

Running head: SOCIAL MEDIA IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT

FROM HUMBLE BRAGS TO INSINCERE FLATTERY: AN EXAMINATION OF SOCIAL
MEDIA IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT

by

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Abstract

The purpose of this research was to develop and validate a self-report measure of social media impression management (SMIM), which could be used to examine the prevalence rates of these behaviors among job seekers, as well as to investigate behavioral differences in SMIM across Facebook and LinkedIn. Through examining a series of exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses (Study One, $N = 548$), a 38-item SMIM scale was produced (as well as a 20-item abbreviated scale) that is comprised of five-factors (i.e., honest self-promotion, deceptive self-promotion, honest ingratiation, deceptive ingratiation, defensive image protection). Through construct validation efforts, several dispositional attributes (e.g., personality-based integrity, honesty-humility, narcissism, psychopathy) were identified that describe job seekers who are prone to engaging in SMIM. Study Two ($N = 202$) cross-validated the SMIM scale on a new sample of job seekers, and results demonstrated favorable psychometric properties for the 20-item abbreviated SMIM scale. In addition, results demonstrated that a majority of job seekers engage in SMIM to some extent (i.e., 54.56% on Facebook, 53.83% on LinkedIn), with honest and defensive forms occurring more frequently than deceptive behaviors. Further, Study Two hypotheses were supported, such that honest and deceptive self-promotion occurred more frequently on LinkedIn, whereas image protection behaviors were more common on Facebook. This study addresses an important gap in the literature by investigating the extent to which job seekers attempt to foster positive impressions on social media, which has important implications for organizations who choose to cybervet job applicants. Study limitations and several future research directions that can advance this line of research are described.

Keywords: cybervetting, social media, selection, impression management

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DEDICATION

For my mom, who dedicated her life to me.

Thank you for always making sure I had everything.

I love you.

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Introduction

Since the early 2000s, social media has infiltrated the daily lives of people across the world, with an astounding 3.6 billion users in 2020 (Statista, 2020). At its inception, social media was intended to serve as an online social network designed to facilitate interactions among one's social circle (Ahmad, 2018; Boyd & Ellison, 2008). Yet, in today's society, social media platforms can be used for a variety of purposes, such as buying and selling items (Facebook Marketplace, n.d.), searching for employment (Smith, 2015), and initiating romantic relationships (Anderson et al., 2020). The implications of social media use are vast, as these platforms provide insight into the lives of users that was not previously readily available. Social media is commonly used as a source to gain information about other individuals (i.e., cybervetting), such as screening incoming immigrants (Kopan, 2018), vetting job applicants (Hartwell & Campion, 2020), and investigating the veracity of dater identity (Couch & Liamputtong, 2008). As impressions garnered from cybervetting evaluations can result in significant consequences (e.g., employment termination, restricted entry into foreign countries; Kopan, 2018; Toropin & Asmelash, 2020), it is important to understand the authenticity of self-presentations on social media profiles.

One context in which cybervetting has received widespread attention is the employment setting, in which organizations use social media evaluations to inform employment decisions (Davison et al., 2011). For example, a recent survey revealed that 82% of organizations report cybervetting job applicants to some extent (Hartwell & Campion, 2020). Although scholars generally advise caution to organizations who cybervet as a pre-employment screening tool due to a lack of validity evidence and legal concerns (Schroeder et al., 2020; Van Iddekinge et al., 2016), cybervetting in this context is prevalent and viewed by many practitioners as a useful tool

to gather information about job candidates (Society for Human Resource Management, 2016; SHRM). Thus, it is likely job seekers may be pressured to maintain a positive image due to organizational use of social media.

Notably, increased organizational reliance on cybervetting has prompted scholars to consider the extent to which individuals engage in impression management (i.e., the process by which individuals control the impressions others form; Leary & Kowalski, 1990) on social media, as the conclusions drawn from cybervetting assessments could be based on inaccurate or exaggerated self-portrayals. For instance, Roulin and Levashina (2016) set forth a theoretical framework of social media impression management (SMIM) that considers the tactics by which social media users manage the impressions that employers form. Although previous research has suggested that social media users generally present a favorable image of themselves (van Dijck, 2013), many unanswered questions remain regarding the prevalence of such strategies. Further, a majority of social media users have profiles on multiple platforms (Smith & Anderson, 2018), and a comparison of tactics used to present a favorable image across platforms has yet to be examined.

Investigating the prevalence of SMIM and the strategies by which individuals construct positive portrayals has important implications for organizational stakeholders who use social media as a source of information, as the authenticity of self-presentations (or lack thereof) may affect the utility of cybervetting as a screening device. Thus, the purpose of the present study was two-fold. Using a multi-study, multi-sample design, the first goal was to create a measure that allowed for an empirical examination of Roulin and Levashina's (2016) theoretical model of SMIM (Study One). The second goal was to compare SMIM tactics across two popular social media outlets, Facebook and LinkedIn (Study Two). Prior to discussing impression management

manifestation on social media, a brief review of impression management and related constructs in relation to organizational science is provided below.

Impression Management in the Pre-Employment Context

Broadly speaking, impression management refers to the process by which individuals control the impressions that others form of them (Leary & Kowalski, 1990). Impression management is often used interchangeably with self-presentation (e.g., Leary & Kowalski, 1990), although some scholars recognize these as distinct constructs (e.g., Schlenker, 1980; Schneider, 1981). For example, Schlenker (1980) defines impression management as an effort to “control images that are projected in real or imagined social interactions” (p. 6), whereas self-presentation is only the self-relevant projected images. Notably, impression management likely involves controlling impressions that are not central to the self (e.g., managing the impressions another holds about an organization), highlighting that impression management is a more encompassing term than self-presentation (Leary & Kowalski, 1990).

Within the personnel selection literature, impression management is often a construct of interest in relation to job applicant testing and employment interviews. However, there has been confusion related to the conceptualization of impression management and similar constructs. For instance, impression management is often conflated with social desirability and faking. Social desirability, or the inclination to present oneself in a favorable way (Edwards, 1957), is commonly examined in the context of intentional response distortion in personality assessments (Uziel, 2010). Impression management is often viewed as a component of social desirability in cases in which one deliberately manipulates information in efforts to produce a positive impression (Paulhus, 1984), although some scholars argue that impression management can be unconscious or habitual in nature (e.g., see, Bolino et al., 2016 for a review). Nevertheless,

research has demonstrated that impression management often results in responding in socially desirable ways in situations that contain demand characteristics (e.g., selection assessments in which applicants are motivated to perform well; Kovačić et al., 2014), highlighting that conscious decisions may largely influence impression management in hiring contexts.

Relatedly, faking refers specifically to deceptive strategies used to alter assessment outcomes (e.g., intentional response distortion to influence scores on hiring assessments; Levashina & Campion, 2007). Impression management can involve faking, when the strategies used to produce a favorable image involve deception (Levashina & Campion, 2007). Faking is strongly related to social desirability such that those who are inclined to respond in a favorable way are more likely to fake on selection assessments (Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998). However, many have noted that social desirability is not synonymous with faking, as individuals who respond in socially desirable ways may perceive their responses to be true (i.e., self-deception; Kovačić et al., 2014). Stated differently, whereas faking refers specifically to deceptive behaviors, both social desirability and impression management can include honesty and deception. In sum, social desirability is comprised of self-deception and impression management, and impression management can involve honest and deceptive (i.e., faking) tactics to construct a desired image.

Of the studies that have examined impression management tactics in employment interviews, the primary focus has been on deceptive techniques (see, Levashina et al., 2014 for a review). For example, Levashina and Campion (2007) developed a measure of faking in the employment interview and demonstrated that 90% of undergraduate job candidates engaged in faking. Their model of interview faking was comprised of four factors, which included slight image creation (i.e., efforts to present an image of a qualified candidate), extensive image

creation (i.e., efforts to invent an image of a qualified candidate), ingratiation (i.e., efforts to gain favor of the interviewer to improve the image of a qualified candidate), and image protection (i.e., efforts to defend an image of a qualified candidate; Levashina & Campion, 2007). More recently, research has begun to examine not only deceptive impression management techniques, but also the strategies by which job candidates gain favorable impressions by being honest (e.g., Bourdage et al., 2018; Roulin & Bourdage, 2017). For instance, Bourdage et al. (2018) developed a measure of honest impression management in selection interviews, which included three factors: honest self-promotion, ingratiation, and defensive behaviors. Scholars have highlighted that neglecting an examination of both honest and deceptive impression management techniques in the pre-employment context is problematic (e.g., Bourdage et al., 2018; Levashina et al., 2014; Roulin & Bourdage, 2017), as distinguishing tactics as honest or deceptive are practically informative. For example, organizations may be interested in the extent to which applicants use self-promotion tactics to highlight their true qualifications (i.e., honest), as well as the extent to which applicants embellish or outright fabricate information to convey an inflated impression of competence (i.e., deceptive). Taken together, I define impression management as the process by which individuals attempt to foster positive impressions of themselves to potential employers, which can include both honest and deceptive behaviors.

Motives for Social Media Impression Management

Broadly speaking, online communication is particularly suited for managing self-presentations compared to in-person interactions, as the content is easily editable, more time can be allocated to message construction, and there are more opportunities to conceal involuntary verbal cues (Walther, 2007). Related to the social media environment, most platforms have predefined categories that encourage users to share certain information about themselves (e.g.,

work and education history), and there are features that allow users to post status updates, photos, and reshare content posted from other sources (Cowles, 2020; Widder & Barbee, 2018). As a majority of content is contributed by the profile owner, there are many opportunities to present oneself authentically in a positive or negative light, as well as to fabricate or exaggerate information (Wilson et al., 2012).

However, many studies have indicated that social media users present a fairly similar image to their offline identity (Back et al., 2010; Gosling et al., 2011), which is often attributed to the likelihood that social media connections are often preceded or followed by an in-person interaction (Guadagno et al., 2012). Thus, social media users may be reluctant to misrepresent themselves online if offline acquaintances can identify falsifications (DeAndrea & Walther, 2011; Toma, 2017). In addition to pressures by offline acquaintances to present oneself authentically on social media, profiles can also be viewed by individuals who do not know the profile owner as a means to gather information. Profile access by others may encourage positive self-presentation (as opposed to an image that may foster negative impressions), especially in a high-stakes scenario when the results of social media evaluations have serious consequences.

One such high-stakes scenario is when organizations cybervet social media profiles for employment decisions, given that the outcomes of these evaluations can have significant ramifications, including elimination from an applicant pool (Bell, 2018; Lam, 2015; Toropin & Asmelash, 2020). Notably, job applicants tend to have poor perceptions of cybervetting, as the procedure is often perceived as an invasion of privacy (Jacobson & Tufts, 2013; Sayre & Dahling, 2015; Stoughton et al., 2015). Nevertheless, research has suggested that social media users are aware that organizations use social media as a screening tool (e.g., Berkelaar, 2014), and users are able to recognize some social media content that may be perceived as problematic

by employers (Kedrowicz et al., 2016; Root & McKay, 2014). Thus, as social media users are aware that profiles are often vetted by organizations, and there are known consequences of poor self-presentation, motivation to maintain a positive image via impression management tactics may be particularly prominent, especially on platforms that are commonly vetted by employers (i.e., Facebook and LinkedIn; SHRM, 2016).

In fact, in a study that examined employee and employer expectations regarding cybervetting as a pre-employment practice, an overwhelming majority of respondents indicated that online presentation management is the new normal and considered “necessary for contemporary professionalism, being a ‘serious worker’, and career success” (Berkelaar, 2014, p. 495). Notably, meta-analytic data have indicated that use of impression management strategies in job interviews is positively correlated with interviewer ratings (Barrick et al., 2009), which is likely related to an increased likelihood of job attainment. Thus, this may further suggest there are benefits to engaging in SMIM which may encourage users to bolster the impressions employers form of them. A discussion of impression management tactics used by social media users is provided below.

Social Media Impression Management

Drawing from extensive research that has examined impression management in the selection context, Roulin and Levashina (2016) set forth a theoretical model of SMIM behaviors that are oriented toward employers, which included five factors: honest and deceptive self-promotion, honest and deceptive other-focused ingratiation, and defensive strategies. Thus, the first goal of this study is to create a measure that allows for an empirical examination of Roulin and Levashina’s (2016) model of SMIM in the pre-employment context. For the sake of parsimony, honest and deceptive forms of self-promotion and ingratiation will be described in

their respective sections, as there are only minor behavioral differences between honest and deceptive forms of these strategies. A description of the proposed factors is provided below.

Honest and deceptive self-promotion on social media. Self-promotion involves describing one's experiences, accomplishments, or abilities in a positive light (Roulin & Bourdage, 2017; Roulin & Levashina, 2016; Stevens & Kristof, 1995) and can include both honest and deceptive behaviors. Whereas honest self-promotion represents truthful descriptions of one's qualifications (Bourdage et al., 2018), deceptive self-promotion can include exaggerating one's experiences and qualifications or fabricating information in order to appear to be more qualified (Roulin & Bourdage, 2017; Roulin & Levashina, 2016). Notably, distinguishing honest versus deceptive self-promotion strategies would be fairly difficult from the perspective of a cybervetter unless additional information was readily available (e.g., transcripts) to verify the veracity of content. The primary difference between honest and deceptive forms refers to whether the social media user is conveying an image that is representative of their true qualifications (i.e., honest self-promotion), or if they are exaggerating or inventing information to make them appear more qualified (i.e., deceptive self-promotion). As many studies have indicated that self-promotion is a common form of impression management in the selection context (Bourdage et al., 2018; Ellis et al., 2002; Levashina & Campion, 2007), Roulin and Levashina (2016) proposed that self-promotion would be a prevalent strategy on social media profiles. In fact, some have argued that social media users who fail to self-promote by listing their qualifications on social media will be viewed poorly by employers (Paliszkievicz & Madra-Sawicka, 2016).

Previous research has indicated that recruiters focus on job-related information when evaluating profiles (Roulin & Bangerter, 2013), which may suggest that self-promotion on social

media is common. Roulin and Levashina (2016) suggested that users can strategically display content that gives the impression of certain qualities that may be viewed favorably by employers. For example, users could share content that highlights accomplishments one has received (e.g., sharing information about a degree or award earned), or post content that exudes favorable characteristics, such as interpersonal skills (e.g., sharing photos of oneself with colleagues at a business conference). Likewise, in one of the only studies to examine deceptive impression management strategies on LinkedIn, Guillory and Hancock (2012) demonstrated that 92.4% of respondents engaged in deceptive self-promotion. Examples of such behaviors included overstating information about previous jobs, exaggerating former job responsibilities, and inventing skills that one does not truthfully obtain (Guillory & Hancock, 2012). Based on a small survey administered to business and graduate students (Roulin & Levashina, 2016), other specific self-promotion behaviors were reported, such as posting one's academic accomplishments or volunteer experiences. Thus, there are many opportunities to engage in self-promotion on social media.

Honest and deceptive other-focused ingratiation on social media. Whereas self-promotion is focused on creating an impression of competence (Ellis et al., 2002), ingratiation involves attempts to elicit interpersonal liking or attraction by others (Levashina & Campion, 2007; Roulin & Levashina, 2016). Ingratiation is other-directed, in the sense that an individual is attempting to gain the favor of others (Roulin & Levashina, 2016). Several studies have reported that a majority of candidates employ ingratiation tactics in interviews (Bourdage et al., 2018; Ellis et al., 2002; Levashina & Campion, 2007), which may suggest that similar tactics are used on social media profiles for pre-employment purposes. Ingratiation can involve giving compliments or highlighting values that one shares with an organization, as well as deceptive

strategies, such as opinion conforming when it contradicts one's beliefs or offering insincere praise (Levashina & Campion, 2007; Roulin & Bourdage, 2017; Stevens & Kristof, 1995). For example, deceptive ingratiation in the interview context can include laughing at an interviewer's jokes when they are not humorous, drawing attention to favorable qualities of the interviewer, or highlighting experiences they believe may be similar to the interviewer (Ellis et al., 2002; Levashina & Campion, 2007). In contrast, honest ingratiation in interviews can include discussing common interests one shares with the interviewer (Bourdage et al., 2018). Notably, Roulin and Levashina (2016) highlight that there are less direct opportunities to engage in ingratiation tactics on social media profiles, given that profiles are not organization- or job-specific. Thus, on social media profiles, ingratiation is likely directed at a number of parties (e.g., employers, colleagues, non-work-related friends). As such, ingratiation on social media in this study is not considered target-specific, but instead includes both honest and deceptive behaviors used to elicit interpersonal liking of others.

Ingratiation on social media profiles can take various forms, such as displaying broad interests that are typically valued by others or connecting with (or friending) individuals to develop one's network (Roulin & Levashina, 2016). In addition, endorsing content posted by others or offering compliments to one's friends or members of one's network are likely strategies used to gain the favor of others on social media. Notably, ingratiation tactics can be honest or deceptive. For example, Guillory and Hancock (2012) identified deceptive ingratiation strategies, such as claiming interests that are of value to others but do not align with one's personal beliefs. Other strategies to gain interpersonal liking may include endorsing or complimenting the accomplishments of others, both of which can be done honestly or deceptively. Thus, as social

media has features that facilitate ingratiation tactics (e.g., liking, commenting, or resharing content), these strategies may be common and could be targeted at multiple parties.

Defensive impression management on social media. Unlike self-promotion and ingratiation, defensive impression management involves protecting or repairing one's damaged image (Roulin & Bourdage, 2017; Stevens & Kristof, 1995). In employment interviews, defensive impression management is used by a majority of candidates (Bourdage et al., 2018; Ellis et al., 2002; Levashina & Campion, 2007). For example, common defensive strategies include omitting examples of job-related weaknesses, justifying poor performance, or leaving out information that may harm one's reputation (Ellis et al., 2002; Levashina & Campion, 2007). Unlike in employment interviews where candidates may be asked questions that require defensive impression management tactics, social media users choose what they present on their profiles, and it is unlikely that users intentionally share content that may need defending.

As social media defensive mechanisms are likely to occur behind the scenes, it would be challenging (and unnecessary) to classify defensive impression management strategies as honest or deceptive (Roulin & Levashina, 2016). Although there have been ethical debates questioning whether the omission of the truth is considered a lie (e.g., Richard et al., 2010), this issue is irrelevant to the present effort, as the focus of this paper is to identify the behaviors social media users employ to protect their image. Thus, in this study, defensive social media behaviors are not classified as honest or deceptive. Rather, defensive behaviors are the strategies users take to modify or eliminate content or to prevent content from appearing on their profiles. Notably, previous research has indicated that social media profiles often contain content that adversely affects employer perceptions (e.g., drug and alcohol references; Karl et al., 2010). As cybervetting practices and consequences of poor online behavior have become publicized (Bell,

2018; Lam, 2015; Toropin & Asmelash, 2020), social media users may be motivated to engage in image protection techniques.

Although not always specific to the employment context, several studies have indicated that social media users engage in defensive behaviors to protect one's image. One of the most obvious defensive strategies is to employ privacy settings which can restrict certain individuals from accessing profile content (De Wolf et al., 2014). However, privacy settings alone cannot fully protect others from accessing profile information (e.g., it can be viewed via friend profiles), which may prompt some users to engage in other image protection behaviors. Several studies have investigated antecedents of posting censorship or selective sharing and have demonstrated that concerns regarding the perceived audience often initiate defensive impression management tactics (Das & Kramer, 2013; Sleeper et al., 2013). Stated differently, concerns regarding who may view one's social media profile (e.g., employers) often results in strategic posting behaviors (Das & Kramer, 2013; Sleeper et al., 2013). In addition, social media users often elect not to post content when they are concerned that it may contradict the image they desire to portray online (Sleeper et al., 2013).

Other defensive strategies include more reactive approaches, such as deleting content, defriending others, or untagging oneself from content posted by others (Roulin & Levashina, 2016; Vitak, 2015). For example, some scholars have suggested that content posted by one's social media friends can be damaging to one's online image (Litt et al., 2014; Walther et al., 2009), which may result in defensive strategies that are aimed at repairing or protecting an image. Likewise, in a study that examined the strategies by which social media users modify their profile to "fake good" (i.e., creating an image of a desirable job applicant), Schroeder and Cavanaugh (2018) demonstrated that strategies such as deleting photos, status updates, likes, and

events were commonly used image management techniques. Thus, there are many defensive impression management tactics that social media users employ to protect one's image (Roulin & Levashina, 2016).

Taken together, as there are many strategies that social media users engage in to gain favorable impressions from employers, the first goal of this paper was to create a measure that allowed for an empirical examination of Roulin and Levashina's (2016) model. To validate the scale, I investigated the construct validity of the measure by examining its relationships with other constructs in its nomological network (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). Specifically, both convergent (i.e., the relatedness between measures of similar constructs) and discriminant (i.e., divergence between measures of dissimilar constructs; Hinkin, 1998) validity were examined. A discussion of the nomological network for the SMIM scale is provided below.

Social Media Impression Management and its Nomological Network

There are several constructs that are likely related to SMIM (see Figure 1). As previously mentioned, impression management is viewed as a component of social desirability in which one attempts to create a favorable impression (Paulhus, 1984). For example, job applicants may distort their responses in efforts to appear as a stronger candidate (Ellingson et al., 2001), and research has demonstrated that socially desirable responding is positively associated with faking in employment interviews (Levashina & Campion, 2007). Thus, it is expected that individuals who are inclined to respond in desirable ways are more likely to engage in SMIM. In addition, it is expected that SMIM is positively related to context non-specific impression management (i.e., a general tendency to foster a positive image). For example, in developing a measure of faking in employment interviews, Levashina and Campion (2007) demonstrated that context non-specific impression management was positively related to faking in interviews. Finally, as social

desirability is influenced by self-deception (i.e., an unconscious tendency to provide honest yet overly positive responses; Ellingson et al., 2001; Paulhus, 1984), it is expected that self-deception is positively related to honest self-promotion and honest ingratiation. Taken together, it is hypothesized that social desirability and impression management are positively related to all five factors of SMIM, and self-deception is positively related honest self-promotion and honest ingratiation (Figure 1).

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Socially desirable responding will be positively related to (a) honest self-promotion, (b) deceptive self-promotion, (c) honest ingratiation, (d) deceptive ingratiation, and (e) defensive behaviors on social media.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): Context non-specific impression management will be positively related to (a) honest self-promotion, (b) deceptive self-promotion, (c) honest ingratiation, (d) deceptive ingratiation, and (e) defensive behaviors on social media.

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Self-deception will be positively related to (a) honest self-promotion and (b) honest ingratiation on social media.

Another construct likely related to SMIM is the honesty-humility trait. The honesty-humility trait is comprised of four facets of personality, which include sincerity, fairness, greed avoidance, and modesty (Ashton & Lee, 2009). Meta-analytic data have indicated that honesty-humility is inversely related to undesirable personality traits (e.g., psychopathy; Howard et al., 2020), and individuals who score highly on this measure tend to be authentic in interpersonal relationships and avoid undesirable behaviors such as cheating (Ashton et al., 2014). The honesty-humility trait has been inversely linked to counterproductive workplace behaviors (Zettler & Hilbig, 2010) and faking in employment interviews (Bourdage et al., 2018; Roulin &

Bourdage, 2017), which makes it likely that honesty-humility is inversely related to deceptive self-promotion and deceptive ingratiation on social media.

Hypothesis 4 (H4): Honesty-humility will be inversely related to (a) deceptive self-promotion and (b) deceptive ingratiation on social media.

An additional construct likely related to SMIM is extraversion, which represents a tendency to be outgoing, talkative, and energetic (McCrae & John, 1992). Some scholars have suggested that individuals who are extraverted value being accepted by others (Weiss & Feldman, 2006), which has prompted researchers to investigate the relationship between extraversion and impression management-related behaviors. For example, previous research has demonstrated extraversion to be positively related to impression management in workplace settings (Bourdage et al., 2015), and more recent work has positively linked extraversion to the use of honest self-promotion and honest ingratiation in employment interviews (Bourdage et al., 2018). In addition, extraversion is positively related to self-deception (Hart et al., 2015), which reflects a tendency to unconsciously report overly positive characteristics about oneself (Paulhus, 1984). Taken together, it is expected that extraversion is positively related to honest self-promotion and honest ingratiation.

Hypothesis 5 (H5): Extraversion will be positively related to (a) honest self-promotion and (b) honest ingratiation.

Another relevant construct is integrity, which is often used to identify honest and reliable employees in the selection context (Berry et al., 2007). Integrity tests are often classified as overt or personality-based (Sackett & Wanek, 1996). Overt integrity tests assess attitudes toward theft and admission of wrongdoings (Sackett & Wanek, 1996), whereas personality-based integrity tests measure broader constructs (e.g., emotional stability, conscientiousness, agreeableness) that

assess an individual's propensity to engage in unfavorable behavior (Catano et al., 2018). Meta-analytic data have inversely linked integrity to various unfavorable behaviors, such as theft and disciplinary problems (Ones et al., 1993). Research has demonstrated that individuals who value honesty are less likely to engage in faking behaviors, and individuals who believe that others engage in dishonest behaviors are more likely to fake in employment interviews (Levashina & Campion, 2007). As many of the constructs expected to relate to SMIM are dispositional in nature, this study focuses specifically on the personality-based operationalization of integrity. Taken together, it is expected that integrity will be inversely related to deceptive self-promotion and deceptive ingratiation on social media profiles.

Hypothesis 6 (H6): Integrity will be inversely related to (a) deceptive self-promotion and (b) deceptive ingratiation on social media.

Other constructs that are likely related to SMIM are Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy (i.e., the Dark Triad), which are traits that represent a tendency to be malevolent and selfish in interpersonal interactions (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). Individuals high in Machiavellianism believe that others can be easily manipulated and often value expediency over morality (O'Boyle et al., 2012). Likewise, narcissism refers to the tendency to obtain an inflated view of oneself, and psychopathy refers to a tendency to lack concern for others and to lack guilt when one's actions harm others (O'Boyle et al., 2012). Previous research has demonstrated positive links between the Dark Triad and cheating and lying behaviors (Jones & Paulhus, 2009; Jones & Paulhus, 2017; Kashy & DePaulo, 1996), counterproductive workplace behaviors (O'Boyle et al., 2012), workplace manipulation tactics (Jonason et al., 2012), and deceptive impression management tactics in employment interviews (Roulin & Bourdage, 2017). As individuals who are high in these traits tend to be selfish and have an inflated view themselves, it

is likely that they engage in all forms of impression management on social media to maintain this elevated sense of self, both honestly and deceptively. In addition, Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy have also all been positively linked to various social media behaviors, such as time spent on social media, photos taken, selfies posted, and photo editing behaviors (Fox & Rooney, 2015), which may further highlight that these constructs are linked to SMIM. Taken together, it is expected that Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and narcissism will be positively related to honest self-promotion, deceptive self-promotion, honest ingratiation, deceptive ingratiation, and defensive behaviors on social media profiles.

Hypothesis 7 (H7): Machiavellianism will be positively related to (a) honest self-promotion, (b) deceptive self-promotion (c) honest ingratiation, (d) deceptive ingratiation, and (e) defensive behaviors on social media.

Hypothesis 8 (H8): Psychopathy will be positively related to (a) honest self-promotion, (b) deceptive self-promotion (c) honest ingratiation, (d) deceptive ingratiation, and (e) defensive behaviors on social media.

Hypothesis 9 (H9): Narcissism will be positively related (a) honest self-promotion, (b) deceptive self-promotion (c) honest ingratiation, (d) deceptive ingratiation, and (e) defensive behaviors on social media.

In sum, the first goal of this paper is to create and validate a scale of SMIM. Whereas this scale is not intended to be used as a selection device, the SMIM scale can be used to advance cybervetting research. In addition, through validation efforts, this study will identify constructs related to SMIM, which will provide information regarding the dispositional makeup of job seekers who are more prone to engage in these behaviors. For example, understanding what traits are related to SMIM could inform organizations who is more likely to present an authentic image

on social media, which has implications for designing selection systems. In addition, the scale will allow for an examination of the extent to which job seekers engage in SMIM, as well as whether these strategies differ across social media platforms (Study Two). Taken together, investigating job seeker SMIM behaviors will shed light on the utility of cybervetting as a selection tool, as decisions derived from these evaluations could be based on inaccurate information.

Study One

Using a two-step approach to scale development and validation (Hinkin, 1998), the purpose of Study One was to create a measure of SMIM. Specifically, the content validity, psychometric properties (e.g., reliability, factor loadings), and the convergent and discriminant validity of the scale were examined (Hinkin, 1998).

Method

Participants and procedure. Data were collected from an initial 699 participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participants were required to be 18 years or older, a United States resident, have been seeking new or additional employment within the past year, and have a social media profile (i.e., LinkedIn or Facebook). Notably, participants were not required to be unemployed, but rather just seeking new/additional employment as it is likely that job seekers engage in SMIM with employers in mind. Further, participants were required to have either a Facebook or LinkedIn profile, as these platforms are most commonly investigated by employers (SHRM, 2016), and the behaviors in the scale are specific to these platforms.

A total of 149 participants were not included in data analyses for either failing eligibility requirements, failing three of six attention checks, or providing incoherent responses to open-ended questions. In addition, two participants completed the survey twice, so only their first

responses were retained. Thus, the final sample included 548 MTurk participants (55.1% male, 71.9% White/Caucasian, 46.2% between 25 – 34 years old, 52.6% had a Bachelor's degree, 11.22 average years of work experience, 5.77 average months spent seeking new/additional employment). Participants were seeking employment in various industries, such as information technology (23.2%), business management and administration (20.6%), finance (i.e., 17.7%), and marketing (10.8%).

To examine the properties of the scale using exploratory factor analyses (EFAs) and confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs), the sample was randomly split into two subsamples (EFA sample, $N = 200$; CFA sample, $N = 348$; DeVellis, 2017). The final sample sizes retained for the split-sample design were appropriate according to the recommended standards for factor analyses (e.g., Hinkin, 1998; Weston & Gore, 2006) and structural equation models (Schwab, 1980). Notably, participant demographics were similar across both samples. Participants completed a survey administered via Qualtrics, and participants who completed the survey in full, met eligibility requirements, passed three of six attention checks, and provided coherent responses were paid \$3.00 upon completion of the survey.

Measures. A description of how the SMIM scale was developed is provided below. In addition, all measures that were included to assess convergent validity are described.

SMIM scale. Identification of SMIM behaviors were gathered from two primary sources. First, items were adapted from extant models or measures of impression management. Namely, items were created based on Roulin and Levashina's (2016) model of SMIM (Appendix A), as well as from studies that investigated impression management in employment interviews. Specifically, items were adapted from Levashina and Campion's (2007) job applicant faking measure (Appendix B) and Bourdage et al.'s (2018) measure of honest interview impression

management behaviors (Appendix C). In addition, items were gathered and adapted from studies that investigated impression management-related behaviors, such as social media privacy management strategies, and manager-specific social media self-promotion tactics. Namely, items were adapted from the measures used by De Wolf et al. (2014; Appendix D), Fieseler and Ranzini (2015; Appendix E), and Vitak (2015; Appendix F), each of which examined some form of impression management-related behaviors on social media. A total of 90 items were created by adapting items from previous scales.

Second, the primary investigator and three industrial and organizational psychology graduate students who actively use social media generated 157 additional SMIM items. Thus, the initial item list contained a total of 247 items. Next, an experienced industrial and organizational psychologist who uses social media assisted in the item refinement process by removing items for redundancy and assessing the face validity of the items in their respective categories (Stanton et al., 2002). After this refinement process, a total of 231 items remained.

To assess the content validity of the initial 231 items, a Q-sort task was conducted (Hinkin, 1998; McKeown & Thomas, 1988). This technique to assess content validity is recommended in the scale development process as an additional step to item refinement (e.g., Hinkin, 1998; Stanton et al., 2002). Specifically, definitions of each construct and a list of items were provided to a group of ten undergraduate research assistants who were familiar with social media. Coders were instructed to sort each item into the most appropriate construct. Drawing from recommendations provided by Hinkin (1998), items that were not correctly categorized into a single category by 90% of raters were eliminated. A total of 88 items were eliminated from the Q-sort process, which resulted in a total of 143 items that were administered to participants, ranging between 22 and 35 items per scale (see Appendix G). Participants reported the extent to

which they used each behavior on social media profile on a scale of 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*to a very large extent*). Items were presented in a randomized order.

Convergent validity measures. In addition to the SMIM scale, participants completed several measures to assess convergent validity. Unless otherwise indicated, measures were assessed using a seven-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree*). Namely, participants completed Catano et al.'s (2018) 10-item personality-based integrity measure (Appendix H). Further, to assess honesty-humility, participants completed Ashton and Lee's (2009; Appendix I) 10-item measure. In addition, participants completed John et al.'s (2008; Appendix J) eight-item measure of extraversion. To assess Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy, Jonason and Webster's (2010; Appendix K) "Dirty Dozen" 12-item measure was administered. To assess self-deception and impression management, Hart et al.'s (2015; Appendix L) Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) 16-item measure was used. A high score on this scale indicates exaggerated desirable responses. To assess social desirability (SDR), Crowne and Marlowe's (1960; Appendix M) 33-item measure was used. Participants responded to each item using a true/false format, and higher scores represent a greater need for approval (i.e., social desirability).

Further, participants completed a brief demographic survey that asked respondents to provide their age, gender, race, education level, years of work experience, time spent on the job market, the industry in which they are seeking employment, and perceived cybervetting job relevance (Appendix N). Time spent on the job market was examined, as job applicants who have been on the market longer may increase engagement in these behaviors if they believe that cybervetting evaluations could influence the likelihood of job attainment. In addition, perceived cybervetting job relevance was examined, as previous research has indicated that applicant

reactions to selection procedures can affect behavioral outcomes (Hausknecht et al., 2004). Thus, if applicants perceive cybervetting as a job-relevant selection device, this may influence engagement in SMIM. To assess perceived job-relevance, two scales (i.e., job-relatedness predictive, job-relatedness content) of Bauer et al.'s (2001) procedural justice scale were adapted. Participants completed four items on a scale of 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

Further, as previous research has indicated that job applicants tend to have unfavorable perceptions of cybervetting as a selection tool (Stoughton et al., 2015), perceived privacy invasion of cybervetting was examined on an exploratory basis to investigate whether these perceptions influence engagement in SMIM. To assess perceived cybervetting privacy invasion, Tolchinski et al.'s (1981) five-item measure of privacy invasion was adapted to match this context (see Appendix O). For quality control purposes, six attention checks were incorporated into the survey to screen out inattentive participants. Finally, as an additional attention check, participants were asked to describe why they were seeking new/additional employment using an open-ended text response.

Results

To examine the hypothesized factor structure and psychometric properties of the SMIM scale, three primary analyses were conducted. First, to assess the underlying factor structure of the SMIM scale, a series of EFAs were conducted to inform what factors to retain and items to eliminate for subsequent analyses. Next, a series of CFAs were conducted to further examine the underlying factor structure of the scale. Several alternative models were tested to ensure that the best fitting model was retained for further analyses. Finally, the convergent and discriminant validity of the SMIM scale was examined by testing structural equation models (SEMs) to

provide further psychometric evidence that the scale operated as intended. A detailed description of each analysis step is provided below.

Exploratory factor analyses. To inform which factors to retain, several criteria were considered, including an examination of Eigenvalues, scree plots, and the interpretability of factors (Costello & Osborne, 2005; DeVellis, 2017). More specifically, a parallel analysis was conducted and compared to the results of a principal components analysis (PCA), and the number of factors in which the observed Eigenvalues were greater than random values were considered. In addition, the scree plot was examined, and the number of factors that were above the most notable reduction in Eigenvalues was considered (Cattell, 1966). Finally, factor loadings were examined to more clearly understand what items represented the underlying theoretical factors. A simple structure was desired in which items loaded at greater than .30 on only one factor and shared near-zero factor loadings with other factors.

Considering the criteria used to inform what factors to retain, an initial unrotated PCA was conducted and compared to a parallel analysis. Four factors demonstrated greater observed Eigenvalues than the corresponding factors in random data. Further, the scree plot suggested a three- or four-factor structure based on the most notable drop in the Eigenvalues (Cattell, 1966). To further examine the potential underlying structure of the data, a subsequent EFA with maximum likelihood extraction and promax rotation (which allowed factors to be correlated) was conducted. In examining the scree plot and Eigenvalues, results again suggested that three or four factors should be retained.

Two additional EFAs with maximum likelihood extraction and promax rotation were conducted, such that a three- and four-factor solution was specified. In comparing the two models, the three-factor structure was most interpretable, as it contained fewer items that cross-

loaded on more than one factor compared to the four-factor model. Namely, in specifying a three-factor solution, 13 items cross-loaded greater than 0.30 on more than one factor, and one item failed to load at least at 0.30 on a minimum of one factor. Thus, the 14 items that performed poorly were dropped, retaining 129 items for further analysis.

After eliminating items, an additional EFA with maximum likelihood extraction and promax rotation was conducted on the remaining 129 items in which three factors were specified. With the exception of one item (i.e., hsp13), the remaining 128 items demonstrated a simple structure (see Table 1). Notably, the three-factor structure was interpretable, such that all deceptive self-promotion and deceptive ingratiation items loaded on Factor 1 only (as well as two honest ingratiation and one honest self-promotion items), a majority of the honest self-promotion and honest ingratiation items loaded clearly on Factor 2, and all defensive items loaded on Factor 3. Thus, the data appear to represent three clear factors that capture deceptive, honest, and defensive social media behaviors. Taken together, results from the EFA process suggested that three factors should be retained for subsequent analyses. To be conservative, the remaining 129 items were retained and examined with a series of CFAs on the second subsample ($N = 348$).

Confirmatory factor analyses. To further assess the factor structure of the remaining 129 items, a series of CFAs were conducted to identify which model best represented the data. Based on recommendations provided by Hu and Bentler (1999), the criteria used to determine appropriate fit included the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) less than 0.090, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) less than 0.060, Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) and comparative fit index (CFI) greater than 0.900, and a non-significant chi-square. In all CFAs

described below, latent factor variances were set to one to allow all indicators to be freely estimated, and latent factors were correlated.

First, based on the results of the EFA, a three-factor model was examined such that all deceptive self-promotion and deceptive ingratiation items loaded on a latent factor (i.e., deceptive behaviors), all honest self-promotion and honest ingratiation items loaded on a latent factor (i.e., honest behaviors), and all defensive items loaded on another latent factor (i.e., defensive behaviors). Results demonstrated poor fit, $\chi^2(8,124) = 19,298.782, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.772, TLI = 0.768, RMSEA = 0.063, SRMR = 0.099$. Next, the hypothesized five-factor model was examined such that deceptive self-promotion, deceptive ingratiation, honest self-promotion, honest ingratiation, and defensive items were loaded on separate latent factors (i.e., five factors total). In comparison to the three-factor model, fit improved slightly, although the criteria failed to meet acceptable fit standards, $\chi^2(8,117) = 18,446.977, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.789, TLI = 0.786, RMSEA = 0.060, SRMR = 0.101$.

In addition, a unidimensional alternative model was assessed such that all 129 items loaded on a single latent factor. Results demonstrated poor fit, $\chi^2(8,127) = 27,205.037, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.611, TLI = 0.604, RMSEA = 0.082, SRMR = 0.125$. Finally, a two-factor model was assessed based on Ellis et al.'s (2002) model of impression management, such that all self-promotion and ingratiation items (honest and deceptive) loaded on one latent factor (i.e., assertive behaviors), and all defensive items loaded on another latent factor. Results demonstrated poor fit, $\chi^2(8,126) = 25,280.102, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.650, TLI = 0.644, RMSEA = 0.078, SRMR = 0.130$. In comparing the four initial CFAs on the 129 items retained from the EFA process, all models failed to meet acceptable fit criteria. Notably, however, the three- and five-factor models demonstrated the best fit in comparison to the alternative models. Thus, the

three- and five-factor models were examined more closely in efforts to refine the scale to achieve acceptable fit.

To refine the scale, items that demonstrated factor loadings less than 0.700 with their intended latent construct and within-factor item correlations greater than 0.800 were identified and eliminated (Kline, 2005). This process resulted in the elimination of 52 items, retaining 77 items for further analysis. After items were eliminated, fit improved for the three- and five-factor model, but still failed to meet acceptable criteria. Upon examining the five-factor model which demonstrated the best fit, all items loaded on their theoretical factor greater than .700, with one exception. Namely, one honest ingratiation item demonstrated a factor loading of .690, but it was retained for subsequent analysis, as only three other items remained in that factor.

In further efforts to improve scale fit and eliminate additional redundant items, item wording was examined for psychological understanding. For example, upon identifying two highly similar within-factor items, factor loadings were examined, and the item that shared the highest factor loading with its intended theoretical factor was retained. For example, item def13 “delete content that reflects poorly on me” and def29 “delete social media content that reflects poorly on me” were highly redundant in terms of theoretical contribution, and the item with the lower factor loading with the latent variable was eliminated. This iterative process resulted in the removal of 39 items, producing a scale containing a total of 38 items (see Appendix P).

Fit was reassessed on the hypothesized five-factor model, a three-factor model (i.e., three latent factors representing honest, deceptive, and defensive behaviors), and the two alternative models described previously. In examining the five-factor model, results demonstrated acceptable fit (see Table 2), $\chi^2(655) = 1,383.298$, $p < 0.001$, CFI = 0.943, TLI = 0.939, RMSEA = 0.057, SRMR = 0.049. The three-factor model also demonstrated acceptable fit, $\chi^2(662) =$

1,682.642, $p < 0.001$, CFI = 0.920, TLI = 0.915, RMSEA = 0.067, SRMR = 0.055, although fit was slightly worse compared to the five-factor model. Further, the two alternative models demonstrated poor fit, providing further evidence that the hypothesized five-factor model best represented the data. Chi-square difference tests were conducted that compared each alternative model to the hypothesized five-factor model. In all cases, the chi-square difference test was significant, indicating that the five-factor model should be retained, as it contains fewer degrees of freedom (see Table 2). Further, the average variance extracted (AVE) in each factor ranged between 0.541 and 0.740, highlighting that the factors explain a moderate to high percentage of variance in their respective indicators.

On an exploratory basis, only the four items that shared the strongest factor loadings with the theoretical latent constructs in the five-factor 38-item model were retained, and fit was reassessed. This item reduction process was completed in an attempt to reduce scale length to provide a more feasible measure for practical use, a common step in scale development (see, e.g., Bourdage et al., 2018). In assessing the fit of the 20-item scale (i.e., four items per latent factor; Appendix P), results demonstrated acceptable fit for the hypothesized five-factor model, as well as for the three-factor model (Table 2). Fit was poor for the unidimensional and two-factor alternative models. Chi-square difference tests were conducted that compared each alternative model to the hypothesized 20-item five-factor model, and in all cases, the chi-square test was significant, which provided evidence that the condensed 20-item scale best represented the data. The AVE in each factor in the 20-item scale ranged between 0.541 and 0.760. The final standardized factor loadings and AVE in the latent factors for the 38- and 20-item SMIM scale can be found in Table 3. Finally, sampling adequacy was assessed for the 38- and 20-item scales ($N = 348$) by conducting a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO; Kaiser, 1970) test, and values above

0.500 are considered appropriate (Kaiser, 1974). Results demonstrated sufficient sampling adequacy for the 38- (i.e., 0.975) and 20-item scale (i.e., 0.951), further highlighting the reliability and distinctness of factors. Alpha and omega reliability coefficients are provided in relevant tables.

After obtaining two SMIM measures that demonstrated acceptable fit, common method bias was examined (Podsakoff et al., 2003). To assess the effects of method bias, an additional alternative model was assessed with a CFA for the 38- and 20-item scale (i.e., six-factor alternative model; Table 2). All items loaded on their theoretical trait factor, as well as an unmeasured latent method factor. The method factor was not allowed to correlate with the latent theoretical factors (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Related to the 38-item measure, CFA results demonstrated improved fit compared to the model without a method factor, $\chi^2(617) = 1,126.683$, $p < 0.001$, CFI = 0.960, TLI = 0.955, RMSEA = 0.049, SRMR = 0.030. In examining the average amount of variance accounted for in the theoretical and method factors, the method factor accounted for more variance (i.e., 47.50%) compared to the trait factors (i.e., 21.90%). Notably, deceptive self-promotion and deceptive ingratiation items largely drive this effect, such that those items demonstrated factor loadings between 0.657 and 0.912 with the method factor. This may suggest that response bias was mainly present in the two deceptive scales, whereas the method factor had a minimal effect on the items in the honest and defensive scales.

Similar results emerge in assessing the 20-item scale, such that fit improves, $\chi^2(140) = 208.854$, $p < 0.001$, CFI = 0.987, TLI = 0.983, RMSEA = 0.038, SRMR = 0.024, when including a method factor compared to the 20-item five-factor model without a method factor. Likewise, in examining the average amount of variance accounted for in the theoretical and method factors, the method factor accounted for more variance (i.e., 41.70%) compared to the trait factors (i.e.,

28.00%). Further, the deceptive self-promotion and ingratiation items demonstrated factor loadings between 0.797 and 0.912 with the method factor. In sum, these results suggest that common method bias is present, and this could be due to the subscales that assess deceptive social media behaviors. Further, significant chi-square difference tests in both comparisons indicate that the model with the method factor should be retained. Taken together, as fit improved for both scales when including an unmeasured latent method factor and results demonstrated significant chi-square different tests, the method factor was retained for subsequent analyses.

In conclusion, through an iterative scale refinement process, two SMIM scales (i.e., a 38-item measure and a 20-item condensed version) were created that demonstrate excellent fit, contain items that share moderate to high factor loadings with their intended latent construct, represent unique within-scale behaviors, and are consistent with the theory in which the factors were derived. However, as common method bias was evident, the method factor was retained for further analyses. Tables contain information for both the 38- and 20-item scales. The final analysis step in Study One to provide further psychometric evidence for the two SMIM scales involved assessing convergent and discriminant validity.

Convergent and discriminant validity. For the sake of brevity, results are only reported in text for the 38-item SMIM scale, as the same pattern of results described below were demonstrated in examining the 20-item scale unless otherwise noted. Relevant information for the 20-item abbreviated scale can be found in Tables 2, 3, and 5. Prior to testing a structural equation model to examine the convergent validity of the 38-item SMIM scale, a CFA was conducted to examine the fit of the full measurement model. Specifically, the SMIM measure and all scales administered to assess convergent validity (i.e., integrity, honest-humility, the Dark

Triad, context non-specific impression management, self-deception) were modeled as latent factors. Notably, socially desirable responding (SDR) was also included, but it was not modeled as a latent factor, as it was scored based on true/false responses. All latent factor variances were set to 1.0 to allow all items to be freely estimated, and the SMIM factors and convergent validity-related latent factors were correlated. In addition, to control for method bias, an unmeasured method factor was included, and all scale items were loaded on this factor. The SMIM scale and convergent validity measures were not allowed to correlate with the method factor.

The full measurement model demonstrated poor fit $\chi^2(4,185) = 8,708.259, p < 0.001$, CFI = 0.833, TLI = 0.822, RMSEA = 0.056, SRMR = 0.057. To investigate sources of misfit in the full measurement model, CFAs were conducted on each convergent validity-related measure (except for SDR) to investigate how the items related to their respective latent factors. With the exception of the Dark Triad measures, all other convergent validity scales demonstrated poor fit, and several items shared weak relationships with their latent factors (i.e., small factor loadings). Thus, the overall poor fit for the measurement model may be due to poor fit identified in the scales used to assess convergent validity.

Further, in examining the effects of the method factor in the full measurement model (that contained measures used to assess convergent validity), notable results emerge. Collectively, the SMIM items explained an average of 31.90% of the variance, compared to an average of 36.70% variance explained by the method factor (Table 4). Thus, when including measures that were strongly related to the SMIM scale (e.g., the Dark Triad), the method factor accounted for less variance in the SMIM items. However, to be conservative, the method factor

was retained in examining convergent and discriminant validity, as failing to account for method bias could result in conflated relationships between study measures (Podsakoff et al., 2003).

Next, a SEM was tested to examine the convergent validity of the 38-item scale by examining the relationships they share with constructs in the nomological network. The significance and strength of path estimates in relation to study hypotheses, variance accounted in latent variables, and overall model fit were examined (Weston & Gore, 2006). All scales (except SDR) were modeled as latent factors, and the factor loading for the first item in each scale was set to 1.0 to allow factor variances to be examined. In addition, all items were loaded on a method factor. All latent factors were allowed to correlate (with the exception of the method factor), and each measure was regressed on the SDR scores. Convergent validity correlations can be found in Table 6.

H1 stated that SDR scores would be positively related to all five SMIM factors. As all five SMIM scales were unrelated to SDR, *H1* was unsupported. *H2* predicted that context non-specific impression management would be positively related to all five SMIM scales. Contrary to expectations, deceptive self-promotion and deceptive ingratiation were inversely related, and the remaining scales were unrelated to context non-specific impression management. Thus, *H2* was not supported. *H3* stated that self-deception would be positively related to honest self-promotion and honest ingratiation, and results supported this hypothesis.

Moreover, results supported *H4*, which predicted that honesty-humility would be inversely related to deceptive self-promotion and deceptive ingratiation. Likewise, *H5* stated that extraversion would be positively related to honest self-promotion and honest ingratiation, and results supported this hypothesis. In addition, results demonstrated support for *H6*, as integrity was inversely related to deceptive self-promotion and deceptive ingratiation. *H7* predicted that

all five SMIM scales would be positively related to Machiavellianism. Whereas deceptive self-promotion and deceptive ingratiation were positively related to Machiavellianism, the remaining scales were unrelated to this construct. Thus, only partial support was provided for *H7*. Related to *H8*, which stated that all five SMIM scales would be positively related to psychopathy, mixed findings emerged. Namely, deceptive self-promotion and defensive behaviors were unrelated, honest self-promotion and honest ingratiation were inversely related, and deceptive ingratiation was positively related to psychopathy. Interestingly, deceptive self-promotion was positively related to psychopathy in the 20-item SMIM scale. Thus, limited support was provided for *H8*. Finally, *H9* predicted that all five SMIM scales would be positively related to narcissism. With the exception of defensive behaviors, the remaining scales were positively related to narcissism, demonstrating partial support for *H9*.

To investigate discriminant validity, a comparison of the shared variance and AVE for each latent factor was examined (Farrell, 2010; Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The AVE represents the average amount of variance that a latent variable explains in its observed variables (Farrell, 2010), whereas shared variance represents the variance that a latent variable explains in another latent variable (i.e., the correlation between any two latent variables; Farrell, 2010; Fornell & Larcker, 1981). When the AVE of any latent factor is greater than the shared variance with another latent variable, this provides evidence of discriminant validity, as the latent variable accounts for more variance in the observed variables than that of another construct.

Related to the SMIM scale, in all but two cases, the square root of the AVE was greater than the correlation between two latent factors, providing evidence of discriminant validity (Table 6). More specifically, the correlation between honest self-promotion and honest ingratiation (i.e., 0.777) was greater than the AVE of honest self-promotion (i.e., 0.677).

Likewise, the correlation between deceptive self-promotion and deceptive ingratiation (i.e., 0.840) was greater than the AVE of deceptive self-promotion (i.e., 0.523) and deceptive ingratiation (i.e., 0.445). Thus, these results demonstrated that the shared variance explained between the two honest scales is greater than that of what is explained by honest self-promotion alone (similar results emerge with the two deceptive scales). Notably, this may suggest that the deceptive items should be modeled with one latent factor (not two), and the honest items should be modeled with one (rather than two) latent factors, as there is limited evidence of discriminant validity in these comparisons. However, a combination of these items represented by one latent factor would result in the three-factor model (i.e., a deceptive, honest, and defensive factor) that was thoroughly investigated during the CFA step in the analysis process. In all comparisons between the three- and hypothesized five-factor model, results indicated that the five-factor model best represented the data. Notably, all other comparisons between the AVE and between-factor correlations indicated that the SMIM factors are well discriminated (Table 6).

Finally, on an exploratory basis, the correlations between the SMIM scales and perceived cybervetting job-relevance, perceptions of privacy invasion, and time spent on the job market were examined. Across the 38- and 20-item SMIM scale, results demonstrated positive correlations with all five SMIM subscales and perceived cybervetting job relevance. Specifically, greater perceptions of cybervetting job relevance were associated with higher engagement in SMIM. In addition, with the exception of deceptive ingratiation ($r = -0.125, p = 0.020$), the SMIM scales in the 38-item measure were unrelated to time spent on the job market. In examining the 20-item SMIM scale and time spent on the job market, a similar pattern of results emerged with only one difference. Specifically, whereas only deceptive ingratiation was inversely related to time spent on the job market using the 38-item scale, both deceptive self-

promotion ($r = -0.120, p = 0.030$) and deceptive ingratiation ($r = -0.117, p = 0.030$) were inversely related to time spent on the job market. Finally, for both the 38- and 20-item SMIM scale, all five factors were positively related to perceptions of privacy invasion. Specifically, perceptions that cybervetting is a fair hiring practice (e.g., “I feel comfortable with personal information being collected through social media evaluations) were associated with greater engagement in SMIM.

Discussion

The purpose of Study One was to develop and validate a SMIM scale. Based on the results of several exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, two SMIM scales were created that demonstrated acceptable fit and outperformed several alternative models. However, results indicated that common method bias is present when using the SMIM scales, which may be due to the fact that the scale assesses deceptive behaviors. In addition, there was evidence of convergent validity such that the SMIM scales were related to expected constructs (i.e., self-deception, honesty-humility, extraversion, integrity), supporting *H3-H6*. Further, partial support was garnered for *H7-H9*, as some SMIM scales were related to Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and narcissism in the expected direction. However, the SMIM scales were unrelated (or related in an unexpected direction) to SDR and context non-specific impression management. Further, results demonstrated partial evidence of discriminant validity, such that the honest, deceptive, and defensive scales were distinct from each other. However, the two honest scales (i.e., honest self-promotion and honest ingratiation) and the two deceptive scales (i.e., deceptive self-promotion and deceptive ingratiation) shared greater between-factor variance compared to what the individual factors explained in its items. Nevertheless, Study One efforts resulted in a SMIM scale that measures and relates to the intended constructs.

However, the apparent method bias is worthy of further discussion. As previously highlighted, when examining the effects of an unmeasured latent method factor on the SMIM scale, results indicated that the method factor explained more variance in the items than the theoretical trait factors. Notably, this effect was particularly pronounced in the two subscales that assessed deceptive behaviors, whereas response bias was minimal in the honest and defensive scales. Although concerning, it is not surprising that bias was present in assessing undesirable behaviors. In fact, using self-report measures to assess deceptive behaviors has been cited as a limitation in psychological assessment (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007), although many scholars have suggested that assessing deception in this way is appropriate when other mechanisms to do so are lacking (Levashina & Campion, 2007; Roulin et al., 2018). Also noteworthy is that upon examining the effects of a method factor on the SMIM scale when also accounting for the scales used to assess convergent validity, the method factor had less of an effect on the SMIM items compared to the model that did not contain the scales that assessed convergent validity. Further, the method factor also accounted for a moderate amount of variance in the scales that assessed convergent validity, highlighting that method bias was no worse in the SMIM scale compared to established measures of related constructs. To be conservative in interpreting the reliability and validity of the SMIM scale, the method factor was retained in all examinations of convergent and discriminant validity.

Related to the examination of convergent validity, study results demonstrated interesting findings. As anticipated, many constructs such as integrity, honesty-humility, and the Dark Triad were related to the SMIM scale. However, some of the SMIM scales did not relate to relevant constructs in expected ways. First, the SMIM scales were unrelated to SDR. This is interesting, as constructs such as integrity, the Dark Triad, and context non-specific impression management

were related to SDR. Similarly, the honest and defensive scales were unrelated to context non-specific impression management. These findings may suggest a context specificity effect, such that there could be behavioral inconsistencies across online and offline settings (Dalal et al., 2015; Suler, 2004). Thus, a user's general tendency to desire approval from others may not influence engagement in these behaviors online. Interestingly, deceptive self-promotion and deceptive ingratiation were inversely related to context non-specific impression management, which provides additional support that there could be behavioral inconsistencies across environments. For example, online environments may offer users a perception of greater freedom to present a certain image compared to offline social settings, given that content can be easily edited or removed from social media profiles (Wilson et al., 2012). Thus, future research should examine the relationship between SMIM and general impression management strategies used in offline contexts (e.g., employment interviews) to investigate how these strategies are related in high-stakes scenarios.

In addition, it was expected that all SMIM scales would be positively related to Machiavellianism, whereas only the two deceptive scales were related to this construct. Relatedly, psychopathy was positively related to deceptive self-promotion (only in the 20-item scale) and deceptive ingratiation, yet inversely related to the honest scales and unrelated to defensive behaviors. These findings highlight the importance of distinguishing honest versus deceptive impression management (Levashina et al., 2014), as distinct patterns of relationships emerged in examining relationships with the honest versus deceptive scales and related constructs. Namely, the honest scales were more strongly related to desirable traits such as integrity and extraversion, whereas the deceptive scales were more strongly related to undesirable traits such as Machiavellianism, psychopathy, low integrity, and dishonesty. These

findings indicate that honest versus deceptive SMIM may have different antecedents, which is consistent with previous research that has investigated these differences in offline contexts (Bourdage et al., 2018). In addition, these findings illustrate that individuals with higher levels of unfavorable attributes (or low levels of unfavorable attributes) are largely relying on deceptive (rather than honest) techniques to maintain a positive image on social media.

These findings have important implications, as traditional “screen out” personality assessments (e.g., the Dark Triad) may be particularly useful in informing hiring organizations about the extent to which job applicants present themselves authentically on social media. In other words, examining scores on “screen out” assessments may shed light on whether deceptive behaviors are likely present on applicant social media profiles. Future research should investigate additional antecedents of SMIM engagement. For example, it would be interesting to examine how constructs such as self-esteem and self-efficacy relate to SMIM. It is possible negative self-perceptions (e.g., low self-esteem) influence item endorsement, particularly for the deceptive scales (e.g., “Post content that makes me look better than I truly am”, “Give myself more credit than I deserve”). However, as the deceptive scales were strongly correlated with narcissism and inversely related to integrity, it is unlikely that lack of esteem or confidence largely influenced this response pattern. Nevertheless, there are many constructs worth investigating that may relate to SMIM.

Relatedly, as previously mentioned, conceptualizing impression management has been widely debated within the field of psychology. Although this study examined many constructs that are often conflated with impression management to establish convergent validity (e.g., self-deception, SDR), a comprehensive examination of all relevant constructs was beyond the scope of this paper. For example, recent meta-analytic data have demonstrated a positive association

between self-enhancement (i.e., a proclivity to maintain an unrealistic self-perception; Dufner et al., 2019) and constructs such as narcissism and SDR, which may suggest that self-enhancement shares conceptual overlap with SMIM. Thus, future research should investigate the relationship between SMIM and other relevant constructs (e.g., self-enhancement) to provide a more holistic assessment of the nomological network.

Notably, whereas the honest and deceptive scales were related to a majority of the constructs investigated for convergent validity, the defensive scale was only related to integrity and honesty-humility. This may suggest that defensive social media behaviors are influenced by other underlying differences unique from predictors of honest and deceptive SMIM. For instance, as the defensive scale largely captures attempts to protect one's image, it is possible that individuals who are insecure or self-conscious may be more likely to engage in defensive behaviors. However, all five SMIM scales were positively related to each other. This highlights that individuals who engage in honest and deceptive impression management also engage in image protection behaviors, but there are likely other influences specific to the use of defensive SMIM. Thus, future research should assess other constructs that are related to engagement in defensive SMIM.

Finally, exploratory analyses examined factors that may influence engagement in SMIM. Namely, results indicated that perceptions of privacy invasion and cybervetting job relevance were associated with higher engagement in SMIM. These results suggest that when cybervetting is viewed as a fair and useful hiring tool (i.e., higher scores on cybervetting job relevance and privacy invasion), job seekers increase SMIM behaviors. Thus, SMIM may be thought of as a skillset that increases the chance of job attainment. Interestingly, the deceptive scales were inversely related to time spent on the job market, which may indicate that deceptive behaviors

are used in the earlier stages of job seeking in an attempt to reduce the time spent searching for new employment. Alternately, perhaps these findings highlight that job seekers who report minimal SMIM engagement are on the market longer, and therefore have had less success in finding a job. However, as the sample used in this study exclusively involved job seekers, these findings may not generalize to all social media users, especially among those who are not actively seeking new employment. Nevertheless, future research should examine whether SMIM is a stable over time or if engagement fluctuates based on employment status. Taken together, Study One efforts produced two SMIM scales that are reliable and related to relevant constructs, yet prone to method bias in assessing deceptive behaviors. The purpose of Study Two was to cross-validate the SMIM scales, as well as investigate cross-platform differences in SMIM engagement.

Study Two

The second goal of this study was to examine SMIM prevalence rates, as well as whether SMIM tactics vary across social media platforms. Investigating behavioral differences across two different social media sites may provide insight into whether personal or professional platforms are more appropriate for cybervetting-based assessments in terms of self-presentation authenticity. Specifically, this study compared differences in impression management tactics across the two platforms most commonly used in employment-related cybervetting assessments – i.e., LinkedIn and Facebook (SHRM, 2016). In addition, the measure will be cross-validated using a new sample of job seekers to provide further psychometric support for the assessment tool. A review of expected behavioral differences across personal and professional social media outlets are described in the following sections.

Impression Management Differences Across Facebook and LinkedIn

Scholars often classify social media platforms as personal or professionally oriented (Roulin & Levashina, 2016; van Dijck, 2013), with Facebook viewed as a platform intended for personal purposes and LinkedIn as a site for professional purposes. For instance, Facebook is typically used for development and maintenance of personal relationships (Muscanell & Guadagno, 2012), whereas LinkedIn is generally used to network professionally and seek employment (Shields & Levashina, 2016). Of course, there are several other social media platforms of similar popularity as Facebook and LinkedIn (e.g., Twitter, Instagram), but Facebook and LinkedIn in particular have often been the focus of cybervetting research (e.g., Hoek et al., 2016; Roulin & Bangerter, 2013), which may be due to organizational reliance of these platforms for employment decisions (Hartwell & Campion, 2020; SHRM, 2016).

Likewise, Facebook and LinkedIn are argued to represent the two extremes on a continuum of social media platforms (Roulin & Levashina, 2016), which makes these platforms ideal for behavioral comparisons. Notably, previous research has indicated that cybervetters utilize Facebook and LinkedIn differently when evaluating applicants. For example, one study demonstrated that recruiters perceive LinkedIn as a viable source for assessing person-job fit, whereas Facebook is perceived to be more suitable to assess person-organization fit (Roulin & Bangerter, 2013). As Facebook and LinkedIn are often used for different purposes by social media users and employers, it is likely that SMIM behaviors differ across platforms. A discussion of expected behavioral differences in self-promotion, ingratiation, and defensive impression management behaviors across Facebook and LinkedIn are described below.

Self-promotion. As Facebook and LinkedIn differ in their intended purposes, it is likely that this affects self-promotion strategies (Roulin & Levashina, 2016). For example, it has been argued that Facebook is used for self-presentation needs related to one's friends, whereas

LinkedIn is specific to a professional audience (Roulin & Levashina, 2016; van Dijck, 2013). Notably, van Dijck (2013) highlights that LinkedIn's interface is designed to facilitate self-promotion more than Facebook, as there are features that encourage posting information about one's professional strengths. For example, LinkedIn users often provide professional references or endorsements, share information about one's accomplishments, and list information related to previous work experience and education (Shields & Levashina, 2016). In fact, LinkedIn is often equated to an online version of a résumé (Guillory & Hancock, 2012). However, Facebook also includes similar features that allow users to share work- or education-related information (Shields & Levashina, 2016), and offers the freedom to post content which could include self-promotion behaviors (e.g., writing a status update related to a recent job promotion). As there are likely greater rewards for engaging in impression management on LinkedIn (e.g., gaining recognition from a potential employer, which could result in a job), it is likely that both honest and deceptive strategies are used to increase the chances that such outcomes are attained. Thus, as LinkedIn is designed specifically for job-related purposes, and as impression management may result in more tangible outcomes than on Facebook, it is expected that honest and deceptive self-promotion will be more common on LinkedIn compared to Facebook.

Hypothesis 10 (H10): Honest and deceptive self-promotion strategies will be used more on LinkedIn compared to Facebook.

Other-focused ingratiation. Similarly, ingratiation tactics are likely to differ across Facebook and LinkedIn. However, social media is not target-specific, indicating that ingratiation can be directed toward various parties, and both Facebook and LinkedIn are designed to facilitate ingratiation-related behaviors. For example, ingratiation likely involves liking or sharing content posted by others and communicating (e.g., commenting on posts) with others to establish shared

interests (Roulin & Levashina, 2016). Although LinkedIn users are encouraged to provide recommendations and endorse others' skillsets using features built into the platform (LinkedIn, n.d.), Facebook users can engage in similar behaviors with their friends (e.g., congratulating others on accomplishments via comments or status updates), which can include multiple parties (e.g., colleagues, friends, family). Notably, ingratiation-related behaviors may be viewed as an expectation on both platforms given the social norms. For example, LinkedIn users may expect others to reciprocate behaviors, such as endorsing skills. Likewise, as Facebook was designed to facilitate interpersonal relationships (Muscanell & Guadagno, 2012), communicating with others may be considered an expectation on Facebook, which could also present opportunities for ingratiation. In sum, because both Facebook and LinkedIn are designed to facilitate ingratiation, it unclear as to whether these behaviors occur more on one platform versus the other. Thus, ingratiation behaviors across platforms will be examined on an exploratory basis.

Research Question 1 (RQ1): How does ingratiation use differ across Facebook and LinkedIn?

Defensive tactics. In considering how defensive behaviors are likely to differ across Facebook and LinkedIn, it is worth discussing reasons why social media users may be required to protect their image. Defensive tactics are likely to include behaviors such as deleting content or untagging oneself from content that may reflect poorly on their image, and such strategies are able to be executed on Facebook or LinkedIn. However, the social norms related to the type of content posted on each platform may result in greater defensive behaviors on Facebook compared to LinkedIn. First, as LinkedIn is often considered an online résumé (Guillory & Hancock, 2012) designed to facilitate professional networking (Shields & Levashina, 2016), it is unlikely that there are many opportunities for content to be posted or shared that may reflect

poorly on social media users. Further, it could be argued that social media users on LinkedIn desire to be seen by employers and colleagues, which may further highlight that content worth concealing or use of restrictive privacy settings is less likely. Second, as some scholars have suggested that LinkedIn is designed for self-promotion (van Dijck, 2013), it is not likely that users share content that could result in negative perceptions. Third, it could be argued that there is a sense of obligation to reciprocate behaviors, such as offering recommendations or endorsements on LinkedIn, which may suggest that other social media users are unlikely to post content that could reflect negatively on others.

In contrast, as the social norms on Facebook are more relaxed and primarily intended to maintain social relationships, there may be a greater likelihood that social media activity is less guarded and less professional, thus increasing the opportunity for content that may result in negative perceptions to appear. For example, several studies have indicated that Facebook profiles in particular often contain social media faux pas or content that would be perceived negatively by employers (Karl et al., 2010; Peluchette & Karl, 2007), and there have been a number of publicized job terminations for posting inappropriate Facebook content (e.g., Love, 2014). Thus, it is possible that because negative social media content may be more likely to appear on Facebook, this may suggest that users are required to engage in defensive impression management strategies more on Facebook compared to LinkedIn. Further, many social media users may perceive Facebook to be inappropriate for work-related screening, as it is not intended for a professional audience, which may suggest greater use of privacy settings to restrict certain parties (e.g., employers) from viewing Facebook content. Taken together, it is hypothesized that defensive impression management behaviors are more likely used on Facebook compared to LinkedIn.

Hypothesis 11 (H11): Defensive strategies will be used more on Facebook compared to LinkedIn.

Method

Participants. Data were collected from an initial 212 participants from Prolific, an online crowdsourced platform. Participants were required to be at least 18 years of age or older, reside in the United States, have been seeking new or additional employment within the past year, and have both a Facebook and LinkedIn account. Eligible participants were paid \$2.00 upon completion of the survey. In addition, three attention checks were incorporated in the survey for quality control purposes, and all participants passed at least two of the three checks and provided coherent responses for the open-ended questions. Upon examining the data, 10 participants indicated that they only had one of the two required social media accounts (i.e., Facebook and LinkedIn). Thus, data from these participants were not included in study analyses. The final sample included 202 participants (49.0% male, 71.3% White/Caucasian, 61.9% between 18-34 years old, 44.1% obtained a Bachelor's degree, 11.74 average years of work experience, 6.68 average months spent seeking new/additional employment). Participants were seeking employment in various industries, such as business management and administration (20.3%), information technology (18.8%), science, technology engineering, and mathematics (18.8%), and education and training (15.8%).

Procedure. Participants completed study measures through an online survey constructed via QuestionPro. Specifically, participants completed the SMIM scale twice (i.e., once regarding their activity on Facebook, and again regarding activity on LinkedIn), and the order of scale presentation was counterbalanced. Only the survey stem changed to specify which social media platform to consider (i.e., Please rate the extent to which you engage in each of the following

behaviors on your [Facebook/LinkedIn]). After completing the SMIM scale, participants responded to a demographic questionnaire.

Measures. Participants completed the SMIM scale developed in Study One and provided demographic data. Participants reported the extent to which they use each behavior on their Facebook and LinkedIn on a scale of 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*to a very large extent*). The demographic survey contained the same items administered in Study One. Further, participants were asked to report several social media related behaviors or information, including how often they log into their profiles, how often they post and share content, and the number of friends/connections on their networks (see Appendix Q). Finally, as an additional attention check, participants were asked to describe why they were seeking new/additional employment using an open-ended text response.

Results

Prior to testing study hypotheses, a series of CFAs were conducted to assess the measurement model for the SMIM scales. As participants completed the SMIM scale twice regarding their Facebook and LinkedIn use, separate models were tested specific to each platform. For each CFA, all factors were modeled as latent variables, latent factor variances were fixed to 1.0 to allow for estimations of all item factor loadings, and all factors were allowed to correlate. Notably, the original measurement models were examined and compared to models that contained an unmeasured latent method factor. Although the original models demonstrated favorable psychometric properties (see Table 7 and 8), significant chi-square tests indicated that the method factor should be retained in all model comparisons. Thus, for the sake of parsimony, only results pertaining to the models that contained a method factor are reported below.

SMIM scale cross-validation. Related to the 38-item Facebook SMIM scale that contained a method factor, results demonstrated decent fit, $\chi^2(617) = 1437.400, p < 0.001$, CFI = 0.902, TLI = 0.889, RMSEA = 0.081, SRMR = 0.044. The average amount of variance accounted for by the trait factors (i.e., 37.67%) was greater than the average amount of variance accounted for by the method factor (i.e., 35.06%). In examining the abbreviated 20-item Facebook SMIM scale that included a method factor, results demonstrated acceptable fit, $\chi^2(140) = 309.280, p < 0.001$, CFI = 0.952, TLI = 0.935, RMSEA = 0.077, SRMR = 0.035. However, in examining the average amount of variance accounted for in the trait and method factors, the method factor accounted for more variance (i.e., 43.18%) compared to the trait factors (i.e., 29.50%).

A similar pattern of results emerged in examining the LinkedIn SMIM scale, such that the 38-item model that contained a method factor demonstrated poor fit, $\chi^2(617) = 9,106.330, p < 0.001$, CFI = 0.870, TLI = 0.851, RMSEA = 0.094, SRMR = 0.050. Likewise, in examining the average amount of variance accounted for in the trait and method factors, the method factor accounted for more variance (i.e., 49.84%) compared to the trait factors (i.e., 21.06%). In examining the 20-item LinkedIn SMIM scale with a method factor, results demonstrated acceptable fit, $\chi^2(140) = 310.979, p < 0.001$, CFI = 0.952, TLI = 0.935, RMSEA = 0.078, SRMR = 0.041. The average amount of variance accounted for by the trait factors (i.e., 30.61%) was less than the amount of variance accounted for by the method factor (i.e., 43.96%). Further, one item (i.e., hig6) demonstrated a negative a residual variance with its latent construct. Although this is concerning from a psychometric standpoint, the item was not problematic in other models that did not contain a method factor (see Table 7 and 8). These results may suggest that the honest ingratiation items do not capture this construct on LinkedIn as well as they do on Facebook.

However, because the SMIM scale is intended to generalize across social media platforms, this item was retained for subsequent analyses. Nevertheless, results related to the honest ingratiation factor on LinkedIn should be interpreted with caution.

As the 38-item Facebook and LinkedIn scales demonstrated poor fit, sources of misfit were further investigated by examining the theoretical and empirical contribution of the items. Upon examining item content and within-factor interitem correlations, results demonstrated several clusters of strongly related items, particularly within the two subscales that contained the most items (i.e., deceptive self-promotion and deceptive ingratiation contained eight and 15 items, respectively). For instance, dsp10 was theoretically comparable to dsp28 and dsp29, and the average interitem correlation was 0.751 on Facebook and 0.719 on LinkedIn. Likewise, dig42, dig13, and dig41 were conceptually similar and shared an average interitem correlation of 0.822 and 0.804 on Facebook and LinkedIn, respectively. Thus, poor fit in the 38-item scales may be attributed to the presence of multiple clusters of highly related within-factor items. Notably, however, this is not to suggest that the abbreviated 20-item scales were deficient in terms of theoretical and empirical contribution. Rather, these findings highlight that the 20-item scale produced better fit, as it captured unique within-factor behaviors that are strongly related. Further, these results indicate that the condensed 20-item scales may be more appropriate than the 38-item scales.

In summary, measurement models were assessed with CFAs for the Facebook and LinkedIn scales in efforts to cross-validate the SMIM measure created in Study One. The two 38-item scales demonstrated poor fit, which was likely due to highly redundant (theoretically and empirically) within-factor items. The 20-item scales demonstrated favorable psychometric properties across Facebook and LinkedIn, although the honest ingratiation factor within the

LinkedIn scale should be interpreted with caution. Further, like in Study One, method bias was present in the data. Taken together, results from Study Two indicated that the 20-item scale is more appropriate for platform-specific examinations. Thus, subsequent analyses are reported only for the 20-item measure.

Cross-platform comparisons. Prior to comparing differences in SMIM across platforms, it was necessary to establish measurement invariance to ensure that the scales demonstrate equivalence across the Facebook and LinkedIn measures (Steinmetz et al., 2009; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). Measurement invariance is established when respondents interpret the underlying latent factors and items similarly across scales (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). In cases in which measurement invariance is not established, it is inappropriate to draw conclusions when measures are compared (Mackinnon et al., 2020). Following the recommendations by Vandenberg and Lance (2000), measurement invariance was assessed in the 20-item Facebook and LinkedIn scales by comparing a series of increasingly constrained CFAs that additively fixed inter-scale properties (e.g., factor loadings) to be equal. Models were compared with chi-square difference tests to determine whether applying equality constraints to scale properties across both measures affected model fit, and non-significant results were desired to provide evidence of measurement invariance (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). In assessing measurement invariance, the method factor was not included in the models to minimize the number of estimated parameters.

First, a configural model was tested that included the Facebook and LinkedIn items in a CFA, and the same pattern of parameters were modeled for both scales. Results demonstrated acceptable fit, $\chi^2(675) = 1,227.723, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.919, TLI = 0.906, RMSEA = 0.068, SRMR = 0.058$, which established configural invariance, highlighting that the Facebook and LinkedIn scales shared the same model structure. Next, metric invariance was assessed by

further restricting the configural model. Specifically, factor loadings were fixed to be equal for the same items across the Facebook and LinkedIn scales (e.g., the factor loading for hsp10 in the Facebook and LinkedIn measure was equivalent). Results demonstrated acceptable fit, $\chi^2(695) = 1,253.474, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.918, TLI = 0.908, RMSEA = 0.068, SRMR = 0.068,$ demonstrating that the extent to which the indicators represent the latent variables do not differ across the scales (Mackinnon et al., 2020). A non-significant chi-square test comparing the configural and metric model indicated that the measures function similarly across social media platforms.

Next, scalar invariance was assessed by fixing item intercepts to be equal across the Facebook and LinkedIn scales, in addition to the previous constraints included in the metric model. Although results demonstrated acceptable fit, $\chi^2(715) = 1,401.935, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.900, TLI = 0.891, RMSEA = 0.074, SRMR = 0.079,$ a chi-square difference test indicated that this model was significantly different from the metric model. Taken together, metric invariance was established which indicated that the SMIM scales function similarly across Facebook and LinkedIn. However, as indicated by the significant chi-square test between the metric and scalar models, individual interpretations of scale items may differ across Facebook and LinkedIn. Nevertheless, establishing metric invariance is considered sufficient (Mackinnon et al., 2020), which allows for a comparison of SMIM behaviors across platforms.

In examining SMIM prevalence rates (i.e., the percentage of respondents that endorsed an item as “2” [i.e., to a small extent] or higher; Table 9), results indicated that on average, a majority of participants engaged in SMIM to some extent (i.e., average of 54.56% across all items on Facebook, 53.83% across all items on LinkedIn). To test study hypotheses, a series of paired-samples *t*-tests (using the 20-item scales) were conducted that compared differences in

SMIM engagement across Facebook and LinkedIn. *H10* predicted that honest and deceptive self-promotion strategies would be used more on LinkedIn compared to Facebook, and results supported this hypothesis. Specifically, participants engaged in honest ($t[201] = 6.740, p < 0.001; d = 0.47, CI [0.328, 0.619]$) and deceptive ($t[201] = 4.099, p < 0.001; d = 0.29, CI [0.147, 0.429]$) self-promotion significantly more on LinkedIn (honest: $M = 3.912, SD = 1.781$; deceptive: $M = 2.472, SD = 1.637$) compared to Facebook (honest: $M = 3.276, SD = 1.732$; deceptive: $M = 2.154, SD = 1.416$). *H11* expected that defensive behaviors would occur more on Facebook compared to LinkedIn, and results supported this hypothesis, $t(201) = -4.903, p < 0.001 (d = 0.35, CI [0.203, 0.487])$. Specifically, participants engaged in defensive behaviors significantly more on Facebook ($M = 3.800, SD = 1.946$) than LinkedIn ($M = 3.293, SD = 2.016$). *RQ1* focused on examining the differences in honest and deceptive ingratiation across Facebook and LinkedIn. Results indicated that participants engaged in honest ingratiation significantly more on Facebook ($t[201] = -4.429, p < 0.001; d = 0.31, CI [0.170, 0.452], M = 3.430, SD = 1.560$) compared to LinkedIn ($M = 3.025, SD = 1.675$), whereas there were no significant differences regarding engagement in deceptive ingratiation platforms.

On an exploratory basis, within platform differences were examined with paired-samples *t*-tests. Related to Facebook, both honest self-promotion and honest ingratiation occurred significantly more often than deceptive self-promotion and deceptive ingratiation. There were no differences between engagement in honest self-promotion and honest ingratiation. In addition, deceptive self-promotion occurred significantly more often than deceptive ingratiation, and defensive behaviors occurred significantly more often than all other forms of SMIM. Related to LinkedIn, significant differences emerged in all comparisons, such that honest self-promotion

occurred most frequently, followed by defensive behaviors, honest ingratiation, deceptive self-promotion, and deceptive ingratiation.

Discussion

The purpose of Study Two was to cross-validate the SMIM scale on an additional sample of job seekers, as well as to compare engagement in SMIM across Facebook and LinkedIn. Results demonstrated favorable psychometric properties of the 20-item Facebook and LinkedIn scales, and tests of measurement invariance provided evidence that the scales function similarly across platforms. However, like in Study One, method bias was present across both scales and accounted for more variance on average compared to the SMIM items. In addition, an examination of SMIM prevalence rates highlighted that a majority of job seekers engaged in impression management across Facebook and LinkedIn, with honest and defensive behaviors occurring more frequently than deceptive behaviors. Further, comparisons of SMIM engagement across Facebook and LinkedIn indicated that job seekers use different strategies to manage others' impressions across platforms, providing support for *H10* and *H11*. These findings have important implications for organizations that choose to evaluate job candidate social media profiles, which are described below.

First, it is worth highlighting that the honest ingratiation scale regarding LinkedIn behaviors did not demonstrate as favorable psychometric properties as the scale that was specific to Facebook use. Perhaps these findings imply that the honest ingratiation items are too general in describing LinkedIn behaviors, and there could be more complex strategies used to ingratiate on this platform that were not captured by scale items. However, it is worth noting that in Study One, 96.90% of the sample had a Facebook and 65.90% had a LinkedIn profile, whereas all Study Two participants used both platforms. This may explain why the SMIM measure

demonstrated stronger scale features when assessing Facebook behaviors compared to LinkedIn, as the scale was largely derived from the responses of Facebook users in Study One.

Nevertheless, future research may consider investigating additional strategies by which LinkedIn users attempt to gain favor of others.

Related to prevalence rates and comparisons of SMIM across platforms, a few key implications can be drawn from these findings. As expected, honest impression management strategies occur frequently across both platforms. This is not surprising, as social media has been regarded as an environment intended to facilitate self-promotion and relationship development (van Dijck, 2013). Likewise, defensive image protection behaviors also are common across platforms, although used more frequently on Facebook. This finding is likely attributed to more relaxed norms regarding what is appropriate on Facebook compared to LinkedIn, such that it is likely that more content that may require “defending” appears on Facebook. Notably, at face value, honest and defensive forms of impression management are not necessarily unfavorable. However, some scholars have suggested that these are “baseline” behaviors for deceptive forms of impression management (Bourdage et al., 2018, p. 613). This is further evidenced by the fact that honest and defensive SMIM was positively related to deceptive SMIM behaviors. Thus, although it may be encouraging that job seekers largely rely on honest and defensive strategies to manage their image on social media, these could be indicators of deceptive behavior in other contexts or in the future.

Deceptive behaviors occurred on both platforms (although to a lesser extent compared to other forms of SMIM), and both promising and problematic implications can be drawn from these results. First, a majority of job seekers do not report engaging in deceptive self-promotion and ingratiation behaviors (i.e., an average of 43.21% and 45.43% on Facebook and LinkedIn,

respectively). However, this should be interpreted guardedly, as method bias was evident in these scales, which may indicate that respondents were not truthful in reporting these behaviors.

Nevertheless, in comparison to the prevalence rates that have been reported related to deceptive impression management strategies used in employment interviews (i.e., an average of 49.00% - 90.00% across job applicants; Bourdage et al., 2018; Levashina & Campion, 2007), these findings may suggest that job seekers present a more authentic image online versus offline. This could indicate that social media evaluations have the potential to add value to selection systems when employers are concerned about the veracity of information provided by applicants.

Unfortunately, however, results also indicated that deceptive self-promotion was used more frequently on LinkedIn compared to Facebook. This is especially concerning, as recruiters perceive LinkedIn as more appropriate in assessing job applicant educational background, technical knowledge and skills, work experience, and overall professionalism compared to Facebook (Hartwell & Campion, 2020). Further, recent empirical research has demonstrated that LinkedIn-derived cybervetter perceptions are positively related to hiring recommendations (Roulin & Levashina, 2018). Thus, when using LinkedIn (as well as Facebook), hiring decisions could be based on inaccurate or exaggerated information.

The observed behavioral differences across platforms also raise an interesting question as to whether different conclusions are drawn about applicants across Facebook and LinkedIn. Notably, previous research has demonstrated mixed findings related to the validity of cybervetting, such that Facebook-based evaluations often lack predictive validity and are prone to adverse impact (Van Iddekinge et al., 2016), whereas LinkedIn-based evaluations are associated with job-relevant outcomes and have minimal adverse impact (Roulin & Levashina, 2018). Perhaps this indicates that job seekers are more effective (or more motivated) in

presenting a desired image on LinkedIn, which may explain why greater utility is demonstrated in LinkedIn-based cybervetting. Nevertheless, organizations who perceive LinkedIn as an appropriate platform to evaluate job candidates should be aware that deceptive behaviors are prevalent to some extent. Taken together, it is important that organizations carefully weigh the costs and benefits of cybervetting to inform hiring decisions, as social media content may not best represent job seeker qualifications and attributes.

General Discussion

Across two studies, this paper explored the extent to which job seekers engaged in SMIM, the process by which individuals attempt to foster a positive impression of themselves on social media. Derived from Roulin and Levashina's (2016) framework of SMIM, a reliable and valid scale was created that can be used to assess these behaviors across Facebook and LinkedIn. Further, this study highlighted that SMIM is a common practice among job seekers, and different strategies are used to convey a positive impression across Facebook and LinkedIn. This study offers valuable insights regarding the authenticity of self-presentations on social media, which has important implications for organizations who cybervet job applicants. A summary of the key findings and implications from this study, as well as promising future research directions and limitations are detailed below.

First, as illustrated across both samples, engagement in SMIM is typical among job seekers. One promising finding was that engagement in deceptive behaviors was less frequent compared to honest and defensive behaviors. However, this does not dismiss the fact that job seekers use deceitful tactics to some extent to self-promote themselves and interact with others on social media. As expected, individuals who engage in deceptive SMIM are more likely to score high on measures that assess undesirable personality traits and score low on measures of

favorable attributes. However, it is important to highlight that not all forms SMIM are necessarily “bad”, as honest and defensive behaviors were related to desirable traits (e.g., integrity). These findings may encourage organizations who choose to cybervet to conduct these evaluations in later stages of the selection system after traditional “screen out” assessments are administered. In doing so, applicants who are more prone to deceive others on social media are unlikely to advance to additional stages of the hiring process, as they would likely be identified by traditional integrity or personality tests. Future research should investigate whether cybervetting assessments predict relevant outcomes when included in a multiple hurdle selection system.

Further, although deceptive behaviors occur infrequently on social media, it is unknown whether cybervetters are able to identify who is inauthentic. Although not specific to hiring-related cybervetting contexts, previous research has demonstrated that humans are poor lie detectors in online and offline settings (e.g., Kumar et al., 2016; Ott et al., 2011; Vrij, 2000). Notably, research has demonstrated that computer-based techniques to detect misinformation online are more effective than humans (e.g., Kumar et al., 2016). For example, techniques such as natural language processing are able to incorporate objective data available online (e.g., text features, negatively valenced words) to detect false information (Demestichas et al., 2020; Sharma et al., 2018; Tsikerdekis & Zeadally, 2020). Thus, future research could identify social media cues that are related to engagement in SMIM, which could be incorporated in machine learning algorithms to identify job applicants who misrepresent themselves on social media. For example, exploratory analyses revealed that number of friends was positively related to engagement in SMIM on Facebook, whereas network size was only related to deceptive ingratiation on LinkedIn. There are likely additional cues that could be objective indicators of

SMIM (e.g., negatively valenced words), and it will be necessary for subsequent research to be mindful that there are likely different cues across various platforms. Although there are numerous research opportunities related to automating cybervetting procedures, from a practical standpoint, organizations should be cautious of data mining job applicant social media profiles until the legal boundaries related to this practice are more defined (Black et al., 2015; Lam, 2015).

In addition, although the SMIM scale is not intended for selection purposes, the scale could be used to advance cybervetting research. In recent years there has been an emphasis on examining the convergence between social media user attributes and cybervetter-based perceptions of the same constructs (e.g., Gosling et al., 2011; Kluemper et al., 2012; Schroeder et al., 2020). It has been argued that in conducting social media evaluations, cybervetters must identify and utilize trait-relevant behavioral cues (i.e., social media content) in order to form accurate impressions of applicant attributes (Whitaker & Schroeder, 2021). Related to the present paper, it is possible that SMIM influences the availability of trait-relevant cues. For example, job seekers who are more likely to engage in image protection behaviors may limit the presence of attribute-relevant cues on their profiles. This may explain why many studies have demonstrated that cybervetters are not that effective in assessing traits via social media evaluations (e.g., Schroeder et al., 2020). Further, this may be an additional explanation for why Facebook-based evaluations are less valid compared to LinkedIn-based assessments (e.g., Roulin & Levashina, 2018; Van Iddekinge et al., 2016), as job seekers engage in self-promotion less frequently on Facebook, thereby reducing the availability of relevant cues.

Relatedly, as job seeker use of SMIM may affect recruiter perceptions differently across platforms, future research should determine whether SMIM has beneficial or detrimental effects

on recruiter perceptions. For example, a recent study demonstrated that candidate use of flattery tactics in an asynchronous evaluation setting (i.e., via LinkedIn messages) had a detrimental effect on recruiter perceptions (Gu & Watts, 2021). This is notable, as use of impression management tactics in traditional hiring contexts (e.g., face-to-face interviews) have generally been associated with positive outcomes (e.g., Higgins et al., 2004). Thus, SMIM may not influence hiring-related decisions in the same way as interview-based impression management. Taken together, there are ample future research directions that can investigate the effect of SMIM on recruiter perceptions and subsequent hiring decisions.

Limitations

Whereas this study offers valuable insights regarding job seeker SMIM that can be used to forward cybervetting research, this study is not without limitations. First, it is important to reiterate that although the SMIM scale yielded excellent psychometric properties, was related to theoretically similar constructs, and demonstrated measurement equivalence that allowed for behavioral comparisons across platforms, common method bias was present in both samples. Although common method bias can have a detrimental effect on empirical results (Podsakoff et al., 2003), both procedural and statistical techniques were implemented in the study design and analyses to mitigate such adverse effects. For example, prior to completing the SMIM scale, respondents were reminded of their anonymity, scale items were counterbalanced within and between scale factors, attention checks were incorporated into the survey, and conservative estimates of study results were reported in examining the relationship between the SMIM scale and other constructs (i.e., by reporting the estimates produced when controlling for method effects). Nevertheless, when administering the SMIM scale in subsequent research, appropriate steps should be taken to investigate and control for bias. Relatedly, as results demonstrated that

the deceptive scales were largely driving the method effects, it is important to note that using self-report measures to assess deception is not ideal (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007), and future research should validate the deceptive SMIM scales. For example, social media friends/connections could report the degree to which profile owners engage in SMIM behaviors, and the relationship between other- and self-reported SMIM could be examined.

In addition, there may be concerns regarding the use of convenience sampling for data collection (i.e., MTurk and Prolific), although several recommended practices were implemented to ensure high-quality data were gathered (e.g., open-ended attention checks, incorporation of sample qualifiers and mechanisms to cross-check responses; Aguinis et al., 2021). Many scholars have advocated for greater acceptance of this sampling technique in organizational sciences when the variables of interest can be appropriately assessed in online samples (Landers & Behrend, 2015). As job seekers who use social media were the focal group of interest in the present study, it is unlikely that SMIM engagement manifests differently in this sample compared to the general population. It is possible that using an online sample was more appropriate than a traditional sample, as individuals who work via online platforms may use social media more frequently (or be more tech-savvy) than those with standard work arrangements. Notably, exploratory analyses demonstrated potential generational differences in SMIM engagement. For example, age was inversely related to all forms of SMIM on LinkedIn, highlighting that these behaviors are more prevalent among younger job seekers. This is not surprising, as young job seekers (e.g., “Generation Z” born between 1997-2012; Dimock, 2019) were raised in an era when social media gained significant popularity. Thus, younger job seekers may acquire advanced skills that allow them to effectively construct a desired image on social media. Nevertheless, future research should examine SMIM in different samples, as well as over

time, as new strategies to manage impressions may emerge with new generations of social media users. Relatedly, exploratory analyses also demonstrated gender differences in SMIM engagement, such that male job seekers reported use of deceptive self-promotion and deceptive ingratiation more on LinkedIn compared to their female counterparts. This is interesting, as previous research has demonstrated male applicants are viewed *less* favorably than females in cybervetting evaluations (e.g., Van Iddekinge et al., 2016), which may imply that cybervetters are penalizing male applicants for deceptive SMIM behaviors. Thus, future research should continue to consider gender differences in cybervetting-related research.

Conclusion

Across two studies, this paper provided psychometric evidence for the newly developed SMIM scale across two samples of job seekers, as well as identified several dispositional traits that describe individuals who are prone to engaging in SMIM. In addition, an examination of prevalence rates and behavioral comparisons across Facebook and LinkedIn indicated that SMIM is common among job seekers, which may raise concern regarding the utility of social media as an applicant evaluation technique. Although leveraging social media to improve selection systems is enticing, this study brings awareness that the “talent bitcoins” (Chamorro-Premuzic, 2021, paras. 5-7) available on social media may not accurately represent the talent. It is my hope that this study stimulates additional research on this topic, which may begin with investigations that attempt to discern humble brags from insincere flattery.

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Figure




Figure 1. A diagram of the expected relationships between social media impression management and constructs in its nomological network.

Appendix A - Roulin and Levashina (2016)

Honest Self-Promotion – Personal Social Media

- Highlighting one's true positive personality traits and values through one's main profile, posts, and pictures
- Accumulating friends to appear more social

Honest Self-Promotion – Professional Social Media

- Highlighting one's true knowledge, skills, and abilities through education and past experiences
- Connecting with professionals and getting one's skills endorsed by them

Deceptive Self-Promotion – Personal Social Media

- Selectively posting information and comments that would enhance one's image of a good applicant
- Using photo editing software before posting pictures to enhance attractiveness or positive personality traits

Deceptive Self-Promotion – Professional Social Media

- Exaggerating one's skills or areas of expertise
- Embellishing one's past academic or professional accomplishments

Honest ingratiation – Personal Social Media

- Liking organizations' posts
- Joining interest groups to highlight one's core values

Honest ingratiation – Professional Social Media

- Following organizations
- Joining professional groups

Deceptive ingratiation – Personal Social Media

- Liking posts or comments by (or related to) organizations only because one plans to apply there
- Exaggerating one's interest in causes or topics viewed positively by employers

Deceptive ingratiation – Professional Social Media

- Trying to create an impression of similarity by connecting with employees one does not know in organizations one plans to apply
- Joining professional groups only to appear interested in issues valued by potential employers

Defensive – Personal Social Media

- Changing privacy settings so that one's profile (or parts of it) is accessible to friends only
- Removing comments or pictures that could be seen as faux pas by employers
- Unfriending close friends whose online activities may have a negative impact on one's image
- Creating separate profiles for potential employers and friends using different names

Defensive – Professional Social Media

- Justifying negative professional experiences in the past or highlight how one's learning from it
- Intentionally omitting or removing past job experiences or associates with organizations having a negative reputation from one's profile

Appendix B - Bourdage, Roulin, & Tarraf (2018) – Honest Impression Management (shortened)
Honest self-promotion (4-items)

- I made sure to let the interviewer know about my job credentials.
- I made sure the interviewer was aware of my skills and abilities.
- I let the Interviewer know how my qualifications were well-suited for the position.
- I brought up my past work experience to make the interviewer aware of my competence.

Honest ingratiation (4-items)

- I tried to find out the values or opinions the interviewer and I shared in common, and was vocal about these.
- I found out about values and goals that I shared with the organization and made sure to emphasize them.
- When the interviewer expressed views that I shared, I focused on incorporating these into my answers.
- I discussed interests I shared in common with the interviewer.

Honest defensive (4-items)

- I gave the interviewer an honest account of why I lacked control over past negative events that came up during the interview
- I recounted to the interviewer steps I had taken to prevent the recurrence of negative events or occurrences in my past.
- I shared my past regrets about how I handled certain situations and how I would improve in the future.
- I gave reasons why I felt I benefited positively from a negative event I was responsible for.

Appendix C - Levashina & Campion (2007) – Job Applicant Faking Measure

Embellishing (4-items)

- I said that it would take less time to learn the job than I knew it would.
- I exaggerated my future goals.
- I exaggerated my responsibilities on my previous jobs.
- I exaggerated the impact of my performance in my past jobs.

Tailoring (6-items)

- During the interview, I distorted my answers based on the comments or reactions of the interviewer.
- During the interview, I distorted my answers to emphasize what the interviewer was looking for.
- I distorted my answers based on the information about the job I obtained during the interview.
- I distorted my work experience to fit the interviewer's view of the position.
- I distorted my qualifications to match qualifications required for the job.
- I tried to find out about the organization's culture and then use that information to fabricate my answers.

Fit enhancing (4-items)

- I enhanced my fit with the job in terms of attitudes, values, or beliefs.
- I inflated the fit between my values and goals and values and goals of the organization.
- I inflated the fit between my credentials and needs of the organization.
- I tried to use information about the company to make my answers sound like I was a better fit than I actually was.

Constructing (7-items)

- I told fictional stories prepared in advance of the interview to best present my credentials.
- I fabricated examples to show my fit with the organization.
- I made up stories about my work experiences that were well developed and logical.
- I constructed fictional stories to explain the gaps in my work experiences.
- I told stories that contained both real and fictional work experiences.
- I combined, modified and distorted my work experiences in my answers.
- I used made-up stories for most questions.

Inventing (7-items)

- I claimed that I have skills that I do not have.
- I made up measurable outcomes of performed tasks.
- I promised that I could meet all job requirements (e.g., working late or on weekends), even though I probably could not.
- I misrepresented the description of an event.
- I stretched the truth to give a good answer.
- I invented some work situations or accomplishments that did not really occur.
- I told some "little white lies" in the interview.

Borrowing (3-items)

- My answers were based on examples of job performance of other employees.

- When I did not have a good answer, I borrowed work experiences of other people and made them sound like my own.
- I used other people's experiences to create answers when I did not have good experiences of my own.

Omitting (4-items)

- When asked directly, I tried to say nothing about my real job-related weaknesses.
- I tried to avoid discussion of job tasks that I may not be able to do.
- I tried to avoid discussing my lack of skills or experiences.
- When asked directly, I did not mention my true reason for quitting previous job.

Masking (4-items)

- I did not reveal my true career intentions about working with the hiring organization.
- When asked directly, I did not mention some problems that I had in past jobs.
- I did not reveal requested information that might hurt my chances of getting a job.
- I covered up some "skeletons in my closet."

Distancing (3-items)

- I tried to suppress my connection to negative events in my work history.
- I clearly separated myself from my past work experiences that would reflect poorly on me.
- I tried to convince the interviewer that factors outside of my control were responsible for some negative outcomes even though it was my responsibility.

Opinion conforming (8-items)

- I tried to adjust my answers to the interviewer's values and beliefs.
- I tried to agree with interviewer outwardly even when I disagree inwardly.
- I tried to find out interviewer's views and incorporate them in my answers as my own.
- I tried to express the same opinions and attitudes as the interviewer.
- I tried to appear similar to the interviewer in terms of values, attitudes, or beliefs.
- I tried to express enthusiasm or interest in anything the interviewer appeared to like even if I did not like it.
- I did not express my opinions when they contradicted the interviewer's opinions.
- I tried to show that I shared the interviewer's views and ideas even if I did not.

Interviewer or organization enhancing (4 -items)

- I laughed at the interviewer's jokes even when they were not funny.
- I exaggerated the interviewer's qualities to create the impression that I think highly of him/her.
- I exaggerated my positive comments about the organization.
- I complimented the organization on something, however insignificant it may actually be to me.

Appendix D - De Wolf, Willaert, & Pierson (2014) – Measure of Social Media Privacy Management

- I make use of private communication channels (e.g., Facebook chat) when I want to talk about sensitive subjects
- I review photos friends tag me in before they appear on my timeline
- I make sure that only friends can see my profile
- I only post information in Facebook that is suitable for everyone that can see
- I untag myself from photos I don't find appropriate
- When I install an application in Facebook, I make sure that I am the only who can see this
- I don't fill in all the information that is requested by Facebook
- I am careful with who I accept friend requests from
- I make use of Facebook lists when posting information
- I defriend those I no longer want to see my status updates

Appendix E - Fieseler & Ranzini (2015) – Managerial Social Media Impression Management

Self-promotion

- Stressing your professionalism and that of your company
- Highlighting how dedicated you are to your work
- Showing others how hard-working you and your company are
- Talking about your personal success or that of your company
- Mentioning your virtues and positive traits
- Talking about your participation in group achievements

Peer support

- Complimenting people on their achievements
- Trying to make others happy
- Paying attention to people's needs and concerns

Appendix F - Vitak (2015) – Facebook Impression Management

Content-based IM

- Spend time thinking about who can see a piece of content you're sharing.
- Delete a status update before posting.
- Change the wording of a status update to avoid angering some of your Facebook friends.
- Delete a status update you've already posted.
- Delete a photo or photo album you've already shared.
- Post a status update to a subset of your Facebook friends so that it will not be visible to a specific user or group of friends.

Network-based IM

- Defriended someone because of the content they share on the site.
- Defriended someone you no longer talk to.
- Refuse a friend request from someone you know.
- Block another Facebook user.
- Hide a Facebook friend (so their posts no longer appear in your News Feed).

Appendix G: Initial 143-item Social Media Impression Management Scale

Social Media Impression Management - 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*to a very large extent*)

HSP

1. Discuss job-related responsibilities that reflect positively on me
2. Share information about specific work projects I have completed
3. Post when I complete a career milestone
4. Post about my personal success
5. Highlight positive attributes
6. Post when I achieve something I am excited about
7. Post when I achieve something I'm proud of
8. Highlight job-related accomplishments
9. Showcase my actual accomplishments
10. Share my successes when given the chance
11. Discuss my personal successes that I have attained
12. Highlight my true knowledge, skills, and abilities
13. Share my true accomplishments
14. Post about my true achievements
15. Highlight my actual work credentials
16. Display my true accomplishments and abilities
17. Showcase my true skills and abilities
18. Illustrate my professionalism in a way that is reflective of the truth
19. Post content that indicates how hardworking I truly am
20. Showcase how truly dedicated I am to my work
21. Post content that indicates how hardworking I actually am
22. Discuss my personal successes through my posting
23. Mention my own struggles to highlight personal growth
24. Post content that reflects my actual skillset
25. Post content that reflects my true qualifications
26. Show my qualifications for others to see
27. Post content that highlights my skills
28. Ensure my work and education information is up-to-date
29. Discuss my own struggles to highlight personal growth
30. Mention my own life struggles to demonstrate growth/perseverance
31. Post content so others see my ability
32. Highlight my positive personality traits on my social media profile
33. List my previous work experiences to appear competent
34. Highlight how truly dedicated I am to my interests and beliefs
35. Mention my positive traits

DSP

1. Misrepresent myself to appear more competent
2. Post content that makes me look better than I truly am
3. Embellish my favorable attributes to appear better than I am
4. Fictionalize stories to make myself look better
5. Slightly modify stories to promote myself in a better way

6. Give myself more credit for certain experiences than I deserve
7. Selectively post content that enhances positive qualities that I do not truthfully have
8. Strategically post content that makes me appear more competent than I truly am
9. Post content that makes me appear more knowledgeable than I am actually am
10. Exaggerate my future goals
11. Exaggerate my job-related responsibilities
12. Exaggerate the impact of my job performance
13. Fabricate examples to appear more competent
14. Post content that makes me appear to have skills that I do not have
15. Exaggerate the impact of my job performance
16. Misrepresent myself to appear more competent
17. Give myself more credit than I deserve
18. Exaggerate my knowledge, skills, or abilities
19. Post content that suggests I do more than what I really do
20. Take credit for aspects of an experience that I did not do
21. Post content that makes me appear better than I truly am
22. Fabricate my involvement in events that will make me look good
23. Spin personal failures to make myself look in control of the situation
24. Post content that makes me appear to have skills that I do not have
25. Lie about my involvement in events to make myself look better
26. Over-embellish my involvement in a project when I know it will be praised
27. Post that makes me appear to have knowledge that I do not have

HIG

1. Offer sincere praise to my friends/connections
2. Share content to establish shared interests with others
3. Highlight positive attributes to gain favor of others
4. Share others' posts when it reflects my own personal opinions
5. Offer positive reactions to others' content
6. Compliment others on their achievements
7. Try to make others happy
8. Share content posted by others because I want them to know I like what they have to say
9. Congratulate others when I believe they deserve it
10. Friend/connect with others because I want them to know I am interested in them
11. Interact with others' social media content because I truly like the content
12. Share content that like-minded people post
13. Post content to establish favorability with others
14. Highlight positive attributes to gain favor of others
15. Interact with content posted by others to gain more friends/connections
16. Friend/connect with others who I truly admire
17. Use flattering language in describing others
18. Share content from my friends/connection if it mirrors who I am
19. Attempt to gain recognition from others by sharing their posts
20. Congratulate others when they deserve it to make a good impression
21. Interact with content posted by others to gain recognition
22. Discuss my interests that are shared by others

23. Highlight my shared interests to establish fit with my friends/connections

DIG

1. Deceitfully congratulate others for their accomplishments
2. Share content from others to appear more similar to them than I actually am
3. Praise others who do not deserve it
4. Offer insincere compliments to my friends/connections
5. Tag social media friends/connections in my posts to make it look like I value them when I don't
6. Brag about my friends/connections when I don't believe they deserve it
7. Exaggerate my interests in others' posts when I am not interested
8. Offer insincere reactions to content posted by others because I want them to like me
9. Deceitfully congratulate others for their accomplishments
10. Interact with people I don't care about because I want to be liked by others
11. Friend/connect with others I don't like because it will make me look good
12. Endorse the opinions of my friends/connections when they do not align with my own
13. Brag about friends/connections accomplishments when they don't deserve it
14. Brown-nose others to be viewed more favorably
15. Deceitfully flatter others to gain favor of my friends/connections
16. Engage with others' content only so they will like me
17. Exaggerate my interests in topics because it will make others like me
18. Offer insincere compliments
19. Reshare content generated by others to make it appear that my values/interests align with theirs
20. Tag friends/connections in my posts to make it look like I value them when I don't
21. Tag friends/connections in my posts to make it seem like I care about their opinions when I don't care
22. Tag social media friends/connections in my posts to make it look like I value them when I really don't
23. Compliment others even when I do not believe the compliment is deserved
24. Insincerely compliment my friends/connections because I want them to like me
25. Congratulate others when they do not deserve it
26. Fake my interest in what others post to appear more favorably
27. Invent misleading content because I think it will be received well by my friends/connections
28. Describe events in posts that didn't really happen because I think it will be a popular post
29. Exaggerate my interests in topics if it will make others like me
30. Offer insincere compliments to my friends/connections
31. Share content that reflects the popular opinion instead of my true opinions
32. "Suck up" to others to get them to like me
33. Distort my personal beliefs and opinions in efforts to be liked by others
34. Falsely claim interests in attempt to be viewed more favorably by my friends/connections

DEF

1. Delete content that I find embarrassing
2. Restrict certain people from viewing my profile
3. Restrict strangers from viewing my profile

4. Employ restrictive privacy settings
5. Review posts that friends/connections tag me in before they appear on my profile
6. Unassociate myself with content that will make me look bad
7. Remove content that will be received poorly by others
8. Untag myself from content that I find embarrassing
9. Post content to restore an unfavorable image of myself
10. Delete content that may be perceived as controversial
11. Refrain from posting about my aspects of my life that I am afraid could harm my reputation
12. Delete social media content that reflects poorly on me
13. Create other social media accounts to make it challenging to find me
14. Use direct messages when I do not want others to see my social media activity
15. Review photos friends tag me in before they appear on my timeline
16. Untag myself from photos I don't find appropriate
17. Defriend or remove connections that I no longer want to see my content
18. Stopped myself from posting content that will reflect poorly on me
19. Delete a post that has already been displayed on my profile
20. Delete pictures that I posted in the past
21. Delete content that does not align with the public image I want to portray
22. Make certain content visible to only me
23. Delete content that reflects poorly on me
24. Cover up "skeletons in my closet"
25. Delete content that may be perceived as controversial
26. Make content only visible to select friends/connections
27. Refrain from posting content that may be subject to negative perceptions
28. Untag myself from content that portrays me unfavorably
29. Avoid sharing content about knowledge that I lack
30. Make use of direct messaging when I need to discuss something that could be viewed negatively by others
31. Make sure that only friends/connections have access to my profile

Appendix H – Catano et al. (2018) Personality-based Integrity

Conscientiousness

- I like to keep my belongings neat and organized
- I am organized
- I am neat
- I always have a place for everything and everything in its place

Agreeableness

- I am always generous when it comes to helping others
- I like to help others when they are down on their luck
- I am helpful
- I always treat others with kindness

Emotional Stability

- When I am under stress I often feel that I am about to breakdown
- Sometimes I feel discouraged and want to give up

Appendix I: Ashton and Lee (2009) – Honesty-Humility

- I wouldn't use flattery to get a raise or promotion at work, even if I thought it would succeed.
- If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million dollars. – R
- Having a lot of money is not especially important to me.
- I think that I am entitled to more respect than the average person is. – R
- If I want something from someone, I will laugh at that person's worst jokes. – R
- I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large.
- I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods. – R
- I want people to know that I am an important person of high status. – R
- I wouldn't pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favors for me.
- I'd be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it. – R

Appendix J: John et al. (2009) – Extraversion

- Is talkative
- Is reserved – R
- Is full of energy
- Generates a lot of enthusiasm
- Tends to be quiet – R
- Has an assertive personality
- Is sometimes shy, inhibited – R
- Is outgoing, sociable

Appendix K: Jonason and Webster (2010) – Dirty Dozen

Machiavellianism

- I tend to manipulate others to get my way.
- I have used deceit or lied to get my way.
- I have use flattery to get my way.
- I tend to exploit others towards my own end.

Psychopathy

- I tend to lack remorse.
- I tend to be unconcerned with the morality of my actions.
- I tend to be callous or insensitive.
- I tend to be cynical.

Narcissism

- I tend to want others to admire me.
- I tend to want others to pay attention to me
- I tend to seek prestige or status.
- I tend to expect special favors from others.

Appendix L: Hart et al. (2015) – BIDR-16

SDE

- I have not always been honest with myself – R
- I always know why like things
- It is hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought – R
- I never regret my decisions
- I sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough – R
- I am a completely rational person
- I am confident of my judgements
- I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover – R

IM

- I sometimes tell lies if I have to – R
- I never cover up my mistakes
- There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone – R
- I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget – R
- I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back – R
- When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening
- I never take things that don't belong to me
- I don't gossip about other people's business

Appendix M: Crowne and Marlowe (1960) – Socially Desirable Responding

1. Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates
2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble.
3. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged – R
4. I have never intensely disliked anyone.
5. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life. – R
6. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. – R
7. I am always careful about my manner of dress.
8. My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant.
9. If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not seen, I would probably do it. – R
10. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my ability. - R
11. I like to gossip at times. – R
12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I knew they were right. – R
13. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener.
14. I can remember "playing sick" to get out of something. – R
15. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. – R
16. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake
17. I always try to practice what I preach.
18. I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud-mouthed, obnoxious people.
19. I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget. – R
20. When I don't know something I don't at all mind admitting it.
21. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.
22. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way. – R
23. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things. – R
24. I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my own wrongdoings.
25. I never resent being asked to return a favour.
26. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own.
27. I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car.
28. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others. - R
29. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off.
30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favours of me. – R
31. I have never felt that I was punished without cause.
32. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved. – R
33. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings.

Appendix N – Demographic Survey, Perceived Cybervetting Relevance

Age: _____

Gender: _____

Male

Female

Non-binary

Prefer to self-describe

Prefer not to say

Race: (circle all that apply)

Black/African American

Native American

Hispanic/Latino

Asian American

White/Caucasian

Hawaiian/Pacific Islander

Other (please specify): _____

Education: (circle one)

Some high school

High school degree/GED

Some college, no degree

Associate's degree

Bachelor's degree

Master's degree

Doctoral degree

Professional degree

Years of Work Experience: _____

Time on the job market (in months): _____

Why are you seeking new/additional employment? (open-ended) _____

Bauer et al. (2001) - SPJS

Job-relatedness predictive

- Receiving a positive evaluation based on one's social media profile means a person can do a job well
- A person who receives a positive evaluation on their social media profile will be a good employee

Job-relatedness content

- It would be clear to anyone that social media evaluations are related to a job
- The content of my social media profile is clearly related to a job

Appendix O – Perceived Privacy Invasion

Tolchinsky et al. (1981)

1. It is acceptable for organizations to collect the personal information gathered in social media evaluations.
2. It is necessary for organizations to collect the personal information from social media evaluations.
3. I feel comfortable with personal information being collected through social media evaluations.
4. (R) Greater internal controls are needed in organizations to limit the kind of use of personal information that is collected from social media evaluations.
5. (R) The collection of personal information through social media evaluations is an invasion of privacy.

Appendix P – Social Media Impression Management Scales

Label	Items and Relevant Construct
<i>Honest Self-Promotion</i>	
hsp10*	Post content that highlights my skills
hsp18	Post when I achieve something I'm proud of
hsp4*	Post content that indicates how hardworking I truly am
hsp32	Highlight my true knowledge, skills, and abilities
hsp3*	Discuss my personal successes that I have attained
hsp44*	Mention my positive traits
<i>Honest Ingratiation</i>	
hig14*	Share content to establish shared interests with others
hig6*	Highlight my shared interests to establish fit with my friends/connections
hig36*	Share content from my friends/connection if it mirrors who I am
hig8*	Share content posted by others because I want them to know I like what they have to say
<i>Deceptive Self-Promotion</i>	
dsp20	Slightly modify stories to promote myself in a better way
dsp28	Selectively post content that enhances positive qualities that I do not truthfully have
dsp6*	Exaggerate my knowledge, skills, or abilities
dsp5*	Give myself more credit than I deserve
dsp10*	Post content that makes me look better than I truly am
dsp31*	Exaggerate my future goals
dsp18	Spin personal failures to make myself look in control of the situation
dsp29	Strategically post content that makes me appear more competent than I truly am
<i>Deceptive Ingratiation</i>	
dig32	Share content that reflects the popular opinion instead of my true opinions
dig13	Invent misleading content because I think it will be received well by my friends/connections
dig48*	Tag friends/connections in my posts to make it seem like I care about their opinions when I don't care
dig39*	Exaggerate my interests in topics because it will make others like me
dig6*	Insincerely compliment my friends/connections because I want them to like me
dig10	Deceitfully congratulate others for their accomplishments
dig41	Distort my personal beliefs and opinions in efforts to be liked by others
dig31	Endorse the opinions of my friends/connections when they do not align with my own
dig29	Interact with people I don't care about because I want to be liked by others
dig36	Brown-nose others to be viewed more favorably
dig11	Share content from others to appear more similar to them than I actually am
dig23*	Brag about my friends/connections when I don't believe they deserve it
dig30	Friend/connect with others I don't like because it will make me look good
dig42	Falsely claim interests in attempt to be viewed more favorably by my friends/connections
dig38	Engage with others' content only so they will like me
<i>Defensive Behaviors</i>	
def2*	Untag myself from content that I find embarrassing
def6	Delete content that does not align with the public image I want to portray
def29*	Delete social media content that reflects poorly on me
def41*	Untag myself from photos I don't find appropriate
def18*	Remove content that will be received poorly by others

Notes: items marked with an asterisk represent the items in the short-version of the SMIM containing 20-items.

Item stem: Please rate the extent to which you engage in the following behaviors on social media (1 = *not at all* to 7 = *to a very large extent*)

Appendix Q – Social Media Behaviors

- How often do you log into your profile?
 - Rarely
 - Monthly
 - Weekly
 - Daily
- Follow-up question:
 - Once a day [week/month]
 - A few times a day [week/month]
 - Multiple times a day [week/month]
- How often do you post self-generated content (e.g., a post):
 - Rarely
 - Monthly
 - Weekly
 - Daily
- How often do you re-share other-generated content?
 - Rarely
 - Monthly
 - Weekly
 - Daily
- How often do you interact with other-generated content (e.g., like content, comment on posts)?
 - Rarely
 - Monthly
 - Weekly
 - Daily
- How many friends/connections do you have on your profile?
 - <50
 - <100
 - <500
 - <1,000
 - <5,000
 - <10,000

Table 1

Means, Standard Deviations, and Exploratory Factor Analysis on the 129-item SMIM scale

Item	Mean	SD	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
dsp19	2.82	2.10	0.977	-0.010	-0.131
dig23	2.71	1.98	0.975	-0.111	-0.064
dsp35	2.77	2.11	0.967	-0.042	-0.086
dig41	2.74	2.02	0.955	-0.095	-0.004
dsp11	2.68	2.11	0.950	-0.032	-0.134
dsp14	2.76	2.09	0.947	-0.051	-0.072
dig13	2.80	2.14	0.943	-0.078	-0.062
dsp22	2.64	2.06	0.940	-0.107	-0.014
dig14	2.67	2.04	0.936	-0.055	-0.055
dig29	2.85	2.02	0.929	-0.124	0.023
dig42	2.70	2.02	0.928	-0.118	0.016
dig5	2.81	2.05	0.926	-0.028	-0.059
dig30	2.77	1.89	0.924	-0.102	0.051
dsp2	2.89	2.06	0.915	-0.020	0.003
dig37	2.75	1.99	0.915	-0.019	-0.009
dig33	2.71	1.99	0.914	-0.070	-0.033
dsp4	2.89	2.05	0.912	-0.051	0.008
dig10	2.81	2.07	0.910	-0.007	-0.034
dsp24	3.07	2.03	0.906	0.079	-0.073
dsp1	2.81	2.02	0.902	-0.116	0.055
dig36	2.70	1.92	0.892	-0.115	0.063
def30	2.75	2.12	0.890	-0.078	-0.017
dig7	2.98	2.09	0.888	-0.130	0.043
dig47	2.91	2.11	0.886	-0.083	0.005
dig48	2.90	2.08	0.878	-0.045	-0.019
dsp39	2.89	2.06	0.876	-0.002	-0.031
dsp21	3.19	2.14	0.874	0.078	-0.029
dig34	2.80	2.00	0.874	-0.052	-0.026
dig39	3.05	2.06	0.873	0.011	0.024
dig19	2.91	2.02	0.869	-0.103	0.101
dig12	2.78	1.98	0.866	-0.113	0.061
dig22	2.84	1.98	0.864	0.040	-0.089
dig51	3.14	2.11	0.863	0.055	-0.067
dig27	2.98	2.13	0.858	-0.047	-0.017
dsp31	2.85	1.99	0.849	-0.015	0.063

Table 1 Continued

Item	Mean	SD	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
dsp13	3.14	2.12	0.846	0.060	0.028
dig6	2.84	2.05	0.842	-0.129	0.106
dig11	3.14	2.09	0.833	0.101	-0.063
dsp3	3.14	2.07	0.829	0.021	0.100
dsp18	2.94	2.00	0.829	-0.012	0.023
dsp8	3.03	2.08	0.828	0.092	-0.034
dig38	3.17	2.05	0.825	0.082	-0.020
dig31	3.11	2.09	0.824	0.075	-0.056
dsp5	3.14	2.14	0.821	0.103	-0.037
dig32	3.12	2.08	0.808	0.112	-0.039
dsp10	3.40	2.17	0.790	0.113	-0.018
dsp15	3.16	2.10	0.785	0.076	0.056
dig45	3.33	2.03	0.764	0.116	-0.037
dsp6	3.11	2.07	0.759	0.026	0.102
dig40	2.90	2.11	0.755	-0.055	0.058
hig38	3.26	2.06	0.754	0.180	-0.043
dig9	3.02	2.07	0.751	-0.103	0.156
dig25	2.96	1.95	0.744	-0.067	0.148
dsp28	3.25	2.18	0.729	0.105	-0.018
dsp32	3.14	2.09	0.689	0.062	0.141
def20	3.08	2.09	0.674	0.168	0.056
dsp29	3.25	2.06	0.665	0.178	0.088
hig26	3.39	2.05	0.646	0.252	0.003
dig20	3.11	2.08	0.610	0.014	0.138
hsp5	3.69	1.97	0.571	0.286	0.002
def15	2.83	2.00	0.536	0.049	0.279
dsp20	3.53	2.04	0.529	0.191	0.202
hsp33	5.05	1.64	-0.137	0.909	-0.111
hsp32	4.86	1.82	-0.036	0.890	-0.118
hsp2	4.80	1.72	-0.096	0.887	-0.035
hsp37	4.92	1.75	-0.037	0.876	-0.128
hsp7	4.76	1.72	-0.187	0.869	-0.003
hsp35	4.60	1.79	-0.010	0.855	-0.083
hsp40	4.39	1.91	0.023	0.848	-0.083
hsp8	4.85	1.69	-0.214	0.840	0.021
hsp43	4.23	1.90	0.075	0.822	-0.012
hsp11	4.35	1.94	0.087	0.809	-0.093

Table 1 Continued

Item	Mean	SD	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
hsp15	4.35	1.83	0.004	0.807	0.017
hsp14	4.45	1.86	-0.003	0.803	0.019
hsp36	4.80	1.70	-0.061	0.784	-0.060
hsp44	4.32	1.84	0.127	0.781	-0.016
hsp4	4.32	1.89	0.136	0.777	-0.067
hsp18	4.84	1.65	-0.062	0.773	0.056
hsp34	4.79	1.74	-0.013	0.767	-0.069
hsp3	4.40	1.84	0.159	0.759	-0.003
hsp24	4.40	1.77	0.066	0.757	0.041
hsp16	4.62	1.74	0.054	0.744	0.043
hsp39	4.76	1.72	-0.050	0.737	0.067
hsp19	4.20	1.93	0.165	0.735	-0.035
hsp42	4.19	2.02	0.081	0.715	0.052
hsp17	4.93	1.69	-0.004	0.694	0.053
hig43	4.68	1.66	-0.118	0.670	0.100
hsp38	3.99	1.98	0.204	0.628	-0.001
hsp12	4.78	1.87	-0.027	0.628	0.126
hsp31	4.75	1.70	0.061	0.628	0.014
hsp13	4.00	2.04	0.303	0.616	-0.128
hsp10	4.41	1.83	0.238	0.613	-0.043
hig9	5.26	1.71	-0.297	0.605	0.133
hig14	4.40	1.81	0.149	0.594	-0.004
hig27	4.95	1.58	-0.251	0.582	0.283
hig24	4.58	1.75	-0.070	0.568	0.006
hig12	5.32	1.50	-0.251	0.565	0.123
hig36	4.32	1.85	0.161	0.563	0.058
hig11	4.51	1.69	0.115	0.561	0.017
hig6	3.88	1.94	0.291	0.533	0.028
hig37	5.18	1.51	-0.277	0.528	0.168
hig29	5.20	1.55	-0.098	0.503	0.151
hig22	4.55	1.74	0.284	0.479	-0.124
hig8	4.23	1.94	0.257	0.393	0.100
hig39	4.79	1.76	0.039	0.386	0.185
hig46	4.34	1.85	0.246	0.316	0.119
def29	4.00	2.10	-0.024	-0.009	0.904
def6	4.12	2.14	-0.065	0.120	0.835
def18	4.04	2.08	0.126	-0.056	0.823

Table 1 Continued

Item	Mean	SD	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
def17	4.15	2.05	-0.073	0.106	0.817
def41	4.21	2.08	-0.115	0.077	0.809
def1	4.22	2.07	0.094	-0.066	0.809
def23	3.99	2.09	0.199	-0.142	0.801
def13	3.87	2.12	0.161	-0.097	0.779
def2	4.23	2.12	0.056	0.059	0.749
def43	4.47	2.00	0.025	0.012	0.743
def24	4.54	1.96	0.022	-0.037	0.696
def3	3.95	1.99	0.120	0.086	0.691
def27	4.60	1.91	0.032	-0.068	0.675
def12	4.58	1.95	-0.103	0.086	0.647
def42	4.48	1.92	0.029	0.015	0.644
def19	4.35	2.01	-0.006	0.068	0.593
def10	4.63	2.03	-0.051	0.015	0.579
def37	4.27	2.03	0.154	-0.003	0.538
def39	4.65	1.99	-0.103	0.111	0.534
def38	4.48	2.05	-0.001	0.175	0.533
def34	4.42	2.02	-0.045	0.163	0.491
def11	4.84	1.97	-0.032	-0.109	0.482
def36	3.89	2.05	0.243	0.134	0.401

Note: hsp = honest self-promotion; hig = honest ingratiation; dsp = deceptive self-promotion; dig = deceptive ingratiation; def = defensive. Results based on exploratory factor analysis with maximum likelihood extraction and promax rotation in specifying a three-factor solution.

Table 2
Confirmatory Factor Analyses Fit Statistics on Study Models

	χ^2	<i>df</i>	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf
Hypothesized model (38-items)	1383.298	655	0.943	0.939	0.057	0.049	-	-
Six-factor alternative model ^a	1126.683	617	0.960	0.955	0.049	0.030	256.615	38*
Three-factor alternative model ^a	1682.642	662	0.920	0.915	0.067	0.055	299.344	7*
Two-factor alternative model ^a	2848.330	664	0.829	0.819	0.097	0.093	1465.032	9*
One-factor alternative model ^a	3575.285	665	0.772	0.759	0.112	0.103	2191.987	10*
Hypothesized model (20-items)	319.381	160	0.971	0.965	0.054	0.035	-	-
Six-factor alternative model ^b	208.854	140	0.987	0.983	0.038	0.024	110.527	20*
Three-factor alternative model ^b	447.333	167	0.949	0.942	0.069	0.044	127.952	7*
Two-factor alternative model ^b	1197.248	169	0.812	0.789	0.132	0.106	877.867	9*
One-factor alternative model ^b	1715.294	170	0.718	0.685	0.162	0.121	1395.913	10*

Note: SMIM = social media impression management scale

^adenoted were compared to the hypothesized five-factor model containing 38-items.

^bdenoted were compared to the hypothesized five-factor model containing 20-items.

Table 3

Measurement Properties of the 38- and 20-item SMIM Scale

38-item SMIM scale			20-item SMIM scale		
Construct and Indicators	Standardized Loading	AVE	Construct and Indicators	Standardized Loading	AVE
HSP ($\alpha = 0.914$; $\omega = 0.914$)			HSP ($\alpha = 0.894$; $\omega = 0.894$)		
hsp10	0.803	0.640	hsp10	0.798	0.679
hsp18	0.756		hsp4	0.813	
hsp4	0.806		hsp3	0.821	
hsp32	0.724		hsp44	0.861	
hsp3	0.843				
hsp44	0.852				
HIG ($\alpha = 0.822$; $\omega = 0.824$)			HIG ($\alpha = 0.822$; $\omega = 0.824$)		
hig14	0.707	0.541	hig14	0.701	0.541
hig6	0.807		hig6	0.807	
hig36	0.723		hig36	0.726	
hig8	0.695		hig8	0.697	
DSP ($\alpha = 0.947$; $\omega = 0.948$)			DSP ($\alpha = 0.926$; $\omega = 0.926$)		
dsp20	0.737	0.695	dsp6	0.855	0.757
dsp28	0.786		dsp5	0.884	
dsp6	0.861		dsp10	0.850	
dsp5	0.865		dsp31	0.890	
dsp10	0.855				
dsp31	0.876				
dsp18	0.839				
dsp29	0.834				
DIG ($\alpha = 0.977$; $\omega = 0.977$)			DIG ($\alpha = 0.928$; $\omega = 0.926$)		
dig32	0.833	0.740	dig48	0.866	0.760
dig13	0.862		dig39	0.888	
dig48	0.876		dig6	0.879	
dig39	0.870		dig23	0.855	
dig6	0.891				
dig10	0.869				
dig41	0.861				
dig31	0.841				
dig29	0.864				
dig36	0.852				
dig11	0.854				

Table 3 continued

Measurement Properties of the 38- and 20-item SMIM Scale

38-item SMIM scale			20-item SMIM scale		
Construct and Indicators	Standardized Loading	AVE	Construct and Indicators	Standardized Loading	AVE
dig23	0.873				
dig30	0.865				
dig42	0.843				
dig38	0.844				
DEF ($\alpha = 0.902$; $\omega = 0.903$)		0.651	DEF ($\alpha = 0.890$; $\omega = 0.891$)		0.671
def2	0.822		def2	0.832	
def6	0.761		def29	0.858	
def29	0.871		def41	0.796	
def41	0.787		def18	0.787	
def18	0.789				

Note: hsp = honest self-promotion; hig = honest ingratiation; dsp = deceptive self-promotion; dig = deceptive ingratiation; def = defensive behaviors

Table 4

An Examination of the 38-item SMIM Scale Accounting for Method Bias

Constructs and Indicators	Std. Trait Loading	Std. Trait Loading Squared	Method Factor Loading	Squared Method Factor Loading
HSP				
hsp10	0.607	0.368	0.534	0.285
hsp18	0.711	0.506	0.311	0.097
hsp4	0.632	0.399	0.498	0.248
hsp32	0.662	0.438	0.320	0.102
hsp3	0.743	0.552	0.431	0.186
hsp44	0.699	0.489	0.480	0.230
HIG				
hig14	0.608	0.370	0.365	0.133
hig6	0.637	0.406	0.477	0.228
hig36	0.665	0.442	0.332	0.110
hig8	0.555	0.308	0.425	0.181
DSP				
dsp20	0.508	0.258	0.546	0.298
dsp28	0.480	0.230	0.622	0.387
dsp6	0.568	0.323	0.652	0.425
dsp5	0.524	0.275	0.685	0.469
dsp10	0.601	0.361	0.622	0.387
dsp31	0.510	0.260	0.710	0.504
dsp18	0.460	0.212	0.700	0.490
dsp29	0.523	0.274	0.651	0.424
DIG				
dig32	0.476	0.227	0.685	0.469
dig13	0.323	0.104	0.814	0.663
dig48	0.478	0.228	0.733	0.537
dig39	0.458	0.210	0.739	0.546
dig6	0.481	0.231	0.751	0.564
dig10	0.400	0.160	0.776	0.602
dig41	0.484	0.234	0.713	0.508
dig31	0.442	0.195	0.714	0.510
dig29	0.452	0.204	0.737	0.543
dig36	0.470	0.221	0.714	0.510
dig11	0.505	0.255	0.694	0.482
dig23	0.362	0.131	0.803	0.645

Table 4 Continued

An Examination of the 38-item SMIM Scale Accounting for Method Bias

Constructs and Indicators	Std. Trait Loading	Std. Trait Loading Squared	Method Factor Loading	Squared Method Factor Loading
dig30	0.418	0.175	0.757	0.573
dig42	0.400	0.160	0.743	0.552
dig38	0.480	0.230	0.696	0.484
DEF				
def2	0.748	0.560	0.339	0.115
def6	0.680	0.462	0.338	0.114
def29	0.805	0.648	0.335	0.112
def41	0.726	0.527	0.310	0.096
def18	0.704	0.496	0.356	0.127
Overall AVE:		0.319		0.367

Note: Common method bias was tested by examining the effects of an unmeasured latent method factor, such that all indicators loaded on their theorized trait factor (five-factor model), as well as a method factor. The method factor and trait factors were not correlated. All convergent validity measures were included in the model. Std = standardized.

Table 5

An Examination of the 20-item SMIM Scale Accounting for Method Bias

Constructs and Indicators	Std. Trait Loading	Std. Trait Loading Squared	Method Factor Loading	Squared Method Factor Loading
HSP				
hsp10	0.587	0.345	0.540	0.292
hsp4	0.641	0.411	0.498	0.248
hsp3	0.706	0.498	0.437	0.191
hsp44	0.718	0.516	0.480	0.230
HIG				
hig14	0.592	0.350	0.377	0.142
hig6	0.636	0.404	0.481	0.231
hig36	0.659	0.434	0.345	0.119
hig8	0.552	0.305	0.435	0.189
DSP				
dsp6	0.585	0.342	0.628	0.394
dsp5	0.581	0.338	0.662	0.438
dsp10	0.599	0.359	0.608	0.370
dsp31	0.564	0.318	0.686	0.471
DIG				
dig48	0.493	0.243	0.707	0.500
dig39	0.515	0.265	0.720	0.518
dig6	0.488	0.238	0.730	0.533
dig23	0.392	0.154	0.777	0.604
DEF				
def2	0.759	0.576	0.340	0.116
def29	0.788	0.621	0.337	0.114
def41	0.734	0.539	0.317	0.100
def18	0.701	0.491	0.358	0.128
Overall AVE:		0.387		0.295

Note: Common method bias was tested by examining the effects of an unmeasured latent method factor, such that all indicators loaded on their theorized trait factor (five-factor model), as well as a method factor. The method factor and trait factors were not correlated. All convergent validity measures were included in the tested model. Std = standardized.

Table 6

The relationship between the SMIM subscales and convergent validity measures

Scale	hsp-38	hig-38	dsp-38	dig-38	def-38	hsp-20	hig-20	dsp-20	dig-20	def-20
hsp-38	(0.677)									
hig-38	0.777	(0.616)								
dsp-38	0.502	0.370	(0.523)							
dig-38	0.313	0.274	0.840	(0.445)						
def-38	0.488	0.542	0.426	0.354	(0.734)					
hsp-20	-	-	-	-	-	(0.665)				
hig-20	-	-	-	-	-	0.764	(0.612)			
dsp-20	-	-	-	-	-	0.510	0.339	(0.582)		
dig-20	-	-	-	-	-	0.344	0.201	0.897	(0.474)	
def-20	-	-	-	-	-	0.504	0.537	0.377	0.309	(0.746)
Integrity ($\alpha = 0.772$)	0.200	0.197	-0.133	-0.208	0.160	0.139	0.166	-0.190	-0.250	0.150
Honesty-humility ($\alpha = 0.750$)	-0.198	-0.104	-0.482	-0.529	-0.135	-0.288	-0.128	-0.493	-0.591	-0.148
Extraversion ($\alpha = 0.852$)	0.224	0.187	0.031	0.028	-0.009	0.221	0.179	0.018	0.060	-0.010
Machiavellianism ($\alpha = 0.904$)	-0.097	-0.020	0.177	0.270	0.018	-0.035	-0.008	0.271	0.417	0.032
Psychopathy ($\alpha = 0.913$)	-0.238	-0.305	0.131	0.216	-0.056	-0.161	-0.262	0.255	0.355	-0.035
Narcissism ($\alpha = 0.882$)	0.401	0.262	0.363	0.321	0.106	0.445	0.256	0.366	0.399	0.106
SD ($\alpha = 0.627$)	0.261	0.233	-0.140	-0.233	-0.002	0.211	0.203	-0.186	-0.327	-0.028
IM ($\alpha = 0.678$)	-0.016	-0.007	-0.246	-0.275	-0.070	-0.048	-0.033	-0.261	-0.353	-0.086
SDR ($\alpha = 0.807$)	0.096	0.085	-0.039	-0.062	0.024	0.096	0.066	-0.055	-0.103	0.015

Table 6 Continued

The relationship between the SMIM subscales and convergent validity measures

Scale	Integrity	Honesty	Extra	Mach	Psyc	Narc	SD	IM	SDR
Integrity ($\omega = 0.760$)	-								
Honest-humility ($\omega = 0.751$)	0.339	-							
Extraversion ($\omega = 0.850$)	0.215	<i>-0.039</i>	-						
Mach ($\omega = 0.903$)	-0.515	-0.713	<i>-0.067</i>	-					
Psyc ($\omega = 0.916$)	-0.690	-0.445	-0.216	0.739	-				
Narc ($\omega = 0.883$)	-0.168	-0.643	0.318	0.482	0.283	-			
SD ($\omega = 0.598$)	0.555	0.429	0.384	-0.217	-0.624	<i>-0.136</i>	-		
IM ($\omega = 0.674$)	0.412	0.607	<i>0.122</i>	-0.754	-0.509	-0.375	0.749	-	
SDR ($\omega = 0.816$)	0.289	0.351	0.170	-0.468	-0.383	-0.173	0.593	0.760	-

Note: Hig-38 and hig-20 contain the same items; all correlations are significant at $p < .05$ except italicized values.

hsp = honest self-promotion; hig = honest ingratiation; dsp = deceptive self-promotion; dig = deceptive ingratiation; def = defensive behaviors; Mach = Machiavellianism; Psyc = psychopathy; Narc = narcissism; IM = context non-specific impression management; SD = self-deception; SDR = socially desirable responding; The AVE for the SMIM scales is provided in the diagonal. Interfactor correlations between the 38- and 20-item SMIM were not reported as they were not estimated within the structural equation model. Intercorrelations between the SMIM scales and the scales used to assess convergent validity control for effects of an unmeasured latent method factor.

Table 7

Measurement Properties of the 38-item Scales in Study Two

Facebook 38-item SMIM scale			LinkedIn 38-item SMIM scale		
Construct and Indicators	Standardized Loading	AVE	Construct and Indicators	Standardized Loading	AVE
HSP ($\alpha = 0.936$; $\omega = 0.938$)			HSP ($\alpha = 0.909$; $\omega = 0.911$)		
hsp10	0.897	0.715	hsp10	0.826	0.633
hsp18	0.794		hsp18	0.810	
hsp4	0.811		hsp4	0.788	
hsp32	0.801		hsp32	0.651	
hsp3	0.864		hsp3	0.856	
hsp44	0.903		hsp44	0.807	
HIG ($\alpha = 0.857$; $\omega = 0.860$)			HIG ($\alpha = 0.883$; $\omega = 0.886$)		
hig14	0.854	0.609	hig14	0.874	0.661
hig6	0.775		hig6	0.853	
hig36	0.799		hig36	0.742	
hig8	0.674		hig8	0.766	
DSP ($\alpha = 0.957$; $\omega = 0.958$)			DSP ($\alpha = 0.950$; $\omega = 0.951$)		
dsp20	0.844	0.740	dsp20	0.902	0.710
dsp28	0.909		dsp28	0.867	
dsp6	0.892		dsp6	0.852	
dsp5	0.909		dsp5	0.869	
dsp10	0.818		dsp10	0.855	
dsp31	0.884		dsp31	0.887	
dsp18	0.832		dsp18	0.772	
dsp29	0.808		dsp29	0.712	

Table 7 continued

Measurement Properties of the 38-item Scales in Study Two

Facebook 38-item SMIM scale			LinkedIn 38-item SMIM scale		
Construct and Indicators	Standardized Loading	AVE	Construct and Indicators	Standardized Loading	AVE
DIG ($\alpha = 0.970$; $\omega = 0.970$)		0.681	DIG ($\alpha = 0.967$; $\omega = 0.968$)		0.673
dig32	0.731		dig32	0.666	
dig13	0.868		dig13	0.845	
dig48	0.857		dig48	0.844	
dig39	0.875		dig39	0.907	
dig6	0.789		dig6	0.857	
dig10	0.801		dig10	0.857	
dig41	0.894		dig41	0.848	
dig31	0.812		dig31	0.645	
dig29	0.818		dig29	0.843	
dig36	0.863		dig36	0.848	
dig11	0.834		dig11	0.895	
dig23	0.821		dig23	0.819	
dig30	0.777		dig30	0.725	
dig42	0.905		dig42	0.868	
dig38	0.768		dig38	0.792	
DEF ($\alpha = 0.927$; $\omega = 0.927$)		0.716	DEF ($\alpha = 0.937$; $\omega = 0.936$)		0.746
def2	0.849		def2	0.834	
def6	0.853		def6	0.867	
def29	0.904		def29	0.911	
def41	0.782		def41	0.802	
def18	0.843		def18	0.906	

Note: Models do not include a method factor. Hsp = honest self-promotion; hig = honest ingratiation; dsp = deceptive self-promotion; dig = deceptive ingratiation; def = defensive behaviors.

Table 8

Measurement Properties of the 20-item Scales in Study Two

Facebook 20-item SMIM scale			LinkedIn 20-item SMIM scale		
Construct and Indicators	Standardized Loading	AVE	Construct and Indicators	Standardized Loading	AVE
HSP ($\alpha = 0.924$; $\omega = 0.926$)		0.759	HSP ($\alpha = 0.892$; $\omega = 0.893$)		0.677
hsp10	0.898		hsp10	0.808	
hsp4	0.811		hsp4	0.786	
hsp3	0.853		hsp3	0.849	
hsp44	0.915		hsp44	0.843	
HIG ($\alpha = 0.857$; $\omega = 0.860$)		0.609	HIG ($\alpha = 0.883$; $\omega = 0.885$)		0.661
hig14	0.848		hig14	0.872	
hig6	0.779		hig6	0.854	
hig36	0.798		hig36	0.743	
hig8	0.677		hig8	0.764	
DSP ($\alpha = 0.925$; $\omega = 0.926$)		0.757	DSP ($\alpha = 0.925$; $\omega = 0.926$)		0.758
dsp6	0.894		dsp6	0.868	
dsp5	0.908		dsp5	0.887	
dsp10	0.803		dsp10	0.833	
dsp31	0.900		dsp31	0.898	
DIG ($\alpha = 0.905$; $\omega = 0.904$)		0.703	DIG ($\alpha = 0.916$; $\omega = 0.918$)		0.739
dig48	0.847		dig48	0.836	
dig39	0.908		dig39	0.933	
dig6	0.770		dig6	0.830	
dig23	0.814		dig23	0.810	
DEF ($\alpha = 0.913$; $\omega = 0.914$)		0.727	DEF ($\alpha = 0.923$; $\omega = 0.922$)		0.747
def2	0.909		def2	0.845	
def29	0.826		def29	0.887	
def41	0.853		def41	0.812	
def18	0.820		def18	0.917	

Note: Models do not include a method factor. Hsp = honest self-promotion; hig = honest ingratiation; dsp = deceptive self-promotion; dig = deceptive ingratiation; def = defensive behaviors

Table 9

Prevalence rates of SMIM engagement across Study One and Study Two

Type of SMIM	Study One (<i>N</i> = 548)	
	% endorsed	M(SD)
Honest self-promotion		
hsp10* Post content that highlights my skills	90.00	4.32(1.80)
hsp18 Post when I achieve something I'm proud of	94.00	4.66(1.71)
hsp4* Post content that indicates how hardworking I truly am	88.10	4.26(1.86)
hsp32 Highlight my true knowledge, skills, and abilities	93.80	4.68(1.78)
hsp3* Discuss my personal successes that I have attained	92.00	4.41(1.81)
hsp44* Mention my positive traits	90.30	4.33(1.84)
Honest ingratiation		
hig14* Share content to establish shared interests with others	91.20	4.45(1.71)
hig6* Highlight my shared interests to establish fit with my friends/connections	85.80	4.10(1.87)
hig36* Share content from my friends/connection if it mirrors who I am	88.90	4.38(1.84)
hig8* Share content posted by others because I want them to know I like what they have to say	87.40	4.24(1.87)
Deceptive self-promotion		
dsp20 Slightly modify stories to promote myself in a better way	79.90	3.78(1.98)
dsp28 Selectively post content that enhances positive qualities that I do not truthfully have	67.30	3.38(2.10)
dsp6* Exaggerate my knowledge, skills, or abilities	70.60	3.37(2.06)
dsp5* Give myself more credit than I deserve	67.70	3.31(2.09)
dsp10* Post content that makes me look better than I truly am	74.80	3.61(2.04)
dsp31* Exaggerate my future goals	64.40	3.18(2.04)
dsp18 Spin personal failures to make myself look in control of the situation	68.80	3.35(2.04)
dsp29 Strategically post content that makes me appear more competent than I truly am	68.60	3.35(2.03)

Table 9 Continued

Final item list and prevalence rates of SMIM engagement across Study One and Study Two

Type of SMIM		Study One (<i>N</i> = 548)	
		General Use	
		% endorsed	M(SD)
Deceptive ingratiation			
dig32	Share content that reflects the popular opinion instead of my true opinions	65.70	3.37(2.11)
dig13	Invent misleading content because I think it will be received well by my friends/connections	54.90	2.96(2.12)
dig48*	Tag friends/connections in my posts to make it seem like I care about their opinions when I don't care	61.30	3.16(2.09)
dig39*	Exaggerate my interests in topics because it will make others like me	65.90	3.19(2.04)
dig6*	Insincerely compliment my friends/connections because I want them to like me	62.80	3.12(2.06)
dig10	Deceitfully congratulate others for their accomplishments	59.30	3.01(2.08)
dig41	Distort my personal beliefs and opinions in efforts to be liked by others	59.90	3.00(2.03)
dig31	Endorse the opinions of my friends/connections when they do not align with my own	65.50	3.22(2.06)
dig29	Interact with people I don't care about because I want to be liked by others	62.40	3.04(2.00)
dig36	Brown-nose others to be viewed more favorably	61.30	3.00(1.99)
dig11	Share content from others to appear more similar to them than I actually am	67.50	3.36(2.09)
dig23*	Brag about my friends/connections when I don't believe they deserve it	58.00	2.93(2.01)
dig30	Friend/connect with others I don't like because it will make me look good	61.50	3.00(1.95)
dig42	Falsely claim interests in attempt to be viewed more favorably by my friends/connections	58.20	2.90(2.00)
dig38	Engage with others' content only so they will like me	68.20	3.35(2.05)
Defensive behaviors			
def2*	Untag myself from content that I find embarrassing	87.80	4.37(1.99)
def6	Delete content that does not align with the public image I want to portray	85.80	4.22(2.02)
def29*	Delete social media content that reflects poorly on me	85.40	4.14(2.01)
def41*	Untag myself from photos I don't find appropriate	87.40	4.31(2.01)
def18*	Remove content that will be received poorly by others	85.80	4.08(1.96)

Table 9 Continued

Final item list and prevalence rates of SMIM engagement across Study One and Study Two

Type of SMIM	Study Two (<i>N</i> = 202)				
	Facebook		LinkedIn		
	% endorsed	M(SD)	% endorsed	M(SD)	
Honest self-promotion					
hsp10*	Post content that highlights my skills	79.70	3.48(1.91)	84.70	4.30(2.04)
hsp18	Post when I achieve something I'm proud of	83.70	4.12(2.02)	78.20	3.83(2.10)
hsp4*	Post content that indicates how hardworking I truly am	64.40	2.84(1.87)	68.30	3.30(2.01)
hsp32	Highlight my true knowledge, skills, and abilities	80.70	3.57(1.98)	87.60	4.56(1.91)
hsp3*	Discuss my personal successes that I have attained	75.20	3.43(1.95)	79.70	3.80(2.06)
hsp44*	Mention my positive traits	75.20	3.36(1.96)	81.70	4.25(2.09)
Honest ingratiation					
hig14*	Share content to establish shared interests with others	84.20	3.67(1.87)	69.30	3.23(2.00)
hig6*	Highlight my shared interests to establish fit with my friends/connections	74.80	3.36(1.88)	66.80	3.18(1.99)
hig36*	Share content from my friends/connection if it mirrors who I am	81.20	3.65(1.88)	62.40	2.92(1.91)
hig8*	Share content posted by others because I want them to know I like what they have to say	69.80	3.05(1.80)	60.90	2.78(1.89)
Deceptive self-promotion					
dsp20	Slightly modify stories to promote myself in a better way	48.50	2.21(1.68)	48.00	2.40(1.88)
dsp28	Selectively post content that enhances positive qualities that I do not truthfully have	40.60	2.05(1.62)	43.10	2.13(1.66)
dsp6*	Exaggerate my knowledge, skills, or abilities	47.00	2.05(1.48)	55.00	2.51(1.78)
dsp5*	Give myself more credit than I deserve	41.60	1.93(1.42)	50.00	2.30(1.70)
dsp10*	Post content that makes me look better than I truly am	57.40	2.57(1.79)	55.40	2.65(1.90)
dsp31*	Exaggerate my future goals	44.10	2.06(1.56)	50.50	2.43(1.86)
dsp18	Spin personal failures to make myself look in control of the situation	40.60	1.91(1.42)	44.10	2.22(1.69)
dsp29	Strategically post content that makes me appear more competent than I truly am	47.50	2.22(1.62)	48.00	2.43(1.84)

Table 9 Continued

Final item list and prevalence rates of SMIM engagement across Study One and Study Two

Type of SMIM	Study Two (N = 202)				
	Facebook		LinkedIn		
	% endorsed	M(SD)	% endorsed	M(SD)	
Deceptive ingratiation					
dig32	Share content that reflects the popular opinion instead of my true opinions	47.00	2.00(1.48)	42.10	2.13(1.66)
dig13	Invent misleading content because I think it will be received well by my friends/connections	24.80	1.59(1.24)	27.20	1.73(1.45)
dig48*	Tag friends/connections in my posts to make it seem like I care about their opinions when I don't care	34.70	1.95(1.58)	31.70	1.87(1.54)
dig39*	Exaggerate my interests in topics because it will make others like me	42.60	2.08(1.59)	46.50	2.33(1.82)
dig6*	Insincerely compliment my friends/connections because I want them to like me	45.50	2.02(1.49)	39.60	2.01(1.61)
dig10	Deceitfully congratulate others for their accomplishments	33.20	1.85(1.49)	34.20	1.98(1.69)
dig41	Distort my personal beliefs and opinions in efforts to be liked by others	31.20	1.72(1.36)	35.10	1.92(1.58)
dig31	Endorse the opinions of my friends/connections when they do not align with my own	33.70	1.89(1.57)	37.60	1.93(1.88)
dig29	Interact with people I don't care about because I want to be liked by others	37.60	1.99(1.57)	46.00	2.40(1.88)
dig36	Brown-nose others to be viewed more favorably	29.70	1.68(1.32)	35.10	1.98(1.66)
dig11	Share content from others to appear more similar to them than I actually am	40.60	1.97(1.47)	41.10	2.17(1.68)
dig23*	Brag about my friends/connections when I don't believe they deserve it	32.70	1.85(1.51)	34.70	1.95(1.63)
dig30	Friend/connect with others I don't like because it will make me look good	38.10	1.98(1.58)	52.00	2.62(1.96)
dig42	Falsely claim interests in attempt to be viewed more favorably by my friends/connections	31.20	1.72(1.35)	35.10	1.92(1.56)
dig38	Engage with others' content only so they will like me	50.50	2.26(1.62)	52.00	2.48(1.83)
Defensive behaviors					
def2*	Untag myself from content that I find embarrassing	78.70	3.92(2.17)	62.90	3.32(2.27)
def6	Delete content that does not align with the public image I want to portray	76.70	3.74(2.18)	66.80	3.35(2.20)
def29*	Delete social media content that reflects poorly on me	76.70	3.75(2.20)	64.90	3.38(2.24)
def41*	Untag myself from photos I don't find appropriate	80.20	4.15(2.25)	62.90	3.34(2.30)
def18*	Remove content that will be received poorly by others	71.80	3.38(2.13)	64.40	3.13(2.15)

Note: items marked with an asterisk represent the items in the short-version of the SMIM scale containing 20-items. The percentage column refers to the percent of participants that indicated they engaged in a behavior "to a small extent" (i.e., 2) or higher.