WHAT GERMANY TAUGHT THE U.S. ARMY:
OCCUPATIONAL LESSONS IN POSTWAR GERMANY, 1945-1946

by

JESSICA LYNN BUISMAN

THESIS
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History at The University of Texas at Arlington August, 2020

Arlington, Texas

Supervising Committee:
Joyce S. Goldberg, Supervising Professor
Scott Palmer
Stephen Maizlish
ABSTRACT

WHAT GERMANY TAUGHT THE U.S. ARMY:

OCCUPATIONAL LESSONS IN POSTWAR GERMANY, 1945-1946

Jessica Buisman, Master of Arts in History
The University of Texas at Arlington, 2020

Supervising Professor: Joyce S. Goldberg

The study of the U.S.-occupation of Germany after the Second World War is not complete without understanding its role in changing the culture of the U.S. Army. Statesmen at the wartime conferences determined what policies the Army should implement in Germany, but these proved to be too impossible for the U.S. Army to carry out. The military directive, JCS 1067, emphasized denazification, democratization, and reeducation. U.S. policymakers in Washington envisioned U.S. troops executing these policies without hesitation. This expectation proved faulty as the occupation entered its first year. Denazification, democratization, and reeducation each failed due to a lack of communication, both within the Army command structure and between government agencies. Significantly, the troops themselves were dissatisfied with their role in the occupation. Additionally, GIs believed the Army’s demobilization was moving at too slow a pace. In response to increasing discontent, GIs protested, demonstrated, and resisted in a very loud, very public, very undisciplined manner. Non-fraternization policies greatly contributed to low morale. Instead of protesting this policy, soldiers overtly ignored it and interacted with Germans as they pleased. U.S. Army leaders appeared appalled at the behavior of their troops and leaders such as Dwight D. Eisenhower and Lucius D. Clay acted to regain control over the soldiers. Eisenhower sought ways to better understand the needs of the troops. Clay created morale-boosting programs to divert the GIs’ attention from their roles as occupiers. While the U.S. Army and Congress ultimately modified the non-fraternization policy. These changes reflected both the actions of the soldiers on the ground and the lack of communication that had prompted them to act. What may have appeared to be concessions to soldier dissatisfaction became the beginning of a larger cultural change within the U.S. Army.
### LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>President Roosevelt’s map of postwar occupation zones created aboard the USS Iowa</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Map of occupation zones presented at the Yalta conference</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Women march to Minnesota governor’s office in protest of the demobilization program</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Baltimore children with Bring Daddy Back sign</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Representatives of the Bring Daddy Back clubs corner Eisenhower to protest demobilization program</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Chart showing progress of demobilization from May 1945 to June 1946</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>U.S. Army Active Duty Military Troop Strength, 1789-2019</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Pocket Guide to Germany</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Cover of <em>Newsweek</em> showing an American Gi with a German woman</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Allied Control Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS</td>
<td>Combined Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIC</td>
<td>Counter-Intelligence Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E&amp;RA</td>
<td>Education and Religious Affairs Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>European Advisory Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GYA</td>
<td>German Youth Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICD</td>
<td>Information Control Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>Military Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSS</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWD</td>
<td>Psychological Warfare Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAEF</td>
<td>Supreme Commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAEF</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters of Allied Expeditionary Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USO</td>
<td>United Services Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WACS</td>
<td>Women’s Army Corps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ALLIED CONFERENCES

Tripartite Meeting in Cairo, November 22-26, 1943
Tripartite Meeting in Tehran, November 28-December 1, 1943
Tripartite Meeting in Quebec, September 12-16, 1944
Tripartite Meeting in Malta, January 30-February 2, 1945
Tripartite Meeting in Yalta, February 4-11, 1945
Tripartite Meeting in Potsdam, July 17-August 2, 1945
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................................................. ii

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES........................................................................................................ iii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS...................................................................................................................... iv

LIST OF ALLIED CONFERENCES............................................................................................................. v

INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................ 1

CHAPTER ONE: PLANNING THE OCCUPATION.................................................................................. 9

CHAPTER TWO: OCCUPATION POLICY, 1945.................................................................................... 43

CHAPTER THREE: DISSENTION AND TRANSFORMATION.............................................................. 72

CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................................................... 114

BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................................................... 120

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH....................................................................................................................... 127
INTRODUCTION

The Allied occupation of Germany has been studied both by historians and those who witnessed it. The manner in which it has been considered, however, has changed over the last seventy years. The postwar decision makers who wrote memoirs detailing their experiences during the Second World War and the occupation offered a glimpse into what it was like to make the policies. Deputy Military Governor Lucius D. Clay wrote a memoir, *Decision in Germany*, detailing his role in the occupation and the problems he faced during that time. Clay’s observations provide important perspectives on how the Military Government (MG) approached the difficulties in implementing occupation policies, such as denazification and non-fraternization, and the problems soldiers encountered while implementing those policies.¹ General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s memoir, *At Ease: Stories I Tell To Friends*, provides additional insight into how military leaders influenced the way the occupation was planned and his role in implementing the occupation policies as the first Military Governor.² Other memoirs describe what it was like to witness and participate in occupation decision-making. Frank Byrnes, John Foster Dulles, Robert D. Murphy, and Henry L. Stimson each wrote about their political and diplomatic experiences concerning German occupation over the course of the 1940s and 1950s. Their memoirs contribute an eyewitness account of how policies were made.³

As historians began to analyze the occupation, they did so within the broader lens of the emerging Cold War. Politics and economics are the most common themes of their monographs.

---

In 1957, Harold Zink published *The United States in Germany, 1944-1955*. His influential book connected the occupation to the larger picture of U.S.-Soviet tensions, focusing on the military and civilian leaders of the occupation and their decisions in determining how the U.S. occupation would proceed. Those decisions were focused on how to combat the spread of communism into the American zone and how to proceed in the joint occupation of Berlin. Using government and military sources, Zink analyzed the political and economic influences over military policy and assessed their interconnectedness during the occupation. So engrained in the historiography was the notion of the occupation as part of the Cold War, that macrohistories like Zink’s remained the standard for decades. Historians referenced Zink as they used the Cold War to explain the policies of the occupation. John Gimbel, Warren F. Kimball, and John H. Backer each provided differing views of the occupation, but within the context of the Cold War. The political and economic approaches of these monographs focus on the U.S. military and political leaders, their decisions, and their reactions to the occupation because of the geographic closeness to the Soviets. These types of arguments offer a top down study of the occupation as U.S. leaders made decisions while facing the emerging Soviet power. The historiography viewed the occupation as part of a large Cold War strategy since historians placed the occupation in the context of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship.

Microhistories written more recently provide an important human element. More than bureaucrats or cold warriors, U.S. soldiers and German citizens have finally given voice to the

---

day to day elements of the occupation. Although the Cold War still dominates these histories, a new focus on the individuals involved reveals the social and cultural developments that resulted from the occupation. Edward N. Peterson’s *The Many Faces of Defeat: The German People’s Experience in 1945* analyzes how the German people transitioned from surrender to occupation. Their experiences allowed Peterson to describe the effect of occupation policies, such as denazification, on the German people. Similarly, Heidi Fehrenbach’s *Race After Hitler: Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany and America* provides a look into race relations between African American GIs and the Germans. Her study gives a new perspective on to the occupation as the children born out of the intimate relationships with U.S. occupation forces dealt with policies and racial prejudices. Similarly, Fredrick Taylor’s *Exorcising Hitler: The Occupation and Denazification of Germany* and Richard Bessel’s *Germany 1945: From War to Peace* contribute additional insights into the everyday consequences of occupation on the German people.6 These histories create a more complete image of how GIs and Germans reacted to occupation policies.

That image is not complete. What has been lacking in all those studies is the relationship between soldiers and the U.S. Army. The U.S. government handed down occupation policies, both civilian and military, to the occupation army. U.S. policymakers neither anticipated or considered that the policies they created to denazify and democratize the German people would, in fact, change the culture of the U.S. Army. The miscalculation was one of expectations in Washington and the realities on the ground. The U.S. Army expected its soldiers to enforce

---

occupation policies. The soldiers did not behave as expected. Instead, GIs staged protests against the Army’s demobilization process and disregarded non-fraternization orders. In the end, the soldiers of the occupation army of 1945-1946 redefined the relationship between the U.S. Army and its troops. Army officials, instead of reprimanding the soldiers *en masse* for insubordination, decided to listen to the soldiers and take collective GI discontent into consideration when making policies. The cultural structure that had defined the U.S. Army of the Second World War changed significantly after V-J Day. The chain of command came to realize it could not issue policy orders that the soldiers found impractical to carry out. Soldiers who often misunderstood their role in the occupation or who considered their orders unreasonable reacted to policies through public demonstrations that lacked military decorum. The first year of the U.S.-occupation of Germany created several opportunities for soldiers to express individualism rather than demonstrate collective military discipline. Their behavior transformed the relationship between U.S. Army leaders and troops on the ground, and ultimately transformed the overall culture of the U.S. Army.

To fully understand how this transition took place, a more complete investigation into the creation of the occupation policies is required. Wartime conferences between the Allied nations from 1943 to 1945 set the tone for how each country would occupy and govern their individual zones of occupation. Allied leaders disagreed on the severity of punishment Germany should receive, but all agreed that Germany should be rehabilitated and converted into a country that could never wage war again. Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin argued that the best way to ensure lasting peace was to reduce the German standard of living below that of any other Allied nation by reallocating the country’s industrial production to the immediate eastern neighboring nations, including the Soviet Union. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill disagreed,
fearing that such severe punishment would only cause the Germans to resist occupation and leave lasting resentment toward their occupiers. U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt stood between these two, agreeing with Stalin that the Germans should be punished, but not, despite Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau’s proposal, reduce them to a pre-industrial state. Roosevelt also agreed with Churchill that the Germans should be treated in such a way to foster cooperation instead of resentment.

In the American zone, the U.S. Army received occupation directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a document coded JCS 1067. The orders outlined three major policies that would occupy the Army’s first six months of occupation: denazification, democratization, and reeducation. Denazification entailed the arrest and detention of participatory Nazis. After the first wave of denazification arrests, those deemed to have been less active members of the party were dismissed from their jobs in politics, business, and education. As much as denazification was meant to demilitarize the American zone, it also led to significant problems for military governors. How could they govern local municipalities without training or even knowledge of local politics? Military leaders found the task more difficult when the only experienced German leaders were associated either actively or peripherally with the Nazi party. Unwilling to compromise the task of democratization, some military governors ignored their orders and consulted or employed former Nazis within the new local governments. According to JCS 1067, once the Germans were denazified and introduced to democratic ideals, the U.S. Army should then reeducate the German people. The U.S. Army should to purge all remnants of Nazi ideology from German culture and politics and replace them with an imagined version of “The American Way of Life.” That entailed an overhaul of the entire German education system. Most policies proved unworkable from the start. U.S. military leaders had not anticipated the
occupation policies failing and certainly had not planned for dissent from their own soldiers. By the end of 1945, each of JCS 1067’s policies had failed or were at a standstill due to resistance from the Germans, U.S. Army leaders, or GIs.

In the first year of occupation, two U.S. Army policies were at the forefront of the public’s attention: demobilization and non-fraternization. The U.S. military had begun planning the demobilization of combat veterans in the fall of 1944. A new point system, the Adjusted Service Rating, determined when a soldier became eligible for demobilization. U.S. military leaders devised the system to provide a gradual release of soldiers while ensuring enough men and women would remain available for occupation duty. At the same time, the draft continued to supply replacements in Germany as combat veterans made their way home or to the Pacific. By the winter of 1945, GIs in Germany and their families back home concluded demobilization was an unnecessarily slow process. Massive letter writing campaigns to state representatives and local newspapers brought national attention to their dissatisfaction, but did not produce any immediate change. U.S. soldiers in Germany complained to their superior officers and even telegrammed President Harry S. Truman and Army Chief of Staff Dwight D. Eisenhower, but they never received a response or an explanation of why they were still stuck in Germany.

To these men, the occupation provided little satisfaction and they found themselves without purpose. The MG told the GIs they were in Germany to police the Germans and keep them from reverting to Nazi militarism. These ambiguous orders left the GIs with a lack of motivation to stay in Germany. On the ground, from day to day, the German people offered little reason to doubt they were defeated, and so U.S. soldiers continued to press for transportation home. In January 1945, a series of mass demonstrations in Frankfurt and Berlin brought the level of soldier dissatisfaction to a very visible light. Thousands of GIs marched to Military
Government headquarters to complain about their situation and to demand repatriation. Military Governor Joseph T. McNarney banned the demonstrations, but his orders did not quiet the soldiers. Eisenhower heard directly from the soldiers’ families in the United States and watched as his once disciplined army became insubordinate. Demobilization, Eisenhower reasoned, had already exceeded the carefully formulated quota. Nonetheless, Eisenhower sought to understand why U.S. soldiers were behaving in such an undisciplined way. The Army Chief of Staff sent investigators to Germany to interview soldiers. Ultimately, Eisenhower’s reaction to the GI demonstrations gave way to a new relationship between the U.S. military leaders and the troops. Communication became a two-way street, although it would take more than protests in Germany to change U.S. Army culture.

In the fall of 1944, Eisenhower had also prohibited the Allied armies from fraternizing with the German populace. This policy extended into 1945 and became an integral part of occupation policies. Soldiers were ordered to resist forming relationships with German men, women, and even young children. If a soldier was found to have disobeyed the order, he faced a court martial. Of all orders, GIs found this the most impractical of all. How could they democratize and reeducate Germans if they were not allowed to talk to them? Moreover, aside from official military policy, U.S. soldiers found German women friendly and inviting, and they often pursued sexual relationships with them without a second thought to non-fraternization orders. Although courts martial were threatened, fraternization was so prevalent that the U.S. Army realized it would be difficult to charge every soldier with disobeying a direct order. With the American public reading about fraternization in local newspapers, U.S. Army leaders decided change the policy so that the soldiers would be less inclined to continue with their insubordination. The non-fraternization policy was slowly modified over the course of a year
and, by December 1946, GIs were allowed to marry German women and bring their own children to America. The GIs’ disregard for a policy they deemed unnecessary forced the U.S. Army to realize it could not control every aspect of the occupation and its troops’ lives and still achieve the objective of the occupation. Changes had to be made to preserve the integrity of the Army in the wake of public attention to discontent among soldiers of the occupation. If not for the unworkable nature of the policies and U.S. leaders’ expectations that they could command the occupation army as they had the wartime army, the U.S. Army would likely not have created a new type of relationship with its troops or changed the culture of the Army.
CHAPTER ONE
PLANNING THE OCCUPATION

In the wartime years leading up to the U.S. Army’s occupation of Germany, the U.S. civilian government worked together with the Allied powers to devise occupation plans. In meetings and tripartite conferences, the Allies agreed Germany must surrender unconditionally and be rendered unable to ever again wage war on the continent. One important question remained undecided: which of the Allied nations would oversee this postwar objective? Many other questions of politics and economics arose from this uncertainty. Meanwhile, some U.S. cabinet members argued that a punitive peace would prevent future conflict. Others thought the First World War’s dictated, harsh peace had led to the Second World War and believed a softer approach would be better. From 1939 to 1945 occupation plans and policies constantly changed based on wartime operations. It was not until 1946 that U.S. and Allied leaders finally reached an agreement on policy. The biggest problem was not so much punishment of Nazi party leaders or generals, but how to treat the German population. Were they complicit with Adolf Hitler’s war crimes? Or were they, too, the victims of a dictator?

The implementation of occupation would initially fall to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the U.S. Army and Supreme Commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces. He imagined the occupation would last less than a year, or until a German civilian government could assume the nation’s management. Instead, in 1944, the U.S. Army entered Germany and stayed. The armed forces fought their way into Germany only to remain and occupy the country. These war-hardened Americans constructed the guiding principles that the long-term occupation would follow, despite U.S. civilian leaders’ attempts to dictate policy. It was within this division of power that the U.S. Army transformed into a constabulary. This change in military culture did
not just affect the troops stationed in Germany, but also future U.S. military policy. In places like Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, wars waged on because U.S. policymakers believed they could occupy a nation and mold its people in their American image.

An Economic Power

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), established in 1921, served as a think tank on matters such as U.S. foreign and economic policy. In the years leading up to U.S. involvement in the Second World War, the CFR examined the role the United States should play on the global stage. Domestic debates over isolationist and imperialist policies became more vital in the summer of 1940 as German troops conquered France and expanded Germany’s sphere of influence in Europe. Policymakers needed to create new foreign policies based on the changing political environment. By 1941, the CFR began to debate how involved would the United States be in a world ravaged by two world wars in the span of thirty years? The CFR devised a plan in the Spring of 1941 that placed the United States at the head of a “one world economy.” Known as the “Grand Area,” the CFR did not assume German defeat. It did, however, assume the United States would emerge unscathed from the war. The Grand Area Plan served as a “short-range war or defense measure” against future hostilities by increasing U.S. economic and military influence in the world. The first implementation of the Grand Area plan surfaced within the lend-lease program, naval assistance to Great Britain in the Atlantic, and the economic embargo of Japan.⁷

---

⁷ Though the CFR was a private think tank, it operated as a government body. This allowed the CFR access to government resources and intelligence. The council’s reports and studies were thorough and objective, allowing the U.S. government to use these conclusions to make public policies. While the CFR worked on placing the United States in an economically advantageous position during the war, it also began looking at postwar plans that would spread U.S. influence around the world. Laurence H. Shoup
The CFR was not the only group working on postwar policy. The privately funded War and Peace Studies (WPS) project was the Council of Foreign Ministers and State Department’s planning group. The civilian group created confidential reports on postwar options for U.S. leaders. Although it began work on 15 December 1939, the WPS joined the CFR in 1942, becoming part of a larger Civilian Advisory Board tasked with making suggestions for “shaping the world after the war.” The majority of WPS’s studies did not suggest policy but focused on long-term discussions over the future of the United States based on current foreign policy and American values.8 The State Department’s Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy set the framework for all postwar decisions made between 1942 and 1944. The fourteen-member committee discussed issues of national policy, the relationship between those policies and the rest of the world, and the establishment of an international organization headed by the United States.9 Each of these planning groups foresaw a devastated and diminished British Empire in the postwar period, leaving room for a rising U.S. influence on the international stage. General George V. Strong, at an Advisory Committee meeting in May 1942, spoke to the committee, agreeing that the United States “must cultivate a mental view toward world settlement after this war which will enable us to impose our own terms, amounting perhaps to a pax-Americana.” Based on Strong’s statements and reports published by the Advisory Committee, it was clear to

---

9 Roosevelt authorized the creation of the Advisory Committee. It reported directly to the Secretary of State, bypassing the State Department. The 14-member committee was made up from State Department officials, businessmen, politicians, lawyers, journalists, and professional researchers. None were from the U.S. military, though meetings were occasionally attended by members of the armed forces. Shoup and Minter, Imperial Brain Trust, 148–50.
the U.S. leaders that once the war ended, the United States would not return to its isolationist tendencies. 10

The United States could not determine postwar policy alone, just as it could not solely end the war with Germany. The Allied forces were required to work together on the continent, just as policy leaders needed to come together to determine the endgame. Several wartime conferences between the three powers took place in the last three years of the war. As U.S. leaders met with the other powers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) provided strategic planning and direction for the conferences. Unfortunately, President Franklin D. Roosevelt did not give his opinion on a specific strategic plan to any of the advisory committees. 11 Instead, he made comments to his advisors or to top officials, but did not provide them a written directive for the postwar period. Roosevelt’s naval aid, Captain John L. McCrea wrote in a memorandum in December 1942 that the president “visualized [that] some sort of international police force will come out of the war.” 12 Postwar military planners supported that notion. These men believed a large armed force would be a useful “safety valve” to preclude any economic problems that may arise in the aftermath of the war due to the sudden return of soldiers to the labor force. Additionally, the Soviet commitment to aid in the Pacific seemed “vague” at best, necessitating the maintenance of a force large enough to defeat Japan. 13 Both the economic and foreign threat of communist influence in the east necessitated the creation of foreign bases to house the large armed force close to the threat. The current State Department and Congress were wary of

10 Strong previously worked on the War and Peace Studies Project in 1940 and was at the meeting as a representative of the subcommittee. Quoted in Shoup and Minter, 164.
12 Quoted in Mark A. Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 107.
forming a standing army and stationing it on foreign lands during peacetime. Prior to the war, both agencies frowned on this policy, believing that base building was “bad diplomacy.”

However, even as U.S. leaders bemoaned a standing army, the Allied leaders also believed that the best way to ensure that Germany could not wage a third war would be military occupation of the country.

1943 Plans

How would Germany fare in the postwar period? The simplest answer, and most generally agreed upon, was dismembering Germany into separate states and occupying those states after the war ended. Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin first proposed the idea of dividing Germany in 1941. Speaking with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Stalin commented that the Treaty of Versailles had been too harsh on Germany, “a thousand times worse than Brest Litovsk.” After hearing Stalin’s suggestions about how Germany should be broken up, Eden passed on the words to Churchill, who then spoke with Roosevelt. The U.S. leader considered the postwar action, then ordered more research into its implementation. Four committees worked for over a year to outline a workable solution. By 1943, the decision appeared simple, but the implementation proved complicated. The concluding report, “H-24 Germany: Partition,’’ provided possible partition lines for Roosevelt’s consideration. It outlined arguments both for and against dismemberment, hoping to present the fullest picture. The report noted partition would leave Germany weak and unable to wage war. However, it may also create dissent within the population and leave the people too bitter for reconciliation with the Western powers.

15 Prior to 1943, the Allies debated breaking Germany into separate states. After the “H-24 Germany: Partition” report was released, the leaders began to discuss other options. Dismemberment, partition, and
Foreign policy advisor Sumner Welles was one of many who supported partition. He commented: “German unity means a continuing threat to the peace of the world . . . partition is the only way of offsetting the German menace in the future.”\(^{16}\) The type of partition enforced, the report noted, was a permanent division of Prussia into individual states. Allied leaders did not agree on how this partition would take place, but they all agreed on the need for some type of military occupation and postwar control of the German population.

On his way to a 1943 tripartite meeting in Cairo, Roosevelt presented his thoughts on partition to his advisors aboard the *USS Iowa*. He took a map and drew lines while making comments to the JCS. The resulting document made it clear to his staff that Roosevelt intended for each of the three major Allied powers to take part in the governing of postwar Germany. He assumed the Soviets would not object but he anticipated some resistance from the British over U.S. intention to control Germany’s northeastern region.\(^ {17}\) No matter which country controlled which section, it became clear to policymakers in 1943 that the Allied countries intended to occupy Germany after the war. The occupation would, at first, be a military necessity to ensure peace, pursue legal punishment of Germans, and oversee the relocation of prisoners. Postwar planners understood the Allied armies would need to remain in order to assure a smooth transition from war to peace.

---

\(^{16}\) Quoted in Backer, 24.

British and American leaders realized they needed to continue working with the Soviet Union after the war, yet a certain level of cautiousness persisted at each conference with the Soviets. Western leaders invited Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov to their meetings. According to American Ambassador to the Soviet Union W. Averell Harriman, in November 1943 Molotov showed “increasing enjoyment” at his admittance as a full member to the councils. However, Harriman warned Roosevelt that this cooperation was not on solid
ground. Soviet leaders supported postwar plans to defeat Hitler and Nazism, but their own idea of postwar vengeance was harsher than the Americans envisioned. Already in 1943, the Soviet Union demanded reparations that would ensure that the German population would be reduced to a lower standard of living than the Soviet population. While each Allied power agreed that Germany should “never again be able to disturb the peace of the world,” how they planned to do that differed.

At the Tehran conference in November 1943, the German question occupied only a small amount of the Allied leaders’ time. At a dinner on 28 November, each head of state agreed to the division of Germany but could not agree on how severely the German population should be punished. Roosevelt wanted to eliminate all remnants of the Third Reich. Stalin wanted more than just the destruction of Germany’s political system. He emphasized the need for the Allies to control Germany in such a way that there would be no risk of future German militarism but did not articulate any policy beyond dismemberment. Even Winston Churchill’s suggestion that they supervise all German industry did not satisfy the Soviet leader. In Stalin’s words: “any furniture factories could be transformed into airplane factories and any watch factories could make fuses for shells.” Stalin, it appeared, had no faith in the reform of the German population and meant to punish each person for the crimes of their leaders and military. The Soviet Premier wanted to make an example out of the German Command Staff. He suggested “at least

---

18 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President, Moscow, November 4, 1943 FRUS 1943 Cairo and Tehran, 152–54.
20 Tripartite Dinner Meeting, November 28, 1943 FRUS 1943 Cairo and Tehran, 509–12; Memorandum of Marshal Stalin’s Views as Expressed During the Evening of November 28, 1943 FRUS 1943 Cairo and Tehran, 513–14; Roosevelt-Stalin Meeting, November 29, 1943 FRUS 1943 Cairo and Tehran, 529–32.
50,000 and perhaps 100,000 of the [men] must be physically liquidated.” Churchill disagreed with the “cold blooded execution,” suggesting they stand trial for their crimes. Despite these disagreements, the three leaders still concluded that the German state must be dismembered and occupied under a “trusteeship.”

After the Tehran conference, the U.S. Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) began work on a postwar plan that would account for Germany’s immediate capitulation. Operation RANKIN provided directives on how the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) should proceed. In December 1943, Soviet forces concluded their Kursk counter-offensive and were preparing to attack the Nazis in the Ukraine, allowing Eisenhower to follow RANKIN instructions to divide Germany into two spheres: one American and the other British. As the war continued, official directives reflected the agreements made at Cairo and Tehran. The postwar period would require continued Soviet cooperation. During the war, U.S. planners recognized that if the Soviet Union survived the conflict with Germany, “it would emerge from the war with enormous power and influence,” regardless of mounting Soviet casualties. Civilian and military advisors supported a cautious stance when it came to their Soviet allies. In 1943, as Operations OVERLORD and RANKIN were taking shape, planners could not predict what Soviet foreign policy would be in the years following peace. Some believed the USSR would embrace postwar cooperation. Others feared the Soviets would embrace an aggressive expansionist

21 Tripartite Dinner Meeting, November 29, 1943 FRUS 1943 Cairo and Tehran, 552–55; Tripartite Political Meeting, December 1, 1943 FRUS 1943 Cairo and Tehran, 596–605.
22 Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes, December 4, 1943 FRUS 1943 Cairo and Tehran, 682–89; Memorandum by the United Chiefs of Staff, C.C.S. 320/4 (Revised), December 4, 1943 FRUS 1943 Cairo and Tehran, 786–87; Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister, C.C.S. 426/1, December 6, 1943 FRUS 1943 Cairo and Tehran, 810–14.
23 Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II, 124.
policy.\textsuperscript{24} Despite this fear, postwar planners tended to disregard the Soviet Union as a military threat. They believed Soviet naval and air power were inferior to U.S. forces. Only through a land invasion could the USSR pose a military threat, which the Special Planning Division concluded was improbable. The Soviet Union, therefore, stood primarily as a political and psychological threat to U.S. interests in Europe, yet one policymakers could not ignore.\textsuperscript{25}

If prolonged occupation of Germany did take place, who would organize it? This question fell to the U.S. Army. In a letter to Churchill on February 7, 1944, Roosevelt noted that military occupation would immediately follow the success of OVERLORD. The “spheres of occupational responsibility,” which were yet to be determined, were “militarily feasible.”\textsuperscript{26}

While each leader agreed to Soviet control of East Germany, Churchill and Roosevelt fought over the northern region. The possibility of German collapse after OVERLORD made it clear to Churchill that the British should control the northwest areas. Strategically, British forces would cross the continent from the northwest while the Americans invaded from the west. If Churchill followed Roosevelt’s suggestion, the lines of communication would cross, or the troops would have to withdraw and reembark to be in position to occupy Germany. Neither of these options was feasible. Roosevelt reasoned that Churchill should allow Eisenhower’s office to make plans, whether or not they agreed on whose forces should occupy the northwest. Still, Roosevelt hoped

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 134–36.
his British counterpart would understand that “there is ample time” for these decisions to be made since Germany showed no sign of collapsing.27

The Allied powers tasked the European Advisory Commission (EAC), created at the Moscow Conference in 1943, with issuing recommendations for postwar Europe. The Commission included representatives from the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union and set up headquarters in London. After studying the military, political, and economic problems the postwar period would present, the EAC made its recommendations. The CCS would use the Commission’s reports to generate directives. The Allied powers agreed the EAC was necessary but disagreed on where the commission should be permanently located. In multiple memorandum, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy emphasized American discomfort with a commission located in a foreign land that determined U.S. policy. The Soviets held the same reservation. However, by the end of November 1943, the EAC’s increase in responsibilities forced McCloy to admit the difficulty in disregarding their findings or even relegating them to “minor importance.” A December 1943 agenda presented a priority list for the commission to address. Numbers three through five focused on Germany: first the armistice, then military government, and finally surrender.28 In August 1944, Churchill added one more item to this list: “prepare a program for the dismemberment of Germany.” Even as Churchill

27 The southern zone of occupation included parts of France, with the expectation that the occupation force would aid in France’s recover. Roosevelt did not want any part of this. Churchill to Roosevelt, No. 589, February 23, 1944 449–50; For the continued conversation, see 501–4.
28 Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy), November 22, 1943 FRUS 1943 Cairo and Tehran, 420–21; Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy), November 25, 1943 FRUS 1943 Cairo and Tehran, 416–20; The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Winant), December 2, 1943 FRUS 1943 Cairo and Tehran, 773–75.
disagreed with his American and Soviet counterparts on the severity of punishment, he knew he could not convince them to reconsider. Germany would be divided.

The Morgenthau Plan

During 1944 and 1945, Allied leaders met four more times before Germany’s surrender. At these conferences, Operation OVERLORD created a sense of urgency for the leaders to decide the postwar treatment of Germany. With the Allied invasion and Stalin’s troops moving in on Berlin from the East, the question of the postwar period loomed over the leaders. U.S. and Soviet planners wanted harsh punishment not just for Nazi leaders but also for the German people. Reminiscent of the Treaty of Versailles, these plans intended to reduce the German population to an agricultural state, incapable of industrial production. Other plans were less severe but still required long-term military occupation. The question soon arose, who would occupy Germany? For the Americans, they had occupation experience in the Philippines after the Philippine-American War and in the Rhineland after the Great War. Those experiences left U.S. policymakers questioning if they needed to re-evaluate occupation policies. They wanted to ensure Germany would never again become a threat. Postwar planners needed to find a system that worked, and that would require transformation in how the U.S. Army occupied a nation and controlled a population.

The largest shadow that loomed over postwar planners was the Treaty of Versailles and its postwar effect on Germany. Policymakers were divided on the effectiveness of the previous peace treaty with Germany. How much did it provoke the current war? Did it go too far, or not

---

29 Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (White), August 13, 1944 FRUS 1943 Cairo and Tehran, 881–82; Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (White), August 15, 1944 FRUS 1943 Cairo and Tehran, 883–84.
far enough? Those who favored policies of repression believed Versailles had been too lenient, allowing Hitler to rise to power. Policymakers who advocated for a rehabilitative approach saw that treaty as too harsh, leading to the social and economic situation in which Hitler’s *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (NASDP) came to power.  

In preparation for the Second Quebec Conference, the CCS compiled recommendations from the various postwar committees within the State Department and EAC. They could not rely on any directive from the U.S. president because as of September 1944, he had not given one. Roosevelt would later state that because “we have not occupied Germany, I cannot agree at this moment as to what kind of a Germany we want in every detail.” This gave planners a sense of flexibility in what to recommend at Quebec.

Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr. proposed the first, and most controversial, postwar plan. He wanted Germany severely weakened, as it had been after the Great War. His plan included stripping the Ruhr of all existing industries to the point where it would be so “weakened and controlled that it cannot in feasible future become an industrial area.” Morgenthau’s proposed plan of action would see the U.S. Army moving through Germany, destroying or removing all manufacturing plants. He wanted Germany’s economy dependent solely on agriculture and its people surviving on international good-will. In August 1944, Morgenthau claimed “there can be no peace on earth—no security for any man, woman or

---

32 Quoted in Murphy, 228.

21
child—if aggressor nations like Germany . . . retain any power to strike at their neighbors.”

The next month, he made clear that he did not care about the welfare of the German population: “why the hell should I worry about what happens to their people?” Morgenthau represented a great many men in the U.S. government who wanted Germany punished for Hitler’s Nazi Regime, but others saw a different way to punish Germany without reducing the country to a pastoral state.

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson did not see Morgenthau’s plan as either enforceable or beneficial to the rest of Europe. The economic welfare of Germany remained an important part of postwar discussions. Stimson wrote to Roosevelt that if the German people were held to “subsistence levels” this would only create “tensions and resentments far outweighing any immediate advantage of security,” obscuring any Nazi guilt. Instead, he offered an Allied occupation and military government sufficient to keep Germany docile.

The Secretary of War documented in his diary his reservations about Morgenthau’s “very bitter atmosphere of personal resentment against the entire German people without regard to individual guilt.” Stimson expressed fear that the Treasury’s plan would “result in our taking mass vengeance . . . in the shape of clumsy economic action. This, in my opinion, will be ineffective and will inevitably produce a very dangerous reaction in Germany and probably a new war.”

The most common opposition to the Treasury’s plan was its destruction of the German economy. The collective welfare of Europe’s economy depended on the Ruhr’s industrial output. In preparation for the Quebec conference, Morgenthau’s staff worked to edit his plan, releasing a newly titled report,

35 Quoted in Blum, 582.
36 The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President, September 5, 1944, *FRUS 1944 Quebec*, 98–100; Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Stimson), September 9, 1944, *FRUS 1944 Quebec*, 123–25.
37 Quoted in Blum, *Roosevelt and Morgenthau*, 578.
“Program to Prevent Germany from Starting a World War III.” The synopsis remained tied to the destruction of Germany industry, but added all large estates should be broken up and distributed to the peasants, disavowing any economic hierarchical system. The secretaries of War and Treasury did not disagree on objectives, which remained the security of Europe and Germany’s defeat. But Stimson worried that Morgenthau’s plan would only poison “the springs out of which we hope that the future peace of the world can be maintained.” The disagreements continued as U.S. leaders met with the Allied heads of states at Quebec.

At a meeting on September 13, Churchill heard Morgenthau’s plan for Germany. Lord Charles McMoran Wilson, Churchill’s personal physician, wrote in his diary that the topic of discussion at the dinner meeting focused solely on “how to prevent another war with Germany.” Calling the Americans’ plan “drastic,” Lord Moran also documented Churchill’s dismissal of such harsh punishment. Morgenthau told Stimson and Hull that the British Prime Minister was “violently opposed” to the plan. According to Morgenthau’s notes on the meeting, Churchill equated the plan to chaining England to a “dead body.” Admiral William D. Leahy, Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff, supported Churchill’s position, remaining unsympathetic to the Treasury’s postwar program. As for President Roosevelt, he did not reply to Churchill’s concerns nor to Morgenthau’s rebuttals, but commented that the Soviets expected a hard peace. Treasury’s proposal provided Stalin with that strict peace. By the next day, Roosevelt supported the removal of industry and reducing Germany to an agricultural state, commenting that the country “could not be trusted with these facilities for making weapons.”

39 Editor’s notes on the Roosevelt-Churchill Dinner, September 13, 1944 FRUS 1944 Quebec, 324–28.
40 Memorandum by the British Paymaster-General (Cherwell), September 14, 1944 FRUS 1944 Quebec, 342–44.
Relegating the German population to dependence on Europeans became the focus of American newspapers. Unknown to Allied leaders, an anonymous leak of the Morgenthau Plan provided newspapers in September 1944 with plenty to write about. The first question involved Morgenthau’s role in the postwar decision making. One article asked why the Secretary of the Treasury went to the Quebec conference and why he, not the secretaries of War or State, made decisions on the postwar world. *New York Times*’ principal political writer and analyst Arthur Krock credited Morgenthau with being the “central civilian government official” concerned with postwar policy with the ability to bend Roosevelt’s ear toward his own decisions. The disagreement between Morgenthau and Stimson quickly became public knowledge. Known as the “opposition within the Cabinet” in newspapers, the American people learned that the Treasury Secretary planned to leave the German population in a state of “starvation.” “Hot Arguments” between the cabinet members led the public to question whether the “hard peace” was too punitive and “have we gone mad?” President Roosevelt’s waning support of the plan upon his return from Quebec also fed the media’s condemnation of Treasury’s recommendations.

In September 1944, while Roosevelt campaigned for his fourth presidential term, the president faced unwanted attention surrounding the controversial Treasury plan. In a letter to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Roosevelt lambasted the individual who “spoke out of turn” to

---

the newspapers about the plan. Faced with half-truths in the papers about his intentions for German industrial capacity, Roosevelt dissolved the Cabinet Committee on German Policy. He tasked the State Department with studying and reporting on the problem of postwar Germany.\(^{42}\) Late-September articles seized on the president’s reversal of support for Morgenthau’s plan. Krock noted that Roosevelt’s abandonment of Morgenthau’s “Carthaginian” plan for Germany was due to how much publicity the American and German media gave the Treasury’s recommendations. Another analyst called the publication of the plan “unfortunate” and “too severe to win the approval of the American [and British] public.”\(^{43}\)

Morgenthau did not give up on his plan for Germany, despite waning support from the White House. In January 1945, the Treasury Secretary wrote Roosevelt, more convinced than ever that to ensure Germany no longer posed a threat in the postwar period, “she must be deprived of her chemical, metallurgical and electrical industries.” He argued that those who disagreed with his September recommendations did so not because of concern over the European economy, but “simply a fear of Russia and communism.”\(^{44}\) He continued to insist that those who argued Germany could be used as a “bulwark” against the communist Soviet Union were ignorant of the past. These fears of communist influence spreading west added fuel to the feud between Morgenthau and his opponents. Stalin and Molotov’s obsession over Germany’s

---


industry left men like Stimson to question Soviet motives. The Soviets wanted to destroy Germany’s industrial power and to distribute all production materials to Europeans. This plan would leave Germany destitute and dependent on the occupying powers. Morgenthau claimed Europe could recover from the war without German industry. Those who “insist Germany should be treated with ‘kindness’” to prevent another world war were illogical and naïve.\(^{45}\) In a monograph published in 1945, Morgenthau argued that if U.S. foreign policy reflected fears of communism, America risked succumbing to a self-fulfilling prophesy. Peace in Europe could only be achieved through an alliance of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. Continued peace depended on continuing that alliance. If, as his opposition argued, U.S. policy towards Germany focused on constructing it as a “bulwark against Russia,” it would only increase tensions between the United States and Soviet Union.\(^{46}\) Caution was not an impractical position, but it was not a popular perspective with policymakers in 1945. Morgenthau only cared about the punishment of the German people, even if it meant allowing the Soviets to dominate postwar policy.

The Treasury Secretary also feared that the connection the American public had with the German population would only grow stronger if the U.S. soldiers remained in Germany after the war. Modeling his recommendations after post-World War I demobilization policies, he advocated an immediate return home of all U.S. armed forces. Long-term occupation, according to the Secretary, should not include U.S. troops. These men would be in danger of becoming overly sympathetic and lenient toward the German people. Morgenthau suggested Germany’s

\(^{45}\) At each conference, the question of reparations was a hot topic for the Soviets. Anti-communist U.S. leaders believed this would only leave Germany in a unrecoverable state, but also allow the communist state to rebuild. Communist fears are nothing new to Americans, but as an occupation policy formed, anti-communists saw the use of Germany as a buffer to communism for western Europe. Henry Morgenthau, Jr., *Germany Is Our Problem* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1945), 90.

\(^{46}\) Ibid., 94, 96.
immediate neighbors, along with the British and Soviets, would be naturally hardened to the German population and therefore better suited for long-term occupation.

The Secretary’s belief that Soviet-American postwar relations were influencing policymakers was not unfounded. President Roosevelt believed that the peace and German occupation should be arranged “in a manner which would convince the Russians that Americans really desired to cooperate with them.”\textsuperscript{47} Still, he would not support a harsh peace. Just prior to his death in April 1945, Roosevelt took a firm stand on reparations. He made it clear to the other Allied powers that the United States would not support the “indiscriminate removal” of German industry to aid Soviet recovery. In March 1945, the Roosevelt administration terminated all negotiations with Moscow on using lend-lease for postwar reconstruction. U.S. leaders had their reasons for making such a drastic move: Congress did not approve using taxpayers’ money to fund foreign economies and U.S. leaders hoped to use “economic pressure to secure Soviet compliance” with U.S. postwar plans. Cutting off the Soviet Union from economic relief strained U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, but the two nations were able to continue cooperating on other fronts during the last months of the European war.\textsuperscript{48} After Roosevelt’s death, Morgenthau had a chance to regain support for his plan with Harry S. Truman, but failed. As Morgenthau contemplated the German question, the JCS worked to create a directive for SHAEF and the Military Government (MG) to follow during the postwar occupation period.

\textbf{Treatment of Germany}

In the month leading up to the Quebec Conference in September 1944, the State Department compiled reports and suggestions for the president to discuss with the other Allied

\textsuperscript{47} Quoted in Murphy, \textit{Diplomat Among Warriors}, 227.
leaders. Among these documents were recommendations on the postwar treatment of Germany. With respect to the political and economic conditions, the State Department recommended the introduction of democracy to the German people as a means of creating stability. Policymakers reasoned that “the most plausible hope for lasting political reconstruction and orderly development lies in the establishment of a democratic government.” The report also cautioned against forceable partition, stating the dismemberment would have to be enforced militarily and would impose so much intrusion in German life it would not be feasible. Instead, the State Department recommended zones of occupation. These zones, which had previously discomforted American and British leaders, should follow the boundaries set by the Soviet and British governments.⁴⁹

The postwar occupation of Germany required a military government to transition from wartime occupation to peacetime. Civilian and military leaders believed this use of the U.S. Army would last only as long as it took for the establishment of a civil government. The State Department’s recommendation proposed two options for postwar governing: one required a direct military government that “would supplant German political authorities.” The other required the establishment of a military government issuing “directives to a central political regime.”⁵⁰ Prior to the State Department’s report, U.S. leaders already began planning for the formation of a postwar military government. In April 1942, the U.S. government founded a School of Military Government on the campus of the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia. Unfortunately, the school ran into problems since division commanders sent candidates they wanted dropped from their own staffs. Some presidential consultants also

---

⁵⁰ Ibid., FRUS 1944 Quebec.
attacked the school, calling it an instrument for empire building. Administration liberals claimed the school was “being filled with right-wing opponents of the President, and antidemocratic doctrines were being taught.” Eventually, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, convinced Roosevelt to continue with the school under the condition that more care would be taken in selecting officer candidates and a more exact survey of courses and theories of government would align with American ideals.\textsuperscript{51} With Marshall’s assurances and Secretary of War Stimson’s insistence that the education of officers in occupational affairs was “absolutely necessary,” Roosevelt permitted the school to remain open. Nine more schools opened at universities across the country, joined by the Civil Affairs Centre in Britain.\textsuperscript{52}

Even before the end of the war, the U.S. military implemented most of America’s foreign policy in Europe. SHAEF coordinated Allied operations and tripartite meetings. The State Department focused on the task of deciding postwar policy. Roosevelt did not care for the Foreign Service, and charging the State Department with the “secondary business” of postwar planning, the president further removed the service from the “main field of action.”\textsuperscript{53} On April 28, 1944, the CCS gave SHAEF its first formal directive on occupational policy. The report, “Directive for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat,” or CCS/551, gave Eisenhower “authority and responsibility for governing occupied Germany.” Major General Bedell Smith commented on this directive: “It is assumed that the Supreme Commander must be prepared to initiate the occupation and control of west Germany immediately after the cessation of hostilities, . . . and furthermore that his responsibilities may be extended to cover an indeterminate period

\textsuperscript{52} Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, 554; Richard Bessel, Germany 1945: From War to Peace (New York: Harper Perennial, 2010), 282.
The Supreme Commander, Eisenhower, did not agree with using the army as a governing body. He supported its use as a garrison, he told Murphy, but not a long-term government. Eisenhower saw the military occupation and governing of Germany as a temporary arrangement. He wanted the U.S. Army to function as a support system to a civilian government. Nevertheless, the establishment of the Military Government (MG) would form the basis for how the United States conducted foreign and military policy. One important question remained: what policies the MG would enforce?

In November 1944, the JCS studied and compiled directives for SHAEF to follow before and after Germany surrendered. The result, JCS 1067, found support within the civilian administration, but the CCS were unsure it would be enforceable. Secretary Morgenthau supported the new directive, since it followed the spirit, and sometimes the letter, of his own plan. The day before he died, Roosevelt reminded Morgenthau that the U.S. Army remained “irked” by JCS 1067’s “clear, punitive provisions,” which would make governing the country harder. It was not “workable.” The CCS produced a revised edition of JCS 1067, hoping to convince the Allied leaders of a more enforceable policy. The directive, written on January 6, did not provide for Morgenthau’s destruction of German industry. It charged the MG with

---

54 Quoted in Kenneth O. McCreedy, “Planning the Peace: Operation ECLIPSE and the Occupation of Germany” (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1995), 16–17.
55 Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 228; At a monthly meeting with Army district commanders, Eisenhower told his men that it was “his purpose to support the development of a Military Government organization which could be transferred to civilian control on twenty-four hours’ notice.” He went on to say that “our troops were in Germany primarily to support Military Government.” Clay later recalled Eisenhower’s words eliminating “further effective opposition to the gradual continued separation of Military Government from the Army Command.” Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1950), 56; Historian John Gimbel notes that as Eisenhower and the Military Government were given more civilian responsibilities over the German people, “the Army maneuvered speedily and effectively to get out of the occupation business altogether.” John Gimbel, The Origins of the Marshall Plan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 26.
56 Ibid., Diplomat Among Warriors, 270.
ensuring the German population did not suffer from “civil unrest” or starvation. Contrary to Treasury’s plan, the MG would protect German resources and equipment from “dissipation” or “sabotage.” The EAC did not agree with the new version of JCS 1067. Acknowledging receipt, the EAC commented on each proposed change, noting their revisions would not pass through their commission unopposed.58 It was up to the Allied leaders at the tripartite conferences in Malta and Yalta to decide what to do about the German question.

The first matter the leaders agreed on regarded the occupational zones of Germany. Reluctantly, Stalin agreed to allow France to have its own zone, provided it came out of the British and American zones. By February 6, each country approved three documents pertaining to Germany: terms of unconditional surrender, occupation zones, and control machinery.59 Specific directives, such as either Morgenthau’s plan or JCS 1067, required more time. In fact, these were all objectives the Allied leaders had achieved at previous conferences. According to later recollections by U.S. diplomat George F. Kennan, the conferences were redundant, but necessary. The meetings had “distinct value as practical demonstrations of our readiness and eagerness to establish better relations with the Soviet regime.” The Allied leaders portrayed these meetings to the public as the means from which a “foundation for a lasting peace” could be built.60 What they did accomplish at Yalta was a morale boost for the Allied nations and a closer military alliance. The principal element of any postwar plan was the cooperation of the military.

59 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State, February 6, 1945 FRUS 1945 Malta and Yalta, 956.
Postwar planners required the military to fulfill national policies. These included not just terms of German surrender, but the punishment of the German people. It was the intention of the Allied leaders at Yalta to “wipe out the Nazi party, Nazi laws, organizations and institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people.” The leaders also planned to “take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world.” The success of the post-surrender period to ensure a lasting peace depended on the military’s ability to achieve these objectives. JCS tasked Eisenhower with the first phase of the occupation, guided by JCS 1067. However, as winter led to spring, JCS 1067 continued to elicit dissention within Roosevelt’s Cabinet.

---

62 Memorandum by the Assistant Adviser on German Economic Affairs (deWilde), February 13, 1945 FRUS 1945 EAC, 3:416–23; Memorandum by the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) to the Secretary of State, March 20, 1945 FRUS 1945 EAC, 3:460–64.

32
Military Government

According to the War Department, the occupation of Germany was intended to be a short-term military affair. In September 1944, a military directive for SHAEF dictated that Eisenhower’s primary objectives after Germany surrendered were to be of a “short term and military character rather than of a long view governmental policy type.” This was not the first time, nor would it be the last, that postwar policies specified that the military occupation would be short, even if no one was confident enough to say just how long “short-term” would last.63

---

63 Interim Directive to SCAEF Regarding the Military Government of Germany in the Period Immediately Following the Cessation of Organized Resistance (Post-Defeat), September 6, 1944 FRUS 1944 Quebec, 110–20; Multiple documents note a six-month military occupation, while some describe military occupation in terms of years. See the Second Plenary Meeting minutes, February 5, 1945 FRUS 1945 Malta and Yalta, 611–19.
Prior to German surrender, the only policies postwar planners could agree on were the denazification and demilitarization of the German people.

At the same time, the War Department compiled specific directives for the occupation forces to follow. Published as the *Handbook of Military Government in Germany*, it produced as much controversy within the postwar councils as Morgenthau’s Plan. Intended as a “supervisory control” over German administration, the MG officers would concern themselves with: law and order; the economy; protection of property; public health; promotion of agriculture; the “control, supply and distribution of food and essential supplies of every kind;” restoration of public utilities; “gradual rehabilitation” of industry; labor; infrastructure; denazification of German education; freedom of religion; and the preservation of high culture, such as art and monuments.\(^6^4\) To President Roosevelt, the specificity of the *Handbook* left no room for adjustment. He did not approve of this type of directive. He insisted his military leaders should have the freedom to make appropriate adjustments while holding to general policies. He took the most issue with the *Handbook*’s strict ration system. Roosevelt wanted Stimson to withdraw the book, arguing in a letter to Stimson that:

> It is of the utmost importance that every person in Germany should realize that this time Germany is a defeated nation. I do not want them to starve to death but, as an example, if they need food to keep body and soul together beyond what they have, they should be fed three times a day with soup from Army soup kitchens. That will keep them perfectly healthy and they will remember the experience all their lives. The fact that they are a defeated nation, collectively and individually, must be so impressed upon them that they will hesitate to start any new war.\(^6^5\)

Both the *Handbook* and the directives released in January deemed MG necessary, including the management of the above aspects, because of anticipated “confusion” within the German


\(^6^5\) Quoted in *FRUS 1944 Quebec*, 110.
population over the defeat of their Nazi leaders. Roosevelt’s belief that the Handbook’s directives would leave the German people starved and bitter towards Americans was nothing compared to his fear of a Germany capable of disturbing the peace and security of the world. Once again, the memories of the Treaty of Versailles and the resultant militant state haunted policymakers. Roosevelt feared the German people would rise again as they had in the 1930s if they were not made to confront their war guilt.

At the time of the Malta and Yalta conferences, Allied leaders still could not agree on specific directives for SHAEF or MG. Besides denazification and demilitarization, questions surrounding economics and politics remained disputed within government departments. The lack of a definitive directive stemmed from disagreements over “the responsibility and functions of the occupying powers” and “policy with respect to economic weakening of Germany.” The War Department favored a limited definition of MG functions, as far as denazification and demobilization were concerned. As for economics, MG officials should concern themselves only “to the extent of preventing such unrest or disease as would endanger the occupying forces.” The Treasury Department believed MG should adopt a “limited liability” approach to the German economy, despite the disruption it would cause within the nation. In March 1945, Morgenthau held on to his belief that a strict governance of Germany would ensure lasting peace. He did not believe JCS 1067 could provide the appropriate directives necessary for his vision. After Roosevelt’s death, the Secretary hoped he would be able to convince the new president to support the Morgenthau Plan. In his first weeks in office, President Truman listened to Morgenthau’s comments on Germany but decided to rely on advice from the State and War

---

67 Memorandum by the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) to President Roosevelt, March 20, 1945 FRUS 1945 EAC, 3:464–65.
departments on diplomatic and military matters.\textsuperscript{68} It was the War Department that would manage the occupation enforce directives for MG. Military planners argued the goal of MG should be the eventual implementation of a democratic German political administration. Any lasting unrest in the nation would hinder MG’s ability to construct such a system, prolonging the occupation.\textsuperscript{69}

May 8, 1945 brought to fruition the debate surrounding governance over the German zones. General George C. Marshall appointed Eisenhower to the position of Military Governor. During the spring and summer, Eisenhower managed the occupation, ensuring denazification of political offices, arresting high ranking leaders for future trials, and placing military leaders in positions to continue the process. Earlier that spring, Eisenhower had selected General Lucius D. Clay as his Deputy Military Governor, charging him with the day-to-day operations of the occupation. At the time of his appointment in March 1945, Clay was working in the Office of War Mobilization for future Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. Byrnes lauded Clay’s appointment, commenting to Marshall that he “found no man more capable than Clay and no army officer who had as clear an understanding of the point of view of the civilian.”\textsuperscript{70} Both Byrnes and Eisenhower agreed that Clay would be best suited to lead the U.S. Army through the occupation period.

After German leaders surrendered to the Allied forces, postwar planners organized the final wartime conference at Potsdam in July 1945. At this meeting, Allied leaders agreed on what one historian deemed the “Five D’s”: demilitarization, denazification, democratization,

\textsuperscript{68} Blum, \textit{Roosevelt and Morgenthau}, 638–39.
\textsuperscript{69} Memorandum by the Advisor on German Economic Affairs (Despres), February 15, 1945 \textit{FRUS 1945 EAC}, 3:412–14.
\textsuperscript{70} Quoted in James F. Byrnes, \textit{Speaking Frankly} (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1947), 47; The United States Political Advisor for Germany (Murphy) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn), April 12, 1945 \textit{FRUS 1945 EAC}, 3:933–35.
decentralization, and decartelization. As part of the “Declaration on Liberated Europe,” or Potsdam Agreement, the victors gave the German lands of Breslau to Poland, resulting in the expulsion of almost ten million Germans from that region. These refugees fled west until they reached the safety of U.S. and British-occupied lands in central and western Germany.71 The Potsdam Agreement also planned for postwar Germans to have no higher standard of living than its neighboring countries. This plan, like the Morgenthau Plan, was not supported within Eisenhower and Clay’s Office of Military Government or Truman’s Cabinet. Renowned political theorist, Raymond Moley, charged the economic plan unworkable. “No plan by which a nation is to be held down by economic sanctions will work. If Germany is to be kept harmless, it must be by military and political, not economic, force.”72 With the influx of refugees and new economic policies, Clay needed to find the most manageable route to occupation. But first, he and the rest of SHAEF needed to confront the initial period of peace.

U.S.-Soviet Relationship

During the war, U.S. policymakers needed to foster a working relationship with the Soviet Union. As the war ended, tension between the two nations increasingly became strained until postwar military policies revealed the anti-Soviet sentiments of U.S. leaders. This transition began prior to V-E Day as each nation expressed suspicions of the other through secret reports and public disagreements on postwar policy. In preparation for the February 1945

---

71 Taylor, Exorcising Hitler: The Occupation and Denazification of Germany, 68–70.
conferences, the Joint Intelligence Committee released to the State Department an assessment
titled “Soviet Post-War Capabilities and Intentions.” In the report, the writers warned that the
Soviet Union’s ideology “preached inevitable conflict,” and would react violently if its “vital
interests” were threatened. The report also concluded the U.S.S.R. would insist on maintaining
control of eastern Europe but would not take any aggressive action against its allies until 1952.73
Until Soviet leaders acted in an overtly aggressive manner, U.S. civilian and military leaders
needed to work with the Soviets.

Both U.S. and Soviet leaders understood the importance of maintaining a friendly
relationship throughout the war. In September 1944, one State Department briefing paper
emphasized the “wartime necessity” of avoiding “friction” that could jeopardize military
operations. Therefore, “more emphasis has hitherto been placed on cooperating with the Soviet
Union per se than on finding agreed basis upon which the cooperation must be established if it is
to endure and form one of the foundations of a secure and peaceful world order.”74 In February
1945 Stalin expressed the same sentiments, commenting that it had not been difficult to maintain
alliances during wartime. For the Soviet Premier, “the difficult task will come after the war
when diverse interests tend to divide the Allies. It is our duty to see that our relations in
peacetime are as strong as they have been in war.”75 No matter the words spoken during the war,
fears of perceived Soviet power would determine U.S. demobilization and occupation plans.

73 Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in
World War II, 219.
74 Department of State Briefing Paper: U.S. Relations with the Soviet Union, September 6, 1944 FRUS
1944 Quebec, 192–93.
75 Quoted in Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 44; Roosevelt’s State of the Union Address also promoted
working with the Soviet Union after the war: “in the future we must never forget the lesson that we have
learned—that we must have friends who will work with us in peace as they have fought by our side in
war.” Speaking about the Soviets specifically, Roosevelt tells the American people not to let the
differences between the two nations “divide us and blind us to our more important common and
continuing interests in winning the war and building the peace.” See “Roosevelt’s Message on the State of
As the war in Europe neared its end, U.S. and Soviet forces began converging on Berlin. Military planners and Allied leaders designed protocols on how the two armies should approach the inevitable “contact.” Churchill wrote President Truman in April, urging the creation and dissemination of instructions for how the western forces should act. Since Eisenhower’s Allied forces were making greater progress into Germany, Churchill worried that Soviet military leaders might be “hustled back” to the occupation zones prematurely. Truman passed along the British Prime Minister’s concerns to Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., who consulted with Admiral Leahy. They both agreed that the movement of Allied forces into Germany, and back to occupation zones, should be determined by Eisenhower and the staff at SCAEF. However, they also advised that an agreement between Truman and Stalin should be reached about how and when that withdrawal should take place.

The problem of withdrawal of troops was that Berlin was located within the Soviet Occupation Zone. So, as U.S. and British troops moved to Berlin, they were trespassing. Truman’s special assistant, and Roosevelt’s top domestic advisor, Harry Hopkins, suggested the simultaneous movement of Western troops to Berlin and back to their respective occupation zones. But first, he said, the withdrawal and movement of troops should only occur “under an agreement between the respective commanders which would provide us either unrestricted access to our Berlin area . . . by air, rail, and highway on agreed routes.” Hopkins also emphasized the need to establish a specific date of withdrawal, or risk confusion and suspicion.

the Union, January 6, 1945 (Excerpts),” in CQ Almanac 1945, 1st ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1946); Stalin warned the Allied leaders that Moscow officials believed that the “American attitude towards the Soviet Union had perceptibly cooled once it became obvious that Germany was defeated, and that it was as though the Americans were saying that the Russians were no longer needed.” See Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of State (Bohlen): Memorandum of 2nd Conversation at the Kremlin, May 27, 1945 Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers: The Conference of Berlin, 1945, vol. 1 (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1960), 31–33. Hereafter FRUS 1945 Berlin v. 1.
amongst Soviet leaders. What most American leaders, including Truman and Morgenthau, agreed upon was the danger posed by immediate demobilization of the U.S. troops. Even as forces were moved from the European Theater to the Pacific, it was paramount to the postwar peace plans that some elements of the U.S. Army remain in Germany. From April to August, over 400,000 men were moved monthly to the Pacific Theater, leaving postwar planners worried. The U.S. ability to oppose Soviet expansion decreased with each soldier leaving the continent.

Eventually, the Soviets and SHAEF leaders agreed to a timetable for withdrawal of Western forces from the Soviet zone. Movement would begin on July 1 and Allied withdrawal to their respective zones would be completed by July 4. As for Berlin, the joint occupation would also be completed by July 4. Soviet military commander Georgy Zhukov and SHAEF leaders met to discuss the logistics required for the mass movement of Allied troops. Occupation of Berlin officially began on July 7. Soviets set up American and British offices and quarters, personally dividing up the city. Diplomat and political advisor to Eisenhower, Robert Murphy later commented that the Soviets “were generous” in the division, greeting “us warmly whenever

---

76 The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Truman, April 18, 1945 FRUS 1945 EAC, 3:231–32; For information regarding Hopkin’s relationship with both Roosevelt and Truman, see Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949, 38–39; Memorandum by the Secretary of State to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, April 21, 1945 FRUS 1945 EAC, 3:235–36; President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Churchill), April 26, 1945 FRUS 1945 EAC, 3:244–45; Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Truman, to the President, June 8, 1945 FRUS 1945 EAC, 3:333–34.

77 Morgenthau supported immediate demobilization of U.S. forces in Germany. He did not suggest a return to isolationist policies, nor did he suggest the American public would support that. He did suggest international policy makers were better suited to assist the Europeans through commissions, technical staffs, and high military command, but not armed soldiers as policemen among the German population. Morgenthau, Jr., Germany Is Our Problem, 190, 200; Copy of Truman’s message to Churchill about demobilizing at the risk of giving the Soviet’s free reign in Europe. See The Chairman of the President’s War Relief Board (Davies) to the President: Supplemental Report in Re: Mission to London, June 12, 1945 FRUS 1945 Berlin v. 1, 1:64–67; Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 252; Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II, 262.
we met them.”

It seemed the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the initial occupation period would begin peacefully, though with some suspicions. This changed, however, as events in August indicated Soviet intentions to create a communist bloc in Eastern Germany and Berlin. Churchill would warn U.S. leaders in May 1945 that “an iron curtain is drawn down upon [the Soviet] front,” and so the Soviets could not be trusted. As the Soviets entered the occupation period, they gained control over political offices and resources. The Americans believed the only manner of recourse, in preventing the spread of communism to the rest of Germany, was democratization through American influence over the German people.

The U.S. forces stationed in Germany and Berlin were put in charge of fostering democracy while punishing the nation for its wartime crimes. Within the U.S. zone, this meant military advisors and leaders needed to re-evaluate how U.S. soldiers approached foreign nations. Whereas they spent the last three years fighting the Germans, now they were to live

---

78 Protocol Between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union Regarding the Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Administration of Greater Berlin, September 12, 1944 FRUS 1945 Malta and Yalta, 118–21; For information on Murphy’s career in the State Department, see Bureau of Public Affairs Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, “Robert D. Murphy,” accessed March 1, 2020, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/stamps/67016.htm; At a meeting between Eisenhower and Zhukov on June 5, proclamations became the basis of a joint occupation of Berlin. Proclamation One dissolved German national government, entrusting supreme authority in Germany to the victorious Commanders in Chief. Proclamation Two established a unanimous agreement between victorious powers must be reached in matters that effect Germany as a whole, resulting in the division of Germany. Proclamation Three established the division of Germany and served as the legal basis for keeping a Western garrison in Berlin. See Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 257–60; See The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Eisenhower), to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 6, 1945 FRUS 1945 EAC, 3:328–29; Political Advisor in Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State ad interim, June 30, 1945 FRUS 1945 Berlin v. 1, 1:135–37; Quoted in Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 263; For details on how the joint governance of Berlin was decided, see The Political Advisor in Germany (Murphy) to the Acting Secretary of State, July 7, 1945 FRUS 1945 Berlin v. 1, 1:630–33.

79 The United States Political Advisor for Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State, August 8, 1945 FRUS 1945 EAC, 3:1036–38; The United States Political Advisor for Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State, August 13, 1945 FRUS 1945 EAC, 3:1038–40; Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman, May 12, 1945 FRUS 1945 Berlin v. 1, 1:8–9; The German Communist Party attempted to have the Soviet leadership in Berlin discharge a German leader in the American bloc. See The United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State, August 20, 1945 FRUS 1945 EAC, 3:1041.
amongst them peaceably. None of the wartime conferences provided these men with adequate directives or policies. JCS 1067 would prove problematic and unenforceable. It would be up to General Lucius Clay and his staff to designate priorities and policies that could create a non-threatening, democratic Germany.
CHAPTER TWO:
OCCUPATION POLICY, 1945

The Allied occupation of Germany unfolded along the lines established by Washington’s policy makers. In April 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) produced a directive for Military Government (MG) officials to follow in postwar Germany. Between September 1944 and March 1945, the policy underwent multiple revisions as military and civilian leaders debated options en route to creating a workable set of guidelines. The JCS released JCS 1067/6 to General Dwight D. Eisenhower and his staff at the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), then the military body preparing for peace and occupation. The military directive reflected “a philosophy of quarantine and revenge,” and deemed it necessary that the German people should be viewed as a “menace to humanity.” Eisenhower instructed his staff to study the directive to prepare for the occupation period. Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay, the Deputy Military Governor, and other MG leaders believed the document would be impossible to implement and still maintain peace. The policies JCS officials wanted the occupation army to enforce would leave the German people in economic hardship while isolating U.S. soldiers from the German population. U.S. Army leaders greatly feared this hard-line approach would prolong the occupation. While trying to ensure a lasting peace, JCS 1067 unintentionally created tensions within German society and within the U.S. Army because of its unworkable, punitive directives.

Although JCS 1067 was created during the war and with agreement of all four occupying powers at the Allied Control Council, it would not apply within Soviet, British, or French zones.

---

of occupation. When the occupation began, the Soviets offered ex-Nazis a place in the Soviet zone if they joined the German Communist Party. The French treated all Germans harshly, regardless of their political affiliation. The British attempted to follow JCS 1067 at the same pace as the Americans, but quickly found the occupation’s directive that Germany be “occupied as a defeated nation under a just, firm, and aloof administration” to be impractical. These polices, general in nature, left the application of the occupation directive up to each military governor. JCS 1067 granted the military governor “supreme legislative and judicial authority,” and charged Eisenhower with bringing “home to the Germans that Germany’s ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed the German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable and that the Germans cannot escape the responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves.” Eisenhower, who wanted to see all Germans “punished, humiliated, [and] made to pay,” released orders throughout the summer that supported JCS 1067. The U.S. Army’s occupation of Germany was principally designed to safeguard the rest of Europe from a resurgent Germany. The occupation forces were to prepare themselves to “police the German people” or at least “change the German people in such a way that the German nation…will be a nation which will not be a threat to the peace of the world.”

---

The U.S. government did not make the American public aware of the specific orders given to the occupying troops. Americans were anxious to see what peace in Europe would entail. Specifically, they wanted to know how their government planned to keep Germany from becoming a militant force. After Eisenhower received the directive, some officials within Truman’s administration believed it necessary to release the occupation plans to the public, if just to explain why the American soldiers were not being discharged. However, JCS 1067 remained a “top secret” military directive for the first five months of the occupation. The media criticized U.S. occupation, claiming the occupiers were operating without a plan. Eisenhower wrote U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall that as Military Governor and Supreme Commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces, he had no authority to release the U.S. government’s occupation policies to the press.85 Not until the fall of 1945 would the American and German public receive the directives of JCS 1067. Once the civilians read the policy, they immediately criticized the document for its unworkability.

A Controversial Policy: Denazification

During the course of Hitler’s reign, Nazi ideology came to permeate every facet of German life. To counteract the social, political, economic, and cultural influence of the country’s former ruling party, American officials introduced a policy of denazification designed to re-educate the German people. The U.S. Army was charged with arresting individuals suspected of war crimes. Any Nazi involvement, direct or indirect, condemned an individual to

arrest or removal from their job. Eisenhower and Clay were charged with rooting out active Nazis and Nazi sympathizers from both public and private industries.  Although all four occupation zones enforced denazification, the Americans purged Nazi ideologies “with vigor.” Historian Richard Bessel offers the explanation for this enthusiasm that the Americans feared a Nazi-inspired insurgency. Whether this assessment was based on military intelligence or not made no difference at the time. The best way, policymakers believed, to keep this concern from becoming reality was to make all German people accept responsibility for Hitler’s crimes.

By the end of 1945, U.S. soldiers had arrested and interned over 117,000 people under the denazification policy. Anyone could be arrested, even for nominal association with the Nazi Party. For example, on April 4, 1945, the U.S. Army entered Detmold, Germany, located in the North Rhine Region. The District’s President Heinrich Drake later recalled American soldiers rounding up any person who was suspected of being a Nazi. Eighteen thousand men were arrested for being part of the Gestapo, SS, or Nazi Party. U.S. soldiers were thorough, even apprehending firemen because their uniforms so closely resembled Nazi uniforms. The

---

87 Compared to the other zones, the U.S. Army enforced denazification more vigorously. The British interned between 90,000 and 100,000 between 1945 and 1949; the French interned about 21,500 in total; and according to Soviet figures released in 1990, 122,671 Germans were arrested, 42,889 of whom died in camps and 756 were executed. The Americans arrested one of every 142 inhabitants of the entire occupation, the highest of four zones. However, those arrested in the American, British, and French zones were more likely to be released quickly than those in Soviet internment camps. By 1947, over half of those in western zones were freed, whereas only one in nine Germans left Soviet custody during the same period. Richard Bessel, *Germany 1945: From War to Peace* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2010), 186–87; Throughout the occupation period of 1945-1949, the U.S. Army brought charges against almost three million Germans. Of those, two million received a trial. Only half of those were found guilty. Zink, *The United States in Germany, 1944-1955*, 425.
American occupiers worked to fulfill the Potsdam Conference Agreement of 1945 to extirpate German militarism and Nazism.\footnote{Communiqué: Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, August 2, 1945 \textit{FRUS 1945 Berlin v. 2}, 2:1499–1507.}

American soldiers used varying tactics in arresting individuals deemed a threat to a lasting peace. Military officials constructed lists of Germans merely suspected of Nazi affiliation. The OSS created “White,” “Gray,” and “Black” lists. Each designation determined the level of Nazi involvement, and the perceived risk posed by each German to the American occupation. Allen Dulles, who served as Chief of the OSS office in Switzerland, wanted to create a “nucleus of friendly Germans to accompany SHAEF in its establishment of control.”\footnote{“Black” was for Germans who were Nazi party members prior to 1933, so were loyal to Hitler and his ideologies. “Gray” were Germans who were party members prior to 1939, so probably joined when Hitler’s rise to power influenced their decisions. “White” were Germans who were party members after 1939, so may have been forced to join or else risk persecution. Eisenberg, \textit{Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949}, 123.} The Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) used these lists to determine arrests. Sometimes the CIC issued letters demanding a person present themselves before military authorities. The most common tactic involved searching for those on the wanted lists, arresting them, and then holding them at a local prison until they could be shipped to internment camps. Squads of CIC officials and U.S. soldiers went from town to town arresting people in their homes. Other Germans were apprehended when they attempted to acquire official documents, such as work permits. In the first month after V-E Day, U.S. soldiers arrested over 200 Germans daily. By October, the average number had risen to 700.\footnote{United States War Department, \textit{Military Government, Weekly Information Bulletin, No. 1} (Frankfurt, Germany: Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 Division, 1945), 11.}

Germans who were arrested in each zone were placed in makeshift camps, quickly built by army engineers or commandeered from the German military. Former concentration camps
were also used to hold German prisoners. In the American zone, Dachau served as the primary internment camp. The mass arrests, intended to achieve denazification, soon overwhelmed the American prison and court systems. This “blunt instrument” meant that potentially harmless people were swept up because they held positions within the Nazi bureaucracy. It also meant that many hard-core Nazis, who held much lower positions in Hitler’s government, escaped punishment. Cultural differences between the American and German military also resulted in failure to understand what particular job titles or uniforms meant. Although the likelihood that Germans would find themselves in shackles remained high in 1945, the MG officials were more likely to just dismiss Nazis from their jobs.\footnote{Bessel, \textit{Germany 1945}, 187–90, 193.}

By Autumn 1945, MG officials faced backlash in the United States for being too lax on denazification. In response, the Truman administration issued “Prohibition of Employment of Members of Nazi Party in Positions in Business Other Than Ordinary Labor and for Other Purpose,” or Military Law No. 8, as a supplement to JCS 1067’s policy. The new policy “banned the employment of former Nazi Party members in any capacity other than as ordinary workers.” The same law also allowed individual Germans to appeal their convictions. The consequence of Law No. 8 was extensive: doctors, dentists, policemen, teachers, and even cleaning women lost their jobs at wholesale rates. Economically, the new policy affected all industries except agriculture. Germans who failed to report former Nazis to MG officers or expel Party members from their jobs could be held criminally liable. However, private firms that wanted to keep managers, despite possible Nazi affiliation, employed the former managers as
office assistants or porters. One German advisor later remarked that “Law 8 has meant merely a change in official signatures and a large number of highly competent clerks.”93

German citizens who lived through the occupation and American observers criticized the denazification practices. Michel Oppenheim, the Jewish government councilor and liaison to the Mainz Jewish community expressed disappointment in U.S. denazification. He complained to Office of Strategic Services (OSS) operative Arthur D. Kahn that non-Nazis lost their homes to the occupation forces while Party members’ homes went unmolested.94 The policy’s unenforceable or over-enforced treatment of all Germans as war criminals created political and economic complications for the army of occupation. JCS 1067 ordered the removal of all persons affiliated with the Nazi Party from “public office and positions of importance in quasi-public and private enterprises.” Additionally, a person could not be retained even for “administrative necessity, convenience or expedience.”95 Removing so many people from public and private life made U.S. reconstruction of Germany difficult.

The only Germans the MG officials seemed willing to trust to run local governments were anti-Nazis, such as Catholics, Jews, and politically centrist or left-leaning Germans. Even this created problems. Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs William Clayton warned presidential advisors in April 1945 that “if you take [away] every Nazi, or Nazi sympathizer, holding an important position . . . before you had somebody to put in his place, I

---

think the wheels will stop.” Economist Jacob Viner commented in the July 1945 issue of *Foreign Affairs* that although it was possible the majority of Germans supported Hitler’s Nazi regime, “it is administratively impossible . . . to treat all of these individuals as war criminals or as mentally sick persons.” Viner acknowledged western civilizations’ tendency to hold groups to “collective responsibility,” but urged Western powers to resist that temptation. Instead, he posited, it was up to the occupation forces to adhere to a higher moral code that showed mercy. Germans who were arrested, Viner continued, should not face a “firing squad,” but a fair trial with fair punishment. Only after a court of law had deemed an individual “guilty of active complicity in Nazi misdeeds” should they face punishment. If this guidance was followed, denazification and the punishment of guilty parties would absolve the occupiers of any guilt for punishing an entire people.

One consequence of denazification resulted in the reliance on an unskilled workforce to rebuild Germany’s utilities, railroads, and factories. Those who were even nominal Nazis were prohibited from working in executive or skilled positions. The CIC lists allowed Clay and Murphy to vet their workers, but it also meant the dismissal of “efficient workers” from skilled employment. The MG leaders tried to rebuild Germany with unskilled Germans under the direction of skilled Americans. This process proved inefficient. Clay and Murphy were dismayed to learn that the skilled workers they had dismissed found work in the British, French, British, and French.

---

96 Clayton’s comment that the “wheels will stop” references occupation efforts to rebuild German industry. Before the war, Germany served as the production and industrial hub for Western Europe. The U.S. government needed Germany to begin producing again so that the Germans could sustain themselves, leaving the United States to direct resources to Western Europe. Quoted in Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949*, 68.

and Soviet zones. Both men came to understand that maintaining order in the American zone would require “extensive German assistance.” By the end of the summer, Clay made the executive decision to employ “minor ex-Nazis” in skilled positions. Washington leaders knew of Clay’s decision, and allowed the Deputy Governor to continue with his policy free of repercussions.98

Democratizing a Fascist People

Denazifying the political sector of German life proved difficult. In true American fashion, policymakers believed that to ensure lasting peace, the German people must embrace democracy and democratic ideals. With Soviets in the east promoting communism and providing incentives to former Nazis to join the German Communist Party, Americans promoted democracy as the antithesis to Nazism. One of many problems with the policy of democratization MG officials faced was not just rooting out Nazis from political life but finding suitable replacements. From the beginning of the occupation, Eisenhower insisted the U.S. Army must not be used as a permanent governing force, but only as an interim authority until the State Department could appoint civil leaders. In the meantime, the U.S. Army needed to learn what it meant to govern a defeated population and then how to transfer political control to those people.

As part of JCS 1067 and the Potsdam Agreement, the U.S. Army was ordered to purge Nazi ideology from German society. Almost all laws enacted during Hitler’s regime encompassed Nazism. The MG officials first abolished all laws that discriminated against any “race, creed, or political opinion.” According to the military directive, “No such discrimination,

---

98 Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 283–84.
whether legal, administrative, or otherwise, should be tolerated.” During the first two years of
the occupation, no central civil authority governed the German people in the American zone.99
The Germans lived under the MG officials’ authority, with laws created and enacted by
American political leaders. Slowly, MG and State Department officials hoped, the German
people would appreciate the purge of Nazism. Americans believed replacing the Nazi
government with German democracy would persuade Germans to comply with denazification.

The denazification of political positions began immediately. High-ranking officials
within Hitler’s government were the first to be arrested. As summer approached, MG officials
began to pay more attention to local government officials and, armed with the lists from CIC,
located and arrested Nazis and Nazi sympathizers. Despite the willingness of MG officials to
conduct denazification of private and public organizations, implementation of the policy was
obstructed by a lack of qualified replacement personnel. Politically, the people who were either
centrists or left-leaning Germans remained the only viable options to govern at the local levels.
While centrists provided a balance between fascism and communism, officials feared that many
of these men were closet Nazis, so could not be trusted.100 The State Department was
apprehensive of left-leaning Germans who held onto anti-fascist sentiments and favored the
ideology of communism. The U.S. government could not hope to foster democratic, capitalist

---

2:1499–1507.
100 Centrists posed the problem of holding similar views of both Nazis and communists. To avoid
accusations that the MG was placing communists in positions of power, the reports called Germans who
favored the ideology of communism “left-leaning.” The literature on the political parties has kept to these
terminologies. So long as centrists and leftist Germans expressed explicit anti-Nazi sentiments, the
Americans placed these Germans in positions of local power, both political and economic. Specifically,
Robert Murphy expressed this fear since there had been previous discoveries of centrist Germans on lists
of Nazi sympathizers or active members. Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide
Germany, 1944–1949, 123.
values within the German population if both closeted Nazis and communists were in power.\textsuperscript{101} This constant suspicion of any German who did not immediately embrace democracy alienated many Germans who might otherwise have been willing to work with the Americans. OSS operative Arthur D. Kahn voiced his frustration in a letter to his mother, chiding the MG for failing to appreciate those in Germany who could help democratize the American zone. “We had not prepared during these last three or four years to take care of problems that we should have foreseen.”\textsuperscript{102} Kahn’s problem with the MG policies was that he believed they could have been more effective in winning over the German population if the officials in Washington had better prepared the occupation forces. Instead, the U.S. Army now grappled with the problems of resistance to denazification, an insufficient labor force, and a starving German population.

After purging Nazis from political office, MG officials turned to the rest of the German population. JCS 1067 prohibited all political activities. Germans were allowed democratic freedoms, such as free speech, religion, and press, so long as their activities did not foster militarism or Nazi ideals. As Germans learned of these democratization efforts, some spoke against them. Hermann Butz, a German film actor, commented in 1945: “We know nothing about other forms of government . . . Democracy to us is only a name—something floating about in the air.”\textsuperscript{103} Democratization would take time, something the U.S. Army did not have. Military leaders did not believe in a prolonged occupation by the U.S. Army as the governing body. Eisenhower and Clay wanted to hold local elections as early as July 1945, but because the State Department feared denazification was not complete, it refused to endorse such an early timetable. The policies of denazification and democratization were complimentary within the

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., 124.
\textsuperscript{102} Quoted in Kahn, \textit{Experiment in Occupation: Witness to the Turnabout, Anti-Nazi War to Cold War, 1944, 1946}, 90.
\textsuperscript{103} Quoted in Kahn, 48.
MG, but the American public saw them as separate parts of JCS 1067. Democratization was popular at home, where it seemed the most logical step to creating a docile and non-threatening Germany. Viner noted the German people would eventually be granted the right of self-governance, but only if that government met the “minimum requirements of political democracy,” such as legislatures chosen through secret ballots; “executives removable either by the legislature or by the electorate;” freedom of press, protest, and assembly; and an “independent judiciary.”

British historian Margery Perham commented in October 1945 that it was natural for Americans to believe that Germany should be self-governing. Clay and Eisenhower had similar views and held local elections in the summer of 1945. Only in December would the State Department permit the German people to develop democratic local governments.

Educating a Broken People

By December 1945, American officials believed the possibility of a Nazi-influenced insurrection less likely, so they began loosening the denazification policies. Instead of interning any German for involvement in the Nazi Party, a new policy of rehabilitation allowed convicted Germans to return to public life. Proposed as “reeducation,” this policy encapsulated all programs that were designed to entice the Germans into accepting their defeat and embracing American democracy. JCS 1067 did not provide a concrete directive on what reeducation would look like in practice, but instead only dictated that “German education should be so controlled as to completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines to make possible the successful

---

106 Bessel, *Germany 1945*, 198.
development of democratic ideas.” It was up to MG’s Information and Control Division (ICD) and the Education and Religious Affairs Branch (E&RA) to devise and implement reeducation policies. Most of the E&RA members were unfamiliar with the German education system. In 1944 and 1945, the State Department, under direction of famous American poet and Undersecretary of State for Public Affairs Archibald MacLeish, worked with the Pentagon’s Civil Affairs Division (CAD) to create reeducation policies. The State Department determined that German reeducation needed to be based on the traditional German education system instead of an American structure. The CAD, though made aware of the State Department’s recommendation, did not comment on it or pass it on to the E&RA. As the MG took over the American zone in the summer, the E&RA council had to create its own reeducation policy.

Reeducation of the German population began with prisoners of war in camps located in the United States and Europe. Americans used propaganda films to “change values” within the Nazi population. After Germany’s surrender, the films had a distinctly anti-Nazi undertone that highlighted wartime destruction of the land and people. The War Department ordered all prisoners of war to be exposed to documentaries as “a lesson in ‘collective guilt’” to make every German feel responsible and remorseful of Nazi crimes. Prisoner camps also heard music, such as jazz and Jewish compositions, along with lectures on democracy to aid in the reeducation effort and expose the Germans to influences opposed to Nazi indoctrination. Reeducation had mixed results. While the Germans learned about the United States, the material they were

109 Quoted in Peterson, The Many Faces of Defeat: The German People’s Experience in 1945, 21; For information on how the United States used jazz music to convey democratic ideas, see Lisa E. Davenport, Jazz Diplomacy: Promoting America in the Cold War (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2009).
exposed to merely presented Americans’ reasons for fighting in a “fair and quiet way” while portraying Americans as valiant heroes coming to the rescue of Europe. This democratic, moralistic imagery proved discordant for those Germans aware of white Americans’ treatment of minorities, especially African Americans. One prisoner held in a Missouri camp later recalled an American man offering him a chance to stay in the United States. After observing the same white man denigrate a black man, the German decided he could not live in a nation “where the Negro population was treated so poorly.” As the war ended, domestic pressure increased from soldiers’ families and employers to send the prisoners of war back to Europe so that returning GIs would have jobs.\textsuperscript{110} MG officials argued against repatriation: “Not only would they probably be the only large group of Germans who are well fed and who are still strongly Nazi, but they would reach Germany at a time when food and supplies are running low.” Officials also feared that if the returning prisoners saw the destruction and ruin that the Allies had inflicted on their country, the Germans would become enraged. Southern farmers needed alien labor to work the fall harvest. Although the War Department released a plan for all German prisoners to be repatriated by April 1946, delays and labor plans gave the prisoners a reason to believe the United States was intentionally delaying the transfer. As Americans inundated the camps with lessons on democracy, the prisoners fell victim to what they deemed “modern slave trading.”\textsuperscript{111}

Education seemed the surest path to democratizing the German people. Reeducation of the German population meant the occupiers aimed to build a “psychological foundation on which political and economic reform could rest.”\textsuperscript{112} This objective was divided into three goals: to

\textsuperscript{110} Quoted in Peterson, \textit{The Many Faces of Defeat: The German People’s Experience in 1945}, 21–23. The prisoners held in U.S. internment camps performed manual labor for local businesses such as farms.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.
“increase the number of school years of primary educations that all pupils shared in common; to upgrade the professional status of all primary and secondary teachers by providing university training for both groups rather than just secondary teachers alone; and to end tuition for pupils in primary and secondary education.” American reformers only succeeded in achieving the last measure as constantly changing and ambiguous occupation policies created complications for the first two goals.\(^{113}\)

One unfortunate consequence of Americans’ “overenthusiastic” application of denazification was the closing of many German schools. Between the destruction of schoolhouses by wartime bombs and the loss of sixty-five percent of the teaching staff to denazification, the German education system was at a standstill by the end of the summer. Even Germans recognized the difficulty in preparing the nation for reeducation, noting that the MG officials had not thoroughly vetted the teachers for their Nazi sympathies and schools suffered from a “lack of even primitive facilities.”\(^{114}\) Still, some American commentators agreed reeducation policies would aid in denazification. The *St. Louis Globe-Democrat* noted that teachers and textbooks must change “if the children of post-Hitler Germany are to be freed from the curse of Nazi indoctrination.”\(^{115}\) The topic of reeducation and children continued to be debated throughout the occupation’s first year. Memory of Hitler’s Youth directed Americans into believing the children of Germany needed a new role model, a new doctrine to follow.

\(^{113}\) For a full comparison of the German and American education systems, see Tent, “American Influences on the German Educational System,” 394.


American policymakers saw the German youth as the key to democratizing the nation. New textbooks and new teachers were needed to reeducate the population, but it was difficult for the MG to provide either. German actor Hermann Butz commented in 1945 that “the students are our best people . . . German youth have been repressed so long that there are hundreds of young men who want to express themselves somehow whether by writing or acting or building.” German Social Democrat Jakob Steffan believed “the young people must learn humanity . . . and unlearn their admiration for force and brutality.” German Communist Heinrich Sohl believed the youngest children should be the American’s target for reeducation. Each of these men, no matter their political leanings, believed that German youth were the key to nation-rebuilding and moving beyond militarism.

German youth watched the Americans denazify society, but were left wondering whether the Americans were serious about the policy. In interviews Kahn conducted with youth in late July, Kahn noted that “despite the fanfare about denazification, young Germans saw Nazi bigshots escaping punishment and even retaining high positions.” Kahn summarized his views of the collective sentiments of German youth: “All we know . . . is that we haven’t enough to eat, we haven’t a chance in the world to rebuild our homes, to clothe ourselves, to find decent jobs, and what’s more, we’re probably going to have another war that will destroy everything that’s left. We’ve always been efficient and industrious, but with [the Americans] here, we don’t get anything done at all.” Instead of attempting to work with the Germans to foster feelings of good-will, American policymakers remained deaf to the plights of the German people and to these complaints. U.S. leaders were only concerned with the results. In the United States,

117 Quoted in Kahn, 93.
officials remained hopeful “that the children of today and of future generations will make a Germany with which all other peoples can live peacefully on equal terms.” After domestic support grew for the reeducation policy, many Americans began to offer suggestions on how that policy should be enacted. Economist Viner remained skeptical that the U.S. Army was the most effective ambassadors for reeducation. Instead, he suggested the German people be allowed to reeducate themselves by self-purging Nazism from schools and universities.118 Other Americans believed education should continue, but along the lines of the U.S. education system and its public admittance into primary and secondary schools and universal course subjects. Author and former teaching fellow Gregor Ziemer proposed the U.S. government create four teacher training schools with a staff of 250 American teachers for each facility. There, Germans would learn how to teach the German youth about freedom and democracy.119

By the winter of 1945, reeducation was at a standstill, despite JCS 1067’s sense of urgency of the policy. There were not enough teachers to reopen German schools under the E&RA guidelines, despite the committee’s efforts. Led by Colonel John W. Taylor, the E&RA did not want to force democracy and Americanism into youthful minds, as Hitler had with Nazism. Instead, the E&RA wanted German children to choose American “qualities.”120 These efforts did not succeed. In December, geography teachers were still using official Nazi textbooks and maps which instructed children that “the German Master Race was destined to rule the world.”121 One suggestion to resolving the problem of insufficient numbers of teachers was

120 Philip W. Whitcomb, “America Statistics Issued on German Youth Education,” The Baltimore Sun, December 16, 1945, 17.
to import German-speaking educators from other countries. There just were not “enough trustworthy anti-Nazis within Germany to undertake” a democratic curriculum. Along with relying on vetted German teachers and new textbooks, officials hoped recreation would also serve to “Americanize” the German youth. Sports events gave U.S. soldiers a chance to interact with German youngsters in a way that placed the occupation army on the frontlines of reeducation and democratization, even if the Americans themselves did not know it.

U.S. policymakers purged sports, music, and film of Nazism, replacing it with democracy and images of Americanism. U.S. officials based their cultural policy on the premise that German culture “was complicit in the militarism that led to two world wars and in the failure of German democracy to prevent the rise of Nazism.”¹²² U.S. soldiers and intense propaganda served as the vehicles for delivery. MG-authorized everyday interactions between the army and the German people gave the U.S. soldiers the unique advantage of portraying a positive image of American democracy, although that meant the media spotlight was often on U.S. soldiers’ actions in Germany.

Football was a staple American sport, and occupation troops made sure they could still enjoy the game even as they occupied Germany. Army units quickly formed American football teams and in September 1945 faced off in a Bomb Bowl tournament in war-torn Berlin. American, French, and Soviet generals attended the game along with German citizens. True to American passion for the sport, players and American spectators erupted in a bout of “fisticuffs and a near riot” in the first half of the fourth quarter. The American game and Americans’ emotional connection to the sport was not just an attempt at normalcy for the troops, but also a distinctly American cultural phenomenon for the German people to observe. Unfortunately, all

¹²² Boehling, “U.S. Cultural Policy and German Culture During the American Occupation,” 388.
the Berliners cared for were the half-smoked cigarette butts left behind after the game. Due to the non-fraternization policy of JCS 1067, this was as close to the Germans as the occupying sports players could get. As spectators, Germans were not receptive to American football.

Propaganda was a useful tool to Eisenhower as he forced the Germans to face the nation’s war guilt. Posters were plastered on walls and poles around military detachments with the caption “Whose Guilt” under pictures of “emaciated skeletons and piles of corpses.” The MG produced similar posters, radio broadcasts, and newsreels throughout 1945 and into 1946. The main themes were a mix of war guilt and Allied victory. These propaganda messages in fact worked against reeducation and democratization efforts. The Americans were not presenting themselves as fair and democratic occupiers, despite attempts to do so. For example, the Germans willingly attended newsreel showings, listened to the American-controlled radio, and read American-approved newspapers. They wanted “broad information” and unbiased reports on the state of the postwar world. What they got instead, domestic media critics claimed, was propaganda “piled on with a heavier hand than was Joseph Goebbels’” of a self-righteous American victor and occupier. The defeated people were inundated with images of “broken civilian refugees” and prosperous American life. Germans did not become “reeducated” or embrace democracy. Instead, they observed the propaganda attempts with “stony silence.” Policies would have to change before U.S. troops could convince the Germans to comply with occupation policies or foster friendly relations that were considered conducive to a lasting peace.

---

124 Gladwin Hill, “Inept Propaganda Repels Germans,” New York Times, January 13, 1946, 7, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times; The Information Control Division (ICD) of the MG was in charge of denazifying the information media, exercising authority over censorship, licensing, and mass-media outlets like newspapers and radio. While the ICD attempted to create or import into German society forms of popular media, like music or films, Germans controlled areas of high culture, such as music and art. The ICD, therefore, had only limited influence over German culture. Boehling, “U.S. Cultural Policy and German Culture During the American Occupation,” 389.
Patton and Bavaria

Denazification, reeducation, and democratization were chief orders of JCS 1067 and Eisenhower’s MG. Unfortunately, not every field commander or occupation leader believed the policies to be in the best interest of German reconstruction. This dissent sometimes reached Military Governor Eisenhower, but most Army commanders knew when to keep their opinions to themselves. However, one man spoke out against the denazification policy and refused to enforce the directive. General George S. Patton was among many U.S. Army voices who believed JCS 1067 could not be enforceable or beneficial to reconstructing Germany. Instead, he decided that Bavaria should be run by capable, experienced Germans—rather than inexperienced locals or U.S. military commanders. Eisenhower’s insistence on denazification and Patton’s disregard for the policy led not only to a break-up of their friendship, but intense public criticism of the denazification policy.

Eisenhower’s summer orders on denazification reached Patton as he governed Bavaria. On August 11, Patton wrote his long-time friend that “a great many inexperienced or inefficient people” held local government positions because of the denazification program. The general continued, “it is no more possible for a man to be a civil servant in Germany and not have paid lip service to Nazism than it is possible for a man to be a postmaster in American and not have paid at least lip service to the Democratic Party or Republican Party when it is in power.” In Bavaria, Patton built an efficiently run system and used former Nazis to achieve that goal. It was this policy that led the MG to take a hard look into Bavaria and Patton’s flagrant disregard for military orders to denazify.

MG officials identified Nazi party members with the lists the CIC compiled. These lists, however, were products of the OSS’s Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) intelligence.
gathering. In Bavaria, Patton did not use the OSS to find Nazis. Instead, he “obtained all intelligence he needed” from the few American “expatriates who had remained in Germany during the Hitler years.” He refuted PWD attempts to “snoop about.” Kahn and Egon Fleck, an Austrian émigré and OSS civilian, were ordered to investigate Patton’s governing of Bavaria. In July, OSS commanding officer Colonel Clifford R. Powell instructed Kahn and Fleck to “go down to Munich . . . and dig up as much dirt as you can. I want to crack Patton’s military government wide open. Let’s put this son-of-a-bitch in his place.” Once in Bavaria, Kahn and Fleck observed posters everywhere displaying appeals to Nazi Party members to “make good for what they had done while in power” by donating clothes to former concentration camp inmates. While this seemed like progress, it quickly was met with disgust as the OSS men saw Nazi advertisements for the Party’s official newspaper, “Voelkischer Beobachter” and swastikas plastered on street poles and building walls. A telephone booth outside a military government building even bore the warning “Jews are forbidden to use this apparatus.”

Even more disturbing were the number of former Nazis in positions of power in Bavaria. Kahn and Fleck documented Nazis and military officers “at every level of provincial and municipal government and industry.” Patton allowed Michael Cardinal von Faulhaber, Prince-Archbishop of Bavaria, to take charge of the local government. Perhaps the Cardinal was chosen because of his reported devotion to the Church and opposition to the Nazi regime. Unfortunately, it would be decades before anyone outside of Bavaria would understand the Cardinal’s opposition was limited. He voiced his disdain for Hitler’s secular doctrine, but also counselled his parishioners to obey the law of the land as well as God’s laws. A letter written on

---

126 Ibid., 85.
February 10, 1933 continued with this ambiguous direction. He wrote that the citizen owes “respect and obedience” to the state. With Hitler already Germany’s Chancellor, citizens believed they were abiding by the Cardinal’s teachings when they voted for the Nazi Party in March of 1933.\textsuperscript{127} After the March elections, Hitler and the Nazi Party solidified their position as the ruling government. This development, along with Hitler’s promise not to attack the Church and hearing the Chancellor praised in Rome, the Cardinal preached obedience to authority. No matter how different his views from the Nazis, the Cardinal urged other Catholics to “support the government.” Even a meeting with Hitler in 1936, in which the Cardinal referred to the Führer as “a devil” in his journal, did not sway him from lauding Hitler’s “faith of God.”\textsuperscript{128} The Cardinal refused to oppose Hitler because of his own convictions that the state is God’s representative.

Despite the Cardinal’s history with the Nazis, Patton encouraged him to restore order to Bavaria, regardless of JCS 1067’s denazification policy. MG officials in Bavaria appointed men the Cardinal recommended. He claimed each were individuals of “high moral standing and positions of business and intellectual leadership, people of experience and of conservative reliability, who understand the particular Bavarian problems.” Despite the Cardinal’s words, PWD intelligence discovered many had ties to the Nazi Party. To make sure the U.S. Army did not arrest the men, the Cardinal’s clergymen offered “vindicating recommendations” for Party members to political positions. Munich’s mayor justified the employment of former Nazis, replying to a complaint from the anti-Nazi group Freedom Action Bavaria, “I do not take part in the fight against fascism. I leave that to the Americans.” The Cardinal also protected former

\textsuperscript{127} Mary Alice Gallin, “The Cardinal and the State: Faulhaber and the Third Reich,” \textit{Journal of Church and State} 12, no. 3 (Autumn 1970): 388–89.

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 392.
Nazi business interests. When business owners, many of them Jewish, wanted to file claims for
their businesses that the Nazis had forced them to surrender, owners discovered they “had no
legal right to demand the return of their properties.”129 Food and housing were just as
disproportionately distributed. Catholics, former Nazis, and even high-ranking military officials
detained in the U.S. camps received greater food rations than the victims of Nazism, anti-Nazis,
and displaced persons.130 While Bavaria represented an extreme case, military commanders
across the American zone deliberately ignored denazification in favor of reconstruction.

Kahn and Fleck documented their investigation in a report titled “Munich, Lack of
Democracy Brings Disillusionment.” The two men noted the initial optimism the people of
Munich had at hearing of the American arrival that spring, and the disappointing reality of Nazis
still in power and another totalitarian government ruling the city. “They were confused as to the
true aims of the Americans.”131 Kahn and Fleck returned to OSS headquarters and reported all
they had seen and heard to their commanding officer. Although Powell had initiated the
investigation, he did not send off the report to his superiors, including Eisenhower. His
intentions in neglecting to do so are unclear.

Kahn returned to Bavaria one month after his initial visit, hoping to find improvements to
the earlier denazification problems. He was sorely disappointed. Not only had denazification
not proceeded, but the situation had gotten worse. Kahn produced an amended report: “Munich,

---

129 Freedom Action Bavaria led a rebellion of soldiers and civilians against the Nazi power structure in
April 1945. After the war, the group continued to oppose Nazism by reporting former Nazis to military
and local governments. Ferdinand Kramer, “A Late Uprising Against the Nazi Regime,” Ludwig-
Maximilians-Universität München, April 26, 2013, https://www.en.uni-muenchen.de/news/newsarchiv/2013/ns.html; Kahn, Experiment in Occupation: Witness to the
130 Ibid., Experiment in Occupation: Witness to the Turnabout, Anti-Nazi War to Cold War, 1944, 1946,
88–89.
131 Ibid. 89.
a Month Later—An Appendix to ‘Munich, Lack of Democracy Brings Disillusionment,’”
detailing the “wholesale violations of SHAEF and Potsdam directives.” In mid-August, Kahn
finally received permission from Powell to send both Munich reports and supplemental
documents to MG headquarters in Frankfurt and State Department officials in Washington. On
August 23, Eisenhower summoned Lieutenant General Wayne H. Haislip, commander of the
Seventh Army and governor of the western district of Baden-Wuerttemberg and Hessen, and
Patton, along with both of the men’s staff and MG officials to Frankfurt. Eisenhower proceeded
to “clarify American economic, political and military policy . . . and military government in the
three months of control” in the American zone.132 This meeting, meant to remind the military
commanders on the position of the U.S. Army in the occupation and governance of Germany,
left Eisenhower assuming his subordinates clearly understood that they were to follow JCS 1067,
the Potsdam Agreement, and MG policies. The military governor trusted his long-time friend
Patton to adhere to the directives. Unfortunately, that trust and their friendship would not last as
Patton proved more impulsive than the U.S. Army commanders could tolerate.

In a September 11 letter, Eisenhower reprimanded Patton, reminding the General that
“the United States entered the war as a foe of Nazism.” Eisenhower made it explicitly clear to
Patton what the policy meant: “we will not compromise with Nazism in any way . . . The
discussional stage of this question is long past . . . I expect just as loyal service in the execution
of this policy . . . as I received during the war.” Even after a visit from Eisenhower, Patton
would not change his position and adhere to policy. Eisenhower complained to Marshall, writing

that Patton’s “own convictions are not entirely in sympathy with the ‘hard peace’ concept and, being Patton, he cannot keep his mouth shut either to his own subordinates or in public.”

Initially, Patton denied publicly speaking against denazification, telling his superior that he was “a clam” in front of the press. But on September 22, after U.S. policymakers lifted the confidential classification on JCS 1067, Patton called a press conference. The General “eagerly” answered questions from Raymond Daniell of the New York Times, Edward Morgan of the Chicago Daily News, and Carl Levin of the New York Herald Tribune. Each reporter peppered Patton with questions on his “handling of the Nazi problem.” Patton replied that his decision to allow Nazis to hold important political and economic positions was deliberate, as they would allow Germany to return to industrial production for the rest of Europe.

One reporter questioned the Bavarian military governor asking why “reactionaries” held powerful positions in Bavaria. “Reactionaries!” Patton exclaimed. “Do you want a lot of communists? . . . I don’t know anything about parties . . . The Nazi thing is just like a Democratic and Republican election fight.” These words sealed Patton’s fate within the U.S. Army.

Patton’s public comparison of Nazism to the democratic two-party system forced Eisenhower to re-evaluate his friend’s position. At first, Eisenhower believed he could remedy the situation as he dealt with outrage from the War Department as well as the State Department, and the U.S. Foreign Office. Eisenhower ordered Patton to call another press conference and read the September 11 letter. He specified two paragraphs that outlined America’s official policy regarding the treatment of former Nazis. Patton obeyed, and through Eisenhower’s

---

135 Ambrose, Eisenhower, 1:424.
words, reassured the press on September 23 that “victory is not complete until we have
eliminated from positions of responsibility and, in appropriate cases properly punished, every
active adherent to the Nazi party."136 But Patton then attempted to justify his policies in Bavaria
to the reporters and their readers: “in Germany practically all . . . of the tradespeople, small
businessmen and even professional men . . . were beholden to the [Nazi Party] which permitted
them to carry on business or profession and that, therefore, many of them gave lip service only
. . . It was a form of blackmail.” These men, he claimed, were the type of Germans he allowed to
hold important positions in Bavaria “to insure ourselves that women, children and old men will
not perish from hunger and cold this winter.” The press conference did nothing to satisfy
Eisenhower. The military governor, reluctantly, came to the conclusion that if Patton continued
to oversee Bavaria, he would do so in violation of the directives laid out by JCS 1067 and the
MG.137

Upon hearing of the press conference, Eisenhower “erupted into the grand-daddy of all
temper,” and immediately called Patton to MG headquarters in Frankfurt. The meeting in the
military governor’s office did not end well for Patton. Eisenhower’s assistant, Kay Summersby,
later recalled overhearing “one of the stormiest sessions ever staged in our headquarters. It was
the first time I ever heard General Eisenhower really raise his voice.”138 Each man had a
different view on the threat to both the U.S. Army and the lasting peace: Eisenhower believed

Nazis in power threatened the peace he had worked so hard for. Patton seemed more concerned with the Soviets and Communism than a resurgence of Nazi militarism. Later in his memoir, Eisenhower remarked that “George Patton was aware that a principal purpose of our occupation mission was to cleanse the continent of Nazi control and influence.” Patton’s remarks at the September 22 press conference were “senseless.” Behind those closed doors on September 29, Eisenhower told Patton that “The war is over and I don’t want to hurt you—but I can’t let you be making such ridiculous statements.” Eisenhower chose to remove Patton from his command over the Third Army and transferred him to a “paper command” over the Theater Board, a unit that wrote the history of the Second World War. Patton remarked later on the disintegration of his friendship with Eisenhower that “he saw the truth of Henry Adams’ phrase that a friend in power is a friend lost.”

Clay’s Early Reactions

On March 23, 1945, General Lucius D. Clay was appointed Deputy Military Governor while he was also working in the Office of War Production and Mobilization under future Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. Clay was a “career army officer with training as an engineer” and had a special ability to understand civilians, unlike other military officers. Historian Carolyn Eisenberg describes Clay as a “gifted, driving, problem-solving technocrat”

---

139 Dwight D. Eisenhower, *At Ease: Stories I Tell To Friends* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967), 308; Quoted in Farago, *Patton: Ordeal and Triumph*, 818; For a detailed account of the events from September 22 to September 29, see *The Patton Papers*, 761–87; Before the meeting, Eisenhower wrote to Marshall explaining the Patton situation. Patton, he says, brought the situation upon himself. Despite Eisenhower’s repeated warnings to “keep his mouth shut,” Patton did not, forcing Eisenhower to place Patton in charge of the Theater Board under the Fifteenth Army Headquarters. See *Papers of Eisenhower*, VI:391–93; For Patton’s official dismissal from the MG, see VI:394–95.
who was “drawn to the work of reconstruction.” With these qualities, Clay studied the occupation plans and through the summer worked to rebuild Germany. In April 1945, he was given a copy of JCS 1067 to prepare the initial occupation period. Clay and his financial advisor, Lewis Douglas, were shocked after reading the occupation directive, not because of its “punitive measures” but because of its creator’s failure to foresee the economic repercussions that would follow its implementation. Douglas commented that the military directive was “assembled by economic idiots” who would “forbid the most skilled workers in Europe from producing as much as they can for a continent which is short of everything.” Part of the problem, Clay believed, was that the authors of the occupation directive were forced to create policies without knowing what the postwar world would look like, or what the occupation army would encounter. Clay and his staff were disappointed in the occupation policy, but were charged with implementing the directives.

Although Clay disapproved of JCS 1067’s directives, he used the document’s many loopholes to create policies that would allow for a successful occupation of Germany. Still, the general found his job made harder by the corps of foreign journalists in Germany. Newspaper reporters dissected Clay’s movements and relayed their analysis of the occupation to millions of Americans. Faced with unrelenting scrutiny, MG leaders were forced to stay quiet on the reasons behind decisions because of the military directive’s top secret status. Once that classification was lifted in September 1945, the War Department was able to admit to the press and public that MG operated off an official directive. After the policy became public, Clay went to Washington, hoping to get the directive modified into a more manageable program. It would

---

141 Quoted in Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany*, 1; Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 18.
be two more years before a new policy replaced JCS 1067. Until then, Clay and Murphy
governed the American zone as they needed to so that the U.S. Army could leave Germany in a
peaceful, cooperative state.142

Although JCS 1067/6 was created with the help of military, political, and diplomatic
officials, its policies proved unworkable and unenforceable. Military officials like Marshall and
Eisenhower remained loyal to the War Department’s insistence that JCS 1067 serve as the
guiding policy of the initial occupation period. But as the occupation played out, the directives
became increasingly troublesome for the U.S. Army or caused more problems than created
solutions. Military commanders like Patton and Clay saw JCS 1067 as a detriment to the lasting
peace. Representative of a broader group of military commanders who disagreed with the
occupation directive, Patton took his beliefs public and shamelessly proclaimed his disagreement
with U.S. policy. This cost the general his command. Clay, however, studied JCS 1067 and
found the loopholes from which he could develop his own policies. Instead of publicly
denouncing the official occupation policy, he went to Washington to change it. When that did
not work, he decided that for the occupation to be a success, he would need to work around the
directives, aware that his actions would not go unseen.

142 John Lewis Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press,
1972), 236; Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 285.
CHAPTER THREE:
DISSENTION AND TRANSFORMATION

The U.S. Army’s first year of occupation duty in Germany created unexpected opportunities for soldiers to express themselves independent of the military. The composition of the military during the Second World War had consisted of men and women working to defeat the enemy in combat until they achieved victory. After VE-Day, the War Department adopted a demobilization policy that would replace veterans with newly enlisted and drafted men. These new recruits were draftees and volunteers fulfilling one- to two-year contracts with the Army, men who expressed no intention of making the military a career. The professional officer corps soon realized that it would be dealing with a different military atmosphere than it had during the war. The predominately civilian, non-combat nature of the peacetime army and its peacetime duties created unanticipated problems for the U.S. Army. The mandate of occupation required the U.S. Army undertake a job it was not prepared for, despite extensive planning. The implementation of occupation policies created dissent within the enlisted ranks of the citizen army. Military officials attempted to control the soldiers but found that traditional methods did not work on the occupation army. The soldiers’ dissent and the military’s reaction led to an important social change in the U.S. Army as it adapted to the new type of soldiers it commanded.

Soldiers in units assigned to occupation duties reacted to U.S. Army policies in two ways: overt objection and active disregard. After the war ended and occupation began, combat veterans wanted to return home quickly. Most of them believed that once the war was over, so too was the need for a large military presence. For those impatient to return home, however, demobilization proved to be a gradual, calculated program. First, before the men could return home, the Army needed to have new recruits and draftees to replace the combat veterans in the
army of occupation. Beginning in the winter of 1945, the American public and overseas soldiers protested what they perceived as unnecessarily slow demobilization. Their actions did not persuade Army officials to change demobilization procedures. It did, though, provide an opportunity for the Army to alter the way it handled collective soldier dissatisfaction.

Second, fraternization with Germans had been strictly forbidden by Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces (SCAEF) Dwight D. Eisenhower and written into the occupation directive JCS 1067. The GIs considered the policy impractical and unreasonable, and so fraternization with German women and youth began almost immediately after VE-Day. Despite MG attempts to curtail this kind of insubordination, citizen individuality prevailed in the U.S. Army. The U.S. media decried the blatant disregard for Army orders and lamented a decrease in prestige that it perceived resulted from this behavior. The U.S. Army surrendered to GI dissention pragmatically, amending the non-fraternization policy to allow GIs to fraternize as they pleased. The calculated process took over a year to take effect, but passive dissent had greater influence on the U.S. Army than more militant protests of January 1946. Ultimately, the Army changed the way it treated its soldiers because of the occupation army’s deliberate disregard and overt objections to policies. This socio-cultural change became permanent and set the tone for the rest of the occupation period.

Demobilization Problems – Winter 1945

Beginning in winter 1944, the War Department began planning for eventual demobilization of the armed forces. To ensure fairness, the War Department developed the Adjusted Service Rating. Each soldier earned points based on length of service, overseas service, and number of children at home under the age of eighteen. After Germany’s surrender,
many soldiers with lower point totals were deployed to the Pacific Theater or were assigned to the army of occupation in Germany. In Germany, soldiers with the most points waited in Europe for transport ships home. The war in the Pacific, however, so occupied the Navy that few transport ships were available to return the troops home. Eisenhower later wrote that the troops had to “wait for the relatively few ships fitted up specifically for troop transport.”

While the troops might not have anticipated transportation problems, the U.S. government had. Six months before Germany surrendered, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill discussed the issue of bringing “American troops home as rapidly as transportation problems would allow.” The U.S. Army borrowed British ships and used U.S. Navy ships to transport troops to their overseas destinations, whether to the Pacific or the United States. After the war in Europe ended, the United States returned the British ships to the British Isles, leaving even fewer ships for Army transport. Army and Navy officials then turned to civilian ships. By the end of 1945, soldiers were returning home, but questions in newspapers and in Congress arose about timelines and resources. Representative Franck Havenner of California, for example, questioned whether the Navy was truly using civilian ships for transporting veterans home, or if the ships were commandeered for the war in the Pacific. Adding to the discontent over transportation problems, once the Navy brought the

---

143 To be slated for discharge, enlisted men needed a rating of 85 and enlisted women needed 44 points. According to historian Earl F. Zeimke, “the rating was calculated for every enlisted man in the theater on the basis of one point for each month of service since September 1940, one point for each month of overseas service since September 1940, five points for each decoration or battle star, and twelve points for each child under eighteen up to a maximum of three.” Earl F. Zeimke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946*, Army Historical Series (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 329.
soldiers into port, they may have had to wait there for railroad transportation home. Those trains, if they arrived on time, were often cramped, and lacked resources to care for the veterans.146

Other concerns influenced demobilization. Newspapers reported that government and business leaders worried that if the troops came home too quickly, the unemployment rate would rise as soldiers tried to find peacetime employment. These leaders supported the perceived slow demobilization so the economy would not be affected too quickly. More important, the postwar plans of maintaining the peace in Europe required the establishment of a large peacetime armed force.147 The U.S. Army could not form a large force if it demobilized its veterans before replacements arrived. Despite these concerns, in a September 1945 message to Congress, President Harry S. Truman promised to demobilize the armed forces as soon as the troops are “no longer needed.” He went on to say that Americans should become accustomed to the existence of a large, permanent military during peacetime, but did not confirm if that force would be stationed at home or abroad. The first step in demobilization, Truman said, was the replacement of the soldiers who had been deployed for “several years” with new recruits. Eisenhower predicted that the Selective Service Act would continue through 1946, otherwise

---

efforts to achieve a lasting peace would fail and there would be “chaos.” After one year of further conscriptions, he predicted the existence of a large, permanent, volunteer army. 148

Clearly, the American public did not support the slow process of demobilization. It did not accept the administration’s or Army’s reasoning that men should be drafted in peacetime. To many Americans, the war in Europe was over, the troops should come home, and civilians at home should stay there. In May 1945, most of the enlisted ranks were still draftees. 149 The opposition to continuing the draft and opposition to the stated demobilization policy stemmed from three problems: first, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps set up different demobilization policies; second, the U.S. military did not adequately explain to the public the conditions and point system for discharge; and third, the Army had not explained the correlation between the discharge and continuing the draft system. 150 A September 1945 article in the Wall Street Journal repeated the public discontent: “When a public policy produces absurdities, it is pretty good evidence that the policy itself is absurd, and whether American citizens are in or out of uniform, they will not tolerate such policies.” 151

The American public did not prove united when it came to demobilization. While many Americans argued that the U.S. Army was keeping troops in Europe for an unacceptable length of time, there were civilians who understood that U.S. postwar policy depended on a large standing army. In a letter to the editor of the Pittsburg Press, one reader voiced concern that the

Army was actually demobilizing too rapidly to sustain a foreign presence. “No other powerful nation is denuding itself of military might as quickly as we are.” This reader insisted that a large armed force was “vital” to U.S. interests.\(^{152}\) Interestingly, he joined with other Americans who believed the occupation should not be carried out by the men who had fought in the war, but by those who did not, such as older men who had been ineligible for the draft or men who had been disqualified for other reasons from active military service.\(^{153}\) U.S. officials dismissed these suggestions, instead focusing on the current demobilization plan. Throughout the fall of 1945, the U.S. Army demobilized according to the established policy, ignoring the public’s suggestions and its own soldiers’ protests.

Protesting U.S. Policy – Winter 1945

In Germany and the United States, newspapers and radio broadcasts spread the word of the demobilization program. The American public reacted, expressing discontent in several ways. Men and women wrote letters to their local newspapers and legislators. Wives and mothers of soldiers made their opinions known in an especially visible and emotional way. “We wonder if anyone in Washington has any adequate idea of the resentment that is being built up in this country.”\(^{154}\) That resentment led to the establishment of “Bring Back Daddy” clubs across the country. Women in Toledo, Ohio established the first club in November 1945. They urged Congressional action “in release of fathers from service.” The current point system favored men with three or more children. Wives and mothers of soldiers wrote letters insisting that all men

---


with children, “no matter how little or how much time he has had in any branch of service,” should be discharged immediately. Wives and mothers sent members of Congress letters, petitions, even packages with “little knitted booties, baby shoes . . . worn of sole, scuffed of toe.” Since the U.S. government did not respond, the women escalated their campaigns to include picketing government offices and marching through the streets in hope of garnering public attention. For example, the St. Paul, Minnesota chapter of the Bring Back Daddy club marched to Governor Edward J. Thye’s office with signs urging the discharge of fathers. The governor responded, assuring the protestors he would do what he could, but “the responsibility rests with military officials.” The women heard his message, and turned their attention to military officials in Washington. They demanded President Truman and Army Chief of Staff Eisenhower to listen to their concerns.

Figure 3: “‘Bring Back Daddy’ Pickets Visit Thye.” *The Minneapolis Star*. December 10, 1945.

---

Christmas season of 1945 brought pleas to Santa to “Bring Daddy home” from his overseas duty. Newspapers throughout December published letters written by, or for, children of all ages. Each one mentioned how the writer had been a good boy or girl, wanted a dollhouse or a toy gun, and candy, and asked Santa to watch over siblings or cousins. In each plea, one can find a young child asking Santa to “bring my daddy home from the army” or “talk to Uncle Sam” to send daddy a discharge. In one notable letter, little Jennie from Johnson City, Tennessee did not ask for toys or candy. She simply wrote, “I wish you would bring me nothing at all but my Daddy home.” The year 1945 was the first time many of the children experienced a peacetime holiday. Mothers wrote for their two-year old’s, sending letters to the North Pole. The media obtained and released these letters, commenting on the heartbreaking prayers “that Santa may find it . . . difficult to meet.” Of 5,000 letters that arrived at the New York City Post Office, most of them asked the “venerable friend of children” to “bring back a father or a brother stationed in some foreign land for yet another Christmas.”¹⁵⁶ Despite publication of these letters in local newspapers, the U.S. government did not react to the public’s passionate pleas for the veterans’ return home. The Christmas season continued on with frustration for many military families. For the mothers of the children and wives of the soldiers, there was only one man who could help fulfill their children’s wishes, and he was in Washington.


On January 15, 1946, the Army Chief of Staff reported to Congress on the Army’s demobilization policy. Eisenhower provided an extensive description detailing the establishment of the policy, how demobilization occurred in both Europe and the Pacific, and why there might be “confusion” over the discharge system. Addressing the public’s displeasure with the Army’s demobilization policy, Eisenhower explained how the “release from the urgency of war started an emotional wave to get men out of the Army.” He then chided the public for this response, insisting that “straight thinking” should replace emotion as it concerns millions of families. Eisenhower repeatedly reminded the audience that the demobilization plan relied on a balance between discharges and replacements. This balance ensured fairness as men returned home
based on their point ratings. He further explained that the point system would be modified so that by April 30, 1946, all enlisted draftees with forty-five points, instead of the current eighty-five requirement, as of September 2, 1945 would be eligible for discharge. Eisenhower believed the system was fair to everyone while still providing the U.S. government with the means to pursue its strategic interests overseas.157

Unfortunately for Eisenhower, his statement to Congress did not ease the public frustration over demobilization. The women of the Bring Home Daddy clubs complained that in his entire speech, there “wasn’t a word in it about fathers.” When individual clubs saw no change in the demobilization plans, a few “decided they’d get better results if they had unified action.” The Pittsburg Servicemen’s Wives and Children Association, the Seattle-based Service Fathers’ Release Association, and Chicago’s Bring Back Daddy chapter conferred with each other on further steps. “Why don’t we go down and talk to Eisenhower?” Maybe then they would get what they wanted: the continuation of the draft so that “daddy would get home sooner” as the draftees would replace their men in occupation duties, an increase in the age limit for conscription, and lowered physical standards.158 The women believed their best option was to speak to the Army Chief of Staff in person, since writing letters to Congress had not achieved their goal.

On January 22, 1946, as Eisenhower entered the congressional office where he would meet with the Military Affairs Committee, over twenty women followed and cornered the Army Chief of Staff, demanding that he immediately release all fathers from the U.S. Army. Reports


of the incident in the *New York Times* claimed the women “dished him out pieces of their mind” as they insisted the Army return every husband and father. Once he escaped the women, Eisenhower told the Military Affairs Committee that he had been “emotionally upset” by the wives’ demonstrative reaction to the military’s demobilization plans. However, he remained “uncompromising” in his position. The point system, which was meant to be fair based on service records, would continue to determine when soldiers would be returned to their families. He told the women and now emphasized to the congressional committee that if any special groups, like fathers, students, or husbands, were released from service early, the Army’s objectives in the postwar period would suffer.\(^{159}\) Eisenhower claimed citizens and soldiers did not understand the scope of the operation. He later recalled in his memoirs that “not everyone was prepared to accept our position that a globally dispersed Army, stationed on all continents and on islands from the Arctic to the edges of the Antarctic, whose mobilization and transport had required years to effect, could not be returned home in a few months.”\(^{160}\) The army of occupation was comprised of draftees who “did not desire Army careers” and whose wives were not prepared to accept their husbands as long-term military men. Chief of the Army Ground Forces, General Jacob L. Devers commented on the communal reaction to the policy, claiming that the public’s refusal to accept the demobilization policy was “jeopardizing our security and wrecking the morale of men we needed to maintain the peace.”\(^{161}\)

---


In the day’s previous statement to Congress on demobilization, Eisenhower laid out the Army's purpose in occupying Germany. He explained that Germany was “going through reconversion” and the Army was “responsible for supervising all the headaches of a changeover from war to peace, with the added directive that we must make certain these people are so disarmed, both economically and in a military sense, that they cannot make war again.” The devastation of the war made the Army’s job harder. “It requires a great many men to supervise the local governments in our zone in Germany and Austria with a civilian population of over 15,000,000. However much you may delegate local work to Germans, you still have the
responsibility for policing these people, their industry, trade and commerce, food and agriculture, education, finance, telephone and telegraph and transportation." Eisenhower described the duties the occupation soldiers: "Demilitarization of Germany . . . means demolition of her fortifications and other installations," supervising and reinforcing local police forces, patrolling "two thousand miles of international or interzonal boundaries," and guarding military stores, telephone exchanges, electrical plants, road and railroad bridges and other points which might be targets of enemy sabotage." The Army Chief of Staff did not specify who those saboteurs might be, but he went on to emphasize the importance of intelligence and counterintelligence. As to returning veterans home once replacements arrived, he added that these fresh troops still needed additional training in occupation duties. Only experienced soldiers could provide that training. Maintaining the peace meant demobilization would continue at the established gradual pace, otherwise the occupation army would fail in its duties.162

Figure 6: Accompanied the article dictating Army Chief of Staff Dwight D. Eisenhower’s speech to Congress on the progress of demobilization. Associated Press, “Gen. Eisenhower’s Statement to Congress Meeting on Army’s Program for Demobilization,” New York Times, January 16, 1945, 14, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times
GI Unrest – Summer to Winter, 1945

In the fall of 1945, many U.S. soldiers stationed in Germany had calculated their discharge points in anticipation of going home. Single men or those with fewer than three children watched as those with more went home. During the war, soldiers believed they were equal to each other, no matter who they had waiting for them in the United States. Some men believed they were drafted without the Army making “class distinction based on dependencies.” While discrimination in conscription based on race, ethnicity, or economic standing cannot be disputed, the use of the word “class” indicates a perceived level of privilege afforded men with three or more children.163 As the Army implemented the demobilization plan, soldiers began to feel discriminated against by the point system because soldiers with less service time but more children were going home. Some men believed they deserved to go home as soon as the war ended. They were greatly disappointed. The U.S. Army touted the fairness of demobilization, but the troops stationed in Germany did not agree.164 In 1946, soldiers’ loud complaints forced the U.S. Army to recognize their dissatisfaction due to the considerable public attention to GI unrest.

U.S. soldiers proceeded with the occupation of Germany with limited knowledge of why they were there. New York Times correspondent Tania Long reported that “the average GI and officer is primarily preoccupied with one thought only—when he can go home. He has forgotten, if he ever knew, why he came here at all, and he is not being told why he must stay to help demilitarize, occupy, and denazify Germany.”165 Robert Macon, a soldier with the 4th

---

Armored Unit, only had eighteen points on V-E Day. The War Department assigned him to the army of occupation, or as Macon called it, the “constabulary force.” Macon, along with other soldiers, knew their jobs were to “go in and denazify Germany,” but they did not understand what that meant. Nor did Macon and his friends understand what it meant to be a “police force.”

New York Times correspondent Drew Middleton reported that the Army, “after a brilliant beginning in the summer of 1945 has neglected to impress upon the soldiers the reasons why it is necessary to maintain” an occupation force in Germany. “Nine out of ten soldiers do not understand why their presence is necessary or how a long-term occupation may prevent future wars.” Middleton wrote that the average enlisted soldier “sees only a listless, subservient population and meets only accommodating women.” Despite MG attempts to convey U.S. motivations behind the occupation of Germany, whether through the Pocket Guide to Germany or the Weekly Bulletin, some soldiers remained unimpressed with the explanation for the assignment.

Although the War Department no longer needed men moved to Japan after August 1945, the department deemed it “too late to change the [discharge] system” and so the required discharge points remained in place for the first year of the occupation. Demobilization proceeded based on the point system. On V-E Day, 1,622,000 soldiers were in Germany. By December, 614,000 remained. The occupation of Germany was the first time a large number of American soldiers would see peacetime service overseas. The Deputy Military Governor of

---


167 Quoted in Kahn, Experiment in Occupation: Witness to the Turnabout, Anti-Nazi War to Cold War, 1944-1946, 139.

168 Refer to p. 9-10 on Eisenhower’s change to the Adjusted Service Rating system that took effect in April 1946. Clay, Decision in Germany, 61–62; The U.S. military participated in other foreign occupations for extended periods of time, but not with the scale of men as the post-war German
the American Zone in Germany, Lucius D. Clay, later recalled that only Eisenhower’s “prestige and the high personal regard in which he was held kept the command together.”\textsuperscript{169} In October 1945, Eisenhower left his command in Germany to serve as the Army Chief of Staff. His absence led the occupation troops to argue that they, too, should be sent home. The men began to scrutinize each discharge, calling out favoritism when the Army released men with too few points. One case garnered much media and troop attention. College football player Sergeant Charlie Trippi had forty-one points in October 1945, thirty-four points short of receiving his discharge. Georgia senators applied political pressure on “a docile Secretary of War” to prematurely discharge Trippi so he could return to the football field at the University of Georgia. Trippi worked as a company clerk, a much needed and essential position that would not have slated the sergeant for demobilization. Yet, the U.S. Army discharged Sergeant Trippi ahead of schedule.\textsuperscript{170} The case of Trippi is one example of privileged men with lower points going home before those with higher ratings. This type of privilege increasingly angered the soldiers as they waited for their own discharge.

\textsuperscript{169} Clay, \textit{Decision in Germany}, 61–62.
At the end of December 1945, the U.S. Army announced it would “slow down” demobilization. Eisenhower continued to speak of the need to balance veterans with draftees completing their training and reaching their occupation posts. This meant that though some soldiers might have sufficient points, they were left in Germany for months while waiting for their replacements. GIs began to see results for speaking out publicly against the military’s policies. GIs first sent letters to their state representatives back home. When that did not garner the desired response, they wrote directly to Eisenhower or sent letters to newspapers. Throughout January 1946, soldiers in the United States and overseas even organized mass
demonstrations protesting the slow rate of demobilization. In Frankfurt, an entire company of soldiers cabled Truman, Eisenhower, and the Military Affairs Committee, angrily questioning whether “brass hats [are] to be permitted to build empires?” and blamed the leaders for the “evident lack of faith of our friends and neighbors [that] is causing bitter resentment and deterioration of the morale of men in this theater.” Afterwards, the men spoke to other soldiers from a lamppost platform asking the GIs “Isn’t the recent redeployment policy merely a squeeze play to force favorable action on the pending peacetime draft by Congress?” and “Isn’t a close-out force of 316,000 men merely an excuse for holding men in the theater?” In Oregon, over seventy men protested the “absence of a real demobilization plan.” On January 9, approximately 4,000 “malcontents” marched to the MG headquarters in Frankfurt, demanding an end to their deployments and a return home. The next day, 1,000 more “booed the names of Secretary of War [Robert P. Patterson, Sr.] and their commander, Gen. Joseph T. McNarney” while also chanting “We want Ike.” One GI organizer shouted, “We are going to continue to hold meetings . . . until we make ourselves heard by affable Ike!” In Berlin, 2,500 GIs signed a petition protesting the “slowdown of demobilization” after a night of “orderly” meetings.172

For the media, the GI protests created a new image of the American soldier as an individual rather than just a cog in the U.S. Army machine. Articles highlighted the independent actions of soldiers separate from the policies of the U.S. Army. Media attention of the soldiers

applauded this new GI for standing up for his beliefs. More often, however, newspapers condemned the protests. *New York Times* correspondent Drew Middleton argued that the actions of the soldiers lowered the “prestige of the United States in the eyes of the German population” and weakened the “authority of the military government.” As MG worked to encourage German cooperation, the German locals wanted to hear more about the GI demonstrations against the MG. Germans were interested in the soldiers’ insubordination and the Army’s response. A few anonymous U.S. officers commented to Middleton that the demonstrations only encouraged German resistant movements that still supported national socialism. The *Fort Worth Star-Telegram* suggested that “this is the sort of situation which Nazi elements will rejoice in. Evidence of discontent among the occupying forces is what they are looking for. This should make them bolder in spreading underground propaganda.” Additional accusations arose from U.S. officials and the media who suspected a connection between the protests and communism. Writers charged the U.S. soldiers with tarnishing the image of the U.S. Army and of sympathizing with German national socialism or communism. In his memoir, Clay attempted to explain why the men reacted to occupation duty with resentment. “A victorious army of combat veterans had defeated the enemy in hard fighting. Released from the discipline of combat, it was not ready to accept the more rigorous discipline of garrison and peacetime training.” Clay’s bid to understand the motives guiding GI unrest was partially correct. The

---

174 Rep. George A. Dondero (R. Mich) claimed “the recent communist-led GI demonstrations prove that the department has sown the wind and is now reaping the whirlwind.” “Communist Conspiracy Seen In GI Demonstrations,” *The Capital Journal*, January 23, 1946, 9; McNarney warned the occupation army that the demonstrations “might be exploited by some individuals or elements” which could injure the “Army discipline.” Associated Press, “McNarney Bans GI Demonstrations,” *Fort Worth Star-Telegram*, January 17, 1946, 16.
175 Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 64.
postwar GI did not understand the reasons behind the Army’s policies. The occupation, compared to the war, was banal and boring. The occupation responsibilities of the soldiers of the U.S. Army did not seem appropriate compared to the harsh policies of JCS 1067 and demobilization.

What the media failed to realize was that it was in the occupation policies that soldiers found their voices. For the first time in the twentieth century, soldiers did not take orders with slight mumbles under their breaths. This occupation caused men to downplay the notion of themselves as a collective. It was because so many men believed they were individually targeted by the military’s demobilization policy that they launched the demonstrations. Military officials and the media described the demonstrations as “mobs,” “wild disorders,” a bout of “hysteria,” “near mutiny,” “distressing,” hotheaded, and “humiliating to all Americans.” Other commentators rationalized that the GI demonstrations were just a part of “a prevailing national mood.”

In Washington, Eisenhower compared the soldiers’ behavior to an “insurrection.” He banned the U.S. soldiers from further demonstrations, drawing more ire from the boots on the ground. The Army Chief of Staff did, however, order representatives of the Inspector General’s Department to go to “every camp and post” to “hear any demobilization pleas.” Eisenhower declared to his subordinates that “the time for [the protests] is past.” In his memoir, Eisenhower argued that the perception of the slow pace belied the progress the U.S. Army had

---

177 Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell To Friends, 317.
made in demobilizing the troops. “From V-J Day on,” he later wrote, “we exceeded the
[projected] quotas of soldiers to be returned to their families. By the end of 1945, the figure had
reached five million, almost double the scheduled number.” Eisenhower commented on the
“purely emotional surge in every echelon of command from the War Department down to the
platoon” as his staff was “visited by committees of mothers, and an incalculable heat was put on
Representative and Senators.” Despite these actions and as Eisenhower surmised,
demobilization was already running at a faster pace before the Bring Daddy Back campaigns and
the GI protests of the winter of 1945-1946. The demobilization plan, however, gave the soldiers
in the occupation army a chance to speak out against military policy. As progress was made in
demobilizing, Eisenhower asserted that if the War Department yielded to “insistent demands”
from families and soldiers, the demobilization system could collapse. Demobilization should
take the pace necessary to ensure the army of occupation could continue its duties. No amount
of protests, letters, petitions, or cornering would change this program. However, the attention GI
protests received from the media and other military officials resulted in an acknowledgement of
the soldiers’ voices. Soldiers did not change demobilization policy, but they did force the U.S.
Army to recognize soldier individuality and launch programs to investigate the rationale behind
the GI dissatisfaction. It would take a different type of GI dissent to force the Army to change its
policies.

179 Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell To Friends, 317; See the figure 14 for the projected and actual
discharge totals for each month after VE-Day to December 1946. Associated Press, “Gen. Eisenhower’s
Statement to Congress Meeting on Army’s Program for Demobilization,” 14.
Fraternizing with the Enemy – The First Year of Occupation

In September 1944, as American soldiers marched through Germany, Eisenhower issued an order prohibiting fraternization between Allied troops and the German population. The policy, as defined in the “SHAEF Handbook for Military Government in Germany,” ordered “avoidance of mingling with Germans upon terms of friendliness, familiarity, or intimacy, whether individually or in groups, in official or unofficial dealings.” Soldiers were forbidden from shaking hands with Germans, visiting their homes, playing games, exchanging gifts, or socializing with them in any manner.\(^{180}\) Reminiscent of Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr.’s fear that the soldiers might sympathize with Nazis, Eisenhower wanted to avoid all appearances of leniency and enforce the idea of defeat on the Germans. JCS 1067 authors supported this policy, writing it into their directive. With both the SCAEF and JCS prohibiting U.S. soldiers from fraternizing with German citizens, MG leaders hoped the troops would abide by the orders. They did not, not because they sought to flagrantly disregard their orders, but because non-fraternization was not a feasible policy in alignment with the occupation’s intention to democratize, reeducate, and rebuild Germany.

The U.S. Army distributed a “Pocket Guide to Germany” to every GI. The forty-eight-page booklet warned the soldiers against trusting the German people: “trust no one but your own kind. Be on your guard particularly against young Germans between the ages of 14 and 28.” On the subject of fraternization, the “Pocket Guide” provided clear orders: “There must be no fraternization. This is absolute!”\(^{181}\) If an American soldier was caught fraternizing with a German, the GI would be fined $65. Consequently, asking a German girl out became known as


the “$65 Question.” Even taking pictures with a German without SHAEF or MG approval resulted in disciplinary measures. In May 1945, American newspapers discovered that two high ranking U.S. generals had taken a picture with Hermann Göring, the former President of the Reichstag and Supreme Commander of the Luftwaffe and accused war criminal, after serving him a “chicken and peas” dinner at the Seventh Army Group headquarters. The media used this incident to claim Nazi leaders were treated in a “friendly manner.” Eisenhower responded by telling his senior commanders that he was “intensely displeased that my orders on nonfraternization have been so flagrantly disobeyed.”

---


---

What Eisenhower and other U.S. policymakers failed to realize was that although “friendliness” could be misinterpreted as “softness” by the media and American public, the occupation of Germany nonetheless required forming relationships with German citizens. For example, U.S. troops defied non-fraternization regulations when dealing with German children. Soldiers were reluctant to blame youngsters for the war. Eisenhower chided his men, insisting that non-fraternization applied to “all individuals with German blood.” For Eisenhower, even a small breakdown in policy could create a ripple in the occupation programs and threaten the success of a lasting peace. But he also knew “that the American soldier is not going to be stern and harsh with young children but on the contrary feels an inner compulsion constantly to make friends with them.” On June 2, he forwarded an amended policy to then Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall to be shared with the American public. This amendment excluded from non-fraternization “those below twelve years of age,” since they reasonably could not be accused of war guilt.\footnote{To George Catlett Marshall, June 2, 1945 \textit{The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: Occupation, 1945}, vol. VI (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 126–27.} All other Germans were to be avoided unless interaction pertained to official business.\footnote{Quoted in Edward N. Peterson, \textit{The Many Faces of Defeat: The German People’s Experience in 1945} (Peter Lang Publishing, 1990), 55.}

JCS 1067 directives on non-fraternization threatened to undermine policies on democratization and reeducation. If U.S. soldiers were unable to interact with Germans, how were they supposed to democratize them? Émigré Heinrich Frankel commented on the “friendly eagerness . . . to impose ‘The American Way of Life’” on the German population. According to Frankel, “there was not much that could be said against a captain or corporal introducing children to baseball, [giving kids] chewing gum, or the shopgirl receiving nylon stockings and a nourishing meal.”\footnote{Quoted in Edward N. Peterson, \textit{The Many Faces of Defeat: The German People’s Experience in 1945} (Peter Lang Publishing, 1990), 55.} Eisenhower issued a directive to the occupation troops in October: “You
are the representative of the United States in Germany who carry our policies direct to the Germans. It is from you that they learn to know and respect Americans.” Every man and woman who wore the uniform was now “American Ambassadors to the World” and should conduct themselves in that way. The contradiction within JCS 1067 was that the soldiers were not allowed to fraternize with the German people, but were directed to reeducate them to love democracy and the “American Way of Life.” Early in the occupation, limitations of the occupation policies began to show.

U.S. soldiers faced the occupation with uncertainty and hostility. They did not know what to do now that the war was over, why they were in Germany, how they were to treat the Germans, or when they were going home. “The general attitude among senior officials is that the disintegration in morale . . . can be checked only by appealing to the American people to consider whether they want troops home now at the cost of losing the peace.” This universal fear of losing the peace influenced U.S. officials’ reactions to the public and the occupation army’s disinterest in Germany. Initial interactions with the Germans underscored the fear of losing the peace. One soldier, Marion Hansen, later remembered seeing starving and freezing Germans. At the chow lines, soldiers were given two garbage cans, one for scraps and the other full of water for washing. Hansen recalled Germans begging for the scraps with an “old tin can [or] old shoe to catch” the food. Most GIs would intentionally leave food on their plates to give to the beggars. Hoyt Higdon, another occupation soldier, remembered an incident while on his way to Germany in the winter of 1945. At a train stop, Higdon saw “the most pitifulist [sic] thing I’ve ever seen in my life” as he watched little boys and girls “with rags on their feet

186 Quoted in Kahn, Experiment in Occupation: Witness to the Turnabout, Anti-Nazi War to Cold War, 1944-1946, 139.
digging out what had been thrown away.” Hansen even told of one GI who went on a hunger
strike in an effort to bring awareness to the Germans’ condition.¹⁸⁷

Clay and Eisenhower took an interest in the morale of the occupation army. Demobilization would take months for some soldiers, so the War Department introduced
education and recreation programs for off-duty troops. The MG organized sports, theaters, and
United Services Organization (USO) concerts in attempts to raise army morale. The MG leaders
wanted to keep the troops engaged in the occupation process and for that to happen, officials
believed, soldiers needed to be happy.¹⁸⁸ In July 1945, Eisenhower established an education
program that would serve a dual purpose. Aside from sustaining morale by keeping soldiers
occupied with worthwhile activities, it also prepared them to transition to civilian life.
Occupation troops had the option to attend three American universities established by the U.S.
government in England and France, and thirty-five civilian colleges spread throughout Western
Europe. Soldiers could apply for an extended furlough to attend the colleges in person or have
course materials sent to their duty station. Courses covered subjects such as agriculture,
commerce, education, engineering, fine arts, journalism, and other liberal arts. Additionally, the
MG built nearly 1,500 libraries and supplied over 15 million books and over 44 million
magazines to the institutions.¹⁸⁹

Entertainment and recreation programs established during the war in Europe to maintain
troop morale continued after the German surrender. Sixty-six USO shows played to 750,000

¹⁸⁷ Marion Dean Hansen, Marion Dean Hansen Collection: Oral History Interview, interview by Barbara
McCroskey, Video, October 17, 2003, AFC/2001/001/07795, Veterans History Project, American
Folklife Center, Library of Congress; Hoyt Marion Higdon, Hoyt Marion Higdon Collection: Oral History
Interview, interview by James Sharpe, Video, September 25, 2009, AFC/2001/001/74096, Veterans
History Project, American Folklife Center, Library of Congress.
¹⁸⁸ Catherine Merridale, Ivan’s War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945 (New York: Picador,
2006), 341–42.
soldiers a month after V-E Day. Postwar entertainment came from several big-named stars such as comedians Bob Hope and Jack Benny, and big bandleader Shep Fields, and other lesser-known professionals. Acting groups of active-duty soldiers, like the Jeep Shows and Soldier Shows, continued to perform plays and provide live entertainment. After the war, the plays became ever more popular as civilian actresses joined the casts. During the summer of 1945, the Seventh Army conducted acting classes at the Soldier Show School. Still, the “most available and most heavily attended form of entertainment” in the postwar period was the motion picture.190 If the occupation army wanted more interactive programs, the MG did not disappoint. By November 1945, the MG provided 21,000 basketballs, 100,000 table tennis balls, and an estimated 350,000 decks of cards. Soldiers participated in official games, playing against each other as officers and Germans watched. Football remained the most popular spectator sport throughout the occupation.191

Despite these programs, troop morale remained low throughout the fall of 1945 as GIs increasingly complained to their superiors and to the media that their deployments to Germany were unnecessary. Newspapers across the United States reported on soldiers’ letters home and in military publications like Stars and Stripes. “The enemy has been defeated and . . . now everyone ought to go home.” Demobilization policies hindered any morale program the Army could devise. Sidney Shalett, a freelance writer for the New York Times claimed the U.S. Army was in the midst of a self-constructed morale crisis. This crisis was exacerbated by the apparent friendliness of German citizens. One October 1945 newspaper charged the Germans with “courting” the Americans into believing they had wanted no part of Hitler’s war. Whether GIs

190 According to Zeimke, “out of a total attendance of 32 million people of all types of entertainment in May 1945,” which includes both theaters of operations, “26 million were at motion pictures. An estimated eight out of every ten soldiers saw at least three movies a week.” Zeimke, 331–32.
191 Ibid.
were truly “forgetting the horrors and destruction that the whole German nation unloosed upon the world” is debatable.\textsuperscript{192} What was more likely was that a shared dissatisfaction with their postwar lives encouraged fraternization. Germans were defeated and had no choice but to live among the U.S. soldiers. GIs wanted to find purpose in the occupation but lacked motivation to rally behind MG policies.

Clay’s efforts to raise troop morale had limited success. Men still sought the romantic companionship of a woman, even though non-fraternization policies prohibited such interactions. U.S. soldiers and German women wanted a sense of normalcy in their lives. During the war, both had been preoccupied with survival. German demography favored women as 6.9 million men had died in the war; by September 1945 over 82,000 more were prisoners undergoing denazification; an estimated six million German men were in labor camps in the Soviet zone; while an unknown number of men simply chose not to return to their families.\textsuperscript{193} Millions of German women functioned as heads of households, providing what they could for their families. Most struggled, facing food shortages every day. For American bachelors or husbands far from their wives, the surplus of German women provided an opportunity for social and romantic relationships.\textsuperscript{194} A mutual satisfaction situation arose as relationships with American men meant opportunities for extra rations and German women were willing to satisfy the GIs’ sexual desires.


\textsuperscript{194} Bessel, \textit{Germany 1945}, 323.
U.S. soldiers disregarded the MG’s non-fraternization policy, finding sexual satisfaction wherever they could. Some men met women in “dark halls and alleys and under the cover of darkness.” Clay blamed German women for the soldiers’ behavior, since “only the lowest type of girl, the tramp, would meet with soldiers under these conditions.”

Cases of venereal disease within the occupation army increased. In the first three months of the occupation, they rose from 50 per 1,000 men to 150. By December, that number had reached to over 250. By April of 1946, the transmission of the diseases was only reported when it surpassed an “above-normal” rate. The U.S. Army attempted to combat the spread of venereal diseases with penicillin shots and prophylactic stations. This move, however, worsened the fraternization problem between GIs and German prostitutes. The medicine shortened the “turn around time” for the women to return to work from clinics or jailhouses. Additionally, more women participated in the sex trade since the risk of contracting diseases had diminished. To try to gain control over this problem, the Allied Control Council (ACC) amended the non-fraternization policy in September 1945, defining new conditions for fraternization. Only carefully screened girls were invited to military clubs and dances. But because of the soldiers’ reputations with “tramps,” and army regulation prohibiting soldiers from giving food or alcohol to women, principled German women were wary to interact with Americans. Consequently, the regulated interactions of American soldiers and German women was a failed process.

---

195 Clay, Decision in Germany, 62.
196 In Munich, one hundred new cases were reported each week. These numbers accounts for only the men and women who reported or sought treatment. Zeimke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946, 332; UP, “Blames Diphtheria on Fraternization,” News-Journal, April 18, 1946, 1.
German women as it suited them, not as the military “issued” them. As a result, fraternization increased, and media correspondents reported the interactions to the American public.

Newspapers lamented the immorality of the U.S. soldiers as they fraternized openly and without hesitation with German women. The “free social contact” between American GIs and Germans was “undermining morals” and tarnishing the prestige of the American military. Still, no amount of sanctions or threats of discipline deterred soldiers from finding emotional and physical comfort during the occupation. Both male and female GIs explored relationships with Germans. Fraternization was different for the women in the Women’s Army Corps (WACS), however, as they engaged in relationships with German men. Male and female GIs condemned the women for fraternizing with men who “killed so many of our boys.” As the occupation continued, the WACS-German relationships were talked about less in the media, possibly because the women did not advertise their relationships.

Media outlets and the MG blamed German women for encouraging GI fraternization more often than they blamed U.S. troops. Some officials and media correspondents claimed the lack of morality during the Nazi regime left the women without the “native sense of delicacy,” women were alleged to possess. Others believed the women knew exactly what they were doing. The “national striptease” inspired soldiers to disobey the MG’s non-fraternization policy. Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Leland Stowe argued that fraternization non-compliance was a postwar battle yet to be won. Although Germany had surrendered, Americans still needed to win the peace. The attention the German women gave the GIs, he argued, was all part of a German strategy to foster not just favorable relationships, but make the Americans admire the German

---

199 Tania Long, “Morals Held to Be Undermined By Fraternization in Germany,” The Gazette, October 1, 1945, 1.
tenacity for survival. Perhaps, then, the American soldiers would be more likely to share rations or overlook nominal Nazis when denazifying a business.

The Nazi regime had considered promiscuity and illegitimate children a “national honor” since women were adding to the Aryan race. After living with this cultural mindset for two decades, women did not believe that having sexual relations with the Americans to be wrong. Most, in fact, tried to use their relationships with American GIs to their advantage to score nylon stockings or extra food. In the United States, however, conservative values prevailed and Americans decried the alleged immoral relationships. In the spring of 1946, President Truman and military officials received letters from American civilians and soldiers stationed in Germany asking them to act promptly on the fraternization issue. For almost a year, U.S. soldiers’ “social contact” with the Germans was a constant source of complaints for the MG. For the average U.S. soldier, finding a sexual partner, whether German or not, made their tour of duty more bearable. By spring of 1946, the majority of the soldiers in the occupation army had not fought in the war and did not have an institutional hatred for every German, especially not for every woman. The soldiers blatantly rejected and disobeyed orders to stay away from Germans. The U.S. Army could not control its men’s every move. The supposedly disciplined, fighting force was too busy buying German girls stockings and satisfying their own needs to concern themselves with military decorum.

African American Occupiers – The First Year of Occupation

In 1945 and 1946, many African American soldiers saw the occupation of Germany differently than their white compatriots. Comprising ten percent of the occupation army, black GIs stood out racially as “other.” The Third and Seventh Army Groups provided about 50,000 African Americans in the military police and other service outfits. These men shared with white soldiers the duty of policing the Germans and “handling the defeated Nazis.” Their task placed black GIs in an odd position. While many held the same resentment of the Nazis as their fellow white Americans, some also identified with the defeated German people as white Americans considered both groups as “lesser.” The occupation opened a window for African American soldiers who would compare their lives in the occupation army to the plight African Americans faced in Jim Crow America. What they experienced as victors gave many black soldiers courage and hope for a life outside of hatred and prejudice.

Germans were initially apprehensive of black soldiers, mostly due to racial prejudice and wartime propaganda. Some Germans believed African Americans had tails, or were cannibals, savages, and rapists. On some initial interactions, Germans reacted to black GIs with disgust. Other Germans looked past the racial disparity to treat the black American soldiers with dignity. Racial prejudice never vanished completely. For instance, civilian complaints of soldier misconduct were disproportionately higher for African American soldiers than white GIs. Black GIs, though, were used to insidious racism as much as to overt bigotry. Despite the

---

202 “U.S. Occupation Forces In Germany 10.4% Negro,” The Chicago Defender, June 23, 1945, 1, 6, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Chicago Defender.
prejudice, African American soldiers generally found life in the occupation army tolerable based on social freedoms they found while in Germany but were denied to them in the United States.

African American GIs compared the way they were treated by Germans during the occupation to the way they were treated by white Americans stateside. The social equality that African Americans experienced during the occupation gave black GIs a vision of a more tolerable life compared to the racial injustices they endured within the United States. By 1946, black GIs were telling their friends and families of the surprising lack of racism in Germany. In the October 1946 issue of Ebony, one writer revealed that, “Strangely enough, here [in Germany] where Aryanism ruled supreme, Negroes are finding more friendship, more respect and more equality than they would back home either in Dixie or on Broadway.” The article continued, “Race hate has faded with better acquaintance and interracialism [sic] in Berlin flourishes. Many of the Negro GIs in the German capital are from the South and find that democracy has more meaning on Wilhelmstrasse [sic] than on Beale Street in Memphis.”204 Black soldiers had faced Nazis during the war and helped eliminate old anti-Semitic barriers as they performed their occupation duties. But at home, they knew there were still racial barriers. The civil rights activist and cartoonist Ollie Harrington described fighting to “wipe out the noose and the whip in Germany” only to find “the noose and whip in Georgia and Louisiana.”205 Systemic racism within the United States and the armed forces encouraged black GIs to seek some semblance of comfort and happiness in Germany.

204 Quoted in Fehrenbach, Race After Hitler: Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany and America, 34.
Because of the welcoming spirit of the Germans, black GIs were less likely than white soldiers to adhere to the MG’s non-fraternization policy according to the Army’s reaction. To the dismay of MG officials, fraternization between African American GIs and Germans reached “epidemic” levels in the months following German surrender. This fraternization differed from the relationship between white soldiers and German women. Black soldiers “appeared less likely to treat Germans as subordinates.” Germans, for their part, found black soldiers compassionate, kindhearted, generous toward children, and “responsive to the stark misery of other Germans after the war.” Just as white soldiers, African Americans sometimes found romance during the occupation. Unfortunately, black GIs also experienced the effect of sexual relations as they also became infected with venereal diseases. According to historian Brenda Gayle Plummer, black soldiers were six to seven times more likely to contract a venereal disease than white soldiers. This may have been because white soldiers did not face racial obstacles to dating “respectable” German women. For example, Military Police who enforced non-fraternization disproportionately targeted German women dating black soldiers. The women were often charged with prostitution or accused of spreading venereal diseases. The high rate of infection within black units “played a major role in the postwar decision to demobilize large numbers of” black GIs before they acquired the necessary discharge points. In this case, the racism worked in the African American soldiers’ favor. Racism was still dangerous, though, as Germans who disapproved of women dating black soldiers would often accuse the men of rape. Black GIs kept their relationships quiet when they could, leading one newspaper to declare that “Negro GIs Fraternize—But Wisely!”

“The Army has retreated so far from non-fraternization that we may soon expect the setting up in the War Department of a bureau of marriage and maternity.”208 Renowned political economist Raymond Moley’s prediction in September 1945 came true by winter. The U.S. Army could not enforce non-fraternization. Soldiers in the occupation army proved this in every interaction with a German woman or child, whatever their ages. By December, Congress received reports of U.S. soldiers requesting marriage licenses from their superiors. Soldiers throughout Europe faced the same barrier to marrying local women. Despite policies forbidding the international marriages, GIs continued to fall in love and ask the Army for permission to bring their girlfriends to the United States. Although at first such requests were denied, Congress and the War Department acquiesced to the calls for change to the marriage policy, and beginning in December 1945, the War Brides Act permitted U.S. soldiers to marry French and British citizens. The ban on U.S.-German fraternization officially remained in place. It would take another year of requests and denials to move Congress to amend the War Brides Act to allow white U.S. soldiers to marry their German girlfriends.209

The practice of “war brides” is not new to the Second World War. War brides from the Great War freely gave advice to the new generation of women emigrating to the United States to be with their GI beaus.210 The difference between the two generations, however, was the countries they came from. Most of the post-Great War brides were from France or England. After the initial establishment of the War Brides Act in December 1945, French and British

209 Goedde, “Gender, Race, and Power,” 517.
brides were welcomed. However, when American GIs began courting German women, the public looked on with disdain while the U.S. Army could not control its soldiers. One young lieutenant, Edgar C. Forsberg, fell in love with Elizabeth Schnupp. His story reached the newspapers in Akron, Ohio, when he announced their engagement. “You can guess how much I love her when you know I have signed to stay over here for two years. I have begged for permission to marry her, but in vain, of course.” Forsberg, along with other GIs, stayed in the occupation army for love. This lieutenant’s experience is one example of many men who defied the Army’s orders to pursue his own interests. This side of the occupation soldier was new and stood in stark contrast to the men who marched on Frankfurt to return home to their sweethearts. Instead of actively protesting occupation policies, GIs simply ignored the non-fraternization policy. Both types of dissent served the interests of the American soldier, but fraternization proved harder for the U.S. Army to control and was more pervasive in the occupation army than the vocal and visible opposition to demobilization.

German Youth – The First Year of Occupation

A new problem soon arose for the MG as children of the U.S.-German relationships were born. As fraternization continued, so did the number of American offspring born to German women. Between 1944 and 1953, an estimated 94,000 children born in Germany had GI fathers. Some soldiers tried to do right by their German lovers and offspring. Many took steps to adopt their children and marry their girlfriends. In June 1946, an article reported that “on the average there are five pregnant German women per American Infantry company.”

---

fraternizing with, let alone marrying, a German woman could result in court martial, GIs still sent in applications for marriage to the MG. As for their own children, GIs tried to provide them with the American way of life through legitimization and citizenship. The occupation army’s interactions with German youth and their own children transformed the soldiers’ outlook on the occupation as they found purpose in Germany. It was not until December 1946 that Congress’ War Brides Act applied to American-German relationships and those marriage applications began to legitimize the relationships.213

In the case of interracial relationships, mixed-race babies heightened MG official’s awareness of the policy violations. U.S. racial prejudice determined how U.S. Army officials dealt with interracial relationships and biracial children.214 German women faced verbal backlash from other Germans and white GIs for engaging in relationships with African American GIs. Commonly, the MG and German locals called the women “sinners” as they were publicly shamed in the streets and in newspapers for choosing black soldiers as sexual partners, referring to the relationships as “an unacceptable antinorm.” The children of these relationships suffered as they were neither German nor American. The MG held the power to grant citizenship, both German and American, in their occupation zone since Nazi Germany had previously denied newborns birthright citizenship. As part of governing the American zone, the MG took over the

---

213 Goedde, “Gender, Race, and Power,” 517; In the summer of 1945, both enlisted and officers were arrested for defying the non-fraternization order. For example, in June, the 29th Infantry had sixty cases of fraternization on the docket. The XXIII Corps’ judge advocate tried twenty-five enlisted men and two officers. The Inspector General, Seventh Army, investigated four cases against generals. By the fall of 1945, cases that had not already been tried were dropped as non-fraternization was “all but defunct” by that point. This did not equate to a diminished threat of court martial, as arrests continued but trials ended with recommendations to take no further actions. Zeimke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946, 322.

issuance of citizenship. White children born to German women and American GIs were often granted German citizenship while military officials refused to grant “brown babies” the same designation based on their race. MG officials refused to consider paternity suits or grant dual citizenship to American GIs’ illegitimate children. Although many African American soldiers wanted to marry their German girlfriends, many U.S. state racial laws in 1946 and 1947 prevented them from doing so. The MG eventually granted mix-raced children of the “offending mothers” only German citizenship without a path to become Americans like their fathers. The MG did not forbid GIs from interacting with their own children, but did continue to prohibit troops from engaging in friendships with German-born youth over the age of twelve.

Official U.S. fraternization policy dictated U.S. soldiers should separate from German youth, less the men become too sympathetic to German suffering. The occupation army largely disobeyed this policy. GIs would give the children candy, show them how to play American sports, and demonstrated general friendliness toward youngsters. At the end of the war, an estimated one-quarter of German children were growing up without fathers. The youth admired “GI wealth” and the soldiers’ “energy in contrast to the exhausted German soldiers.” By 1946, the U.S. Army adopted a youth program: the German Youth Assistance program (GYA). At the program’s peak, “more than 600,000 boys and girls participated in its activities.” The MG’s military governor, General Joseph T. McNeary, founded the GYA, believing the program would “improve morale and discipline” among German youth. The MG in Berlin distributed sports equipment to the children to provide a distraction from the devastation of the city. The

215 German contempt for these children is most apparent in the names associated with the biracial babies: farbige Besatzungskinder (colored occupation children), Mischlingskinder (mixed-blood children), and Negermischlingskinder. Heidi Fehrenbach, Race After Hitler: Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany and America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), 66, 68–69.

youth policy allowed the Germans to “get together purely for the pleasure of good fellowship.” In Berlin, kids played ping pong, read books, played piano, and generally enjoyed the company of the U.S. soldiers.217

The GYA faced many challenges. American soldiers staffed the program but as men were sent home in 1946, McNaurney had trouble filling positions. Consequently, there were not enough men for the GYA to have the effect on morale that McNarney had hoped for.218 To compensate for the lack of manpower, the MG extended the program to include religious activities. German children were allowed, and encouraged, to attend army chapel services. Conversely, American GIs were also urged to attend German religious services.219 The role U.S. soldiers now played encompassed not just coach, but mentor in many activities.

During the first year of the occupation of Germany, U.S. soldiers redefined what it meant to be in a peacetime Army. Originally, occupation policies dictated that GIs keep themselves at an emotional distance from the German people. Those same policies indicated the occupiers would be at their duties for an undetermined amount of time. Loneliness and low morale gave the men and women of the occupation army the courage to speak up, protest, and violate non-fraternization policies. Adapting to local conditions forced the U.S. Army to re-evaluate its occupation policies. While demobilization policies remained largely unchanged in 1945 and 1946, Eisenhower and the War Department did begin to listen to the individuals who made up the army as evidenced by Eisenhower’s programs to increase morale and investigate the rationale

218 U.S. soldiers were used to guard supplies, internment camps, railways, and military installations. In January 1946, Major General Ernest Harmen headed a constabulary force of 30,000 U.S. soldiers for “police and riot duty.” Clay, Decision in Germany, 64–65.
behind the demonstrations. The soldiers’ reluctance to follow policy, and the public outcry that
followed, forced the U.S. Army to create and amend occupation procedures. Because the
soldiers decided how they would interact with the Germans and their own chain of command, the
Army changed its policies so that it would appear as if it was in control of the soldiers. The
amendment to the War Brides Act and the establishment of youth programs and policies were
two such changes. The men and women of the occupation army caused the U.S. Army to
fundamentally change how the occupation would proceed. The Army, which controlled and
organized men and women as a fighting force, found it difficult to dictate what the soldiers did in
peacetime. This new army had minimal appreciation for the military chain of command, which
is unsurprising as these men were not attached to the military structure as professional soldiers
were. The occupation troops expected a clear line of communication between themselves and
their superiors. When the troops did not understand policies, or disagreed with them, the men
began to act independent of the military structure. During the occupation, GIs carried guns but
did not shoot. They wore helmets but did not fear shrapnel. Instead they gave out chocolates to
children, danced with German women, and taught German children to play football. The U.S.
Army adapted. The soldiers of the occupation army changed the way the U.S. Army treated its
soldiers because active resistance to demobilization policies and the passive disregard of non-
fraternization opened a line of communication and new type of relationship between the Army
and its soldiers.
CONCLUSION

The U.S. occupation of Germany had been hammered out during the Second World War, refined in military directives, and passed to the U.S. Army to implement. U.S. political and military leaders assumed that the military needed to follow these plans precisely for the occupation to succeed and achieve its objectives. Those directives, however, proved flawed from the outset. The many wartime conferences had provided the Allied leaders the opportunity to construct postwar plans assuming that U.S. troops would follow orders as obediently as they had during combat operations. Instead, loopholes and ambiguities in the directives allowed occupation leaders such as Deputy Military Governor Lucius D. Clay to devise more pragmatic policies. Even so, Clay could not prevent the GIs from conducting themselves in a surprisingly unmilitary manner.

During the Second World War, U.S. policymakers and the Allies debated the objectives of postwar occupation. These men, for example, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr., bickered over the treatment of the defeated Germans. From 1943 to 1945, the debates were intense and bitter. Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill also bickered over Germany’s treatment at every Allied conference. Exacerbating this problem was U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s silence or lack of clarity. At conferences, he would respond to the other Allied leaders with sarcasm, but never provided a definitive statement of how he believed Germany should be handled after the war. Perhaps he was too occupied with winning the war, or, in the election year of 1944, with winning reelection. Perhaps he was simply exercising caution in openly supporting one ally over another. His advisors, nonetheless, created policies that the president presented to the Allied leaders, even as the advisors remained uncertain of what Roosevelt actually wanted. Originally,
Morgenthau believed he could win Roosevelt’s favor for a plan to revert Germany to an agrarian state. He was sorely disappointed when, in September 1944, the president formally rejected the plan after it leaked to the public. Roosevelt’s lack of decisiveness led his successor, Harry S. Truman, to make decisions based on limited knowledge of Roosevelt’s desired objectives. Despite the best intentions of the wartime planners, their concerns with Soviet ambitions and their idealistic notions of defeated and therefore compliant Germans ultimately led to a cultural change in the Army in during the occupation of 1945-46.

U.S. military leaders did not embrace JCS 1067 without concerns. Its punitive measures and restrictive wording led Clay and his staff to doubt its viability. Even before VE-Day, the directive placed too much importance on denazification and democratization without realizing their effects on reeducation. During the initial months of occupation, committees like the Education and Religious Affairs Branch were not communicating with the Civil Affairs Division. Interagency communication completely broke down. The MG either created its own policies or reinforced existing ones. Reeducation failed, democratization faltered, and denazification made the occupation harder for military leaders. Clay saw JCS 1067 as too harsh to foster the friendly relationship with Germans that its makers hoped would rebuild Germany. Military Governor, and later Army Chief of Staff, Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to speak out against the military directive, applauded its use of collective guilt, and remained unbothered by its adverse effect on the population. He did not question JCS 1067 policies and reprimanded those who did, including his long-time friend General George S. Patton, who was in charge of the MG in Bavaria. When government policymakers faced backlash in the press for JCS 1067, they stubbornly resisted any modification. The policies implemented, they insisted, would assure that Germany would be incapable of waging another war. Their idealistic view of the
occupation’s effect on Germans blinded them to what Germans and U.S. soldiers faced day to
day because of the occupation policies. JCS 1067 may have seemed the best option while the
war raged, but U.S. political leaders refused to admit it was not viable after VE-Day. Leaders in
the British and Soviet zones promptly recognized the problems and subscribed to different
occupation policies. Even when Clay visited Congress in October 1945 to argue for changes to
JCS 1067, his arguments were dismissed and, consequently, he resigned himself to govern
Germany through the directive’s many loopholes.

The men of the occupation army carried out orders with only a vague understanding of
their main objective: police the Germans so they would not relapse into their old militaristic
ways. The policies of the Military Government (MG), however, simply did not make sense to
the men and women who were directed to implement them. Denazification, democratization,
and reeducation all were deemed necessary, but they would not successfully transform Germany
if the soldiers were prohibited from fraternizing with Germans. It proved difficult for the men of
the occupation army of 1945 to understand why it was more important for them to remain in
Germany implementing impractical policies than returning home to their families. Disgruntled
soldiers protested. Lonely soldiers courted German women. The Army proved slow to take
notice but ultimately adapted.

JCS 1067 failed because its creators could not foresee how it would play out on the
ground. Denazification failed because it proved impractical for rebuilding Germany.
Democratization failed because denazification failed. Reeducation failed because denazification
and democratization failed. Most important, non-fraternization failed because soldiers were
dissatisfied with their lives in the occupation army and attempting to implement unachievable
goals. Demobilization continued to be scrutinized and protested as unfair. U.S. officials had
created occupation policies, but the men and women in Germany who implemented those policies resisted them or, at best, had a hard time following them.

The soldiers who fought in the war believed they had earned their return home. Instead, in May 1945, many either found themselves on a ship headed to the Pacific War or in the occupation army. New draftees recently arrived in Germany questioned their purpose there. Lack of communication from commanders led to poor morale and, eventually, a breaking point. When soldiers began to speak out against the directives, Army commanders at first ignored GI dissatisfaction. GI letters, interviews in newspapers and military journals, plus families of soldiers marching through the streets of the United States, none of these examples of soldier dissatisfaction led to speeding up the pace of demobilization. GIs protested, loudly and in large numbers, placing the blame for the slow rate of demobilization on the chain of command. Eisenhower and then his replacement, Joseph T. McNamney, banned GI demonstrations. The GIs ignored the ban and continued to remonstrate and protest. The men in Germany in the winter of 1945 were not the same soldiers as those who had stormed Normandy Beach. These GIs were not battle hardened. They could not see the point of policing the defeated Germans. Why should the Army draft men to send them to a place completely devastated by war? Peacetime occupation did not make sense to these GIs. The Army’s lack of communication about U.S. occupation objectives did nothing to increase morale or encourage GIs to carry out the directive. These GIs would not follow orders if they did not understand why they were being given. They needed to see the purpose of the orders.

U.S. soldiers’ option of escaping their dreary life in Germany, at least partly, in the arms of a German woman was forbidden. Fraternization, one of the oldest accompaniments to war, was punishable by either court martial or a fine. Apparently that did not stop GIs from
interacting with German women and men. Instead of openly protesting, as they had with the slow pace of demobilization, they simply chose to ignore the order. Officials of the MG attempted to restrain the men but found them uncontrollable and the policy unenforceable. The MG then tried to screen German women in an attempt to provide “appropriate,” respectable companions for lonely GIs. Military leaders, however, did not understand that it was not a particular type of woman that U.S. soldiers sought, but the freedom to choose how they occupied their off-duty time. No matter the MG’s efforts to amend the non-fraternization policy, GIs continued to disobey it. Military leaders, it appears, once again failed to understand the soldiers. Commanders needed to come to terms with this new, peacetime soldier. Army leaders eventually adapted and learned from these soldiers and created new policies and programs to appease the troops.

Communication between civilian policymakers in Washington and implementors on the ground was almost nonexistent in 1945. Future leaders took the lessons learned in the occupation’s first year and carried them forward. Communication became essential to success. After GI demonstrations and disobedience reached a fevered pitch, military leaders took notice. Although demobilization policy did not formally change, Eisenhower sought out the reason for soldiers’ protests. He endeavored to understand the men and women under his command. His actions reflect the first steps towards a cultural change in the U.S. Army. Although he did not support the soldiers’ insubordination, he was wise enough to realize that these GIs were not acting without cause. When he initiated a program to interview the occupation troops, he inadvertently admitted that Army commanders had not recognized soldier dissatisfaction. Eisenhower needed to understand how to prevent this level of disobedience in the future.
Army culture prior to the occupation of 1945 relied on a certain level of trust. Soldiers trusted their commanders to lead them into battle. Commanders trusted their men would follow. During the occupation, that trust broke down. Soldiers no longer believed their leaders would lead them to victory, because in the troops’ eyes, victory in Europe had already been won on May 8, 1945. The soldiers wanted to go home. Commanders could no longer trust the occupation troops to follow orders. Non-fraternization and demobilization policies had undermined a basic tenet of the U.S. military, even in the eyes of the Germans. But the ways GIs responded to their orders seemed detrimental to military culture and occupation objectives and it would take time and trial-and-error adjustments to satisfy this occupation army. The MG, faced with insubordination and dissent, established new policies and programs, amended old policies, and at last listened to soldier complaints. Eventually, with these actions, the occupation army changed the culture of the U.S. Army, which in the postwar years began to focus on communication over blind obedience.

Studying the cultural change of the U.S. Army is not new. Historians have examined the culture of the U.S. Army and analyzed the occupation for the last sixty years. Unlike those authors who have dedicated their attention on the origins of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, this study seeks to understand American military cultural change outside the lens of the Cold War. By concentrating on the men and women of the occupation army, this study finds the seeds of change in the increasing need for genuine communication. Ultimately, the occupation created a larger and far-reaching cultural transformation of the postwar U.S. Army. Assessing how policies were created and implemented, or failed to be implemented, provides historians a different path from which to continue to analyze the relationship between the highest and lowest ranks of the military chain of command.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Government Documents


Published Collections


Oral Histories


SECONDARY SOURCES

Monographs


**Articles**

Mason, Edward S. “Has Our Policy in Germany Failed?” *Foreign Affairs* 24, no. 4 (July 1946).


**NEWSPAPERS**

*Courier-Post*, Camden, New York
*Daily News*, New York, New York
*Fort Worth Star-Telegram*, Fort Worth, Texas
*Harrisburg Telegraph*, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
*Johnson City Press*, Johnson City, Tennessee
*Lincoln Journal Star*, Lincoln, Nebraska
*Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München*, Berlin, Germany
*New York Times*, New York, New York
*News-Journal*, Mansfield, Ohio
*Palladium-Item*, Richmond, Virginia
*Pampa Daily News*, Pampa, Texas
*Pittsburg Post-Gazette*, Pittsburg, Pennsylvania

125
Rapid City Journal, Rapid City, South Dakota
Seminole Producer, Seminole, Oklahoma
South Bend Tribune, South Bend, Indiana
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, St. Louis, Missouri
Star Tribune, Minneapolis, Minnesota
Sunday News, Lancaster, Pennsylvania
The Akron Beacon Journal, Akron, Ohio
The Baltimore Sun, Baltimore, Maryland
The Bee, Danville, Virginia
The Capital Journal, Salem, Oregon
The Chicago Defender, Chicago, Illinois
The Daily Courier, Connellsville, Pennsylvania
The Daily Herald, Provo, Utah
The Delta Democrat-Times, Greenville, Mississippi
The Dothan Eagle, Dothan, Alabama
The Eugene Guard, Eugene, Oregon
The Evening Sun, Baltimore, Maryland
The Gazette, Montreal, Quebec
The Hanford Sentinel, Hanford, California
The Knoxville News-Sentinel, Knoxville, Tennessee
The Mercury, Pottstown, Pennsylvania
The Minneapolis Star, Minneapolis, Minnesota
The Montgomery Advertiser, Montgomery, Alabama
The News Leader, Staunton, Virginia
The Pittsburg Press, Pittsburg, Pennsylvania
The Plain Speaker, Hazelton, Pennsylvania
The Tampa Tribune, Tampa, Florida
The Times, Munster, Indiana
The Times, Shreveport, Louisiana
The Wilkes-Barre Record, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania
The Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
The York Daily Record, York, Pennsylvania
Wall Street Journal, New York, New York
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Jessica Buisman was born in Richardson, Texas. After completing her schoolwork at Richland High School in North Richland Hills in 2011, Jessica enlisted in the U.S. Army. In 2012, she began her college career at Tarrant County College. She received an Associate of Arts in 2016 and transferred to the University of Texas at Arlington to study history. Jessica graduated summa cum laude in December 2018 with a Bachelor of Arts in History with a minor in military history. The next semester, she entered the Master of Arts in History program at the University of Texas at Arlington with a focus on twentieth-century military culture. Jessica expects to graduate in August 2020 and continue her post-graduate studies of history at the University of North Texas.