

REACTIONS TO DEPICTIONS OF INTERGROUP SIMILARITY AND DISTINCTIVENESS
AMONG LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES

by

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ABSTRACT

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Reactions to an intergroup distinctiveness manipulation and a potential mechanism of intergroup boundary maintenance between liberals and conservatives were investigated. In Study 1, self-identified liberals and conservatives ($N = 121$) read an ostensible newspaper article depicting either high or low levels of distinctiveness between their groups on political issues and responded to items assessing the consistency of the encountered article with held views and attitudes towards the article's content. Participants' level of identification with their political orientation category moderated the relationship between distinctiveness and reported consistency. Study 2 ($N = 152$) tested whether threatened intergroup distinctiveness by way of the distinctiveness manipulation would lead to selective exposure to more extreme outgroup sources. No support for this mechanism of boundary reassertion was found. However, strength of preference for the chosen clip and a measure of openness to experience were each positively related to the odds of selecting an extreme versus a moderate outgroup source to view.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Political scientists have offered differing accounts of the degree of difference between the major political camps¹ in the United States (see Noden, 2004). Where some may perceive a vast divide between the political left and right, others see small differences. The degree of perceived polarization or similarity between America's major political groups likely depends upon whether one is comparing party hardliners or the general citizenry, with hardliners polarized and the mass public differentiated to a lesser extent. Nevertheless, disparate depictions of the state of political polarization (or lack thereof) can be offered.

The present research investigated how people who consider themselves to belong to the political right or left respond to differing depictions of intergroup differences. Specifically, the objective of the research reported here was to attempt to address whether there are differences between those who identify more versus less strongly with their political orientation in their reactions to portrayals of intergroup similarities and differences. The theoretical background for the present research will be presented within the framework of the Social Identity Perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; for a brief historical review, see Hornsey, 2008). The concept of intergroup distinctiveness is a fundamental part of the Social Identity Perspective, and thus it is an apt theoretical framework for this research. The impetus for this research, however, has grown largely out of a curiosity about the variables associated with the existence of inconsistent views of the degree of difference between political groups in the United States, and how these views influence the thoughts and behavior of those who identify with these political groups.

1.1 Intergroup Similarity as Distinctiveness Threat

Group memberships allow us to derive positive self-evaluation via intragroup and intergroup comparisons (Festinger, 1954; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). When important ingroups are

threatened, it can be unpleasant because a potential basis of individual identity and self-evaluation is called into question. Strategies used to enhance or maintain perceptions of one's ingroups, and consequently one's social identity, come to the forefront when beliefs about ingroups are threatened. Fuzzy or ill-defined lines of difference between an important ingroup and an outgroup can present a challenge to one's identity. When the psychological boundaries between a valued ingroup and a relevant outgroup are blurred, group members often seek to alleviate such identity threats (termed distinctiveness threat) by re-establishing intergroup differences (e.g., Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, 2001; Jetten, Schmitt, Branscombe, & McKimmie, 2005).

The construction of intergroup separation (see Gergen, 2001, pp. 169-183) can take place at the social and intrapsychic levels when group members are motivated to perceive or re-establish coherent intergroup differences. For groups that can be classified as "human artifact" more so than "natural kind" (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992), as is likely the case with ideological groups, the motivation to construct coherent intergroup boundaries and mutual exclusivity between groups may be especially strong, particularly among members who strongly identify with such groups. Ideological group members may be particularly keen on maintaining intergroup separation because there are not salient overtly observable characteristics that correspond to ideological group membership. As part of socially constructed entities, ideological group members may seek to identify and accentuate differences between ingroups and relevant outgroups to a greater extent than members of more "natural" categories.

Jetten, Spears, and Postmes (2004) define intergroup distinctiveness as "the perceived difference or dissimilarity between one's own group and another group on a relevant dimension" (p. 862). Thus, groups may be similar without being indistinct so long as differences are perceived on dimensions of importance. As noted by Hornsey and Hogg (2000a), social identity can be threatened "through self-conceptual and social uncertainty hinging on indistinct intergroup boundaries" (p. 145). The tendency for group members to seek distinctiveness

between ingroups and outgroups was demonstrated in early research conducted by social identity theorists (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). This work showed that participants who were assigned to groups on a trivial basis (using the minimal group paradigm) often exhibited a maximum differentiation strategy on commodity allocation tasks, whereby differences favoring the ingroup were preferred over alternatives that allowed for greater gain for one's ingroup, but a lesser magnitude of difference between groups.

The usual method of detecting whether low intergroup distinctiveness is experienced as threatening is to measure whether the levels of bias and differentiation are higher when ingroups and outgroups are depicted as less distinct. If lower levels of distinctiveness are experienced as unpleasant and threatening, intergroup differences in participants' allocations, performance ratings, and outgroup trait ratings are expected to be larger than in conditions when groups are depicted as sufficiently distinct (e.g., see Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 2001). Because these intergroup differences can occasionally favor an outgroup, at least in terms of generic norms (e.g., if ingroup members exemplify their distinctiveness by seeing themselves as more frequent drug users than outgroup members), the broader term differentiation is often used in the literature. Differentiation encompasses all varieties of intergroup distinctiveness assertion.

Research examining the effects of intergroup distinctiveness and similarity on intergroup bias and differentiation has revealed the complicated role that intergroup differences play in the perceptions and relations between groups. According to predictions derived from Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), the motivation to maintain a distinctive identity through group memberships will tend to make the perception of intergroup similarity an aversive experience. SIT and one of its primary offshoots, self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987) both propose that increased friction between groups can occur on the basis of intergroup similarity. SCT, however, tends to focus on perceptual aspects of social groups and the individual processes of categorization, whereas SIT has as its foundation the

proposition that individuals are motivated to maintain positive social identity via intergroup comparisons. SCT's cognitive—perceptual focus hinges on the concept of meta-contrast, which states that in order to categorize oneself or others into distinct groups, the differences within a group should be perceived as smaller than the differences between groups. Some may interpret this to mean that when perception of meta-contrast is violated, classification at a more inclusive (superordinate) level of categorization should ensue. On the other hand, SIT emphasizes the motivation to achieve and maintain positive self-evaluation as a fundamental result of, and motive for, group membership while also highlighting the importance of maintaining positive distinctiveness between ingroups and outgroups. This motivational component of SIT likely guards against the perception of violated meta-contrast. When an ingroup is an important one, encountered information regarding its similarity with a relevant outgroup (i.e., a violation of meta-contrast) is likely to be processed in a group-protective manner.

1.2 The Role of Identification Strength

Research on the topic of distinctiveness threat has begun to address the conditions under which the perception of low distinctiveness constitutes a threat to the identity of the individual. Jetten et al. (2004; see also Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1998) noted that the relationship between the amount of intergroup distinctiveness and differentiation is not a straightforward main effect, and empirical evidence supports the role of ingroup identification strength as an important moderating variable in this relationship. When intergroup distinctiveness is threatened by way of increasing intragroup heterogeneity (thereby creating a greater potential for intergroup overlap), high identifiers differentiate intergroup stereotypes to a greater degree than do low identifiers (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 2001). Crisp and Beck (2005) asked participants to think about intergroup similarities between university majors and found that this resulted in lower levels of bias on fund allocation measures and higher (i.e., more positive) ratings on a feeling thermometer compared to controls, but only for low identifiers.

However, bias increased with identification strength in conditions where intergroup similarities were contemplated.

Another method of manipulating intergroup distinctiveness involves classifying an ingroup as part of a superordinate whole. Testing the effects of superordinate and dual identities experimentally, Hornsey and Hogg (2000a) simultaneously manipulated university (superordinate) and university major (subgroup) classifications and found the highest levels of bias between university majors when majors are classified at the superordinate level of classification only, and the lowest levels of bias when classification takes place at both the superordinate and subgroup level. Maintaining the salience of the subgroup in this context presumably led participants to experience superordinate classification as less threatening. Strength of ingroup identification has also been demonstrated to moderate the amount of bias expressed in similar paradigms. For instance, in a study conducted by Crisp, Stone, and Hall (2006) high identifiers exhibited higher levels of bias than did low identifiers after being classified solely on the basis of a superordinate group.

Jetten et al. (2004) conducted a meta-analysis to examine the role of moderating factors in the relationship between intergroup similarity and differentiation. They found that level of identification with one's ingroup was a consistent moderator of the distinctiveness—differentiation relationship across both evaluative and behavioral measures. Higher, as compared to lower, identification levels were found to be more strongly related to differentiation under distinctiveness threat across both evaluative and behavioral measures.

Studies examining the role of identity strength suggest that individuals who identify more strongly with a group are more susceptible to distinctiveness threat and exhibit a greater tendency to reassert intergroup boundaries following a demonstration of intergroup similarity. For high identifiers, a perceived violation of sufficient meta-contrast between groups would likely be less consistent with their own views and therefore viewed less positively. High identifiers may be more motivated to ward off identity threats and, therefore, may be more sensitive to

situations involving reduction of meta-contrast. Conversely, low identifiers should not be as likely to perceive violations of meta-contrast as unpleasant and inconsistent with their views.

By maintaining the perception that the groups to which people belong are cognitively distinct from outgroups, individuals can maintain a more lucid sense of identity. Whereas for some groups (such as gender and race) intergroup boundaries are often visible or clear-cut, other groups are not as easily delineated. Groups founded on values and belief-systems, for example, can often have ambiguous intergroup boundaries (see Huddy, 2001). Thus, for groups characterized by commonalities of ingroup members' belief systems and values (such as political or religious groups), the maintenance of boundaries between relevant outgroups by accepting accounts of intergroup distinctiveness and rejecting accounts of intergroup similarity may be an important strategy in maintaining the perception of intergroup distinctiveness.

1.3 Summary and Hypotheses

The purpose of the present study was to examine self-identified liberal and conservative group members' responses to (bogus) newspaper accounts where level of intergroup distinctiveness is experimentally manipulated (high distinctiveness, low distinctiveness). More specifically, the study investigated how political orientation, identification strength with one's political orientation category, and manipulated intergroup distinctiveness (hereafter distinctiveness) are related to participants' reactions to the encountered manipulation in terms of (a) self-reported consistency with held views and (b) positivity of reaction. Previous work examining distinctiveness threat has focused on bias and differentiation resulting from threatened intergroup distinctiveness, particularly among high identifiers. Research findings indicating that low levels, versus high levels, of intergroup distinctiveness lead to more differentiation are plentiful, yet evidence for the antecedents of these effects are scarce. The present study explored potential antecedents of these effects. Specifically, it examined whether the experience of a threatened intergroup boundary for high, versus low, identifiers is more

inconsistent with their views and experienced as more unpleasant. Conversely, whether high identifiers, as compared to low identifiers, view depictions of vast intergroup differences as being more consistent with their views and less unpleasant was also examined.

I predicted that given the current divisive political climate in the United States, the article depicting high levels of intergroup distinctiveness will be viewed as more consistent with participants' views, generally, than the article depicting low levels of intergroup distinctiveness. For participants who identify highly with their political orientation group, it was expected that predictions in line with the Social Identity Perspective would hold. Specifically, identification strength was expected to interact with the distinctiveness manipulation, such that identification strength would be positively related to consistency and positivity of reaction to the article in the high intergroup distinctiveness condition, but negatively related in the low intergroup distinctiveness condition. No hypotheses regarding the role of political orientation are offered; however, this variable will be included in the design and analyses because of its potential importance (for a discussion of the importance of ideology in psychological research, see Jost, 2006).

CHAPTER 2

STUDY 1

2.1 Method

2.1.1 Participants

One hundred thirty-one undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses at the University of Texas at Arlington participated in this study in exchange for partial course credit. Participants who indicated that they self-identified as being either liberal or conservative were included in the data analyses. Nine participants who indicated that their political orientation was neither liberal nor conservative, and one participant with an extreme score on the dependent measure assessing consistency of article content with participants' held views ($z > 2.8$), were excluded from further analyses. Of the remaining 121 participants 71 (59%) self-identified as being politically liberal and 50 (41%) self-identified as being politically conservative.

2.1.2 Design

Participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions where the degree of depicted distinctiveness between liberals and conservatives was manipulated (high distinctiveness or low distinctiveness). The participants reported political orientation (liberal or conservative) and strength of their identification with their political orientation category were also assessed and included in the design to yield a 2 (distinctiveness: high or low) X 2 (political orientation: liberal or conservative) X identification strength (as a continuous measure) design.

2.1.3 Materials and Procedure

2.1.3.1 Instructions to Participants

Participants were informed that the study involved answering questions about their political orientation, reading a short newspaper article about political groups, and

answering questions about the article. Participants were given a questionnaire containing items assessing basic demographic information, political orientation, identification strength with political orientation category, an ostensible newspaper article containing the manipulation, and items assessing participants' reactions to the article.

2.1.3.2 Political Identification and Identification Strength

Political orientation was recorded by an item asking participants to indicate how they would characterize their political beliefs on a 7-point continuum with choices marked respectively as: very liberal, liberal, slightly liberal, slightly conservative, conservative, and very conservative. The mid-point of the scale was indicated neither liberal nor conservative; middle of the road; moderate as a political orientation. Strength of identification with one's political orientation group was assessed using items adapted from Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) and Brown, Condor, Wade, and Williams (1986; see Appendix A; $\alpha = .85$). Items were assessed on 7-point scales where 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree.

2.1.3.3 Manipulation of Distinctiveness

Following the identification strength items, participants read an ostensible newspaper article that presented information indicating that political differences between liberals and conservatives in the United States were either substantial or slight (see Appendix B for the text of the stimuli). In the high distinctiveness condition, the article reports on a recent study that has shown "clear and convincing" differences between liberals and conservatives on "both major and marginal issues". Conversely, in the low distinctiveness condition, the article reports that the study indicates that conservatives and liberals in the United States tend to have "very similar stances" on political issues.

2.1.3.4 Dependent Measures

After reading the article, participants completed items assessing the degree to which the article was consistent with their views ($\alpha = .81$). These items asked of participants: "To what degree did you find the contents of the article: consistent with your views, accurate,

questionable (reversed), inaccurate (reversed), inconsistent with your views (reversed)" . Items assessing how favorably participants viewed the articles content (hereafter positivity) were also assessed ($\alpha = .79$). These items asked of participants "To what degree did you find the contents of the article: pleasant, enjoyable, unpleasant (reversed), irritating (reversed). Items were measured on 5-point Likert-type scales (1 = not at all; 3 = moderately; 5 = very much).

After completing the dependent measures, participants were debriefed about the true nature of the article they encountered and assigned credit for their participation.

2.2 Results

2.2.1 Consistency of Article Content with Participants' Views

A moderated multiple regression analysis was performed to examine the relationships that the intergroup distinctiveness manipulation (high distinctiveness, low distinctiveness), political orientation (liberal, conservative), political identification strength (as a centered continuous measure), all two-way interaction terms, and the three-way interaction term exhibited with self-reported consistency.

The full model accounted for a significant proportion of consistency ratings, $R^2 = .26$, $F(7, 113) = 5.63$, $p < .001$. See Table 2.1 for a correlation matrix of the study variables and Table 2.2 for regression summary statistics.

Table 2.1 Intercorrelations Between Study Variables (N = 121)

Measure	1	2	3	4
1. ID Strength	--	-.08	.16	.11
2. Political Orientation		--	.01	-.03
3. Consistency			--	.33**
4. Positivity				--

** $p < .01$

Note: Political Orientation is a dichotomous measure with liberal coded in the positive direction.

As expected, participants in the low distinctiveness conditions rated the article as being less consistent with their views than participants in the high distinctiveness condition. No other main effects were present. The predicted identification strength X distinctiveness condition interaction emerged.

Examination of the simple slopes of identification strength on consistency at each level of the distinctiveness manipulation partially confirmed the predicted nature of the two-way interaction (see Figure 2.1).




Figure 2.1 Reported Consistency as a Function of Identification Strength and Distinctiveness

In the low distinctiveness condition, the relationship between identification strength and consistency, although marginally significant, was in the predicted negative direction, $B = -0.20$, $t(113) = -1.78$, $p = .08$. In the high distinctiveness condition, the relationship between identification strength and consistency was positive and statistically significant, $B = 0.28$, $t(113) = 3.22$, $p < .01$.

As can be seen in Table 2.2, an unpredicted distinctiveness X political orientation interaction emerged. A dummy coding scheme was used to interpret the simple effects of the distinctiveness manipulation separately for liberal and conservative self-identifiers.

Table 2.2 Summary of Moderated Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Reported Consistency of Article Content (N = 121)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	<i>t</i>
Constant	3.53	0.07	54.15**
Distinctiveness	0.21	0.07	3.22*
ID strength	0.10	0.06	1.65
Pol. Orientation	0.06	0.07	0.85
Distinctiveness X ID strength	0.18	0.06	2.99*
Distinctiveness X Political orientation	0.21	0.07	3.19*
ID Strength X Pol orientation	0.01	0.06	0.11
Three-way Interaction	-0.06	0.06	-1.03

Note. Identification Strength and Political Orientation are deviation coded with liberal and distinctiveness, respectively, coded in the positive direction.

* $p < .01$; ** $p < .001$

Liberals in the low distinctiveness condition rated the article they encountered to be significantly less consistent with their views ($M = 3.17$, $SE = 0.12$) than did liberals in the high distinctiveness condition ($M = 3.98$, $SE = 0.12$), $t(113) = 5.19$, $p < .001$. However, conservatives in the low distinctiveness condition ($M = 3.49$, $SE = 0.13$) did not differ significantly from conservatives in the high distinctiveness condition ($M = 3.62$, $SE = 0.15$), $t < 1$. See Figure 2.1 for a graphical depiction of the distinctiveness condition X political orientation interaction.




Figure 2.2 Mean Consistency Levels as a Function of Political Orientation and Distinctiveness

2.2.2 Positivity of Reaction to Article Content

A moderated multiple regression analysis was again run to determine the relationship between the predictors and their interaction terms with participants' ratings of the positivity of their reaction to the article. Despite a significant bivariate correlation between ratings of consistency and positivity ($r = .33, p < .001$), a non-significant amount of variance in positivity was accounted for by the full model, $R^2 = .04, F(7, 113) = 0.65, p > .05$. Therefore, interpretation of the regression coefficients was not undertaken.

2.3 Discussion

Several noteworthy findings emerged from the current study. A main effect of the distinctiveness manipulation was observed, such that high levels of depicted intergroup

distinctiveness were viewed as more consistent with participants' views that low levels of intergroup distinctiveness. This finding comes as no surprise given the current political climate in the United States. However, to what degree a perception of large intergroup differences is veridical is open to debate. A perception of large intergroup differences between liberals and conservative in the United States may be fueled by portrayals of divisiveness in the popular news.

The main effect of the distinctiveness manipulation was moderated by identification strength. Identification strength was positively related to the consistency of high intergroup distinctiveness depictions with participants' views regarding intergroup differences. Conversely, identification strength was negatively related, albeit marginally, to the consistency of low intergroup distinctiveness depictions with participants' views regarding intergroup differences. The nature of the interaction between identification strength and distinctiveness further corroborates the role of identification strength as a key moderating variable of the effects of distinctiveness manipulations. Previous work has examined the effects of distinctiveness manipulations on differentiation, but Study 1 explored potential antecedents of differentiation. The results obtained here suggest that distinctiveness threat may be defined more in terms of cognitive inconsistency than a negative evaluative reaction. However, replication of the pattern of results obtained in the current study is necessary before any firm conclusions can be drawn.

Unexpectedly, the effect of the distinctiveness on consistency ratings was moderated by political orientation. Liberals in the low distinctiveness condition rated the article as being less consistent with their views than liberals in the high distinctiveness condition. Conservatives in the low distinctiveness and the high distinctiveness conditions rated the article as being similarly consistent with their views. This effect may be explainable in light of the state where the study was conducted. Liberals living in Texas may be more conscious of the differences between themselves and conservatives because they are more likely to have encountered extreme conservatives. Conservatives, on the other hand, being the majority, may be less aware of the

differences and similarities between the groups; hence their similar ratings for both the low and high distinctiveness conditions. Alternatively, liberals' perceptions of the ineffectiveness of recent political policies advocated by conservative politicians may increase their desire to differentiate themselves from conservatives.

The absence of any relationship between the predictors and the positivity measure may suggest that the effects of distinctiveness threat are not manifested through negative evaluations of the experience. However, future tests of this relationship are needed.

CHAPTER 3

STUDY 2

Study 1 revealed that the strength of identification with one's political orientation plays an important moderating role in the reactions to depictions of intergroup differences. Study 2 examined a potential consequence of experiencing one's ideological ingroup depicted as very similar or very different from an ideological outgroup. When intergroup distinctiveness is threatened, individuals who identify strongly with ideological groups may find it necessary to employ protective strategies to maintain the boundary between their ingroup and a similar outgroup. In some circumstances, individuals may selectively seek out exposure to outgroup members as sources of information. That is, when the boundaries between ideological groups are threatened, members may seek exposure to people and sources of information that will reassert the intergroup boundary and thus confirm and maintain their perceptions of intergroup distinctiveness.

The notion that a person's desire to maintain a consistent belief structure can influence voluntary exposure to information sources was an important part of Festinger's (1957) formulation of cognitive dissonance theory (see also Frey & Wicklund, 1978). An extension of cognitive dissonance research, self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988; see also Sherman & Cohen, 2006) emphasizes the defensive processes involved in maintaining self-integrity when information inconsistent with an individual's self-concept is encountered. An application of this theory to distinctiveness research would imply that the integrity of the self could be threatened when one's group is depicted as similar to another group that one would not identify with, and that self-integrity would be maintained when there is sufficient contrast between an important ingroup and a relevant outgroup.

Study 2 explored a potential mechanism for maintaining a coherent view of one's political identity in an intergroup context. More specifically, I examined selective exposure to either an extreme (i.e., more boundary affirming) or a moderate outgroup member and how the intergroup distinctiveness manipulation used in Study 1 influences such a choice.

A small number of previous studies have used dependent measures relating to voluntary contact choices between ingroup and outgroup members as a function of intergroup similarity or distinctiveness. Kelly (1988) found a negative relationship between outgroup contact measures and differentiation in political groups. Specifically, higher reported amounts of contact with outgroup party supporters, was related to lower amount of difference in ratings of the ingroup and an outgroup party. Note, however, that Kelly's study examined differentiation as a function of contact, and not vice versa, as proposed here.

A limited amount of other work has used contact preference as a measure of bias after manipulations or measurements of similarity between academic groups (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000b) and prestigious high schools (Roccas & Schwartz, 1993). Hornsey and Hogg (2000b) did not find differences in contact preference when intergroup similarity was manipulated (Study 1), but found results consistent with the similarity-attraction hypothesis (Byrne, 1971), and inconsistent with predictions derived from SIT, when intergroup similarity was measured. That is, participants in conditions allowing classification at a superordinate and a subgroup level, as opposed to at the superordinate level alone, who saw the two academic areas (math-science and humanities) as more similar, exhibited less contact-related bias than those who saw them as less similar.

Roccas and Schwartz (1993) demonstrated that among high ingroup identifiers, greater levels of manipulated similarity between ingroup and outgroup prestigious high schools, yielded more reported readiness for social contact with the outgroup. The participants in this study, however, made ratings between interacting with an outgroup member or a student at a different high school that remained unnamed to participants. Thus, the choice provided was between

members of two different outgroups: one that was part of a superordinate group (viz., prestigious high schools) that would seemingly continue to offer its members positive distinctiveness, and the other unknown.

Instead of examining differences in readiness for contact between two different outgroups, Study 2 examined the effect of intergroup distinctiveness manipulations on exposure preference for exposure to either moderate or extreme information sources from the same outgroup. Through selective exposure to more extreme outgroup members, the perception of sufficient differences between groups may be maintained, especially when intergroup boundaries are threatened. Because of this, there may be a tendency to avoid information from moderate members of the outgroup, and to seek information from more extreme members as a means of boundary (re)assertion.

For groups founded on values and belief-systems, members who are high identifiers exhibit a tendency to maintain the distinctiveness of intergroup boundaries more so than low identifiers (Kelly, 1988). People who strongly identify with ideological groups are hypothesized to prefer exposure to more extreme outgroup targets under low intergroup distinctiveness. By seeking information from more extreme outgroup sources, over time, the perception of a typical outgroup member and the variability among outgroup members on relevant dimensions are likely skewed and “coherent covariation” (McClelland & Rodgers, 2003) between ingroup and outgroup exemplars may be accentuated through limitations placed on experience. In this way, high identifiers can maintain the integrity of their ingroup identity.

The prediction that high identifiers would prefer exposure to more extreme outgroup sources may seem to conflict with existing evidence regarding the relationship between latitudes of rejection (the range of attitude positions one would reject; Hovland, Harvey, & Sherif, 1957) and both closed-mindedness (see Powell, 1966) and degree of issue involvement (Sherif, Kelly, Rodgers, Sarup, & Tittler, 1973). One might expect high identifiers to hold wide latitudes of rejection leading them to experience extreme outgroup sources as relatively

intolerable. However, the assertion that those who identify more highly with their ingroup will find a more extreme outgroup source acceptable in terms of attitude positions is not made here. High identifiers are expected to consult extreme outgroup information sources not because they expect the message they encounter will be consonant with their own attitudes on the issues addressed, but because they expect the information will be more likely to be consonant with their own views about the outgroup as more dissimilar and objectionable. That is, high identifiers are expected to seek information that they expect to be unacceptable in order to maintain their perception of the outgroup as objectionable and distinct.

The purpose of Study 2 was to examine self-identified liberal and conservative group members' preferences for exposure to either moderate or extreme out-group members under conditions where distinctiveness was experimentally manipulated (high distinctiveness, low distinctiveness). A no information control condition was also included in Study 2 in order to assess exposure preferences when no experimental manipulations are present. Level of identification with one's political orientation group (conservative or liberal), and a measure of openness to experience were also assessed. Openness to experience was assessed and included in the model because it was seen as an important personality variable that should predict behavior in the present paradigm. Level of openness to experience was expected to be positively related to the odds of choosing the extreme clip. Participants in the low distinctiveness condition were expected to have higher odds of choosing the extreme clip than participants in the high distinctiveness and no information control group. Furthermore, a distinctiveness condition X identification strength interaction was predicted. For participants who identify strongly with their political orientation group, it was expected that predictions in line with SIT would prevail. Because political group membership is important to the identities of strong identifiers, they were expected to have more motivation than weak identifiers to maintain intergroup boundaries or reassert intergroup boundaries when they are threatened. In order to maintain or reassert intergroup differences, strong identifiers were expected to seek out

information that would enhance intergroup separation. Thus, in the low distinctiveness condition, identification strength was expected to be positively related to the odds of choosing the extreme rather than the moderate outgroup source. In the high intergroup distinctiveness condition, however, the intergroup boundary was sufficiently discrete, and identification strength was not expected to be related to clip choice.

3.1 Method

3.1.1 Participants and Design

One hundred fifty-five undergraduate students from the psychology participant pool at the University of Texas at Arlington participated in exchange for partial course credit. Participants were recruited via e-mail. Participants indicating a political orientation other than the midpoint on a liberal/conservative continuum (1 = very liberal, 4 = neither liberal nor conservative, 7 = very conservative; see Study 1) were recruited and eligible to participate. Data for three participants were not available on one or more of the study measures. These participants were excluded from analyses. Of the remaining 152 participants, 92 (61%) self-identified as being politically liberal and 60 (39%) self-identified as being politically conservative. The potential explanatory variables were distinctiveness (high, low, no information control), identification strength (a continuous variable), political orientation (liberal or conservative self-placement), and openness to experience (a measured continuous variable). The criterion variable in the present study was clip choice (extreme or moderate outgroup member).

3.1.2 Procedure and Materials

3.1.2.1 Openness to Experience

The measure of openness to experience was assessed during an online departmental pretest. Openness to experience was assessed with four items: "I like to try new things," "I avoid new experiences" (reversed), "I try to avoid the ordinary" (reversed), and "I get excited

about new ideas" ($\alpha = .67$). Participants rated the degree to which they agreed with each statements regarding themselves on 7-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The first three items were developed for the present study; the last item was found on the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) scale for openness to experience (see Goldberg et al., 2006). It was decided not to use existing measures of openness to experience because they often include items assessing political liberalism. For example, one item on the IPIP scale reads: "[I] tend to vote for liberal political candidates." For the present purposes a short improvised scale was deemed appropriate because it was desirable to have a measure of openness to experience that was statistically and conceptually independent of political orientation.

3.1.2.2 Instructions to Participants

Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were told that study involved exposure to political information and questions about their political orientation. They were informed that they would encounter sources of political information and answer questions about what they encountered. They were also informed that they would be asked to respond to items about their political orientation and how important their political orientation (liberal or conservative) was to them. After informed consent procedures, the experimenter led participants to a computer terminal where the study measures were assessed. Participants took part in the study individually, and the experimenter left the area of the computer terminal while participants were responding to study measures.

3.1.2.3 Political Orientation Check and Identification Strength

Participants self-identified as being liberal or conservative along the seven-point scale used in Study 1. To check the validity of this self-identification measure and as a means to increase the salience of participants' political identities, a 15-item² measure of agreement with political statements was used (see Appendix C; $\alpha = .85$). Agreement with

political attitude statements were assessed on 7-point scales (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree), with higher scores indicative of political conservatism.

Strength of identification with one's political orientation group was assessed with the same items used in Study 1 ($\alpha = .88$). Responses were recorded on 7-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). After these measures were completed, the screen prompted the participants to inform the experimenter that they were ready for the next part of the study.

3.1.2.4 Manipulation of Distinctiveness

After the participants completed the political orientation and identification strength measures, distinctiveness was manipulated in a manner similar to Study 1. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the article conditions or to the no article control condition. Participants in the control condition did not receive a description of similarities/differences. They were simply given the identification scale followed by the clip selection measure.

3.1.2.5 Clip Selection

After reading the article, participants were told that they were going to watch a clip of a member of their political outgroup expressing political views. They were presented with a choice between a moderate and an extreme outgroup member. They were told the person and the views expressed in the video clips were classified as being either moderate or extreme on the basis of previous research with students at the same university where the study was taking place. Participants were asked to select the video they would view by entering in either "moderate" or "extreme" into the computer. The screen where the selection was made reiterated these directions to participants.

3.1.2.6 Strength of Preference

Immediately after making their clip selection, participants were asked to respond to a question assessing the strength of their clip preference. They were told the clip would follow this

additional question. This item was assessed on a 7-point Likert-type scale, with higher scores indicative of stronger preference.

3.2 Results

3.2.1. Political Orientation Check

Conservative self-identifiers ($M = 4.82$, $SD = 0.75$) scored significantly higher on the political orientation measure than liberal self-identifiers ($M = 3.13$, $SD = 0.78$), $t(155) = 13.56$, $p < .001$. This finding indicates that the student sample used in the present study labeled their political orientation in a manner consistent with popular conceptions of the terms liberal and conservative.

3.2.2 Binomial Tests

Prior to testing the full model, normal approximations to the binomial test were conducted to examine the proportions of moderate versus extreme clip selections in each condition (low distinctiveness, high distinctiveness, control). In the control condition, 29 (58%) of the participants chose the extreme clip and 21 (42%) chose the moderate clip. This was not significantly different from equal proportions, $z = 1.15$, $p > .05$. In the low distinctiveness condition, 34 (62%) of the participants chose the extreme clip and 21 (38%) chose the moderate clip. This was also not significantly different from equal proportions, $z = 1.81$, $p > .05$. In the high distinctiveness condition 35 (70%) of the participants chose the extreme clip, and 15 (30%) chose the moderate clip. This was significantly different from equal proportions, $z = 3.09$, $p < .05$. The results of the binomial tests indicate that, contrary to expectations, the low distinctiveness condition did not lead participants to choose the extreme clip to a greater extent than the other conditions. In fact, the high distinctiveness condition was the only condition where participants chose the extreme clip at a proportion greater than chance. Surprisingly, in no condition was there an overall preference for the moderate clip, and collapsing across all

conditions 98 (63%) of the participants chose the extreme clip, and 57 (37%) chose the moderate clip, $z = 2.15$, $p < .05$.

3.2.3 Logistic Regression Analysis

A logistic regression analysis was performed using clip selection as a dichotomous outcome measure and distinctiveness, identification strength, openness to experience, and all two way interactions between these variables as predictors. It was decided to use strength of preference as a control variable in the analysis because preference strength was higher for participants who chose the extreme clip ($M = 4.44$, $SE = 0.18$) than participants who chose the moderate clip ($M = 3.82$, $SE = 0.20$), $t(152) = 2.25$, $p < .05$. See Table 3 for the intercorrelations among the study variables.

Table 3.1 Intercorrelations Between Study Variables (N = 152)

Measure	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. ID Strength	--	-.03	.06	.05	.00	-.01
2. Political Orientation		--	-.73**	.05	.17*	.05
3. Political Orientation Check			--	-.09	.01	-.08
4. Openness				--	.07	.19*
5. Strength of Preference					--	.19*
6. Clip Selection						--

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Note: Political Orientation is a dichotomous measure with liberal coded in the positive direction. Clip choice is a dichotomous measure with the extreme clip coded in the positive direction. The political orientation check is coded with higher scores indicating more agreement with conservative positions.

Three participants were missing data on one or more variables, so they were excluded from this analysis. Testing the saturated model against the constant-only model revealed that the fit of the saturated model was superior, $\chi^2(12, N = 152) = 24.97, p < .05$. Relevant logistic regression coefficients, Wald statistics, odds ratios (eB), and significance levels are reported in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2 Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Extreme Clip Choice (N = 152)

Variable	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	e^B	Wald
Constant	0.68*	0.20		11.84
Distinctiveness				3.21
Similar (vs. control)	0.19	0.28	1.21	0.50
Different (vs. control)	0.32	0.29	1.38	1.27
Pol. Orientation	-0.72	0.20	0.93	0.13
Strength of Preference	0.32*	0.12	1.38	6.89
Openness	1.06*	0.34	2.89	9.54
ID Strength	0.10	0.17	1.11	0.33
Pol. Orientation X Openness	-0.88*	0.35	0.41	6.52
Pol. Orientation X Distinctiveness				1.59
ID Strength X Distinctiveness				1.82

Note: Openness, Identification Strength, and Strength of Preference are centered around their respective means. Political orientation and Condition are deviation coded with conservative and the control group as reference groups, respectively.

* $p < .05$

Strength of preference and openness to experience each had a positive and significant relationship the odds of choosing the extreme as opposed to the moderate clip. A significant openness to experience X political orientation interaction was revealed. Among liberals, there was a non-significant relationship between openness to experience and the odds of extreme clip choice ($B = 0.18$, $Wald = 0.52$, $p < .05$). However, among conservatives, there was a positive and significant relationship between openness to experience and odds of extreme clip

choice ($B = 1.94$, $Wald = 9.08$, $p < .01$). One might posit that this interaction is potentially an artifact of attenuated variance among liberal participants on the openness measure; however, examination of the descriptive statistics (see Table 5) indicates that there are very similar mean levels and standard deviations across these groups on the openness to experience measure.

Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables

Variable	Liberals ($n = 92$)		Conservatives ($n = 60$)		Total ($n = 152$)	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
ID Strength	4.61	1.14	4.65	1.18	4.64	1.15
Openness	5.54	0.97	5.44	0.66	5.50	0.70
Strength of Preference	4.47	1.63	3.88	1.65	4.24	1.66
Political Orientation	3.12	0.79	4.83	0.76	3.80	1.14

Note: Higher scores on Political Orientation indicate higher levels of conservatism.

All other predictors and interactions in the model were not significant. Therefore, the hypotheses regarding the effects of distinctiveness and the distinctiveness X identification strength interaction were not supported by the results.

3.3 Discussion

The results of Study 2 did not support the thesis that selective exposure to extreme outgroup sources is a means of boundary maintenance when intergroup distinctiveness is threatened. The binomial tests indicated within the high intergroup distinctiveness condition participants were more likely to choose the extreme clip than the moderate clip, but within the low distinctiveness and the control conditions no tendency to select the moderate or the

extreme clip was exhibited. The difference found in the high distinctiveness condition may be the result of a demand characteristic. Participants in this condition may have presumed the purpose of the article was to induce selection of the extreme clip and then chose the extreme clip to fulfill the perceived purpose of the study. An alternative explanation is that the high distinctiveness article led to the selection of the extreme clip because large intergroup differences were primed, and the extreme clip was more consonant with this prime.

The expectation that identification strength would play an important role in the relationship between distinctiveness and clip choice relationship was also not supported. The results of Study 2 raise more questions than answers: What causes people to want to view information from an extreme ideological outgroup source? If it is not to create positive distinctiveness between the ingroup and the outgroup, are extreme sources viewed for derisive entertainment purposes? Does willingly viewing extreme outgroup sources lead to more positive or negative attitudes and stereotypes about the outgroup under some conditions? Might viewing extreme outgroup sources lead to more political tolerance and integrative complexity (Suedfeld & Rank, 1976)? More research will be needed to answer these questions. Study 2 did demonstrate that those who viewed the extreme clip had a stronger preference for seeing the clip they chose than did participants who chose the moderate clip. A potential explanation for this effect could be that those who chose the extreme clip had a greater tolerance for political outgroups generally or a wider latitude of acceptance for attitudes that are not consonant with their own (Hovland et al., 1957). Those who chose the moderate clip may have only done so not because they wanted to view the moderate clip, but because they wanted to avoid the extreme clip. Participants with little tolerance for the outgroup in general may have chosen the moderate clip because it was perceived as the least aversive option.

As expected, the improvised measure of openness to experience was found to predict preference for clip choice. However, this effect was qualified by political orientation. The positive relationship between openness to experience and odds of choosing the extreme clip

was present for conservative participants, but not for liberal participants. The interaction between political orientation and the openness measure was not predicted, so any conclusions that can be drawn from it are tentative, yet one potential explanation is that people who are conservatives and low in openness to experience are less likely to decide to view an extreme outgroup source because their latitudes of rejection are wider than those of conservatives with high openness to experience and liberals in general. It is questionable whether the political orientation X openness to experience interaction would emerge if an established measure of openness to experienced had been used. However, future work should examine whether this broad personality dimension predicts behavior in the current paradigm.

CHAPTER 4

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Study 1 demonstrated that identification strength, a seemingly ubiquitous moderator of intergroup phenomena, moderates the relationship between how consistent depictions of low versus high distinctiveness are to currently held beliefs. Low identifiers' beliefs regarding the degree of difference between liberals and conservatives were consonant with them being depicted as very similar. Conversely, high identifiers saw the depiction of large intergroup differences as being consonant with their views. These findings are noteworthy in that they demonstrate a potential antecedent to differentiation. Despite its correlation with the consistency measure used in Study 1, the evaluative measure was not accounted for by the distinctiveness manipulation and identification strength. This may suggest that the antecedents of intergroup differentiation are more conducive to measurement as cognitive inconsistency between held views and the perception of shrinking intergroup boundaries rather than as a negative evaluation of the perception of shrinking intergroup boundaries. Future research could examine cognitive inconsistency and evaluative measures as mediators of distinctiveness threat.

The findings of Study 2 did not clearly support predictions derived from the social identity perspective or the similarity-attraction hypothesis. With the exception of the high distinctiveness condition, participants did not exhibit a reliable tendency to choose either the moderate or the extreme clip, and no differences were found across the experimental manipulation of intergroup distinctiveness. Participants who chose the extreme clip had a stronger preference for their chosen clip than those who chose the moderate clip. For

conservatives, it seems that a level of openness to experience predicts choosing an extreme outgroup source; however, this relationship did not hold for liberals.

Clearly, there is variability in choice of exposure to more or less extreme outgroup sources that is in need of explanation. It may be that opportunity for derision is the main reason that people chose to consult more extreme ideological outgroup sources. Another potential explanation is that people may consult extreme outgroup sources in order to verify their existing view of the irrationality of the outgroup's position. These potential functions are not mutually exclusive.

The consequences of selective exposure to extreme outgroup members may be detrimental to intergroup relations. Exposure to extreme outgroup sources may lead to the construction of extreme outgroup stereotypes. A liberal who restricts contact with conservatives to Ann Coulter video segments is likely to come away with a skewed and negative conception of conservatives, and likewise, a conservative who restricts contact with liberals to Michael Moore documentaries is likely to come away with a negative and inaccurate conception of liberals.

The current paradigm investigated selective exposure to video clips. Choices for in-person contact with actual members of an ideological outgroup were not investigated. Choices for face-to-face contact with members of an ideological outgroup may yield a different pattern of results from what was found in the present study. Choosing to have contact with extreme ideological outgroup members' ideas via media sources is probably a more frequent occurrence than choosing to have contact with extreme outgroup members in person. A potential reason for this would be that the expectation of embarrassment and interpersonal conflict (i.e., intergroup anxiety; see Stephan & Stephan, 1985) would be present if face-to-face interactions but not encounters with media source. This is an empirical question worthy of future investigation.

The present research has several limitations that should be noted. The identification strength measure that moderated the relationship between distinctiveness and consistency in Study 1 is likely correlated with political knowledge. Political knowledge is therefore a potential

confound of identification strength. Future research using identification strength with political groups to examine distinctiveness threat should use a measure of political knowledge as a statistical control. The measure of openness to experience used in Study 2 had only four items. This scale was used in place of existing validated measures of openness to experience because a measure that was statistically and conceptually independent of political orientation was desired. In hindsight, the measure of intellectual openness provided by the IPIP (see Goldberg et al., 1996) would have provided a reliable measure that is at least conceptually independent of liberalism. Finally, the use of a student sample with research on political groups severely limits the generalizability of the results. The majority of the participants who took part in this research were not hard-liners, so it is unlikely that encountering a low intergroup distinctiveness manipulation in the form of a newspaper article was threatening, even to the identities of those who indicate high levels of identification. A more impactful manipulation should be used in future work.

The boundary between liberals and conservatives in the United States is probably not as vast as it is depicted to be on cable news. The exemplars that dominate many news outlets can be characterized as argumentative and extreme. Conservatives and liberals often draw attention to these extreme outgroup exemplars, presumably as a way of making the other side appear more extreme and less rational. In this way, positive intergroup distinctiveness is maintained. That is, the ingroup is seen as different and more rational than the outgroup. Although the research presented here did not establish that selective exposure to extreme outgroup sources is a mechanism of intergroup boundary reassertion, it is reasonable to conjecture that exposure to extreme outgroup sources leads to the enhancement of intergroup boundaries. If this is the case, are likely to follow negative effects intergroup relations. Viewing the outgroup as more extreme and less rational may negatively impact intergroup cooperation. Given the amount of freedom people have to choose political information sources available through television and internet sources today, selective exposure to information from and about

ideological (and other) outgroups is an important and timely topic of study that merits further investigation.

APPENDIX A
IDENTIFICATION STRENGTH ITEMS

I see myself as a part of a group of people who share my political perspective (liberal or conservative).

Being a part of the group of people who share my political perspective (liberal or conservative) is central to my sense of who I am.

Being part of the group of people who share my political perspective (liberal or conservative) is an important part of who I am.

In general, being part of the group of people who share my political perspective (liberal or conservative) is an important part of my self-image.

I value being a part of the group of people who share my political perspective (liberal or conservative).

I feel proud of belonging to the group of people who share my political perspective (liberal or conservative).

Belonging to the group of people who share my political perspective (liberal or conservative) is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am. (reversed)

I feel strong ties to other people that hold my political perspective (liberals or conservatives).

APPENDIX B

TEXT OF THE STIMULI

Washington--The Pew Research Center issued a report last week indicating the divide between the major political parties in the United States is surprisingly [vast, small]. This may come as no surprise to Washington insiders who are keenly aware of the major [differences, similarities] between the agendas of the Democratic and Republican parties. The results of the study conducted by researchers William Hohman and Reginald Tanner [lends support to, contradict] views pointing towards a growing political divide in the United States, but as Tanner and Hohman note in their report, "the major American political camps take [highly divergent, very similar] stances on the substantive issues that face our nation."

Their research team interviewed a nationwide sample of over two thousand registered voters. Political views on topics ranging from gay marriage to estate tax laws were compared to determine where supporters of each political party generally differ. Tanner and Hohman began the study expecting to find that Republicans and Democrats differ in [minor and insignificant, expected and predictable] ways. According to Hohman, "the [amount, lack] of coherent differences between the two major political parties on both major and marginal issues was contrary to [his] initial expectations."

The report points to recent elections with nearly split decisions as support for their findings. "The upsurge in elections resulting in recounts," they explain, "is evidence in favor of the [presence, lack] of a growing ideological divide; [the population is clearly divided, it seems as if mere chance pushes the voter one way or another]." According to the report, "the differences between members of the political left and right are [clear and convincing, extremely fuzzy and anything but clear-cut]." Tanner acknowledged that the results of the study indicate, "in America, there, in reality, exists [two, one] [very distinct, undifferentiated] political [parties, party]. The fact is the overwhelming majority of conservatives hold worldviews that are [highly disparate, not very different] from those held by liberals."

The report mentions the adversarial approach of several cable news channels as a possible contributor to the [common misconception of a] growing political divide in America.

The Pew research Center is nonpartisan research organization that studies attitudes towards the press, politics and public policy.

APPENDIX C

POLITICAL ORIENTATION CHECK ITEMS

Funding for social programs like welfare should be increased. (reversed)

People who don't support our country's leadership in a time of war should keep quiet.

The death penalty should be outlawed. (reversed)

Military spending should be increased.

Same-sex (gay) marriages should be legalized. (reversed)

Universal healthcare is not right for America.

Abortion should be illegal.

I support affirmative action programs. (reversed)

Church and state should be separate. (reversed)

Individuals are ultimately responsible for their financial situation.

America almost always supports the "good guys" when we take sides in a conflict.

American soldiers should use any means they can (including torture) to get information out of potential terrorists.

The United States should declare English as its official language.

More restrictions should be placed on gun ownership. (reversed)

A decline in family values is at the root of most social problems.

NOTES

¹ The categories liberal and conservative were used as in the present research due to their greater level of inclusiveness than party affiliation. People who do not identify with either of the major political parties in the United States are often still able to identify as generally being politically liberal or conservative.

² There were initially 17 items. One item intended to assess support for the privatization of social security and another item intended to assess the belief that financial wealth can result from situational forces were excluded because several participants indicated that they had difficulty understanding these items.

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BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

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