly argues that the temporary status of ephemeral maps belies their potential to shape public perception of foreign places over long periods of time. This is certainly true of British and American news journal maps in the early Cold War period. News maps were arguably the most influential cartographic medium for shaping public attitudes about foreign places in the pivotal period between the end of WWII and 1955. Though these maps were indeed ephemeral, the sheer volume of their production made them invaluable vehicles shaping public opinion about foreign policy.

Although Britain and the United States were the closest of allies in the fight against communism after WWII, they nevertheless exhibited significantly different world views. Anglo-American differences in this regard were shaped as much by political ideology as by the geographic location of the nations. This dissertation has

462 Ibid.
revealed that these differing world views found many expressions in news maps appearing in the British and American weekly press.

Trends in American News Maps

News maps in the American press were colorful, plentiful and were created using latest technology. They were products of a national press that was revitalized by WWII, and they catered to a public with preference for images with the news. National news journals, regardless of their political orientations, generally portrayed foreign places in uniform fashion and appealed to conservative values of nationalism, antifascism and anticommunism. Although all national news journals had direct ties to national politics, they nevertheless presented their news in the guise of political objectivity. American news cartographers were professionally trained and took great care in preparing their weekly maps. These maps were seldom reprinted or recycled for later use in altered form.

Thus, the American press had superior resources and more professional staff cartographers relative to the British press. But these factors alone do not account for the striking visual appeal of American news maps. Innovative projections, bold use of color, prominent text labeling and a strong reliance on geostrategic themes, among other trends, were cultivated by a new generation of mapmakers with unconventional training. Two of the most influential mapmakers, Richard Edes Harrison and Robert M. Chapin, Jr., borrowed from their training in architecture to develop innovatively bold
and colorful news maps that captured the reader’s attention and brought vitality to foreign news items.

American national news journal editors, who were generally very active in politics as well, granted their staff cartographers a large degree of artistic license to produce maps designed to cultivate public support for WWII and Cold War foreign policies. Beginning in the late 1930s, the most popular news journals, including *Time*, *Fortune* and *Newsweek*, developed strong traditions of in-house map design that became a motive forces in the development of news cartography throughout the early Cold War period.

The rise of the Air Age had a profound impact on American news maps as well. The return of polar projection maps highlighted a renewed interest in the Polar Regions recently accessible by airplane, and relayed a sense of closeness between nations in the higher latitudes. The closeness of the Soviet Union to the United States on polar projection maps was reassuring during WWII, but was alarming in the early Cold War period. But unlike the Mercator projection, which displayed all the world’s landforms at a glance, Air Age projections examined selected sections of the globe while they obscured up to half the earth over the horizon. It is somewhat ironic, then, that while Air Age technology allowed a mapping of the earth with greater precision than ever before, Air Age news maps (with their new focus on the sphericity of the earth) obscured more of the earth than did Mercator maps.

American news cartographers capitalized on the new availability of an Air Age “horizon line” on maps to theorize about what friend or foe laid waiting beyond. Most
often, the horizon line was portrayed as the extent of American power and security beyond which the loomed the omnipresent Soviet communist menace. But the horizon was also occasionally used to hide the Soviet Union, or other non desirable communist regions, on maps appearing in travel advertisements. Hiding the Soviet Union was an especially daunting task on maps advertising air travel across the Arctic Circle, but it was nevertheless a prominent practice. Ad maps, especially those relating to air travel, frequently used polar projections to portray an interconnected and accessible world for tourists across the top of the world. Travel ad maps usually saw the world as borderless and peaceful even during WWII and into the mid 1950s. The use of Mercator projection maps remained popular for analyzing foreign relations, as well.

The North Pole received far more attention in American news and ads maps than did the South Pole. This reflected the reality that most of the earth’s landmasses are located above the equator. But American and Soviet animosity across the Arctic Circle was a prime factor, too. Polar projection maps of the South Pole usually portrayed the region as a scientific frontier rather than a geopolitical arena. But maps that showed Antarctic territorial claims usually gave equal legitimacy to all nations involved, which reflected a general American strategic disinterest in the area.

Another factor contributing to the striking appeal of American news maps was that news cartographers themselves were products of a culture rife with advertising imagery. Though this study examined many ad maps, their overall contribution to Cold War news cartography remains unexplored. Mapmakers raised on visually appealing ad
icons, colors and text created news maps with similar attributes. In some cases, news maps were almost identical to ad maps describing the same mapped areas.

For example, in a May 1950 issue of *Newsweek*, two maps were published—one news map and one ad map—which portrayed the rubber trade of Southeast Asia in very similar ways (fig. 6.1).\(^{463}\) The news map, entitled “Red Threat to the World’s Rubber Supply,” accompanied interviews with executives from American rubber manufacturers B.F. Goodrich and Dunlop who warned that communist movements in the region could stifle the American rubber trade. The ad map was placed by the Natural Rubber Bureau, a Washington, D.C.-based lobby group that promoted “more natural rubber…[for] millions of people in Southeast Asia…[and] people living outside the Iron Curtain….”\(^{464}\)

![Images of maps](image.png)

Fig. 6.1. Contemporary American news maps and ad maps often portrayed the world in similar ways. These two maps were published in the same issue of *Newsweek* in May 1950. The news map (left) and the ad map (right) both warned of a communist threat to the American rubber trade in Southeast Asia.

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\(^{463}\) *Newsweek*, v.35, n.22 (May 29, 1950): 62.

\(^{464}\) Ibid, pp 75.
Both maps appeared in the same issue of *Newsweek*, which demonstrates how ad maps and news maps often reinforced each other’s alarmist themes in the Cold War—they were both timely reactions to warnings from national rubber manufacturers about the danger of communism in Southeast Asia after the “fall of China” in 1949. The mapped area was almost identical on both maps, although the news map included more of China to underscore the proximity of the communist threat. Red ink dominated both maps, which played on, by then, long established American associations of that color with danger and communism. And both maps creatively combined cartographic imagery with other imagery to better describe what was at stake. The news map included a graph showing amounts of national rubber exports; the ad map included an icon of a Southeast Asian native working a rubber tree.

Another factor that influenced American ad map portrayals of the Cold War world was the perception that the western frontier extended beyond the West Coast. Beginning with the writings of Frederick Jackson Turner in the early 1890s, historians have acknowledged, albeit to differing measures, the significance of the frontier in the American imagination and experience. 465 Though the American frontier was officially closed in 1890, frontier style rhetoric survived into the Cold War. As historian Martin Ridge has pointed out, for example, that American and foreign presses have portrayed

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Cold War presidents with strong foreign policies as “either western bad men or steely-eyed sheriffs.”  

During and after WWII, America-based international businesses frequently portrayed foreign markets as extensions of the American frontier on ad maps. This was especially true of businesses operating in the Far East. For example, in May 1945 *U.S. News and World Report* published an ad for Shell Industrial Lubricants which described American air shipments of oil to China as the new Pony Express (fig. 6.2). Just as Turner envisioned the American frontier as the promoter of democracy at home and in Europe, the Shell ad map saw the new Air Age Pony Express as the guarantor of freedom against Japanese imperialism in China. Ad maps for Northwest Airlines similarly linked post-WWII air travel to the Orient with older American dreams of the Northwest Passage. In late 1946, an ad map was published in *Time* magazine which saw private passenger air service to China as the fulfillment of the American search for the Eastern markets which began in the early nineteenth century (fig 6.2).

Equating the Far East as the new American frontier during and after WWII was simultaneous with the American military effort to secure the Pacific Ocean—first from the Japanese, and later, to contain communism. Although news maps describing an American empire in the Pacific were rare indeed, ad maps portrayed the region clearly as the commercial domain of the United States. As such, early Cold War era ad maps

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of the Far East deserve more attention for they offered a stark contrast to contemporary news maps that carved the world up into geopolitical spheres of influence.

Fig. 6.2. During and after WWII, many American ad maps portrayed the Far East as an extension of the western frontier. A 1945 ad for the Shell Corporation (left) saw American air supply routes to China as the new Pony Express in *U.S. News and World Report*. Northwest Airlines promoted its 1946 air service to the Far East as the modern day Northwest Passage in *Time* magazine (right).

Though the Monroe Doctrine itself lost importance in lieu of international programs such as the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, spheres of influence were valuable conceptions for visualizing the competition between capitalist and communist realms. In this regard, all communist nations in Europe and Asia were portrayed as a monolithic Soviet Eurasian threat. All non-communist nations were seen as the “free world.” Meanwhile, the American press never acknowledged an American empire in the Western hemisphere, although Britain and the Soviet Union did.
Germany dominated American concerns in Europe during and after WWII. The mapped image of Nazi Germany was an alarming symbol used to rally American support for the Allied war effort. After 1945, the occupied zones of Germany were portrayed in terms of Cold War polarization. The capitalist zones under American, British and French control were lumped together as “free Germany” even before the formal portioning of East and West Germany in late 1949. The Soviet zone of Germany, and later the German Democratic Republic (GDR), was de-legitimized as a puppet state of the Soviet Union on maps. Winston Churchill’s Iron Curtain rhetoric reinforced the idea that Cold War Germany represented the boundary between the free West and the communist East. And considerable efforts were made to link the GDR to communist advances in China and Korea on world maps in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

**Trends in British News Maps**

Britain’s war-ravaged economy severely restricted the national press’s ability to design and print news maps in large quantities during and after WWII. Government rationing of paper and colored inks lasted well into the early Cold War period. No national weekly news journals printed in color except on special occasions such as Christmas or New Years Day. As a result, news maps in most national journals were relatively simplistic, black and white, hand-drawn portrayals with a distinctively non-professional appearance. The monthly *Serial Map Service (SMS)* provided the only
exception to these generalizations as its maps rivaled American news maps in terms of color usage and appearance.

Most national news journals were admitted organs of the British political system, and they presented the news with unabashed bias. But these journals did not generally employ professional staff cartographers, which reflected the traditional British preference for texts over graphics. Professional cartographers from private map publishers were occasionally contracted to design more professional maps, but prohibitive costs kept these to a minimum. Instead, news journals often promoted private map sales for newsreaders who craved news cartography. Maps appearing in the British press were usually rendered in large scale, and as such, were not suitable for experimenting with projections or Air Age perspectives. Moreover, these “locator maps,” as they were called, were often reprinted in altered form, especially during WWII.

Still, British news maps were not without artistic appeal. Surrounding the stark white landforms and plain political borders were richly depicted waterways that revealed a British affinity for all things maritime. Even the most simplistic locator maps often portrayed waterways with artistic line shading reminiscent of maps in professional British atlases produced centuries earlier. A detail of the first printed map from British New England, produced in Boston in 1677, reveals careful attention given to land features, but the most detailed sections described waterways (fig. 6.3). 469 By the

469 David Buisseret (ed.). From Sea Charts to Satellite Images: Interpreting North American History through Maps (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1990) pp 64. This map was part of William Hubbard’s A Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians in New England, and was probably made by John Foster.
beginning of WWII, British news cartographers still devoted most their ink and energy describing waterways while leaving landforms in relatively sparse detail. A relatively simple rendering of Mediterranean landforms in an April 1939 Spectator map contrasted sharply with the dark shading and careful positioning of labels describing the surrounding waterways.470

Fig. 6.3. WWII and Cold War-era British news maps depicted waterways with greater detail than landforms—a tradition that dates back to at least the 17th century. John Foster’s 1677 map of New England (left) and a 1939 news map published in Spectator (right) illustrate this trend. (The Foster map is courtesy of Special Collections, University of Texas at Arlington Central Library)

The British reliance on the oceans and waterways as avenues of empire partially explains their affinity for maps with detailed waterways. But more than this, for a people who have never known an open, terrestrial frontier in the American sense, the seas were their frontier. The world’s waterways were not an incubator for frontier democracy in the Turnerian sense; rather, they were frontiers of commerce and empire. On maps from the Age of Exploration to the Cold War, the rich treatment of waterways reflected the richness of empire conveyed by maritime trade. Stylized waves hinted at
frontiers that lie beyond the area described by locator maps. Did the advent of the Air Age, and later the Space Age, lead British mapmakers to abandon their attention to waterways? Future studies could answer these questions.

A partial answer to these questions was found in the examination of British air travel ad maps that saw Air Age transport as a continuation of maritime concerns. A common trend was a “world without coastlines,” which emphasized the British naval tradition and promotion of travel to the British Empire. But Air Age map projections, which became popular after WWII, generally were not concerned with waterways. As the Cold War heated up after 1946, British news maps focused as much on the land-based superpowers as on Air Age geopolitical competition.

The Serial Map Service published several polar projection maps predicting postwar air routes over the Arctic Circle until the United States denied access to American air space for British commercial flights in 1946. The British press generally mapped the North Pole as an arena of economic competition, for fishing, air travel, etc. Long-standing British territorial claims in the Antarctic, however, compelled cartographers to portray that region as a geopolitical arena in the early Cold War era. This trend was preserved by rival claims by Argentina, Chile, and the Falkland Islands.

British politicians, and news cartographers, saw the world as divided into “zones of influence.” These zones were equally political and economic in nature, and they did not promote a strong distinction between communist and capitalist national interests. In other words, British maps did not conceive a monolithic Soviet menace. Rather, they

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distinguished several grades of communism in Eastern Europe. Moreover, distinctions were made between the Soviet Union and all other communist regimes—most notably in China, Yugoslavia and North Korea.

The mapped image of Nazi Germany was never an alarmist symbol in the weekly British press. After 1945, occupied Germany was generally portrayed as a multilateral, four-power state and not as a polarized barometer of Cold War tensions. Throughout the early Cold War period, divided Germany was seen in economic rather than political terms. The mapped states of Germany were usually not linked to a larger polarized Cold War world due to the large scale employed in their rendering. And British mapmakers generally did not link the GDR to communist movements in the Far East.

Other Suggestions for Future Studies

This dissertation compared news journal maps of two nations and revealed important differences and similarities. Suggestions for future studies include comparing examples of British and American news maps with those of the third party in the “Big Three”—the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the Soviet press did not print maps with the news in the manner that the Western press did. Official Soviet state maps were classified until the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. To date, no academic surveys of these state maps have been published. The only cartographic imagery currently available from the Soviet press consists of political cartoons in journals such as Pravada and Krokodil; a couple of cartoons from the latter journal were included in this study. However, the fall of the Iron Curtain has allowed at least
one promising study. In 2006, Lit Verlag edited a book entitled State Security and Mapping in the German Democratic Republic which offers valuable insight into why and how GDR mapmakers falsified official state maps from the early 1950s to the 1980s.471

A prominent theme in this dissertation was the idea of a polarized world, between communism and capitalism, which dominated headlines in the United States and Britain. It would be interesting to examine how ideas of polarization were affected by the rise of Third World nations as a challenge to American and Soviet dominance after 1955. When, if ever, did the American press recognize that Third World communist movements were not extensions of Soviet power? Did British news maps continue to discern between various national communist movements throughout the Cold War?

Furthermore, the year 1955 signifies the end of what might be called a unified Anglo-American foreign policy in the Cold War. The Suez Crisis of 1956 marked the first publicly acknowledged divergence of British and American goals in the Middle East, for example. Also, the British Foreign Office recognized the legitimacy of communist China long before the American State Department did, which caused considerable animosity on the American side. Did these, and other Anglo-American differences, affect how each nation portrayed the world with maps?

The British maps discussed in this study, not including those published by the Serial Map Service, were greatly affected by government rationing that began in WWII
and lasted well into the 1950s. How did the end of such rationing affect British maps in the remaining years of the Cold War? Did British maps become as colorful and professional in appearance as those in the American press? Or did the British preference for text over imagery prevent a revitalization of news cartography as the Cold War progressed?

Future studies could also address the effect that maps have had on international relations. Do the maps of that one country prepares to propagandize its perceptions actually affect the policy of a country so characterized? Historian Neil Smith argued that geographers (and presumably mapmakers) have collaborated with government intelligence organizations from the era of the Roman Empire to the present. Negotiations at the Paris Peace Accords after WWI were greatly affected by the “astute understanding of the power of maps” of the American delegation to gain support for Wilson’s Fourteen Points. A study of the role of maps, and news maps, in Cold War diplomacy is sorely needed. For example, in 1948 the United States House of Representatives cited a 1947 *New York Times* map of communist party membership as its source for communist activity in the world. Surely political orientation of the press was at work here, as well, and future studies can shed light on this.

Lastly, several maps discussed in general terms in this study deserve greater attention. Susan Schulten has examined the maps of Richard Edes Harrison as a

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474 Ibid
“challenge to American cartography,” but no published studies have addressed maps by his greatest student, Robert M. Chapin, Jr. \(^{475}\) In a forthcoming article in the German journal *Comparativ* I discuss an exceptionally detailed and embellished map of Germany published in *Time* magazine on the occasion of the formal partitioning of Germany in 1949. \(^{476}\) But Chapin’s body of work remains largely ignored. On the British side, many maps published by the *SMS* are truly works of propagandistic art that so far have not been examined. Moreover, the arrangement whereby private map publishers were contracted to produce maps for weekly British news journals was temporary—it lasted only as long as government rationing existed. However, this arrangement seems to be exclusive to the British press and, as such, deserves further study.

\(^{474}\) Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, 80\(^{th}\) Congress, 2d Sess., 1948, H. Doc. 619, pt. 1D.


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BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

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