LANGUAGE, ORDER AND THE PROBLEM OF THE OTHER:
INVENTING A POSTMODERN SERVICE-LEARNING
PEDAGOGY

by

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to my late father, Tommy Love Trussell, Jr., who valued education above all else and who inspired me to do the same. I also dedicate this to Dr. Glenn Blalock, formerly of Stephen F. Austin State University, who showed me what it means to teach.
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Abstract

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My dissertation argues for a different approach to implementing service-learning into composition pedagogy. I argue that because critical pedagogy has long been the primary vehicle for incorporating service-learning initiatives into the composition classroom, and because this pedagogy—despite claims to the contrary—is still deeply committed to the tenants of modernism, service-learning’s potential has also been confined to this narrow world view. I further argue that the confrontational strategies employed by critical educators often work to undermine not only their own pedagogical goals, but also any benefits students might receive from their service experience. In making my argument, I examine closely social-epistemic rhetoric, the rhetoric devised
by James Berlin and the radical feminist pedagogies it has engendered. In doing so, I point out the enormous accomplishments of this immensely popular rhetoric, as well as discuss at length what I believe are its failures. Chief among these are the rhetoric’s allegiance to a monolithic worldview, its privileging of the rational over the irrational, its proclivity for constructing binary oppositions, and its belief in the ability of language to accurately represent reality. These are in fact the same failures that Berlin so harshly and--- justly---- criticized in Current Traditional Rhetoric. My project is an effort to think otherwise; that is, to think outside the confines of modernist theory and the constraints such a worldview imposes on pedagogy.

Thinking otherwise involves interrogating the relationship between the Same and the Other and laying bare the false promises offered by this dichotomy along with exposing all the false choices represented in binary oppositions. It means abandoning any notions of a monolithic worldview, whether that worldview is the American Dream or a Marxist Utopia. It means adopting a theory of language that allows for all manner of expression and it means employing inventional techniques and pedagogical strategies that allow for the accident. It’s my belief that if service-learning can be re-configured as a postmodern concept it can create the conditions of possibility for thinking otherwise.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Rhetoric was not invented because people wanted to express themselves more accurately and clearly, but because they wanted to make their positions prevail in the conflicts of politics.

James A. Berlin, *Rhetorics, Poetics and Cultures*

Political analysis and criticism have in a large measure still to be invented . . . that is to say the problem is not so much that of defining a ‘political’ position (which is to choose from a pre-existing set of possibilities) but to imagine and to bring into being new schemas of politicization.

Michel Foucault, *Power / Knowledge*

Two of the most promising pedagogies to emerge following the collapse of Current Traditional Rhetoric (CTR) were service-learning and critical pedagogy. Both pedagogies were born out of the social and political upheaval of the 1960’s, and early practitioners in both fields shared a healthy skepticism for what passed for “knowledge” in the university, for how that knowledge was conveyed to students and for the overall purpose of the university. Because early practitioners in these fields envisioned a more socially just society and because they believed the right education could bring about that society, both pedagogies took as their aim the production of not only better students, but also better *citizens*. That is, the goal of both pedagogies was to produce socially-conscious, engaged citizens who would act as agents of change within their professions and society-at-large. In my dissertation I will argue that despite the presumed kinship of critical and service-learning pedagogies, their goals are not always compatible. In fact, critical pedagogies have often undermined the objectives of service-
learning. I will propose a new model of service-learning that better meets its stated objectives and is less susceptible to co-option by competing pedagogies.

Statement of the Problem: Composition’s Chronic Discontent

In this section I offer a brief history of composition studies and an overview of current practices to show where the field has been, where it is now and where it might be going in the future. This review and overview are necessary because where the field is now is certainly a consequence of where it has been, just as the future of the field will certainly be a consequence of its current practices. This section also focuses on the reasons for composition’s chronic discontent with its first-year writing courses. In fact, it is not an overstatement to say that, within English Studies, Composition is configured as Other to more established studies, particularly Literature. This concept of Other will play a vital role throughout my dissertation.

In *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison*, Foucault observes that efforts at penal reform are contemporaneous with the inception of the prison (234). Unfortunately, the same can be said of composition. In "the Abolition Debate in Composition," Robert Connors chronicles the alternating calls for reform or abolition that have plagued the course since its inception at Harvard in 1885. However, as Connors points out, the latest calls for abolition of the first-year course have come, not from self-interested professors of literature, but from some of the most influential scholars in the fields of rhetoric and composition. And, while Connors claims that these critics are primarily concerned with student interests and only secondarily with their own professional interests, he also admits that their characterizations of the first-year
requirement as "futile," "a disliked hinterland of English studies," "expensive to run," "exhausting to teach," and "alienating to administer" are strikingly similar to those of previous abolitionists. For instance, David Jolliffe argues that the freshman course amounts to no more than "literary calisthenics;" while Charles I. Schuster, a practicing composition administrator, characterizes composition as the "Third World of English studies" (qtd. in Connors 59). Not only are their characterizations similar to those of their predecessors, so is their proposed solution—to make composition the responsibility of faculty across the disciplines.

What is reflected in both the characterizations and the proposed solution is a historical and chronic discontent with what Crowley calls composition's "ethic of service" (Composition in the University 50-51). That is, because composition is perceived as having no "content" of its own, it has traditionally been used to serve the interests of the university and its various, more important, more established disciplines. But it is not composition's ties to "service" that Crowley specifically objects to—because, as she points out, medicine and law are two examples of powerful disciplines developed around an explicit service ethic—rather, it is the "low status" associated with composition's service ethic that she and many others find untenable. Donald McQuade attributes this "low status" to the fact that both teachers and students of composition are assigned to these classes because of what they lack—students lack the necessary writing skills to succeed in other courses and graduate students and adjunct faculty lack the necessary credentials to teach other courses. Consequently, composition remains, both figuratively and literally, "[s]ituated marginally as the necessary ‘other’ along the borders
of literature, literary criticism, and rhetoric" ("Composition and Literary Studies" 484). As well, Richard Marius claims that lacking a content of its own, "composition became what it remains—the domain of beginners in the profession" ("Composition Studies" 472-73). However, composition's historically low stature within the department, as well as within the university, is but one reason that many scholars in rhetoric and composition studies would like to disassociate themselves and their discipline from the first-year requirement.

These calls for the abolition of composition are also, in part, a response to the discipline's failure to replace the Current-Traditional paradigm with a new dominant paradigm. Sharon Crowley, one of the most vocal of the "new abolitionists" insists that neither of the two "paradigmatic alternatives" that have emerged in the last decades has succeeded in dislodging the underlying assumptions of CTR that continue to dominate writing instruction in our colleges and universities (Crowley, “Around 1971: Current-Traditional Rhetoric and Process Models of Composing” 191). The two paradigmatic alternatives that Crowley refers to — expressionist rhetoric and social-epistemic rhetoric — have both been harshly criticized — the former from within the discipline, and the latter from both inside and outside the discipline.

Because expressionist rhetoric privileges the "private" over the "social," it has been fiercely attacked and effectively marginalized by proponents of James Berlin's social-epistemic rhetoric. Nevertheless, expressionist rhetoric and pedagogies deserve credit for changing the content of the composition classroom from literature to the composing processes of their students. As well, expressionists can be credited with returning "invention" to the writing process by encouraging pre-writing activities such as
"brainstorming," exploratory writing, and journal entries. While it is true that
expressionism has not disappeared from the composition classroom, its theories,
practices, and particularly its epistemology have been harshly criticized by pedagogues
who insist that an epistemology grounded in the "social" is the only valid "way of
knowing."

While social-epistemic rhetoric remains the most popular pedagogy in
composition studies, it also has come under harsh scrutiny not only for its
confrontational methods, but also for its failure to achieve its objectives. Berlin believed
that if students could learn to decode cultural texts and then recode them in more socially
equitable ways, they could resist the lure of capitalism and themselves become "agents of
change." However, Berlin was forced to admit that while students become very adept at
"decoding" and "recoding," these exercises had very little effect on students' consumer
habits. Likewise, those who are heirs to Berlin's pedagogy have increasingly begun to
question its effectiveness. For instance, Michelle Sidler and Richard Morris complain
that students often resent this "in-your-face" confrontational pedagogy, countering it with
even stiffer resistance and opposition ("Writing in a Post-Berlinian Landscape" 280).

Perhaps the most stinging rebuke of critical pedagogy is Marshall Alcorn's claim that this
pedagogical approach is not only ineffective, but is also potentially harmful to students.
He warns that attacking students' ideological assumptions is tantamount to "assassinating
their subjectivity by means of a discourse that purports to be educational" ("Changing the
Subject of Postmodernist Theory" 345). Alcorn's argument is that when we try to
"liberate" students from their ideological commitments, we are attacking “who” they are;
that is, their very subjectivity is bound up in ideological and libidinal attachments that often operate at a subconscious level.

But attacks on critical pedagogies have not been limited to "in-fighting" among those in the fields of composition and rhetoric, because what has made composition such a "contested" space within English Studies is the so-called "politicization" of the composition classroom. As long as composition served the purposes of the university and of professors of literature, and as long as its disciplinary duties were carried out by part-time faculty and graduate students, it was virtually ignored. However, when Berlin's pedagogy attempted to change the "content" (and, therefore, the purpose) of the writing classroom, he and his followers came under heavy attack from other faculty members, who accused them of "politicizing" the classroom. Despite the criticism, the critical approach remains extremely popular.

Some of the more noteworthy advocates of confrontational pedagogies (whose work I will discuss at greater length in my dissertation) include Dale M. Bauer ("The Other "F" Word: The Feminist in the Classroom"), Teresa Ebert ("For a Red Pedagogy: Feminism, Desire and Need"), Andrea Greenbaum (Insurrections) and Peter McLaren ("Revolutionary Pedagogy in Post-Revolutionary Times"). Although these critical pedagogues loathe admitting it, their direct challenges to students' ideologies have proven even less effective than Berlin's more subtle approach. And, while student attitude to Berlin's approach might be described as cynical, student resistance to harsher pedagogies can be described as downright hostile. Interestingly enough, critical pedagogues "read" such student resistance as a sign that their pedagogical methods are
effective. To the contrary, I will argue that these confrontational, critical approaches actually reinforce students' resistance to Marxist theory, while reaffirming their allegiance to capitalism. This is so because, as Uri Lotman and Boris Uspenskij point out, a vital factor in the self-definition of any culture is a hostile, ideological opposite against which to define itself (*The Semiotics of Russian Culture*). Certainly it would not be difficult to argue that capitalism’s *Other* has always been Marxism (socialism, communism). However, Lotman and Uspenskij go on to warn that in so defining itself, the culture makes its opposite an essential part of itself, thereby guaranteeing the opposing culture's preservation. Thus, Marxism and capitalism remain "enslaved" to each other, locked in a binary opposition that makes "thinking otherwise" impossible.

Despite the ineffectiveness of their methods, critical pedagogues remain deeply committed to both their theories and their methods. But, Virginia Anderson suggests this commitment may have less to do with pedagogical imperatives and more to do with "solidarity," not solidarity with their students, but with each other. Arguing with Richard Sennett (*The Fall of Public Man*), Anderson observes that solidarity within the group often becomes more important than the relationship of the group to the outside world (including students), in other words, these teachers sometimes see their radical positions as "badges of personal worth" and adherence to group dogma as a "personal test." As a result, these groups devote themselves to discovering and "pillorying heretics" who do not measure up to the group's rigid code. At this point, students become insignificant and the debate evolves into a "personal standoff between the two principles whose virtue is on trial" (Anderson, "Confrontational Teaching and Rhetorical Practice" 210). That is to
say, some critical educators appear to be more concerned with ideological "purity" than they are with pedagogical effectiveness. These deep ideological and philosophical differences, along with the petty, territorial bickering that is too often a part of departmental politics, have left composition studies in a precarious state, one that has resulted in many of its practitioners questioning whether or not teachers and students alike might be better served if the required first-year course were abolished.

Nevertheless, I believe, along with others, that the first-year course is too important to abandon. The fact is that despite the on-going criticism, research in rhetoric and composition studies has resulted in improvements in the composition classroom; therefore, rather than abolishing the course, I believe the discipline must reexamine the theories and assumptions that have been driving the course for the last twenty-five years. In particular, we need to reexamine Berlin's social-epistemic rhetoric and the critical pedagogies it has engendered. As Berlin himself observed, no rhetoric is permanent; rather, rhetorics evolve in response to economic, social and political changes (Rhetorics, Poetics and Cultures). I believe Berlin would be the first to agree that since he first formulated his rhetoric, and especially in the last decade, what passes for "reality" has changed profoundly. Such profound change demands changes in the way we think; that is, we must begin to think outside the narrow confines of modernist thought and its allegiance to rationality, meta-narratives and false dichotomies, as well as the modernist view of language as “representational.” Despite arguments to the contrary, I will demonstrate that social-epistemic rhetoric and critical pedagogy remain deeply committed to these modernist ideals. And, it is to
some extent this commitment to modernism that has prevented service-learning (because it is so often coupled with critical pedagogy) from realizing its full potential.

I offer this brief and admittedly selective assessment of the current state of composition studies in an effort to situate my project in the context of the ongoing disciplinary "debate." I also offer it as a means of highlighting what I believe is the importance of my project and how it contributes to and advances that debate.

Service-Learning as Pedagogy

As I have already stated, I believe critical pedagogy’s allegiance to modernism has prevented it from achieving its stated objectives. Likewise, because service-learning is so closely aligned with critical pedagogy, it too has been held hostage by the precepts of modernism. However, not all the reasons for the “failure” of service-learning to achieve its objectives are attributable to its connection to critical pedagogies. In fact, I will argue that, in many ways, service-learning has been a victim of its own success.

Like critical pedagogy, service-learning was born out of the conflict and turmoil of the 1960's, and it is evident from service-learning literature that the field's early pioneers clearly envisioned their mission as one of "overtly political activism." According to T. Minh-Ha Trinh, most of these pioneers were individuals who worked independently and "against the grain" of what was accepted in communities and in the academy. These "humanistic" educators worked with student activists to change what in their view was a "monolithic, teacher-centered, alienating and irrelevant" educational system that failed to serve the needs of an increasingly diverse population of learners.
While these were community activists and educators who believed that community service and structured learning could be combined in a way that provided for "stronger service and leadership in communities" and "deeper, more relevant education for students" ("Helping a 'New' Field Discover Its History" 1), it is important to note that none of these pioneers viewed "service" alone as an adequate response to what they perceived as "deficits" in both traditional volunteer service and academically sanctioned "experiential" learning. That is, they sought not only to reformulate the relationship between service and learning, but also to reformulate the very concepts of service and learning themselves (Stanton, "First Professional Steps" 77).

However, as these individual efforts began to be mainstreamed within the academy, converts to service-learning began to sacrifice the more radical elements of the pedagogy on the altar of "legitimization." Early proponents of service-learning point to the founding of Campus Compact in 1985 as a critical point in the timeline of service efforts in higher education. With the founding of this organization, service-learning began to move from individual pioneer efforts to more institutionalized efforts ("Helping a New Field Discovery Its History" 5). Not all early proponents of the pedagogy were happy with service-learning's new found success. Timothy Stanton points to Campus Compact's early tendency to view "service" as noblesse oblige; a concept of service that he claims undermines both the service and the learning. Likewise, Nadinne Cruz argues that service can actually be a "disservice" to communities when it is inspired by "missionary narcissism." While she allows that charitable works and philanthropy serve an important purpose, she also claims that purpose is not solving social problems. And,
like Stanton, she argues that attempting to solve social problems through "charity" results in disservice to both students and communities ("Passing the Torch" 208). Meanwhile, other early proponents express concern with the "limiting" effects of institutionalization. For instance, Herman Blake argues that "to the extent it becomes institutionalized, and you begin to evaluate it and encapsulate it in any formal structure, you begin to limit its capacity" ("Mainstream or Margins?" 171). Moreover, as Stanton points out, the fact that service-learning is now being endorsed not only by faculty and students, but also by public school and university administrators, the U. S. Congress, and the President of the United States, should cause us to question whether these institutions have so transformed themselves that they can now accept such a "radical pedagogy" or whether this pedagogy has been adapted to survive and expand in the mainstream (Service-Learning Preface XV). In other words, it is difficult to see how service-learning can serve the needs of institutions and entities with such disparate and often, conflicting interests without subjugating its own.

Current practitioners of service-learning find themselves grappling with many of the same questions that plagued their predecessors, while pioneers of the movement remain concerned that neither they nor those who have followed have adequately articulated and debated the disparate goals of this movement ("Passing the Torch" 207). In addition, pioneers in the field express deep concern about questions relating to service-learning's connection to both learning and community development, the answers to which could inform and improve practices, but which at this time remain unanswered (Stanton, et al. 241). As well, Ira Harkavy questions service-learning's effects on the "intellectual,
moral, and citizenship development of participants," as well as its effects on the "advancement of social institutions and democracy." While Harkavy claims to be impressed by recent advances in service-learning research, he also points to current conditions within our universities, schools and society itself as indications that service-learning has not fulfilled its promise ("Service-Learning and the Development of Democratic Universities, Democratic Schools, and Democratic Good Societies in the 21st Century" 4).

Ironically, I believe the enormous success of service-learning is part of the reason the pedagogy has not fulfilled its early promise. A survey of the literature indicates that the term "service-learning" is used to describe a wide range of practices that include efforts such as joint celebrations of community holidays to bring "Town and Gown" together to total immersion pedagogies, with most service-learning efforts failing in-between these two extremes. And, as Dan W. Butin's four conceptual models demonstrate, the pedagogy is almost as likely to be used to promote the status quo as it is to promote an ideological Other ("Service-Learning as Postmodern Pedagogy" 90-91). Like Butin, I believe two of his conceptual models are, in fact, obstacles to service-learning achieving its fundamental goals of reformulating the very concepts of service and learning. However, contrary to Butin’s argument, I believe only one conceptual model poses a real threat to the service-learning movement: critical pedagogy.

In addition, I believe service-learning has failed to fulfill its promise because, in trying to be all things to all educators, it has become shortsighted; that is, its practices have focused too much on the Same and not enough on the Other. In other words, much
has been written about the impact of service-learning initiatives on student and faculty participants, but much less has been written about the impact of such initiatives on the communities and the people they are meant to "serve." My dissertation is an attempt to answer Butin's call for a fourth conceptual model—a postmodern conception and one that Butin describes only in very general terms. My task will be to provide specific theories, a sound epistemology and a theory of language that build on Butin's initial "sketch" of a postmodern service-learning pedagogy and then to link that model directly to composition pedagogy.

In developing a postmodern composition / service-learning pedagogy, my emphasis will be primarily on the long-term impact of its practices on the communities it serves, because I believe that is the only way to truly measure its "worth," not just to the community, but also to students and faculty members. However, rethinking the "service" aspect is only half the equation. If service-learning is to become a truly "radical" pedagogy, we must also rethink and reconfigure the "learning" aspect of this pedagogical equation. As Butin points out, what is at stake is whether service-learning "plays by the normative 'old school rules' of the academy" or whether it "attempts to modify what counts as the rules (and truth) in the academy ("Service-Learning as Postmodern Pedagogy" 102). Butin’s point here is crucial because, while I believe that many in service-learning have already begun to question the field’s concept of service, I believe that far less attention has been paid to rethinking the field’s concept of learning. For this reason, I will be concerned with interrogating the relation between "academic
knowledge" and what Foucault refers to as "the insurrection of knowledges" (Power/Knowledge).

Language, Order and the Problem of the Other

In this section I address one of the most important concepts to this dissertation: the relationship of Self and Other. In fact, the dichotomy of Self/Other is interrogated throughout the dissertation; although, at times, under different labels, because of the myriad forms this false dichotomy assumes. In what follows, I attempt to explain why this concept is so crucial to my work.

Michel Foucault claims his seminal work, The Order of Things, arose out of a passage from Borges that “shattered . . . all the familiar landmarks of my thought—our thought . . . breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things, and continuing long afterward to disturb and threaten with the collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other” (Preface xv). What is so disturbing and delightful about Borges taxonomy, says Foucault, is that “[i]n the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we apprehend in one great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that” (Order Preface XV).

The author further explains that what is "impossible to think" are not the "fabulous animals," but rather, "the narrowness of the distance" separating them from the "stray dogs, or animals that from a long way off look like flies." In other words, what is
impossible to think is not the existence of the "other," but rather, the site—the common locus—on which the "same" and the "other" might coexist. Paradoxically, it is language that allows us to articulate the contents of this taxonomy— to give them names that distinguish one from the other—and, at the same time, language makes it impossible to "think" a single, inclusive space in which they all might reside, because Order (our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other), which is itself a function of language, precludes such thought (Preface VI-XX). In other words, both our concept of the Other and our notion of Order are nothing more than products of discourse. This is so because, according to Foucault, discourse is not merely a system of signs or signifying elements, but rather a "set of practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" (Archaeology of Knowledge 49).

Moreover, Foucault points out that the history of the Other in any given culture is that which is at once "interior and foreign" and thereby must be excluded (to reduce the internal danger) or "shut away" (to reduce its "otherness"). On the other hand, the "history of order" is the "history of the Same—of that which, for a given culture, is both dispersed and related, therefore to be distinguished by kinds and to be collected together into identities" (Order Preface XXIV). That is to say, the Same achieves its "sameness"—its Order—by categorizing, labeling, defining, differentiating and otherwise evaluating that which "belongs" to a given culture and by excluding (incarcerating, institutionalizing, marginalizing, disciplining, normalizing) that which does not belong. However, Foucault makes clear elsewhere that this "separation" and the resulting "order" it establishes are counterproductive to mankind's self-knowledge, because, in expelling the Other,
Western culture is excluding "the very thing in which it might have just as easily recognized itself---where in fact it had recognized itself in an oblique fashion" ("La folie, l'absence d'oeuvre" 1964). In other words, this separation between Self (Same) and Other is an artificial distinction imposed upon members of a given culture, by that culture, in order to create a sense of security and solidarity (order).

Drawing on his reading of Jerzy N. Kosinki's *The Painted Bird*, Ray Linn explains that the presence of the Other also satisfies the persistent human need for an "opposite" against which to define one's self or one's culture. Moreover, Linn claims that human beings have a need to project their own moral failings onto an evil Other, without which, they would be forced to face "the evil within" (66). Linn's point here is that human beings do not just find someone who is "different" and then set him or her up as their evil opposite; rather, humans create that difference where none exists (65). However, in creating that difference and projecting their own shortcomings onto it, he warns that human beings also invest "parts of [their]secret selves" in the Other(66). Linn's observations underscore Foucault's claim that in excluding the Other, Western Culture has excluded "the very thing in which it might have just as easily recognized itself."

In a similar vein, Martin Heidegger claims that "Others" does not mean "everyone else but me"; but rather, it means those from whom "one does not distinguish oneself—those among whom one is too" (*Being and Time* 154). In fact, Heidegger's signature concept—*Dasein*—is not an entity unto itself; that is, *Dasein* does not denote *Being*, but rather the term encompasses a "situation" in which *being*
is "always being in a world with others" and always in a situation. Moreover, this situation always involves an ongoing interrogation of both Being and the situation; it is a situation (the lived experience) through which Dasein interprets (understands) itself, the world, and others. And, while Heidegger insists that Dasein is in each case "mine," his use of the personal pronoun is in no way related to the "Kantian—I," a notion that Heidegger rejects (367). To the contrary, Heidegger insists that the situation (Being-in-a-world) is a "unitary phenomena" (78). That is, the Heideggarian situation is an ongoing dynamic in which Being "knows" itself and its world, but only in relation to other Beings. In other words, there is no self-knowledge without knowledge of others; in fact, there is no self without others.

Anthropologist Roy Wagner makes similar claims in his description of the cultural anthropologist's methodology and the resultant "in-between" character that develops in the course of his or her fieldwork. Wagner explains that "culture" is an anthropological "construct"— an invention. But it is a necessary invention because the only way a researcher can possibly build a relation between his or her own culture and the subject culture is by simultaneously knowing both of them. In the process of establishing that relationship, the researcher experiences (rather than "learns") the subject culture while simultaneously retaining his or her own, resulting in what Wagner calls the "in-between character" of the anthropologist (The Invention of Culture). As a result, what to the anthropologist first seemed "strange" becomes increasingly more familiar, resulting in the "familiar" becoming increasingly strange (11). Wagner's observation that the more familiar the strange becomes, the stranger
the familiar will appear, demonstrates that the separation between Us and Others is
not as distinct as we like to think and that, as Foucault suggests, our ways of thinking
are anything but "natural." Wagner's description also suggests a "space" or set of
circumstances in which the Same and the Other might meet and, through
sustained contact, become less and less strange to one another.

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari also theorize an "in-between-ness," however they refer to it as a becoming: “A becoming is neither one nor two, nor
the relation of the two; it is the in-between, the border. . ."(A Thousand Plateaus
293). If we interpret this in-between-ness as "in-between" the Same and the
Other, we begin to see a space where "the stark impossibility of thinking that"
becomes possible. However, it is important to note that this "space" is in no way
a "middle ground" or compromise. Nor is it an idealistic realm, devoid of
contradictions, in which "the lamb and the lion" might lie down together
(Kenneth Burke, Grammar of Motives 345). Rather, it is a space of "shared
proximity" in which the Same and the Other might co-exist in a symbiotic
relationship much like that of the wasp and the orchid (Delueze and Guattari A
Thousand Plateaus 293). It is the "excluded middle" Victor Vitanza, Negation,
Subjectivity and the History of Rhetoric), "the third meaning" (Roland Barthes,
"The Third Meaning"); in other words, all that the construction of binary
opposites has prohibited for the sake of Order..Thus it is within this "space"—
this space "outside” of Order—that we must begin to rethink our "age-old
distinction between the Same and the Other."
This dissertation will concern itself with developing a pedagogical space from which a "third way" or "third meaning" (and even a fourth, fifth, etc.) might emerge. That is, a pedagogy that is not confined to the false choices presented by binary constructions, most importantly the Same / Other dichotomy and the myriad forms it assumes; but rather, a space in which the "conditions of possibility" for what can be thought, spoken, and written in the composition classroom are profoundly changed. Specifically, I will be concerned with developing a rhetoric—a sound theoretical ground, a well-articulated epistemology, and a complementary theory of language—of a postmodern composition / service-learning pedagogy.

My interest in this project derives from what I believe is the failure of both critical pedagogies and service-learning pedagogies to fulfill their stated goals—that is, to produce active, engaged citizens, capable of acting as "agents of change" in a participatory democracy. This failure comes despite the fact that both pedagogies have been widely practiced for almost three decades. In fact, critical pedagogy has been the dominant pedagogy in composition studies since the early 1980's, while, in the same time span, service-learning initiatives have been implemented vertically (Kindergarten through Graduate studies) and horizontally (across all disciplines). Obviously, both pedagogies have enjoyed great institutional success; however, I will argue that neither has lived up to its early promise of becoming a truly "transformational pedagogy.” In this dissertation, I will outline my proposal for reconfiguring composition and service-learning as postmodern concepts capable
of invigorating and legitimizing the first-year course while at the same time, allowing service-learning to fulfill its early promise as a truly transformative pedagogy; that is, a pedagogy that encourages us to think otherwise.

Methodology

I will derive my postmodern theoretical base from the concepts of Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault, who, strictly speaking, may not be classified “postmodern,” but whose thoughts are the definitive forerunners of postmodernism. I am particularly interested in Foucault’s and Heidegger’s concepts of Self and Other and their observations about language, as well as Foucault’s observations on knowledge and power. In addition, I will look to the ways that Jacques Derrida, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Gilles Delueze, Felix Guattari, and Giorgio Agamben have reconfigured and advanced the concepts first formulated in Heideggarian and Foucauldian thought to arrive at what is now referred to as post-critical theory. The important concepts of these postmodern, post-critical theorists will provide this model of service-learning with the theoretical ground it needs to develop sound pedagogical methods and strategies of its own, thereby making it less susceptible to co-option by competing pedagogies. These concepts will also help practitioners of this model articulate an epistemology that is grounded in an awareness of “self” through an understanding of the Other. This “way of knowing” will necessarily question what passes for “truth” in the university and its relationship to the "local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges" that are often found in communities we serve.
However, because such “knowledges” are often communicated in a language other than “academic discourse,” this service-learning model must adopt a theory of language that allows for and recognizes all forms of expression. This inclusive theory of language must also acknowledge the intricate role that language plays in the construction of “self,” “other” and the “world” they inhabit. As Foucault points out, both the self and the Other are products of a set of discursive practices that “systematically form the objects of which they speak.” Perhaps, more to the point is Foucault’s claim that every “educational system is a political means of maintaining or of modifying the appropriation of discourse, with the knowledge and the powers it carries with it” (Archaeology 227). However, we should not confuse Foucault’s use of the word “knowledge” with “truth,” for it is also his claim that the “will to truth” has imposed itself on us for so long that “the truth it seeks to reveal cannot fail to mask it” (Archaeology 219). Therefore, before we can rethink our relationship to the other, we must first rethink our relationship to language.

That is exactly what Gregory L. Ulmer does in an invention process he calls “chorography.” According to Ulmer, choral writing is writing without representation, without judgment, without evaluation, and without the negative. In other words, it is the signifier without the signified. Ulmer (following Foucault) explains that the self is an invention of a Socratic discourse that objectifies language, thereby subjectifying the user of that language (Heuretics: The Logic of Invention). Or, to put this in more Foucauldian terms, as users of
language we are bound up in a subject / object dialectic in which we are “governed and paralyzed by language” (Order 298). But Ulmer points out that subject formation is itself subject to invention, and that is exactly what the choral writer seems to be inventing: a new “self.” But because chorography writes with puns, jokes, images, gestures, and all manner of expression, the choral writer is not “governed” or “paralyzed” by the limitations of conventional discourse. Nor is the new self limited by convention; in fact, the new self might be reinvented, again and again.

This is especially important to my project, because “subject position” is a crucial element in service-learning pedagogies. However, Ulmer’s pedagogy offers students a non-confrontational method of interrogating their particular subject positions and imagining those positions otherwise. That is, when students construct their own “mystories” (one of Ulmer’s pedagogical strategies), they become aware of how they have been constructed by their parents, by society, by their religious and ideological beliefs, by language, by the narrative of capitalism, and various other influences in their lives. Moreover, they are given the opportunity---through technology and chorography---to write other stories and other “selves.” What Ulmer is inviting students to do is write with what Derrida calls a “surplus of meaning” (“Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” 260-61)), something that is perhaps impossible to do within the confines of academic (rational) discourse.
Ulmer’s pedagogy employs all manner of media technology and does so in a way that makes the “content” of his courses relevant to today’s youth culture. He is not, however, the only educator who is attempting to develop a radically postmodern pedagogy. Eric White (*Kaironomia*) and Michael Jarret (*Floating on a Read*) also utilize aleatory invention devices in their writing courses, as well as incorporating technology and encouraging alternative forms of writing. The use of aleatory invention devices is crucial because, unlike algorithmic invention devices that allow for only one “right” answer, and heuristic devices that allow for a finite number of answers, aleatory methods allow for an infinite number of possible answers (a “surplus of meaning”). The use of aleatory devices also allows for the accidental juxtaposing of images and words, of semantic sets not usually related to one another, a juxtaposing that cannot possibly take place within the confines of Aristotelian logic. Moreover, encouraging students to use different methods and forms of writing allows them to “destroy syntax” and “shatter tyrannical modes of speech” (*Order Foucault* 298), and perhaps, in the process, invent something truly new. But such invention will require a new “form” of writing, because as Ulmer points out: “The modes of academic writing now taught in school tend to be positioned on the side of the already known rather than on the side of wanting to know (of theoretical curiosity) and hence discourage learning how to learn” (*Heuretics* Preface xii). I will explore experimental pedagogies such as these at greater length in my dissertation, because, as I have already pointed out, when service-
learning is “paired” with pedagogy, in a sense it becomes a “hostage” to that pedagogy. Consequently, for a postmodern model of service-learning to be effective, it will have to be paired with postmodern, post-critical composition pedagogy.

This dual pedagogy would situate students, in a “real” world environment in which they are exposed to the Other and where they are encouraged to explore and interrogate themselves and reality through an interrogation of the Other. Moreover, students would be encouraged to re-write---re-invent---themselves, and through this process to re-write reality in a way that precludes the necessity of the Other. In other words, students would be encouraged to continuously re-invent themselves (to deterritorialize and reterritorialize themselves) to the point they might become---in the Deleuzian sense---what Agamben calls “radical singularities” (A Thousand Plateaus, The Coming Community 86.7). Agamben describes these singularities as having been “reclaimed” from “having this or that property, which identifies it as belonging to this or that set or to this or that class” (The Coming Community). That is, “radical singularities” are so radical and so singular (because they are constantly changing) that no two are the same, and therefore no one is the Other. If students are able to deconstruct the self / other binary, then they can begin to deconstruct other binaries, along with the false choices they represent, and the boundaries they impose. The collapsing of these binaries and the crossing of these boundaries will significantly alter the “conditions of possibility” for what can be thought and written in the
composition classroom, as well as profoundly impacting what can be accomplished in the service community.

My work is significant because it offers a model that, to this point, has been absent in service-learning literature. It is also a model that attempts to address the disciplinary concerns that continue to haunt composition studies. First among these is the charge by some faculty members that other members are politicizing the classroom; this comes despite the recognition by most faculty that the classroom is always, already political. However, I agree that the classroom should not be politically partisan, but a truly postmodern, post-critical model would not be partisan because it would not support a telos. That is, it would neither support the status quo (capitalism) nor promote an alternate Other (Marxism). To the contrary, this model would facilitate the opening of a “third way” or an infinite number of ways, but never would it promote any predetermined “end.” However, it would not be, as Butin points out, “value-free,” because it recognizes that there are no value-free positions from which to teach or to learn.

Secondly, this model would answer some critics’ complaints (Sharon Crowley is chief among these) that composition, as it is now taught, has nothing to do with rhetoric. Crowley claims that any theoretical discourse that purports to be “rhetoric” must give a central place to “invention” and must “intervene in some way in social and civic discursive networks” (*Enculturation*). I would argue that service-learning, by its very nature, immerses students not only in
public discourse, but also in civic action. And, this model, as I have outlined it above, not only gives a central place to invention—it is invention. Crowley defines invention as "the systematic discovery and investigation of the available arguments in a given situation" (*Enculturation*). Traditional invention techniques include the classical devices—*topoi* (commonplaces), the "stasis questions," the three appeals of argument (*logos, ethos, pathos*)—heuristic devices—Burke's pentad, "tagnemics," as well as expressionists methods such as pre-writing, brainstorming, and journal keeping. The problem with all of these invention techniques is that the "inventor" (the student) is always inventing out of the same place; that is, whether he or she is using the *topoi*, the pentad, freewriting, or any other device, he / she is still inventing out of his / her own "thrownness" (*Heidegger Being and Time*). Until we change their (our students) "conceptual starting places," they will continue to reproduce the same old arguments, rather than inventing new ones. Service-Learning does just that—it gives students new perspectives, new "lenses," new ways to look at the world (others) and themselves. As Lori Pompa claims, "service-learning is the ultimate border-crossing experience," an experience in which "borders disintegrate and barriers recede" (*"Service-Learning as Crucible"* 175).

Third, endorsing postmodern service-learning would give new meaning to composition's *ethic of service*, a meaning that all in the discipline could embrace. Rather than simply serving the interests of the university or those of more established disciplines, composition would serve the best interests of its students,
its teachers, and the larger community, all of whom would have a say in exactly what those "best interests" might be. Rather than being "defined" by its service ethic, the discipline could redefine "service" in its own terms.

Fourth, critics could no longer argue that composition was no more than—to use Jolliffe’s term—"literary calisthenics." Nor could critics persist in claiming that the underlying assumptions of Current Traditional Rhetoric continue to dominant composition studies. However, I am not proposing this pedagogical model as a paradigmatic alternative to all other pedagogical practices. Service-Learning is not for everyone. Many educators have valid reasons for not engaging in service-learning activities and those reasons should be respected. What I am proposing, however, is that for those who do want to practice service-learning, this postmodern, post-critical model offers students and teachers alike the opportunity to dramatically enhance both their service and their learning experiences.

This is also a model that attempts to answer the nation’s demand for an active, engaged citizenry. By engaging students in a process that immerses them in the growing political and social problems we face, without trying to tell them how they should respond to those problems, we are inviting students to “own” (make an investment in) the communities in which they live and serve. When students feel as though they “own” a part of something, then they are more likely to devote their time and energy to securing their investment. This was apparent in the 2008 presidential election when one of the candidates used technology and social networking to invite young people (a voting demographic notorious for its
historically low turn-out record) to become a part of his campaign. By actively recruiting this demographic and keeping them involved throughout the campaign process, Barack Obama registered millions of new voters and produced a record turn-out among the 18-25 year old demographic, a turn-out that helped him secure an impressive victory.

Barack Obama’s election has also added to the significance of my project. In March of 2009, Obama reinforced his commitment to service and to education by signing into law the *Edward M. Kennedy Serve America Act*, the largest expansion of community service in seventy-five years. This legislation will dramatically increase service opportunities by expanding AmeriCorps’ current 75,000 positions to 250,000 positions by 2017 (CNCS).

**Outline of Subsequent Chapters**

In Chapter Two, I will outline exactly why and how I believe critical pedagogues have undermined and continue to undermine, not only their own objectives, but also the objectives of service-learning. I will start with a brief history of the discipline, beginning with a discussion of Modernism, New Critical Theory and its rhetorical counterpart Current Traditional Rhetoric and the ways these theories influenced and continue to influence the discipline, despite the so-called "paradigm shift" of the early seventies. I will be especially concerned with the development of Berlin's social-epistemic/critical rhetoric and radical feminist pedagogies that developed in its wake. I will argue that critical pedagogy, despite claims to the contrary, remains firmly entrenched in, and allegiant to, the tenets of
modernism. This chapter will also include a discussion and assessment of the roles of invention and language in composition pedagogy. This may seem like a diversion, but it is anything but, because what I have been talking about all along is invention and language, in the broadest sense of the terms.

In Chapter Three, I will offer a brief history of service-learning, as well as describe current conceptual models and the divergent goals they espouse. I will argue that these competing models along with their disparate aims are a hindrance to the movement achieving its early goals. However, I will also argue that critical pedagogies, despite the fact that they share those original goals, are the biggest threat to the movement. Included in this chapter will be discussions and analyses of specific service-learning pedagogical tactics and strategies.

In Chapter Four, I will outline my proposal for a postmodern, post-critical service-learning pedagogy. I will derive my theoretical base from the concepts of Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault, who, strictly speaking, may not be classified postmodern, but whose thoughts are the definitive forerunners of postmodernism. I am particularly interested in Foucault’s and Heidegger’s concepts of Self and Other and their observations about language, as well as Foucault’s observations on knowledge and power. In addition, I will look to the ways that Jacques Derrida, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Gilles Delueze, Felix Guattari, and Giorgio Agamben have reconfigured and advanced the concepts first formulated in Heideggarian and Foucauldian thought to arrive at what is now referred to as post-critical theory. The important concepts of these postmodern, post-critical theorists
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Chapter 5 includes a discussion of two possible, practical contexts for a post-modern, post-critical service-learning pedagogy: experimental pedagogies and distance-learning pedagogies. I will especially be concerned with the seemingly limitless possibilities offered by technological advances in distance learning. This chapter will also include a discussion of a hybrid course I developed in the summer of 2012 and taught in the fall of 2012.
Notes to Introduction

1Crowley is not calling for the abolishment of the first-year course, but rather for the abolishment of the requirement. I think it safe to say that if we abolished the requirement, we might as well abolish the course. In my 10 years of teaching First-Year English I have never had a student take the course as an elective. All of them are there because the course is a requirement, and some of them put off taking the course until their junior and senior years.

2This is a reference to Kenneth Burke’s reading of Herbert Read’s Poetry and Anarchism in which Burke points out, “in the realm of the soul, the lion and the lamb may lie down together, but in the realm of the body, the lion either eats the lamb or starves.” Nevertheless, Anderson claims rhetors often use this utopian theme to persuade audiences to overcome their differences.

3Delueze & Guattari allude to a symbiotic relationship in which the wasp and the orchid exist in a “shared proximity” in which the “discernibility of points disappears.”
Chapter 2

Structuralism, Poststructuralism and the English Wars

There is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.

Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*

The function of this center was not only to orient, balance and organize the structure----one cannot in fact conceive of an unorganized structure----but above all to make sure that the organizing principle of the structure would limit what we might call the freeplay of the structure.

Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences”

Perrot: And there’s no point for the prisoners in taking over the central tower?
Foucault: Oh yes, provided that isn’t the final purpose of the operation. Do you think it would be better to have the prisoners operating the Panoptic apparatus and sitting in the tower instead of the guards?

*Power / Knowledge*

In October of 1966 at a conference at Johns Hopkins University, Jacques Derrida introduced Poststructuralism into the American university with the presentation of his seminal work “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences.” The world of Literary Criticism has never been the same; nor has the discipline of English Studies. The advent of the poststructuralist movement coincided with other historical events that were to have a profound effect on the American university, in particular, and American society in general. The Feminist and Civil Rights movements of the early 1960s, along with the university open enrollment policies of the late 60s and early 70s, combined with poststructuralist theory to spark a bitter and divisive debate that, to this day, embroils all aspects of the discipline.
In the decades prior to these events, The New Critical Paradigm had been the model for literary criticism, scholarship and pedagogy. But with the rapid influx of women and minorities into the university population and the emergence of poststructuralist theory, the traditional paradigm, along with its underlying assumptions and methodologies, came under increasing attack. In spite of staunch resistance from both inside and outside the discipline, these forces of change succeeded in toppling the paradigm and, in the process, blurring the boundaries that had previously "mapped" the discipline, boundaries that had made clear distinctions between theory and practice, reading and writing, print and oral literature, high culture and pop culture, English Studies and other disciplines and, perhaps most importantly between "works" of Literature and other "texts." Of course these boundaries did much more than simply make distinctions between these enterprises; they also evaluated them and privileged one over the other. With its disciplinary map in tatters, the field of English Studies was forced to redefine its theories, its practices, its objects of study, and its purpose within the university. As a result, profound and fundamental differences have surfaced in English Departments across the country producing animosity, confusion, and open splits along theoretical lines.

Although the repercussions were felt in all areas of the discipline, this chapter will discuss the special implications for one of the most bitterly contested "spaces" within English Studies: the composition classroom. That this particular disciplinary space should become such a hotbed of controversy is especially ironic since composition, to this point, had not only been ignored by most tenured faculty, it had also been the object of much disdain and even ridicule. Such sentiments are reflected in William Riley Parker's characterization of
composition as "an unfortunate historical accident" (qtd. in *Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures* 19). As a result, the teaching of composition was primarily left to under-paid and over-worked adjunct faculty and graduate students, who themselves were often ignored or treated with disdain by veteran faculty members. The dramatic changes that took place in the 1960s resulted in Rhetoric and Composition becoming a legitimate discipline within English Studies; however, the discipline remains a source of conflict and controversy in many universities to this day.

Part of the reason for the continuing controversy can be described as "territorial." In spite of the influence of Poststructuralism, the majority of tenured faculty in English departments still hold PhD's in Literature, and many of them still view those who teach and study composition as "second-class citizens." That this is so, is evident in Donald McQuade’s claim that composition is still "situated marginally as the necessary ‘other’ along the boundaries of literature and literary criticism" in spite of the fact that it "continues to underwrite" the work of these more established disciplines (484). In spite of this, more and more graduate students are opting out of literature in favor of Rhetoric and Composition, finding in the new discipline a sense of worth and purpose. Understandably, this poses a threat to those who have devoted their careers to literature.

Still another source of contention is that while its detractors insist that practitioners in this field have "politicized" the classroom, those of us in the field of Rhetoric and Composition will argue that the classroom is always, already political. What has changed, of course, is that prior to the 1960s, the politics of the classroom were "invisible"; that is, they
served to merely reinforce the status quo or the interests of the more privileged in American society. All of that changed with the influx of a new student population that did not share the politics or basic assumptions of the more privileged class. These new students were largely concentrated in freshman composition classrooms, since it was still one of the few universally required courses. There, they were to have a profound effect on this fledgling discipline, its practitioners, and the theories and methodologies that would continue to redefine and re-configure the discipline.

CTR: The Rise and Fall of a Paradigm

To understand just how dramatically the field of English Studies has changed over the last several decades, it is first necessary to understand the theories and methodologies that constituted the pre-1960s disciplinary landscape. As I have already stated, New Critical Theory was firmly entrenched as the governing literary theory, and since English Departments are first and foremost Literature Departments, the underlying assumptions of New Critical theory informed all aspects of the discipline from literary production (rhetoric) and consumption (Literature) to pedagogical theories and practices. One of the more important of these assumptions was the belief that the meaning of any literary work could be "objectively" derived from the text itself—apart from any "authorial intent" or subjective reader response and divorced from all social and political contexts. Implicit in this assumption is the belief that literary works are ahistorical; that is, their meanings are not only privileged, they are also permanent. And, because these critics were less concerned with what the poem said, than in how it said it, this form of criticism absolved the individual of the responsibility to take any social or political action. Or, as Eagleton puts it, it was a “recipe for
political inertia, and thus for submission to the status quo” (43). It was in this impotent form that New Critical Theory entered the American university in the 1940s and quickly became the ruling paradigm.

Current Traditional Rhetoric (CTR), heavily influenced by British New Rhetoric, had been the prevailing rhetorical theory in American colleges since the mid-nineteenth century. This rhetorical theory is grounded in the modern worldview that dominated Western thought for nearly three hundred years. According to Crowley, the terms used to describe the modern worldview are “precisely those of modernism” and the definitive statement of modernism is Descartes’ “cogito ergo sum” (The Methodical Memory 4-5). Crowley claims the modern epistemology with “its insistence on the superiority of reason, its interest in systems, and its assumption that language is a docile, reflective medium, was inimical to rhetoric” (The Methodical Memory 10). Under this rhetorical theory, the Freshman English course idealized the five-paragraph essay, privileged the single authorial mind, and tended to equate students’ writing with their character (Crowley Composition in the University 76-77). These were characteristics that made CTR and New Critical Theory immensely compatible. Teachers of composition suddenly had a new rationale for introducing literary texts into the writing classroom; they served as “models of current traditional discourse” (Crowley, Composition in the University 114). This “merger” served a dual-purpose: composition drills introduced students to the disciplines of academic discourse and reading literary texts instilled moral values.

According to Eagleton, New Criticism served the university well until the 1950s when American society grew even more scientific and managerial and demanded an even more
ambitious form of “critical technocracy” (79). This more systematic and scientific criticism came in the form of Northrop Frye’s *Anatomy of Criticism* (Eagleton 79). While Frye follows in the humanist tradition of Arnold and Richards, his theory can also be described as *structuralism* and it coincided with the growth of Classical Structuralism in Europe. An important aspect of literary structuralism is its application of structural linguists to Literature. According to Ferdinand de Saussure, the founder of modern, structural linguistics, language is made up of a system of “signs” or arbitrary relationships between a signifier and the signified that in themselves have no meaning. Rather, each sign in the system has meaning only by virtue of its difference from other signs (Eagleton 84). Like the New Critics, Saussure was less interested in the meaning of signs than he was in their structure. In fact, he believed that in order to study language effectively, the referent of the sign had to be placed in "brackets" (Eagleton 84). Like structural linguistics and formalism, structuralism brackets off the actual *content* of the story and concentrates entirely on the *form*. Nevertheless, Eagleton credits structuralism itself with making some gains. First, it demystified literature by recognizing that the literary work, like every other product of language, is a *construct* whose mechanisms can be classified and analyzed like the objects of any other science. Secondly, it questioned literature's claim to a privileged status as a unique form of discourse, since all texts could be shown to contain the same deep structures found in literary works. But most importantly, the structuralists' emphasis on the "constructedness" of all human meaning represented a major advance. According to this theory, meaning is neither a private experience, nor a divinely ordained occurrence; it is a product of a shared system of signification. What meaning we are able to articulate depends on what script or speech we share. Therefore, it was no longer
possible to see reality simply as something "out there;" a fixed order of things which
language merely reflects (Eagleton 93). In other words, reality is not external to language;
rather reality is constituted by language. This realization should have put an end to the
"correspondence theory of language"—the belief that the "word" corresponds directly with
the "referent"—a theory closely aligned with Aristotle's "correspondence theory of
knowledge." But it would be decades before this alternative view of language had any
practical impact in the composition classroom. And, that fact is perhaps owing to the
shortcomings that Eagleton attributes to structuralism. That is, despite their espousing the
cultural variability of signifying systems, structuralists insisted that the laws that governed
these systems were “universal” and “embedded in a collective mind that transcended any
particular culture.” In this way structuralism is, in Eagleton's words, "hair-raisingly
unhistorical" (95). And, because structuralism insisted on "bracketing off reality," it was
incapable of seeing literature as social practice and incapable of inquiring into the material
conditions surrounding the production and consumption of works of literature. In this sense,
there was little difference between structuralism and New Criticism (Eagleton 97).
Nevertheless, New Criticism (and its rhetorical counterpart, Current-Traditional Rhetoric),
now heavily influenced by structuralism, was to remain the dominant literary theory for
decades. The pedagogical implications of this theory, particularly Current Traditional
Rhetoric (CTR), were to have decidedly adverse effects on the already beleaguered field of
Composition Studies.

In Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, author Michel Foucault makes it
clear that the difference in the disciplines of the human sciences and the discipline imposed by
the prison system is just a matter of degree. In fact, according to Foucault, penal law and the human sciences share a "common matrix"; that is, they both derive from the same source: the "technology of power" (Discipline 22). Foucault goes on to say, "at the heart of all disciplinary systems functions a small penal mechanism" (Discipline 177). More to the point, Foucault insists, "in its function, the power to punish is not essentially different from that of curing or educating" (Discipline 303). Calls for reform in both disciplines have been continuous, because, until very recently, both the discipline of composition and the penal system had proved ineffective in achieving their stated purposes. But a closer look at Foucault's work demonstrates that the discipline of composition, like the penal system, may appear to fail at its "stated purpose," but it is actually very effective at achieving its hidden agenda.

Foucault reveals that agenda in his observations about the links between knowledge and power. It is important to note here that when Foucault claims there is a relationship between power and knowledge, he is not merely implying that knowledge "empowers" those who possess it. He has something far more sinister in mind. What he is referring to is a particular mastery of the body that he calls “the political technology of the body” (Discipline 26). It is his claim that the physical architecture of the prison with its methods of surveillance, examination, recording and dividing---its panoptic functioning and the human sciences (psychology, education, sociology and medicine) make possible a “knowledge of the body” that extends and reinforces the effects of power. According to Foucault, prison merely continues “a work begun elsewhere, which the whole of society pursues on each individual through innumerable mechanisms of discipline” (Discipline 302-03). For Foucault, the only
difference between the discipline of the educational system and the discipline of the penal system is a matter of degree.

The subtitle of Foucault's book is *The Birth of the Prison*, but what he is really concerned with is not merely a history of the penal system, although that is certainly part of his story. But running parallel to that history is the history of the "incarceration" of man's soul; not a Christian soul, born in sin and subject to punishment; but rather, a soul born out of the methods of punishment, supervision, and constraint (*Discipline* 29). This soul is both the effect and the instrument of incarceration, a fact that allows Foucault to claim, "the soul is the prison of the body" (*Discipline* 30). This soul is produced permanently around, on, and within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised over those imprisoned, but also, over those who are supervised, trained or corrected, cured, schooled, colonized, and those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives (*Discipline* 29).

*Discipline and Punish* (the main title) are the "mechanisms of normalization" by which this incarceration is achieved: for, as Foucault points out, the art of punishment that pervades every disciplinary institution "compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it normalizes" (*Discipline* 183). Normalization is a crucial process in the incarceration of the soul, because it has the effect of reducing political dissent, while at the same time, increasing productivity. The invention of this new "political anatomy" (the productive, but obedient body) was not a sudden discovery; nor was it an accident; rather, it evolved in response to the needs of particular political and economic structures (*Discipline* 138). In short, it developed in response to the needs of capitalism and the economic expansion of the West (*Discipline* 221).
James Berlin makes claims similar to those of Foucault when he points out that college curricula are devices for creating a certain kind of consciousness and behavior—a certain kind of "student"—in response to the internal demands of faculty and the disciplines they serve, as well as, to external political and economic demands (Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures 17). Berlin points out that in the nineteenth century the small liberal arts college in America met the demands of entrepreneurial capitalism by preparing wealthy young men to assume their roles as civic and moral leaders within their professional and social communities. The curricula in these colleges centered on three to four years of rhetoric in which students brought to bear the fruits of their learning in public performances and written essays. At the same time, these institutions ignored the needs of commerce and manufacturing, staunchly resisting the implementation of any scientific or technical courses. However, at the end of the century, in response to the economic shift from entrepreneurial capitalism to corporate capitalism, these small colleges were replaced by large research universities that were designed to serve the economic and social needs of the larger society, or at least the needs of the more powerful groups in that society. Universities were now charged with conducting empirical studies in the sciences and finding ways to improve farming, mining, manufacturing, and commerce. And, because corporate capitalism required fewer "leaders" than did entrepreneurial capitalism, universities took on the task of training professionals, who at the mid-management level, could use their expertise to produce increased profits for businesses (Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures 18).

Of course the college curriculum had to be adjusted to meet these new demands, and Berlin insists that at the center of this transformation was the emergence of a heretofore non-
existent disciplinary field—English Studies. However, it is important to note that what emerged as English Studies was almost completely divorced from the studies in Classical Rhetoric that were so important in preparing young men for leadership roles in a democratic society. This new configuration called English Studies was at the center of a “comprehensive certification process” that provided the now compulsory public education system with professionals who were trained, not only to teach "proper" English to American elementary and high school students, but more importantly, to help assimilate the vast numbers of immigrants from eastern and southern Europe into cultural norms defined in specifically Anglo-Protestant terms. Joel Spring defines this process in more Foucauldian terms when he claims that the most important goal of the twentieth century school system was the development of human capital (qtd.in *Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures* 23). This process of normalization served corporate capitalism in two ways: High schools produced workers with lower-level skills that fed the ever-increasing demands of the manufacturing sector and universities produced high school teachers, as well as, mid- and upper-level professionals who served the managerial needs of corporate America.

Under this system, high schools became "sorting machines" that further reinforced class distinctions through the use of curricula that helped decide the future occupations and income levels of the young students it sought to educate. Likewise, university curricula were re-designed to fill the needs of what Berlin calls the "new scientific meritocracy" that evolved along with, and in response to, corporate capitalism (*Rhetorics, Poetics, and Culture* 28). Although the English Department played a central role in the new science-oriented university, in many ways it was a subservient role, because the new "science-centered"
curriculum dictated profound changes in the teaching methods of literary scholarship (text consumption) and those of writing instruction (text production). In fact, it is probably more accurate to say that the purpose and function of English Studies was completely transformed by the external political and economic forces at work in the country at this time. While a liberal arts curriculum that centered on Classical Rhetoric had prepared privileged young men to assume active, decision-making roles in politics and society—much the same as Classical Rhetoric had originally prepared privileged young Athenian males to take an active role in a participatory democracy—the new science-based curriculum provided students with the necessary skills and credentials to succeed, first and foremost in the world of commerce.

That is not to say that rhetoric disappeared from the English department; it remained, but in a truncated form that bore little resemblance to what had been the oldest and most prominent discipline in American and European education. Composition is the abbreviated and subservient form that rhetoric assumed in the new English department that was now primarily concerned with the teaching of literary texts. And, because literature is associated with talent, while composition is associated with skills, writing became, literally and figuratively a "discipline," a matter of drills in which students were required to produce "models of correctness" in terms of punctuation, grammar, spelling, and syntax. McQuade explains that this distinction between the "practical" (composition) and the "aesthetic" (literature) reflected society's demand for literate workers and consumers, as well as, the desire of one class to distinguish their interests and tastes from those of other classes (489-90).

McQuade further argues that the widespread adoption of the values and assumptions
of New Critical Theory might well have been the most important obstacle to composition studies' halting progress towards self-identification and the articulation of an intellectual foundation on which to build an independent, professional status. Principal among these assumptions is the notion that the purpose of composition is to serve the more privileged interests of literature (492-93). If, as McQuade argues, the distinction between the practical and the aesthetic reflects American society's desire for class distinctions, then it is entirely reasonable to assume that that same society shares the notion that the strictly "utilitarian" in society should serve the needs of the more privileged. Seen in this way, theories of literary criticism become much more than hermeneutic devices for interpreting literary texts; they become ways of describing and explaining "the way things are." Or, as Eagleton argues, literature and ideology are not separate phenomena; literature is an ideology (19). Moreover, claims Eagleton, literary theory is inextricably bound up with political beliefs and ideological values (170).

Berlin makes similar claims about rhetoric, noting that every rhetoric has at its base a conception of reality, of human nature, and of language. Rhetoric is therefore implicated in all aspects of society (Writing Instruction in Nineteenth-Century American Colleges 2). Berlin argues that rhetoric is a social invention, arising out of a particular social context and establishing, for a period of time, the conditions that make communication possible. At any given time, there are any number of rhetorics competing for dominance; however, no rhetoric is permanent. Rather, rhetorics, like their poetic counterparts (literary theories), evolve in response to political and social conditions (Writing Instruction in Nineteenth-Century American Colleges 1). Just as teaching a particular literary theory involves much
more than merely interpreting literary texts, teaching students to write according to a particular rhetorical theory involves much more than teaching them how to perform an instrumental task. According to Berlin, in the composition classroom, students are being taught assumptions about what is real and what is not, how to know one from the other, how to communicate the real, and how language works. In other words, they are being indoctrinated into a basic epistemology, usually the one held by society's dominant class (Writing Instruction in Nineteenth-Century American Colleges 2).

The prevailing rhetorical theory in early English Departments was Current-Traditional Rhetoric (CTR). In fact, the prevalence of CTR accounts for the truncated form that rhetoric assumed in the new scientific curriculum. Unlike the rhetoric of ancient Greece and Rome, CTR dealt in certainties, not in probability. There was, therefore, no need to teach invention, the first and most important canon of rhetoric, because, according to Berlin, practitioners of CRT believed that the "truths" of all matters, whether political or logistical, reveal themselves under the correct application of scientific investigation (Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures 29). In other words, CTR relied on “reason” or the “rational” as its only “way of knowing.” The pedagogical strategies derived from this theory also imply that students are either incapable of thinking or, worse; they should be discouraged from thinking.

Certainly, there is evidence to suggest that the former is true; some college professors believed their students incapable of thought. Richard Marius notes that with the establishment of the new English Departments, literature became the "bible" and its professors the "high priests." As such, these "high priests" were certain that students of composition were
incapable of writing anything worth reading (471). Marius blames what he calls "the impoverishment of the student mind" on the death of rhetoric in the late nineteenth century, adding that because composition teachers had no grounding in rhetoric, they had no tools to analyze the thought and development of student papers or to help students say something intelligent and worthwhile (472). As a result, composition instructors were reduced to teaching the lesser canons of rhetoric—*arrangement* (a five-part structure that eventually morphed into the dreaded five-paragraph essay) and *style* (style involves "dressing up previously formulated ideas in attractive verbal garb") (Bizzell and Herzberg, Introduction 6). Their pedagogical methods included teaching the "rules," assigning daily "theme writing," and "marking" (correcting) those themes. As such, very little "thought" was required of either the teacher or the student. This impoverished rhetoric, combined with the New Critics' insistence on "bracketing off reality," also stripped the composition classroom of what should have been its "content"—social and political reality.

Unfortunately, the latter is probably also true; this curriculum reflects the belief that students should be discouraged from thinking. As Foucault and Berlin have both argued, the educational system is less concerned with "educating" students than it is with producing a particular kind of behavior or a particular kind of student; in other words, the curriculum is designed to *normalize*. In Foucauldian terms, normalization involves increasing productivity, while stifling dissent. A rhetoric that emphasizes "correctness" in terms of form, but is devoid of any "content" (meaning) would certainly encourage the very behavior this curriculum is designed to produce—acquiescence. What made this approach even more effective, however, was that English departments found other "content" with which to supply the
composition classroom—canonical literature. According to McQuade, under this "managerial" form of instruction, students were required to produce "models of correctness" that were the products of rigorously controlled analyses of literature drawn from a designated list of standard authors (490). This practice put composition squarely in the service of literary criticism, and, as we have already seen, literary criticism, as practiced by New Critics, is utterly incapable of resistance.

In spite of, or perhaps because of, its obvious limitations, CTR remained the governing paradigm until the 1970's, because, according to Berlin, the American economy remained essentially unchanged until the latter half of the 20th Century. During that time, a period that Berlin refers to as Fordism, corporate capitalism demanded highly skilled professionals, who were trained in very narrow fields of specialization. All of that changed in the 1970's with the advent of "Post-Fordism" or the "regime of flexible accumulation" (43) or what we now refer to as "globalization."

One of the features of "flexible accumulation" is an accelerated cycle time in production, which, in turn, demands an accelerated cycle time in consumption. As a result, there was now an increased demand for well-educated workers in the fields of advertising, marketing and public relations who could entice the public into the kind of rampant consumption that this stage of capitalism demands. Additional well-paying service jobs have been created by the new information industries that provide up-to-date analyses of market trends and consumer preferences. As David Harvey points out in The Condition of Postmodernity, today's markets are as much created as they are identified and, as such, control over the flow of information and "the vehicles of propagation of public taste and culture"
have become vital weapons in the global marketplace (160). In order to succeed in this global economy, today's workers must possess skills that are as diverse and adaptable as the ever-shifting markets they hope to control. Chief among these required skills are excellent communicative (rhetorical / persuasive) skills, proficiency in new technologies, and recognition of, and training in, cultural diversity. This economic revolution or what Berlin refers to as "Post-Fordism" coincided with Derrida's introduction of poststructuralism into the American University, and with good reason, for the two movements have much in common. In fact, what is central to each of these movements is a decentering: In the case of Post-Fordism, economic markets and their centers (cities) are decentralized or dispersed both on the local level and on a global level; while post-structuralism features a decentering of the text, a term that under the influence of poststructuralism, takes on a radical new meaning. Again it is no accident that poststructuralism emerged as the dominant theory at the same time that the world went to a global, decentered economy. The fact is, CTR was ill-equipped to handle the demands of a student population that now needed to be proficient in new technologies, possessed of diverse skills and attuned to cultural and ethnic diversity. The theories and assumptions of poststructuralism would prove to be much more in line with the fast-paced, rapidly-changing, decentered global economy.

Poststructuralism and the Linguistic Turn

Derrida introduces poststructuralism as an “event” or "rupture," that occurred in the history of the “concept of structure” (“Structure, Sign and Play” 247). This event or occurred when "language invaded the universal problematic; that is which, in the absence of a center or
Derrida claims that before this rupture, the "center"—that defined the whole history of the concept of "structure"—was simply a "series of substitutions of center for center." All the terms or substitutions for this center—eidos, arche, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject) aletheia, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man—were based on the concept of being as presence in all senses of the word (249). Derrida also claims that this decentering did not begin with him, but that it already "has begun to proclaim itself and begun to work" (249-50). Although he claims it would be naive to designate one event, doctrine, or author as having begun the "rupture," he does credit Martin Heidegger with "destruction of metaphysics," or put another way, the destruction of the "determination of being as presence" (250).

Indeed, in his seminal work, Being and Time, Heidegger goes to great lengths to first prove that Aristotle theorized being as constant presence and then to debunk that theory. The destruction of this Aristotelian concept is crucial to Heidegger's own philosophy, because as Thomas Kisiel points out, Aristotle's view posits being as a "finished product" or the being in which "movement has come to an end" (268). This view also reflects the ancient Greek desire for "a world in which nothing more can really happen" (301). These views are antithetical to the Heideggarian concept of authentic Being as a dynamic "being in the situation." According to Heidegger, "when the call of conscience summons us to our can-be, it does not hold before us some empty ideal of existence, but calls us forth into the situation" (347). And, rather than seeing being as a "finished product,\(^3\) " Heidegger insists that Dasein's "can-be" is its "possibilities" and, further, that all three dimensions of time past, present and future are
"permeated by possibility" (qtd.in Kisiel 439). For Heidegger, authentic being is never simply "present;" rather, being is always "futural," always a being-in-the-world, and always a being in relation (relative) to other beings. Further, for Heidegger, authentic being is constituted by what he calls temporality, a concept of "time" that is both, and in same instance, certain and indeterminate.

Derrida points out that Nietzsche and Freud also contributed to the destruction of the concept of "presence." Nietzsche's contribution was a critique of the metaphysical concepts of being and truth, for which he substituted the concepts of "play, interpretation, and sign (sign without truth present)". And Freud, of course, with his critique of consciousness demonstrated that we are not even "present" to ourselves, nor are we entirely possessed of ourselves; instead, our behavior is often governed by the "unconscious," of which, of course, we are not conscious. But, what may be most important is that all three of these theorists called into question Aristotle's correspondence theory of truth and the ability of language to reflect that truth. Despite these critiques, the logo-centered paradigm, CTR, remained intact until the advent of poststructuralism and it continues to influence the discipline to this day.

Perhaps the paradigm held for so long because, as Derrida observes "man…through the history of all his history---has dreamed of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of the game" (264-65). In other words, the one human yearning that seems to underlie all metaphysical worldviews is the yearning for certainty, constancy, and immutable truth, or, as Derrida puts it, "fundamental immobility" and "reassuring certitude" (248). Eagleton too claims that behind structuralism's "embarrassment with the problem of historical change" lies a worldview that sees change as "disturbance and disequilibrium as an essentially
conflict-free system, which will stagger for a moment, regain its balance and take the change in stride" (96). It is possible that this aversion to change represents a "natural," human yearning, but it is also possible that it simply represents the yearning of those in power to stay in power. This idea that humans are somehow "naturally" averse to change is one that will not hold up in the context of my later discussions of postmodern capitalism.

But there is still another explanation for the enduring power of this paradigm, and it is one that Derrida, himself, points out. Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Freud all used concepts inherited from metaphysics to destroy the concepts of metaphysics, thus trapping themselves in a "sort of circle." According to Derrida, because "we have no language—no syntax and no lexicon—which is alien to this history, we cannot utter a single destructive proposition which has not already slipped into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest' ("Structure, Sign and Play" 250). And, although these theorists contested the "meaning" of the metaphysical "sign," they did so by seeking to "reduce" it (by submitting it to thought). However, they were unable to do so, because "the metaphysical reduction of the sign needed the opposition it was reducing...the opposition is part of the system, along with the reduction." This paradox, this entrapment within the circle, is what allowed these "destroyers" to destroy one another in a critical exercise of "destructive discourses" (Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play” 251). In other words, because Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Freud constructed their theories in opposition to metaphysics, but did so using metaphysical terms, in so defining themselves, they made the opposition an essential part of their own theories, thereby guaranteeing its preservation.
Derrida is determined not to engage in destructive discourse. He prefers to call his method "deconstruction," which he points out has nothing to do with "destruction" (271). By refusing to posit his theory in opposition to structuralism, Derrida is moving into the realm of postcriticism. Although he is critical of structuralism, he is not attempting to destroy the structuralist concept of a "center," but, rather, to "situate" the center, not as a "being or reality," but as an indispensable "function" (271). This delocation of the center allows for what Derrida calls "freeplay" or the "disruption of presence." But Derrida sees this "disruption" not as a "loss" or "lack of something," but rather, as an "affirmation" that produces a "surplus of meaning" (262). In other words, with no "transcendental signifier" to ground the text or to limit or "fix" the meaning of the text, the text opens itself to the endless processes of difference, deferral, and undecidability (Agger 58-59). While Derrida convincingly demonstrates that meaning is never fully "present" in the "word," that conviction does nothing to undermine the importance of language. To the contrary, in a poststructuralist world, language becomes, not a representational tool that we use, but rather, the very thing we are made of, the very air that we breathe (Eagleton 112-13). In fact, it is the very means by which we constitute the "text" that is ourselves and our world.

As I have already stated, with the coming of poststructuralism, the term "text" took on a radical new meaning. John Carlos Rowe points out that under poststructuralism "every aspect of human experience became a 'text'—that is, a signifying system." He goes on to say that although poststructuralism is often criticized as being "ethically relativist or radically skeptical" that, in fact, poststructuralism "gave academic credibility to the moral conviction that the more self-conscious we are about the ways we use language, the more
likely we are to improve our social and human relations" (Rowe 189). Likewise, Derrida claims that we must be "alert to the implications, to the historical sedimentation of the language we use" ("Structure, Sign and Play" 271). Language (discourse) is also crucial to Foucault's argument concerning the structures of discipline and power, because it is from discourse and its underlying discursive practices that social texts derive their power (Agger 140). It is also important to note that under poststructuralism, and particularly postmodernism, language becomes discourse, because neither school of theory is interested in studying the structure of language; rather, they are concerned with language at the level of utterance; that is, language as social practice.

In this respect, poststructuralists are closer to the theory of language espoused by Mikhail Bakhtin, one of the most important critics of Saussurean linguistics. Bakhtin focused his study on the utterances of people within social contexts, rather than the "abstract system of langue." For Bakhtin, the "sign" was less a neutral element in a given system, than a focus of struggle and contradiction. In short, language was a field of ideological contention in which signs themselves were the very material medium of ideology, and, as such, were always inescapably shot through with valuations (Eagleton 101-02).

These observations give credence to Berlin's claim that in teaching students how to read, write, and interpret texts, we are indoctrinating them into a basic epistemology, and until very recently, that epistemology has been the one held by the dominant social class. Therefore, teachers of composition must be concerned not just with the "text," but with the text that is the world—the social reality in which they and their students live. And,
because that reality has been "constructed," it can also be "deconstructed," and possibly even "reconstructed" in such a way that allows for the liberation of the Foucauldian "soul."

If indeed the possibility of liberation ever existed, it was never more so than in the late 1960s and early 1970s when the forces of poststructuralism, a new, demographically diverse student population, and militant civil rights and anti-war movements converged on American universities in what might be called "the perfect storm." As Berlin points out, these changes in the academy were paralleled by dramatic economic changes, both of which called for changes in the curriculum, changes that would meet the demands of a more "democratic" student population, as well as, those of a more "flexible" economy. These changes were taking place at the same time that students in France were manning the barricades and preparing for a confrontation with the apparatus of state power. As Eagleton puts it, this was a time of "social hope, political militancy, and high theory." Nor was this conjuncture accidental, for as Eagleton points out, "high theory tends to break out when routine social and intellectual practices run into trouble and are forced to rethink themselves" (190).

This was certainly the case in English departments when the long-standing New Critical Paradigm and its rhetorical counterpart, Current Traditional Rhetoric, finally succumbed to the forces of change. As a result, faculty members in English Studies were forced to rethink their most basic assumptions about their objects of study, their critical methods, and their pedagogical theories and practices. Poststructuralism produced profound and enduring changes in almost every aspect of the discipline. Women and minorities rewrote the literary canon so as to include voices that had long been suppressed.
Likewise, course offerings began to reflect the demands and needs of an increasingly diverse student population. These included courses in Women's Studies, Critical Theory, Cultural Studies, minority literatures, and upper-level writing courses. In addition, writing courses at every level began to emphasize the importance of linking writing with computer technology. Even the faculty in English departments began to reflect the move towards diversity by hiring more women for tenure-track positions; although other minorities failed to achieve any significant representation. In addition, search committees began to actively seek PhD's in Rhetoric and Composition to staff First Year English courses, upper-level writing courses, courses in Cultural Studies and Rhetoric, and graduate courses. However, in spite of the importance of, and increasing demand for, writing and writing-intensive courses, the majority of tenure-track positions were, and still are, held by specialists in various "periods" of Literature. One consequence of these hiring practices has been that the vast majority of First Year English courses are still taught by adjunct faculty and graduate students; a further consequence is that Rhetoric / Composition continues to occupy a servile and often tenuous position within the department.

After the Fall: The Emergence of Competing Rhetorics

In spite of these drawbacks, by mid-1960, those engaged in composition studies had begun to articulate the distinctive features of their work and to build an impressive body of research. Contributions to composition research began to appear with increasing frequency in journals such as *College English* and *College Composition and Communication*. However, the turning point in composition studies may well have been the Dartmouth Conference of 1966, which was sponsored by the Modern Language Association and the National Council
of Teachers of English, and which brought together teachers and scholars from all levels of education and from both sides of the Atlantic to discuss the status and the future of English Studies. A major outgrowth of the conference was the increased attention given to the self-expressive purposes of writing. As a result, in the years that followed, composition instruction shifted from repetitive exercises that produced formulaic essays to a focus on writing as a tool for learning about oneself and about the world (McQuade 496). Still another important result of these changes—one that's importance cannot be overstated—was that the content of the composition classroom changed.

As McQuade claims, after Dartmouth, much emphasis was placed on the value of personal expression in the writing process. This was perhaps a natural response to the decades of dry, formulaic, lifeless, detached "models of correctness" produced under the CTR paradigm. At any rate, the first "new" theory of rhetoric to emerge was Expressionist Rhetoric, and, like its name implies, it encourages students to learn about themselves by expressing themselves in writing. Its pedagogical / inventionial methods include journal keeping, freewriting, one-on-one conferencing, and exploratory writing. The underlying theory of reality is one that emphasizes individuality and views truth as a matter of internal perception. Moreover, its practitioners believe these internal truths can be expressed through language, provided one can find his or her "authentic voice." "Platonic," in nature, this theory of rhetoric holds that "truth" is a matter of inner vision, and although truth transcends language, through the use of metaphor, language can suggest what is beyond the senses and beyond language (Berlin, Writing Instruction in Nineteenth Century American Colleges 89).

The most influential proponents of this theory include Ken Marjorie, Peter Elbow, Donald
Stewart, Stephen Judy, and William Coles, Jr. The most important contribution that this theory of rhetoric makes to composition is that it puts students at the center of the composing process; in other words, their self-expression becomes the *content* of the writing classroom. However, it does so at the expense of the "social." This theory ignores the social and political ramifications of discourse; it ignores the Heideggarian concept of *authentic Being* as a "being-in-a-world" (in the *situation*) and "being-with-other-beings;" it also ignores the constitutive nature of language. In spite of these short-comings, this rhetoric remained popular well into the 1980s and is still in use today, especially in the first semester of composition.

As Berlin points out, at any given time there are a number of rhetorics competing for dominance; this was especially true in the three decades immediately following the collapse of CRT when competing theories of rhetoric rushed to fill the power vacuum created in the wake of that collapse. Like all rhetorics, each of these contenders has its basis in a particular view of reality and a particular theory of language from which it derives its pedagogical practices. Equally important, each of them is accompanied by a theory of invention—the first and most important canon of rhetoric and the one most neglected by CRT. The most influential rhetorical theories to come out of this time period, in addition to Expressionist rhetoric, were Neo-Classical and Social-Epistemic.

Particularly at odds with Expressionist Rhetoric were those who sought to revive Aristotelian Rhetoric. In an effort to revive the social and political nature of rhetoric, Sharon Crowley and Edward Corbett turned to the rhetoric of the oldest known democracy and attempted to apply Ancient Greek concepts and terms to the poststructural / postmodern classroom. They experienced limited success, however, in part because students had difficulty
relating to terms such as _inventio, enthymeme, topoi, stasis,_ etc., and because, like Ancient Greek democracy, Aristotelian Rhetoric is limited. Although the turn toward the "social" is to be applauded, this rhetoric confines "invention" to the "available" means of argument. If those means are already available, then there is nothing new to discover; rather, the student merely has to consult the _topoi_ and decide which formula best suits his or her "issue." And, in spite of numerous attempts to rewrite, redeem, or otherwise reclaim Aristotle for the postmodern period, the fact remains that his rhetoric adheres to the correspondence theory of truth and to the belief that language can express (represent) that truth—two concepts very much out of step with Postmodern thought.

The Sophists

On the other hand, there were rhetoricians in ancient Greece whose views were more in line with our postmodern age. When scholars in the field of rhetoric began in earnest to restore the ancient practice to a central role in the curriculum, they were not content to simply revive Classical Rhetoric; rather, they went in search of an ancient rhetoric that better reflected their postmodern viewpoints. They found that rhetoric in the philosophy of the ancient Sophists. Vilified in the _Platonic Dialogues_, and later by Aristotle, for centuries, the Sophists had been characterized as manipulative and deceitful. In fact, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle established themselves as philosophers of "absolute truth" by positioning their philosophy against the Sophists' belief in "provisional truth." By engaging in what Derrida would call "destructive discourse," Plato, in particular, succeeded in destroying the Sophists' reputations, as well as, their texts. However, some texts, along with some fragments, did survive and from those writings, and scholars have attempted to revive Sophistic Rhetoric.
According to Bizzell and Herzberg, the Sophists considered themselves philosophers in the classical sense, but because they believed that knowledge was accessible only through discourse, they practiced rhetoric as an intellectual exercise—a way of generating provisional or probable knowledge. Furthermore, the Sophists saw human nature, not as uniform, but rather, as shaped by social circumstances. Likewise, they did not argue that there was no difference in value pairs such as good and bad or just and unjust, but they saw the assignment of a particular value to any of these terms as dependent on social and historical circumstances. In other words, they appreciated the contingent relationship between truth and circumstances (Bizzell & Herzberg 22-23). It is also important to note that the Sophists exercised a healthy skepticism in their relationship to language. While they viewed language as the only means of attaining even provisional knowledge, they also realized that, as Antiphon observes, "when we speak there is no permanent reality behind our words." And, Gorgias notes that language is incapable of encompassing or communicating reality; hence, we exchange words, not realities (qtd.in Bizzell and Herzberg 24). It is not difficult to see why postmodern rhetoricians find the contingent and provisional philosophy of the ancient Sophists particularly attractive and useful.

Rhet / Comp Becomes a Berlian Landscape

What Berlin attempted to do was combine the social aspects of Classical Rhetoric and Social Constructionist Rhetoric with the provisional elements of Sophistic Rhetoric. According to Berlin, this rhetoric involves the study and critique of signifying practices in their relation to subject formation within the framework of economic, social and political conditions (Rhetorics, Poetics and Cultures 77). In developing this rhetoric, Berlin draws
from the earlier work of Harold Martin, Richard Ohmann, and Kenneth Bruffee, all of whom were involved in the Social Constructionist response to the racial and social injustices of the sixties and seventies. Berlin finds in their rhetoric an important commitment to preparing students for citizenship in a participatory democracy that demands communal participation in decision-making. However, he also finds fault with Social Constructionist rhetoric noting that it never abandons the notion of the individual as a sovereign free agent, it lacks a critique of economic conditions, arguing instead for the primacy of the political, it demonstrates a naiveté regarding power, and it accepts its own signifying practices as indisputably representative of "things-in-themselves" (Rhetorics, Poetics and Cultures 80).

Berlin's Social-Epistemic rhetoric retains this commitment to preparing students to become active, engaged citizens, but it departs from Social Constructionist theory in its embrace of the postmodern critique of such Enlightenment concepts as signification, the subject, and foundational narratives. Berlin notes that the subject of the rhetorical act is not the unified, coherent, autonomous, transcendent subject of liberal humanism; but rather, multiple and conflicted—a construct, a fabrication established through the devices of signification. Berlin does not deny that each of us possesses a "measure of singularity," but he insists that political agency, not individual autonomy, is the only possible means of resistance and negotiation in responding to the power-knowledge formations of discursive regimes. Likewise, the material conditions—political, social, and economic—to which the subject responds are also constructs of signifying practices. Berlin argues that these practices are always at the center of conflict and contention as different groups vie for the right to "name" experience, to own and control the meaning of terms in any given discourse situation. Here
Berlin is drawing from the “emancipation pedagogy” of Paulo Freire (Pedagogy of the Oppressed). Freire’s pedagogy is one of liberation from oppression, but, like Berlin’s, it relies too heavily on the modernist aims of emancipation and empowerment and on the power of rational argument (discourse).

The theory of language that underlies this rhetoric derives from Kenneth Burke’s formulation of language as "symbolic action"; that is, the belief that only through language do we know and act upon the conditions of our experience. From this perspective, language acts as a "terministic screen" that structures, rather than simply records, experience. Moreover, language is a social construction that shapes us as much as we shape it; it is a product of social relations and is therefore inextricably bound up in power and politics. The different language practices of various social groups are inscribed with ideological interpretations of "what really exists, what is really good, and what is politically possible." These ideological prescriptions translate into cultural codes that tacitly instruct group members in who they are, how they fit into the larger scheme, and the nature of the scheme itself (Rhetorics, Poetics and Cultures 86). Because both reading and writing are implicated in these ideological prescriptions, Berlin believes the English classroom should be the site at which theory, practice and politics intersect in an enlightened conception of the role English Studies plays in preparing students for their lives as citizens, workers, and sites of desire (Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures 94). While Berlin’s goals are laudable, we will see that his means of achieving those goals are problematic and that his strategies are often ineffective.

A Paradigm Shift or Simply a Binary Inversion?

Berlin's Social-Epistemic Rhetoric has been, by far, the most influential rhetoric to
emerge post 1960s. In fact, Berlin’s rhetoric contributed greatly to what many viewed as a “paradigm shift” in the fields of composition and rhetoric. As Social-Epistemic Rhetoric became the driving force in theory and pedagogy, social and political issues became the content of the classroom and raising the social consciousness of students became its primary purpose. Berlin insisted that rather than indoctrinating students into reading and writing practices of the prevailing ideologies of power, teachers of composition must challenge the underlying assumptions of those ideologies by exposing the discursive practices that preserved their power.

According to Berlin, the most effective means of accomplishing this objective is by providing students with methods for revealing the semiotic codes enacted in the production and consumption of texts (*Rhetorics, Poetics and Cultures* 89). Specifically, Berlin suggests that composition teachers take as their "content" the discourses of radio, television and film—in other words, popular culture. He insists that students engage in both the production and consumption of these media works as a means of demystifying and illuminating their characteristic textual practices and inherent ideological inscriptions. It is Berlin's belief that when students "gain some control" over these forms of reading and writing, they will become "active agents of social and political change, learning that the world has been made and can thus be remade to serve more justly the interests of a democratic society" (*Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures* 112). Simply put, Berlin trusts that when students are able to "de-code" the social semiotics at work in television shows such as *Roseanne* and *Family Ties*, as well as, the cultural codes implicit in the advertisements for their favorite sneakers, they will be able to resist these codes. Moreover, in the production of their own texts, students will learn to "en-
code" a different set of cultural codes—codes that are more economically, socially, and politically humane. The problem with this strategy is, it doesn’t work. While students willingly engage in decoding advertisements (and they are very good at it), the practice does nothing to change their behavior. In other words, students can very skillfully decode the cultural text of a Nike advertisement, and then go right out and buy a pair of Nike sneakers. Those who practice Social-Epistemic rhetoric assumed that once students realized they were being "duped" by capitalism, they would be able to resist the lure of rampant consumerism. After all, “generations X and Y” were supposedly immune to the enticements of Madison Avenue; except of course that Gen X and Y were themselves “constructs” of Madison Avenue. This, however, has not been the case.

The fault may lie with pedagogical approaches that attempt to reduce complex behavior to an exercise in “decoding” contradictions in cultural texts, exposing those contradictions, and expecting a change in behavior as a result. This approach reflects the modernist view that reason supersedes all other human faculties; that is, that ideas that have been formed irrationally can be undone by rational discourse. Our motives are much more complex than this formula allows. Alcorn, following Louis Althusser, argues that ideology is not external to subjectivity, nor is ideology a belief system that individuals can freely adopt or exchange; rather, ideology is subjectivity (336). Alcorn also points out that Berlin’s theoretical model of subjectivity as “protean and plastic, a linguistic structure of complex and multiple alliance” differs sharply from his classroom model that is constructed of “very traditional liberal ideals,” who he seeks to liberate using “freedom and knowledge” as pedagogical tools, and whose liberation is dependent upon “free choice and rational speech”
for its success (334). Although social-epistemic rhetoric claims to embrace postmodern thought with regard to subjectivity, its pedagogical strategies belie that claim. That is, to be effective its strategies rely on a modernist concept of subjectivity: a fully integrated, autonomous entity capable of acting as a “free agent.” Despite increasing questions about the effectiveness of his methods, Berlin remained firmly committed to his pedagogical and ideological convictions until his death in 1994.

Although Berlin's colleagues and students have struggled valiantly to carry on his tradition, Social-Epistemic Rhetoric has increasingly come under fire and even its staunchest supporters have been forced to admit its limitations. For instance, many advocates have expressed frustration over students' resistance—not to the dominant culture in which they live—but to critical pedagogy. Students are either not willing or not able to examine their own ideological biases, which are often in conflict with the consciousness raising efforts of compositionists. Michelle Sidler and Richard Morris (intellectual descendants of the Social-Epistemic tradition) report that students often resist this type of "in-your-face" confrontational pedagogy, countering it with even stiffer opposition and resistance. This resistance makes sense in the context of Marshall Alcorn's claim that subjects are often attached to painful behavior, preferring to suffer from a bad ideology than to suffer from changing their ideology (347-48). Alcorn argues that often logical and informative arguments have no effect on the commitments students have to ideological beliefs, and he warns that “attacking their ideological assumptions is tantamount to assassinating their subjectivity by means of a discourse that purports to be educational” (345-47). This is especially true today when so many students practice ideologies deeply rooted in religious beliefs. The fact that their
"subjectivities" are in large part a product of their religious beliefs makes the teacher's job extremely difficult—it is one thing to challenge students' political beliefs, but it is an altogether different matter to challenge their religious beliefs. Students quickly pick-up on these threats to their subjectivity, and rather than being persuaded by critical discourse, they immediately construct a wall of resistance.

Nevertheless, as I stated earlier, some critical pedagogues (mis)read this resistance as proof that their tactics are effective. This seems to be particularly true of so called “radical feminists” who have become particularly enamored of Berlin’s rhetoric and his pedagogical methods and who are often more abrasive in their classroom techniques than was Berlin. For example, Teresa L. Ebert minces no words when she declares, “pedagogy is not therapy but sustained education of critical citizens who have the conceptual ability to analyze, participate in, and change the existing social relations of production” (796). Ebert goes on to say the, “pedagogy of critique enables us to explain how exploitation operates in the everyday lives of people so we can change it. It is, in short, a means for producing politically effective and transformative knowledges” (816). The problem is that Ebert not only wants to expose what knowledge her students have as “false,” she wants to replace their knowledge (ideology) with her own “transformative” knowledge (ideology). As D. Diane Davis points out, radical feminist pedagogies “often camouflage pedagogical violence in their move from one form of ‘normalization’ to another,” but their aim is the same: “to create useful subjects for particular political agendas.” Davis suggests that these pedagogies, rather than emancipating students, actually “participate in the carceral network they so desperately hope to transcend” (212). In other words, they seek to liberate
students from one political agenda only to enroll them in another political agenda. It is for this reason that Davis claims these pedagogies, because they obey a “pedagogical imperative—which is a political imperative” end up “protecting and perpetuating rather than dethroning the assumptions of the political and economic structures they mean to oppose” (211). This kind of overt, political agenda is bound to be met with stiff resistance and even hostility.

Nevertheless, feminists such as Dale M. Bauer argue that, “political commitment--especially feminist commitment--is a legitimate classroom strategy and rhetorical imperative. The feminist agenda offers a goal toward our students’ conversions to emancipatory critical action” (389). Bauer acknowledges that when she asks students to identify with her politics, she is simultaneously asking them to disavow their own ideologies, but she insists that the “critical tension” between their “internally persuasive voices” and her “externally authoritative rhetoric” is the only way to bring about “radical social change” (391). Bauer claims it is the job of the teacher to recognize students’ “unacknowledged ambivalence” and offer them a “critical alternative to dominant social norms” (387). Bauer quotes the following from one of her student evaluations in first-year composition: “[The teacher] consistently channels class discussion around feminism & does not spend time discussing the comments that oppose her beliefs. In fact, she usually twists them around to support her beliefs” (388). Perhaps, as Bauer claims the student’s ambivalence is “deeply buried,” but in this evaluation, she appears to be very unambivalent about Bauer’s teaching practices. Bauer insists that she welcomes student dissent; in fact, she and other feminist pedagogues see such resistance as a sign that their
strategies are working.

In advocating for what she calls a “bitch” pedagogy, Andrea Greenbaum encourages feminist pedagogues to engage in agonistic discourse to counter the stereotype of women as nurturers and to fulfill their “ethical obligation to model and teach young women agonistic discourse” (159). What Greenbaum is doing is replacing the authoritative “paternal” voice in the classroom with the authoritative “maternal” voice. To many of us, that may actually be far more frightening! What is obvious in all of these descriptions is that feminist pedagogues are simply turning the tables on their male counterparts; they are flipping the male/female binary so that it now privileges the female. I would further argue that their strategies are counterproductive to their own goals because advocates of this method refuse to acknowledge that students are simply not capable of abandoning long-held values and beliefs just because their English teachers say they should. In insisting that they do, these pedagogues are trying to “unteach” lessons that students have spent their lifetimes learning.

Thomas Frank makes it clear just how difficult it is for students to set aside their ideologies when he takes up the question of "Why Johnny Can't Dissent" in his article by the same name. According to Frank, what we understand as "dissent" does not, in fact, subvert, challenge, or even question the cultural faith of Western business; rather, the whole idea of a "counterculture" is more the official doctrine of corporate America than it is an exercise in resistance. Students can't dissent because corporate America is no longer an "oppressor;" instead, it is now a "sponsor of fun, provider of lifestyle accoutrements, facilitator of carnival, our slang-speaking partner in the quest for that ever-more apocalyptic orgasm" (Frank, “Why
Johnny Can’t Dissent” 34 & 44) In other words, capitalism has a much better story to tell than does Marxism. According to Virginia Anderson, this is one of the major hurdles critical pedagogues face and one that Kenneth Burke was aware of in 1935 when he warned his audience (The Marxist American Writer’s Congress) that their cause was doomed if they insisted on identifying it with the downtrodden “worker.” Burke warned that the image of the oppressed worker was antithetical to middle-class American values, and while they might sympathize with the worker, potential converts could not identify with him; rather, they saw him as Other (qtd. in Anderson 201). Since capitalism promised citizens the opportunity to accumulate wealth, it also guaranteed that they could avoid the plight of the worker. In this way, capitalism was able to exploit the very symbol that Marxists worked so hard to create. Anderson warns that critical pedagogues make this same mistake when they insist that students identify with the victims of oppression (201). Likewise, Foucault argues that if all power did was say “no,” no one would obey. What makes power acceptable, claims Foucault is its positive aspect, an aspect that permeates the social fabric and is a fundamental instrument in the constitution of capitalism and the society that accompanies it (Power/Knowledge 59, 105). If the objective of critical pedagogies is to reconstruct a more socially, economically and politically humane society, then their strategies are clearly undermining their stated objective. What they read as positive resistance from students is, in many cases, resentment and hostility. As a result, rather than dissuading students of their ideological beliefs, they are instead, further reinforcing those beliefs. In the more than three decades that social / critical rhetoric has held sway over the field of composition, there is simply no evidence that it has worked to promote social change; in fact, given the political and economic state of our union, it is reasonable to
argue that it has accomplished just the opposite.

For these reasons, I would argue that what Berlin precipitated was not a paradigm shift, but simply a binary inversion. That is, critical and / or feminist pedagogues are guilty of many of the same practices they so harshly criticized in CTR. Like CTR, they support one, monolithic underlying ideology, they construct binary opposites that force false choices, they privilege reason and rational discourse, they consider it a pedagogical imperative to impose their moral code on their students, and they vilify all who disagree with their practices. In other words, these pedagogues have simply inverted the capitalist / Marxist, male / female binaries so as to privilege their own world views. At this point in time the prisoners have taken over the central tower, they are operating the panoptic device, but the Foucauldian “soul” is no better off, because, as Foucault points out, this inversion should not be the end game.

Despite this criticism, it would be difficult to overstate Berlin's contributions to the field of English Studies and, in particular, to the discipline of Rhetoric and Composition. He not only "mapped" the discipline, he legitimized it. He brought the importance of writing instruction to the foreground for the people who mattered most: the teachers and students of composition. He transformed the composition classroom that had once served the practices of "normalization" into the primary site in the ongoing struggle for change within English Departments, the university, and society-at-large. In doing so, Berlin forever changed the content and the purpose of the composition classroom. What remains is for those of us who still wish to promote a more socially, economically and politically humane society to find more effective ways of doing it. In Chapter 3, I will argue that if service-learning can be
unshackled from the constraints imposed by critical pedagogues and if it can be reconfigured as a postmodern, postcritical pedagogy, it still holds the promise of real change.
Notes to Chapter 2

1 As developed by George Campbell, Hugh Blair and Richard Whately (Crowley Methodical Memory 12). Crowley claims by mid-nineteenth century the dominant rhetoric in American colleges was derived from Lockean discourse and came to be known as Current Traditional Rhetoric (Crowley Methodical Memory 13).

2 This is of course an allusion to one of Foucault’s more enduring images—that of the Panopticon. Its architectural features allowed a few prison guards to keep the entire prison population under constant surveillance, thereby substituting surveillance for force or other violent constraints. Designed by Jeremy Bentham, the panopticon promised the following benefits: “Morals reformed—health preserved—industry invigorated—instruction diffused—public burthens lightened—Economy seated, as it were, upon a rock.” According to Foucault, the panoptic schema would eventually spread throughout the entire social body (Discipline 207).

3 Although he is seldom given credit for it, the notion of writing as a "process"—a concept that will become critically important to the teaching of writing—is derived directly from these early Heideggarian concepts.

4 This is in no way meant to detract from the important work that Freire did with illiterate populations. The problem arose when Berlin tried to transfer Freire’s methodology to American universities. Berlin argued that American
students were also oppressed, and therefore in need of a pedagogy of eman- 
cipation. Perhaps, Berlin is right, but I would argue that the two populations 
are vastly different and, therefore, call for different methodologies.

5 According to Janice Lauer’s Afterword in Rhetorics, Poetics and 
Cultures, when Berlin died he was in the process of making revisions to the final 
manuscript. And on the advice of one reviewer he was working on “toning down 
his anger and blame,” however, he never got the chance to make those revisions. 
Lauer claims Berlin remained convinced that students would “inevitably resist 
and work for change.”

6 I believe Berlin’s classroom technique to be more subtle than that of more 
recent pedagogues, particularly radical feminist, because of my own experience 
with two of Berlin’s students while I was earning my Masters’ degree. Neither 
teacher was confrontational; to the contrary, they were two of the best educators I 
have had the pleasure of learning from.

7 Burke suggested the movement adopt “the people” as their symbol, but 
this was soundly rejected by the party as a “debased” symbol.

8 What I am referring to here is the nation’s move toward a decidedly more 
conservative agenda, the rise of the religious right and the rampant growth of 
consumerism over the past three decades. And, while some might argue that the 
election of Barack Obama signaled a sea change in American politics, I think we 
only have to look at the resultant backlash of racism and the growing disparity
between the 1% and the other 99% to see that things have not really changed at all.
Chapter 3
Service-Learning as Pedagogy

If service-learning can be conceptualized in this way---as a culturally saturated, socially consequential, politically contested, and existentially defining experience---then we can begin to talk about a different game.

Dan W. Butin

We should look to the practices in our own shop, narrowly conceived, before we set out to alter the entire world by forming moral character, or fashioning democratic citizens, or combating globalization, or embracing globalization, or anything else.

Stanley E. Fish

In this chapter I will offer a brief history of the service-learning movement, as well as an overview of the way the pedagogy is currently practiced. In doing so, I aim to show that, while service-learning has become immensely popular, as well as institutionally successful; it has failed to achieve its promise as a transformational pedagogy. The overview of current practices will show one reason for this failure: the movement’s commitment to modernist ideals as a result of its deep ties to critical pedagogy. As well, a look back at the roots of the movement---its history---will show that the pedagogy has also been a victim of its own success and popularity; that is, the movement’s widespread popularity has resulted in a vast range of initiatives that bear the service-learning moniker, but that espouse vastly divergent goals from those envisioned by the pioneers of the movement.

Although the literature locates the beginnings of the service-learning movement in the 1960's, it also acknowledges that the concept, if not the term itself, has its roots in
antecedent movements such as land grant colleges and universities, settlement house education, progressive educators, work programs of the 1930s, the Peace Corp, Vista, and the civil rights movement, as well as in the philosophical pragmatism of John Dewey. And, although the early pioneers of the movement articulated different priorities in terms of service-learning's impact on students, communities and higher education, all shared a deep commitment to connecting students to the people, the issues, and the inequalities present in off-campus communities ("First Professional Steps" 77). According to T. Minh-Ha Trinh, most of these pioneers were individuals who worked independently and "against the grain" of what was accepted in communities and in the academy. These "humanistic" educators worked with student activists to change what in their view was a "monolithic, teacher-centered, alienating and irrelevant" educational system that failed to serve the needs of an increasingly diverse population of learners. Clearly, the early pioneers of service-learning viewed pedagogy, not as a mechanism of normalization, but rather, as a vehicle for promoting a more equitable social order. In search of that more equitable society, these pioneers set out to redefine both “service” and “learning.”

"Service" to these early advocates was in no way to be confused with "charity." According to Jane Kendall, former executive director of the National Society for Experiential Education, good service-learning programs encourage students to see their service in the larger context of issues of social policy and social justice—rather than in the context of charity (qtd. in “Passing the Torch” 207-08). Service-learning advocates underscore this distinction by insisting on reciprocity between "server" and "served."
Kendall points out that the concept of reciprocity "negates the traditional, paternalistic approach to service in which one group or person has resources which they share charitably and voluntarily with a person or group that lacks those resources" (qtd. in “Passing the Torch” 207-08). Likewise, Nadinne Cruz argues that service can actually be a "disservice" to communities when it is inspired by "missionary narcissism." While she allows that charitable works and philanthropy serve an important purpose, she also claims that purpose is not solving social problems. And, like Stanton, she argues that attempting to solve social problems through "charity" results in disservice to both students and communities ("Passing the Torch" 208).

The concept of reciprocity also applies to the "learning" in service-learning. In other words, students engage in community service not only to teach the community participants, but more importantly to learn from them. This reformulation of the concept of learning encourages students to question the relationship of the "knower" to the "known" and to question the "what" and the "why" of "knowledge" as it is understood in the academy. Under this concept of learning, students are encouraged to compare the theoretical knowledge found in their textbooks and course work with the practical knowledge that resides in the community or what Foucault refers to as “local knowledges.” In fact, like Foucault, these pioneers often privileged local knowledge over academic learning.

However, as these individual efforts began to be mainstreamed within the academy, converts to service-learning began to sacrifice the more radical elements of the
pedagogy on the altar of "legitimization." Early proponents of service-learning point to the founding of Campus Compact in 1985 as a critical point in the timeline of service efforts in higher education. With the founding of this organization, service-learning began to move from individual pioneer efforts to more institutionalized efforts ("Helping a New Field Discover Its History" 5). Not all early proponents of the pedagogy were happy with service-learning's new found success. For instance, Stanton points to Campus Compact's early tendency to view "service" as noblesse oblige; a concept of service that he claims undermines both the service and the learning. As well, Ira Harkavy questions service-learning's effects on the "intellectual, moral, and citizenship development of participants," as well as its effects on the "advancement of social institutions and democracy." While Harkavy claims to be impressed by recent advances in service-learning research, he also points to current conditions within our universities, schools and society itself as indications that service-learning has not fulfilled its promise ("Service-Learning and the Development of Democratic Universities, Democratic Schools, and Democratic Good Societies in the 21st Century" 4).

Meanwhile, other early proponents express concern about the "limiting" effects of institutionalization. For instance, Herman Blake argues that "to the extent it becomes institutionalized, and you begin to evaluate it and encapsulate it in any formal structure, you begin to limit its capacity" ("Mainstream or Margins?" 171). At the same time, pioneers in the field continue to express deep concern about questions relating to service-learning's connection to both learning and community development. These early
advocates of the movement remain concerned that neither they nor those who have followed them have adequately articulated and debated the disparate goals of this movement ("Passing the Torch" 207). A survey of current practices indicates that the term "service-learning" is used to describe a wide range of practices that include efforts such as joint celebrations of community holidays to bring "Town and Gown" together to total immersion pedagogies, with most service-learning efforts falling in-between these two extremes. Obviously, such a wide range of service initiatives, result in vastly divergent goals. In fact these goals are so disparate that Butin claims the pedagogy is almost as likely to be used to promote the status quo as it is to promote an ideological Other ("Service-Learning as Postmodern Pedagogy" 90-91). In a similar vein Stanton points out that the fact that service-learning is now being endorsed not only by faculty and students, but also by public school and university administrators, the U. S. Congress, and the President of the United States, should cause us to question whether these institutions have so transformed themselves that they can now accept such a "radical pedagogy" or whether this pedagogy has been adapted to survive and expand in the mainstream (Service-Learning Preface xv). In other words, it is difficult to see how service-learning can serve the needs of institutions and entities with such dissimilar and often, conflicting interests without subjugating its own. The obvious answer is that it cannot; service-learning is today a servant of many masters, all with their own agendas. Meanwhile, current practitioners in the field continue to grapple with the questions and concerns that plagued its pioneers, while at the same time, trying to make sense of the many manifestations of
the current movement. As a way of shedding some light on these questions and concerns, I will survey the ways service-learning is currently being practiced and outline some of the conceptual models on which those practices are based.

**Conceptual Models**

Despite the multiplicity and diversity of service-learning initiatives, its advocates consistently agree that in order for service-learning to be “legitimate, ethical and useful” it must be guided by four principles: respect, relevance, reciprocity and reflection. In this case respect means respect for the circumstances, conditions and needs of those being served. Reciprocity reflects the field’s commitment to hearing and answering the concerns of the communities they serve. In order to be relevant, the service must be a central component of the course in a way that “helps students engage with, reinforce, extend or question its content” (Butin “Of What Use is It?” 1677). The success of the service also depends on students being given ample opportunity to reflect on their service experience as a way of giving it context and meaning. From these four starting points, any number of conceptualizations about the how and the why of service-learning are available. One noteworthy example is Thomas A. Deans’ 1998 dissertation in which he proposed three paradigms based on the different aims, literacies and discourses each paradigm valued. He described the paradigms as, “those that write for the community, about the community, or with the community.” Deans’ theoretical lens is the progressive/liberal lens of John Dewey combined with Freirian critical pedagogy. Deans focuses this theoretical lens on three exemplary pedagogies to gain a better understanding of the theoretical, rhetorical
and ideological assumptions that inform them (Introduction vii).

The first paradigm, writing for the community, reflects John Dewey’s “middle-class sensibility” and his pragmatic approach to learning. Deans claims those who teach under this paradigm do not subscribe to any particular philosophical or educational theory, but rather tend “to frame their goals in rhetorical and practical terms, such as “real world writing” (77). When these educators put their students into non-profit organizations they are looking for “real world contexts”; that is real audiences and real purposes for writing. Deans admits that this paradigm borrows “heavily from current workplace-based technical writing pedagogies,” but he also claims it offers students a “relatively low-risk and short-term opportunity to experience an unfamiliar discourse community” (85). In other words, in this pedagogy the emphasis is on learning rather than service and the learning, although “real world,” is very much in line with traditional academic learning. The writing that takes place in this model is more or less dictated by community needs. It might be grant proposals, brochures and other advertising, newsletters etc., but what is important is that the writing involves both academic and non-academic writing. The downside of this model is that it allows only part of a semester to be spent in the service context, and most scholars agree this is not enough time for these new writers to acclimate themselves to the discourse conventions of an unfamiliar community. As a result, students sometimes feel overwhelmed by the service requirements (87). Also, there is very little chance of any “conscience raising” because contact with the service context is brief and because students are too occupied with the writing requirements. In this paradigm, I think we see what
Butin will later refer to as the “technical” model.

The second paradigm---writing about communities---is exemplified by Bruce Herzberg’s expository writing course at Bentley College. Students in this course tutor elementary school children and use their service experience to discuss themes of literacy and education in the composition classroom (114). Herzberg describes himself as “an old lefty” whose theory is influenced by Marx, Lukacs, Foucault, Freire and Eagleton and his critical pedagogy reflects this influence (117-18). As Deans points out, critical pedagogues distinguish between “functional” literacy (assimilation to dominant practices), “cultural” literacy (accepting a normative cultural schema) and “critical” literacy which is concerned with “power relations and the critique of oppressive cultural institutions and practices” (118). For critical pedagogues the site of one of the most oppressive cultural institutions is the academy (school), itself (119). According to Deans, Herzberg’s course aims to teach academic discourse, but also to “encourage new college students to critique dominant social institutions---particularly schools---and attitudes---particularly the ubiquitous American faith in individualism and meritocracy” (122).

In the “classroom” aspect of this pedagogy emphasis is heavy on the conventions of academic discourse, and, although Herzberg sees in the service site the possibility for the “development of critical consciousness,” he does not depend on community service to bring about such an “epiphany” (125-126). In addition to using the service site as an invention technique, Herzberg also uses readings, class discussion and directed assignments in an attempt to raise social consciousness by unpacking “the social
dimensions of literacy and schooling from a largely neo-Marxist perspective” (126).

While Herzberg admittedly has another agenda besides the teaching of conventional writing, his students seem to benefit from both, and that is evident from their course evaluations. One student writes:

I am writing my paper on the topic of Ebonics or African-American Vernacular English (AAVE). So far it is going well; I am only waiting for my first-hand research from the Hamilton school so that I might complete my paper. I asked the teachers if Ebonics instruction could be used in the Boston area. Is there actually a linguistic problem locally, and would this type of teaching help? . . . Since we are only working on one paper this semester, a lot of effort is put into it. For example, I have used over forty sources for this paper, which is different than high school or any other class at Bentley. (qtd. in Deans 128)

In this student’s remarks, one can see the influence and results of both agendas.

Another student writes:

The most important thing I have learned is that writing is not just something people read or write for amusement, but a powerful medium used to portray important messages that affect our children's education in this country every day. Writing can make a difference. It can show people what inequalities exist in our educational system and maybe even show them how they can help solve these problems. I think that this course has definitely helped improve my writing style and informed me on the educational issues that exist in this country. It has shown me the different views on curriculum, school funding, ebonies, and much more. I never even cared about these issues before this course. Now that I am more informed I feel that it is partly my duty to get involved in some of these topics and to help inform people. Often people make a judgment before they know all the facts. (qtd. in Deans 131)

Likewise, this student’s remarks reflect a sophisticated appreciation of what writing can do, as well as a new awareness of social inequalities, especially in education. As Deans
points out, in this course the two agendas—social conscience raising and teaching academic discourse—are not at odds with one another, and that fact is apparent in the student evaluations. Most scholars in the field insist that this connection between theory and practice must be apparent to students if the course is to be successful.

Deans’ third paradigm—writing with the community—is certainly the most ambitious of his models. As a way of exemplifying this model, Deans describes the partnership of the Community Literacy Center of Pittsburgh (CLC) with Carnegie Mellon Research University. The developers of this partnership articulate four guiding principles: social change, intercultural conversation, strategic approach and inquiry/research. The project draws from three theoretical bases: Dewey’s pragmatism, enhanced by Cornel West’s “prophetic pragmatism,” social cognitive rhetoric as articulated by Linda Flower and inter-cultural literacy studies. As Deans points out, most community based service-learning hinges on an academic course, but the CLC is a “comprehensive social change effort with rhetoric at its center, rather than a revamped college course.” In fact, the project rejects the service-learning moniker, preferring to call itself, literate social action. This model also distances itself from radical critical pedagogies because, according to Wayne Peck:

...the discourse of critique offers few strategies for change beyond resisting the dominant discourse practices with the promise that the victors will somehow be more just than their predecessors. Critique is necessary but insufficient on its own terms for building a just society. Without a clear strategy for constructing more participatory practices, critique alone cannot articulate the "somehow" of this promise. (qtd. in Deans 152-53)
Flowers is even more dismissive of Berlin’s radical critique approach, calling it “a dialogue among academics in academic discourse”; in other words, “tempests in teapots” (qtd. in Deans 153). Flowers claims she has “no patience” for approaches that focus on “problem-posing” rather than “problem solving” (qtd. in Deans 153). Despite cognitive rhetoric’s emphasis on the individual, Deans claims the CLC project is predicated on “collaborative social action” that involves such diverse constituencies as middle-class college students, minority working class and urban poor (159). The CLC project also breaks with other service-learning initiatives in that it encourages alternative forms of discourse that, according to Deans, result in “innovative hybrid discourses we expect in contemporary poetry and fiction, but rarely discover in traditionally conservative academic, workplace and political discourses” (183). The CLC project is an exemplar of community-based service because it is obviously more concerned about the impact on the community than it is about the impact on university students. The key is for educators to understand how each of these models work and what results they can and cannot expect from each. Deans’ taxonomy is a valuable heuristic for making clear the aims and expectations of these three modes of service-learning, and, although it was written 13 years ago, it remains a valuable taxonomy, especially for those wanting to implement service-learning initiatives into composition courses.

As of late, more current ways to slice up the field have been put forward, ways that take into account all disciplinary courses, as well as the rise of more radical critical pedagogies and those radical feminists. For instance, Jane Kendall suggests we make a
distinction between service-learning as pedagogy (a specific method for delivering course content) and service-learning as philosophy (an ideologically permeated curriculum, instruction and assessment), while C. D. Lisman argues that “volunteerism, consumerism, social transformation and participatory democracy” are all embedded in the “philosophical.” Still others insist that all modes of service-learning have the potential to provide service and enhance learning. While Butin allows that such conceptualizations are useful, he also points out that they foreground two important concerns: latent teleology and unsustainable ethics. According to Butin, “latent teleology” refers to the field’s tendency to privilege activities performed by students with “high cultural capital for the sake of individuals with low cultural capital.” Such tendencies reflect the field’s teleological adherence to “modernist, liberal, and radical individualistic notions of self, progress, knowledge, and power.” While I agree with Butin’s assessment here, I think it should include all teleologies. That is, in any course in which “conscience raising” is a goal, there is likely to be a latent ideology at work. If the telos is predetermined, that predetermined end will affect all other aspects of the course, but in particular, assessment. In these cases, thinking otherwise might not be encouraged or rewarded.

Additionally, Butin argues that “practice and scholarship in the field is predicated on the belief that both the process and the outcomes of service-learning are universally beneficial”; however, he considers such a stance ethically unsupportable. Butin makes this claim, because while service-learning is generally considered beneficial to the “servers,” there is much less evidence that it is always beneficial to those being “served.” Butin
claims that from the “notion of autonomous individuals consciously willing positive change to the win-win mantra of service-learning advocates” such conceptualizations have become problematic through the lens of postmodernism (“Of What Use is It?” 1678-79). For instance, Robert Cooke points out that community service could “work in a larger way as a kind of voluntary band-aiding of social problems that not only ignores the causes of problems but lets off the hook those responsible for the problems” (qtd. in Herzberg “Community Service and Critical Teaching” 139). In other words, when students spend several hours a week tutoring at the Boys & Girls Club, they may feel as though they have made a contribution to society, and in some ways they have. However, they have done nothing to address the underlying social problems that make organizations such as this necessary in the first place. These are serious concerns within the field and ones that Butin attempts to address.

In an effort to bring greater clarity to both scholarship and practice, Butin advances four more conceptual models and suggests we use these models to make sense of the multiple and often conflated goals expressed in the ubiquitous nature of service-learning as it is now practiced in higher education (“Service-Learning as Postmodern Pedagogy” 90). While I think any taxonomy conceals as much as it reveals, I also think Butin’s four conceptual models illuminate some of the problems in service-learning pedagogy. In addition, I believe his fourth model actually answers some of the more pressing questions in the field.

The first of these models is the "technical" model, which focuses on "pedagogical
effectiveness”; that is, it serves the function of "better teaching for better learning" ("Service-Learning as Postmodern Pedagogy” 90). On its face, this appears to be sound pedagogical strategy. After all, who doesn't want to promote "better learning" through "better teaching" practices? The problem here is that the concepts of "teaching" and "learning" to which these practitioners adhere are synonymous with those of the university. Butin is especially concerned about the efforts of practitioners of the "technical" model to "quantify" the results of service-learning experiences. He points out that insisting on quantification as "academic corroboration privileges the legitimacy of the academy as an objective, rationally bound enterprise." In other words, claims Butin, by playing this dangerous "political game," we are binding service-learning to "an academic interpretive community not of its own making." Butin buttresses his claim by reminding us that "Women's studies and qualitative research" did not become a part of the academy by "playing by the prescribed rules." He suggests that rather than playing by the "normative old school" rules, service-learning should attempt to "modify what counts as the rules (and truth) in the academy." What Butin seems to be suggesting is that service-learning has the potential to change "the conditions of possibility" for what counts as "knowledge," "truth," and "learning" within the academy ("Service-Learning as Postmodern Pedagogy” 102). However, it’s obvious from Butin’s description of this model that he believes it works “within a strong normative framework” and is therefore not likely to produce any new knowledge. It is also this model that Butin claims is on the “verge of making a Faustian bargain” with the university. I would suggest that this model
is Deans’ writing for the community model, and it is the only one that Butin rejects out-of-hand.5

The second model Butin identifies is the "cultural" model of service-learning—one that is informed by multicultural studies and one whose first principle is "tolerance." According to Butin, this model is very conducive to service-learning aspirations because it supports respect for, and increased tolerance of, diversity by promoting stronger moral and ethical engagement. The multicultural approach works at both the individual level and the societal level to repair the “frayed social networks of our increasingly individualistic and narcissistic society” (“Of What Use is It?” 1680). Following Stanley Fish, Butin argues that the multicultural approach will always "stop short of approving other cultures at a point where some value at their center generates an act that offends against the canons of civilized decency" (for instance, female genital mutilation). The multicultural approach is thereby limited by its refusal to "take seriously the core values of the culture [it] tolerates" (“Service-Learning as Postmodern Pedagogy” 92-93). Nevertheless, Butin claims this conceptual model along with the political model represent the most popular conceptions of service-learning as it is practiced in higher education today.

Although Butin refers to critical pedagogies as "political," I prefer the term "critical" because this term is the one most recognized within composition studies and because referring to critical pedagogies as "political" implies that they alone are political, when in fact both the technical and the multicultural models are equally political. As
Butin points out, a "political (critical) conceptualization" of service-learning is concerned with promoting and empowering the voices and practices of "disempowered and nondominant groups in society." As such, this particular adaptation of service-learning is committed to a vision of change by means of individual and social progress, a vision that Butin claims is the "classic liberal argument embedded in the modernist Enlightenment project," and one that relies on "rational and logical discourse and persuasion" as a means of achieving that vision (“Service-Learning as Postmodern Pedagogy” 91). The more important point here is that critical pedagogies—even when embedded in a service-learning context—remain deeply committed to the modernist notions of subjectivity as agency and language as the instrument of liberation and empowerment. Unless and until critical pedagogies can disengage with the theories and politics of modernist thought, their potential will remain inscribed within the limits of this system of thought and it will necessarily limit the impact of the service experience.

As the title of his essay suggests ("Service-Learning as Postmodern Pedagogy"), Butin's answer to service-learning's dilemma is his fourth conceptual model—a postmodern pedagogy that focuses on "how the service-learning process creates, sustains, and / or disrupts the boundaries and norms by which we make sense of ourselves and the world" (98). Here the emphasis is on the "how of the experience;" for instance, "how we come to legitimate certain forms of knowledge and practice rather than others." Butin suggests that we ignore the question of "What's the point of service-learning?" where "the point" is understood in terms of "liberal notions of progress and fixed / hoped for
outcomes." Butin points out cultural and political manifestations of service-learning focus almost exclusively on making "points"—about diversity, about social justice, about reciprocity (97). In other words, these pedagogies have a pre-determined "end," a particular destination that determines the process in advance, whereas in a postmodern conceptualization, the process is the "point." Therefore, this conceptual model frees the teacher of the responsibility for what may or may not be "learned" through the service experience, because in the end, it is up to the student to make whatever "meaning" he or she will of the experience.

In making his case for a postmodern concept of service-learning, Butin makes a critical move. That is, Butin does not just move to the postmodern, he moves to the postcritical. Butin’s article is written in response to Stanley Fish’s declaration that educators should, “[s]tick to questions about the truth . . . and don’t trouble with issues of morality, democracy, or social justice” (qtd. in Butin 89). Butin is also responding to demands from Conservatives in a post 9/11 world, to rid universities of their liberal bias and to get politics out of the classroom (89). Butin points out that although service-learning has not yet been “lambasted,” it cannot stay out of the “conservative crosshairs” forever (100). Butin seems to be suggesting that a less overtly political, less directive approach to service-learning is not only more efficacious, it is also safer. Instead of reacting against this conservative sentiment and against Fish, in particular, Butin writes along with Fish. He adopts what he says is Fish’s call for a “self-consuming” text (pedagogy); that is, a pedagogy that deliberately frustrates the need to “simplify and close off our experiences” (98). Such a pedagogy would be incredulous
to metanarratives, skeptical of “commonsense thinking,” averse to binary oppositions and inversions, disruptive of our sense of order and immersed in “the complexities and ambiguities” of ourselves and the world (98-99). Most importantly, says Butin, the teacher cannot “control,” nor can s/he “force” any particular social or political outcomes (103). By finding a more favorable way to read Fish and by writing along with him instead of against him, Butin avoids the politics of division and destruction about which Derrida warns us. It is also important to note that Butin does not set his pedagogy up in opposition to any other pedagogy. That is, he doesn’t negate multicultural or political service-learning perspectives; instead, he suggests we “bracket them” (97) and play a different political game (102).

As my descriptions of these conceptual models indicate, in many cases, the goals of service-learning as it is currently practiced have diverged greatly from the original aims of its pioneers. That is perhaps inevitable given the normalizing effects of institutionalization. No doubt the movement would not be as popular as it is today had it remained entirely a rogue pedagogy. The fact is, as Butin points out, the pedagogy is just as often used as a vehicle for promoting the status quo as it is for promoting a radical agenda. For instance, Butin’s technical model, that he so harshly criticizes, and Deans’ writing for the community concept are both examples of service-learning that, rather than challenging the status quo, actually work to promote it. And, while Butin sees these models as the greatest threat to what he understands as the real goals of service-learning, I will argue that, in fact, it is the practices and methods of critical pedagogies that pose the biggest threat to the service-learning movement. I argue this in spite of the fact that the goals of critical pedagogies are the ones
most in line with the original goals of the movement; that is, to use the concepts of service and learning to produce better citizens, who in turn, will produce a more equitable society. To demonstrate my point, I will examine a pedagogical model that I think typifies the methods employed by critical pedagogues.

From Concept to Practice

The case in point is a service-learning / critical pedagogy course designed by Susan Jones, Jen Gilbride-Brown and Anna Gasiorski. The service-learning aspect of the course "partners" students with administrators and clients of local service organizations dealing with HIV / AIDS, hunger and homelessness, and literacy. These teachers situate their pedagogy within the theoretical frameworks of "self-authoring" and "critical whiteness." As a means of promoting "self-authorship," the critical pedagogy aspect asks students to view their experiences in these service organizations through the "lens" of "critical whiteness." Specifically, students are asked to focus on their "whiteness" and the unearned privileges it affords them ("Getting Inside the Underside of Service-Learning" 4-5).

This course description immediately raises several concerns. First, asking students to view their experiences through any lens precludes the possibility of their seeing these experiences through any number of other possible "lenses," because, as Kenneth Burke reminds us, "a way of seeing is a way of not seeing." Likewise, service-learning pedagogues, Caroline Clark and Morris Young acknowledge the necessity of "theorizing" service-learning, but they warn that in every instance "theory
conceal[s] as much as it reveal[s]" ("Changing Places" 74) Moreover, the "learning" in service-learning is supposed to be experiential—meaning that students learn by experiencing, first-hand, the political, social, and economic inequalities at work in their service communities. The key word here is experiential; whatever learning takes place (or does not) must be the result of their experiences and not our expectations or interpretations of those experiences.

Secondly, the insistence that students focus on their "whiteness" carries with it the implication that—by their very nature, by virtue of who they are—they are responsible for these inequalities. Such an implication is, by definition, discriminatory. Furthermore, it engages students in a form of "identity politics" that is divisive and destructive. It pits students against one another: students of color are necessarily the victims and white students are their oppressors. This is not to deny a connection exists between race and power, and consequently between race and inequality, but as Foucault points out, the problem is with power itself (Discipline and Punish, Power and Knowledge); racial inequality is just one manifestation of power, and it is just one of many inequalities with which students are confronted in the course of their service. Also implicit in this form of "identity politics" is the notion that simply "flipping" the white / black, male / female, privileged / underprivileged, capitalist / Marxist binaries will result in a more equitable society for all concerned—it won't. If nothing else, our ongoing "experiment" in Iraq should demonstrate the futility of such binary inversions. One of the many ways the Bush
administration justified the war in Iraq was by pointing out the atrocities committed by Saddam Hussein's Baathist party against Shiite Muslims; however, once "liberated," the formerly oppressed Shiites have exacted a terrible revenge on their Sunni neighbors. In other words, after tens of thousands of civilian and military casualties and hundreds of billions of dollars, all we have succeeded in doing is substituting one oppressor for another. This is further proof that when we simply invert binaries, we keep ourselves locked into either/or choices that ignore all the possibilities that exist "in-between" those choices.

A third problem with this pedagogy has to do with its conception of the composing "subject" or what these practitioners refer to as "self-authorship." Here, they rely on Baxter Magolda's description of self-authorship as the “ability to construct an internal identity separate from external influences, and an ability to engage in relationships without losing one's internal identity." Magolda's suggestions for promoting self-authorship include "viewing students as capable participants in the journey to self-authorship" and "providing directions and practice in acquiring internal authority" (qtd. in Jones, Gilbride-Brown & Gasioriski 8). This description of subjectivity lays claim to an "internal identity separate from external influences," a concept that postmodern theories of subjectivity reject. Additionally, the suggestions as to how this self-authorship might be promoted belie the concept itself. What these authors are in fact promoting is not self-authorship, but rather what Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari refer to as deterritorialization (the process of freeing desire from established organs and
objects) and *reterritorialization* (the "remapping" of that desire) (*Anti-Oedipus*). In other words, these teachers seek to "liberate" students from their unfounded assumptions only to re-inscribe them within their own (the teachers') ideologies. The irony here is that these pedagogies define themselves against the traditional "banking system" of teaching in which the teacher "deposits" his or her concept of "knowledge" or "truth" and later "withdraws" the knowledge via exams, papers, or other testing methods. In most cases, critical pedagogues are using the same system, but with different "currency" (Marxist theory rather than capitalist theory). While these critical pedagogues insist on challenging the underlying ideological assumptions of their students, they never once question their own underlying assumptions, in particular, their primary assumption that Marxism represents a more equitable, more socially just, and therefore a more desirable economic system and form of government than capitalism. Instead, they simply assume that a Marxist Utopia is both attainable and desirable; however, neither of these assumptions is warranted.

To the contrary, Paulo Freire (whose emancipation pedagogy serves as the inspiration for many American critical pedagogues) claims that both "rightist" and "leftist" sectarians suffer from "an absence of doubt." Freire differentiates between "sectarianism," which he claims is "always castrating" and "always an obstacle to the emancipation of mankind" and "radicalism," which he says is "nourished by a critical spirit" and "always creative." The author further warns that both rightist and leftist sectarians close themselves off into "circles of certainty" from which they cannot escape
and in which they "make their own truth" (*Pedagogy of the Oppressed* 21). The point here is not that Marxism is "wrong" and capitalism is "right," but rather that uncritical adherence to either system precludes the possibility of thinking *otherwise*.

Nor is my point here to merely denigrate the pedagogy of Jones, Gilbride-Brown & Gasiorski; it is rather to point out specific problems inherent in critical pedagogies and show how those problems undermine the effectiveness of service-learning. By their own admission, these practitioners derive their methods more from critical theory (specifically the Frankfurt School) than from service-learning theory. One reason for this may be that service-learning has yet to articulate a firm theoretical ground from which pedagogical methods and practices might be derived. As a result, those wishing to implement service-learning usually do so as an "add-on" to their existing pedagogies. Consequently, service-learning rather than supplying an extra dimension—a potentially transformative dimension—to the existing pedagogy, becomes merely another pedagogical tool. In this case, critical pedagogues believe they have found in service-learning a method of promoting Marxist theory through "real world" practices. In this case they are not merging critical pedagogy with service-learning in order to enhance both pedagogies; rather, they are subjugating the aims of service-learning to the aims of Marxist ideology. Or, as Sara Arroyo claims when she describes critical pedagogues' attempts to transfer their theories and practices to a digital medium, they are merely "re-inscribing hard-line Marxism" onto another medium ("Locating Post-Critical Composition in the Field"). What these practitioners fail to consider is that the
"medium" (context) is different and therefore calls for different theories and methodologies. In other words, "linking" critical pedagogy with the digital medium or with a service-learning context provides teachers and students with the possibility of discovering (inventing) something "new." But this kind of invention is impossible when the theory driving the methodology pre-determines the end result.

I believe critical pedagogues make another crucial mistake when they interpret student resistance as an indication of pedagogical effectiveness. For instance, Jones, Gilbride-Brown & Gasiorski report high levels of resistance (especially among white students), not to the service aspect of their courses, but to the course work. When asked what the most educational aspect of the course was, one student replied: "The service aspect. The classroom was not, in my opinion, educational." Still another remarked that while he "liked his service site," he did not like the course readings, "because he got very little out of them and they had nothing to do with leadership," just people's depressing lives." A third student spoke even more directly when responding to the question, "What could be improved?" He replied: "More emphasis on community service. Less on ideologically driven readings and lessons."

According to these teachers, these are "common critiques about the class content" (Jones, Gilbride-Brown & Gasiorski 11-13). In other words, these students willing engaged in the course "practices," but they rejected the course "theory." Part of this resistance is explained by the "subject positions" (either oppressor or victim) that students were forced to occupy as a result of the teachers' directive to focus on their
"whiteness" and the unearned privileges it affords them. Such a directive immediately puts students on the defensive and often results in their erecting impenetrable walls of resistance.

This same dynamic is evident in Patricia Webb's description and assessment of a graduate course that merged feminist theory with service-learning practices ("Feminists' Social Projects: Building Bridges between Communities and Universities"). Webb designed the course as means of correcting what she describes as feminism's "inability to connect academic theories and community practices," an inability she claims, "severely limits the impact our critiques can have on social structures" (238). While Webb acknowledges the mutual benefits of such a merger, she also warns that in attempting to create an activist, change-based classroom—one in which students are encouraged to define themselves—"we run the risk of defining them through the lens of our own agendas" (239).

As a way of averting this risk, Webb designed a final assessment of the course that included not only her perspective, but also the perspectives of two of the students enrolled in the course (these happened to be graduate teaching assistants, because this was a course in teaching composition). Both the course work and the service-learning activities focused exclusively on the intersections between feminist theory and "systemic patriarchy," and it did so with interesting results. Both Webb and Kristi (female GTA) reported high levels of satisfaction with both the course and the service experience; in fact, Kristi has adopted her own feminist / service-learning
pedagogy and continues to volunteer at her service site. On the other hand, Tom, the male GTA, expressed deep dissatisfaction with his service experiences, which he admits were limited by his "subject position as a young male in the context of feminist activism." He further claims that he felt a "disconnect" between the course work (the theory) and his actual service experience; that is, although he claims to accept feminist theory, he felt like an "observer" in a context in which feminist issues were being played out. As a result, he has not incorporated service-learning into his pedagogy (Webb 252-53).

Tom's feelings of inadequacy, while they might be "deserved," are certainly not productive. And, I would suggest they signal another form of resistance, albeit a more subtle form than that demonstrated by those students who were asked to focus on their whiteness. In other words, Tom did not blame feminist theory or his teacher for his "failure"; instead, he blamed himself or his "subject position." The fact that the course was premised on the opposition between feminism and patriarchy or an inversion of the male / female dichotomy, it was bound to result in male students "feeling roped off and even demonized" (Anderson "Rhetoric of Confrontation" 202). Even in a course as thoughtfully and carefully designed as Webb's, focusing on the service-learning experience through only one lens (in this case, the feminist lens), invariably leaves some male students feeling excluded, persecuted, and / or resentful. On the other hand, feminists will certainly argue, and rightfully so, that systemic patriarchy leaves them feeling "excluded, persecuted, and resentful." For these
reasons, this particular binary inversion was necessary and justified, but it should also be temporary. While I believe it was necessary at one time for women to set themselves apart from men, as a way of pointing out the inequalities that existed (and, to some extent, still exist) between the sexes, I also believe that, at some point, feminists have to find a way of re-inscribing males, particularly students, back into their theories and practices. In this way, we invite them to become part of the solution rather than part of the problem.

However, I suspect it is more likely that critical pedagogues such as Jones, Gilbride-Brown and Gasiorski, along with Dale Bauer, Andrea Greenbaum and others will continue to view pedagogy strictly through the critical / feminist lens and continue to insist that student resistance as an indication of pedagogical effectiveness. However, as I have already argued, these teachers woefully underestimate the tenacity of student resistance to what they understand as “socialist” (and, therefore “Godless”) attacks on their ideology. They also underestimate and misunderstand the “lure” of capitalism.

The Pedagogy of Capitalism

To make my point here I return to Thomas Frank who in his 1997 book, The Conquest of Cool, advances an alternative theory that challenges the traditional narratives of the 1960's countercultural revolution. Newt Gingrich, Allan Bloom (The Closing of the American Mind 1987), and Robert Bork (Slouching Towards Gomorrah 1996) rank among the bitterest "historians" of the tumultuous decade. According to Bloom,
the 60's represent an "intellectual catastrophe comparable only with the experience of German professors under the Nazis," while Gingrich imagines it as a time of "countercultural McGoverniks" intent on destroying American values and tradition (qtd. in Frank 2). But Bork is perhaps the most acidic critic of the decade, declaring it a "malignant decade" that accomplished nothing less than "sending America Slouching towards Gomorrah" (qtd. in Frank 3).

The other side of the story is, of course, that it was a decade in which the youth of America rose up in glorious revolution against the "irredeemable evil of big business" that they saw as the driving force behind "the orderly lawns of suburbia and the nefarious deeds of the pentagon" (Conquest 6). Frank insists that the story is not that simple. Nor is it simply a story of corporate America co-opting the language, dress, music and symbols of the youth revolution, although certainly co-optation and appropriation are part of the story. It is Frank's theory that what happened in the sixties represented "a simple and direct confluence of interest." It is his claim that capitalism itself underwent revolutionary change from the mid-fifties to the early sixties. He further claims that academics make a "strategic blunder of enormous proportions" by continuing to overlook the trends, changes, and intricacies of corporate culture and by continuing to regard it as "a monolithic, unchanging system with unchanging values" (Conquest 18). This kind of thinking leads us to establish false dichotomies—hip versus square, homogeneity versus heterogeneity, conformity versus the individual—to describe the relationship between capitalism and its opponents. And, this kind of thinking makes resistance impossible because it profoundly misunderstands the
workings of corporate capitalism.

Frank claims that, far from opposing the larger cultural revolution, the corporate revolution of the sixties paralleled it, and, in some cases, even anticipated the impulses and new values of the counterrevolution. When corporate America entered this revolutionary stage, "Organization Man" became a "drag," as did the old virtues of caution, deference, and hierarchy. In the uprising of youth culture, corporate leaders saw an "affirmation of their own revolutionary faiths, a reflection of their own struggles to call their corporate colleagues into step with the chaotic and frenetically changing economic universe" (Conquest 28). Consumerism was longer about "conformity" but about "difference," and this imperative of endless difference is at the very heart of American capitalism. Simply put, what happened in the sixties is that "hip" became central to the way American capitalism understood itself and explained itself to the public (Conquest 26). Frank claims that dissent is virtually impossible because they are "hipper" than we can ever hope to be, because hip is their official ideology. According to Frank, they are going to be at the poetry reading to encouraging rebellion" with a hearty "Right on, man!" And we can't outrun them because "it’s their racetrack and they are waiting at the finish line to congratulate us on our outrageous new style and on how we shocked those stuffy prudes out in the heartland" ("Why Johnny Can't Dissent” 44-45). Simply put, the narrative of capitalism is far more attractive than the Marxist narrative.

In making his claim, Frank is not attempting to discredit all of the revolutionary
efforts of the sixties, for certainly important gains were made in regard to civil rights for minorities and women, but it is difficult to argue with his assertion that, in the youth rebellion, capitalism found the perfect vehicle for advancing the form of rabid consumerism that defines not only our economic policies, but also our social and cultural values. In their attempt to expose and subvert the evils of big business, the youth culture, inadvertently, facilitated the enormous growth in consumerism that the last forty years have witnessed. And, it is a gift that keeps on giving, for as Frank points out, business always finds what it needs in youth culture—the flamboyant affirmation of the core tenets of hip consumerism. And, every few years, the cycles of the sixties repeat themselves on a smaller scale, with new "rebel cultures" to replenish the various culture industries' depleted arsenal of "cool" (Conquest 234).

James B. Twitchell, the author of ADCULT, shares Frank's concern about the effects of advertising on America's youth. He claims that children between the ages of two and five years spend an estimated twenty-eight hours a week in front of the television screen, and in the process, they digest thousands of commercial ads. Factoring in all other types of media advertising, Twitchell estimates that by the time students reach the college classroom, they have spent the equivalent of a decade of their lives being bombarded by advertising. On the other hand, as teachers, we meet with our students for less than three hours a week in a typical 16-week semester. Providing our students show up on a regular basis, we have approximately 48 hours to achieve our semester objectives. If those objectives include challenging the lessons learned from what Greg Ulmer calls our
“didactic rival”--television--then we are obviously fighting an uphill battle. But what concerns Frank and Twitchell is not the ad itself but what is transmitted along with the ad. According to Twitchell, what we ingest along with the ad is our very culture, what we know, what we believe, and who we are. For Twitchell, advertising is no less than "the educational program of capitalism, the sponsored art of capitalism, the language of capitalism, the pornography of capitalism" (41). In other words, advertising is another form of cultural studies and its lessons are brought to us at the astonishing rate of 3000 messages per day.

Because the majority of these messages are brought to us by way of television, I think it can be argued that television functions as a panoptic device—in reverse. That is, unlike Foucault's account of the notorious Panoptical design that allowed one prison official to keep an entire inmate population under constant surveillance, television functions just the opposite—it keeps all of us watching it, but the effect is the same—it renders us docile and useful. It does so first, by presenting "programming" that distracts us from reality; and, secondly by channeling cultural messages through those same programs, as well as through the advertising that accompanies them. Attempting to counter the cultural lessons disseminated by the mass media is indeed a daunting task, especially considering the meager amount of time we are allotted. Moreover, attempting to counter the "language of capitalism"---which just happens to be the language of youth---with rational arguments is, in most cases, a futile exercise.

That is not to say that we should surrender to the pedagogy of capitalism; rather we
should learn from it, because capitalism, itself, learns. In virus-like fashion, capitalism mutates and evolves in order to survive. It does not resist resistance; it absorbs it, as in the case of the counterrevolution. In true rhetorical fashion, it learns to speak the language of its audience. But perhaps its most chilling characteristic is its ability to mock reality. Frank claims that analysts from Marx to the editors of Wired have described capitalism as "dynamic stuff, an order of endless flux and change" (The Conquest of Cool 19). This description is eerily similar to Eric White's description of reality as "an ever-changing flux of appearances," Heraclitus' vision of reality as "an ever-living fire that rests by changing, or remains the same by becoming other than itself," and Gorgias' image of a world that is "constantly changing, in a condition of ceaseless flux." Under the guise of reality, capitalism promises what it can never supply—"the thing itself." Of course, we now know that "the thing itself," like the universal signifier, is nothing but a modernist illusion, but that knowledge does not prevent us from constantly pursuing the "one thing" we believe will fulfill us. Capitalism offers us a never-ending series of "things" that might serve as substitutes for the non-existent "thing itself." That these things always fail to satisfy us should come as no surprise, for capitalism merely exploits human desire and always leaves us "lacking."

However, it is inaccurate to construct capitalism as the bogeyman in all that ails us, as though capitalism, in itself, is to blame for the gross inequalities that we witness in American society. In ADCULT, Twitchell argues that, “we are not victims of advertising”; rather, “[w]e make our media. Our media makes us.” According to Twitchell,
commercialism is not “making us behave against our better judgment. Commercialism is our better judgment.” The author further argues that consuming makes us happy and “getting and spending” is what gives our lives purpose” (110). In this way, claims Twitchell,” [a]dvertising is more a mirror than a lamp” (111). I believe the same is true of capitalism; that is, capitalism is us; it is a reflection of our values and our desires. If it were not, we would not respond so readily to it. Moreover, the values of capitalism are built into our language, allowing “its productive force to traverse the whole social body” (Foucault Power / Knowledge 59). For this reason, any insurgent pedagogy would have to occupy the “mute ground,” the non-place of language” (Foucault The Order of Things Preface xvii).

As well, any insurgent pedagogy would have to employ generative, innovative inventional strategies to replace the reductive strategies of critical pedagogies. Examples of reductive inventional strategies can be found in the Jones, Gilbride-Brown & Gasioraki pedagogy in which the teachers claim community service sites “situate students in a ‘borderlands,’ where existing patterns of thought, relationship and identity are called into question and juxtaposed with alternative ways of knowing and being.” It is in these “borderlands” that they claim student resistance emerges as a site of “transformative potential.” In other words, new knowledge emerges as a result of resistance. For these educators, student resistance is not an unintended consequence; instead, it is an inventional strategy (4-5), but one that only leads to more resistance. It is for this reason that I claim critical pedagogy does more to undermine the goals of service-learning than do those
concepts that support the status quo. Students enrolled in courses that employ the technical model come out of the courses the way they went in; that is, their psyches are no better or worse than when they entered the course. These courses are not meant to raise social or political awareness; rather the service component is simply another pedagogical tool. On the other hand, there is considerable evidence that the methods used in critical pedagogies can do damage to students’ emotional and psychological well-being, and when these methods include a service component, they risk undermining any possible benefits from the service experience.

I sympathize with some of these educators’ goals, but I strongly disagree with their methods. For reasons I have already outlined I do not believe this kind of “new knowledge” can be forced on students; rather, I think they have to find it themselves. All we can do is facilitate the conditions of possibility that are conducive to that kind of learning. It is my claim that a postmodern, postcritical conception of service-learning as pedagogy offers us the possibility of creating those conditions. The inventional strategies in this pedagogy would not be unlike those in Jones, Gilbride-Brown & Gasioriski’s, because the service context is fertile ground for invention. Jones et al are attempting to “move” students out of what Heidegger calls their “thrownness”; that is, the assumptions and predispositions that are a function of their birthplaces and circumstances. This is a worthy endeavor; however, not when the invention is directed and forced. On the other hand, having students visit the “common places” as an invention technique does not do much good if they are still inventing out of the same old starting places—-their thrownness.
As educators, we must develop a pedagogy that not only rivals the pedagogy of capitalism, but also learns from it; a pedagogy that is as dynamic and adaptable as capitalism; a pedagogy that offers students an alternative to the mock reality of capitalism by inviting them to "invent" new realities. Rather than challenging our students' ideologies, we should offer them the opportunity to re-write the narratives into which they were born—narratives that Foucault and Heidegger demonstrate are pre-determined—and over which they have had no control. We must also develop a pedagogy that displaces and disrupts normative discourse: one that encourages students to write with all manner of expression. In addition, I continue to insist that any such pedagogy must acknowledge the Other in all of us.
Notes to Chapter 3

1 I argue that while Foucault began as a structuralist/Marxist, he later rejected structuralist theories and Marxist ideology.

2 These readings include Mike Rose’s *Lives on the Boundary*, Jonathon Kozol’s *Savage Inequalities* and E.D. Hirsch’s *Cultural Literacy*.

3 Deans acknowledges that about half of the evaluations reflected increased degree of civic engagement, while the other half focused on the course’s usefulness in their academic careers. Deans reported no resistance to the course. Most scholars agree that a connection between theory and practice is crucial to any service-learning course.

4 Of course Flowers’ cognitive rhetoric was also attacked by critical pedagogues such as Bizzell and Berlin because it focused on individual agency.

5 Deans allows that he added a writing about the community to his writing for the community course as a way of addressing the perceived shortcomings of this model.

6 Butin is responding to a series of essays on the roles and responsibilities of higher education that Fish wrote as he was leaving the University of Chicago. Butin claims Fish’s remarks managed to inflame liberals and conservatives alike.

7 Butin points particularly to David Horowitz, who has spent years trying to demonstrate the liberal bias of academia. Butin claims Horowitz’s “Academic
Bill of Rights” has resulted in numerous legislative initiatives that would, in effect, result in affirmative action hiring for conservative teachers.

8 Members of The Frankfurt School include Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Friedrich Pollock, Erich Fromm, Otto Kirchheimer, Leo Lowenthal, Franz Leopold Nuemann, and later Jurgen Habermas, Claus Offe, Alex Honneth, Oskar Negt, Alfred Schmidt and Albrecht Wellmer.

9 This was a 10-week course in “Leadership Theories” that asked the question “Leadership for what purpose?” It was designed with an intentional focus on social justice through the goals of multi-cultural education.
Chapter 4

The Intersection of Self and Other: A Linguistic Threshold

_There is no sense_ in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to attack metaphysics. We have no language---no syntax and no lexicon---which is alien to this history; we cannot utter a single destructive proposition which has not already slipped into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest.

Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play”

It is comforting, however, and a source of profound relief to think that man is only a recent invention, a figure not yet two centuries old, a new wrinkle in our knowledge, and that he will disappear again as soon as that knowledge has discovered a new form.

Foucault, _The Order of Things_

In fact, the self is only a threshold, a door, a becoming between two multiplicities.

Deleuze & Guattari, _A Thousand Plateaus_

This chapter will be concerned with developing a theoretical base from which pedagogical practices and methods pursuant to a _postmodern, postcritical_ service-learning pedagogy might be derived. Integral to this theoretical base is a concept of _self_ that departs from the modernist notion of a unified, coherent self (subject) capable of exercising agency, and instead embraces the postmodern notions of self (or selves) as articulated in the theories of Martin Heidegger, Marshall Alcorn, Foucault, Lacan, Freud and Deleuze & Guattari.

Dasein: Heidegger’s Signature Concept

I begin with Heidegger's concept of Dasein, a concept he brings to fruition in _Being and Time_, but the roots of which Theodore Kisiel ( _The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time_ ) traces to Heidegger's early seminars. In Heidegger's first seminar after
returning from World War I (KNS 1919), Kisiel notes that he makes a major break with the Neo-Kantians by displacing their starting point in the "fact" of knowledge and science with the phenomenological starting point in the "primal fact" of not "knowability," but rather "experiencability." In the summer seminar (SS 1919) that followed KNS, Heidegger continues to emphasize "experiencability" by identifying the "situation" (from Karl Jasper's "limit situation" in *Psychology of World Views*) as a self-contained unit that exists in experience—prior to all theorizing—and one in which the "experiencing—I" is thoroughly steeped, thus the term "situation—I." Kisiel further claims that the "situation—I" is a clear precursor to *Dasein*, which can be translated as "the human situation" (64-65). Heidegger's emphasis on *experience* as opposed to *knowledge* (knowing) could not be more fundamental to a pedagogy that privileges experience, particularly experience that challenges our very concept of "knowledge." As Heidegger's concept of *Dasein* becomes more clearly focused, so does the importance of this notion to service-learning pedagogies.

In Heidegger's first draft of *Being and Time* (The Dilthey draft), Kisiel locates the question that he claims takes us to the most immediate presence of the "self—"Who is in the world?" Kisiel claims the answer to this question is *Dasein* whose way of "being in the world" is always, already a "being with others"(329-32). In the third draft (The Husserl Draft), Kisiel argues that Heidegger gives primacy to the "interrogative experience"; that is, *Dasein*, in its very facticity, is both the questioning activity and the locus of the questioning. Moreover, *Dasein* can only be interpreted out of "lived experience" and only by way of its "encounter" with a "meaningful world" (as opposed to the "unworlded" world of subject / object constructions) (366-
To clarify, *Dasein* is not an entity onto itself; that is, *Dasein* does not denote *Being*, but rather the term encompasses a "situation" in which *being* is "always being in a world with others" and always in a situation. Moreover, this situation always involves an ongoing interrogation of both *Being* and the situation; it is a situation (the lived experience) through which *Dasein* interprets (understands) itself, the world, and others and a situation that Kisiel suggests is “at the very threshold of language” (362-63). It is important to note that *Dasein's* "way of knowing" is "disclosedness," a term that Heidegger introduces in his 1923 SS seminar. Kisiel claims that for Heidegger, disclosedness is the means by which "being shows itself in its *being,*" but this "showing" is not a philosophical "knowing," rather it is a *finding oneself* (275).

Kisiel's reading of Heidegger's early lectures and drafts suggests an epistemology (a way of "knowing") from which service-learning pedagogies might derive the kind of practices that could potentially transform our concepts of both "service" and "learning."

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger underscores the importance of the *situation* by pointing out that when "the call of conscience" summons us to our "potentiality-for-Being" it does not call us to some "empty ideal of existence," but rather, "calls us forth into the Situation" (347). (The Heideggarian concept of "conscience" is in no way to be confused with "guilt" or "indebtedness"; that is, conscience is not a negative concept, rather it is a positive one.) Moreover, when *Dasein* answers the call of conscience with *resoluteness,* it "allows the Others who are with it to 'be' in their own most potentiality-for-Being." In other words, only when *Dasein* is *authentically* itself, can "others" be *authentically* themselves. And, according to Heidegger, "[o]nly by authentically Being-
their-Selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another." Heidegger further points out that "resoluteness" is a distinctive mode of Dasein's "disclosedness" or what Kisiel claims is Dasein's "way of knowing" or "way of finding oneself." Heidegger also makes it clear that the only "world" (reality) we can know is the one "disclosed" through the dynamics of this situation: "If no Dasein exists, no world is 'there' either" (417). And, what is "disclosed" gets expressed through discourse (primarily through language, but "listening" is also discursive). According to Heidegger, "discourse is constitutive for Dasein's existence," because it is the "articulation of the intelligibility of the 'there'"; in other words, what gets articulated in discourse is "the totality-of-significations" (204). Simply put, Dasein is the (human) situation in which Being—finds itself, understands itself, and expresses itself and its world—but only through an understanding (Verstehen) of Other (Beings).

But this situation deserves further explication, because it is this Heideggarian concept that completely collapses the social / private, subject / object binaries. While Heidegger insists that Dasein is in each case "mine," his use of the personal pronoun is in no way related to the "Kantian—I," a notion that Heidegger rejects (367). What Heidegger does say is that anxiety "individualizes" Dasein—calls it out of the "they" world, a subject / object world—and that by answering the call of conscience with resoluteness, Dasein comes face to face with both the inevitability (the "what") and the uncertainty (but not the "how" and the "when") of its own death. This "being-towards-death" is what belongs exclusively to each of us; it does not, however, make us "subjects" within a subject / object relationship with others. To the contrary, Heidegger insists that the situation (Being-in-a-world) is a "unitary phenomena" (78). In a similar vein, he
claims that "Others" does not mean "everyone else but me"; but, rather it means, those from whom "one does not distinguish oneself—those among whom one is too" (154). And, this "too," according to Heidegger, means "a sameness of Being as circumspectively concernful Being-in-the-world" (154 emphasis mine). In saying this, Heidegger comes very close to saying that there is no difference between the Same and the Other. In any event, we can certainly infer from the Heideggerian concept of Dasein that the "private" is always, already "social" and that the situation in which Dasein is always involved is a relationship in which there is no distinction between subject ("my" Dasein) and object (the Dasein of others).

My explication and interpretation of the "human situation" suggests that learning should no longer be seen as an independent process, rather it is a cooperative situation in which we come to know (understand) ourselves only through the process of understanding others and becoming, with others, "co-disclosers" of the "world" (reality) or co-authors of knowledge. In other words, reality (knowledge, truth) is a function of our ongoing, dynamic relationship with others and with language. Consequently, whatever reality we can "know" is always situational and always provisional. Furthermore, Heidegger's concept of the situation (as "lived experience" that exists prior to all theorizing) emphasizes the importance of "experiential learning" as opposed to simply "book" learning (theoretical knowledge). This explication also exposes the futility of the ongoing argument in composition studies between advocates of a "personal" or private epistemology and those who insist that the "social" is the only "way of knowing." In addition, it demonstrates that attempts to separate the personal from the social (or, for that matter, the Same from the Other) are counterproductive to any epistemology. While I
believe Heidegger’s concept of *Dasein* is fundamental to a reconceptualization of self. I also argue that Heidegger’s notion of “call of conscience” is problematic because he never explains “who” is doing the calling. I also find that while Heidegger makes enormous contributions to our understanding of *language*, as well as profound connections between self and language, he is too trusting of language’s ability to express *Being, World* or the *Other*. It is true that Heidegger recognizes both the “concealing” and “unconcealing” nature of language, and he acknowledges the fact that “language speaks man” but he, nevertheless puts great faith in Dasein’s ability to “disclose” the world through language (or vice-versa).

The Foucauldian Soul

This is not the case with Foucault who rejects the notion of a "knowing subject," claiming rather that the (speaking) subjects of scientific discourse are, in fact, determined "in their situation, their function, their perceptive capacity, and their practical possibilities by conditions that dominate and even overwhelm them" (*Order* xiv). For these reasons, any analysis of the history of scientific discourse is subject to “a theory of discursive practice,” rather than a theory of a “knowing subject” (*Order* Forward xiv). Foucault claims that while men believe that "speech is their servant," they are, in fact, "governed and paralyzed by language" (*Order* 297-98). It is obvious that Foucault is far more skeptical of the ability of discourse to produce knowledge, truth or meaning than is Heidegger. Rather, it is Foucault's claim that discourse is subject to underlying (and *unconscious*) rules or "codes" of knowledge that determine, in advance, what can be said or thought in all instances of discourse, and
particularly in the discourse of the human sciences. Foucault makes his argument by
demonstrating that the history of Western culture is not one of a progressive, steady
march toward the "perfection" of knowledge, but rather one that is characterized by
abrupt changes in the "ordering" of things and in the "codes of knowledge" that
discourse must obey (*The Order of Things* Forward IX). In other words, mankind's
sense of *Order*—"all the familiar landmarks of [our] thought"—is, in fact, merely a
function of the very language that imprisons us (Preface XV).

However, like Heidegger and contrary to modern thought, Foucault insists that *self*
and *Other* are inextricably connected. Foucault points out that the history of the *Other* in
any given culture is that which is at once "interior and foreign" and thereby must be
excluded (to reduce the internal danger) or "shut away" (to reduce its "otherness"). On
the other hand, the "history of order" is the "history of the Same—of that which, for a
given culture, is both dispersed and related, therefore to be distinguished by kinds and
to be collected together into identities" (*Order* Preface xxiv). What Foucault seems to
be saying here is that the *Other* is *within* (interior to) us, but *unknown* or *unacceptable*
to us (foreign), and that the *Sameness* we work so hard to achieve is anything but
*natural*. That is, the Same achieves its "sameness"—its Order—by categorizing,
labeling, defining, differentiating and otherwise *evaluating* that which "belongs" to a
given culture and by excluding or shutting away (disciplining) that which does not
belong. However, Foucault makes clear that this separation of self and *Other* and the
resulting “order” it produces are counterproductive to mankind's self-knowledge,
because, in expelling the Other, Western culture is silencing "the very thing in which it might have just as easily recognized itself—where in fact it had recognized itself in an oblique fashion." Furthermore, from the perspective of future cultures, it will, perhaps, be Western culture (from the middle-ages through the twentieth century) that will appear strange: "All that we experience today as limits, or strangeness, or the intolerable, will have joined the serenity of the positive. And that which for us now designates this Exterior might come, one day, to designate us" ("La folie, l'absence d'oeuvre"1964).

Psychoanalysis, Semiotics and the Self

Marshall Alcorn agrees with Foucault’s concept of the self as a conflicted, linguistic construct. However, Alcorn believes this concept is too simplistic and fails to explain what he calls the “libidinal” effects of language (“Changing the Subject” 338-39). Alcorn suggests that English teachers look to psychoanalysis for a more complex model of subjectivity. He points out that while subjects manifest multiple and sometimes contradictory identities, they also show resistance to “discourse manipulation.” The author claims subjects have a “kind of adhesive ‘attachment’” to discourses that are “characteristic of subjects” and these “modes of discourse” act as “symptoms” of subjectivity and work to defend the subject’s identity (“Changing the Subject” 338-39).

Simply put, something within the subject distinguishes between discourse that “represents [defines] the subject and discourse that addresses [tries to change] the subject” (“Changing the Subject” 337).

In an effort to explain why subjects desperately cling to their ideological identities, Alcorn turns to the Lacanian theory that subjectivity is “a form of defense.” Alcorn
explains that Lacan’s theory suggests, contrary to Berlin’s claims, that subjectivity is not “an amoeba eagerly absorbing all the discourse it encounters.” Rather, claims Alcorn, subjectivity is more like a hard outer skeleton that protects the subject from “invasive facts and discourse that threaten . . . its harmonious self-identity” (“Changing the Subject” 339). As with Foucault, Alcorn makes no distinction between “discourse” and “subjectivity.” Like Foucault, Alcorn argues that subjectivity is both a product and function of discourse; however, Alcorn complicates the relationship between discourse and subject by claiming:

> It [ideological discourse] is the material embodiment of human emotion, of emotionally charged thinking, and emotionally intense identification. This libidinal language is in fact the material instrument of subjective “penetration,” “seductive” rhetoric, invasive fantasy, and hostile assertion. (“Changing the Subject” 341)

Alcorn’s remarks about the way the subject is constituted by language, not just at the level of discourse, but also at a psychological, emotional and even libidinal level, should have a sobering effect on all who teach rhetoric and composition. These remarks underscore the author’s claim that ideology is not exterior to subjectivity; ideology is subjectivity (“Changing the Subject” 336).

Further adding to the complexity of this relationship is the fact that libidinal language “is also irrational, often unconscious, and generally resistant to conscious intervention and control” (“Changing the Subject” 342). Not only is discourse often irrational and unconscious, but channeling Slavoj Zizek, Alcorn points out that “prejudice and persecution are driven by unconscious fears and poorly repressed internal conflicts,” just as unconscious conflict “clearly drives oppression” (“Changing the Subject” 343). If
we accept Alcorn’s theories, then we have to posit a subject that operates both consciously and unconsciously; but more importantly, we have to develop a theory of language that “speaks” to not only the rational (conscious) subject, but also to the irrational (unconscious) one. We should also heed Alcorn’s warning that these unconscious, libidinal attachments must be “explored in a language other than the language of politics and utopian thought” (“Changing the Subject” 345).

Like Alcorn, Kaja Silverman turns to psychoanalytic theory and semiotics to demonstrate the role of language and the unconscious in constituting subjectivity. In her explication of Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams*, Silverman claims that both the territories that comprise the geography of human subjectivity derive their identities from the signifying systems that they employ: an affective and sensory system in the case of the unconscious and a rational and linguistic one in the case of the conscious mind (*The Subject of Semiotics* 54). According to Freud, "the conscious presentation comprises the presentation of the thing, plus the word belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation is the presentation of the thing alone" (qtd. in Silverman 71). In other words, the conscious mind presents the thing (signified) and its linguistic representation (signifier), while the unconscious is limited to the presentation of only the thing itself (signified). Silverman claims that because unconscious perceptions are denied linguistic expression, they remain "unknowable" (72). However, these perceptions are not entirely unknowable, because the conscious mind does have access to the unconscious, but only through the "disguise" of dreams, parapraxes, jokes, daydreams, and neuroses (60).
Silverman's reading of this early Freudian topography encourages us to view the human subject as a complex, signifying system in which all discourse proceeds from the interactions between the unconscious and the conscious mind.

Language plays an even more crucial role in the construction of the Lacanian subject. According to this model, the unconscious is formed around a "unary signifier" that embeds itself in the psyche when the child utters his or her first binary signifier. Lacan illustrates this concept through the familiar story of Freud's grandson and the "fort" / "da" game. As long as the child utters only the word "fort," it is both nonsensical (because there is no other signifier into which it can be translated) and irreducible (because it does not represent, cannot be reduced to the drives). But, as soon as the child utters "da," the word "fort" falls to the position of the signified. Since the binary signifier ("da") refers back to the unary signifier ("fort") instead of to the drives, it affects a complete rupture with them and results in what Lacan describes as the "fading" of the subject's being in the face of its meaning. "Fort" is inscribed in the psyche in its original nonsensical form and the unconscious takes shape around it (Silverman 171). Uttering this first binary signifier thrusts the child into the Symbolic, a world of signification in which meaning comes about only through a system of differences. These differences are often binary oppositions that limit thought to either / or propositions such as the male / female, present / absent, white / black binaries. What gets left out in these binaries is the "excluded middle" or a "third meaning" that cannot be signified. According to Lacan, once the subject enters the Symbolic, both its identity and its desires are dictated by the discourse of the Other: "If
desire is an effect in the subject of the condition that is imposed on him by the existence of
the discourse . . . it must be posited that, produced as it is by an animal at the mercy of
language, man's desire is the desire of the Other" (qtd. in Silverman 178). This Lacanian
concept certainly challenges the notion that language is a tool at man's disposal; rather, in
the Lacanian scheme, language is the agency of self-loss. For Lacan (and Freud) there is
no way out of the Symbolic; the only way open to man (or woman) is acquiescence to the
existing social order. Although psychoanalytic theory offers insight into the complexities
of the signifying subject and alerts us to the role that language plays in constituting that
subjectivity, because that self is predicated on lack, it is a sterile model that offers few
possibilities for freeing the Foucauldian soul. Despite its limitations, psychoanalytic
theory provides us with a deeper appreciation of the relationship between subjectivity
and signifying systems (particularly binary constructions) and it foregrounds the
importance of the unconscious in that relationship.

For Deleuze and Guattari, the self only becomes stable, fixed or static as a result
of repression (Anti-Oedipus 26). Repression comes in the form of Oedipus, which the
authors define as “belief injected into the unconscious, it is what gives us faith as it robs
us of power, it is what teaches us to desire our own repression.” This idea of an
oedipalized subject is analogous to the Foucauldian soul, who is both the effect and the
instrument of discursive regimes of power. And, we have all been oedipalized: at home,
at church, at work, and at school (the human sciences are heavily implicated in this form
of repression) and the result is (echoing Foucault) the creation of docile and obedient
servants (Mark Seem, Introduction to *Anti-Oedipus* xx). While Deleuze and Guattari credit psychoanalysis with the discovery of the unconscious, they also claim that when Freud placed man within the “oedipal framework,” the *productive* unconscious was replaced with the *unproductive* (based on lack) unconscious (*Anti-Oedipus* 24). The productive unconscious might have expressed the desire of the self, but the unproductive unconscious can only express lack (*manque*) which is “created, planned and organized in and through social production” (*Anti-Oedipus* 28). In other words, for Deleuze and Guattari, as for Foucault, the (repressed, oedipalized) *self* is a product and a function of the capitalist regime.

However, unlike Freud and Lacan, Deleuze & Guattari see a way out for the enslaved self. In contrast to the subjugated self, they posit the potential for a self that “is only a threshold, a door, a becoming between two multiplicities” (*A Thousand Plateaus* 249). In other words subjugation is just the starting point for the Deleuzian self on its way to becoming *Other*: “A becoming is neither one or two, nor the relation of the two; it is the in-between, the border . . .” (*A Thousand Plateaus* 293). Deleuze & Guattari insist, “all becomings begin with and pass through becoming-woman. It is the key to all other becomings” (*A Thousand Plateaus* 277). In fact, even *woman* (radical feminists take note!) has to pass through “becoming-woman” (*A Thousand Plateaus* 275). On the other hand, there is no becoming-man, because man “constitutes himself as a gigantic memory” and “[m]emories always have a reterritorialization [recoding]function” whereas “*Becoming is an antimemory*” (*A Thousand Plateaus* 293-94). There is also no
becoming-man because man is “the molar entity par excellence, whereas becomings are molecular” (A Thousand Plateaus 292). When the authors say man is the “entity par excellence,” they mean man is the “standard” by which the majority is judged (white, male, adult, rational). Deleuze & Guattari use the term “molar” to refer to a “rigid segmentation” as opposed to the “supple segmentation” of the molecular. They also seem to imply that the molar entity is a fixed, individual entity, while the molecular is a fluid “multiplicity.” The generative nature of becoming is reflected in the fact that there is no final stage of becoming; rather, becoming is the process of deterritorialization, of becoming other than one is. That is to say, there is no becoming subject; rather, becoming is the dissolution of the self.

The concept of self that informs a postmodern, postcritical service-learning pedagogy would draw from all of the previous conceptualizations. I insist on this multi-theory conceptualization, because they are just that---theories of subjectivity. No one school of thought holds the answers to the all-important question of “who we are.” Besides, “we” are not all the same, although thinking so makes theorizing “us” easier.

What we can say with certainty is that language is central to subjectivity; therefore, the epistemology and the theory of language that inform this pedagogy must be as robust, diverse and inclusive as our concepts of self.

Man as the Speaking / Knowing Subject

According to Foucault, the “problem” with language began when Plato and Socrates succeeded (for the most part) in silencing the Sophists. They did so by rejecting
the paradoxical and situational nature of Sophistic rhetoric and insisting, instead, that language “tell the truth.” What Foucault calls the “great Platonic division” resulted in man developing, neither truth nor knowledge, but rather a “will to truth” that has pervaded discourse for so long and that denies discourse its own reality such that “the truth it seeks to reveal cannot fail to mask it.” However, Foucault claims this “will to truth” (“will to knowledge” / “will to power”) is dependent upon institutional support such as pedagogy, the book-system, publishing, libraries and laboratories (Archaeology 219). In fact, according to Foucault, “[e]very educational system is a political means of maintaining or of modifying the appropriation of discourse, with the knowledge and the powers it carries with it” (Archaeology 227).

In the Order of Things, Foucault draws our attention to another important “break” in the history of thought, but first he reminds us that in the episteme we call the Renaissance, resemblance constructed knowledge. That is, resemblance makes possible the knowledge of all things, but language is “the mode of being of knowledge” and language, not knowledge gives signs their signifying power. During this period, language is not an arbitrary system; rather, it has been woven into the culture by virtue of its resemblance with the forms of the world (Order 34-35). The linguistic sign of the Renaissance is a ternary sign consisting of “the formal domain of marks, the content indicated by them and the similitudes that link the marks to the things indicated by them” (Order 42). In the ternary sign, the middle term represents the relation between the other two terms (signifier and signified). The profound “break” occurs at the end of
the Renaissance when the sign becomes a binary system. That is, the middle term that linked the signifier to the signified is eliminated, resulting in the dissolution of “the profound kinship of language with the world” (Order 42-43).

In the Classical Period, the sign is no longer associated with resemblance, but rather with identity and difference. These two concepts construct knowledge, which functions as Order through a system of signs that extracts all epistemological value from the sign. Rather, in this episteme linguistic signs become tools of analysis that impose Order and the function of language is reduced to the mere representation of the already known (Order 63-64).

It is in the modern episteme that Foucault claims language comes to be defined in terms of its internal structure and its function rather than its “content.” It is also in this episteme that Foucault alleges man emerges as both the subject and the object of knowledge (Order 318). This episteme coincides with, or rather is a function of, the founding of the Human Sciences. Make no mistake; it is not language that constitutes man in this episteme, but rather, it is the discursive formations in relation to non-discursive domains (political, social and economic) underlying the Human Sciences that dictate the rules of disciplinary discourse. Under this system, discourse is no longer a set of representational signs, but a set of practices that systematically construct their objects of study (Archaeology 49) and their primary object of study is man. Foucault makes it clear that discourse is entirely divorced from language when he claims the “only thing we know at the moment, in all certainty, is that in the Western culture the being of man
and the being of language have never, at any time, been able to coexist and to articulate themselves one upon the other” (Order 339).

The “Makers” and the “Made” in Man’s System of Signs

No discussion of language would be complete without a description of the contributions semiotics has made and continues to make to our understanding of language and culture. Semiotics is both a hermeneutic (interpretive) and a heuristic (inventive) theory, and because man, himself is a sign, he both makes and is made by signs. This concept of language as a system of signs may go back as far as the Sophists. At least that seems to be the implication when Antiphon observes, "when we speak there is no permanent reality behind our words" and when Gorgias notes that language is incapable of encompassing or communicating reality; hence, we exchange words, not realities (qtd.in Bizzell and Herzberg 24). As we have already noted, it is Saussure who formulates the first complete theory of linguistic semiotics (structural linguistics) and Mikhail Bakhtin who turns the study of signs toward social concerns (Eagleton 84 & 102).

Saussure’s system consists of a dyadic structure in which the signifier (word) and the signified (concept) constitute the sign and the sign, as a whole, refers to the referent (the thing itself). Saussure insists on the arbitrary nature of the sign, noting that the sign is not a link between a "thing" and its "name." Saussure also insists that signs have meaning only within a system of signs; a sign has no absolute value independent of its context; rather, its meaning is a result of its difference from other signs in the system. This difference is defined in terms of binary opposites that Saussure concedes are "negative," but he claims that the
sign, as a whole, is positive (*Course in General Linguistics*).

Charles Sanders Peirce, Saussure's American counterpart, theorizes a ternary structure that includes the *representamen* or the form the sign takes (Saussure's signifier), the *interpreant* or the sense made of the sign (signified) and the *object* (referent). Pierce also distinguishes between three kinds of signs: symbolic, iconic, and indexical. The symbol is the most arbitrary of the three signs and includes such systems as alphabets, punctuation, numbers and Morse code. The iconic sign is the most "original" of the signs and one in which the signifier is perceived as resembling the signified. Icons include pictures, cartoons, metaphors, etc. In indexical signs, the signifier, rather than being arbitrary, is connected to the signified. These include, thunder, smoke, medical symptoms, echoes and the like. Peirce claims that these types of signs exist in a hierarchy, but that their "rank" depends on their context.

Other important contributors to semiotics include Jacques Derrida, who "re-materialized" the sign by attacking Saussure's privileging of the spoken word over the written word (Eagleton 114-16), Roland Barthes (*Elements of Semiology*), who is considered the founder of cultural criticism and who claims that as soon as there is a society, every usage is converted into a sign of itself (Eagleton 117), and, of course, Foucault whose work demonstrates how signs have been used and continue to be used by power / knowledge structures to create and maintain the underlying discursive practices and formations that determine the conditions of possibility for what can be known in those disciplines. And, while structuralists and semiotics were first allied in
their concern with overall systems and deep structures of the "text," social semiotics, as the name suggests, has moved from structural concerns to social use (content).

Mikhail Bakhtin agreed with Saussure and Peirce’s conclusion that language is a system of signs, but he rejected the structuralist approach to signs, claiming that it fails to account for the roles that “intention, interpretation, social context and historical circumstances play in the creation of meaning” (Bizzell & Herzberg 911). In other words, like Foucault, Bakhtin is concerned with discourse at the level of utterance (parole). Rather than viewing the sign as a fixed unit, Bakhtin sees it as “an active component of speech” and one that’s meaning is subject to ever-changing political, social, cultural and historical contexts. Bakhtin also sees the linguistic sign as a site in the “field of ideological contention”; in fact, for Bakhtin, “signs are the very material medium of ideology, since without them no values or ideas could exist” (Eagleton 101-02).

It is Bakhtin’s social theory of semiotics that Berlin finds so useful in the composition classroom. Echoing Bakhtin, Berlin claims, “[t]here are no strictly disinterested uses of language, since all signifying practices---both in writing and reading---are imbricated in ideological predispositions” (Rhetorics 87). This belief leads Berlin to further claim:

The English classroom should therefore provide methods for revealing the semiotic codes enacted in the production and interpretation of texts, codes that cut across the aesthetic, the economic and the political, and the philosophical and scientific, enabling students to engage critically in the variety of reading and writing practices
The primary method for revealing these semiotic codes is critique of the dominant culture; in this way, language (the decoding and recoding of semiotic signs) becomes the primary method of invention in the social-epistemic classroom. Drawing from Freire’s emancipation pedagogy, Berlin underscores his belief in the power of language when he claims: “Language in its positioning between the world and individual, the object and subject, contains within its shaping force the power to create humans as agents of change” (Rhetorics 98). In other words, the same codes that according to Berlin, “define subjects as helpless objects of forces--economic, social, political and cultural---that render them forever isolated and victimized by the conditions of their experience” can also liberate them (Rhetorics 98). Though at times, Berlin acknowledges the complex nature of our relationship with language, at other times he seems to suggest that changing the world is just a matter of teaching students to decode and recode the cultural signs at work in an episode of Family Ties. Like Heidegger, Berlin professes to understand the “negative” power of language, but at the same time, he sees it as a vehicle of emancipation. However, we have to remember that, according to semiotic theory, man both makes and is made by signs in a signifying process over which he has little control. A student can usually decode the text of his or her favorite sit-coms, but because they, themselves, have been made by these codes, it is much more difficult to decode and recode the student. Nevertheless, semiotics is a powerful theory of language and one that we can use to “read” not only the word, but the world. It is, however, only one theory of language and as Burke reminds us, “a way of seeing is a way of not seeing.” Or, to put it in Heideggerian
terms, “every unconcealment is a concealment.”

From Postmodern to Postcritical

In the discussion of semiotics, I alluded to the contributions of Derrida and Barthes to this field of study. It is those contributions I want to consider now, because they move us from a postmodern to a postcritical conception of language. Derrida begins making that move as early as 1966 when he presents his seminal work, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences.” Derrida’s main point in this work is to de-center the universal signified; that is, to demonstrate that the “meaning” of the sign is never absolutely “present” outside a system of differences (249). His work is also a repudiation of structuralism, but Derrida goes about making his argument in a way that avoids the destructive and divisive practices he attributes to Freud, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, all of whom attacked the metaphysical notion of “presence” (Structure 250-51). Rather than destroying presence, Derrida insists freeplay (made possible by the de-centering) is “always an interplay of absence and presence” (Structure 264). But Derrida makes it clear that this de-centering does not produce a lack; rather, the indeterminate center becomes a supplement or sign that “adds itself, occurs in addition, over and above” the absent center (Structure 260). Further, in regard to the center, Derrida claims:

I believe the center is a function, not a being—a reality, but a function. And this function is absolutely indispensable. The subject is absolutely indispensable. I don’t destroy the subject, I situate it. That is to say, I believe that at a certain level both of experience and of philosophical and scientific discourse one cannot get along without the notion of subject.

By not destroying the concepts of structuralism, but rather finding another way to read them,
Derrida avoids the circular trap that he argues his predecessors fell into when they used metaphysical terms to destroy metaphysics (*Structure* 250). Likewise, in *The Semiotics of Russian Culture*, Lotman and Uspensky claim that in Russia, Christianity was literally constructed atop the ruins of the pagan religion; that is, “top” and “bottom” radically switched places; “plus signs” became “minus signs” and the old religion was inscribed into the new religion with a negative sign. As a result, Christianity, rather than destroying its pagan adversary, ensured its eventual return (6). Derrida wishes to avoid this same fate and so calls his own method *deconstruction* which he insists is not destructive (*Structure* 271). Using this method, texts are never finally deconstructed, but rather are continuously deconstructing themselves in a manner that always defers meaning.

Derrida’s theories have particular relevance for writing teachers, because by demonstrating that meaning is not present in the linguist sign, Derrida overturned centuries of privileging the spoken word (presence) over the written word. For Derrida, all language is writing, but writing in which meaning is (un)determined by *differance* (difference and deferral) (Bizzell & Herzberg 1173). And, writing is always writing with a surplus of meaning. Because Derrida seems to play with language and because he insists on the indeterminable nature of the text, he is often accused of being apolitical. To the contrary, Eagleton argues that deconstruction is “ultimately political practice, an attempt to dismantle the logic by which a particular system of thought, and behind that a whole system of political structures and social institutions, maintains its force” (128). Derrida does not attack ideology directly or by using “its” language; rather, he disrupts the binary operations that help maintain
ideological discourse and shows how collapsing those binary constructions results in a surplus of meaning.

Likewise, for Roland Barthes language is always a matter of excess. And, like Derrida, language is Barthes’ ultimate theme. Barthes’ primary concern is with the Saussurean sign which he claims “denies the productive character of language” (Eagleton 118). Also like Derrida, Barthes’ method of critique is to write along with the text. Barthes sees critical discourse as a “second language” that “floats above the primary language of the work” (qtd. in Eagleton 119). Eagleton points out that Barthes commentary “does not re-create its object, but drastically rewrites and reorganizes it out of all conventional recognition.” But his work is not all play, because, as Eagleton points out, Barthes’ work calls into question the representational value of the ideological sign (120-21). Barthes, along with Derrida celebrates the “death of the author” (the universal signifier), because it relieves readers of the responsibility to ascertain authorial intent or the “real meaning” of the text (Linn 26).

Like Barthes and Derrida, although certainly not as well-known, Gregory Ulmer takes language as his life’s work. Following Barthes and Derrida, Ulmer approaches language from a postcritical perspective. For this reason, Ulmer, like Derrida is often accused of being apolitical. This simply is not the case. Anyone who reads Ulmer’s *Heuretics* carefully will realize that—in this book—he is doing important cultural work. What he is exploring (among other things) is his own socialization as a white, middle-class male. Ulmer’s “mystery” includes three generations of Ulmer males. His
father, Walt, is a “divider” in true Aristotelian fashion, and it is from Walt that Ulmer receives the proverb of the fool and the wise man. Ulmer’s recollection of this childhood memory offers a practical demonstration of postcriticism and also demonstrates that Ulmer is doing cultural critique in earnest:

It was Saturday, and people were hauling their trash out to the town dump up Airport Hill. A wind was blowing over the river, and a large piece of cardboard had blown off the back of some pickup or trailer. I came up out of the hole about the time the Cryers approached the cardboard. As the rototiller chugged along Old Man Cryer gestured and Red stepped off to pick up the cardboard. Dad had called my attention to the scene, both of us standing beside the plant, which made a tremendous racket, its motor vibrating the contraption into which the pit gravel was fed by the conveyor from the trap and out of which came four materials—three sizes of rock plus the sand.

Red picked up the large piece of cardboard, carried it over the side of the bridge, and threw it off into the river. But threw it into the strong wind, which whipped it back into Red’s face, nearly knocking him over. He retrieved the cardboard, carried it over to the same side of the bridge, and threw it off again (with the same result). With his hand on my shoulder, Dad pointed to the bridge, and to be heard above the roar of the machinery, he leaned closer to shout into my ear. "There's a lesson in that!" he said, gesturing toward the bridge.

Family discourse, a primary vehicle of the Cultural code, operates with these kinds of lessons, with common sense couched in maxims and proverbs, or tales with morals. What did Walt mean that day, when he raised his arm to point at the bridge (the whole scene remains in my memory as a living tableau)? Ostension I now know is notoriously ambiguous, since it is never certain exactly at what the finger is pointing. The context reduces the ambiguity only in an unstable way. In the paradigm of possibilities, I might suppose Dad intended to evoke the proverb about not spitting into the wind. At the same time, Dad also believed in perseverance in support of a cause, even if it
was unpopular, so perhaps he meant just the opposite.

Reliving the scene from a postcritical perspective gives Ulmer the opportunity to embrace Red’s *otherness* without passing judgment on his father. This is an important lesson for critical pedagogues, because the assumptions and beliefs students are asked to give up most often come from their parents. In rejecting those beliefs, they often feel as though they are rejecting their parents, as well. This is hardly a choice we want students to have to make.

The difference in Ulmer's postcritical approach and Berlin's social-epistemic approach is that Ulmer does not have to make that choice; rather, in a very Derridian gesture he keeps the question folding back into itself over and over, always deferring any final judgment and always keeping open all possibilities.

There are still other advantages to this pedagogy that I will come back to in Chapter 5.

**Epistemology: How We Know What We Know**

We need to acknowledge that in the postmodern era, the term *knowledge* has assumed a pejorative connotation. Foucault, in particular, is skeptical of knowledge, especially our knowledge of ourselves. The first of the three *epistemes* he describes in *The Order of Things* is the Renaissance period which--because it privileged resemblance---- “condemned itself to never knowing anything but the same thing” (30). The second is the Classical Age³ in which knowledge is produced through the *ordering* of things ---ranking, dividing,
classifying--and, an age in which knowledge is “profoundly nominalist” (296).
The third episteme is the Modern Age in which Foucault claims knowledge takes
up residence in History, but not the history of factual successions or sequences,
but History as “the birthplace of the empirical” (219) Consequently, these three
epistemes do not represent the “growing perfection” of knowledge; rather, “it
was simply that the mode of being of things, and the order that divided them up
before presenting them to the understanding, was profoundly altered” (Preface
xxii). In other words, in all three epistemes, Knowledge is the History of the
Same, and this is not a History or way of knowing in which man will ever know
himself (Preface xxiv). Foucault suggests that man will only come to know
himself in the history of the Other. Exploring that history is a matter of
“rendering once more noisy and audible the element of silence that all discourse
carries with it as it is spoken” (Order 298). We evoke that “element of silence”
by invoking all the subjugated knowledges that have been silenced for the sake
of Order: “Subjugated knowledges are thus those blocs of historical knowledge
which were present but disguised within the body of functionalist and
systematizing theory.” Foucault goes on to argue that such knowledge is “far
from being a general commonsense knowledge, but is on the contrary a
particular, local, regional knowledge, a differential knowledge incapable of
unanimity and which owes its force only to the harshness with which it is
opposed by everything surrounding it” (Power / Knowledge 82). One way of
finding these “knowledges” is in the discourses of the madman, the deviant and the delinquent, discourses that Foucault suggests are epistemic in nature.

Likewise, Deleuze and Guattari claim the human and social sciences are forms of knowledge that, rather than representing reality, actually blind us to the reality that subjugates us and makes us desire our own repression. And, like Foucault, they search for knowledge, not in psychoanalysis, which they claim further subjugates us, but in schizoanalysis. For Deleuze and Guattari, “a schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst’s couch” (Anti-Oedipus Introduction xvii). This is so because the neurotic is under the sign of negation; s/he is predicated on lack, a lack the authors claim is created by the dominant class as a function of market economy (Anti-Oedipus 28). On the other hand, in his/her excess the schizophrenic is the exterior limit of capitalism: the de-socialized, de-territorialized and de-oedipalized nonsubject (Anti-Oedipus 246). The authors insist that schizoanalysis has no political affinity and speaks for no party or group or even for the masses; rather, the aim of schizoanalysis is the liberation of desire, for as Deleuze & Guattari point out, “[t]here is only desire and the social, and nothing else”(Anti-Oedipus 380 & 29). In the preface to Anti-Oedipus, Foucault claims that the way to such liberation lies in “the tracking down of all varieties of fascism, from the enormous ones that surround and crush us to the petty ones that constitute the tyrannical bitterness of our everyday lives” (xiv). This is an important point and
one that I will return to in chapter 5. It is also important to note that although Deleuze and Guattari’s primary target is capitalism, they also attack (often by way of humor) both Marx and Freud, as well as modernism and structuralism.

In addition to Ulmer’s epistemology of performing and the other highly theoretical epistemologies discussed above, there are other “ways of knowing” that we need to consider in a postmodern, postcritical pedagogy. For instance, as we have already discussed, social-epistemic rhetoric privileges discourse, by way of critique, as its way of knowing. But, as its name implies, in this pedagogy only the “social” produces and maintains knowledge. Social and critical pedagogues are adamant in their refusal to acknowledge the role of the individual / private in the production of knowledge. However, in doing so, they become guilty of the same kind of “silencing” that they attribute to other rhetorical systems. In setting up this false dichotomy (choice) between the social and the private, they not only silence the private, but also everything in-between; that is, everything that is excluded in the construction of this binary. For that reason, this is an epistemology based on exclusion and not the kind of generative “way of knowing” that Ulmer, Barthes and Derrida put forward. Nor does the social episteme allow for the unconscious, a concept that---as we have already seen---is important to other theories of knowledge. But, as we have seen before, these exclusionary methods seldom result in the production of knowledge; to the contrary, they deprive us of important ways of knowing.
For example, in “Kaironomia: The Will-to-Invent,” Eric White explains how Aristotle attempted to rid language of its self-contradictory nature by ridding us of the Sophists. To demonstrate how Aristotle attempted to impose order on language, White compares his rhetoric to the Sophistic rhetoric of Gorgias, pointing out that while Aristotle sought to ensure a stable reality and a language in which to express it, Gorgias famously claimed that nothing existed and if it did, we could not express it (25). However, White suggests that neither version of reality is correct because reality cannot be expressed in the either/or form of “Being and Not-Being”; that is, it does not obey the law of the “excluded middle.” Rather, it must be thought of as “both/and”; that is, both Being and Not-Being (35). (And, Barthes would add to this “and everything in-between.”) On the other hand, White argues Gorgias’ doctrine of dissoi logoi is an epistemology that acknowledges that speech can never express more than a partial truth and that every truth, even the one that posits “no truth” is situationally determined (43). It is for this reason that White claims, “[t]hought must therefore always keep on the move, lest it freeze into the rigidity of complacent self-delusion” (41). In other words, as soon as we think we “know” anything, we become subjects of self-deception. Just as reality is an ever-changing flux that “rests by changing,” so must thought always be willing to “begin again” (White 16-17). White advocates for an epistemology grounded in the ancient Greek notion of Kairos; that is an epistemology that “regards the
present as unprecedented” and conceives of “language as a process of continuous adjustment to and creation of the present occasion, or a process of continuous interpretation” (14).

In all of these epistemologies, language is the preeminent ground of knowledge. Even for someone as suspicious of language as Foucault is, he still claims “local,” subjugated knowledges possess epistemic potential. And, while Deleuze & Guattari agree with Foucault that discourse often masquerades as knowledge, they too see potential in the discourse of the Other. Barthes, Derrida and Ulmer are even more optimistic that language is indeed epistemic, especially the discourse of writing with excess. They too would return to language everything that has been excluded from it for centuries. With that in mind, a postmodern, postcritical epistemology would not exclude any way of knowing; not the social or the private; not the discourse of the Same, nor of the Other; rather, it would recognize the discourse of the feminist and the chauvinist, of the capitalist and the Marxist, the deviant and the divine, the wise man and the fool, of singularities, as well as multiplicities. It would recognize all discourses lest it exclude the very one in which we might have recognized ourselves. As well, this epistemology would recognize that knowledge is always, already partial and provisional and historically situated. Finally, this pedagogical model would foreground language as writing, all manner of writing. That is, this would be an inclusive pedagogical model that operates with a surplus of meaning.
What this pedagogical model will not do is engage in what Stephen M. North calls “paradigm hope” and what Victor Vitanza refers to as “pedagogy hope.” The discipline has fallen victim to such “false” hopes for the second time in recent memory. For decades practitioners and researchers in the field of Rhetoric & Composition have laid the failure of composition squarely at the feet of the Current-Traditional paradigm. Criticism of the failed paradigm—although thoroughly justified—has been harsh and unrelenting. However, in the forty years following the collapse of CTR, the only paradigmatic alternative—Social Epistemic Rhetoric—is, itself coming under fire. In other words, the discipline once again finds itself without a ruling paradigm to answer the obvious questions about who we are, what we do and why we do it.

According to North, this "failure" to agree on a unifying theory has been a source of recrimination, self-flagellation, and insecurity within the discipline ("The Death of Paradigm Hope" 196). North contends that for too long the discipline has indulged in "paradigm hope" or what Victor Vitanza refers to as "pedagogy hope" ("Three Countertheses"143). Both North and Vitanza are referring to the disciplinary preoccupation with defining, cataloging, classifying, verifying, perfecting, standardizing, and otherwise—systematizing—rhetoric and composition so as to make it teachable (North 197, Vitanza, “Countertheses” 140). Both North and Vitanza agree that such a unifying theory is not only untenable, but also undesirable. In making his argument, North points to the
powerful conservative effects of "paradigmatic orthodoxy," noting that composition research is directed at perfecting a set of institutional practices that we have reason to believe are objectionable, but that we nevertheless have a vested interest in perpetuating (204).

Vitanza echoes similar sentiments arguing that the primary, unstated purpose of any system is to maintain itself. He further argues that such systems stifle creativity, and that while control over the system is aimed at improving performance, it actually lowers the performance level. Vitanza underscores the paralyzing effects of systemization when, along with Jean-Francois Lyotard, he points out that universal theory, rather than emancipating us, actually enslaves and impoverishes us (“Countertheses” 146). He reminds us that embracing a single rhetorical theory (paradigm) blinds us to all other rhetorical and pedagogical possibilities. Even more disturbing is Vitanza's suggestion that the disciplinary tendency towards "totality" (unity, homogeny, community) actually reflects the will of the discipline to systematize the language of composing, the will to be its authority, and the will to teach it to students. In other words, it reflects the discipline's will to power and knowledge—to impose our beliefs, ideologies and realities on the students in our charge (“Countertheses” 140).

For all of these reasons, I do not posit my particular conception of a postcritical service-learning pedagogy as the disciplinary model; rather, I see it as just one way that service-learning might be done. Service-Learning is an
important pedagogy and one that offers enormous potential for students, faculty and community partners, but never just because it provides a service; after all, many community-based organizations provide service. What is crucial in service-learning is the learning that takes place, and that will be the subject of chapter 5.
Notes to Chapter 4

1 Heidegger’s “resoluteness” is an acceptance of both the inevitability of death and the indeterminacy of death; that is, acceptance of the fact that we are going to die, but we don’t know when.

2 Authentic Dasein differs from what Heidegger refers to as “everyday Dasein,” in that authentic Dasein is pulled out of the discourse and concerns of the “they world.” However, everyday (inauthentic Dasein) first finds itself in a world in which both world and self have already been interpreted by “what they say.” Resoluteness in the face of death pulls Dasein out of this inauthentic world, but only temporarily because Dasein is destined to go back and forth between the “uncanniness” of being authentic and the familiar comfort of inauthenticity.

3 Obviously, Foucault’s “periods” do not line up with those of literary theory. In fact, Foucault claims he was “led to abandon the great divisions that are now familiar to all of us” (Order, Forward x).
Chapter 5

Praxis: Merging Theory and Practice

Barthes’s lesson for the teacher . . . is a lesson in allegorical writing in which the elements of everyday life and of science may be introduced into a discourse to serve the ends of a third meaning, the nature of which was perhaps best characterized by Lacan as neither sense, nor common sense, but “jouis-sens” [bliss-sense]. What bliss-sense teaches is the pleasure of the text, the love of learning, the subject’s desire for knowledge.

Gregory Ulmer “A Night at the Text”: Roland Barthes’s Marx Brothers

A . . . major illusion on which the school system rests is that most learning is the result of teaching.

Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society

Before discussing practical applications of my concept of a service-learning / composition pedagogy, I need to return briefly to one of the most important concerns of my dissertation. As I have argued throughout this project, invention is the most important concept in any pedagogical and / or rhetorical scheme, and as others have pointed out, when CTR separated invention from rhetoric, it left the field impoverished and impotent. However, once the current-traditional paradigm gave way to more inclusive rhetorics, the discipline began to show renewed interest in the first and most important canon of rhetoric (Lauer "Issues in Rhetorical Invention"120). Attesting to the centrality of invention to rhetoric, Crowley insists that “any theoretical discourse that is entitled to be called ‘rhetoric’ must at a minimum conceive of rhetoric as an art of invention, that is, it must give a central place to the systematic discovery and investigation of the available
arguments in a given situation” (Enculturation). If, as Crowley claims, it is rhetoric’s attention to invention that sets it apart from other fields of study, then it follows that any rhet/comp pedagogical model must be constructed on a sound theory of invention. Moreover, if the goal is to encourage students to think otherwise, then that theory of invention must be different from what has come before.

In the wake of CTR’s demise, several competing rhetorical theories evolved complete with their own theories of invention. These rhetorics include Neo-Classical, Expressionist, Social-Epistemic, and "Heuretics," or experimental rhetorics. According to Janice Lauer, the various inventional strategies that accompany these rhetorics can be classified—depending on the range of choice they offer—as algorithmic (rule governed and highly formulaic), heuristic (a finite number of right choices), or aleatory (an unlimited number of possibilities based on chance and accident) (“Invention Pedagogies” 122). Classified as algorithmic are the invention strategies of Aristotle’s Classical Rhetoric; these include the topoi, the stasis questions and the three appeals of argument. While these are excellent strategies that are still useful to rhetors, they do not produce new knowledge; rather they aid us in finding all the “available means of argument.” By Aristotle’s own definition what can be discovered using these devices is only what is already available. Lauer classifies these strategies as “almost algorithmic,” and, as a result, they are “largely non-epistemic” (“Invention Pedagogies” 125).

Less rule-governed and allowing for a finite number of right answers, heuristic inventional strategies have largely been employed by expressivists such as

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Peter Elbow and Ken Macrorie for whom the conceptual starting places are in the recesses of the individual mind and who advocate for freewriting as a method of finding and developing topics. However, expressivism finds its most radical form in the work of Geoffrey Sirc, who claims that for the last thirty years composition has been in retreat, having lost the promise of a new path to poetry and intensity that was personified in the "happenings" of the late 1960’s. Sirc recommends re-configuring the classroom to create a space in which students can invent radical texts. Such a re-configuration would include the introduction of art (Jackson Pollock is a Sirc favorite), rap and hard rock music ("The Sex Pistols" and "2Pac"), and even architecture (parking lots!) ("English Composition as Happening"). In other words, Sirc wants to radicalize the traditional "conceptual starting places" in order to change "the conditions of possibility" (for what can be produced) in the writing classroom. Sirc’s techniques (minus “The Sex Pistols”) are akin to those of Ulmer’s whose heuretics I will discuss at length later in the chapter.

As social-epistemic rhetoric became the dominant force in the field, invention strategies associated with expressivist rhetoric came under attack because they supposedly privileged the private / individual (capitalism) over the social / collective (Marxism). The so-called “social turn” of the mid 1980s resulted in a backlash against expressivism and a demonizing of its practices. In their stead, social-epistemic rhetors employed a number of heuristics including Burke’s Pentad, Young, Becker and Pike’s Tagnemics and even some Neo-Classical techniques. However, once social epistemic rhetoric became the prevailing
rhetoric, its theory of invention became the theory of invention, and by the early 1990s that method of invention could be summed up in one word—critique. Berlin himself claims, “persuasion in the play for power is at the center of this rhetoric and studying the operation of signifying practices within their economic and political frames is the work it undertakes” (Rhetorics, Poetics and Cultures 83). That is to say, the language of critique of the dominant culture (capitalism) became social / critical pedagogies’ primary method of invention. Despite all the warnings of postmodernism that language is unstable, uncontrollable and even deceptive, Berlin and other critical pedagogues still trust it to change the world. Because this method of invention allows for only one right answer, it is algorithmic by nature.

The final category of rhetoric under consideration is "heuretics" or experimental rhetorics. The most radical of these theorists is Gregory Ulmer. Ulmer’s theory employs an (un)method he calls CATT:

C=Contrast (opposition, inversion, differentiation)
A=Analogy (figuration, displacement)
T=Theory (repetition, literalization)
T=Target (application, purpose)
t=Tale (secondary elaboration, representability) (Heuretics 9-11)

Ulmer replaces the topics with chora. One who writes from the chora writes with all the meanings, and, while it does not exclude the rational, it also allows for the irrational. Choral writing is writing without representation, without judgment, and without the negative. The choral writer is neither reader nor writer but an active receiver: it is the signifier without the
signified (*Heuretics* 33-34). But what is really new in Ulmer's invention scheme is the choreographer's relationship with language. Ulmer explains that the "self is a Socratic invention that relies on the subject / object dichotomy. But he also claims that subject formation is itself a product of invention. And, that is exactly what the choral writer seems to be inventing—a new self (*Heuretics* 38). Because the logic of Ulmer's method is associational, rather than argumentative, it allows for linkage between different and unrelated items. This type of linkage is crucial to invention because it allows for the accidental juxtaposing of semantic sets not usually related to one another; in other words, it allows for the accident (*Heuretics* 34). Ulmer’s invention techniques are aleatory because they allow for any number of “correct” answers, and because they keep turning the question back on itself, thereby generating more questions.

Eric White offers still another aleatory invention strategy. White conflates the two ancient Greek definitions of *Kairos* ---“the right moment” and “the opportune”--- to arrive at an understanding of Kairos as, “a passing instant when an opening appears which must be driven through with force if success is to be achieved” (“Kaironomia” 13). White’s understanding of *Kairos* conveys the immediacy of a given rhetorical moment and recognizes the constantly changing dynamics of the *situation* (in the Heideggarian sense). White suggests that the kairotic “opening” not only appears in a “passing instant,” but also that it disappears just as quickly. According to White, in this theory of invention, “[c]onsciousness would then no longer rotate around memory, but would be open instead to the irrational novelty of the moment” (“Kaironomia” 18). White's theory "forgets" (in the
manner of Deleuze and Guattari) all that has come before and approaches each moment as new and unprecedented. It accepts the contradictions inherent in "truth" and the provisional character of logos. It views reality as a state of constant flux, as an ever-lasting Fire that rests by changing, an ever-changing flux of appearances that harbors no permanent structures beneath its surface. White believes the way to confront this view of reality is not with reason, but with spontaneity, with the irrational novelty of the moment. Consequently, kairotic thought can only intervene in the world if we are willing, as circumstances change, to begin again (Kaironomia 17; emphasis mine.). White claims Kairos is both theory and practice caught in an inevitable double-bind between the intention to speak the truth about the endlessness of interpretation and the awareness that every truth (including the one that would posit no truth) is historically determined (“Kaironomia: On the Will to Invent” 42).

I find White’s use of Kairos as an invention technique especially attractive because the importance of timing (not necessarily in the chronological sense) is often neglected in traditional configurations of the rhetorical situation. However, what could be more crucial to any argument or any idea than the time in which it is presented? Here I am using timing to indicate the “opportune moment,” whether that moment be measured in chronological time or, more likely, determined by the prevailing conditions (economic, political and social) This invention technique also acknowledges Heraclitus’ warning that one can never step in the same river twice. That is, like Heraclitus, White realizes that the river is constantly changing as is the world in which we live. For these reasons, we cannot depend on yesterday’s answers to solve today’s problems. Rather, we must recognize the kairotic
moment when it appears and respond to it with spontaneity and *invention*.

Like Ulmer's invention strategies, White's, by its very nature is impossible to codify, but I would assert that this is exactly the point. Once invention techniques become *teachable* they immediately lose their ability to produce something *new*. This is the case with traditional invention strategies that point students toward what is already known or, as Ulmer claims, “[t]he modes of academic writing now taught in school tend to be positioned on the side of the already known rather than on the side of the wanting to know (of theoretical curiosity) and hence discourage learning how to learn” (*Heuretics* Preface xii). Aleatory techniques such as White’s and Ulmer’s are not reductive; they are generative. That is, each use of the technique(s) results in another, new invention. Although Lauer rejects aleatory strategies, claiming they “offer little guidance to students” (“Invention Pedagogies” 127), I would argue that is exactly what makes them attractive. Too often, we employ invention strategies that lead students to write the arguments we want them to write; we do not leave enough room in our assignments for students to occasionally *surprise* us. On the other hand, I am certainly not suggesting that we simply allow students to do whatever they want to do, and neither is Ulmer. There is a method to his madness---a pattern to his thought---but it is associational rather than logical. That is, it more resembles Borges’ Taxonomy than it does Aristotle’s. It is this kind of associative (intuitive) thinking that Ulmer claims leads to “eureka moments,” which I will explore at greater length shortly. For now, perhaps it is helpful to recall how many important inventions / discoveries have been made *purely by accident*. A simple *Google* search
quickly reveals that these inventions / discoveries include everything from post-it notes to microwave ovens to Viagra.

I believe aleatory invention strategies offer teachers and students new and promising avenues to explore; however, as I have argued throughout my dissertation, the problem is often not with the invention device but rather with the inventor (rhetor). The problem is that the "inventor" (the student) is always inventing out of the same place; that is, whether he or she is using the topoi, the pentad, freewriting, or any other device, he / she is still inventing out of his / her own "thrownness" (Heidegger Being and Time). Until we change our students "conceptual starting places," they will continue to reproduce the same old arguments, from the same limited perspectives, rather than stretching themselves and inventing new ones. Perhaps the most important axiom I have learned in regard to teaching is this: *we do not see the world the way it is; we see it the way we are.* This simple truth explains why, even when students are willing to learn something new, it is often so difficult for them to broaden their perspectives or even to acknowledge the complexities of most of the challenges we face as a nation. Often we, as teachers, make the mistake of believing that if students just research all aspects of a particular issue they will have to acknowledge that the problem defies a simple, black and white response. This simply is not the case. Far too often students read their own biases and assumptions into the research, despite what the text might actually say. In other words, they read what they want to read because their perspectives are not yet broad enough to allow for other ways of being.
In order to see the world and others differently, students themselves have to---in the Deleuzian sense---become different. Service-Learning represents a beginning in the process of becoming, because it gives students new perspectives, new "lenses," new ways to look at the world, at others and at themselves. For these reasons, I argue that service-learning pedagogy not only gives a central place to invention---it is invention. Service-Learning repositions students to think otherwise by moving them out of their comfort zones; that is, the service-learning experience, by its very nature, helps students rid themselves of the habits of thought that are associated with the cultural, religious, political, economic and geographical circumstances of their births.
However, I must stress once more that this change cannot be forced or even directed; this transformation must arise---unprovoked---out of the service experience.

Eyler & Giles’ research supports the claim that service-learning, under particular conditions, can lead to “perspective transformation” in students. The authors report that students who participate in well-integrated service programs demonstrate a greater ability to define causes and propose solutions for social problems than those in less well integrated service courses or those with no service at all (149). Students surveyed also reported an increased interest in effecting fundamental social and political change (Eyler & Giles 149). As well, Eyler & Giles report that strong service-learning programs promote the “values, knowledge, skills, efficacy, and commitment that underlie effective citizenship” (164) and, as such, are capable of transforming the ways students view their roles as citizens and may permanently change how students
involve themselves in their communities (141). However, it is important to note that
the aforementioned outcomes were most often associated with strong service-learning
pedagogies that involved high quality placement in which students were assigned
meaningful and challenging work that was also genuinely helpful to the community. In
addition, the authors note that application---the degree of integration between
classroom theory and service practice---is often “the strongest predictor of learning
outcomes, problem-solving and critical thinking and perspective transformation”
(170).

Recall that one of the chief complaints of students involved in Jones, Gilbride-
Brown and Gasiorski’s service-learning course was the disconnect they perceived
between classroom theory and service practice. Recall, also, that this was a pedagogy
in which students were given very strong directives about what they were expected to
experience even before they entered the service context. That is, cognizance of their
own whiteness and the privileges it affords them was the conceptual starting place for
these students, and as I have already argued, this was a defensive position from which
to begin the service-learning experience and one that indubitably undermined that
experience. Had these pedagogues taken a more hands-off approach and allowed
students to discover for themselves the advantages their whiteness affords them, they
might have felt less of a disconnect and expressed far less resistance. As one student
complained, “you should never be forced to change your values” Still another student
pointed out that the experience might have been more meaningful if the instructors had
focused more on community service and less on “ideologically driven readings and lessons” (Jones, Gilbride-Brown and Gasiorski 14). Obviously, trying to push students into the places we want them to occupy is not usually pedagogically effective. However, in those pedagogies in which students are allowed some agency over their experiences and in which service and learning---theory and practice---are seamlessly integrated, the outcomes are much more positive. This type of immersion pedagogy represents the first possibility for the practical application of a postmodern, postcritical theory of service-learning.

Immersion Pedagogy

Lori Pompa’s “Inside / Out” service-learning pedagogy is an example of a pedagogy in which theory meets practice to produce praxis. It is also an example of how service-learning can, both literally and figuratively, move students out of their conventional starting places. Pompa designed a pedagogy that engages criminal justice students and prison inmates in discussions about justice, crime, punishment, rehabilitation, victimization, and other issues of importance to both her "inside" students and her "outside" students. Moreover, the course is conducted entirely within the confines of the prison, one of which is a maximum security prison. But, it is important to note that Pompa's students do not simply "visit" the prisoners; rather, they meet every week of the semester for two and one-half hours in a setting in which all are considered equal participants, both in the service and in the learning. Nor are these prisoners "petty offenders." In fact, many of them have been convicted of murder and are serving life terms. This is a service-learning context that
allows for the kind of sustained contact in which the "strange" becomes "familiar" and vice-versa. According to Pompa, "service-learning is the ultimate border-crossing experience," an experience in which "borders disintegrate and barriers recede" ("Service-Learning as Crucible" 175). In this service context, students are not just researching issues associated with the criminal justice system; for a few hours at least, they are living with these issues. And, it is obvious from their course evaluations that this lived experience dramatically changes students' perceptions of themselves and of the prisoners with whom they share the experience.

Although Pompa's pedagogy is an emancipation pedagogy (and therefore theoretically "modernist"), her own description of the course—in other words, her "practices" and her "attitude" (approach) to both her "inside" and her "outside" students—moves her pedagogy closer to the postmodern adaptation that Butin recommends. For instance, Pompa claims that the discussions between prisoners and students produce "layers of understanding that defy prediction," as well as realizations about how human beings might operate in a world "beyond the myths and stereotypes that imprison us all," a world in which "the self is inexplicably tied to the other"(181-83). She also claims it is a space from which the "unexpected" often emerges; that is, Pompa does not claim to know in advance what kinds of "learning" might emerge from this context. The difference in Pompa's pedagogy and those of other critical practitioners is that she sees herself as directing a "process" (rather than directing students) and it is a process in which she is a co-learner and a co-inventor of knowledge. Still a more important difference in this pedagogy is that the
dialogue that takes place among the inside and outside students is "more a lived reality than a spoken one" ("Service-Learning as Crucible" 182). In other words, students are not just paying "lip service" to the ideals of service-learning; they are living them.

This "lived reality" has a profound impact on all her students, an impact that, as I mentioned earlier, is reflected in students' course evaluations. These students also experience resistance, but not to the pedagogy. Rather, they see themselves as performing acts of resistance "to normative assumptions about 'criminals' and 'criminality' and normative reactions to those who have violated the law" (Pompa 184). As one student put it, "[e]very time we go to the prison and have class there or even have 'normal' interactions with the guys there, we are in fact engaged in an act of resistance." Another student claims, "I will hold the ideals and values [of the course] for the rest of my life—but not only to keep them with me but to act consciously with them" (qtd. in Pompa 189). Perhaps more importantly, one of Pompa's "inside" students remarks that the course has changed her so much that, "[i]n the eight years I have been incarcerated, I've never felt so strong about wanting to make a change." Still another "inside" student notes, "[d]uring our meetings, we're no longer in jail, we're students of Temple [University]." Or, as another student observes, this service-learning context is "a space that humanizes" (qtd. in Pompa 183-84).

But Pompa's "teaching" extends beyond the boundaries of the classroom and even beyond the prison. Her students are engaged in extra-curricular activities that include: 1. Theme-based workshops offered to community and public officials, neighborhood organizations, students, faculty, and staff from area colleges and universities. 2. Production
of original Inside-Out writings to be made available through a variety of publications for use in college classes and community groups. 3. A series of mural projects in partnership with Philadelphia Mural Arts Project, SCI-Graterford artists, victims and victims' advocates, and community representatives, the theme of which is "Victims and Healing." And, recently Pompa secured funding from the Soros Foundation to develop her Inside-Out pedagogy into a national model (188).

In addition, Pompa's inside and outside students collaborated on a new design for a women's prison that involved deconstructing the existing structure, rethinking the philosophical underpinnings of its various dimensions, and reconstructing something completely new and visionary. Although Pompa is philosophically opposed to the building of any new prisons, she is practical enough to realize that if a new prison is going to be built, it would be better to have the women who have to live in it, design it. The prison recently opened in Philadelphia. Furthermore, the female inmate who submitted the architectural design for the prison, later became an "outside" student at Temple University where she continued her studies in art education while working with "at risk" youth, using art as a vehicle (Pompa 186).

Although Pompa's teaching is inspired by Freire's modernist notions of language as a tool of liberation and empowerment, she does not depend on the power of rational discourse alone to exact change. Instead, she insists that change occurs through the "lived reality more than the spoken one." And, while she may be an idealist in some ways—for instance, in her opposition to the building of prisons—she is also practical enough to
realize that prisons are a reality, at least for now. Consequently, she accepts the small victories that are achievable (the building of a better prison). In other words, Pompa does not simply "talk" theory; she puts her beliefs into action and inspires her students to do the same. However, nowhere in her course description or in student evaluations is there any indication that she tries to impose her own political agenda on her students. To the contrary, like Freire, she considers herself a co-learner in a dynamic and unpredictable process. It is also important to note that Pompa encourages her students (both inside and outside students) to view issues of crime and punishment, not only from the perspective of the perpetrators (the prisoners), but also from the perspectives of victims and their families, victim's advocates, community representatives, public and prison officials, and residents of the surrounding communities—in other words, everyone involved in or affected by these issues (186-87).

Admittedly, not every teacher has the means or the opportunity to engage in a project of such breath-taking scope; however, there is still much we can learn from Pompa’s example. And, while hers is a criminal justice class and not a composition course, there is no reason that we cannot take the "lessons" of her pedagogy and transfer them to our own; notably, her dedication to student-centered and student-directed learning, her recognition of and respect for the various and conflicted subject positions her students occupy, her acknowledgment of the provisional and local nature of knowledge, her commitment to an idealism tempered by pragmatism, her attention to all aspects of the service experience, her willingness to extend herself beyond the boundaries of pedagogy into the lived reality of
those she "serves," and her insistence that students become completely *immersed* in the service experience. Pompa's is truly a *transformative* pedagogy, and despite Butin's claim that there are no universal "best practices" in service-learning (a claim I tend to agree with), it is difficult not to describe her program as an exemplar of "best practices." For me, the critical aspect of this pedagogy is the conflating of contexts; that is, the service context and the classroom context are one in the same. This arrangement ensures that there is no daylight between theory and practice. It also collapses the server/served (same/other, subject/object) binary and allows for invention to continue throughout the writing process.

**Heuretics: The Logic of Invention**

Gregory Ulmer’s pedagogy is one I have alluded to throughout my project and I want to more thoroughly address it here as a possible “partner” to a postmodern, postcritical service-learning pedagogy. Although Ulmer does not incorporate a service component in his courses,¹ I believe his commitment to invention (throughout the writing process), his insistence on student-centered learning and his reluctance to posit his pedagogy in opposition to others in the field makes this pedagogical space a particularly attractive one for service-learning. At the same time that Berlin was developing his critical pedagogy, Ulmer was also developing a new pedagogy, one designed to do the work of cultural studies in an electronic environment. But the "environment" is not the only difference in Ulmer and Berlin's pedagogical methods. Ulmer takes an entirely different approach to language than does Berlin. While Berlin sees language as both the instrument and
the object of critique, Ulmer treats language as a post-critical object. Ulmer's approach also seems to take into account both the conscious and unconscious aspects of human subjectivity, as well as Alcorn's warning about the consequences of attacking students’ subjectivity. Ulmer explains that the "self is the invention of a Socratic vocabulary that requires the user of language to be separated from the language in order to discover it (Heuretics 92). In other words, language is the "object" that creates subjectivity. Or, as Roland Barthes notes, "the subject is merely an effect of language". In "The Object of Post-Criticism" Ulmer explains that in post-criticism the object of study is no longer conceived in terms of subject / object, but in terms of subject / predicate (86). This reconfiguration allows the post-critic to escape the subject / object dichotomy and the kind of critique that Ulmer claims can become as cruel and dogmatic as the ideology that it criticizes. Rather than attacking the "object" of study (and thus inviting retaliation), Ulmer prefers Barthes method of writing that "caresses its subject matter, which interweaves or braids together several (heterogeneous) texts into a patchwork, thus composing a «writing of reading». In post-criticism, not only does the critic's relationship with language change, but his or her relationship with the object of study changes profoundly. The post-critic no longer assumes a critical distance—or a metalinguistic position— from which to critique the object of study. Again, what changes in post-criticism is the "subject of knowledge—the relation of the knower to what is known" ("The Object of Post-Criticism” 219). What Barthes and Ulmer are seeking is a discourse (a relationship
with language) that allows the critic to approach "the vicinity of knowledge in a relationship that is neither ignorance nor domination" (“The Object of Post-Criticism” 222). Ulmer implies that subjects of knowledge find this relationship when they (like Barthes) "interrogate" their own pleasure and take pleasure in the metaphorical nature of language (“The Object of Post-Criticism” 223).

Ulmer takes pleasure, not only in the metaphorical nature of language, but in all manner of expression: puns, jokes, images and gestures (or, according to Freud, the raw signifying materials of the unconscious). In his invention process, Ulmer replaces the topoi with "chora," the place where genesis takes place, for Ulmer's method is not a deconstructive one but rather, a generative one. One who writes from the chora writes with all the meanings (Heuretics 65). Choral writing (chorography) does not exclude the rational, but it allows for the irrational. Choral writing is writing without representation, without judgment, without evaluation, without the negative. It's the signifier without the signified. It's a way of writing that keeps the question folding back into itself, again and again. Perhaps, most importantly, Ulmer suggests that choral writing is a form of unconscious writing that helps students free themselves (note that students themselves do the liberating) of libidinal attachments. He explains that one important aspect of choreography is learning to write an intuition, but these intuitions "are not left in the thinker's body but simulated in a machine, augmented by prosthesis" (Heuretics 37). Ulmer explains that this augmentation of ideological categories in a machine is known as
"artificial stupidity" or a "computerized unconscious" (*Heuretics* 38). The choral writer does not "give up" his or her intuitions, but like Barthes, learns to "write with stereotypes and thus take into account his [or her] own stupidity" (*Heuretics* 59). In other words, students don't have to *unlearn* (habits, traditions, ideologies) before they can begin to think in an entirely new way.

Chorography is probably best demonstrated in Ulmer’s use of a genre he calls *Mystory*. Using this genre, Ulmer invites students to rewrite the narratives into which they were born and over which they had no control. The genre encourages students to link their personal biographies (memories) with public discourse such as films, icons, events etc. The book *Heuretics: The Logic of Invention* is, in part, Ulmer’s own *mystory*. Recall that in the book, Ulmer “retells” an event involving the “village idiot” Red Cryer and Ulmer’s father, Walt. It is a personal story, but as Ulmer (following Foucault) points out, family discourse is a primary conveyer of cultural codes (*Heuretics* 136); therefore the most personal family stories are always, already public. By having students write in this unique genre, Ulmer invites back into the writing classroom a crucial element that has long been excluded by critical pedagogues: the private. This genre also requires students to link disciplinary or academic discourse to the personal and public (cultural) discourse in their texts. According to Ulmer, the genre was designed to “simulate the experience of invention, the crossing of discourses that has been shown to occur in the invention process” (*Heuretics* 136).
Preface xii). In other words, writing in this genre allows for those discourses to 
“bump against one another”, accidentally, in a way that sets up the conditions of 
possibility for a “eureka moment.” That eureka moment just might result in a 
change in perspective for, as Ulmer notes, “[t]he challenge of chorography is to 
remake the sense of judgment itself” (Heuretics 145). However, these texts do not 
function as critique; they are not written in opposition to any other text. 
Moreover, mystories do not represent “real life”; they are not designed to 
reproduce or reflect reality, but Ulmer does suggest that mystories, like the objects 
constructed by montage, possess the potential change reality.

Ulmer's claim that the chorography does not “represent” is an important one, 
because "representation" is a crucial issue in post-criticism, specifically, 
representation of the object of study (“The Object of Post-Criticism” 83). What is 
happening in criticism, according to Ulmer, is an abandonment of the values and 
assumptions of "realism"("The Object of Post-Criticism” 83). He claims that the 
principal device used by post-critics is the compositional pair collage / montage. 
"Montage," he claims, "does not reproduce the real, but constructs an object. . .in 
order to intervene in the world, not to reflect, but to change reality" (“The Object of 
Post-Criticism” 86). Collage, on the other hand, calls into question "all the illusions 
of representation" (“The Object of Post-Criticism” 88). Employing this 
compositional pair involves "lifting] a certain number of elements from works, 
objects, preexisting messages, and integrating] them in a new creation in order to
produce an original totality manifesting ruptures of diverse sorts" ("The Object of Post-Criticism" 84). What post-critics are attempting to represent with these hybrid genres is the unrepresentable, or what Barthes calls the "obtuse" or "third meaning."

As its name implies, the "meaning" of this meaning cannot be pinned down, but Barthes insists that first and foremost, "obtuse meaning is discontinuous, indifferent to the story and to the obvious meaning" (The "Third Meaning" 61). What the obtuse meaning does is "disturb" or "sterilize" criticism. It works somewhat in the same way that Walter Benjamin claims montage works: it interrupts the action (qtd. in Ulmer "The Object of Post-Criticism 86). Barthes further describes the obtuse meaning as a "counter-narrative; disseminated, reversible, set to its own temporality, it inevitably determines ... a quite different analytical segmentation to that in shots, sequences and syntagms. . . an extraordinary segmentation: counter-logical and yet 'true'" ("The Third Meaning" 63). But what is important to note in all these descriptions is that the third meaning is not set in opposition to the "text;" it coexists with the text. It is "in addition to," not "in opposition to" the obvious meaning. This is one of the conditions that renders it "post-critical," for the post-critic is never confrontational. For this reason, Ulmer and other post-modernists are often accused of being *apolitical*.

This simply is not the case. Anyone who reads Ulmer's *Heuretics* carefully will realize that— in this book— he is doing important cultural work. In addition to questioning his own socialization as a white, middle-class, male,
he is also questioning the issues of race, class, and gender so important to traditional cultural studies. The difference in Ulmer's post-critical approach and Berlin's social-epistemic approach is that Ulmer does not presume to answer the questions he raises, rather, in a very Derridian gesture, he keeps the question folding back into itself over and over, always deferring any final judgment and always keeping open all possibilities.

But there is still an important point to be made about post-criticism. According to Ulmer, "Post-criticism . . . functions with an 'epistemology' of performance—knowing as making, producing, doing, acting" ("The Object of Post-Criticism" 94). While conventional academic discourse explicates, describes, and/or argues theory; the post-critic performs his or her theory. Post-critical theory is a showing that incorporates academic discourse, as well as gestures, images, sounds, and other sensory perceptions. Ulmer's Heuretics combines the features of video and the computer in hypermedia, a merger that allows students to write in multimedia, combining in one composition all the resources of words, images and sounds.

But Heuretics doesn't just offer students additional modes of expression; it offers them an entirely new way to think. Because the logic of Ulmer's method is associational rather than argumentative, linkage may occur among different and apparently irrelevant items. This type of linkage is crucial to invention. While academic writing is linear, cause and effect writing that
organizes information hierarchically, by contrast, hypermedia is organized as a network and its logic is associational (*Heuretics* 34). What this allows for is the accidental juxtaposing of images and words, of semantic sets not usually related to one another; a juxtaposing that cannot possibly take place within the framework of Aristotelian logic. This juxtaposing of seemingly incongruent sets also allows for what Ulmer calls “eureka moments” (*Heuretics* 141). Ulmer claims eureka moments arise out of the unconventional way memory stores information in “emotional sets” rather than organizing it logically (*Heuretics* 142). Because these ideas and information are stored associationally rather than logically, one can never be sure what might “trigger” the eureka or “Aha! moment” or throw the Gestalt switch. In other words, these moments of insight are seemingly accidental. To back up his point, Ulmer cites what he calls “canonical” eureka moments: “Newton observing the falling apple, Archimedes taking a bath, James Watt watching the kettle boil, Poincare getting on a bus” (*Heuretics* 141). Ulmer further argues that his invention technique—chorography—“writes directly the hyperbolic intuition known as the eureka experience” (*Heuretics* 140).

However, it is important to note that Heuretics does not replace analytical thinking; rather, it supplements it. What Ulmer is offering is a rhetoric that responds to the new electronic environment, an environment in which writing will be profoundly different (*Heuretics* 18). It is an environment that allows theory and practice to fold in on one another and emerge as pure praxis. It is also an
environment in which students engaged in service-learning initiatives might be allowed
to reach their full potential.

Connectivity: The Globalization of Education

The third possible application of my theoretical pedagogy---distance learning---is one that offers, perhaps, limitless possibilities. The dispersed nature of an environment that makes time and space irrelevant seems ideal for bringing together diverse communities that otherwise might never “meet.” On-line courses, also referred to as distance education and distributed learning, have become increasingly popular in the last two decades, but especially at this time when colleges and universities are facing harsh budget cuts, more and more of them are turning to virtual classrooms as a more economical method of delivering course offerings. William R. Doyle reports that in the mid-1990’s there were few on-line courses being offered in higher education, but by 2002, 1.6 million students (approximately 20% of all college students) were taking at least one on-line course (58). In the fall of 2007 that number had grown to an astounding 3.9 million students engaged in on-line courses (Doyle 58). Between 2009 and 2010 enrollment in on-line courses grew by 21% compared to a 2% increase in traditional university enrollment (Daniel). As of November 2011, 6.1 million students or 31% of all higher education students were enrolled in on-line learning (Allen & Seaman).

According to a survey of both corporate and academic executives
conducted by *The Economist*, online degree programs and distance education have become firmly entrenched in universities around the world. In fact, nearly two-thirds of those surveyed predict that technological innovation will have a major impact on higher education and teaching methodologies over the next five years, while sixty percent of those surveyed say, “the technological change occurring in our midst will alter the perception of the college campus from a one-dimensional (physical) concept to a multi-dimensional (physical and online) one” (4-5). Indeed, many universities have already embraced a multi-modal approach to teaching and learning with the introduction of hybrid courses, those that combine traditional in-class learning with on-line learning. Because these courses physically meet a limited number of times in a semester, they also offer universities the opportunity to better allocate resources. Attesting to the efficacy of this dual environment, Tom Delaney, CIO of New York University School of Law, points out, “Law school students enrolled in hybrid programmes that integrate distance and in-class education outperform those who study exclusively in one environment” (4).

Moreover, distance education is becoming a world-wide trend with Asia claiming the largest number of adult, on-line learners. Latchem & Jung report that China and India now have 70 open universities, and that 10% of China’s and 20% of India’s university students are enrolled in on-line courses (qtd. in Clothey 3). Rebecca Clothey reports that other countries such as Japan, Korea,
Cambodia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey all offer on-line courses at the university level (3). As well, EDEN (European Distance & E-Learning Network) boasts memberships from 55 countries and 430 institutions across Europe.

According to the International Council for Open and Distance Education (ICDE), the emergence and evolution of open universities around the world can be characterized by a number of features including the following:

- providing educational opportunities to a broader segment of the population, thereby encouraging the movement from elitist to mass higher education
- formalizing independent and lifelong learning opportunities for adults
- promoting the use of multimedia and new information and communication technology in distance and conventional higher education
- achieving cost effectiveness through large scale operations as seen in the mega Universities
- promoting internationalization in higher education through cross-border delivery of courses and programs (13-14)
These characteristics reflect the growing belief that access to knowledge and learning is a “universal right, one of the key rights of the global community.” In fact, educators have long held that knowledge and learning are the keys to solving “individual and collective social and economic problems: it has become a new global religion” (ICDE Introduction 3). These characteristics also reflect many of the values and goals associated with service-learning.

Along with the dramatic increases in on-line enrollment have come stunning developments in distance learning technology. As Clothey points out, technological advances have made it possible to collaborate across international borders, as well as improved access to global resources and increased the potential for cultural and social interaction through distance education (3). Sophisticated and increasingly innovative Learning Management Systems (LMS) now make it possible for universities to deliver course content through a variety of media, including audio, video and even “live” lectures. The technology of videoconferencing allows universities to inexpensively host virtual live lectures, symposia, and conferences among scholars and professionals throughout the world. As Latchem & Jung point out, “[t] his opens up a new professional network to individuals, and provides limitless guest lecturers for course participation” (qtd. in Clothey 3).

Advances in technology not only allow teachers to more effectively interact with students, these advances also promote more meaningful interaction
between students. It is this kind of meaningful interaction among students and between teachers and students that some educators believe is lost in on-line courses. To the contrary, on-line courses put everyone “on the front row.” Well-designed distance education courses encourage 24/7 communication between everyone involved in the course, not just those students who are more inclined to participate. Likewise, interactive course tools such as discussion boards, blogs, wikis and “chat” features encourage and enhance collaborative learning, even for the shyest participants. In fact, normally reserved students are often emboldened by the anonymity of the distance learning classroom, because the virtual classroom ignores those “attributes”---good looks, expensive clothes---that are often “rewarded” in the traditional classroom. Instead, the virtual classroom rewards intelligent, articulate and positive student participation. While to date technology has been used to replicate the traditional classroom in a virtual environment, Elliott Masie, chair of the Learning Consortium and CEO of the Masie Center argues “the next stage of innovation and development will come as faculty and designers ask online education to accomplish things that could never happen in the classroom” (qtd. in Chronicle of Higher Education).

Actually, technology is already accomplishing things that cannot happen in the traditional classroom, at least not in most of them. What technology is now making possible is the kind of “cross-border” distance learning that most students (and teachers) would never have the opportunity to experience. It is these
opportunities that might create the conditions of possibility in which Same and the
Other could make contact with one another long enough for the strange to
become familiar and the familiar to become strange. And, because time and
space are irrelevant in distance education, one can imagine any number of
possibilities in which students from entirely different cultures, religions,
nationalities, and etc. might share a “space” in which thinking becomes thinking
otherwise. This would also be a space in which no distinction between server and
served could possibly be discerned. In this context, both service and learning
would take on a whole new meaning.

Despite its potential, distance learning is not without its detractors. Some
of the drawbacks of distance education as a practical application for any pedagogy
include resistance on the part of faculty, skepticism of the efficacy of on-line
courses, and questions regarding the integrity of these courses. Many in academia
are understandably dubious about the efficacy of on-line courses. This can be
explained in part by the difficulty that is always inherent in the introduction of
something new; change is difficult for all of us. However, I also think many are
distrustful of a learning environment in which neither teacher nor students are
present. While this sentiment is certainly justified, I think we have to question the
assumption that underlies it. What I am referring to here is the assumption that
because a teacher and her/his students are in the classroom, they are fully present
in a sense that allows learning to take place. Here, we might do well to recall
Derrida’s claim that “full presence” is always “out of play” (“Structure, Sign and Play” 248). First as a student and then as a teacher, I must confess that there have been times in which I was not always fully present in the classroom, and I am absolutely certain that my students are not always fully present. On the other hand, from my experience with teaching on-line courses, I would argue that in two important ways, I have to be even more present in my on-line courses. First, on-line courses are always in session; the teacher never gets to “go home.” Secondly, to compensate for the lack of visual cues that are on display in the traditional classroom, on-line instructors have to develop a persona that communicates concern, immediacy and, above all professionalism. As we all know, the written word is often misunderstood; as a result, the on-line instructor has to read communiqués very closely and then respond in a way that completely answers the student’s question and invites them to ask additional questions if necessary. In addition, we have to be available to help students navigate the course and adjust to the technology. The fact is, many on-line instructors find these courses far more demanding than face-to-face classes.

Addressing more directly the learning outcomes of distance education courses, Robert W. Mendenhall reports that a 2010 meta-analysis and review of online-learning studies, published by the U.S. Department of Education, concluded that online learning was as effective as, or slightly more effective, than traditional face-to-face instruction. According to the *Chronicle of Higher
Education 2011 Special Report on On-Line Learning, because “most online education is simply classroom instruction delivered through the Internet, it isn't surprising that the learning outcomes are roughly the same.” The report laments the fact that most universities, even those that offer on-line courses, have failed to find ways to make technology transform education. The report suggests that rather than debating the efficacy of different modes of delivery, we should be looking for ways to transform education through technology, both on-line and off-line. I am sympathetic to the desire to judge on-line learning against its traditional counterpart, but, at some point, those engaged in distance education need to realize that the “mode of delivery” need not be the determining factor in the assessment of on-line pedagogies. Just as with any other pedagogy the level of expertise, the commitment to learning and the level of engagement on the part of the instructor, as well as his/her ability to communicate these qualities to students is the best indicator of pedagogical success. For these reasons, there will be effective on-line courses and those that are less effective, just as there are more and less effective traditional pedagogies.

Still another source of distrust arises from skepticism regarding the integrity of on-line courses. This fear is also understandable; since we cannot “see” students, how can we be sure they are not cheating? The simple answer is “we can’t.” However, I think it is helpful to look at the statistics regarding cheating among the students we can “see.” In a survey conducted by Neil Selwyn,
61.9% of the more than 1200 students surveyed admitted to engaging in online plagiarism (online plagiarism is referred to as “cybercheating” and is not directly related to distance education courses; rather, the term refers to using the internet to cheat). Of these, 59% copied a few sentences, 30% copied a few paragraphs, 12% copies a few pages, 4% copied entire documents, and 3% purchased essays. What is possibly worse news is 25% of graduate students admitted to cheating (qtd. in Landers). If there is any good news for the English Department it is that Selwyn broke the “cheaters” down by disciplines and found that the Humanities scored at the bottom of the ten disciplines with 46% admitting to cheating compared to a whopping 72% of Engineering students who admitted to cheating (qtd. in Landers). Even more disturbing are the results of a survey of 50,000 college students from 60 campuses in which 70% of those surveyed admitted to cheating, with half of those admitting to one or more “instances of serious cheating on written assignments” (qtd. in Campbell).

With statistics this high in traditional classrooms, we might assume cheating/plagiarism is even more prevalent in on-line courses; however, statistics indicate this assumption is unwarranted. What may be the case is that plagiarism is easier to detect in on-line courses. In more sophisticated LMS’s, such as Blackboard, assignments are digitally submitted and automatically run through plagiarism “checkers” such as Safeassign. While such systems are not fool-proof, they do provide instructors with an additional tool by which to detect plagiarism,
and the overworked writing instructor with 100 essays to grade does not have to
go to any trouble to detect the infraction. Plagiarism is indeed a threat to academic
integrity, but there is no evidence to indicate that it occurs any more often in on-
line courses than it does in the traditional classroom.

Nevertheless, distance education, like service-learning, is not for everyone
(teachers or students). However, for those who can see the potential in service-
learning combined with distance learning, the possibilities are almost limitless.
Technology now provides us with the opportunity to “merge” dramatically
diverse student populations into one virtual classroom. The service and learning
possibilities are limited only by the imaginations of instructors and course
developers. Of course, service-learning components are already being added to
distance-learning courses, but almost always as an add-on to the courses. In other
words, in many cases, students taking on-line courses are required to make their
own service opportunities. And, while these efforts are to be applauded, I believe
they fail to take advantage of the transformational potential inherent in both
service-learning and technology.

In pursuit of that potential, in the summer of 2012, I developed a hybrid
English 1301 course that I taught in the following fall semester. I wanted to begin
with a hybrid course because, so far, it has not been attempted at my institution, at
least not in the English Department. As the research I cited earlier indicates,
hybrids seem to offer students “the best of both worlds” and I believe that was borne out by the very positive results of my experience.

English 1301.039 Comp I

This course met physically on Mondays of each week. The remainder of the week, students engaged in on-line activities such as discussion boards, speech and debate analyses and collaborative assignments. The major assignments, as well as all other elements of the course were designed to meet the guidelines and stated objectives of First Year English at UTA. All instructions, handouts and other course materials were delivered on-line and all assignments submitted through the course. Since the running of the course coincided with the presidential election, we took “Campaign 2012” as a subtext. The timing of the campaign was but one reason I felt students would benefit from making it the focus of our assignments. The two national nominating conventions, the abundance of campaign ads and the four debates offered students the opportunity to analyze real world events in rhetorical terms. Students wrote lengthy rhetorical analyses of convention speeches, the four debates and selected campaign ads. These analyses included considerations of text, audience, speaker, constraints and exigence and, more importantly students analyzed the ways in which “meaning” changed when any of these rhetorical elements changed. As well, they considered how the speakers appealed to logos, ethos and pathos and how successful those appeals
were. We also considered the speeches and debates in terms of “style” and “substance.”

The three major writing assignments were very much in line with other 1301 courses. For instance, the first assignment, The Discourse Community Analysis (DCA) asked students to analyze a community in which they were or had been a member and to consider how that community was actually a discourse community in terms of the logos (training, skills, credentials) required to join it, the necessity of establishing ethos and the pathos (values) they learned in the community. In addition, I asked them to consider how “politics” is its own discourse community and to describe their efforts, so far, to join that community. The DCA’s were no better or worse than those usually submitted in 1301. Some students did seem to be gaining a better understanding of specialized discourse communities and how this concept related to politics, even this early in the semester.

The second major assignment was a two-part assignment that included a group component and an individual writing assignment. With the help of the Library and Moviemaker, students worked in groups of four to create campaign videos. It was not necessary for them to choose between candidates unless they truly had a preference and wanted to express it. Not all of them did. For instance, one group created an ad that encouraged young people, 18-24, to vote and make their voices heard. Still another group went with a third party candidate. Those
who did decide to back a particular candidate did so with a specific issue in mind (women’s issues, clean coal, energy, for example). As they created their videos, it was obvious that they had listened to and understood the issues being championed by each of the candidates. Students enjoyed this assignment enough to meet together outside of class to work on it. The constraints I put on the videos were that they couldn’t be longer than one minute, they had to make an argument and support it with evidence, and while they could certainly slant the evidence to favor their position, the ads had to be truthful.

The second part of this assignment was an individual effort and required students to do an exhaustive analysis in which they justified every rhetorical choice they made in creating the video from the background music to the visuals to the tone of the ad and the time and place the ad would run. Students analyzed the text, author, constraints, exigence and particularly the target audience for the ad. In the process of analyzing the ad, they stated their claim and defended the evidence they used to support it. Students and teacher alike were very pleased with the process and product of this assignment. In addition to learning rhetorical skills, students also gained a better understanding of how the democratic process works and how they can impact that process.

In the final assignment, students selected an issue from the many that emerged during the campaign and wrote an argumentative essay in which they drew from at least four outside sources to support their claims. Although those
submissions are still coming in, so far, I am very pleased with the diversity and complexity of the issues being addressed. As students drafted these essays we discussed the differences in the persuasive ads they created and in the conventional arguments they were writing and the different purposes and audiences that each might serve.

Student-to-student interaction is vital in any course, but it is especially so in online and hybrid courses. That is the element I was most pleased with in this course. Students interacted primarily through discussion boards and peer review. The peer reviews were thoughtful and thorough; while the discussion posts were outstanding. Several students posted responses that consistently averaged well over a thousand words. Most importantly, participation in these online conversations was 100%, as was in-class attendance. When the course runs in the spring 2013, I will be looking for ways to make technology do what cannot be done in the traditional classroom.

By the fall of 2013, I plan to have developed a hybrid that includes a service-learning component. Teaching the course in the fall and again in the spring semester will allow me to decide how best a service-learning component might be integrated into the course and what form that component might take.

Conclusion

This dissertation did not exactly follow the course I had planned when I began to write it. At that time, distance education was not part of my professional
plans. However, since becoming involved in on-line teaching, I have become increasingly interested in the possibilities it offers. Those possibilities have never been greater than in this age of globalized education and technological innovation. We are already witnessing enormous growth in open universities, on-line universities and universities that offer hybrid courses. There is no reason to believe this trend will do anything other than increase. Not only does on-line learning offer a university education to populations that would otherwise never receive one, but the anonymity of the internet also allows for other kinds of “border-crossings.” For instance, in Saudi Arabia, videoconferencing allows female students on segregated campuses (where are those radical feminists when we need them?) to interact with male lectures without violating cultural restrictions against being “seen” by them (Latchem and Jung 4). Likewise, the anonymity of the virtual classroom erases ethnic, racial, gender and disability biases, effectively leveling the playing field for all involved. And, as I have already argued, the globalization and internationalization of education now offers millions of students the opportunity to serve and learn together, in a way never before thought possible.

Perhaps more importantly, distance learning puts a college education within reach of millions across the globe, a fact that is especially important in developing nations. Despite increased participation worldwide, some regions of the world remain profoundly underserved by the internationalization of higher
education. For instance, Africa’s overall rate of participation is 45%, but sub-Saharan Africa reports only 2% participation. According to Barney Pityana, vice-chancellor of the University of South Africa, distance learning may provide the only viable and affordable means of post-secondary education in Africa (rpt.in International Trends in DE 11-12).

The rapidly increasing numbers of those qualified for post-secondary education in other parts of the world also present a challenge that distance learning can help address. For example, to meet the demands of this growing demographic Asia, South America and Africa would have to build tens of thousands of traditional universities, each capable of accommodating 40,000 students (International Trends 12). Quickly developing this kind of educational infrastructure is certainly not feasible; however, these students could be accommodated in on-line institutions. India’s success with different modalities of delivering education attests to the success of these programs. While accounting for one-fourth of the developing world’s population, India, boasts the third largest higher education system in the world. Approximately 24% of all higher education students are enrolled in some sort of distance learning institution (International Trends 13). Clearly, the vast expanse of the internet offers additional resources where few exist on solid ground.

Nevertheless, for all its promise, internationalized, globalized education also presents enormous challenges, as well as potential dangers. Chief among the
dangers is the possibility that the wealthiest Western countries will colonize distance learning as they have historically colonized other enterprises. According to the ICDE, most countries are now participating in, and contributing to internationalization efforts, however, “the large English-speaking developed countries are the biggest providers of international education services, a fact that is causing some alarm.” This alarm is probably warranted, because the threat of foreign providers overpowering poorly funded domestic higher education systems is quite real. To combat the threat, the ICDE suggests poorer nations find ways to contribute to world knowledge, but, at the same time, control their own “knowledge futures.” However, this may be impossible for these poorer countries because even “middle-income” Asian and Latin American countries are increasingly concerned about their ability to control the internationalization agenda (ICDE). The enormity of the advantages countries like the U.S. have over these other nations is staggering when we consider that, according to the World Bank, North America has 65% of the world’s internet hosts, but only 5% of the world’s population; conversely developing countries have only 5% of internet hosts and 80% of the world’s population (Bjarnason 4). These statistics will profoundly and perhaps negatively impact our world in the coming decades, because as ICDE President Frits Pannekoek points out, “those who are successful in the new global knowledge economy may harvest great wealth and exert an inordinate influence on the world’s future.” I fear it may be a negative impact
because if a few wealthy Western nations are allowed to “own” knowledge, they will, without a doubt, seek to further systematize and standardize it, effectively marginalizing all “local” knowledges. In that case, rather than technological innovation bringing us in contact with the Other, it will simply render us all the Same. The challenge for those in service-learning and / or distance education will be to work to combat this almost irresistible force. We will not meet that challenge by confronting it head-on; rather we must, as Butin suggests, learn to play a different political game.
Notes to Chapter 5

1 My aim is not to criticize students; we are all guilty of this practice. However, in this project my primary concern is with the way students view the world.

2 Ulmer does not use service-learning himself, but I did email him and ask if there was anything about service-learning that might detract from the effectiveness of his pedagogy and he assured me that there was not.

3 I think mysteries could be used in place of the literacy autobiographies students now compose in English 1301. These unique texts could serve many of the same purposes as the autobiography, but with an interesting twist. They would help students transition to academic writing by writing about what they already “know”; they would introduce students to the concept of writing in different genres; and they would help students understand that they are indeed literate in a number of discourses. In addition, they would allow students to use multimedia to explore their own subjectivity. It is now relatively easy and certainly inexpensive for students to “publish” their own e-books. Free software downloads such as Calibre and Sigli allow students to embed video and audio in e-books and publish them under their names. I am grateful to Cedric May of UTA for his workshop on publishing e-books.
4This research was conducted in July and August 2008 and featured a
global online executive survey and in-depth interviews. Of the 289 executives
responding to the survey, 189 participants came from higher education and 100
came from corporate settings. The US accounted for slightly over one-half (154)
of all respondents, with the remainder distributed through Europe (69), Asia-
Pacific (43) and the rest of the world (23). Of this total, board members and C-
level respondents made up 43% of private-sector respondents, while professors,
deans and other faculty members accounted for 86% of those surveyed from
academic institutions. In addition, 12 interviews were held with university chief
information officers and leaders in the private sector to gauge reaction to the
survey’s findings and gain deeper insight into the wider impact of technology on
both higher education and the job-preparedness of today’s graduates.

5I would argue that in this case, the “medium is not necessarily the
message.”

6Safeassign is, of course, the plagiarism checker used by Blackboard. In
addition to this “check,” instructors in all courses have added “plagiarism
modules” that teach students how to avoid plagiarism, as well as outline the
consequences of such infractions. The misconception that plagiarism is more
prevalent in on-line courses may have worked to our advantage in that it has made
on-line instructors hyper-vigilant in their efforts to educate students about what
constitutes plagiarism and how to avoid it.
I am not being naïve here. I understand the cultural, political, religious and social issues that would be involved in such a merger. Developing and teaching this course would require expertise in a number of fields and would have to be approached with all due caution. Nevertheless, the potential benefit to faculty and students far exceeds the risks.

The fact that I have been away from service-learning since I arrived at UTA is but one obstacle I will need to overcome in developing this course. Perhaps of greater concern is the realization that my audience---my students---at UTA are a different population than the student body at SFA. The majority of my SFA students were true freshmen who were attending college on their parents’ dime. As a result, they had more time to commit to the service aspect. My UTA students often include mature students who are already employed full-time, as well as students working their own way through school. There will be constraints on their time, which I plan to off-set, in part, by having them meet physically only once a week. However, their service-learning “needs” and expectations will also be different. Finding the right service contexts for this audience will be challenging indeed, but it is a challenge I look forward to.
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