Transatlantic History: Locating and Naming an Emergent Field of Study

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What is transatlantic history, and why do we need it? After all, we are currently neck-deep in the “transnational turn” within the humanities, while the established and overlapping fields of Atlantic, world, and global history all deal with subject matter relating to “the interconnectedness of human experience and cross-cultural encounters of Europe, Africa, and the Americas (North and South) from 1500 to the present” (to quote Traversea’s own definition of transatlantic history). Does adding yet another historiographical field benefit or simply confuse our understanding of the past? I suggest that transatlantic history is not only an immensely fruitful and illuminating framework, but that it already exists as burgeoning field of scholarship, albeit one that is generally unacknowledged as such – even by many of its practitioners. My goal in this article is therefore to outline the contours of transatlantic history and to identify just some of the many extant works that fit within its parameters.

Both transatlantic history and the much more widely recognized field of Atlantic history share common origins and characteristics. As a self-conscious field of historical research, Atlantic history can be traced to the decade following the end of the Second World War in 1945 and the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, as a quest for the historical origins of the postwar “Atlantic community” or “Atlantic civilization.” However, one of the great ironies of Atlantic history is that the very events that focused twentieth-century historians’ attention on the interconnectedness of the early modern Atlantic – two global wars and the western Cold War alliance – were deemed by most of those same historians to fall outside of the chronological framework of the field. The “Atlantic world” (or in many cases, “worlds”) with which the overwhelming majority of Atlantic scholarship is concerned resides solely within the period from 1492 until roughly 1800 or 1820, though many of these studies end anywhere between 1774, with the onset of the age of “national” revolutions, and 1888, with the final abolition of slavery in the Western Hemisphere. The subsequent modern era, it is implied (though rarely stated), was defined by the hegemony of nation-states and the expansion of imperial and capitalist

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integration, and therefore belongs to the realm of national and world history.\textsuperscript{2} A few histories of the early modern Atlantic, however, extend all the way to 1900, 1920, or even 1927.\textsuperscript{3}

But the end of the early modern era also marked the beginning of a century of steam-powered transatlantic travel and the laying of the transatlantic telegraph and telephone lines, which together dwarfed the earlier epoch’s traffic of migrants, goods, and information across the Atlantic. It is true, as many Atlantic historians suggest, that this age of industrialization and “proletarian mass migrations”\textsuperscript{4} gave rise to a very different system of political, economic, and social connections between Africa, Europe, and the Americas than had characterized the early modern Atlantic. But this new world was, arguably, no less centered on the Atlantic than its predecessor. At the very least, the Atlantic continued to function as the primary conduit for many goods, migrant groups, and ideas.

A few Atlantic historians explicitly concede this point. In one fairly early survey of the field, Michael Jiménez and Marcus Rediker argue that “the Americas, Africa, and Europe have composed a ‘regional system’ from the late fifteenth century to the present,” and “the ‘modern’ era remains a crucial, and growing arena for Atlantic History.”\textsuperscript{5} Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan likewise propose that the existing terminus point of Atlantic history is completely arbitrary, and “[w]herever the Atlantic remains a vital, even a privileged arena of exchange among the four continents surrounding it, Atlantic history can still be a useful tool of analysis.”\textsuperscript{6} Nevertheless, very few self-identified works of Atlantic history actually extend up through the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{7}

The most coherent argument in favor of writing the history of “A Long Atlantic in a Wider World” comes from migration historian Donna Gabaccia’s contribution to the inaugural issue of the journal Atlantic Studies. Gabaccia contends that, although the early modern Atlantic characterized by European imperialism and African slavery did come to an end in the early nineteenth century, “the very changes that undermined the earlier Atlantic ‘world’ were creating a new Atlantic, with a new geography, and place in the world.” This formation was characterized by a new, industrial “Atlantic economy,” mass transatlantic migrations, intellectual and political

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\textsuperscript{4} This oft-used term was coined by Imre Ferenczi, “Proletarian Mass Migrations, 19th and 20th Centuries,” in International Migrations, vol. 1, ed. Walter F. Wilcox (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929), 81-85.

\textsuperscript{5} Michael Jiménez and Marcus Rediker, “What is Atlantic History,” CPAS Newsletter: The University of Tokyo Center for Pacific and Asian Studies (October 2001), available online at http://www.marcusrediker.com/Articles/what_is_atlantic_history.htm.

\textsuperscript{6} Greene and Morgan, “Introduction,” 21.

exchanges, and pan-African and anti-colonial struggles. While some of these elements did not survive the First World War and Great Depression, the onset of the so-called “American Century” and the creation of the Cold War “Atlantic Community” ushered in a new phase of Atlantic-centered connections. In other words, even though what J. R. McNeill suggestively called “the old Atlantic world” came to an end, it remains analytically valid to, in Karen Kupperman’s words, “think Atlantically” even when studying the late nineteenth and twentieth century. In fact, Mary Nolan’s recent book has rechristened the entire period from 1890 to 2010 The Transatlantic Century, and offers a further refined periodization of waxing and waning (northern) Atlantic connections.

The subtle distinction between “Atlantic” and “transatlantic” is, however, important and useful. Hundreds of works of “Atlantic history” now exist, and all but a few focus on the early modern period or, to coin a term, the “first” Atlantic world. It seems unreasonable, at this late date, to retroactively redefine Atlantic history to include the subsequent “second” and “third” Atlantic worlds – and perhaps even a fourth, contemporary one, observable in phenomena such as the interlinked mass protest movements against neoliberal economic entities like the World Trade Organization, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund that began in the 1990s, and the spread of the Occupy movement, in its many forms, throughout Europe and the Mediterranean following the occupation of Zuccotti Park in September 2011. What I propose, therefore, is that we conceive of Atlantic history and transatlantic history as historiographical units of two different scales: Atlantic history, retaining its conventional temporal framework, encompasses studies of only the “first,” early modern Atlantic world, whereas transatlantic history embraces both the early modern period and all successive “Atlantic worlds” and transatlantic connections. Put another way, just as Atlantic history is often defined as a subfield or specialization of transnational or world history, it can also be regarded as a particular subcategory of the field of transatlantic history, which has no chronological end point.

Of course, transatlantic history has no claim to universality. As is the case with any choice of analytical framework and unit of analysis, adopting a transatlantic perspective has what Peter A. Coclanis calls “opportunity costs”: you risk excluding or ignoring relevant data that do not fit neatly within your chosen schema. But, as Greene and Morgan point out, “a web of connections outside of the Atlantic world always existed…Nevertheless, there was an intensity of interaction and activity within the Atlantic world that still merits focused attention.” Accordingly, a transatlantic framework only makes sense for topics characterized by “an intensity of interaction and activity” centered on or across the Atlantic Ocean.

In one of the few attempts to define the field, Steven Reinhardt and Dennis Reinhartz contend that “[t]ransatlantic history is a field of study defined primarily by its conceptual approach, which

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10 Amory Starr, Naming the Enemy: Anti-Corporate Social Movements Confront Globalization (London: Zed Books, 2001); Donatella della Porta, Massimiliano Andretta, Lorenzo Mosca, and Herbert Reiter, ed., Globalization from Below: Transnational Activists and Protest Networks (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006); Manuel Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age (Stafford BC: Polity, 2012); Marina Sitrin and Dario Azzellini, They Can’t Represent Us!: Reinventing Democracy from Greece to Occupy (Brooklyn: Verso, forthcoming 2014).
focuses on the interconnectedness of human experience over the centuries in the Atlantic Basin. It is problem oriented and dedicated to analyzing the dynamic process of encounter and interchange among the peoples on all sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Moreover, transatlantic history is inherently interdisciplinary, transnational, and comparative in approach.”

It thus utilizes a highly flexible range of methodologies, suited for analyzing macro- and micro-level phenomena.

Peter Krüger further argues that transatlantic history should be viewed as a major category of transnational history, as “it is doubtful...that national history may be transcended at random;” rather, “a cautious scrutiny of relevant areas with important transnational linkages, thus concentrating on the transatlantic realm, may prove useful...‘[T]ransatlantic’ may be seen as only a specification, although arguably one of prime priority, of ‘transnational.’”

Here we must pause to address the potential tension that comes with including early modern Atlantic history under the rubric of transnationalism; according to some historians, we cannot speak of the “transnational” before the emergence of the modern nation-state. Ian Tyrrell, for instance, argues that transnational history “concerns the period since the emergence of nation-states as important phenomena in world history” in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. However, Tyrrell is in a distinct minority on this point. Of the six major scholars involved in The American Historical Review’s much-cited 2006 “conversation” on transnational history, only Chris Bayly expresses discomfort with the term “transnational” because “before 1850, large parts of the globe were not dominated by nations so much as by empires, city-states, diasporas, etc.” Sven Beckert, however, argues that transnational history is “an approach to history that focuses on a whole range of connections that transcend politically bounded territories” – not just nation states – “and connect various parts of the world to one another.” By the midpoint of this exchange, Bayly declares himself a “convert” to the view that “transnational” is an appropriate term for describing the early modern Atlantic. The monumental Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History edited by Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier, although confined to the period “from the mid-19th century to the present day,” defines transnational history as dealing with the “links and flows” of the “people, ideas, products, processes and patterns that operate over, across, through, beyond, above, under, or in-between polities and societies,” not just nation-states. Additionally, Atlantic

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12 Steven G. Reinhardt and Dennis Reinhartz, ed., Transatlantic History (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2006), ix.
historians like David Armitage, Marcus Rediker, Jack P. Greene, and Philip D. Morgan all use the term “transnational” to describe border crossings of the early modern era.18

But how can the “transnational” precede the “national”? Scholars in other disciplines have been much more attentive to this question than historians. German sociologist Thomas Faist insists that the term ‘trans-state’ makes more sense when describing ties that crisscross the borders of sovereign states,” because even today “there exist not only nation-states constituted by a single nation but also multinational states such as India, Belgium, Canada and, perhaps, Switzerland.” “However,” he concedes, “this use of terminology is likely to create confusion because established terms then acquire a new and different meaning...Therefore, while it is important to avoid confusing ‘state’ and ‘nation’ it may suffice to point out the dilemma and continue using the established terms.”19 Political scientist Jonathan Fox, in turn, notes that “transnational” is typically defined “in common sense terms as ‘cross-border’ (and therefore, technically, ‘trans-state’),” and his German colleague Rainer Baubök suggests, “[t]he problem here is that in most uses of the term, the political unit that is transcended by institutions, actions, discourses or flows is not the nation, but the state. It is certainly very common to regard nation and state as synonyms, but this stance reflects...a statist bias that privileges claims to nationhood by entities established as sovereign states over those of stateless minorities and national minorities, and it ignores the nested constellations of pluri-national democracies...If we wanted to avoid this implication, we could use the term ‘trans-state’ rather than ‘trans-national’. This solution would create some additional confusion, however.”20 In other words, as historian Philip L. White observes, “[f]or many, perhaps most people in the academic world, ‘nation state’ appears to have become a synonym for ‘sovereign government.’” This is clear in many other usages of the term “national,” as well. For instance, scholars speak of international trade, international relations, national borders, gross national product, and even “national history” in myriad instances where there is no proper “nation state.”

The substitution of “nation” for “state” is of course problematic, not only due to the chronological confusion it creates, but also because it naturalizes and universalizes the “myth of the ‘nation state,’” an entity originally conceived of as a geographically bounded political unit encompassing and representing a single (imagined) ethnically and culturally cohesive “nation.” The problem here is twofold: first, it is likely that no perfectly demarcated nation-state has ever existed, especially given the fact of human migration; second, as Faist and Baubök point out, numerous imperial, multinational, and other non-“national” states have existed and continue to exist. Philip L. White notes that, by some calculations, less than ten percent of member countries of the United Nations could be considered “nation-states” in the literal, “ethnic” sense, and if every “nation” had its own state the number of countries in the world would increase at least tenfold. In

other words, if transnationalism applies only to genuine nation-states, it cannot be applied to most contemporary cross-border phenomena, let alone those of centuries past. But, as many of the scholars mentioned here note, the terminology of “transnationalism” is too deeply ingrained to change. Therefore, White argues, “‘Nation’ ought to be construed again to mean not an ethnic group, but a sovereign government, as it did – and does – in the United Nations.” This would, for the most part, eliminate the ambiguities of the term “transnational” and its application to both the modern and early modern eras.

Yet if transatlantic history is a category of transnational history, it is equally a category of world or global history. According to William H. McNeill, it is “part of a much larger phenomenon, inasmuch as other bodies of navigable water also transmitted powerful and transformative influences to the peoples along their shores and have done so form early prehistoric times.” This does not mean that the Atlantic must be studied within the context of the entire globe, but rather that the “Atlantic world” is one “world” (i.e. one densely interconnected macro-region) among many that world historians may use as their unit of analysis. Alison Games’ description of Atlantic history is pertinent here: “Atlantic history is…a slice of world history. It is a way of looking at global and regional processes within a contained unit, although that region was not, of course, hermetically sealed off from the rest of the world, and thus was simultaneously involved in transformations unique to the Atlantic and those derived from global processes.”

However, we are still left with the question of whether or not there actually exists a body of scholarship that can be accurately labeled transatlantic. Surprisingly, both the terminology and the temporal framework of transatlantic history are at least as old as “Atlantic history.” In 1949 Norwegian historian, politician, and unorthodox Marxist Halvdan Koht published his celebratory The American Spirit in Europe: A Survey of Transatlantic Influences, which traced America’s intellectual, economic, and technological impact on Europe from the colonial era through its ascension to “leadership of Western Civilization” in the twentieth century. It also, incidentally, anticipated by a decade R. R. Palmer’s argument that the American Revolution precipitated the European “Age of Revolutions.” Koht’s book was more prophetic than influential, however. Whereas Atlantic histories began to multiply in the following decades, transatlantic histories did not – except in West Germany, where historians struggling to come to terms with their own recent past, and influenced by the United States’ prominent role in postwar West German politics and academia, turned to exploring the longstanding relationship between America and Germany under the rubric of “transatlantic history.”

The task of outlining the “Atlantic economy” (or “economies”) of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century fell largely to historians of American immigration like Frank Thistlewaite and

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Dirk Hoerder. These scholars critiqued historian’s failure to pierce the Atlantic “salt-water curtain” and investigate immigrants’ European origins, and recognized the Atlantic as an interconnected zone within which the process of industrialization and economic integration created both the dislocations that led to emigration and the demand for cheap workers that funneled migration streams to sites of expanding industrial and extractive labor.28 Historians like Hoerder, Rudolf J. Vecoli, Donna Gabaccia, Jose Moya, and Christiane Harzig subsequently transformed “immigration history” into the interdisciplinary field of migration history, which gives equal place to analysis of migrants’ sending societies as well as their receiving societies.29 Migration historians later adopted the vocabulary of “transnationalism” from anthropologists studying contemporary migrations, and placed what was initially touted as a novel characteristic of “post-modern” migrants in its proper historical context.30

In the 1990s, as “globalization” became an academic buzzword, historians also set out to historicize this phenomenon. Kevin H. O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson undertook one of the most important such efforts, in their 1999 book *Globalization and History*. Measuring economic “convergence” between industrialized countries, they found that the nineteenth-century “Atlantic economy” was the site of an earlier phase of economic “globalization” lasting from roughly 1850 to 1914 – thereby indirectly confirming the arguments of Thistlewaite and Hoerder – before it entered into a period of “deglobalization” that lasted until the end of the Second World War.31 Two other major works published in this decade established that the transatlantic convergences of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century extended far beyond economics: Paul Gilroy’s *The Black Atlantic* and Daniel T. Rodgers’ *Atlantic Crossings*.32

Although both Gilroy and Rodgers borrowed from the by-then vogue terminology of Atlantic history, both of their works fall well outside of the chronological limits of that field. Indeed, although Gilroy’s book contributed to a proliferation of studies of both the early modern “black Atlantic” and twentieth-century black internationalism, the former works ignore Gilroy’s timeframe while the latter eschew his usage of the Atlantic as his organizational unit. Similarly, whereas Rodgers’ path-breaking work profoundly shaped the emerging field of transnational history, it has inspired surprisingly few historians of the modern era to explore his argument that “the Atlantic functioned…less as a barrier than as a connective lifeline – a seaway for the

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movement of people, goods, ideas, and aspirations” during what he termed “the Atlantic era in social politics.”

Nevertheless, both the language and the approach of transatlantic history have increasingly appeared in scholarship published over the last two decades, often, it seems, unconsciously or arbitrarily. A survey of history books containing the term “transatlantic” in their titles and dealing with the period beyond the 1820s uncovers a surprisingly large and growing body of literature. We thus find self-identified transatlantic books on topics such as Protestantism and anti-Catholicism, spiritualism, liberalism, feminism, anarchism, black activism, fascism, masculinity, marriage, tourism, modernism, science and sociology, urban development, legal history, journalism, literary celebrities, environmentalism, Italian architecture and British film, Americans in Paris, Greeks in America, the transatlantic Statue of Liberty, and the transatlantic 1960s.

33 Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings, 1, 4.
these works clarify what they mean by “transatlantic” or place themselves in relation to one another, they all fit within the definition of transatlantic history outlined above. Publishers have also begun to launch book series in transatlantic history, including the Ashgate Series in 19th Century Transatlantic Studies and ABC-CLIO’s encyclopedic Transatlantic Relations series.\(^{35}\) Moreover, in 1998 the University of Texas at Arlington established the first (and to date, only) Ph.D. program specializing in Transatlantic History. The interdisciplinary journals *Atlantic Studies*, established in 1994, and *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, founded in 2003, as well as the UTA graduate program’s own *Traversea*, founded in 2011, provide a further institutional basis and forum for transatlantic research.

The preceding list, moreover, only includes scholarship that actually utilizes the term “transatlantic;” a far greater number of works generated by the “transnational turn” are transatlantic in form and content but not in name. This includes, for example, books on everything from the pan-Atlantic roots and ramifications of the American Civil War to black internationalism within the African diaspora;\(^{36}\) from Daniel Rodgers’ “Progressive Atlantic” to the revolutionary networks of what Jose Moya has termed “Atlantic anarchism;”\(^{37}\) from transatlantic migrations to (and from) the Americas to the “Americanization of Europe;”\(^{38}\) from the “globalization” of Booker


\(^{38}\) Among a vast number of relevant works see especially Kerby A. Miller, *Emigrants and Exiles: Ireland and the Irish Exodus to North America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); Gabaccia, *Militants and Migrants*; Gabaccia,
T. Washington’s vision of the New South to the transatlantic connections within the “global” New Left. And this somewhat arbitrary list of topics only scratches the surface.

Transatlantic history, then, is an expansive and thriving field of historical inquiry, but one that often goes unrecognized and unnamed. By naming it, we highlight the connections between research that has too often been carried out in relative isolation, and promote the collective project of exploring and theorizing transatlantic history without forcing scholars to reinvent the analytical wheel with each new transatlantic project. Bringing these works into conversation with one another will produce new insights and syntheses. For instance, what can historians of early modern transatlantic migration learn from the more robust and theoretically sophisticated literature on later migrations, and vice versa? What do scholars of twentieth-century black internationalism and historians of other transatlantic political movements have to learn from one another? And if the Atlantic was at the center of earlier expansions of globalization, is it still a principal channel of goods, people, and ideas in today’s globalized world? Answering these and related questions requires us to “think Atlantically” together, which only becomes possible once those of us engaged in transatlantic research recognize our commonality and the coherence of our collective efforts.
