AN INVESTIGATION OF COMPROMISE ACROSS POLITICAL PARTIES

by

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Abstract

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The debt ceiling crisis of 2011, the government shutdown of 2013, and the extension of partisanship past the water's edge into Ukrainian-Russian and Israeli-Iranian politics are all recent examples of how polarized American politics has become. Despite the growing desire and necessity for more compromise in American politics, "the systematic study of compromise remains surprisingly under-developed" (Bellamy, Kornprobst, & Reh, 2012). The purpose of this dissertation was to test the premise that citizens create congress, and therefore citizens who value compromise could incentivize more integrative negotiations than citizens who only want their representative to adhere to their values. Using the dyadic negotiation paradigm from Aaldering and De Dreu's (2012) experiment, I had self-identified Democrats and Republicans negotiate over several political issues while playing the role of representatives seeking reelection. For dyads whose (hypothetical) constituents desired partisanship, Republicans were more competitive and had higher individual outcomes than Democrats; however, outcomes did not differ between parties for dyads whose constituents desired compromise. Interestingly, only dyads with a partisan Republican were affected by the manipulation, whereas outcomes for dyads with a moderate Republican did not differ between conditions. These findings suggest that citizens can incentivize compromise when it is electorally consequential, particularly among conservative Republicans.

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Chapter 1

The Absence of Compromise: Divided and Divisive Government

"…when politics goes well, we can know a good in common that we cannot know alone."
– Sandel, 1998

Compromise is essential for reaching goals in America's political arena, particularly in times of divided government. Divided government refers to times when the Democratic and Republican parties share control of America's bicameral legislative branch, or when the party occupying the White House differs from the party in control of the legislative branch. It is noteworthy that divided government has been the norm for nearly half a century, as the Democratic and Republican parties have shared control of every legislative body since the end of Lyndon Johnson's Presidency, except for President Jimmy Carter's first two years in office and a few months of President Barack Obama's first year in office.[1] Despite the norm of divided government, politicians' willingness to compromise has grown increasingly rare.

Having a divided government is not inherently a cause of partisanship. Indeed, the divided Congresses over which President Dwight Eisenhower presided were no more polarized than the one-party rule that Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson presided over (Poole, 2008). Over the past 30 to 40 years, however, there has been an ideological realignment in Congress to the point that there is virtually no ideological overlap between the two parties (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Carroll, Lewis, Lo, McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2013). In other words, there are no longer any Republicans who are more liberal than the most conservative Democrat, and no Democrats who are more conservative than the most liberal Republican (Barber & McCarty, 2013). The result has been an increasingly polarized Congress, increased use of the filibuster (a procedural mechanism to prevent invoking cloture on a piece of legislation), fewer laws passed, and less overall compromise between the two parties (Binder,

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[1] By 'shared control' I mean that either the House was controlled by a different party than the party controlling the Senate, or that both parties controlled the House and Senate but the party in control of the Senate did not have a filibuster-proof majority.

2014; Marziani & Liss, 2010). In many instances, the greatest casualty of failed compromises has been the well-being of our country and its citizens, as evidenced most recently by the government shutdown of 2013, Congress' failure to address the influx of Central American refugees in 2014, failing to vote on war authorizations in America's battle against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and using funds for the Department of Homeland Security as bargaining chips.

Ironically, the very people who are most affected by Congress' failures are the citizens who elect the members of congress and then re-elect them to "serve the country." Therefore, it is important that social scientists attempt to understand the factors that influence voters' choice among candidates, the degree to which the voting electorate desires compromise, and the extent to which compromise can be branded as a desirable quality in congressional candidates. The study of intergroup compromise is more than an academic interest, because increasing the proportion of politicians who value compromise (whether intrinsically or because it is desired by voters) can further the interests of the entire country.

In this dissertation, I sought to answer the following question: *can voters incentivize compromise*? Given that politicians are dependent on their constituents to win elections, it is expected that they would approach political negotiations with the interests of their voters in mind. Thus, I proposed that negotiation outcomes should differ for Democrats and Republicans who are incentivized to compromise compared to those who are incentivized to adhere to their values (i.e., partisanship). I tested this proposal by utilizing a dyadic (Democrat-Republican) interaction paradigm in the context of a political negotiation. The results of this experiment complement the political psychology literature by showing the differential influence of negotiation incentives on Democrats and Republicans.

Overview of the Chapters

This dissertation consists of six chapters, starting with this initial chapter which provides some historical perspective on divided congresses over the last 50 years, and introduces the

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dissertation's focus. In chapter two, I introduce the negotiation research that guides the methodological framework of this experiment, with a particular emphasis on the negotiation research by Aaldering and De Dreu (2012) (De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, & Euwema, 2006; Steinel, De Dreu, Ouwehand, & Ramirez-Marin, 2009).

In chapter three, I review the political science literature as it relates to Democrats' and Republicans' policy stances on the four issues central to this experiment (health care, voting rights, immigration, and gun laws) and provide an overview of the study.

In chapter four, I discuss methods, sampling populations (i.e., recruitment strategies), procedures, and the data analysis strategy.

In chapter five, the negotiation results are presented. I address findings that support and fail to support the central hypothesis, as well as unexpected results that contribute to the interpretation of incentives on dyadic interactions.

Finally, chapter six considers the implications of the results in a political context (particularly during an election cycle), and the concerns with applying it to a macro-level context given the limitations of having non-elected students embody politicians in a laboratory setting.

Chapter 2

Partisan Negotiators

Citizens Create Congress

The question of fundamental interest in this dissertation is whether or not constituent accountability pressures can incentivize policymakers to compromise. Thus, it is important to begin by identifying what the negotiation literature tells us about the psychological factors underlying individuals' amenability to and resistance towards inter-group compromise. Unfortunately, "the systematic study of compromise remains surprisingly under-developed" (Bellamy, Kornprobst, & Reh, 2012). However, an abundance of research has catalogued the effect of group polarization on negotiation outcomes, and understanding the seeds of partisanship may help us identify factors that inhibit brinksmanship and promote compromise. Below I review research on inter-group negotiation and political polarization, and I also discuss conditions that lead individuals to employ a cooperative approach to intergroup negotiations.

Hawks Fly Higher Than Doves

Compromise, by definition, requires both parties to mutually and voluntarily "let go of something dear, but not invaluable," to reach an outcome neither can obtain unilaterally (Bellamy et al., 2012). Partisanship reduces the desire or willingness to accept something undesirable (e.g., a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants) even if offered something desirable (e.g., tougher border security), or to forgo something desirable (e.g., funding for Planned Parenthood) to achieve something even more desirable (e.g., avoid going over the nation's debt limit). Cooperation, or the act of working constructively with the other party for mutual accommodation, is part of the process of reaching compromise (Bellamy et al., 2012). Mere cooperation, however, does not involve the type of tradeoffs required to reach a compromise.

To date, no experiment has investigated if the degree to which voters value compromise influences the degree to which elected officials engage in integrative negotiations, and no research has investigated if branding compromise as *valuable* influences voters' choice in

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political candidates. However, a recent study by Aaldering and De Dreu (2012) provides a useful methodological approach for conducting experiments on this understudied issue.

In Aaldering and De Dreu's (2012) experiment, participants were randomly assigned into dyads to represent dovish (desiring cooperation with the outgroup representative) or hawkish constituencies (desiring competition with the outgroup representative). The dyads were then instructed to negotiate a collective employment contract with the outgroup representative. They received points based on the nature of their negotiation: 1290 was the highest for individual representatives, 810 for the best joint outcome, 645 for a 50-50 compromise, and no points if they failed to reach an agreement in the 15 minutes they were given. Finally, within dyads, the dovish majority had a hawkish minority within and the hawkish majority had a dovish minority within, and these minority factions had either high or low status relative to the majority constituents.

Aaldering and De Dreu (2012) found that representatives' joint outcomes were higher with dovish majorities. In addition, a dovish constituency was perceived as more cooperative when the hawkish minority had low minority status. Indeed, this combination of factors led representatives to feel more trust in their constituents' acceptance of the negotiation. When the majority was hawkish, however, minority status did not influence cooperativeness or perceived trust. Such findings are consistent with those of other negotiation experiments, which found representatives to be more lenient towards the outgroup when they had a constituency that desired cooperation, and more aggressive towards the outgroup when their constituency desired competition (Enzle, Harvey, & Wright, 1992; Haccoun & Klimoski, 1975; Van Kleef, Steinel, Van Knippenberg, Hogg, & Svensson, 2007).

<div align="center">Factors That Influence Negotiations</div>

"…constituencies that favor cooperation influence their representative to take a more cooperative approach. The bad news is that small factions favoring a competitive approach counteract the good intentions of a cooperative majority." – Steinel, De Dreu, Ouwehand, & Ramirez-Marin, 2009

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The patterns illustrated by Aaldering and De Dreu (2012) are consistent with real-world politics and underscore the importance of citizens' orientation towards compromise when considering legislators' willingness to negotiate across party lines. Political candidates are elected by citizens and tend to act on behalf on their constituents' interest. Thus, if voters in particular districts or states prefer a candidate who is less likely to compromise, then joint outcomes and 50-50 compromises are less likely to occur. Making matters worse is the finding that the most partisan voters are the most likely to vote in both midterm and general elections in U.S. politics (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008). It comes as no surprise then that hawks tend to carry more weight than doves when representatives have both sets of 'voters' in their constituency (Steinel et al., 2009). In such a scenario, failure to reach an agreement will become the norm, which was the case with the 113th United States Congress which was quantitatively the most partisan and least productive Congress in American history (Carroll et al., 2013).

What, then, can be done to increase compromise and remedy the partisan gridlock that has engulfed US politics? Identifying conditions that promote compromise relative to partisanship requires reviewing what the research tells us about the psychological factors that influence negotiation outcomes. Below, I review relevant research on the cognitive, affective, and group-based determinants of negotiation outcomes and their implications for US politics.

First, Foster, Mansbridge, and Martin (2013) argue that negotiators should find the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA), or bargaining range, within which to reach a joint outcome. Decreasing the bargaining range increases the possibility of reaching an agreement. Doing so also requires that negotiators communicate which items are taboo tradeoffs that they are not willing to discuss (Tetlock, 2003). Unfortunately, establishing such an open dialogue is no small feat, as many individuals enter into intergroup negotiations with fixed-pie assumptions and feel that any benefit to the other party will be at their expense (Bazerman, Baron, & Shonk, 2001). Such a defensive predisposition reduces the likelihood that negotiators will exchange information relevant to establishing their ZOPA (Thompson & Hastie, 1990). For example, Thompson,

Peterson, and Brodt (1996) found that less than a quarter of individuals in a negotiation shared information about their own interests or sought to learn the interests of the other party. However, for negotiators who did share their own and ask about their opponent's priorities, information exchange was moderately positively correlated with higher joint gains. Thus, it is important to encourage negotiators to have an open dialogue and an open debate to the extent practically possible.

Increasing open dialogue and information exchange between political parties seems easy enough to manipulate in experimental settings with college undergraduates debating value-free (i.e., amoral, non-political) issues, but the odds of successfully using this approach have dwindled in recent years in the United States Congress. The primary opportunity for intergroup interaction when approving legislation in the United States Congress is in conference committee (CC). In CC, the House and the Senate meet to flesh out differences between their versions of a piece of legislation, and then hold a final vote to send it to the President's desk. As a consequence of the increasing polarization in Congress, however, "…70% of the people" in the current Congress "have no idea what a conference committee is because Congress has not worked that way for five years" (former AL-Republican Congressman Joe Scarborough on Morning Joe, 12/3/2014).

On no other issue has this trend been more visible than Comprehensive Immigration Reform (CIR). CIR passed with bi-partisan support in the United States Senate in the summer of 2013, but CIR was never brought up for a vote in the House of Representatives. Interestingly, most observers from both parties agreed that it would pass the House if allowed up for a vote, mostly because Republicans desire to improve their standing with Hispanic voters, but then went on to note that the Republican Speaker of the House (John Boehner) feared that allowing such a vote would enrage the far-right elements of his caucus and end his Speakership (Foley, 2012; Hunt, 2013; Palomarez, 2014). A problem with that assertion is that a CIR discharge petition was introduced by the Democratic Caucus in March 2014. If the petition received 218 signatures, then the CIR would come up for the vote without the Speaker of the House having to do anything

(thus protecting his Speakership). Of the 30 Republicans necessary to reach 218 signatures (out of over 230 House Republicans), not one signed the petition. To be clear, on a policy that Republicans view as their best chance to win more Hispanic votes, they refused to allow a vote on it, even when any risk to the Speaker's political capital was taken out of the equation (Gittelson, 2014).

Thus, the second factor to address in intergroup negotiations is partisan intransigence: a preference for gridlock as an alternative to an agreement that is objectively (based on the Senate CIR vote) within the zone of possible agreement (Foster et al., 2013). As the degree of polarization has increased between Democrats and Republicans, so has legislative obstructionism. Consider the increase in the use of the Senate filibuster in the past 20 years – a development which has created a 60-vote threshold for anything to pass (Marziani & Liss, 2010). The Hastert Rule has had similar effects in the House of Representatives, which states that a majority of the majority must support a bill for it to pass the lower chamber (Fetchner, 2014). What this means is that even if the Speaker of the House (John Boehner at the time of this writing) knew that a desired piece of legislation would pass with a majority of votes from the other party and a minority of votes from their own party, the bill would not be allowed to come up for a vote out of concern that the desired legislation would pass with support from the *wrong* party.

It is noteworthy that the Hastert Rule is not a constitutionally enshrined legislative hurdle, but the product of an increase in outgroup animus that has made integrative agreements undesirable to such an extent that most legislation can only be accepted when it is partisan enough to be supported by a majority of the majority (ingroup) rather than a majority of the minority (outgroup). The same is true for the 60-vote threshold to pass a bill in the Senate, which is only implicitly required due to abusive use of the filibuster. This abuse is what led Senate Democrats to invoke the *nuclear option* in 2013, a rule change that nullified Republicans' legal right to filibuster Senate confirmations of Presidential appointments (Kane, 2013). In short, both House Republicans and Senate Democrats have enacted procedures that block the voice of the

opposing party. These developments illustrate the degree to which partisanship represents not only an adherence to the values of one's party but also a negative affective and attitudinal approach to the other party. To quote former Senator Olympia Snowe (R-Maine), "*Congress is becoming more like a parliamentary system where everyone simply votes with their party and those in charge employ every possible tactic to block the other side.*"

<center>Organic Political Negotiations</center>

The aforementioned negotiation research sheds light on the dynamics that affect negotiation outcomes, but the generality of the findings is limited because political negotiations are not context-free social events in which individuals enter with minimal intergroup histories and exit assuming that the other participants' attitudes have little real-world consequentiality (Barley, 1991). Democrats and Republicans have a preexisting history of distrust that is substantively reinforced through the media and is structurally reflected in the demographic makeup of the two parties (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Brownstein, 2013; Harwood & Murray, 2002). Moreover, political issues are not interchangeable or equidistant in value across parties (or demographic groups), because some issues are characterized by protracted conflict in a way that others are not. In the following section, I will discuss these three factors and their consequences for negotiations.

Partisans Programs

The 24-hour news cycle increases the pressure legislators feel to remain consistent on issues, even when they may be open to negotiation in closed-door settings (Guttman & Thompson, 2012; Levendusky, 2013; Warren & Mansbridge, 2013). News outlets such as MSNBC (a progressive station) and FOX (a conservative station) serve as echo chambers where partisans are reinforced in their beliefs and their antipathy for the opposing party (Goren, Federico, & Kittleson, 2009; Lee, 2007; Stroud, 2010). The resulting increase in polarization has measurable electoral and policy consequences, because candidates feel pressure to

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accommodate the increasingly partisan positions of their constituents (Brady, Han, & Pope, 2007; Layman, Carsey, Green, Herrera, & Cooperman, 2010).

These effects are most pernicious in non-competitive (e.g., 80-20 party divide) districts where an incumbent fears a Primary Election challenge. In non-competitive districts, the incumbent already has no incentive to even pretend to be moderate because a majority of the registered voters are already supporters. However, as was well-documented after FOX News' influence in the 2010 Tea Party wave, partisan media can encourage Primary Election voters to support the ideologically purest candidates (Williamson, Skocpol, & Coggin, 2011). There are generally only two possible outcomes in such a scenario: either the incumbent abandons any previous departures from the party platform, or the more extreme candidate wins.

One consideration to combat electoral incentives that increase polarization (and one of the underlying ideas of this dissertation) is to increase the electoral influence of citizens who value compromise. Although branding compromise as a desirable attribute may be a challenge in itself (particularly among those who see compromise as a dirty word), the media can play an instrumental role by highlighting responsible lawmakers who assist in shepherding through compromises that benefit America rather than a particular political party. Of course, such information should come from a non-partisan, reputable source (Lupia & McCubbins, 1998); otherwise, partisans may reflexively exhibit a disconfirmation bias whereby their partisan attitudes increase following exposure to discredited counterattitudinal information (Taber & Lodge, 2006). To quote Chambers (2009), media should "promote dialogue, not monologue."

Disparity in Demographic Diversity

Baron and Banaji (2006) found that Whites' implicit bias towards Blacks did not vary across different age cohorts, but explicit bias towards Blacks decreased as cohorts increased in age. Because race is arguably the greatest fault-line in American politics (more so than same-sex marriage or abortion; Harwood & Murray, 2002), it is not surprising that strong social norms exist that make any discussion of race almost taboo (McVeigh, Cunningham, & Farrell, 2014;

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McWhorter, 2004; Milligan, 2012; Saad, 2010; Saad, 2013). To paraphrase Harwood and Murray 2002, "Race is the social issue burned most deeply in the American psyche… with many leading Democrats consistently advancing many causes embraced by Blacks, and many leading Republicans consistently opposing them."

Political bias, however, is not arrested by any social norms, and partisans are often encouraged to (and sometimes rewarded for) the expression of hostility towards the other party (Iyengar & Westwood, 2014). Rather than explicit political bias decreasing with age (as in the case of explicit racial bias), explicit political animus appears to increase with age as adults incorporate a political identity into their overall social identity (Baron & Banaji, 2006; Iyengar et al., 2012). Their political identity is reinforced by the aforementioned partisan television channels; it predicts selective exposure to content on social media (Rainie & Smith, 2012); and it is related to an increase of morally homogeneous neighborhoods (Howard, Gibson, & Stolle, 2005), a sharp decrease in people exchanging vows with a spouse from the opposing party (Alford, Hatemi, Hibbing, Martin, & Eaves, 2011), and less parental acceptance of children who marry outside the family party (Iyengar et al., 2012). To quote Iyengar and Westwood (2014), "partisan animus in the American public exceeds racial hostility."

There is an abundance of political science, psychological, and observable Congressional data illustrating the influence of differential racial/ethnic (and sexual orientation) perceptions between the Democratic and Republican parties (Bartels, 2000; Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Campbell & Herman, 2010; Crawford and Bhatia, 2012; Cunningham et al., 2004; Daniel, 2012; Mangum, 2013; Miller, Brewer, & Arbuckle, 2009; Nosek, Banaji, & Jost, 2009; Tritt, 2009; Xu & Lee, 2013). There exists an asymmetry in social group perceptions between Democrats and Republicans that is inseparable from their interactions with and treatment of (both perceived and actual) various social groups. The clearest consequence of this asymmetry is the growing disparity in demographic diversity between the Democratic Party and Republican Party, particularly since the 1960s. The Republican Party has not won more than 22% of the overall non-White vote since

1972 (Brownstein, 2013). The Democratic Party has become increasingly diverse in both its

voting base and its elected officials, with over a third of Democratic legislators being minority

group members. In contrast, the Republican Party is as diverse in 2014 as it was in the late

1980s, with minorities representing fewer than 2.2% of Republican lawmakers. As I stated in

Chapter 1, citizens create congress, and the values of the citizens from the Democratic and

Republican parties have resulted in one polyglot party and one racially homogeneous party,

respectively.

The demographic asymmetry between the parties has unique consequences for

negotiations that cannot be captured by the concept of *hawks* and *doves*. Consider negotiations

over issues such as the Employment Non-Discrimination Act to protect lesbian/gay individuals in

the workplace, Immigration Reform to give legal status and perhaps citizenship to the 11 million

undocumented Latinos and Asians in the United States, and the End Racial Profiling Act. In each

case, Democrats will be negotiating on behalf of ingroups (Blacks, Asians, Latinos, lesbians/gays)

whereas Republicans will be negotiating issues relevant to their outgroups (Blacks, Asians,

Latinos, lesbians/gays). In this scenario, the morality of the negotiated compromise becomes

important. For example, if the Employment Non-Discrimination Act became the law only in

businesses where hiring a gay person did not go against the manager's religious beliefs, and if

the End Racial Profiling Act was only enforced in majority-minority neighborhoods, then the gay

and Black communities would likely see those successful compromises as failures.

The etiology of this demographic disparity brings me to my final point, which is that the

outcomes of negotiations have consequences that may permeate in the public's mind long after

Congress has adjourned (e.g., Blacks will likely remember which party supported voter ID laws

and which party supported strengthening section four of the voting rights act). In short,

constituents do not observe the negotiating context as a "blank slate" in which artificial inputs and

outputs, equal in their comparative inconsequentiality, are computed free from any residue from

previous arguments or anticipated confrontations once the current negotiation concludes

(Kramer, 2004). Instead, citizens (especially active voters) act as political auditors: they have taken account of Democrats' and Republicans' historical stances on various issues, and thus the manner in which they approach present-day policy debates is contextually dependent on the legislation being debated.

To close this chapter on *partisan negotiators*, it is clear that the preexisting history of distrust between Democrats and Republicans affects political negotiations in a way that is not easily captured in laboratory experiments with minimal groups. The way partisan negotiators approach interparty interactions depends on their appraisal of political history, which is shaped and reinforced by partisan media and is nested in a social identity in which their political, racial, religious, gender, and sexual identities are inextricably linked. In the next chapter, I discuss how different identities may be motivating factors based on the policy issue being debated (e.g., equal pay and gender, immigration and ethnicity).

Chapter 3

Culture Wars

In political negotiations, the participants tend to debate issues in which there are established moral divisions and varying degrees of consequentiality, and more often than not the issues are embedded in individuals' social identity (or the identity of their constituents). For example, Democrats and Republicans likely have an easier time negotiating if a bridge should be named in honor of Football player Troy Aikman than they do negotiating if state Medicaid plans that cover abortion (e.g., Medi-Cal) should be given federal funding through ObamaCare. Thus, one of the first steps to achieving a successful negotiation is deciding on and accepting the ideological limits, or "scope conditions," for each party. For example, Democrats are unlikely to enter any negotiation if restrictions to abortion access are among the demands, and Republicans are unlikely to enter any negotiation if gun control measures are among the demands (Allen, 2013; Bash, Desjardins, Silverleib, Steinhauser, & Walsh, 2009). The most recent example of such limits can be found in the 2013 budget deal between Representative Paul Ryan and Senator Patty Murray, in which they agreed from the outset on which issues were not up for consideration.

Partisan negotiators' willingness to compromise differs based on the relevance to "core values" of the issue under consideration. Understood in this way, individuals' disposition to compromise and the emotional valence of the issue under consideration interact to determine the likelihood of reaching an integrative agreement. Consider the following illustration: individuals with high partisanship scores (which serve as a proxy for their willingness to compromise) are equally unlikely to compromise on funding for Hurricane Sandy relief and funding for Planned Parenthood, whereas the least partisan individuals would have no problem funding disaster relief but may have reservations about funding Planned Parenthood.[2] Notice that the least partisan

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[2] Iowa (R) Congressman Steve King, who had a .72 partisanship rating in the 112th US Congress, voted against relief for Hurricane Sandy victims (Carroll et al., 2013; Foley, 2012). Conversely, Florida (R) Congressman Mario Diaz-Balart, who had one of the lowest partisanship ratings in the

individuals were willing to agree on the lower-valence item in this example, whereas more partisan individuals (perhaps out of complete enmity to the other party) objected. At the same time, both groups opposed funding for Planned Parenthood, presumably because the immediate association with abortion services was equally unpalatable. Tetlock (2003) considers issues such as abortion and gay rights to be sacred values and thus unlikely to be considered in a negotiation. Thus, the most judicious investigation of the degree to which compromise can be incentivized would be an investigation using issues where a compromise is realistically plausible, as opposed to issues with taboo tradeoffs.

Issues Are Not Mutually Exclusive

Another consideration for political negotiations is that, unlike minimal group experiments where multiple issues may be treated as cognitively and affectively orthogonal to one another, the stances a partisan negotiator takes on Policy A tends to influence the stances taken on Policy B. To be clear, this bi-directional influence can take place within the context of a single legislative item or between items.

To understand how this may work within the debate of a single legislative item, consider CIR. It is possible that Republicans' willingness to support a path to citizenship as opposed to legalization was dependent on Democrats' willingness to further militarize the border and create a national E-Verify System (a proposal requiring employers, under threat of a penalty, to validate the American citizenship of employees).

To understand how negotiation positions may affect the outcomes of multiple pieces of legislation, consider the bi-partisan agreements during the 2010 *lame duck* session. Don't Ask Don't Tell (DADT) was repealed in exchange for an extension in the 2003 Bush Tax Cuts. In addition, the Payroll Tax Cuts (seen as Demand-Side tax cuts as opposed to President George Walker Bush's Supply-Side tax cuts) and Unemployment Insurance were renewed, but the

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112th U.S. Congress at .36, voted to pass disaster relief for Hurricane Sandy victims (Espuelas, 2013). Both representatives voted to defund Planned Parenthood (New York Times, 2011).

DREAM Act failed to pass. It is possible that Democrats had a choice between repealing DADT

and passing the DREAM Act and chose the former. In addition, it is possible that Republicans

would have been amenable to supporting the DREAM Act if Democrats also agreed to the

Keystone XL Pipeline. What these post-2010 Midterm negotiations illustrate is the fact that policy

debates in political negotiations are routinely interwoven with one another, and laboratory studies,

no matter how elegant, will struggle to truly capture that.

The current dissertation attempted to measure the former process; how individuals

negotiate the merits of and reach compromises on individual legislative items (rather than making

tradeoffs across multiple pieces of legislation). In doing so, I used a payoff matrix point system

based upon the one used in Aaldering and De Dreu's (2012) research; however, the distributive

(non-equidistant) allocation of points in the negotiations were based on both the Democrat and

the Republican agreeing to one policy idea from the opposing party – effectively making each

agreement a compromise. [3]

Therefore, a key procedural consideration in this dissertation was choosing issues in

which the discrete stances of Democrats and Republicans would be nonetheless discernible

(even for Intro to Psychology students), but where there existed the possibility for amicably

resolved, if not well-articulated, integrative agreements. It is for that reason that the following four

issues were selected for this dissertation: Immigration Reform, Gun Control, Voter ID Laws, and

ObamaCare.

The basis for choosing these four issues can be found in surveys on the political views of

Millennials, a generation of individuals who are between the ages of 18 and 34, which was the

anticipated age range for a majority of undergraduate participants in this dissertation. A 2014

survey by the Harstad Strategic Research firm revealed that Millennials have strong (and mostly

supportive) attitudes on a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, background checks

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[3] Though the effect of one issue affecting other issues was not the focus of this dissertation, it was examined by assessing what (if any) effect the order in which the issues were presented had on participants' negotiation outcomes. Analyses revealed no order effects (all *ps* > .35).

for gun purchases, protecting the rights of minorities (including voting rights), and health care reform. In addition, each issue was discussed in the media around the time of data collection. For example, the mass shooting at the University of California in Santa Barbara in May 2014 reignited the debate over gun control; the influx of Central American refugees in the summer of 2014 and President Obama's promise to act on immigration by the end of 2014 increased engagement among Hispanics, Asians, and liberal activists; the initial problems with the ObamaCare website and the Supreme Court's birth control ruling in favor of Hobby Lobby helped make it a campaign issue for the 2014 Midterms (and the fact that most of the 2014 races were in Republican states); and the Supreme Court's 2013 ruling on the preclearance clause of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 increased engagement among Blacks and liberal activists. In addition, the distributive point system was constructed in such a way that two of the issues offered more points to Democrats (Immigration Reform and Gun Control) and two of the issues offered more points to Republicans (Voter ID and ObamaCare). Since Democrats tend to favor more immigration laws and oppose the current gun laws, points on those issues were scaled in their favor, and since Republicans tend to favor more Voter ID laws and oppose the health care law, points on those issues were scaled in their favor.

The issues of college affordability, net neutrality and privacy rights, marijuana decriminalization, universal Pre-Kindergarten and tuition-free community colleges, raising the minimum wage, Middle East policy, and increasing taxes on companies that fail to invest in wind and solar energy were all potential issues. However, the intent was to select issues with clear (and perhaps historic) divisions between the two parties, which college undergraduates could intelligibly discuss, and (as mentioned at the end of chapter two) that are tied to individuals' different identities. The issue of voting rights is sacred to Blacks for obvious historical reasons, and the issue of immigration is imprinted in the heritage of Hispanics and Asians in a manner that is not true for any other issue (Johnson, 1997). And although ObamaCare and Gun Control do not necessarily tie into immutable characteristics such as race, gun ownership is a predictor of

Republican Party support (ANES, 2014), and health care has been a historic division between the two parties (Bodenheimer, 2005).

Finally, the issues of abortion and same-sex marriage were removed as negotiation topics. Although they were initially proposed, it is unlikely that anyone would compromise significantly on those issues regardless of an experimental manipulation. Content on abortion was included only as one option of several within the larger topic of ObamaCare, but was not itself a stand-alone topic. Content on birth control was also included as an option within the ObamaCare topic. Although certain forms of birth control are sometimes mistaken as abortifacients, that was not considered a serious methodological concern.

Overview and Hypotheses

In summary, the goal of this dissertation was to answer the following question: *can voters incentivize compromise*? I emulated the design used in the study by Aaldering and De Dreu (2012) and adapted it for an explicitly political context.[4] Participants engaged in a semi-structured dyadic negotiation task in which they played the role of a legislator in the House of Representatives seeking re-election from their hypothetical voters. The key variable was the different incentives I gave participants (based on the desires of their hypothetical constituents) to change how they approached the negotiation. Half of the dyads were informed that they represented districts in which their voters wanted them to compromise whereas the other half were informed that they represented districts in which their voters wanted them to adhere to their values (i.e., to behave in a partisan manner).

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[4] In Aaldering and De Dreu's (2012) study, a compromise (645 points) was obtained if both players selected the middle option on all five issues. Such a strategy would not amount to a compromise in the political arena, especially when issues are not equidistant in their importance to both political parties. For instance, the middle option for Democrats on immigration reform is likely to be detrimental to Republicans, whereas the middle option for Republicans on immigration reform is likely to be detrimental to Democrats. However, if both sides accept something mildly undesirable in exchange for a portion of what they desire, then they have reached a compromise. In short, the best joint outcomes in instances of intergroup negotiations are indistinguishable from reaching a compromise, and it is possible that bipartisan accommodation will produce a deal that meets the goals of both parties better than what either individually proposed.

Two of the key components in the design were the use of individuals who identify with the Democratic or Republican parties as research participants (placed in dyads of one Democrat and one Republican), and the task of negotiating joint outcomes on four policy issues in which the parties are known to disagree (but are not considered taboo tradeoffs). The implicit advantage in having partisan identifiers is that participants already understand the consequentiality of the issues, and many may have an emotional investment in any one of them.

A second goal of this dissertation was to test the construct validity of a self-report measure of political compromise, the UT-Arlington Intergroup Compromise Inventory (ICI). To date, there are no established scales of intergroup compromise that validly and reliably assess individuals' willingness to compromise with the other party, the degree to which they distrust negotiations with the other party, or their degree of political animus (the desire to obstruct the other party even at the cost of your own values). In two studies conducted in 2012 and 2013, I developed and tested 49 items putatively related to political compromise. In both studies I found a similar factor structure and scale reliabilities among three constructs: compromise, distrust, and political animus.[5]

In summary, this dissertation is, to my knowledge, the first experimental investigation of intergroup compromise between representatives of the Democratic and Republican parties, and the degree to which political partisans can be incentivized to compromise.

Hypothesis 1

I hypothesized that participants whose voters desired compromise (compromise-condition dyads) in exchange for re-election would negotiate higher joint outcomes than participants whose voters wanted them to adhere to their values (value adherence-condition dyads). If compromise is consequential for victory, then individuals should be inclined to reach agreements that are worth more points interdependently than they could reach with an independent, partisan strategy.

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[5] Please see appendix A for psychometric findings.

Hypothesis 2

        I hypothesized that the discrepancy between Democrats' and Republicans' scores would be higher for value adherence-condition dyads than for compromise-condition dyads. The rationale for this prediction is that value-adherence dyads will be motivated to maximize their score, and they will only be inclined to compromise to the extent necessary to ensure that the other participant does not leave the negotiation altogether (leaving both players with zero points).

Chapter 4

Method

Participants

One-hundred and ninety five undergraduate students at the University of Texas at Arlington, ages 18-57 years old (M_{age} = 21.85, SD = 6.43), participated in this experiment. Participants in psychology courses enrolled in either the Democratic (n = 111) or Republican (n = 84) version of this experiment based on their response to a political affiliation item included in the psychology department's SONA prescreening survey (Sona Systems; Fidler, 1997).[6] Participants who met the eligibility requirements for a particular political party received email invitations through SONA indicating when timeslots were available. Non-psychology participants were recruited using flyers posted around campus and were scheduled for participation based on the party affiliation provided to the principal investigator via email. Psychology participants were compensated with 1.5 research credits and non-psychology participants were compensated with $10 cash.

Democratic participants were 47 male and 64 female students, and Republicans were 40 males and 43 females. The ethnic composition for Republicans was as follows: 40 White, 13 Asian, 12 Black, 11 Hispanic, and 8 mixed. The ethnic composition for Democrats was as follows: 35 Black, 26 Asian, 21 Hispanic, 20 White, and 7 mixed. The fact that the disparity in diversity between the parties resembles national trends suggests that the procedure to sort participants by political affiliation was successful. Additional evidence stems from the finding that Republicans made up 79.2% of Pro-Life and 65.5% of anti-Gay Marriage advocates, whereas Democrats made up 71.6% of Pro-Choice and 70.9% of Marriage Equality advocates.

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[6] From this point forward participants are considered Republican if they indicated that they lean right, if they are Libertarian and would vote for a Republican in 2016 (which 86.6% indicated), or explicitly identified as a Republican/Conservative. Similarly, participants are considered Democrats if they indicated that they lean left, if they are Libertarian and would vote for a Democrat in 2016 (which 98.1% indicated) or explicitly identified as a Democrat/Progressive.

One-hundred and forty participants took part in the negotiation (a total of 70 dyads). Fourteen dyads were removed from dyadic analyses due to the following confounding factors: failing to understanding the manipulation or negotiation instructions, being indistinguishable on the political spectrum, and two dyads literally switched negotiation materials with each other when the experimenter left the room. The remaining 56 dyads were included in dyadic analyses, with 28 Democratic-Republican dyads randomly assigned into the Compromise condition and 28 Democratic-Republican dyads randomly assigned into the Value Adherence condition. The discarded dyads were included with the other non-dyadic data for the purposes of psychometric analysis (i.e., the integrity of their questionnaire responses, which preceded the negotiation, was not influenced by confounds during the negotiation session).

Setting and Procedure

Laboratory Setting

The experiment was conducted in room 401 of the UTA Life Sciences building, which contains two long conference tables and chairs so that participants could sit across from one another during the political negotiation. The room also contained bookshelves and an office desk against the outside window (with the chair facing the window) which allowed the Echo Smartpen to be conveniently concealed while audio-recording dyadic negotiations.[7]

Research Procedure

When scheduled participants arrived, the experimented greeted them, asked that they sit directly across from one another at the negotiating table, and asked their name. Asking their name ensured that the materials for the Democratic and Republican participant would be given to the person registered under the heading for that political party. Each participant was then given a consent form to complete with one of the two pens placed on the table. Upon completing the consent forms, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire packet.

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[7] Audio data was collected for use in future linguistic inquiry and word count (LIWC) analyses but is not a central part of this dissertation.

Once both participants completed and returned the questionnaire packet to the experimenter, they were given a blue (Democratic) or red (Republican) negotiation folder (based on their political party). The experimenter then read instructions from page one of the negotiation materials (see Appendix B). The experimenter then asked participants to turn to the next page (the manipulation page) and informed participants that their constituents either wanted them to compromise with the other political party and get things done, or stay true to their values while negotiating with the opposing political party. Participants were then asked to complete the four manipulation check items on the bottom of page two. Once both participants appeared to have completed the four items, they were asked to turn the page to the final instruction page (scorecard practice). The experimenter then explained how the compromise scorecard point system worked, with particular emphasis on selecting "no action" and avoiding multiple selections from a single participant (see Supplemental Materials).

On each issue, participants would have to choose exactly one Democratic option from the left side of the page (letters A, B, C, and D), one Republican option from the right side of the page (letters E, F, G, and H), and place the agreed upon letters in the box below the corresponding column. If they were unable to agree one on letter from each column then they could choose "no action" and move on to the next issue.[8] In addition, all four issues had distributive point systems, with immigration and gun control favoring Democrats in points available, and voter ID and ObamaCare favoring Republicans in points available. There was no integrative negotiation issue in this experiment, and participants were advised not to share their points with one another during the negotiation.

Once participants appeared to grasp the point system the experimenter collected their practice materials (except for the example of the scorecard practice topic), informed them that they would have 20 minutes to complete the four negotiation topics, and went into the 4th floor

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[8] Participants in the value adherence condition chose "no action" at a higher frequency than those in the compromise condition (particularly on the issue of immigration), however their difference in frequency was not significant.

stairwell so that the participants could negotiate without the experimenter being present. Participants were told to come see the experimenter if they had any questions or finished in less than 20 minutes.

Once 20 minutes expired (or participants indicated that they were done) the experimenter returned to room 401 to hand participants the audio-release consent form, the post-negotiation questionnaire, and the debriefing form. Upon handing out the audio-release form the experimenter explained that deception was necessary in regards to the recording, because if participants were aware of it during the negotiation it may have affected their outcomes. After completing the audio-release form and the post-negotiation questionnaire, participants were asked not to share the nature of the experiment with other students and were dismissed (and non-Psychology participants were paid $10).[9]

<center>Materials</center>

Personal Background Information and Party Identity

Participants completed demographic items (e.g., age, sex, sexuality, race/ethnicity, SES, religion) as well as items intended to discern their political orientation (see Appendix B). The first item explicitly asked participants which political orientation they identified with (e.g., Tea Party, Conservative/ Republican, Right-Leaning Independent, Left-Leaning Independent, Progressive/Democratic, Occupy Movement, or Libertarian). The next three items asked participants to indicate their position on abortion, same-sex marriage, and undocumented Americans. Finally, participants were asked to indicate who they would support in the 2016 Presidential Election, Hillary Clinton (or another Democrat) or Rand Paul (or another Republican). These political items helped verify that participants enrolled in timeslots for a particular political party actually were members of that party.

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[9] There were only five participants in the study who signed up via the flyer and were paid $10. The only difference in questionnaire material compared to participants who signed via SONA was the inclusion of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire and Stereotype Content Model (see Supplemental Materials).

Liberal-Conservative Ideology

Participants then completed a 20-item measure of Liberal-Conservative Ideology (LCI). The LCI is a modified version of the Political Ideology Scale used by Shook and Clay (2011) and Clay (2012). Participants were asked to respond using a 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree) Likert-type scale, with higher scores indicating liberal attitudes (overall α = .88; Republicans α = .82; Democrats α = .75).

Just like the demographic information, the LCI was used in instances where the eligibility of a negotiation dyad was uncertain. For instance, if one participant indicated that they were progressive and the other indicated that they were Libertarian, then the LCI was used to verify that it was a right-leaning Libertarian and not a left-leaning Libertarian (because that would make the dyad ineligible).

Intergroup Compromise Inventory

The intergroup compromise inventory (ICI) is a 26-item measure developed in previous research to assess individuals' propensity to compromise (Willis & DeNobrega, 2013). The secondary goal of this dissertation was to determine the construct validity of the Compromise (k = 8), Animus (k = 8), and Distrust (k = 10) scales. Please see Appendix A for a detailed summary of the psychometric results.

Agreeableness

Participants completed the 9-item measure of agreeableness included in the Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999). Participants were asked to respond using a 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree) Likert-type scale, with higher scores indicating higher levels of agreeableness (α = .72).

Partisanship

Three nominal measures of partisanship were included. The first was a modification of a distribution strategy matrix used in intergroup differentiation research (Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979). Participants with low scores indicate a willingness to receive less if it means there will be

a greater difference in outcomes between their group and the outgroup (relative favoritism), whereas participants with high scores indicate a greater willingness to compromise (joint profit). *Proposal* was expected to serve as criterion-validity for the ICI (see Appendix A). The measure was scaled from 1-to-6, with 10-1 indicating '1' (competitive/ maximum difference) and 15-15 indicating a '6' (cooperative/ joint profit).

The second measure of partisanship asked participants to indicate their support, opposition, or indifference for inter-party marriage (Almond & Verba, 1960; Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012). American National Election Studies (ANES) surveys have used the inter-party marriage item as a social distance measure for about 50 years, and it is correlated with the United States' general increase in partisanship.

The final measure of partisanship asked participants if they supported President Obama's desire to repeal the 1975 Public Affairs Act. Of course, there is no such thing as the 1975 Public Affairs Act, but research over several decades reveals that the most partisan individuals will support or oppose any given President's desire to repeal this imaginary legislation based on their political identity (Bishop, Oldendick, Tuchfarber, & Bennett, 1980).

Political Knowledge

Finally, four items were used to gauge participants' general political knowledge. Participants were asked "Who has the final responsibility to decide if a law is Constitutional or not?", "Which party has the most members in the U.S. Senate?", "Who is the current Secretary of State?", and "How much of the time do you trust the government in Washington?", with each question presenting participants with two to four options.

Chapter 5

Results

The dyad was the unit of analysis for negotiation outcomes. Rather than using the actor-partner interdependence model (APIM) the data were structured in SPSS such that the joint outcomes (one score per dyad) and the party-specific outcomes (separate scores for the actor and partner) could be assessed using univariate and mixed-model ANOVAs, respectively. The mixed-model ANOVAs provided both a more parsimonious and richer means from which to interpret the results (however, the data from the multilevel models is available upon request).

There were four main dependent variables. The first was joint outcomes (the combined score for the Democratic and Republican participants), which I predicted would be higher in the compromise condition because dyads incentivized to work together should produce greater results than dyads incentivized to prioritize partisan gains. The second dependent variable was discrepancy (the difference between the Republican minus Democratic participants' outcomes), which I predicted would be higher in the value adherence condition because dyads incentivized to prioritize partisan gains will be more polarized (by definition), talk past each other, and end up farther apart in their negotiations. The final two dependent variables were simply the individual scores for the Democratic and Republican participants, which I predicted would be higher in the compromise condition.

Negotiation Results

Hypothesis 1 predicted that compromise-condition dyads would negotiate higher joint outcomes than value adherence-condition dyads. A univariate analysis of variance found no difference in the joint outcomes for dyads in the compromise ($M = 42.4$) or value adherence ($M = 45.39$) conditions ($p = .24$).

Next, a univariate analysis of variance found support for hypothesis 2, which predicted that the discrepancy between Democrats' and Republicans' scores would be higher for value adherence-condition dyads than for compromise-condition dyads, $F(1, 49) = 5.94$, $p = .02$, $\eta_p^2 = $

10.8%. Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons revealed that the discrepancy between Democrats' and Republicans' negotiation outcomes was significantly lower in the compromise condition (M = -1.76, SE = 2.99) than in the value adherence (M = 8.46, SE = 2.94) condition. This finding suggests that dyads incentivized to compromise worked harder to reach mutual agreements rather than partisan gains. However, the finding that joint gains did not differ between conditions suggests that either those in the compromise condition simply agreed to the *low hanging fruit* in order to reach a compromise or that those in the value-adherence condition (particularly Republicans) had great partisan success. These possibilities will be explored in the discussion.

Finally, a mixed-model analysis of variance was conducted to delineate party-specific differences in outcomes for the two negotiation conditions, and thus shed some light on the discrepancy between conditions. The analysis revealed a significant interaction between political party and negotiation condition, $F(1, 49)$ = 5.94, p = .02, η_p^2 = 10.8%. As illustrated in Figure 5-1, bonferroni post-hoc comparisons revealed that Republicans' negotiation outcomes were higher in the value adherence condition than in the compromise condition (p = .011), whereas Democrats' negotiation outcomes did not differ between the compromise and value-adherence condition (p = .14). Moreover, in the value adherence condition, Republicans' outcomes were significantly higher than Democrats' (p = .006), but the scores for the two did not differ in the compromise condition (p = .56).

Figure 5-1 Individual Outcomes for Democrats and Republicans Based on Constituency.

Democratic participants' general willingness to acquiesce to a more competitive Republican negotiation partner (even though both were given the partisanship incentive) may reflect their general belief in government to address national issues. If their political disposition is to make government work, then matching Republicans in competitiveness would have been counterproductive. Thus, any sense of dejection from achieving fewer individual outcomes may be tempered by the success of reaching an agreement. On the other hand, Republicans in the compromise condition may have acquiesced more to Democrats because the manipulation explicitly conveyed that they would only be rewarded for working together. Thus, any sense of dejection from conceding greater ground to Democrats may be tempered by the expected electoral rewards of doing so. The degree to which philosophical differences between parties may have been a factor will be explored further in the discussion.

Dyadic Composition

A subsequent analysis assessed dyadic composition; specifically, whether or not the dyad had a self-identified independent from either party, an independent from both parties, or was a pure-party dyad (i.e., no independents). Univariate analyses indicated that whether or not the

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Republican was independent made the most difference. Dyads in which the Republican was an independent showed no differences between the compromise or value adherence conditions for any outcome measure, including Democrats' negotiation outcomes. However, if the Republican was a self-identified conservative or member of the Tea Party, then the outcomes of both Democrats and Republicans varied significantly between conditions, such that the discrepancy between Democrats' and Republicans' scores was more pronounced for these dyads, both for those in the compromise ($M = $ -6.85) and value adherence ($M = $ 12.92) conditions, $F(1, 24) = $ 18.05, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = 42.9\%$. Democrats' negotiation outcomes were significantly higher than Republicans' in the compromise condition ($p = .048$) but lower in the value adherence condition ($p = .001$), and Democrats had higher scores in the compromise condition ($p = .009$) whereas Republicans had higher scores in the value-adherence condition ($p < .001$) (see Figure 5-2).[10]


Figure 5-2 Outcomes for Dyads with a Partisan Republican.

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[10] The covariates of race/ethnicity, age, dyadic gender composition, and whether or not the dyad members were friends or previously debated politics were not significant or influential in the analyses.

Supplemental Analysis: Gender and Ethnicity

It is accepted as common wisdom in the DC beltway that women compromise more than men (Weisman & Steinhauer, 2013). An analysis of the partisanship (DW-NOMINATE) data over the past 50 years reveals that Republican women were the least polarizing group in the United States Congress for most of the last 50 years (see publicly available data from Carroll et al., 2013; and data from America's 50 state legislatures from Shor & McCarty, 2011, 2013). A similar trend was found in this dissertation, as joint outcomes in the partisanship condition were significantly lower in female-female dyads ($M = 41.18$, $SE = 2.41$) than in any dyad with a male ($M = 48.47$, $SE = 2.07$), $F(1, 24) = 5.26$, $p = .031$, $\eta_p^2 = 18\%$. A subsequent analysis revealed that Republican women competed for significantly fewer individual outcomes ($M = 24.19$, $SE = 2.14$) than Republican men ($M = 31.30$, $SE = 2.71$), $F(1, 24) = 4.25$, $p = .05$, $\eta_p^2 = 15\%$. Finally, there were marginally smaller outcome discrepancies in partisan dyads with Republican women ($M = 4.5$, $SE = 3.46$) compared to those with Republican men ($M = 14.80$, $SE = 4.37$), $F(1, 24) = 3.41$, $p = .077$.

An analysis of the DW-NOMINATE data by McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006) found that Black and Hispanic legislators were more partisan in their voting behavior than lawmakers from other groups. A similar trend was found in this dissertation, as Black and Hispanic Democrats had significantly higher outcomes than other Democrats in the compromise condition, $F(1, 23) = 7.69$, $p = .011$, $\eta_p^2 = 25\%$ (see Table 5-1 for associated means). There were no findings for dyads with Black or Hispanic Republicans, possibly due to the small sample of such individuals for dyadic analyses (n = 5). In addition, the issue-specific outcomes for comprehensive immigration reform and voter ID were not significantly different in dyads with a Hispanic or Black negotiator, respectively (however, Blacks were marginally more competitive on the issue of voter ID than ObamaCare, $p = .081$).

Table 5-1 Negotiation Outcomes by Ethnicity, Party, and Condition

| | Compromise | | Value Adherence | |
	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans
White	18	20.62	22.14	25.00
Black	26.44	21.67	15.50	31.33
Hispanic	26.50	16.40	17.25	30.00
Asian	17.75	30.50	20.50	28.75
Mixed	14.50	16.00	13.33	27.00

Supplemental Analysis: Empathic Accuracy

After the negotiation task, participants completed a post-negotiation questionnaire that assessed their perceptions of the conversation. A pair of items asked participants how comfortable they felt during the interaction and how comfortable they think the person from the other party felt. In a series of analyses, I assessed the accuracy of each party's perceptions and computed a composite index of empathic accuracy.

A univariate ANOVA revealed that Democrats felt significantly less comfortable in the value adherence condition ($M = 4.54$, $SE = .3$) than in the compromise condition ($M = 5.5$, $SE = .26$), $F(1, 23) = 5.81$, $p = .024$, $\eta_p^2 = 20.2\%$. In addition, Democrats in the value adherence condition reported marginally less comfort than Republicans ($M = 5.45$, $SE = .33$), $F(1, 20) = 3.88$, $p = .063$, $\eta_p^2 = 16.2\%$. Republicans' reported comfort did not differ between conditions.

A subsequent univariate ANOVA with composite empathic accuracy as the dependent variable revealed that Republicans were more accurate in their appraisal of Democrats' comfort ($M_{discrepancy} = .19$, $SE = .28$) than Democrats were in their judgment of Republicans' comfort ($M_{discrepancy} = .97$, $SE = .27$), $F(1, 44) = 4.08$, $p = .049$, $\eta_p^2 = 8.5\%$.

In summary, the results of these analyses revealed that (1) the joint outcomes of negotiations do not differ regardless of the incentive; (2) however, Republicans profit most when given a partisan incentive whereas Democrats profit most when incentivized to compromise; (3) men, regardless of party, were more competitive than women; (4) Republicans displayed greater empathic accuracy than Democrats; and (5) the only dyads in which the incentive manipulation

had any measurable effect was in dyads where the Republican was not an independent. Although finding that the manipulation was only influential on dyads with a partisan Republican was unexpected, it is perhaps the most ecologically reinforcing finding in the experiment. Consider that Republicans have moved farther to the right than Democrats have moved to the left, and that there are no more Republicans more liberal than the most conservative Democrat (Carroll et al., 2013; Hare & Poole, 2013). Thus, the finding that the compromise manipulation was most influential in dyads with a partisan Republican (those most reflective of our current Congress) suggests that such an incentive may help reduce the toxicity in the current political atmosphere.

Chapter 6

Discussion

The current dissertation was an attempt to determine whether or not constituents' desire for compromise makes it enough of an electorally consequential incentive that it influences the outcomes of interparty negotiations. In an experiment that adapted the procedure used by Aaldering and de Dreu (2012), self-identified Democratic and Republican participants played the role of US legislators seeking re-election in the 2014 Midterm Elections, and were randomly assigned to either dovish (favoring compromise) or hawkish (favoring value adherence) constituencies. They were tasked with negotiating four political issues in a semi-structured dyadic interaction which used a compromise scorecard, a purely distributive payoff matrix based on the format used by Aaldering and de Dreu (2012). I will begin with a discussion of the dyadic negotiation findings and their implications for the political process, and conclude with a discussion of limitations and directions for future research.

Dyadic Interaction Findings

Discussion of Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 1, which predicted that joint outcomes would be higher in the compromise condition than in the value adherence condition, was not supported. The contrasting findings of this experiment and that of Aaldering and de Dreu (2012) may be attributable to variations in methodology. Recall that the current study used self-identified partisans debating historically difficult political issues, whereas Aaldering and de Dreu (2012) randomly assigned participants to play hypothetical roles and debate issues for which no pre-existing emotional, moral, or religious investments were expected to exist. This distinction is important because it implicitly suggests that the zone of possible agreement was narrower in the current study. For example, it is more likely that Hispanic participants would negotiate the length of a contract at a fictitious company than negotiate whether or not families with mixed immigration status should be separated through deportation.

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In addition, Aaldering and de Dreu (2012) included an integrative negotiation issue as a fifth topic whereas this dissertation only used four distributive issues. Moreover, their article does not indicate the different *outcomes by topic* across their manipulation conditions. Considering that their single integrative topic (salary) accounted for 42% of the points available across the five topics, it is possible that it contributed significantly to the differences they reported between conditions. An integrative topic was not possible in the current dissertation given the constraints necessary to make the project feasible, which includes considering which topics could reasonably be considered integrative in the current political climate (e.g., tax reform, divestment and renewable energy expenditures) and which topics a sample of mostly college freshmen and sophomores could intelligibly discuss.

Finally, Aaldering and de Dreu (2012) used mixed constituent pools: either mostly dovish constituents with a low or high status hawkish minority, or mostly hawkish constituents with a low or high status dovish minority. Although this dissertation did not use mixed constituencies, such a design should be applied to future studies. For instance, Republican participants' willingness to compromise on immigration may change in the value adherence condition if they are told that a majority (60%) versus a minority (20%) of their voters are Hispanic.

Discussion of Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 2, which predicted that the discrepancy between the Democratic and Republican participants' individual outcomes would be greater in the value adherence than in the compromise condition, was supported. The analyses revealed that Republicans' outcomes were significantly higher in the value adherence than compromise condition, and higher than Democrats' outcomes in the value adherence condition. Democrats' outcomes did not differ by condition and there was no discrepancy between parties in the compromise condition.

If the results of hypotheses 1 and 2 are taken together, they suggest that dyads reached the same overall joint outcomes regardless of whether they were incentivized to compromise or obstruct by their hypothetical constituents, but Republicans in the value adherence condition were

more combative and achieved better personal outcomes by acting that way. Findings in the

political science literature have demonstrated that the increase in polarization in the United States

Congress since the realignment of the South has been asymmetric and largely driven by

increased Republican partisanship (Barber & McCarty, 2014; Hare, McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal,

2012; Mann & Ornstein, 2013). Thus, consistent with real-world findings, Republicans in the

current study were more competitive overall than Democrats, most likely because they were

personally rewarded for it.

Philosophical Differences on the Role of Government

It is important to consider the philosophical mismatch between what Democrats and

Republicans find rewarding as it relates to government. Conservatives believe in a limited

government and, to quote former President Ronald Reagan, that the "government is the

problem." Progressives believe in a government that helps progress the public good and

advocates for greater equality in the social fabric. Given that difference, it is not surprising that

Republicans would be more competitive than Democrats when they have been told (in the value

adherence condition) that they would be personally rewarded for it. Conversely, it makes sense

that Democrats would be more engaged in negotiations when they know they will be rewarded for

effective governance (in the compromise condition). The motivation to debate, deliberate, and

reach a compromise also likely explains why there was no difference between Democrats' and

Republicans' individual outcomes in the compromise condition, because the motivation to reach a

compromise conflicts with the motivation to maximize individual outcomes.

Implications for the Political Process

There is one clear yet profound truth about the United States' current political climate that

underlies the purpose of this dissertation: partisanship is our current default. The reason the

study of political compromise is under-developed is because the alarming increase in political

discord likely caught many by surprise (Bellamy et al., 2012). From August 2007 through

February 2014, the Pew Research Center recorded the lowest public trust in government since

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they began keeping records in 1958. Concurrent with the erosion of public trust has been increasing polarization between Democrats and Republicans in Congress, state legislatures, marriages, and even neighborhoods (Alford et al., 2011; Carroll et al., 2013; Hare & Poole, 2013; Howard et al., 2005; Shor & McCarty, 2013). The finding in this dissertation that political partisans can be incentivized to compromise, while hopeful, must be considered in a real-world context. In particular, would a scorecard motivate Republicans and Democrats in the same way, would it restore a degree of polity to the legislative process, would voters care, and in which elections would it be most effective?

Legislative Gridlock

The Hastert Rule, a procedural tactic utilized in the House of Representatives, is an example of the philosophical mismatch between the parties, and one that directly affects the legislative process (Fetchner, 2014). The Hastert Rule carries an implicit partisan motivation by requiring that a bill can only pass a Republican-controlled House Chamber if it has votes from a majority of the majority rather than votes from the Democratic minority. However, there were three instances between the 112th and 113th Congresses in which Speaker of the House John Boehner (R-OH) broke the Hastert Rule and allowed legislation to pass with mostly Democratic votes: the fiscal cliff, disaster relief for victims of Hurricane Sandy, and the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act. The common theme in each of these examples is that a failure to get something done would have resulted in a financial crisis or public disgust, with Republicans taking much of the blame. Thus, it could be argued that those are real-world examples of how citizens can incentivize compromise, at least from party leadership who are concerned with their party's brand (e.g., you do not want to be the party that opposes the Violence Against Women Act).

Although those examples highlight how public pressure can incentivize compromise, it is important to remember that all three of them happened immediately after a General Election. Many elected officials may feel some initial immunity to accountability pressures based on the

mandate they believe they earned by winning their election (Klimoski & Ash, 1974). They may feel immune to the repercussions of compromising because the next election is at least two years away (or six years for a newly elected Senator). Thus, a compromise scorecard would not be an effective or necessary incentive during non-election years, particularly the months immediately after an election. However, because most laws are enacted in the final months of congressional sessions, the scorecard might be an effective remedy for legislative gridlock near the end of a session (see www.GovTrack.us/congress/bills/statistics).

Aside from the end of congressional sessions when electoral incentives would be salient and influential in the minds of candidates, it is unclear how effective a compromise scorecard system would be at preventing political gamesmanship from undermining the legislative process throughout the rest of a congressional session. If we consider timing as a key variable in the effectiveness of the compromise scorecard, then it would have even less utility in the Senate where it would only influence individual Senators once every six years. More troubling is the fact that many current senators came from the hyperpolarized House, which has resulted in increased Senate polarization (Rosen, 2013). Combine that finding with the 14 moderate senators who quit the Senate in 1996 due to excessive partisanship, and the result is a Senate that is just as discordant as the House (Tannen, 2013).

Consider the Gregg-Conrad Plan in 2010 to address the national debt. There were originally seven Republican co-sponsors for the bill, but once President Obama supported it, each Republican co-sponsor decided to kill the bill (Rushing, 2010). A similar example is former Senator Olympia Snowe's (R-ME) 2009 vote in support of ObamaCare in the Senate Finance Committee, and subsequent vote against the healthcare law for final passage. More recently, former Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) voted against the DREAM Act in 2011 after previously voting for and sponsoring the bill. In addition, Senate Democrats (while in the majority) prevented Republicans from introducing amendments, removed the ability to introduce senatorial holds and filibusters on executive nominations and appointments, and increasingly utilized omnibus bills

rather than allowing for a broader debate (Mann & Ornstein, 2013). Research by Geoffrey Stone (2013) suggests that the injection of political animus into the Senate nomination process has been particularly striking:

> "…between 1964 and 2000, only 30 percent of the opposing-party senators opposed confirmation. Since 2000, 74 percent of the opposing-party's senators voted against confirmation. In the four confirmations since 2000, 67 percent of Democrats voted against Roberts and Alito, and 81 percent of Republicans voted against Sotomayor and Kagan."

In each of these examples, legislators weighed political animus and electoral considerations more heavily than upholding legitimacy and public trust in the legislative process. A compromise scorecard that was consequential for re-election may help mitigate some of the factors, but certainly not all. A key concern that remains unaddressed is the degree to which the public cares. Does the libertarian student in Texas who is watching college Football care that Senator Olympia Snowe changed her vote in the Finance Committee? Even if that student did care, would the former Senator from Maine feel motivated to compromise based on concerns of a voter from Texas? This dissertation assumed that a compromise scorecard already exists, that it was deemed legitimate by voters, and that lawmakers saw it as consequential to winning their election. However, a clearer understanding of the voters who turnout in different elections (Midterm versus General) is important in determining the electoral scenario in which the scorecard would be most influential.

Voter Efficacy

Voter efficacy posits that the degree to which eligible voters feel like their vote can make a difference the more likely they are to vote (Pinkleton, Austin, & Fortman, 1998). For any scorecard to be effective, whether it is for the National Rifle Association, VotoLatino Immigration scores, or a compromise scorecard, the voting-eligible constituents reviewing the scorecard information for their elected official must believe that their vote is consequential. Moreover, the lawmaker must believe that their constituents' votes are consequential to their re-election; in particular, the constituents who desire more compromise. It may appear to be a very subtle point

but it matters whether a legislator is more concerned with constituents who favor open-carry handguns, abortion rights, banning carbon taxes, or compromise.

Consider the background check debate following the Newtown, CT shooting in 2012. Numerous polls showed that a majority of Americans (in both parties) favored background checks on gun purchases following the 2012 Newtown shooting (Clement, 2013). However, because the Republican Party felt that their partisan minority who opposed background checks were more consequential to their re-election, they voted against the legislation. As it turns out, political science research has found that the most partisan voters are most likely to vote (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008).

The immigration reform debate offers another instance in which legislation supported by a majority of Americans, and passed in the Senate, was ultimately not brought up for a vote in the House. Not only that, but as the 2014 Midterm Election drew closer, many Republican senators who voted for immigration reform began to walk back their vote. Political science research has found that legislators tend to fit their ideology to the voters they expect will turnout (McCarty, Rodden, Shor, Tausanovitch, & Warshaw, 2013), and Hispanics are less likely to vote in Midterm Elections (Oakford, 2015).

With that in mind, consider that the election following the background check vote and immigration reform vote was going to be a Midterm Election, in which turnout tends to be lower, especially among minorities (e.g., who are mostly Democratic voters), moderates/independents, and young voters (Oakford, 2015). On top of that, most of the races in the 2014 Midterms were in red (Republican) states, and so the expected turnout of those opposed to gun control and immigration was proportionately greater. Taken together, the electoral incentives for most Republicans (and several red-state Democrats) was such that failing to reach a compromise on background checks and opposing immigration would be to their benefit when seeking support from an older, less diverse, and more conservative Midterm electorate (Oakford, 2015).

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The distinction between Midterm and General Elections is critical given the demographic differences between the two electorates (Oakford, 2015). Unfortunately, it is difficult to make a strong argument for the remedial value of a compromise scorecard in Midterm Elections as voter efficacy among moderates/independents is likely to decrease with the overall turnout. Given that turnout is higher in General (Presidential) Elections than in Midterm Elections, and significantly higher in swing states than in partisan states, a compromise scorecard may be useful for incentivizing a more respectable debate and legislative tenor for politicians vying for competitive seats during General Elections (McDonald, 2015).

> "Voters in competitive states are more interested in politics, more aware of the policy positions their U.S. senators have taken, and more likely to hold them accountable for those positions at election time." (Jones, 2013).

Competition Breeds Compromise

The overwhelming majority (379 of 435) of elected House officials represent non-competitive districts – a trend that only worsened following the 2014 Midterm Elections (Kondik, 2014). What this means is that most legislators are incentivized to behave with as much position-extremity as possible to avoid a Primary challenge within their own party (usually from a challenger who is even more acrimonious than the incumbent). Moreover, being in a non-competitive district means the candidate who is partisan enough to win the Primary Election will not have to move back towards the moderate-center in the General Election. In short, a compromise scorecard would have no consequentiality in most congressional districts; in fact, it may backfire such that incumbents do their best to get a low score to prove how much they hate the word *compromise*.

The notion of *false equivalence* incorrectly suggests that purple districts are inherently moderate due to being equally balanced in regards to Democrats and Republicans. However, investigations on affective polarization have consistently shown that out-group animus is higher among Republicans (Iyengar et al., 2012; Iyengar & Westwood, 2014; Jost, Hennes, & Lavine, 2013; Jost et al., 2003). The results in this dissertation were no different, as (non-Independent)

Republicans took a more competitive approach to negotiations when given a partisan motivation. It is in this scenario, however, where the results of the compromise manipulation are most promising. If we assume that both parties in competitive districts have a 47% baseline from their voters, then a compromise scorecard could influence candidates to move towards the center to win a majority of the 6% undecided voters. Furthermore, a compromise scorecard would put incumbents at an advantage when running against non-incumbents because the current office-holder will be able to provide undecided constituents with a graded account of bipartisan deal-making.

<div align="center">Limitations and Future Research</div>

The influence of scorecard systems on elections, and ultimately on legislators' approach to negotiations, depends on the degree to which the issue being scored is branded as desirable to voters. The more desirable a position is, the more consequential it is for re-election, and thus the more influence it has on a lawmaker's negotiation tactics. Although this dissertation has obtained some interesting findings, several caveats should be kept in mind when generalizing the results.

Perhaps the most obvious limitation of all is the sample. The participants in this dissertation were not elected officials, retired politicians, campaign staffers, or even political science majors. At least a few of the participants asked what the political parties represented, and a few thought that Hillary Clinton became Vice-President in 2012. It is likely that the novice political IQ of the participants also influenced the integrity of the negotiations. For instance, it is possible that someone who was only well-versed in voter ID laws and gun control was paired with someone who was only knowledgeable in ObamaCare and voter ID, with neither having any knowledge on immigration reform. In such a scenario negotiation outcomes would be based on a dyad with incongruent knowledge on two issues, shared knowledge on one, and a complete lack of knowledge on another. Screening potential participants with items that assess political knowledge (not just ideology) would help ensure that only those with at least basic political

knowledge (e.g., knowing who the Vice-President is) would be allowed to participate in the study. In addition, a sample of political activists would serve as an effective remedy in future research, because their knowledge of the issues would make them more reliable sources from which to discern the influence of the compromise manipulation.

Another issue related to the manipulation is that there was no true control condition, where participants were told that they were running un-opposed for re-election and therefore their constituents did not care what they did. It is clear that the manipulation significantly affected negotiation outcomes, but the absence of a control condition complicates the party-level interpretation. Republicans may have compromised more in the compromise condition, but perhaps they would have behaved that way even without the instruction. Democrats compromised more in the value adherence condition, but perhaps they would not have conceded so easily if Republicans were not instructed to be aggressive.[11] Having a true control group in future research would help us to determine which direction (towards aggression or cooperation) each party is moving based on the manipulation.

There are also ecological limitations to the generalizability of this dissertation. The semi-structured dyadic interactions used for the negotiations took place in an explicitly political context, and therefore the results should not be applied to or used to predict the outcomes of negotiations concerning non-political issues. More importantly, the current dissertation was embedded in a political context but was removed from other relevant factors that contribute to an overall political atmosphere.[12]

First, participants were not provided with demographic information about hypothetical constituents (e.g., race, sex, age, gun ownership, income, education), a factor that is known to

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[11] Democrats were also instructed to behave aggressively in the value adherence condition, but failed to do so relative to Republicans.
[12] The key aspect that did provide a political atmosphere was that the dissertation was conducted during an election year in which participants were tasked with winning re-election on November 4th, 2014. Because the premise of winning re-election was written into participants' instructions, no data were collected after Election Day.

influence how legislators position themselves on key issues (Damore [Latino Decisions], 2015; Walter, 2013). Given the demographic shifts in the United States, including information about the racial/ethnic composition of hypothetical constituents would provide insight into the influence of demographic incentives.

Second, there was no experimental condition in which hypothetical lobbying groups offered participants monetary or endorsement incentives based on their selection of particular options, which is known to influence party positions on issues ranging from reducing CO^2 emissions to pledging never to raise taxes on high-income earners (Grasse & Heidbreder, 2011). Research by Gilens (2012) indicates that lawmakers tend to sponsor legislation that favors the interests of a few wealthy donors rather than their less wealthy campaign contributors. Moreover, out-of-district contributors tend to be more partisan and such contributions have increased following the Supreme Court's ruling in *Citizens United* (Bonica, 2013; Gimpel, Lee, & Pearson-Merkowitz, 2008). Given the degree to which campaign contributions incentivize legislation, future research could include conditions with different monetary incentives to determine the degree to which negotiators balance value-driven incentives with financial incentives.

Third, there was not a group of confederates who played the role of the media, or artificial news reports that cheered or condemned the participants' actions. The growth of the 24-hour news cycle since the 1990's is regarded as a key factor in the growth of hyper-polarization (Goren et al., 2009). Finally, even though the structure of the current dissertation was partially inspired by the successful negotiation between Paul Ryan and Patty Murray, most political negotiations take place in groups where conformity, obedience to party leadership, coercion (e.g., "vote against this bill or you will lose your chairmanship"), groupthink, and affectively charged group-level biases operate in concert to recalibrate the parameters of each negotiation (Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, & Wade-Benzoni, 2008; De Dreu, Koole, & Oldersma, 1999; De Dreu & Beersma, 2001; Maoz, Ward, Katz, & Ross, 2002).

Personality traits are also related to one's political identity (e.g., openness to experience for Democrats and Conscientiousness for Republicans) and may predict individuals' disposition towards partisanship and compromise (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, 2012). Although agreeableness was not a significant predictor of compromise in the current study (see Appendix A), agreeableness and openness to experience have been found to predict compromise in previous research (DeChurch & Marks, 2001; Wee, 2013). Additional research will be needed to determine the degree to which the big five traits predict political negotiation outcomes.

Finally, and in relation to the ecological concerns noted above, the structure of the compromise scorecard point system was such that points for one issue were detached from the others. What this means is that participants could not have agreed to an item on ObamaCare in exchange for an agreement on gun control. Even for the few participants who may have attempted such a strategy, those tradeoffs were not captured in the scoring system. Future research could change the instructions so that participants have the option to complete negotiations by making agreements across topics rather than being restricted to completing topics one at a time.

One avenue for future research is to assess the influence of scorecards in the 2016 Presidential Election. VotoLatino, Emily's List, and the National Rifle Association will be scoring legislators on their voting behavior and public statements on key issues. If scorecards are truly influential in swaying public opinion and inducing legislative accountability, then scorecards by VotoLatino should affect the tenor of the immigration debate in majority Hispanic districts more so than in minority Hispanic districts, and scorecards by the National Rifle Association should affect the tenor of the background check debate in districts with high gun ownership than in districts with low gun ownership. It may also be possible to assess the degree to which compromise can be branded as a desirable trait, as the group *No Labels* is invested in rewarding politicians who meet regularly with the other party and try to build consensus on contentious issues. Although *No Labels* is currently the best example of how one would address the issue of political compromise

in the real world, it has limited outreach and marketing, and occasionally exhibits partisan behavior such as its support for Republican Senators Cory Gardner (Colorado) and Joni Ernst (Iowa) in the 2014 midterms (Brown, 2014). Any organization that is predicated on being a fair judge of compromise cannot afford to erode public trust by taking such a polarizing stance.

If I had the resources, I would use Facebook's methodology (see Bond et al., 2012) to conduct a real-world experiment on the influence of compromise incentives in the emerging field of social media research. Bond and colleagues (2012) sent 60 million Facebook users messages indicating that their friends had voted on the day of the 2010 Midterm Elections, and the message included pictures of their friends, links for nearby polling places, and a button to push indicating that they voted. Another 600,000 users received a message indicating their friends voted but without a picture, and another 600,000 received no information at all. After the election, Facebook obtained public voting records and found that people who they sent pictures of friends to were more likely to vote than those who only received a message about voting or no message at all.

Given that everyone who joins Facebook has consented to participate in any experiment they choose to run (whether or not they actually read the terms and conditions), I would send half of the voting-age eligible Facebook users in each swing district information regarding the degree to which each candidate in the upcoming election compromises, and the other half would receive no information at all. I would then obtain public voting records to determine if Facebook users who received the compromise information were more likely to vote for the compromise-candidate.

Concluding Remarks

At the 2013 Association for Psychological Science Convention in Washington, D.C., Dr. Diane Halpern suggested that the media and political organizations should encourage (and perhaps create) the use of a cooperation point system. Organizations such as the National Rifle Association score lawmakers on their support for guns, and VotoLatino scores lawmakers on their support for Immigration. These scorecards are intended to serve as incentives to influence the

nature of legislators' negotiations, and their influence is proportional to the degree to which individual legislator's constituents support the specific issue at hand. This dissertation was an attempt to determine if a scorecard assessing compromise could influence partisans' willingness to compromise based on how consequential it was to their re-election (i.e., whether their constituents wanted them to compromise or adhere to their values).

The results herein provide support for the view that negotiators will adjust the position they take in political negotiations to satisfy the disposition of their voters. Although the final joint product of negotiations did not change across conditions, individuals with hawkish constituents were farther apart in their individual outcomes than individuals with dovish constituents. Moreover, self-identified partisan Republican participants were the ones influenced the most by the manipulation, whereas self-identified independent Republicans approached negotiations the same way regardless of the incentive. These findings indicate that implementing a compromise scorecard system during General (not Primary) Elections, particularly in swing states with competitive seats, could help reduce the increasing animosity across party lines.

In conclusion, this dissertation contributes to political psychology by providing a measure of intergroup compromise and by demonstrating that partisans from historically opposing groups can negotiate agreements on polarizing issues if incentivized to do so. In a sense, the results reinforce the most promising, appealing, and reassuring aspect of our democracy: citizens create Congress.

Appendix A

Psychometric Data for Intergroup Compromise Inventory

The intergroup compromise inventory (ICI) was included in this dissertation to assess its construct validity in an explicitly political context. Construct validity is arguably the most important standard in the scale validation process, because having a reliable scale means nothing if the scale does not measure what it is intended to measure (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Construct validity for the ICI is based on the degree to which the scales can predict participants' negotiation outcomes.

Using SPSS, I conducted a preliminary EFA on the 31 ICI items using the principal axis factor-retention method, as it provides a more reliable assessment of shared variance among constructs than principal components analysis, which tends to inflate factor loadings (Kline, 2000; Matsunaga, 2010). In addition, I set .4 as my cut-off for factor scores (Stevens, 1996), and requested three factors with a Promax rotation with kappa set to 1 for optimal delineation of the factors (Hendrickson & White, 1964).

The *Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin* (*KMO*) index of sampling adequacy and Bartlett's Test of multivariate normality were at acceptable levels (*KMO* = .87; X^2 = 2743.01, *df* = 465, *p* < .001), as the preliminary analysis revealed the three expected factors. Distrust (*k* = 10) was the first factor to emerge, with compromise (*k* = 8) as the second factor, and animus (*k* = 8) as the third. In addition, items 5, 9, 19, 20, and 25 were discarded.

Using FACTOR, I conducted a subsequent factor analysis on the remaining 26 items (Lorenzo-Seva & Ferrando, 2006). FACTOR offers Parallel Analysis, which is considered the best factor extraction method, and also provides estimates of scale reliability that correct for the variance overlooked by Cronbach's alpha (Horns, 1965; Matsunaga, 2010). Once again, the *KMO* and Bartlett's Test of multivariate normality were at acceptable levels (*KMO* = .86; X^2 = 2126.70, *df* = 325, *p* < .001). The program verified that three dimensions should be retained and indicated that the common explained variance among them was 50.67%. In addition, a Schmid-Leiman (1957) 2nd-Order factor analysis found no evidence of a superordinate factor (G). All loadings on the hypothesized higher-order factor G were simply those from the Animus scale, with no changes observed on the Distrust or Compromise scales, or the inter-factor correlations.

The composite reliability (rho, ρ) estimates for each scale were as follows: Distrust (ρ = .91),

Compromise (ρ = .86), and Animus (ρ = .87). See Table A-1 for item loadings.

Table A-1 Intergroup Compromise Inventory Loadings from FACTOR Parallel Analysis

Item	Distrust	Compromise	Animus
The other party can't be trusted to keep their end of a compromise.	.84		
I don't think the other party would compromise even if we tried.	.77		
The other party tends to have secret motives whenever they compromise.	.72		
The other party usually has no desire to compromise.	.70		
I can't trust the other party after everything they've done in the past.	.68		
The other party won't agree to a compromise without getting more than they deserve.	.67		
The other party tends to make decisions based on ideology and not on facts.	.59		
I worry that compromising with the other party will have unintended consequences.	.58		
The other party rarely considers ideas or policies that I believe in.	.57		
My party values cooperation more than the other party.	.40		
I'd prefer to compromise sometimes rather than only follow my party.		.77	
Compromising could lead to things that will enrich our country.		.66	
It is better to find compromise than to always agree with your party.		.65	
If the other party's solution is proven to be better for the country, we should help them.		.64	
It's more important to do what's best for society than to follow my party.		.62	
We should try and find middle-ground with the other party on issues where we can.		.57	
It's acceptable to compromise with the other party when we can't handle problems on our own.		.57	
I'd be proud if the media reported that both parties achieved their goals by compromising.		.52	
We should not help the other party, even when they do things we support.			.78
We should never compromise with the other party until they change their position on fundamental moral issues.			.69
Helping the other party is wrong, even if it does not harm my party's goals.			.68
We should resist compromise even when we agree with the other party.			.65
We should not support the other party's agenda, even			.64

when it supports our moral values.			
We should not give in to the other party, even when they are using our ideas.			.63
We should stand firm on our principles, even if it may hurt the country.			.50
We should follow our party's morals, even when it may do more harm for society than good.			.41

Using AMOS, I conducted a CFA to determine the degree to which the 3-factor ICI model fit the sample data, and to verify that the factor score weights for each item was more predictive of its latent factor than for the other two factors. Using the minimum likelihood estimator, all items were constrained to their factor, and the latent (unobserved) factors were allowed to be correlated. Criteria from my previous research (Osman, Freedenthal, Fang, Willis, Norizuki, & Gutierrez, 2011) were used for evaluations of model fit: Comparative fit index (CFI) and Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) > .9, and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) of .08 or less.

I began by assessing the degree to which the data met psychometric assumptions. None of my univariate kurtosis values exceeded 7 (values ranged between -.92, 6.92), indicating that my univariate data was normatively distributed. Moreover, a scale-level P-P plot to check homoscedasticity revealed no significant curve, indicating that the residuals were approximately normally distributed around a mean of zero (see Figure A-1). Mahalanobis distance indicated that 21 cases are potential influential outliers (Mahalanobis d^2 range = 38.99, 87.05 for those 21 cases) based on their distance from the multidimensional centroid. However, the studentized deleted residuals for the computed scales indicated that there were no distance multivariate outliers, as all values were below 3 (SDR range = -2.41, 2.36). In addition, there were no leverage multivariate outliers, as no cases exceeded a leverage value of .5. Finally, multicolinearity is not an issue, as the tolerance ($\geq$ .61) and variance inflation factor ($\leq$ 1.63) values meet their assumptions.

Figure A-2 displays the standardized estimates for each item in relation to its latent variable. Fit statistics for the hypothesized model indicated inadequate fit: $\chi^2(296) = 638.26$, *p* < .001. At the same time, incremental fit statistics indicated slightly more satisfactory fit: CFI = .82,

TLI = .81, RMSEA = .08 (PCLOSE < .001; 90% CI= .07 - .09), and AIC = 74.83. The discrepancy

could be due to the sample size, as large samples tend to inflate the chi-statistic. Thus, I

assessed the Normed chi-square, which attempts to correct for sample size by comparing the

ratio of the chi-statistic and degrees of freedom (with preferred values between 2 and 5), and

found adequate fit for the hypothesized model $\chi^2/296 = 2.16$. Each item's factor score weight

was greater in magnitude for its predicted factor than for the other two. In addition, none of the

latent variable intercorrelations exceeded desirable levels (i.e., r of .7). Finally, I ran a multigroup

structural equation analysis to determine if the model was invariant between Democrats and

Republicans. A chi-square difference test found invariance between the models ($\chi^2 = 32.99$;

critical value of 35.17 needed for significance), indicating that the ICI functions similarly for those

on the left and right sides of the political spectrum.

       I proceeded to assess the criterion-related validity of the ICI scales. Note that for these

analyses the variable representing the discrepancy between Democrats' and Republicans'

negotiation outcomes was transformed to be positive-definite. Thus, it provided the discrepancy

without indicating which political party won the negotiation. For dyads in the compromise

condition, a pair of regression analyses found that Republicans' animus scores predicted higher

discrepancies in negotiation outcomes (with Democrats' outcomes being higher, albeit not

significantly) between parties, $b = .77$, $se = .35$, $t(22) = 2.24$, $p = .04$, and Democrats' animus

scores predicted lower joint outcomes, $b = -.98$, $se = .35$, $t(21) = -2.80$, $p = .01$. For dyads in the

partisanship condition, Republicans' animus scores predicted lower negotiation outcomes for their

Democratic opponents, $b = -.52$, $se = .25$, $t(24) = -2.10$, $p = .046$. The other two scales were not

significant predictors of negotiation outcomes.

       I then assessed the degree to which the scales predicted the proposal variable, which

has been a key criterion throughout the ICI's development (Willis & DeNobrega, 2013). A

multiple regression analysis with distrust, compromise, animus, and the Big-5 Trait

agreeableness found that distrust was the only significant predictor, $b = -.06$, $se = .02$, $p < .001$,

$sr^2 = 9.42$, in a significant model predicting proposal, $F(4, 122) = 5.68$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = 12.9\%$.

Next, I used respondents' political affiliation as criterion-related validity for the ICI. On a conceptual level, one would expect independents to score higher on the compromise factor and lower on the distrust and animus factors than partisans from either major party. As expected, a univariate analysis of variance found higher Compromise scores for Independents ($M = 40.87$, $SE = .68$) than for Democrats ($M = 39.93$, $SE = .96$) or Republicans ($M = 37.76$, $SE = .88$), $F(2, 169) = 3.98$, $p = .02$, $\eta_p^2 = 4.5\%$. A subsequent univariate ANOVA found lower Animus scores for Independents ($M = 13.76$, $SE = .63$) than for Democrats ($M = 14.21$, $SE = .92$) or Republicans ($M = 17.15$, $SE = .82$), $F(2, 165) = 5.70$, $p = .004$, $\eta_p^2 = 6.5\%$. No differences were found for the Distrust scale.

Finally, I assessed whether or not joint outcomes differed between dyads where both, one or neither dyad member scored low on the animus subscale and high on the compromise subscale. I used median splits on the two subscales to classify individual dyad members as low-high, low-low, high-low, and high-high.

A univariate ANOVA revealed there were no differences in joint outcomes between dyads with at least one low-high individual compared to those with none. I then conducted a univariate ANOVA focused on individual dyad members. The analysis revealed a marginally significant effect for Republicans, indicating that joint outcomes were marginally higher in dyads where the Republican was low-high ($M = 47.87$) compared to other classifications ($M = 42.47$), $F(1, 43) = 3.91$, $p = .055$. There were no results (not even marginal trends) for Democrats based on the low-high classification, and no results for the high animus-low compromise condition. Consistent with the aforementioned findings for dyadic composition, Republicans' degree of partisanship had a greater influence on negotiation outcomes than Democrats'. Additional research with a larger sample of compromise-disposed Republicans will be necessary to gain a clearer understanding of these findings. Still, these preliminary findings suggest that one way for the members of both parties to achieve better joint legislative outcomes is for the voters to elect more compromise-minded Republicans to office.

Figure A-1 Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residuals.

Figure A-2 Path Diagram of ICI Standardized Estimates from CFA in AMOS.

Appendix B

Experimental Packet

What is your current age (in years)? _____

What is your biological sex? ○ Male   Female ○

What is your sexual orientation?   Heterosexual   Gay/Lesbian   Bisexual
                                               ○   ○   ○
What is your race/ethnicity?

Caucasian ○   Black ○   Latino(a) ○   Asian ○   Bi/Multiracial ○

Other (or Decline to Answer):_____

Your political orientation?

Tea Party Movement ○ Conservative Republican ○   Right-Leaning Independent ○

Occupy Movement ○   Progressive Democrat ○   Left-Leaning Independent ○

Libertarian ○   Other (or Decline to Answer):_____

Please indicate the current marital status of your parents. (Check the one that best applies)

Married ○   Cohabitating ○   Divorced ○

Never Married ○   Remarried ○   Separated ○

Other (or Decline to Answer): _____

Are you officially dating someone (have a girlfriend/boyfriend), in a civil union, or married?

Yes ○ No ○ Other (or Decline to Answer): _____

What is the biological sex of your current (or most recent) lover? Male ○   Female ○

Are you the same race as your current (or most recent) lover? ○Same-race   ○ Different-Race

Do you and your lover support the same political party? Same ○   Different ○

What are your views on abortion?

Pro-Life ○   It should only be legal in cases of rape/incest ○   Pro-Choice ○

Other (or Decline to Answer):_____

What are your views on same-sex marriage?

Neither ○   Support Civil Unions ○   Support Marriage ○

Other (or Decline to Answer):_____

What are your views on families with an undocumented parent & American born child?

Neither ○   Deport the undocumented parent ○   Keep the family together ○

Other (or Decline to Answer): _____

What is your mother's level of education? _____

What is your father's level of education? _____

Do you and your parents have similar political attitudes? Mostly the Same ○ Mostly Different ○

In which of the following ranges is your family's annual income?

○   Less than $30,000

○ $30,000 to $50,000

○ $50,000 to $100,000

○   More than $100,000

Don't know (or Decline to Answer): _____

What year are you in?

Freshman ○   Sophomore ○   Junior ○   Senior ○

Don't know (or Decline to Answer): _____

What is your major? _____

What is your religious affiliation? _____

If the 2016 election were held today, who would you vote for?

Hillary Clinton (or another Democrat) ○   Rand Paul (or another Republican) ○

Please use the scales below to indicate the degree to which the following statements describe you

[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Strongly disagree					Strongly agree

_____1. Sex education should be taught in schools instead of abstinence-only.

_____2. I support most parts of President Obama's health care reform law.

_____3. I support groups that are fighting for gun control legislation.

_____4. The death penalty is not an effective deterrent to violent crime.

_____5. Evolution should be taught in schools instead of intelligent design or creationism.

_____6. I agree with environmentalist groups that climate change is a serious issue.

_____7. America's 11 million undocumented immigrants deserve a pathway to citizenship.

_____8. I support feminist groups advocating for pay equity in the workplace.

_____9. Congress should increase taxes on the rich to help minority groups in society.

_____10. I support gay and lesbian groups advocating for same-sex marriage.

_____11. Religious institutions should be exempt from the ObamaCare birth control mandate.

_____12. Sex education and evolution should be taught at home by parents, not in public schools.

_____13. The government should adopt a stricter immigration policy for undocumented groups.

_____14. Some crimes are so despicable, they should be punishable by death.

_____15. Gun control violates people's constitutional right to bear arms.

_____16. Congress should not increase taxes; rather, they should decrease spending.

_____17. Environmentalists should worry less about the climate and more about people's jobs.

_____18. Homosexuals should not be allowed to marry.

_____19. It is fair if women are paid less to compensate for paid maternity leave & child care.

_____20. I support the deferred action (DACA) program which has allowed some undocumented youth to live without fearing deportation only.

Please rate the extent to which you believe your party should compromise with members of the other party.

[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Strongly disagree					Strongly agree

_____1. Helping the other party is wrong, even if it does not harm my party's goals.

_____2. We should follow our party's morals, even when it may do more harm for society than good.

_____3. It's more important to do what's best for society than to follow my party.

_____4. If the other party's solution is proven to be better for the country, we should help them.

_____5. Being firm in your beliefs is more important than finding middle-ground.

_____6. We should try and find middle-ground with the other party on issues where we can.

_____7. We should stand firm on our principles, even if it may hurt the country.

_____8. I'd prefer to compromise sometimes rather than only follow my party.

_____9. Protecting our values is more important than helping any particular group in society.

_____10. It is better to find compromise than to always agree with your party.

_____11. The other party usually has no desire to compromise.

_____12. I'd be proud if the media reported that both parties achieved their goals by compromising.

_____13. It's acceptable to compromise with the other party when we can't handle problems on our own.

_____14. We should resist compromise even when we agree with the other party.

_____15. I don't think the other party would compromise even if we tried.

_____16. The other party can't be trusted to keep their end of a compromise.

_____17. I can't trust the other party after everything they've done in the past.

_____18. I worry that compromising with the other party will have unintended consequences.

_____19. If we help the other party, our lives will change for the worse.

_____20. The more we compromise with the other party the more we'll lose our values.

_____21. Compromising could lead to things that will enrich our country.

_____22. The other party tends to have secret motives whenever they compromise.

_____23. The other party won't agree to a compromise without getting more than they deserve.

_____24. We should never compromise with the other party until they change their position on fundamental moral issues.

_____25. Preserving our moral values is more important than helping any particular group in our country.

_____26. We should not help the other party, even when they do things we support.

_____27. We should not help the other party's agenda, even when it supports our moral values.

_____28. The other party rarely considers ideas or policies that I believe in.

_____29. The other party tends to make decisions based on ideology and not on facts.

_____30. My party values cooperation more than the other party.

_____31. We should not give in to the other party, even when they are using our ideas.

I see myself as someone who…

_____32. Tends to find fault with others

_____33. Is helpful and unselfish with others

_____34. Starts quarrels with others

_____35. Has a forgiving nature

_____36. Is generally trusting

_____37. Is cold and aloof

_____38. Is considerate and kind to almost everyone

_____39. Is sometimes rude to others

_____40. Likes to cooperate with others

While debating how to improve America's economic recovery, each major party (Democratic and Republican) presents 15 policies for a final bill. Of the 30 total proposals, how many would you accept from each side?

10	11	12	13	14	15	My Party
1	4	7	10	13	15	The Other Party
O	O	O	O	O	O	

If my daughter/son married someone from the other political party I would feel:

O   Pleased

O   Indifferent/wouldn't matter

O   Would prefer they married someone with my beliefs/values

In his 2013 State of the Union speech, President Obama said that the 1975 Public Affairs Act should be repealed. Do you agree or disagree?

O   Agree   Disagree   O   Not Sure   O

Who has the final responsibility to decide if a law is Constitutional or not?

President O   Congress O   The Supreme Court O

Which party has the most members in the U.S. Senate? Democrats O   Republicans O

Who is the current Secretary of State?

Kathleen Sebelius O   John Kerry O   Susan Rice O   John Roberts O

How much of the time do you trust the government in Washington?

Most of the time O   Sometimes / Depends on the Agency O   Almost Never O

<u>Instructions read to both participants</u>

Welcome to today's experiment. In this experiment you will be playing the role of a United States legislator in the House of Representatives. You were elected during the 2012 General Election and you are now seeking re-election in the 2014 Midterm Elections. Your task will be to negotiate and reach agreements on several political issues with an elected Representative from the other political party. For each issue you reach an agreement on, you will receive points on your compromise scorecard, a metric used to measure the extent to which lawmakers make deals across party lines.

You are not allowed to exchange scorecards or share the points available to either of you on any particular issue. You must reach agreements by discussing how you feel about each issue and what you are willing to negotiate on. Both of you must agree on a decision in order for it to take effect. When you have reached an agreement on an issue, please write down the number of points you have gained (or loss) before moving on to the next issue. You may use the calculator to keep track of your total number of points. Do not share how many points you have earned. The negotiation task will last for a total of 20 minutes.

In a moment you will begin working on the practice sheet to understand how the point system works, and you are encouraged to ask any questions you have during this practice session. Once you are both comfortable with how the scoring works, I will leave the room and you will begin the negotiation task. If you have a question I will be in the 4th floor stairwell, right outside the door. This means that I will not be present during the negotiation and will not be able to hear you, but I will be less than 5 yards away if you have a question or if you finish the negotiation task in less than 20 minutes.

Negotiation Instructions Given to Democratic Participants

What your voters want: You are already leading in the polls and all your voters really want you to do is <u>stay true to your principles</u>. Your voters are not necessarily concerned with your compromise scorecard, and you will lose points if you compromise too much on the core principles that your Democratic voters care about.

No action: If for any issue the representative from the other party says "no action," you may try to persuade them to choose another option, but you are not allowed to select any option unless you both agree to it. If you both disagree on selecting "no action," then you may skip the issue altogether and move on to the next issue. No points will be awarded (or taken away) if you reach a deadlock and have to skip an issue.

Please answer the following questions

1. My role is a _____ (Republican/Democratic) Representative.

2. My voters want me to stay true to my principles. (True/False)

3. Have you ever debated politics with the person sitting across from you? (Yes/No)

4. Are you friends with the person sitting across from you? (Yes/No)

Negotiation Instructions Given to Republican Participants

What your voters want: Your voters want you to <u>compromise with the person from the</u> <u>Democratic party</u> and get things done, even on tough issues like gun control and immigration.

No action: If for any issue the representative from the other party says "no action," you may try to persuade them to choose another option, but you are not allowed to select any option unless you both agree to it. If you both disagree on selecting "no action," then you may skip the issue altogether and move on to the next issue. No points will be awarded (or taken away) if you reach a deadlock and have to skip an issue.

Please answer the following questions

1. My role is a _____ (Republican/Democratic) Representative.

2. My voters want me to compromise with the other party. (True/False)

3. Have you ever debated politics with the person sitting across from you? (Yes/No)

4. Are you friends with the person sitting across from you? (Yes/No)

Negotiation Instructions Given to Republican Participants

What your voters want: You are already leading in the polls and all your voters really want you to do is <u>stay true to your principles</u>. Your voters are not necessarily concerned with your compromise scorecard, and you will lose points if you compromise too much on the core principles that your Republican voters care about.

No action: If for any issue the representative from the other party says "no action," you may try to persuade them to choose another option, but you are not allowed to select any option unless you both agree to it. If you both disagree on selecting "no action," then you may skip the issue altogether and move on to the next issue. No points will be awarded (or taken away) if you reach a deadlock and have to skip an issue.

Please answer the following questions

1. My role is a _____ (Republican/Democratic) Representative.

2. My voters want me to stay true to my principles. (True/False)

3. Have you ever debated politics with the person sitting across from you? (Yes/No)

4. Are you friends with the person sitting across from you? (Yes/No)

Negotiation Instructions Given to Democratic Participants

What your voters want: Your voters want you to <u>compromise with the person from the</u>

<u>Republican party</u> and get things done, even on tough issues like ObamaCare and Voter ID laws.

No action: If for any issue the representative from the other party says "no action," you may try to

persuade them to choose another option, but you are not allowed to select any option unless you

both agree to it. If you both disagree on selecting "no action," then you may skip the issue

altogether and move on to the next issue. No points will be awarded (or taken away) if you reach

a deadlock and have to skip an issue.

Please answer the following questions

1. My role is a _____ (Republican/Democratic) Representative.

2. My voters want me to compromise with the other party. (True/False)

3. Have you ever debated politics with the person sitting across from you?

   (Yes/No)

4. Are you friends with the person sitting across from you? (Yes/No)

[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Strongly					Strongly
disagree					agree

1. During the negotiation task, I tried to reach agreements even if it meant agreeing to something I personally disagree with. _____

2. I tried to negotiate solutions that would be in everyone's interest. _____

3. The other person tried to impose their will on me. _____

4. During the negotiation task the other person was honest with me. _____

5. I felt like the other person trusted me. _____

6. Despite our different opinions, the atmosphere was constructive. _____

7. I felt comfortable expressing myself. _____

8. The other person listened to me. _____

9. Our interaction was sociable. _____

10. I am satisfied with the agreements we made. _____

[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Not comfortable					Very
at all					comfortable

11. How comfortable did you feel during the interaction?

12. How comfortable do you think the other person felt during the interaction?

13. Were you suspicious of any hidden audio recorders in the room? _____

14. Were you suspicious of any hidden cameras in the room? _____

15. What do you think the political orientation of the experimenter is? _____

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR Jarryd Willis, Psychology, Jarryd.Willis@mavs.uta.edu

FACULTY ADVISOR: Dr. William Ickes, Psychology, Ickes@uta.edu

TITLE OF PROJECT: An Investigation of Compromise across Political Parties

INTRODUCTION
You are being asked to participate in a political psychology experiment. This form provides you with information about the study. The Principal Investigator or his/her representative will provide you with any additional information that may be needed and answer any questions you may have. Read the information below and ask questions about anything you do not understand before you decide whether or not to take part. Your participation is entirely voluntary, and you can refuse to participate or withdraw at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

PURPOSE
There has been very little research on negotiation strategies between political parties despite the pressing need for more cooperation between Democrats and Republicans in Washington, D.C. In this experiment, we are interested in the strategies you use while negotiating with someone from the opposing political party, and how much the two of you are able to agree on.

DURATION
It will take you approximately 15 minutes to complete the questionnaire and 20 minutes to complete the negotiation task. The pre-negotiation practice session will last 10 minutes. The post-negotiation questionnaire should take 1-2 minutes. You are free to ask questions at any time.

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS
200 individuals will be participating in this study.

PROCEDURES
Please do not put your name, Maverick ID, or any identifying information on the questionnaires; it is completely anonymous. All your responses are confidential.
If you consent to participate in the study, you will be given a questionnaire packet with various political surveys as well as non-political questions (e.g., demographic information). After completing the questionnaire, you will begin the negotiation task in which you will be negotiating with someone from the opposing political party. You will negotiate over four issues and will have 20 minutes to reach compromise agreements. Once this task is complete, you will complete the post-negotiation survey and will then be debriefed by the primary investigator.

POSSIBLE BENEFITS
While there is no direct benefit to participants, the benefit to political psychology will be a greater understanding of the strategies political partisans use to accept or reject compromises with individuals from the opposing political party. The successful validation of the measures in this experiment would provide political science with a valid method to assess individuals' willingness (or lack thereof) to compromise with people in the opposing political party.

POSSIBLE RISKS/DISCOMFORTS
There are no perceived risks to your health for participating in this research study. Please be aware that the other person in this experiment is a member of the opposite political party. This may make the negotiation task challenging but you do not have to discuss any issue you're not comfortable having a debate about. Should you experience any serious discomfort please inform the researcher. You have the right to quit the study at any time at no consequence.

COMPENSATION
You will be granted 1.5 credit hours towards your research participation requirement.

ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES
You have the option to participate in other research studies or complete alternative class assignments in order to fulfill your course research requirements.

VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION
Participation in this research study is voluntary and you are free to withdraw consent and to discontinue participation at any time without penalty. Should you choose not to complete all study procedures, you will still receive 1.5 hours towards your research requirement.

CONFIDENTIALITY
Materials will be kept in filing cabinets in a locked office. A copy of this signed consent form and all data from this study will be stored in Life Sciences 506 for at least three (3) years after the end of this research. Your research records will not be released without your consent unless required by law or a court order. The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, the UTA Institutional Review Board (IRB), and personnel particular to this research have access to the study records, but the confidentiality of your records will be protected to the extent permitted by law. The data resulting from your participation may be used in publications, presentations, or future studies, but your identity will not be disclosed or linked to you. To ensure anonymity, do not put your name or any identifiers anywhere on your experimental packet. The IRB at UTA has reviewed and approved this study and the information within this consent form. If in the unlikely event it becomes necessary for the IRB to review your research records, UTA will protect the confidentiality of those records to the extent permitted by law.

CONTACT FOR QUESTIONS
Questions about this research study may be directed to Jarryd.Willis@mavs.uta.edu or Dr. William Ickes at Ickes@uta.edu. Any questions about your rights as a research participant or a research-related injury may be directed to the Office of Research Administration; Regulatory Services at 817-272-3723 or regulatoryservices@uta.edu.

As a representative of this study, I have explained the purpose, the procedures, the benefits, and the risks that are involved in this research study:

Signature and printed name of principal investigator or person obtaining consent Date

CONSENT
By signing below, you confirm that you are 18 years of age or older and have read or had this document read to you. You have been informed about this study's purpose, procedures, possible benefits and risks, and you have received a copy of this form. You have been given the opportunity to ask questions before you sign, and you have been told that you can ask other questions at any time.

You voluntarily agree to participate in this study. By signing this form, you are not waiving any of your legal rights. Refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits, to which you are otherwise entitled.

SIGNATURE OF VOLUNTEER   **DATE**

The University of Texas
ARLINGTON™

PHOTOGRAPHIC CONSENT AND RELEASE FORM

I understand that I was audio-recorded during the negotiation task of the experiment.

I hereby release the audio-recording and authorize The University of Texas at Arlington, with the understanding that the recording will be used for data analysis purposes only and that my anonymity as a participant will be preserved.

I understand that my name or likeness will not be linked with this recording.

I release the University and those acting pursuant to its authority from liability for any violation of any personal or proprietary right I may have in connection with such use. I understand that all such recordings, in whatever medium, shall remain the property of the University. I have read and fully understand the terms of this release

Name: _____

Signature: _____ Date: _____

I do not wish to release the audio-recording. I would like the audio-recording to be erased.

Name: _____

Signature: _____ Date: _____

Debriefing Form

Thank you for your participation in this experiment. By playing an incumbent Representative seeking re-election with hypothetical voters, you just experienced (for 20 minutes) what many politicians deal with on a daily basis. Any frustration you felt while negotiating with the participant from the other party likely pales in comparison to the vitriolic rhetoric that we see between leaders of the two parties in Washington, D.C. Political scientists are seeking answers to the undeniable increase in polarization over the last few decades.

The primary purpose of this experiment was to determine if Democrats and Republicans can be incentivized to compromise with one another. This experiment was modeled after the successful 2013 budget negotiation between Representative Paul Ryan and Senator Patty Murray.

You were audio recorded as a part of this experiment. The verbal recording will allow analysis of the strategies you used to reach agreements (or fail to) during the negotiation task, and may lead to a better understanding of the interactive structure underlying successful and unsuccessful negotiations between opposing parties. The audio recorder had to be hidden so that the knowledge of it did not affect your negotiation styles in a way that made them artificial and less organic. Your identity will remain unknown and protected.

A final point of interest in this experiment was to develop a scale to assess intergroup compromise between political parties. If validated in a naturalistic setting, it would be provide political scientists a measure to assess individuals' willingness to compromise across party lines.

You have been fully informed of all study procedures and have the right to retract your consent to participate or to decline to allow your recording to be used for research purposes.

If you are interested in more information regarding how political ideology and polarization, I encourage you to see the following:

The History of Polarization in the U.S. Congress (1788-2012): http://xkcd.com/1127/large/

Political Polarization: http://voteview.com/political_polarization.asp

Your participation will provide valuable information for political and social psychology. We are very grateful for your help! Your individual data will not be released, but if you would like information regarding group results we will be happy to share that information with you once the data have been analyzed. For any questions you may have about the study, please contact Jarryd Willis at The University of Texas at Arlington at (Jarryd.Willis@mavs.uta.edu).

If you encountered any problems during the study or have any concerns about ethical issues related to it, please contact the Office of Research Administration; Regulatory Services at regulatoryservices@uta.edu or 817-272-3723.

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Jarryd T. Willis was born and raised in Dallas, Texas, grew up in Austin, completed his Bachelors and Masters degrees in Psychology from the University of Texas at San Antonio, and returned to Dallas for his doctoral training at the University of Texas at Arlington. His research interests over that time include attachment theory, psychometrics, and romantic relationships and bullying among LGBT.

Political Psychology is his primary career interest and the focus of his current research. He is particularly interested in the demographic differences between political parties, their moral motivations, and in promoting a healthier, more constructive discourse to ensure that the 21st century is another American century.