

INTER-MINISTERIAL COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION
IN SOCIAL PROGRAMS: A CASE STUDY OF
THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
OPORTUNIDADES

by

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ABSTRACT

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The purpose of this research is to use the case study approach to determine how coordination is achieved in the Program for Human Development: Oportunidades (*Opportunities*). Oportunidades is the largest anti-poverty program in Mexico. The program has its origins in the Program for Education, Health and Nutrition (*Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación, PROGRESA*) implemented in 1997 under the administration of former President Ernesto Zedillo. In 2002 the new elected government change its name to Oportunidades without any substantial changes in its operation. The Program began in 1997 serving 300 thousand families; today 5 million people are enrolled (Sedesol, 2007b). This means that one of every four Mexicans receives Oportunidades. Ten interviews were conducted with key informants and documents of the Board and Technical Committee minutes from 1997-2006 were analysed using the

constant comparative method. The results show that coordination mechanisms can be classified into the following macro-mechanisms: hierarchy, networks and markets. The Progres-Oportunidades Program achieves coordination, at the federal level, with instruments of these three macro mechanisms, although the institutional setting of the program is predominantly hierarchical.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
ABSTRACT	v
LIST OF ILUSTRATIONS	x
LIST OF TABLES	xi
Chapter	Page
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Statement of the problem	2
1.2 Historical overview and purpose of the study.....	4
2. LITERATURE REVIEW.....	7
2.1 Coordination and organization theory.....	8
2.2 Coordination and collaboration	11
2.3 Structures and tools.....	15
2.4 Levels.....	20
2.5 Actors and interests	21
2.6 Context	22
3. METHODS	26
3.1 Case study research.....	27
3.2 The selection of the case study: the Oportunidades Program	28
3.3 Techniques for data collection	29
3.4 Selection of participants.....	29
3.5 Model of analysis: actor-centered institutionalism	30
3.6 Data analysis	32

3.7	Validity	55
3.8	Description of the Human Development Program: Oportunidades	56
4.	RESULTS.....	60
4.1	Results of the interviews.....	60
4.2	Results of the minutes from the Board and Technical Committee of the National Coordination for the Education, Health and Dietary Program (Oportunidades).....	91
5.	ANALYSIS.....	126
5.1	First research assumption: a hierarchical-bureaucratic dominant model of public administration and public management	126
5.2	Second research assumption: forms of coordination inside the Human Development Program Oportunidades based on market, network and hierarchy mechanisms	133
5.3	Main strengths and weaknesses of the Oportunidades Program	160
5.4	Synthesis of the analysis	167
6.	CONCLUSIONS.....	176
6.1	Summary of research study.....	177
6.2	Were the research assumptions fulfilled?.....	181
6.3	Main contributions.....	185
6.4	Recommendations.....	186
6.5	Limitations.....	189
APPENDIX		
A.	PUBLIC OFFICIAL BY ATTENDANCE AT TECHNICAL COMMITTEE MEETINGS OF THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OPORTUNIDADES (1999-2006).....	193
B.	PUBLIC OFFICIAL BY ATTENDANCE AT BOARD MEETINGS OF THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OPORTUNIDADES (1997-2006).....	196
C.	INTERVIEW GUIDE.....	199

REFERENCES.....	202
BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION.....	209

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure	Page
3.1 The domain of interaction-oriented policy research.....	31
5.1 Predominantly hierarchical-bureaucratic management model	133
5.2 Coordination mechanisms inside the Oportunidades Program	138

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
3.1 Dimensions, categories and subcategories to identify bureaucracy on the Progesa-Oportunidades Program.....	37
3.2 Dimensions, categories and subcategories to identify the coordination mechanisms in the Progesa-Oportunidades Program	49
4.1 Professions and Positions of the Interviewees	61
4.2 Sessions of the Oportunidades National Council, 1997-2006	92
4.3 Sessions of Oportunidades' Technical Committee, 1999-2006.....	93
4.4 How Oportunidades' Technical Committee is comprised	97
5.1 Summary chart of the results of the first assumption a dominant hierarchical-bureaucratic model of public administration and public management.....	127
5.2 Summary chart of Hierarchy Dimension	139
5.3 Summary chart of Network Dimension	153
5.4 Summary chart of Market Dimension.....	157
5.5 Summary of the Strengths of Oportunidades	161
5.6 Summary of the Weaknesses of Oportunidades	166
5.7 Dimensions and a priori categories and subcategories compared with the results obtained in the analysis of the first research assumption.....	171
5.8 Dimensions and a priori categories and subcategories of market, network and hierarchy mechanisms	173
5.9 Dimensions, categories, subcategories and instruments identified based on the analysis	174

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Inter-agency coordination has been repeatedly identified in the literature as a factor of success in social policy programs; however, the majority of the studies do not address this subject directly. This dissertation identifies and analyzes how inter-institutional coordination of social programs is achieved in Mexico, in particular through the case study of the Human Development Program Oportunidades.

There is a consensus that poverty must be addressed with a multidimensional approach, and, given the inability of an office or governmental unit to satisfy all the needs of a target population, coordination becomes necessary (Whetten, 1982). Mexico implemented its first anti-poverty programs in 1970 in response to the increase in rural poverty. Levy (1994) states that, in general, anti-poverty programs are designed to attack the causes of poverty and/or to mitigate the effects of poverty; also, they require an accurate identification of their target population.

The implementation of the Progres-Oportunidades Program in 1997 represented a break with previous anti-poverty programs; until then, governments had preserved continuity in the internal administrative structures of social programs (Ordóñez, 2002). In general, anti-poverty programs worked with a bottom-up structure in that communities and organized groups channeled their demands, and the Federal government's main responsibility was to provide funding. The operation and administration of social projects relied mainly on local and municipal governments. In contrast, the Oportunidades Program has a top-down structure; its design and

administration relies on the central government, and the beneficiaries only decide if they will enroll in the program or not (Levy, 2006), while local governments and municipalities are only service providers.

The positive evaluation results obtained by Progres-Oportunidades have allowed its operation through three Federal administrations. During those 12 years, the impacts of the three components of education, health and nutrition have been widely evaluated. However, little attention has been paid to the administrative mechanisms within the Program. The consistent identification in the literature of inter-institutional coordination as a factor for the success or failure of a social program reinforces the relevance of this study.

1.1 Statement of the problem

Several Latin American scholars have pointed out the importance of coordination and the inter-sectoral nature of social policies and have noted the very limited number of studies on the subject. Repetto (2005) states that the number of unmet social needs and the limited results of a sectoral strategy evidence the urgent need of multi-sectoral approaches. Also, Cunill (2005) points out that the basis of coordination is finding better solutions since it allows the sum of resources, perspectives and specialties.

In Mexico, it has been repeatedly stated that poor or no inter-institutional coordination has been a constant problem in social policy (Campos & Vélez, 1994; Contreras, 2004; Levy, 1994; Ordóñez, 2002); however, there are no studies that examine how coordination is achieved. The main contribution of this research is to analyze, through a case study of the Oportunidades Program, the articulation of mechanisms and tools to achieve formal and informal coordination. Understanding how a complex Program like Oportunidades is able to coordinate will provide valuable information that will result in a better design and implementation of social policies.

The Progres-a-Oportunidades Program represents an interesting opportunity for analysis. Its design includes several mechanisms especially created to achieve inter-institutional coordination across sectors and across levels of government. Its administrative structure has several coordination units between sectors and an operational structure based on coordination units in local governments for the implementation of the program in the states.

The study of how coordination is achieved is relevant because the literature shows that coordination and collaboration are not well-defined concepts. Although the literature commonly refers to both concepts simultaneously, there is not a clear understanding of where one concept finishes and the other starts. Some authors point out that collaboration is a lower-level type of coordination (Alexander, 1995), but the lack of consensus makes impossible to arrive to any definitive conclusions.

Similarly, the degree of theory development depends on the level at which coordination occurs. The literature shows that it is easier to study coordination that happens at higher levels of government, under hierarchical structures, than those that happen at the micro level through informal channels between agencies. This is due to the fact that is easier to study exchanges that leave some evidence than those in which the sole interaction was a personal communication.

The lack of consensus about coordination makes necessary its study in order to reach a better understanding of its importance and desirability. The recent trends on public governance have stressed the importance of policy coherence and service integration without analyzing their potential impacts. There is not much evidence about how coordination is promoted, and less evidence exists about its possible impact.

1.2 Historical overview and purpose of the study

The design phase of Progresa-Oportunidades Program involved a long process of consensus building among the various ministries and departments involved in its operation and implementation. Since the publication of the General Guidelines for the Operation of Progresa in 1999, the Program has been described as a set of inter-sectoral actions of education, health and nutrition for families living in extreme poverty to assure the coordination of actions to avoid resource duplication and reduce administrative spending (Sedesol, 1999). The Program based its operation on the joint commitment of Federal and local governments to establish the necessary coordination to achieve its goals.

The horizontal approach of Progresa-Oportunidades required the creation of a central coordination unit with enough power to effectively coordinate the various ministries involved in its operation and to control the budget of the program, given its distribution among different ministries and agencies involved in its implementation (Levy, 2006). Thus, in 1997 the National Coordination Unit of the Education, Health and Nutrition Program (Conprogesa) was created as a decentralized agency of the Ministry of Social Development with technical autonomy, whose objective was to formulate, coordinate and evaluate the implementation of Progresa. In 2002, along with the new name of the Program to the Human Development Program Oportunidades, Conprogesa became the National Coordination Unit of the Human Development Program Oportunidades (Sedesol, 2002).

One of the main features of the program is its centralized administration through a National Coordination Unit and its decentralized provision of education and health services by local governments responsible for service delivery. The centralized

management of the Program concerns the normative aspects, like the amount of resources transferred to poor households, but not service provision (Levy, 2006).

The program uses existing infrastructure in the localities to provide health and education services. The operational guidelines state that once a location is chosen, according to their level of marginalization, it is necessary to confirm the accessibility of services. If the locality does not meet this condition due to the lack of or saturation of health and/or education services, the inclusion of families to the Program will be postponed until the service can be provided (Comité Técnico, 2009). This design allowed the Program to have a rapid coverage expansion, and according to Levy (2006), if done differently its scope would have been limited to the capacity of creating new infrastructure for the provision of education and health services.

Since the creation of Conprogesa, it has served as a governance mechanism for the coordination of actions among the various Federal ministries involved in the Program's operation and between different levels of government for service provision. The National Coordination Unit has the following functions: To formulate, coordinate, monitor and evaluate the implementation of the Program; to contribute to the entailment of actions of education, health and nutrition with regional policy and employment and poverty alleviation programs; to plan and schedule, according to budget, the gradual inclusion of families and regions in extreme poverty to the Program; and to promote coordination with local governments and municipalities, research entities and higher education institutions, and social and private sectors (Sedesol, 1997). In order to fulfill these functions a Board and a Technical Committee were created and a National Coordinator was named. The complex organizational structure and implicit elements for inter-institutional coordination in the design and implementation of Progresas-Oportunidades represent a unique case study for analysis.

This study will use the case study approach to analyze the coordination process within the Oportunidades Program. According to Yin (2009) it represents a *unique* case study and its design is a single case with multiple units of analysis. The units of analysis are the ministries and departments that participate in the Program's design and implementation at the Federal level.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The achievement of coordination in public policy, and specifically in social policy, has been a recurrent concern for public administrators and scholars (Anderson, 1974; Jones, 1975). The decrease of funding for the provision of social services and the need for a coherent and less fragmented strategy for delivery of welfare benefits have reinforced the importance of coordination at different levels of government (Mizrahi, 1999; Walter & Petr, 2000). The complex needs of clients stress the importance of coordination between service providers, since no agency alone can provide all services. Problems such as health care, child welfare and elder support, just to name a few, require the collaboration of professionals from different fields and from different service agencies, but how can organizations increase coordination and collaboration? Despite the importance of coordination, the literature offers only broad and diverse definitions, resulting in a poorly understood concept (Longoria, 2005).

The objective of this section is to contribute to a better understanding of the concept of coordination through a systematic review of literature. The first part analyzes the importance of organizational theory and institutionalism for understanding coordination. The second section reviews the literature of coordination and collaboration. For conducting the literature review, two key concepts were used: coordination and collaboration. The decision to use both concepts responds to the fact that some authors use the concepts interchangeably (Longoria, 2005; Sloper, 2004; Springer, Sharp, & Foy, 2000), others place them on a continuum according to the degree of human services integration between the agencies (Walter & Petr, 2000), and others define coordination

as a stand-alone concept with its own implications (Braun, 2008; Edler & Kuhlmann, 2008; Griessen & Braun, 2008; Koch, 2008; Saner, Toseva, Atamanov, Mogilevsky, & Sahov, 2008).

The search was conducted using the database *Academic Search Complete*. As criteria for the search the following key words used were: 1) *Coordination* and *public policies*, 131 articles matched the criteria and only nine were selected on the basis of their relevance to the literature review (Anderson, 1974; Braun, 2008; Cumella, 2008; Edler & Kuhlmann, 2008; Griessen & Braun, 2008; Harley, Donnell, & Rainey, 2003; Jayasuriya, 2001; Koch, 2008; O'Reilly, Inwood, & Johns, 2006); 2) *Collaboration* and *social policy*, 165 articles matched the criteria and eight were selected (Dunlop & Holosko, 2004; Hultberg, Glendinning, Allebeck, & Lanroth, 2005; Longoria, 2005; Mizrahi, 1999; Sandfort, 1999; Scott & Thurston, 2004; Sloper, 2004; Walter & Petr, 2000), and 3) *Coordination* and *inter-ministerial*, 23 articles matched the criteria and one was selected (Saner, et al., 2008).

A second search was conducted using the database *Social Work Abstracts* using as criteria concepts of *coordination* and *policy*, 165 articles matched the criteria and one article was selected (Springer, et al., 2000). In total, 21 articles were chosen for review. The selection of the articles was done using two conditions: 1) that a definition of collaboration or coordination was offered, or 2) that the analysis involved a public policy. Other academic articles and book chapters, known to the author, that provided important elements for the analysis of coordination and collaboration were also used (Alexander, 1995; Peters, 1998; Peters, 2004; Peters, 2005; Rogers & Whetten, 1982).

2.1 Coordination and organization theory

Organizational Theory studies how groups and individuals act under different organizational structures and circumstances (Shafritz & Ott, 2001). Gulick (1937)

considers coordination as one of the major functions of organizations. He states that, as an organization becomes larger and the subdivision of work is required, coordination becomes mandatory. For him, coordination can be achieved in two ways: by hierarchy in which the higher levels of management instruct lower levels on their specific tasks, so coordination goes from top to bottom, or by establishing common goals. However, he states that for larger organizations the idea of a common goal can be lost through self-interest, so the hierarchical option better keeps workers focused on the central purpose of the organization.

Although coordination is seen as a function of any organization, the forms in which an organization can promote coordination differ. For some authors the driving force behind coordination has been the search for rationality in public policy. For others, this view of coordination is too naïve, due to the facts that self-interest and power come into play and that coordination will depend on the advantages each organization perceives from coordinating.

2.1.1 Coordination: rationalist and power perspective

In the rationalist perspective, organizations are rational institutions with established goals and objectives. The search for efficiency and the pursuing of these goals will guide organizations to coordinate, generally through a defined set of rules and authority (Shafritz & Ott, 2001). Challis and colleagues (1988) state “coordination is above all the rationalist’s technique for embracing the complexity and interrelatedness of social issues and problems...” (p. 25). For rationalists, coordination involves a process and a structure. The process is coordination that results from self-interest and “utility maximizing,” and the structure is the type of organizational setting that can more effectively promote coordination (Challis et al., 1988). The most important question under

this perspective is which organizational structure can best promote efficiency and goal attainment.

The power perspective considers the rationalist view of organizations as naïve. This perspective views organizations as complex systems made up of individuals with their own interests (Shafritz & Ott, 2001). From this perspective, conflict is inevitable as organizations compete for scarce resources. The collaboration and coordination between organizations results only when there are mutual benefits or because one organization has more power than the other. Therefore, the “interactive processes leading to greater coordination may include bargaining/exchange and power/dominance relationships...” (Challis et al, 1998, p. 45). This perspective also takes into account the coordination that happens through informal channels. While the rationalist perspective focuses on the structure to promote coordination, the power perspective offers a framework for analyzing the coordination and collaboration that occurs through informal structures.

The majority of literature that studies how coordination is achieved in social services uses as a frame of reference both perspectives: coordination resulting from a rational effort of the organization to promote greater efficiency through its structure, and coordination resulting from mutual adjustment arrangements that occur between different organizational units or agencies under no formal agreement. Both approaches are necessary to understand how the literature has addressed the concepts of coordination and collaboration.

2.1.2 The role of Institutions

Rational and power perspectives place a strong emphasis to the choices made by the individuals who participate in the coordination process. Although the rationalist perspective analyzes the structures that could best promote coordination, its units of analysis are the actors' individual choices. Scharpf (1997) argues that actors' motivations

for action are based on their own perceived reality, revealing the highly subjective nature of actors' decisions. Concluding that it would be impossible for social sciences to find "lawlike regularities and for theory-based explanations and predictions" (p. 19).

For this reasons, scholars have developed different frameworks of analysis in order to be able to analyze the influence of institutions on rational choice, given that institutions are "composite actors." Peters (2005) identifies Dunleavy's (1991) approach to "institutional public choice" and Keman (1996) "institutional rational choice" (p. 48). Scharpf (1997) cites the models developed by Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994) called "institutional analysis and development," by Burns, Baumgartner and Deville (1985) as "actor-systems dynamics," and by Zurn (1992) known as "situation structural framework" (p. 36). Manytz's and Scharpf's (1995) model of "actor-centered institutionalism" is based on the idea that policy processes are "driven by the interaction of individual and corporate actors endowed with certain capabilities and specific cognitive and normative orientations, within a given institutional setting and within a given external situation" (p. 37).

These models simplify the study of coordination processes, positioning them in a higher-level of analysis: from the individual actor to the composite actor bounded by institutions. Rational and power perspectives are necessary to understand actors' motivations, but institutions constrain their available options and the use of different mechanisms and tools used to promote coordination.

2.2 Coordination and collaboration

This literature search was conducted using "coordination" and "collaboration" as interchangeable concepts, although the literature shows that there is a difference in the use of both concepts. Collaboration is used more often at a local level for promoting cooperation between different agencies of service delivery, while coordination is defined

in the macro level of analysis, generally in the design of public policy, as providing a coherent framework so collaboration can occur (Challis et al., 1988).

2.2.1 Importance of coordination and collaboration

The study of coordination and collaboration is important since one agency cannot provide all the services required by a group (Whetten, 1982) and because coordination does not automatically occur. It is necessary to create the appropriate structure and provide the right incentives to promote coordination and collaboration between organizations (Challis et al., 1988). As almost every organization is interdependent with another and coordination is the result of dealing with these interdependencies, "IOC [interorganizational coordination] means a recognition of interdependence and ways of coping with it" (Alexander, 1995, p.7).

Mulford and Rogers (1982) identify three types of interdependence among organizations. The first they term "pooled," when each organization or unit contributes to a final objective: "in the public sector we find pooled interdependence [...], when a number of agencies are servicing the same client population" (Alexander, 1995, p. 33). The second is "sequential," when the outputs of an organization serve as inputs of another. The third is called "reciprocal," where the outputs of each unit are inputs for others. The exchanges resulting from these interdependences can be formal or informal. Depending on the level and frequency of the transactions, these can become formal coordination mechanisms or remain as informal channels of coordination between units.

2.2.2 Definition: coordination and collaboration

Although the majority of the literature treats coordination and collaboration as different concepts, one can argue it is the same concept applied on different organizational levels. The term that focuses on the macro-structure is usually referred as coordination, while that referring to the exchanges that occur at the meso-level (between

agencies) is usually termed collaboration. This section explores the different definitions of both concepts found in the literature and proposes a comprehensive concept of coordination.

Constructing a definition for collaboration is a difficult task. Longoria's (2005) review of the literature on collaboration identified 15 definitions and concluded that "attempting to standardize the term 'collaboration' is difficult as there does not appear to be a unified understanding of the concept" (p. 125). This remains true. From the eight articles that talked about "collaboration," six presented a definition of what was meant by the concept. According to the different studies, collaboration might be defined as a "process" in which agencies or organizations work together based on a specific set of values to provide an integrated group of services (Dunlop & Holosko, 2004; Harley, et al., 2003; Longoria, 2005; Mizrahi, 1999; Springer, et al., 2000; Walter & Petr, 2000).

The problem with this definition is that it is so broad that any interaction between the agencies can be classified as collaboration. The study of Walter and Petr (2000) is the only one that states that collaboration involves "joint activities, joint structures and shared resources" (p. 495). The study states that the collaboration of two agencies or organizations "requires a change of agency structure and relinquishing of autonomy" (p. 495). This definition goes beyond the informal mechanisms of mutual adjustment between organizations to formal structures of coordination. This means that, like coordination, collaboration (at a local level) can range from informal agreements and exchanges between units or agencies to formal structures to promote collaboration because no agency is able to provide all the necessary services required by its target population.

The concept of coordination is used more often when referring to public policies and governmental departments or ministries. Although, some authors use coordination

and collaboration interchangeably, the articles referring to collaboration analyze the process of different agencies working together, while those referring to coordination direct their attention to the coherence and integration of public policies.

Seven articles analyze the need of coordination, of which six refer to the importance of coordination for achieving coherence of public policies (Anderson, 1974; Braun, 2008; Edler & Kuhlmann, 2008; Griessen & Braun, 2008; Koch, 2008; Saner, et al., 2008). One article studied the need for inter-organizational coordination under the New Public Management Model (NPM) (Cumella, 2008). Coordination usually has been defined as the process “where two or more organizations create and/or use existing decision rules that have been established to deal collectively with their shared environment” (Rogers & Whetten, 1982, p. 12). But coordination also can be defined as a result of a process “in which the policies and programmes of government are characterized by minimal redundancy, incoherence and lacunae” (Peters, 1998, p. 296).

The literature shows that a consensus exists for the definition of coordination. Four articles (Braun, 2008; Edler & Kuhlmann, 2008; Griessen & Braun, 2008; Saner et al., 2008) use the definition provided by Peters (Peters, 1998, 2004) and three of the same four also use the definition provided by Mulford & Rogers (1982). The two remaining articles do not offer a definition of coordination.

Analyzing both definitions, we can arrive to the conclusion that both concepts are referring to the same idea: two or more organizations working together creating or using formal or informal rules for pursuing their individual and/or joint objectives. On the macro-level these objectives could be to decrease levels of poverty through a joint strategy and in the micro-level these could be delivering a group of integrated services to a target population. The result of the process would also be the same, having “minimum levels of redundancy, duplications and lacunae,” as Peters (1998) establishes.

2.3 Structures and tools

Coordination and collaboration can be promoted by formal and/or informal structures. The literature shows that coordination can be promoted mainly by three types of interactions although different authors name them differently: mutual adjustment (or markets), alliance (or networks), and corporate (or hierarchy) (Alexander, 1995; Peters, 1998; Peters, 2004; Rogers & Whetten, 1982)

Coordination by markets (mutual adjustment) is based under the same principle as economic theory in which coordination will occur if forces are left to act without interference. Network coordination (alliance) occurs through organizations and depends on their willingness and interest to cooperate. Finally, hierarchy (corporate), the most common form of coordination within governments, is a top-down mechanism where the structure promotes coordination through authority and formal structures (Peters, 2004). However, these three structures of coordination are not independent from each other and frequently work together.

The way organizations promote coordination varies according to their specific environmental characteristics and incentives. The literature has stressed the importance of interagency collaboration to be able to provide integrated services to the population in response to the recent trends of fragmentation, downsizing and cutting of funding for the provision of welfare services (Mizrahi, 1999). Also, "the lack of coordination at the policy level is identified as the major problem that the U.S. social welfare system has to address" (Jennings and Zank as cited in Alexander, 1995, p.5). The difficulty arises when there is not a clear understanding of how collaboration and coordination could and should be promoted (Dunlop & Holosko, 2004; Longoria, 2005). To be able to identify which are the most common structures for promoting collaboration and coordination, the reviewed

articles were analyzed according to the previous identified coordination structures: mutual adjustment (or markets), alliance (or networks) and corporate (or hierarchy).

It is interesting to note that the promotion of collaboration at the agency level uses the structures of mutual adjustment (markets) and alliance (networks). The literature shows that the hardest structure to analyze is mutual adjustment coordination (markets) (Rogers & Whetten, 1982). No record is usually kept of this kind of collaboration, and it is usually based on previous history of collaboration and in personal relations between front line workers. The second type of structure used at the agency level was the alliance or mutual adjustment that is based in the use of tools to promote coordination between units, such as pooled budgets and joint planning.

Finally the search for policy coherence at the macro level demonstrates that usually governments prefer the hierarchical structure to promote coordination. The articles reviewed analyze the impact of creating a super ministry and grouping several policy areas in order to provide some coherence to innovation policy.

2.3.1. Mutual adjustment or markets

Dunlop (2004) reports a qualitative study of the inter-organizational collaboration of health and human services agencies in Ontario, Canada. Twenty-two interviews were conducted with upper level public health managers. The results identify six key areas for achieving coordination: 1) historical conditions of collaboration, 2) institutional conditions, 3) financial conditions, 4) operational processes, 5) organizational processes and 6) relational processes (p. 7). Although all these areas influence collaboration, making it easier or more difficult, the mutual adjustment structure depends highly on the previous history of relations between the agencies, "This study affirmed previous research which posited that personal and professional relationships between community members can facilitate or constrain collaboration" (Dunlop & Holosko, 2004, p. 14). The identification of

these key areas or themes is valuable, due to the lack of a systematized methodology through which this type of coordinating structure can be assessed.

2.3.2. *Alliance or networks*

Hultberg and colleagues (2005) study the use of pooled budgets in an effort to integrate health and welfare services in England and Sweden. The objectives in both countries were “1) to improve efficiency of services, by reducing duplication and fragmentation, 2) increase flexibility in the use of resources so that these can be directed to wherever in health and social care system they can make the maximum impact regardless of organizational boundaries, and 3) improve co-ordination in the delivery of front-line services” (p. 538). In general, the results were positive for the integration of services and strengthening of horizontal relationships. However, it has not been evaluated whether the integration of services results in better quality services to the final user (Hultberg et al., 2005).

The study by Springer and others (2000) uses qualitative methodology to analyze the efforts to coordinate local service delivery for children and their families through Community Resource Coordination Groups (CRCG) in Texas. The study use semi-structured interviews and focus groups with the members of CRCG in order to: 1) identify their compliance with the Memo of Understanding (MOU) required for state agencies since 1987 to provide services to Texas children, and 2) identify best practices and major obstacles (p. 44). In general, the results were positive, the CRCG “managed to overcome turf battles between individual agencies, organizations and providers to meet the increasing needs in their local communities” (p. 49). The study concludes with the recommendation that further assessment should be done stressing the importance of collaboration between agencies due to the devolution of services to the state and local level.

2.3.3. *Hierarchy*

Braun's (2008) article analyzes the importance of coordination in knowledge and innovation policies. The article provides a quick overview of the importance of achieving coordination to advance the integration of innovation policies. The author also stresses the need for coordination at three levels: the cabinet, within the ministries or departments, and at the agency level. He also points out that Federal countries have a much bigger challenge in trying to achieve coordination between levels of government.

The articles by Braun (2008), Edler & Kuhlmann (2008), Griessen and Braun (2008), and Koch (2008) are part of the same journal number that studies specific cases to analyze how coordination has been promoted in the area of innovative policies.

Griessen & Braunn (2008) analyze the reforms undertaken by Switzerland to integrate and give coherence to education and research to promote innovation. The country gave the control of the "utilitarian" education and research areas, vocational education and applied research, to the Department of Economic Affairs, while "non-utilitarian" research and education, from primary to tertiary level, was given to the Department of Home Affairs. The conclusion is, although efforts have been made, it is difficult to coordinate a coherent strategy having two very large ministries involved.

Edler and Kuhlmann (2008) describe the German system for policies on innovation and identify different challenges, such as the Federal nature of the country and the high level of decentralization and fragmentation of the policies. Coordination has been promoted in several ways not involving the institutional structure. A proposal has been to merge together the different ministries under one "super ministry," although there are important challenges due to the fragmentation of the system.

Koch (2008) analyzes the case of Denmark where a super-ministry was created in 2006 to promote coordination among all the areas involved in science, technology and

innovation. A Globalization Council was also created in order to provide guidance on which should be the long-term goals. Although the general conclusions are positive, further assessment is needed due to the fact that these changes are very recent.

A general conclusion is, although there has been governmental pressure for promoting collaboration and coordination, little research has been done on how two or more organizations work together under different structures of coordination and collaboration. Longoria (2005) states that currently collaboration and coordination are considered as the solution for dealing with complex needs and problems, but no one has analyzed if the results outweigh the costs. The literature identifies that collaboration should be promoted to:

- Achieve service integration (Longoria, 2005);
- Resolve the problem of agencies not working together at the three levels of government (Longoria, 2005);
- Attend to the population that “falls through the cracks” (Longoria, 2005);
- Save money and increase efficiency of service delivery (Mizrahi, 1999);
- Integrate fragmented services and complex care system (Harley et al., 2003);
- Address multiple needs of specific population groups such as families, children, the elderly and the people with disabilities (Harley et al., 2003; Walter & Petr, 2000).

The next question to address is how governments or agencies can promote coordination and collaboration based on mutual adjustment (markets) and alliances (networks) or corporate (hierarchy) structures. Harley and colleagues (2003) recommend switching to an outcome-focused approach based on the population needs. Also as Hultberg and others (2005) show, the use of pooled budgets is useful to promote

collaboration. Mizrahi (1999) and Sloper (2004) identify factors that could facilitate the collaboration process at the agency level:

- Trust and good communication;
- Clear and common objectives;
- Defined roles, responsibilities and limitations;
- Commitment of all level personnel in the agencies;
- Leadership in the agency council for coordinating actions;
- Prioritization of activities and objectives;
- Accountability within the agencies working together.

2.4 Levels

The literature shows that coordination has been classified in several levels according to policy integration and according to the level in the organization at which coordination occurs. Concerning policy integration, Scharpf (1995) defines positive and negative coordination, and Peters (2004) identifies a third level of coordination referred to as “policy integration” and a final “strategic” level.

Negative coordination occurs when new policies do not interfere with or stand in the way of other public policies (Peters, 2004; Scharpf, 1994). Positive coordination goes further and attempts to maximize the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the government by working together through joint strategies. (Peters, 2004; Scharpf, 1994). Policy integration refers to common goals across different departments or ministries (Peters, 2004). Finally, strategic integration is sharing a clear vision of the policy and government future.

The levels of organization in which coordination can occur varies from “meta-structures” at the highest level of government, “meso-structures” which cover a particular inter-organizational system or action set, defined as a group of organizations interacting

to accomplish a common purpose (Alexander, 1995), and “implementation set,” defined as the group of organizations that participate in the implementation of a program or policy (Alexander, 1995). Finally, there are the “micro-structures” that are devices for linking intra or inter-organizational decision centers (Alexander, 1995, p. 52-3). These devices can be informal links between organizations or they can be formal mechanisms such as pooled budgets or coordinating units. In all the levels, coordination can range from a market-mutual adjustment, mostly informal links, to a hierarchical structure with defined rules and norms.

2.5 Actors and interests

Rogers and Mulford (1982) identify the importance of actors for promoting coordination. In the service delivery sector they identify four different interest groups: support groups, coordination groups, administrative groups and, demands groups. Each group has its own particular interest in promoting coordination. Also each group has concerns that probably will constrain coordination.

Federal and state legislators want to promote coordination to improve accessibility, continuity and efficiency of delivery systems. They are concerned with the impact of the policy on the final user. Administrative and professional staffs are “coordination groups” concerned with making the policy work across the different units involved in its implementation. This group is more interested in conflict resolution, priority setting, resource utilization, system orientation, and control of a central unit. The front-line workers are the “administration groups” whose main concern is their organizational autonomy; Rogers and Mulford (1982) argue that this group usually favors coordination that occurs through informal channels rather than that promoted by alliances or corporate strategies. The reason would be that any of these two forms of coordination would modify the internal structure of their organization so their main interest is to protect their

autonomy. Finally, the recipients of services are “demand groups” interested in increasing client control over the services provided. Although there could be more interests, these have not been documented on research (Rogers & Mulford, 1982).

The authors present an analysis of the consequences of the type of the coordination structure in each group; in general the corporate (hierarchy) structure seems to have the highest level of impact followed by a moderate impact by the alliance (networks) strategy. The Mutual Adjustment (market) does not seem to have much impact, although this is difficult to assess due to the fact that there have been few studies that analyze the consequences of this type of coordination structure.

2.6 Context

Halpert (1982) states that there are “organizational and environmental conditions that facilitate or constrain an agency’s decision to coordinate” (p. 54). The literature has shown two main assumptions: that the main incentive for organizations to coordinate is their quest for survival, and that every coordination strategy will lead to an adjustment to the organization’s internal structure.

Two factors facilitate or inhibit coordination: interpretative factors and contextual factors (Halpert, 1982). Alexander (1995) offers the following definition:

Interpretative factors are perceptual and subjective. They relate to the image which members of one organization have of another. The contextual factors are ones which actually exist in and organization or its environment, which affect the potential relation between it and other organizations... (p. 16)

Organizations have three main reasons to coordinate: 1) to avoid a potential loss in their autonomy, resources, tasks or power domains; 2) to prevent a future crisis, and 3) to decrease the vulnerability in front of more powerful organizations. Although the need to coordinate exists, the interpretative and contextual factors will promote or constrain its

possibilities to coordinate. That is why there is the “need to pay attention to the internal and external logic of the organization.” (Halpert, 1982, p. 56).

In general, the interpretative factor that facilitates coordination is awareness of the benefits and rewards that it will bring. It could be improving service delivery, a shared set of values, common professional ethics, ideological consensus a good history and image of the other organization (Halpert, 1982). This perceived image of the actual benefits of coordination has to be shared by the upper level management of the organization to the front line workers, so coordination could have the desired success. The contextual factors that facilitate collaboration and coordination are the actual benefits. These could be decreasing the costs of delivering the services, reaching more clients, and increasing professionalization of service delivery (Halpert, 1982).

In conclusion, the study of coordination is difficult; the concept involves huge complexities and multiple levels of interactions. Also, its theory takes elements from organizational theory, game theory, and sociological theory for its background and analysis. The difficulty is that depending on the level and type of structure, different concepts apply and different approaches are used for its study. The literature shows that there is not a clear method to study coordination; some papers approach the concept using quantitative methods, while others used a qualitative approach. Those that use quantitative methods make the observation that studying a complex phenomenon quantitatively gives the general picture but does not offer information about the actors' motivations. On the other side, qualitative studies have used mostly the case study method, and the main criticism is that the findings of each study apply only to that particular situation; since there has not been much replication, the findings are also limited. Finally, although the reasons for promoting collaboration and coordination are

diverse, it is necessary to study and understand it to meet the challenges of service delivery and policy coherence.

Social work literature reflects a central concern with getting agencies to work together to be able to face the challenges imposed by fragmentation, decentralization and limited budgets, without decreasing quality and quantity of the services provided (Longoria, 2005; Mizrahi, 1999). Also, scholars have identified the need of providing an integrated offer of services, especially health and human services, finding difficulties to get agencies to work together (Dunlop & Holosko, 2004; Sandfort, 1999; Sloper, 2004; Springer, et al., 2000). The studies seek to identify the obstacles and facilitators for promoting inter-agency collaboration and coordination going from informal mechanisms of coordination, such as personal communication, to formal mechanisms of coordination, such as joint budgeting and file sharing. One general conclusion is that, although coordination and collaboration has recently become an objective to improve service delivery, there is a lack of knowledge of how to achieve it.

This research aims to identify how inter-institutional coordination is achieved in the Oportunidades Program through the identification of how the institutional setting affects the coordination process among actors and then identifying the specific mechanisms and tools used for coordination. Thus, this research is based on the following assumptions:

1. Despite the adoption of new public management principles, in Mexico the dominant model of public administration and public management is hierarchical-bureaucratic. The Human Development Program works under this model of public administration.

2. Despite the prevalence of a hierarchical-bureaucratic model of public administration, the process of coordination among actors within the Program is through formal and informal mechanisms of markets, networks and hierarchy.

Therefore the research question this dissertation addresses is: How is inter-institutional coordination achieved at the Federal level among the different ministries and departments involved in the operation of the Oportunidades Program?

Specific research questions are:

- How does the institutional framework affect the available coordination options within the Progres-Oportunidades Program?
- What are the formal coordination mechanisms established through the institutional design of the Progres-Oportunidades Program?
- What are the formal coordination tools used by the Progres-Oportunidades Program?
- Does the coordination occur only through formal channels? If not,
- What are the informal mechanisms and tools used to achieve coordination of the Progres-Oportunidades Program?

CHAPTER 3

METHODS

The choice of using qualitative methods to analyze the coordination process in social policy is due to the interest of studying the phenomenon with a comprehensive approach to be able to understand how and why coordination is achieved. The objective of this research is not quantification or generalization to confirm a theory, but understanding of why and how actors collaborate. Martínez (1999) states that when we seek to understand a complex structure we need to study qualitatively the unique cases and situations in their own complex reality.

Maxwell (2005) states that the main goal of a qualitative study is to have a precise description, interpretation and explanation of a single case. Also, qualitative research helps the researcher to identify unanticipated phenomena and influences for developing new theories. Additionally, it aims to understand the process in which action and events take place not focusing on their consequences but explaining the process of how x determines y.

The relevance of the use of qualitative methods is that we seek to understand how the coordination process works in the Human Development Program Oportunidades. The researcher's interest is to study the factors, actions and/or characteristics of the coordination process between the different actors involved in the operation of the Progres-a-Oportunidades Program, to be able to identify through which mechanisms, tools and types of interaction, formal and informal, coordination is achieved.

3.1 The case study research

Creswell (2007) defines a case study as a qualitative approach in which the researcher explores a single case or multiple cases through detailed, in-depth data collection, involving multiple sources of information, that ends with a detailed description of the case and the themes that derived from it (p. 73). Also, Yin (2009) defines case studies as empirical inquiries that “investigate a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 18). According to Yin (2009) the use of case study research is useful when the question we seek to answer wants to identify how or why a phenomena occurs. The case study results in a detailed understanding of the situation and its meaning for those involved in it.

Stake (1998) identifies different types of cases studies. The *intrinsic* case study is defined as a given case study in which the researcher’s interest is based on that specific case and what can be learned from it. The second type of case study is the *instrumental* case in which the researcher faces a situation that must be studied and the case is useful to understand that situation in particular. In this situation, the case study represents the instrument to gain understanding about certain phenomena.

Yin (2009) identifies four different design types for a case study research: two of them involve the selection of only one case; one with only one unit of analysis, *holistic*, and other with multiple units of analysis, *embedded*. He also identifies two other design types that involve the selection of multiple cases; one with only one unit of analysis by case, and the other with multiple units of analysis in each case.

The selection of the type of design for conducting case study research is based on the research objective. The selection of a single case is based on five rationales: the case is a *critical* case when there is enough elements for confirming a theory, the case is

unique or *extreme* in which its sole existence makes its study necessary, the case is *representative* or *typical* in which the objective will be to understand its circumstances and conditions since it is representative of other cases, the case is *revelatory* when the researcher has access to a situation that was not able to observe before, and the case is *longitudinal* in which the interest of the researcher is studying the same case at two or more different points in time.

3.2 The selection of the case study: the Oportunidades Program

The reason for the selection of the Human Development Program Oportunidades as the case study for this research is because according to Yin (2009) it represents a *unique* case study due to its size, scope and organizational structure. Today, the Oportunidades Program is the only social policy program in Mexico that has a unit for the coordination of the ministries and departments that participate in its operation. Because what we want to study is not the program itself but the coordination process within the Program, we define it as an *instrumental* case study. Stake (1998) states that in an instrumental case study the topic is dominant; in this case, what we want to study is the coordination process not the Program itself.

Based on Yin's typology (2009), the case study is a *single case design with multiple units of analysis*. The units of analysis are the different ministries and departments that participate in the Program's design and implementation at the Federal level: the National Coordination Unit of Oportunidades, the Ministry of Social Development, the Mexican Social Security Institute, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. The selection of participants is based on their participation on the formal mechanisms for the coordination of the Program, specifically those who participated in the Program's Board and the

Technical Committee of the National Coordination Unit of Oportunidades until 2006 (Appendix 1 and 2).

3.3 Techniques for data collection

The techniques used for data collection are documentation, archival records and the interview. All of them are identified by several authors of case study research as the most common and appropriate for the development of a case study (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006; Stake & Filella, 1998; Yin, 2009).

Yin (2009) notes that the strength of documentary analysis is the ability to review the material several times in addition to being a source of useful information to confirm and expand evidence from other sources (p. 102). This research uses official documents such as laws, regulations and organizational and operational manuals. The information is available on the Government's official website as part of the transparency policy and access to public information. Also, the minutes from 1997 to 2006 of the Board meetings and the minutes from 2000 to 2006 of the Technical Committee meetings were requested to the Federal Government; the researcher received both on February 2, 2010.

3.4 Selection of participants

The selection of participant is based on their participation in the implementation of the Human Development Program Oportunidades during the period under study from 1997 to 2006. The sample selection is based on the sampling strategies identified by Miles and Huberman (as cited in Creswell, 2007) of criterion, stratified purposeful and snowball or chain. As noted by Creswell (2007) several sampling strategies can be used within a single study. Using the criterion strategy, the participants will be selected based on their participation on the Board and Technical Committee meetings (Appendix A and B); these public officials are considered key informants. The stratified purposeful strategy will select within these universe of participants one from each ministry or department that

participated in these meetings. Finally, the strategy of snowball or chain will be used only in the situation in which one of the selected participants recommends the researcher to interview some other participant that could provide new and/or useful information for the analysis.

The minutes of the Board and Technical Committee meetings show that the number of ministries and departments that participated in these meetings were 12 in total from which eight had the highest number of attendance. Based on the stratified purposeful strategy doing 10-12 interviews will give the researcher access to all the ministries or departments involved in the operation of the Oportunidades Program. These 10 to 12 interviews sought data saturation, defined as the point where no new information is found to gain a better understanding of the phenomena under study (Creswell, 2007).

3.5 Model of analysis: actor-centered institutionalism

The analytical framework used in this study is actor-centered institutionalism (Scharpf, 1997) developed by Fritz Scharpf and Renate Mayntz during the 1970s. The model was chosen because, unlike other models for public policy analysis, actor-centered institutionalism draws attention to the interaction between several elements of a public problem and how they influence public policy. For the model, public policy is the result of the interaction of actors with bounded rationality equipped with a set of capabilities, preferences and perceptions circumscribed by formal and informal rules.

Interaction-oriented policy research study actors' behavior but focus its analysis on the interaction among the actor constellation of a specific public policy. The interaction usually occurs through several modes of interaction that allows reaching conclusions about the capacity of different institutional structures for solving public problems. The elements of the model are: 1) *actors* involved in the policy process with specific capabilities, perceptions and preferences, 2) *actor constellations* involved in public policy,

their strategies and preferences over possible outcomes, 3) *modes of interaction* circumscribed by the institutional setting and are defined as the ways in which actors behave with respect to the others; these can be unilateral action, negotiated agreement, majority vote or hierarchical direction, and finally the 4) *institutional framework* defined as the set of rules that limit the courses of action, modes of interaction and desirable outcomes (see Figure 3.1).




Figure 3.1 The domain of interaction-oriented policy research (Scharpf, 1997, p. 44).

There are different frameworks for the analysis of inter- and intra-organizational relations in the public and the private sector. Several frameworks were developed mainly in the United States and Europe, especially in Germany, although under different names. However, there is no consensus that allows the identification of a general theory of inter- or intra-organizational relations. One of the main differences is due to the institutional tradition in each country. In the United States the studies focused on the relations among various agencies in a network type institutional setting or in the absence of an institutional structure such as anarchic fields, given the limited existence or absence of hierarchical structures of management in the provision of social services. In Germany, studies focused on the inter-organizational relations between ministries in a more centralized and bureaucratic management structure.

The existing differences in the provision of social services in Mexico and the United States makes problematic the use of frameworks that base their analysis in the quantification of the exchanges between public agencies, the structural and functional similarities among agencies providing the same or similar service, or the distribution of resources. In addition, the provision of social services in the United States occurs in a decentralized manner and through public and nonpublic agencies, while in Mexico it is done centrally and only through governmental agencies. Given the characteristics of public administration in Mexico a framework of analysis with a structural approach adapts better to the prevailing government system and thus brings more elements for the analysis.

The main contribution of this research is to identify, using an interaction-oriented policy research approach, under which institutional setting coordination takes place in the Human Development Program Oportunidades and how coordination is achieved among the different ministries and agencies involved in its operation at the Federal level.

3.6 Data analysis

This research is based on the analysis of official documents from the creation of Oportunidades (formerly Progresa) before 2006. The decision to not include the government currently in office is because the purpose is to analyze complete government periods and also because political considerations could affect the information provided by respondents who are public officials still in office.

3.6.1. The Program for Human Development Oportunidades works under a hierarchical-bureaucratic model of public administration

According to Weber (2001, pp. 73-74) the basic characteristics of the bureaucratic paradigm of public administration are: 1) existence of fixed and official jurisdictional areas ordered by rules, laws or administrative regulations, 2) existence of an

office hierarchy with levels of graded authority, 3) the management of the office is based upon written documents, 4) office management presupposes thorough and expert training, 5) official activity demands the full working capacity of the official, irrespective of the fact that his obligatory time in the bureau may be firmly delimited, and 6) the management of the office follows general rules that can be learned.

Several studies were conducted in the 1960s that sought to identify the degree of bureaucracy in both public and private organizations (Hall, 1963; Hall & Tittle, 1966; Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, & Turner, 1968; Samuel & Mannheim, 1970); this research uses the dimensions identified by Hall (1963) to analyze whether the Progres-Oportunidades Program operates under a hierarchical-bureaucratic model of public administration. One of the main criticisms of the models that tried to measure the degree of bureaucratization in organizations was that they seek to identify the absence or presence of a pure model of bureaucracy. However, most organizations tend to have a predominant model of public administration with some characteristics of other models. Therefore, this research explores whether the Oportunidades Program operates under a predominantly bureaucratic model of public administration.

The dimensions used to identify if the Progres-Oportunidades Program is predominantly bureaucratic are: a) division of labor based on specialization, b) a defined hierarchical structure, c) written rules covering the rights and responsibilities of public officials; d) operation procedures for dealing with work situations, and e) promotion and selection of personnel is based on technical competence.

The dimension *division of labor based on specialization* aims to identify if the division of labor is based on a defined area of competence area and if the personnel was chosen based on their technical capabilities. The category *degree of specialization of agencies/departments* wants to identify if the agencies and offices are associated to

activities and careers clearly defined through the following sub-categories: a) the responsibilities, duties and obligations of departments and positions are defined in writing; b) agencies/departments are based on historical and institutional tradition and their responsibilities may or may not be defined; c) structures are defined by the leader on ad hoc basis, departments and positions are newly created and their responsibilities, duties and obligations are not defined. The units of observation are the agencies/departments and positions involved in the operations an implementation of Progres-a-Oportunidades.

The dimension *defined hierarchical structure* addresses whether the Program has a fixed administrative hierarchy and a defined chain of command where higher authorities have regulation and inspection powers over a lower office and whether the systems offer the lower office the right to appeal to its higher authority in a regulated manner. The category *characteristics of work organization* examines whether the organizational structure is clearly defined, with defined responsibilities and obligations for each agency/department and positions. The subcategories that will be analyzed are: a) existence of an organization chart with a defined chain of command based on positions and functions; b) the organization structure is based on historical institutions result from historical tradition or are defined by the leader; and c) there is not an organizational structure because the institutions are newly creation and lack consolidation and as a consequence there is no a administrative hierarchy. The unit of observation is the organizational structure of institutions.

The dimension *system of written rules covering the rights and responsibilities of public officials* is explored to determine whether there is a clear delimitation of duties and responsibilities of the position held by a public official, independent of the person occupying the position. The category of *institutional characteristics* addresses whether

the rules clearly define the rights and responsibilities of public officials according to the following subcategories: a) formal written rules to which the public officials have to adhere; b) the rules can be formal and informal and are publicly known as a result of historical tradition, and c) the rules are informal and created on ad hoc basis for specific cases without jurisdiction or competence. The units of observation are manuals for public officials and organizational manuals.

The dimension *written procedures for handling work situations* assesses the need to act based on the file. That is, if the administrative operation, proposals, decisions, regulations and ordinances of all kinds, are recorded in writing. The category of *rules for conflict resolution and decision-making* is used to identify whether they are based on previously established processes according to the following subcategories: a) there are procedural manuals that detail the process of making decisions and solving conflicts based upon the file, b) making decisions and solving conflicts is based on historical patterns and traditions taking into account rules and precedents or by decision of the leader, and c) making decisions and conflict resolution are made by the leader given the lack of regulations and historical precedents. The observation unit is the procedure manuals.

The *dimension promotion and selection of personnel based on technical skills* is used to identify if the organization and administration is on hands of public officials who are professionally qualified. The category *staff selection and promotion* seeks assesses whether the selection and promotion of staff is based on their professional qualifications according to the following subcategories: a) professional career service that base the selection and promotion of personnel in their professional training through professional examinations, b) member of the elite in which the personnel is recruited in the traditional way or by a trust relationship with the leader, and c) member of the leader's personal

group where the staff is chosen based on their charismatic qualities, there is no professional career or promotion only by the appointment of the leader. The observation unit is the professional career service. Table 3.1 summarizes the dimensions, categories and subcategories of the first assumption of this research.

Table 3.1 Dimensions, categories and subcategories to identify bureaucracy on the Progres-Oportunidades Program

Weber's Dimensions	Units of observation	Categories	Subcategories
<p>Division of labor based on specialization</p> <p>Division of labor is based on a defined area of competence area and the personnel is chosen based on their technical capabilities. There is a clear differentiation of functions organized based on technical criteria</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Agencies/ Departments - Positions 	<p>Degree of specialization of agencies/departments</p> <p>Identify if the agencies and offices are linked to activities and careers clearly defined</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Departments and positions have responsibilities, duties and obligations defined in writing - Agencies/departments are based on historical and institutional tradition and their responsibilities may or may not be defined - The leader on ad hoc basis defines the structure; departments and positions are newly created and their responsibilities,

Table 3.1 – *Continued*

			duties and obligations are not defined
<p>Defined hierarchical structure</p> <p>Fixed administrative hierarchy and chain of command where higher authorities have regulation and inspection powers over a lower office. The system also offers the lower office the right to appeal to its higher authority in a regulated manner.</p>	- Organizational chart	<p>Characteristics of work organization:</p> <p>Identify if the organizational structure is clearly defined, with defined tasks and obligations for each agency/department and position.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organizational chart (the organization has a defined chain of command based on positions and functions) - Historical institutions (the organization structure is based on historical tradition or is defined by the leader) - New institutions (there is no hierarchy)
System of written rules covering	- Organization	Institutional characteristics:	- Formal written rules

Table 3.1 – *Continued*

<p>the rights and responsibilities of public officials</p> <p>There is a clear delimitation of duties and responsibilities of the position held by public officials independently of the person occupying the position.</p>	<p>manual</p> <p>- Function manuals</p>	<p>Identify if the rules clearly define the rights and responsibilities of public officials</p>	<p>(existence of rules to which the public officials have to adhere)</p> <p>- Formal and informal rules publicly known (the formal and informal rules are product of historical tradition).</p> <p>- Informal rules created on ad hoc basis (there is no jurisdiction or competencies)</p>
<p>Written procedures for handling work situations</p> <p>Identify if there is the need to act</p>	<p>- Process manuals</p>	<p>Rules for conflict resolution and decision-making</p> <p>Identify if conflict resolution and</p>	<p>- Process manuals (decision making and conflict solution are done upon</p>

Table 3.1 – *Continued*

<p>based on the file. If the administrative operation, proposals, decisions, regulations and ordinances of all kinds, are recorded in writing.</p>		<p>decision making are based on previously established processes</p>	<p>file).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Historical patterns of conflict solution and decision-making (decision making and conflict solution are based on historical patterns and traditions taking into account rules and precedents or by the leader's decision). - Decision-making and conflict solution by the leader (lack of regulations
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Table 3.1 – *Continued*

			and historical precedents).
<p>Promotion and selection of personnel based on technical skills</p> <p>Identify if the organization and administration relies on public officials who are professionally qualified.</p>	<p>- Professional career service</p>	<p>Staff selection and promotion</p> <p>Identify if the selection and promotion of staff is based on professional qualifications</p>	<p>- Professional career service (the selection and promotion of personnel is based on their professional training through professional examinations).</p> <p>- Member of the elite (personnel is recruited in the traditional way or selected by a trust relationship with the leader).</p>

Table 3.1 – *Continued*

			- Member of leader's personal group (staff is chosen based on their charismatic qualities, there is no professional career or promotion only by appointment of the leader).
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Source: Made by the author with information from (Hall, 1963; Hall & Tittle, 1966; Weber, 1995; Weber, Winckelmann, & Medina Echevarría, 1964)

3.6.2. *The process of coordination among actors within the Program is through formal and informal of markets, networks and hierarchy.*

The literature on coordination shows consensus on the existence of three macro mechanisms for coordination in intra- and inter-organizational relations. The classification of markets, networks and hierarchies is constant across different studies that analyze coordination within and among institutions and organizations (Alexander, 1995; Bouckaert, Peters, & Verhoest, 2010; Rogers & Whetten, 1982; Thompson & Open University., 1991). The research assumption suggests that with a bureaucratic model of public administration the relations among actors occur through this macro mechanisms with different modes of interaction like unilateral action, negotiated agreement and hierarchical direction. The units of observation are instruments used by organizations that depending on their mode of interaction can be classified in one of these macro mechanisms of coordination, that is, according to the actor's motivation to coordinate it can be classified on markets, networks or hierarchies. The categories and subcategories were identified according to the framework of analysis proposed by Scharpf (1997) for the study of coordination. Although, the identification of the dimensions, categories, subcategories and units of observation resulted from the analysis of literature on coordination. This gave us a valuable guide for the analysis however, fieldwork will provide new elements that could enrich our analysis. This section explains in detail the dimensions, categories and subcategories that will be use to analyze the information.

3.6.2.1 Markets

Although the economical connotation of the concept *markets* in which buyers and sellers meet to find the equilibrium between supply and demand through a price mechanism; in the area of public administration the dimension of markets aims to identify the creation of legal frameworks to regulate the exchange between suppliers through mutual adjustment. This exchange might happen in different governmental bodies where

the exchange could involve goods, services, resources, information authority, political support or power (Ilchman and Uphoff [date] as cited in Alexander, 1995).

In general, this type of exchange occurs on the final product, implementation, and there is no need for formal agreements between organizations because it results from mutual adjustment in which each party seek to adapt their reality to its environment. Generally, the means for negotiation are power or authority. The coordination through markets is based on public choice theory and economic institutionalism; the assumption is that public institutions need a competitive environment in order to be efficient through the creation of quasi-regulated markets where the government creates, regulates and gives shape to markets that involve public sector organizations (Bouckaert, et al., 2010, p. 41).

The category *type of unilateral action* addresses whether actors only compete or negotiate the final product, the implementation, of a service, program or public good. In this kind of interaction there are welfare losses because of the impossibility of negotiating in the design phase. The subcategory *mutual adjustment* identifies if actors adjust their behavior according to the opportunities on their environment, without any negotiation or communication with other actors; equilibrium is reached when neither party can unilaterally improve its position. Typically, this type of interaction occurs in anarchic fields or in fields with minimal institutions. The subcategory *negative coordination* aims to identify the existence of legal frameworks that impose limits on actors to not harm each other. Normally this happens under fields of minimal institutions. The units of observation will be the existence of regulated markets, quasi-markets and systems for information exchange.

3.6.2.2 Networks

The dimension of *networks* identifies the coordination that occurs based on voluntary and cooperative actions. A definition of networks is “(more or less) stable patterns of cooperative interaction between mutually dependent actors around specific issues of policy (or management)” (Bouckaert, et al., 2010, p. 44). The coordination is horizontal and depends on the participants’ willingness to negotiate. Inside the network there is mutual trust and good will achieved through a series of repeated interactions. There is a need for information-sharing among network participants to achieve coordination and coherence. Being part of a network affects the actions of participants since it reduces the risk of opportunism in two ways: the bad reputation that will bring a negative action and the increase of the actor’s visibility just for being part of the network (Scharpf, 1997). Normally, cooperative strategies involve the voluntary interaction and coordination through negotiation, resource exchange, co-sponsorship and mutual cooptation among participants. The network participants use communicative strategies based on information and persuasion, common values and partisanship towards a share vision to achieve coordination.

The category *type of negotiated agreement* between actors addresses whether welfare losses are avoided through negotiation, losses are distributed among actors, and the best option is chosen through negotiation. Negotiated agreements are based on exchange or joint production. Negotiation that takes place in the design of a public policy has a cooperative nature, while in the implementation phase where only costs and benefits are negotiated it has a competitive nature.

The subcategory *spot contracts* wants to identify those interactions where the values of production and distribution are clearly defined and the agreement and

execution are simultaneous (take it or leave positions). In the public sector this happens when a proposal is accepted or rejected or in veto situations.

The subcategory *distributive negotiation* identifies those interactions where there is maximization of welfare obtained through negotiation; those who win from a project can compensate those who lose. In this type of negotiation the project, the design of public policy, is not under discussion, only the distribution of costs.

The subcategory *problem solving* identifies those transactions where the design of the public policy can be negotiated. The main objective of this type of negotiation is creating value through a better joint policy design, in this case, the problems of distribution, implementation, are not part of the negotiation. The main interest is finding the best solution for the problem.

The subcategory *positive coordination* identifies when actors negotiate issues of production (design) and distribution (implementation). Normally, this type of negotiation happens when inter-ministerial groups are created for specific projects with the objective of finding better solutions to complex problems away from the routines of their of their departments and hierarchical links. However, it is common for these representatives bring to the negotiating table concerns from the departments they represent complicating the negotiation process. In this sense, positive coordination has very high transaction costs that increase with the number of participants in the negotiation (Scharpf, 1997).

The units of observation that will be analyzed are inter-organizational coordination units, systems for information exchange, negotiation or consultation groups, groups for collective decision-making, joint organizations, strategic management processes, cultural factors, mandatory advisory groups, and the existence of associations, leader organizations, and joint ventures.

3.6.2.3 Hierarchy

The dimension *hierarchy* identifies the coordination based on authority and power as main instruments for achieving coordination. Thus, hierarchy is the control strategy to coordinate the behavior of organizations by limiting their choices to produce actions that would otherwise not have been taken (Alexander, 1995). Coordination by hierarchy can be achieved through the organization structure, coordination by architecture (Hood cited in Bouckaert, et al., 2010, p. 38), or it can be achieved with the use of management control instruments imposed over the structure.

The category *type of hierarchy interaction* identifies when “ego is able to specify alter’s choices...” This possibility may merely arise from ego-superior capacity to offer rewards or to threaten severe deprivations, or it may rest on legitimate hierarchical authority” (Scharpf, 1997, p. 172). . Coordination by hierarchy reduces transaction costs of joint action and offers the possibility of welfare maximization; however, hierarchical direction has limitations: the information problem and the problem of motivation. For coordination to be efficient it requires that both upper and lower levels have available and relevant information; unfortunately, this does not happen on all organizations. Another problem is actor’s motivations because although the organization has the necessary information, actors’ motivations, like self-interest, can act against the organization (Scharpf, 1997).

The subcategory *decision by majority vote* identifies coordination that is achieved through a binding agreement between actors; although, this probably mean that the decision goes against the interests of a few. However, there is the need of legitimating the decision supported by a higher welfare for the majority of actors. In this type coordination transaction costs are low when there is a high number of players.

The subcategory *authority/subordination* identifies coordination that is based on the organizational structure and the chain of command of the organization through norms, regulations and procedures.

The subcategory *mandatory negotiation* identifies coordination that takes place under normative structures intentionally created to govern negotiations among actors formally established and committed to respect the position of interest of other parties for the achievement of their objectives. Also, the possibility of negotiation and compensation exists.

The subcategory *system of joint decision* identifies coordination that takes place among groups where all the players are physically or legally unable to reach their objectives through unilateral action and where joint action depends on the unanimous acceptance of all parties.

The units of observation that will be analyzed are: organizational structure, lines and levels of command, coordination units, coordinator position, systems for information exchange, advisory bodies, consultation and negotiation bodies, joint ventures, management structure and strategic management processes. Table 3.2 summarizes the dimensions, categories and subcategories to identify the coordination mechanisms within the Progres-Oportunidades Program.

Table 3.2 Dimensions, categories and subcategories to identify the coordination mechanisms in the Progesa-Oportunidades Program

Dimension	Category	Subcategory	Units of observation
<p>Markets</p> <p>Market mechanisms bringing together buyers and sellers and equilibrating supply and demand through a price mechanism. Legal frameworks that govern buyers and sellers exchange. Involves information and power. The exchange happens only in the final product (implementation). There is no necessity for formal links among organizations and results</p>	<p>Type of unilateral action</p> <p>Identify if actors only compete or negotiate the final product, the implementation, of a service, program or public good. In this kind of interaction there are welfare losses because of the impossibility of negotiate in the design phase.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mutual adjustment: actors adjust their behavior according to their environment reaching equilibrium when neither party can unilaterally improve its position. Typically, this type of interaction occurs under anarchic fields or fields with minimal institutions. - Negative coordination: identify the existence of a legal framework that imposes limits to actors for not harming each other. Normally this happens under fields of minimal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Regulated markets - Quasi-markets - Systems for information exchange

Table 3.2 – *Continued*

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<p>from processes of mutual adjustment of each unit to its perceived environment. In public administration, market type of coordination happens under quasi-regulated markets and through the creation of economic incentives for achieving coordination. The government creates regulated markets that involve public sector organizations.</p>		<p>institutions. There are welfare losses because there is not the possibility for bargaining on the design phase.</p>	
<p>Networks Coordination mechanism based on the voluntary and cooperative actions based on</p>	<p>Type of negotiated agreement between actors Identify if welfare losses are avoided through negotiation</p>	<p>- Spot contracts: identify those interactions where the values of production and distribution are clearly defined and the</p>	<p>- Inter-organizational coordination units - Systems for information exchange</p>

Table 3.2 – *Continued*

<p>organizations' solidarity. The coordination is horizontal and depends on the on the participant's willingness to negotiate. Inside the network there is mutual trust and good will. There is the need for information sharing between the network participants to achieve coordination and coherence within the network. Cooperative strategies involve voluntary interaction and collaboration through bargaining, resource exchange, co-sponsorship and mutual cooptation among</p>	<p>because losses are distributed among actors and the best option is chosen through negotiation. Negotiated agreements are based on the exchange or in joint production. The negotiation can take place in the design of a public policy and normally it has a cooperative nature or it can take place on the implementation where only costs and benefits are negotiated and has a competitive nature</p>	<p>agreement and execution are simultaneous (take it or leave positions). In the public sector happens when a proposal is accepted or rejected or in veto situations.</p> <p>- Distributive negotiation: identify those interactions where there is a maximization of welfare because through negotiation those who win from a project can compensate those who lose. In this type of negotiation the project, the design of public policy, is not under discussion only the distribution of costs.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Negotiation groups - Advisory groups - Groups for collective decision-making - Joint organization - Strategic management processes - Cultural factors - Mandatory consultation groups - Associations - Joint ventures.
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Table 3.2 – *Continued*

<p>participants</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Problem solving: identify those transactions where the design of the public policy can be negotiated. The main objective of this type of negotiation is creating value through a better joint policy design, in this case, the problems of distribution, implementation, are not part of the negotiation. The main interest is finding the best solution for the problem. - Positive coordination: identify when actors negotiate issues of production (design) and distribution (implementation). 	
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Table 3.2 – *Continued*

		In this type of negotiation transaction costs are very high.	
<p>Hierarchy</p> <p>Identify coordination based on authority and power as main instruments for achieving coordination. Thus, hierarchy is the control strategy to coordinate the behavior of organizations by limiting their choices to produce actions that would otherwise not have been taken (Alexander, 1995). Coordination by hierarchy can be achieved through the</p>	<p>Type if hierarchical interaction identifies when ego can alter the options of alter due to ego superior capacity to offer rewards or by the threat of inflicting severe deprivation (Scharpf, 1997). Coordination by hierarchy reduces transaction costs of joint action and offers the possibility of welfare maximization, however, hierarchical direction has</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Decision by majority vote: identifies coordination that is achieved through a binding agreement between actors - Authority/subordination: identifies coordination that is based on the organizational structure and the chain of command of the organization through norms, regulations and procedures. - Mandatory negotiation: identifies coordination that takes place under normative 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organizational structure - Lines and levels of command - Coordination units - Coordinator position - Systems for information exchange - Bodies for consultation and negotiation - Joint ventures - Management structure - Strategic management processes.

Table 3.2 – *Continued*

<p>organization structure, coordination by architecture (Hood cited in Bouckaert, et al., 2010, p. 38), or it can be achieved with the use of management control instruments imposed over the structure.</p>	<p>limitations: the information problem and the problem of motivation.</p>	<p>structures intentionally created to govern negotiations among actors formally established and committed to respect the position of interest of other parties for the achievement of their objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Joint decision: identifies coordination that takes place on groups where all the players are physically or legally unable to reach their objectives through unilateral action and where joint action depends on the unanimous acceptance of all parties 	
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Source: (Alexander, 1995; Bouckaert y otros, 2010; Scharpf, 1997)

According to Yin (2009) data analysis in a case study must be based on theoretical assumptions under which the case was designed, this means the case study must be focused on answering the research questions established in the design phase resulting from the literature review. This research identifies pre-existing or *a priori* dimensions and categories identified through the review of literature to analyze the data gathered from the interviews and documents. However, the actual analysis of the data could modify the coding since a qualitative research design should be flexible enough to allow the identification of additional categories (Creswell, 2007; Merriam, 1998)

The analysis of data uses the constant comparative method of data analysis based on the “continuous comparison of incidents, respondents’ remarks and so on, with each other. Units of data—bits of information—are literally sorted into groupings that have something in common” (Merriam, 1998; Chapter 9, Section, 3, para. 2). To assist in the analysis of the data the researcher will use the HyperResearch computer program available for Macintosh.

3.7 Validity

There are several methods to assure the validity of a study. This research will use several sources of information to analyze the phenomena using different perspectives, from the actors’ perceptions and through official documents of the Program; this gives validity to the study through *methodological triangulation* (Merriam, 1998). Another strategy that will be used to provide theoretical validity to the study is peer examination, that is, the discussion of the study with other researches to identify possible problems (Johnson, 1997).

In synthesis, this research will use the case study approach for qualitative research to study the coordination process in the Human Development Program Oportunidades, the case. The program represents a *unique* case study but an

instrumental one since we want to study how the coordination process works within the Program. The units of analysis are the different ministries and/or departments involved in the Program's operation and implementation resulting in a *single case study design with multiple units of analysis*. The selection of participants will use the *criterion, stratified purposeful and snowball or chain sampling strategies*. For analyzing the information the researcher will use the *constant comparative method developed by Glaser and Strauss* (as cited in Merriam, 1998).

3.8 Description of the Human Development Program: Oportunidades

The Program for Human Development: Oportunidades is targeted to rural and urban households living in extreme poverty conditions. A household is defined as a group of people living under the same roof who may or may not be related (Sedesol, 2009). The Technical Committee on Poverty Measurement defined being poor as, given the social and individual conditions, people who do not have the necessary economic means to meet their basic needs and capacities (Comité Técnico, 2002). Mexico has three poverty lines based on income: 1) food, insufficient access to food; 2) capabilities, insufficient access to health and education; and 3) patrimonial, insufficient access to housing, clothing and transportation. Oportunidades aims to reach those families who fall under the first and second poverty lines.

For the selection of the beneficiaries Oportunidades uses a two-step methodology (Orozco, 2005; Sedesol, 2009). First, regions with the highest marginality index are identified, then a socioeconomic characteristics survey is applied to families who wish to enroll in the Program. The National Coordination of Oportunidades uses the *discriminant analysis* technique to interpret the results of the survey and identify which families qualify into the Program (Sedesol, 2009).

The benefits offered through Oportunidades consist of five components: nutrition, education, health, energy, and support for the elderly. The nutrition component is made up of a monthly cash transfer of a fixed amount to all the families enrolled in the Program, and an in-kind nutritional supplement to pregnant or nursing women, children between four months and two years of age, and children between three and five years of age who suffer from undernourishment (Levy, 2006).

The education component has three elements: monthly cash supplements during the academic year for each boy or girl enrolled in school from the third grade of elementary school through the end of high school. This cash transfer increases with each school year, and after middle school the cash transfer for girls is larger than for boys (Levy, 2006). Families also receive a cash transfer for school supplies. For those children enrolled in elementary the cash transfer is given at the beginning and in the middle of the school year; children enrolled in middle school and high school receive a one-time cash transfer for the academic year. Finally, a third cash transfer is given to children who finish high school before reaching 22 years of age. All of these cash transfers are conditional on school attendance of at least 85 percent of each month (Sedesol, 2009). However, there is a ceiling for the amount of total cash transfers to avoid the incentive to have large families (Levy, 2006).

Attendance at health clinics is a necessary condition to receive the cash transfers from the nutritional component of the program. In these visits, children's anthropometric measurements are taken, and the nutritional status of pregnant and nursing women is monitored. Families receive a *Basic Package of Health Services* that includes immunizations, family planning, maternal health services, pap tests, prevention and treatment of stomach and/or respiratory infections, tuberculosis, diabetes and high blood pressure. In addition, health talks on various topics are offered (Sedesol, 2009).

The component offering energy assistance and support for the elderly are the most recent additions to the Program. The energy component was added in 2007 and consists of an additional monthly cash transfer to all the families who receive Oportunidades. The support-for-the-elderly component is also a monthly cash supplement for each member of the household over 70 years of age; this component was added to the Program in 2006 (Cámara de Diputados, 2008).

The in-kind benefits, nutritional supplements, are delivered to families on their visits to the health clinics along with the health services. The cash benefits of each component are distributed to the mothers on a bimonthly basis (for amount of transfers, see Appendix A). The nutritional cash transfer is conditioned to the assistance to the health clinics and the education scholarships for the children are conditioned on their attendance to school. Although, since 2001 the payment method in some urban areas has been through a direct deposit in banking institutions, in most cases payments are distributed through a cash payment center of the Oportunidades Program as Levy (2006) states:

Local health and school officials periodically record a household's attendance at clinics and schools, the requirement for which depends on the age and gender of each member. This information is sent every two months to Mexico City (increasingly by electronic methods), where the administrative unit verifies that the family is in the program and that it has complied with the program requirements for the previous two months. The unit then calculated the payment, which is based on the number, gender, and school of children or youth and on the reported attendance of each child at school and mothers at health clinics. The payment is sent to a payment center, where mothers collect the money and then dispose of it at desired. This procedure is repeated bimonthly (Levy, 2006, p. 97-8).

Oportunidades has the largest budget of any Federal Program (Sedesol, 2007a). Each year the Executive branch estimates the Federal Spending Budget and submits it to the Legislative branch for its approval. This budget includes Oportunidades' resources assigned to the different ministries participating in its operation. The Federal Spending

Budget is calculated based on Government revenues mainly from taxes and oil rents (for evolution of Oportunidades' Budget, see Appendix B). In year 2009, Oportunidades received an estimated budget of 3.4 billion dollars, which represents two percent of the total Federal Spending Budget (Ministry of Finance, 2009).

The goals and objectives of the Program are clearly defined in the Administrative Rules of the Program. The goal of Oportunidades is to contribute to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty by supporting families living in extreme poverty to improve their capabilities through education, health and nutrition (Sedesol, 2009). The objectives of the Program are: 1) to provide education scholarships for children enrolled from elementary school through high school, 2) to give access to the Basic Package of Health Services and to promote a culture of prevention and self care, 3) to deliver the nutritional cash transfers and in-kind benefits to improve the nutrition of all the members of the household, and 4) to promote the co-responsibility of the beneficiaries by complying with the Program's requirements of school attendance and visits to health clinics.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

4.1 Results of the Interviews

4.1.1 A dominant hierarchical-bureaucratic model of public administration and public management of the Human Development Program: Oportunidades

The first assumption of this research states that despite the adoption of new public management principles, in Mexico the dominant model of public administration and public management is hierarchical-bureaucratic. The Human Development Program Oportunidades works under this model of public administration. The results of the interviews showed there is consensus that the prevailing model of operation of Oportunidades is hierarchical-bureaucratic.

The methods section identified the basic characteristics of the bureaucratic paradigm of public administration according to Weber (2001): a) Division of labor based on specialization, b) A defined hierarchical structure, c) Written rules covering the rights and responsibilities of public officials; d) Operational procedures for dealing with work situations, and e) Promotion and selection of personnel is based on technical competence. The results of the interviews are:

In the dimension *division of labor based on specialization* the respondents agreed that in all cases agencies and offices are associated to clearly defined activities and professional careers. The results showed that all respondents have a professional career and half of them (5) have graduate studies. The majority of the respondents have a career related to the office / agency where they are working except for one case (E05) where the career is not related to the position but professional experience of over 15

years in the public sector working on related activities to the agency / office demonstrates a high degree of specialization.

The category *degree of specialization of agencies/departments* aimed to identify if the agencies and offices are associated to activities and careers clearly defined. The results of the interviews showed that:

Table 4.1 Professions and Positions of the Interviewees

Interview	Profession	Position
E01	BS in Economics	Representative of the Civil Service Secretariat
E02	Bachelors and Masters Degree in Chemistry	Director of the National Institute for Adults' Education (INEA)
E03	Bachelor of Social Work and Master in Public Administration	Responsible for the education component of Oportunidades in CONAFE
E04	Electrical Engineering	General Director of beneficiaries selection in Oportunidades
E05	Bachelor of Dentistry	General Director of Finance and Administration in Oportunidades
E06	Physician with specialization in epidemiology, population studies	Undersecretary of Health

Table 4.1 – *Continued*

	and administration of public health services	
E07	BA in Sociology	National Coordinator of Oportunidades
E08	BS and MastersDegree in Economics	General Director of Programming and Budget in the Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit
E09	BS in Economics	Undersecretary of Planning and Coordination in the Secretariat of Public Education
E10	BS and Masters Degree and Ph.D. in Economics	Coordinator of Advisers at the Social Development Secretariat

The table shows that in most cases agencies and offices correspond to clearly defined activities and professions.

Finally, the subcategory *departments and positions with responsibilities, duties and obligations defined in writing* wants to identify whether the roles and responsibilities of the positions are defined in writing. In most cases, the respondents stated their responsibilities were clearly defined; there were only two respondents that said this was not the case because their job posts were created with the implementation of the Oportunidades Program and part of their function was defining the duties and obligations

of the job position in writing. The interviewee E05 states that: "There was absolutely nothing. When I ... I created the structure of Progresa. When I arrived there were 17 job positions. I did the structure of PROGRESA, I worked the structure with the Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit". The interviewee E03 refers to the same situation stating that:

...there was only a formal agreement of the board of directors that assumed that CONAFE was responsible, and we took on a series of tasks to start the program, it was titanic because it was everything, from designing formats, the teachers' training and then designing the materials for the teachers' training, about what was the program about and how they needed to implement it and what they have to do and also to the secretariats of education in the states which began to participate at that moment.

The dimension *defined hierarchical structure* aims to identify if there is a fixed administrative hierarchy and chain of command. In all cases, the respondents stated they clearly knew who was their superior.

The category *characteristics of work organization* all the respondents claimed to know their superior and stated that their position was "totally regulated". Thus, the subcategory *organizational chart* that seeks to identify if the organization has a defined chain of command based on positions and functions is also present in all cases. Some of the respondents' comments when asked if the chain of command was followed in the internal processes were the following:

E02: Yes, yes, sure, in fact I've seen that the most obedient people are from the government and the unions.

E04: If your question is, if a governmental job has or do not has a hierarchical structure. Of course it does. Two, if it has, it depends on the level in which you are and depends on how the structure of the institution is defined and if its responsibilities and characteristics are clearly defined and published in the Official Gazette...

E06: If not, we get fired. Just kidding. Of course, the chain of command in the internal processes has two dimensions, one that tells you what to do based on the program and the one that we have to do as a responsibility of your job position. You have these two, and then to observe those who depend from you to comply with their responsibility.

All participants in the study confirmed the existence of the dimension *system of written rules covering the rights and responsibilities of public officials* when they recognized a clear delineation of rights and responsibilities of the job position that are independent of the person who is in office since they are regulated by law. Thus, for the category *institutional characteristics* that aims to identify the existence of clearly defined rules that establish the rights and responsibilities of public officials, all respondents identified the existence of clearly defined rules that established their rights and responsibilities mentioning the existence of precise laws and regulations. Thus, the existence of the subcategory *formal written rules* was confirmed in all the interviews. This subcategory aims to identify the existence of rules to which public officials are subject to carry out their duties.

The interviewee E01 stated that being a government position these rules are part of the “general and specific laws that establish which is our participation”. The interview E02 mentioned that “... in any instance of the Federal government we can only do what we are specifically authorized to do”. The interviewee E05 mentioned the existence of an organization manual where all the rights and obligations of each government employee are clearly defined.

All respondents mentioned that the dimension *written procedures for handling work situations* is a constant in the public sector since the most part of the administrative operation have written records. Thus, the category *rules for conflict resolution and decision making* that aimed to identify if conflict resolution and decision making are based on previously established processes, was mentioned by all the interviewees. The respondents stated that the program operates based on established rules and when a confusion or conflict arises they check the rules for its solution. The interviewee E03 mentioned that:

...we were under the impression that if you asked me for something it is because the education sector has already done his part which was certifying and sending the information right? Then it forced us to create specific rules to define our responsibility in relation to the transfer of resources, right?

Also, the interviewee E05 mentioned that:

In 1999 the Chamber of Deputies required every program to have operation rules, Oportunidades was the first program in the history of this country to have precise operation rules. And the rules tell you exactly what each sector has to do, which are your responsibilities, your obligations and it is not negotiable.

The interviewee E06 also mentioned "Sure, because the fact that the rules of operation establish so precisely what you have to do, and also they make you record each step you take, then yes it was very specific".

The subcategory *process manuals* aimed to identify if whether decision-making and conflict resolution are taken based on the record. The respondents stated that this was the case in the majority of situations. The interviewee E10 stated:

If someone asked you to supervise something that was not a responsibility of Oportunidades, thanks to the manual or the rules of operation there was no argument, right? If they wanted to change the rules they have to specify why but if they did not respect them, the rules were there, the rules of operation were there to follow them, is someone thought that something would improve the program there was flexibility but the rules were not modified by freewill, right?

Also the respondent E08 mentioned that:

...the rules, the first that were publicly available and which were created as a mechanisms to avoid conflicts in the field were Oportunidades' rules which tried to specify, to some extent, the responsibilities and obligations of the secretariats not only at the Federal level but also at the local level.

Finally the last dimension *promotion and selection of personnel based on technical skills* aims to identify if the personnel that works on the organization are professionally qualified through successful professional examinations. In the majority of the cases (7 out of 10) the selection process and promotion of personnel worked this way with the exception of high level job positions such as Undersecretary or General Director, which are political or high trust government positions. The interviewee E02 took office by

invitation from the President, the respondent E07 took office through an internal promotion, but he also described his position as a political government position that was granted by presidential appointment. The interviewee E09 also mentioned that the President appointed him. In all other cases either experience in the public sector or professional qualifications gave them access to the job.

The *category staff selection and promotion* aims to identify in what measure professional qualifications justifies the selection and promotion of personnel. The following subcategories were identified a *professional career service* where the selection and promotion of personnel is based on their professional training through successful professional examinations and the subcategory *member of the elite* where personnel is recruited in the traditional way or selected by relationship of trust with the leader.

The majority of the respondents correspond on the first subcategory since they have professional experience in public administration and/or an adequate profile for the job position. Respondent E01 mentioned:

I worked 15 years in the public service, I entered as head of department and was promoted to assistant director and then to comptroller and then I went back to the secretariat of civil service as deputy commissioner. As deputy commissioner one of my responsibilities was monitoring through the committees and public entities the objectives and goals of the institutions we had assigned and among them I had Oportunidades. The interviewee E03 states:

...at that time (when he was involved in the Oportunidades Program) I had like 15 years (of experience). Yes, I worked at the Interior Secretariat and in the Secretariat of Social Development, in Social Development I worked at the predecessor of Oportunidades that was Children in Solidaridad. The program was born there but with a very different logic of operation. When I entered there I had already like 15 years and now I have like twenty something years in the public service.

The respondent E04 mentions that in that moment they were looking for a specific profile for the development of technical issues:

In my case... it was a little different, because they were looking for a technician, right? I arrived as a technician because there was a necessity

to define some technical issues of information systems and decision-making related to information technology strategies. They were looking strictly for someone with some expertise in information systems and that is how I got the job.

This confirms that personnel selection was based in professional qualifications. Also, the respondent E07 mentioned that in that time, when he took office, there was not a civil service but personnel selection was based on “the experience on public service and for the academic background”. He mentions:

...it was by successive approximations based on acquired experience and responsibility and finally it ended when I was undersecretary of health responsible of monitoring the compliance of the program in that department and to negotiate with the Secretary the resources for our activities in relation to the Program.

In the subcategory *member of the elite* falls respondents E02, E07 and E09, although this last one had already years of public service experience. Nonetheless, in these three cases they were appointed by the President due to the high level of trust of the job positions. The interviewee E02 states, “A political advocate recommended me and I guess I was also promoted by Dr. Reyes Tamez. He never told me but I suspect, because he was already Secretary of Education and I went to talk with the President and he invited me and I said yes”. Respondent E07 mentions that his appointment to the job position was an “internal promotion, I was the head of Indesol and I was moved to Progresa, but it is a presidential appointment, is a political office”. Finally, interviewee E09 took office by presidential appointment also although he already had 7 years of public service. It can be concluded that in the category staff selection and promotion the model of public administration that predominates is bureaucratic.

4.1.2 Methods of Coordination inside the Human Development Program Oportunidades

The second research assumption states that in spite of the prevalence of a hierarchical-bureaucratic model of public administration, the process of coordination

among actors within the Program is through formal and informal mechanisms of coordination based on markets, networks and hierarchy.

The results of the interviews show the existence of various instruments for coordination between the actors of these three macro mechanisms of coordination. However, the existence of instruments based on hierarchy and networks predominates and, to a much lesser extent, the market.

4.1.2.1 Hierarchy

The dimension of *hierarchy* as a mechanism of coordination is based on the idea of authority and power as central elements for achieving coordination. Generally, coordination through hierarchy occurs based on the organizational structure, or based on administrative instruments of control imposed onto the structure. The category *type of hierarchical interaction* seeks to identify whether the coordination occurs when there is a higher authority that obliges an inferior one to make decisions that the latter would otherwise not have made in response to rewards or threats that rest in the legitimacy of the hierarchical authority.

The results of the interviews show that the Program Progres-Oportunidades (Progress-Opportunities Program) achieves part of its coordination by means of hierarchical instruments. The sub-category *authority/subordination* is based on the organizational structure and the chain of command of the organization through norms, regulations and procedures for achieving coordination inside the program. In general, the elements of coordination used in this sub-category can be grouped in the following hierarchical instruments:

- a) Objectives, goals and services clearly defined in response to laws and regulations

- b) Processes of operation that led to the creation of routines for achieving coordination
 - c) Assigned budgets
 - d) Centralized information systems
 - e) Express mandates of a higher authority
- a) *Clearly defined objectives and goals in response to laws and regulations*

All the interviewees pointed out that all the sectors do what they are meant to do because their objectives and the services they offer are clearly defined through laws and regulations. Interviewee E06 mentions that:

...everyone at the SEP already knew what they had to do, everyone in health and IMSS already knew what they had to do... that way there was no confusion around I had understood it this way, no, here you say and you have to comply with what the rules say and were ...

Interviewee E09 points out "...actually I think that the rules are thought out in terms of having everyone do their part". Likewise, interviewee E08 pointed out that "If the program has a clear objective and because of that the rules, the rules of Oportunidades also if you compare against any other rules of operation of any other program they are the broadest...". Finally, interviewee E04 mentions that the very clear assignment that each of the participating dependencies in the program had been given was the reason for the coordination occurring within or inside Oportunidades by pointing out that "look the Committee today and ever since was born with a clear objective and with assigned budgets, that's why I reiterate this, that it seems to me that these are important elements in achieving a serious inter-institutional coordination, don't you think?"

b) *Established processes of operation that led to the creation of routines for achieving coordination*

The interviewees pointed out that the operation of the Program is accomplished in response to processes of operation, which facilitate coordination. In the words of interviewee E07:

... (the Program) is a permanent cycle and everything has to happen just in time or the machine stops. For delivering a transfer, there is a process behind it where everything, that depends on health, education and IT and on different levels of IT and on them, in other words, depends on how you see the objective but any of the objectives you see, in other words, the work process business, the objective is clear but if the work objective ends in delivering a transfer, a woman receives a transfer, this happens every two months with a set of activities and processes that, besides, in several of its points touches health and education.

Likewise, interviewee E03 described in detail the process for the transfer of educational scholarships to the beneficiaries that confirms the perception expressed by interviewee E07 with regard to the routinizing of the processes:

For us CONAFE we would program the budget with Oportunidades, but this is the budget that is going to be exercised for the entire cycle, during the next fiscal year for the payment of scholarships and the acquisition of school supplies in the context of Oportunidades, so, at the beginning of the fiscal year, CONAFE has an assigned budget to cover this scholarship, according to the calculation made also by Oportunidades, this is done every two-month period for the payment of the... (telephone interruption)

This... and well, they transfer the resource to us and we have to coordinate the parties responsible for the educational component in the ministries of education in the states, right?... to let them know how is being handled and how the enrolment is being handled and what universe of attention we have registered per state. Oportunidades generates formats E1 and E2 for student enrolment and for the registration of attendance, it generates them in the states and sends them, delivers them, for example the state coordination of Nuevo Leon delivers it to the coordination of Oportunidades of Nuevo León, delivers all the documents for the certification of the enrolment or attendance is delivered to the responsible for the educational component in the ministry of education of the state, there are, thousands delivered, aren't there, and he has to distribute them through his management chain where, I don't know, supervisors, heads of sectors and directors of schools and teachers, they deliver them, they reach the schools and there in the schools the directors with support from the teachers certify the students' attendance, those documents have to be sent back to the responsible for

the educational component in the state, in the state's Ministry of Education, delivers it to the coordination of Oportunidades in the state, delivers everything... maybe says I'm delivering to you 100 formats for certifying attendance hand them out to each of the schools that are already enrolled and then return them to me duly signed and therefore they get sent back, if he delivered 100 he gets 100 back and the state coordination of Oportunidades captures the information of non-attendance of the scholarship-holders, right? They capture it, calculate how much, how many resources they are going to require to pay for this two-month period and based on that they make the request to the CONAFE. I want such and such amount of resources to cover the payment of scholarships for the January-February two-month period to use as an example, right?

So then CONAFE transfers the resource to them and they make the transfer directly to the National Coordination in Mexico City and they make the transfer of the resource to the states so that they in turn make the transfer to the beneficiaries, and in the end we, as CONAFE, receive from them the list of beneficiaries that received the resources.

Respondents indicate that these activities are carried out every two months and each sector and level of government already knows what they have to do in each step of the process. For this reason, the Program operates based on repetitive patterns and operation routines.

Another example of the creation of routines occurred in the expansion phase of the Program. In general, all respondents stated that Oportunidades operates based on established processes such as the validation of services for its expansion to new localities. The Ministries of Health and Education are responsible for confirming the existence and availability of services; if they do not validate the provision of services then the program does not operate those areas. Respondent E03 states:

...were asked as the Ministry of Public Education to verify the existence of education services, in most cases education services are available, what you do not have are health services, which is the reason why the project is not implemented in some localities.

The interviewee E05 also mentions "There is no room for negotiating with the validation of services, especially health services, if the sector does not confirm the

provision of the service you can not enter the community". Thus, respondent E07 mentions:

...how do you include someone in this cycle, right? How do you do it? It has to be in certain point of the process because you cannot have parallel cycles, the only thing we cannot do is having parallel cycles. No, wait you have to add some beneficiaries, you have to make another cycle! No... no, no, no, that can not be done, with five million beneficiaries you can not do that, with auditors that can not be done, nothing can be done as an independent project, either the beneficiaries enter to the central line of production or they cannot enter.

c) Assigned budgets

The majority of the respondents (9 out of 10) agreed that having an "assigned" budget helps the coordination process because the money has to be used specifically in the Oportunidades Program. Although the budget is given to each sector it can only be used for the operation of the Program so the sectors cannot use it on anything else.

The interviewee E03 state "...to implement Oportunidades you have a specific budget that can not be confused or mistaken with other resources. The education component has an specific resource for scholarships and you can not use it for anything else". The same person states that since the sector has an additional budget to use specifically for the operation of Oportunidades "you have no problem implementing the program".

The interviewee E04 also identify the assigned budget as an important factor for achieving coordination "... the allocation of an assigned budget to a Program with specific indicators for its evaluation, were basic elements to make this happen...".

Also, like interviewee E07 states, not only the budget is assigned; also the Government Expenditure Budget protects Oportunidades budget by establishing that "Oportunidades budget cannot be changed or used for anything else". This means that there is no way to use the Program's resources for any other program of the same Ministry.

d) *Centralized information systems*

Another factor identified by the respondents was the existence of centralized information systems that help the coordination process. Being a centralized program, Oportunidades have information systems with data from all the localities. This helped to identify precise indicators that make easier the program's implementation. The interviewee E07 mentions "... the system make you record the activities, it was pretty cool, you were going to use these information to make the program work...".

Also, the ease of access to the information made easier the identification of problems in the operation of the program. Respondent E10 states "... Oportunidades is very high tech, right? You have geo-referenced databases and you could cross that information with another database about the locations of the schools with a specific health problem".

e) *Express mandates of a higher authority*

Finally, there are express mandates of a higher authority for adding new elements to Oportunidades, commonly without a previous analysis, which are commonly the result of political interests. The majority of the respondents identified that the order comes directly from the President and once it is given "it has to be done". Thus, the addition of certain elements to the Program such as the elderly support, the "living better" aid and the monetary transfer of the energy component were based more on political interests rather than in the identification of a necessity. As the interviewee E05 mentions, "...these aids were given by a presidential order".

The interview E04 states "In 2007 the elderly support was implemented and was the result of political pressure, which put on the table of negotiation in the Congress a political agreement of 6500 million pesos..."

Respondents agreed that because of the operative structure of Program it is easy to add elements to the program because as noted by the same interviewee (E04):

I think there are other factors that come into play right? It is very difficult and very expensive to have an operation structure like Oportunidades, with the coverage it has, and the ability to make transfers, with the transparency of operation and the evaluation elements it has.

Interviewee E06 identified the same thing that the elderly support was more a political issue but this should be a different program and not part of Oportunidades, but he states:

... but why this new component was added to Oportunidades, because it was the Program that was working better, and had the best control of the subsidies and that is why they included it in Oportunidades, it was a political decision based on the fact that it had a guaranteed implementation.

Other instruments used for coordination are based on the subcategory mandatory negotiation. This subcategory aims to identify coordination that takes place under normative structures intentionally created to govern negotiations among formally established actors who are committed to respect the position of interest of other parties for the achievement of their objectives. The interviews showed there are two main normative structures to achieve coordination among actors:

- a) Coordination units
- b) Bodies for mandatory consultation and negotiation

a) *Coordination units*

Respondents identified that the creation of the National Coordination for the administrative operation of the Program was an innovation and an advantage for the Program that facilitated inter institutional coordination among actors. Interviewee E04 mentions that the fact that the National Coordination was an independent organizational structure “a decentralized of Sedesol” made it have “technical and administrative

autonomy with its own structure. This took it out from the political environment and led to a much more efficient operative situation...”

In addition, the function of the coordination unit was to administratively manage the Program but it was not responsible for the delivery of the services to the beneficiaries, which was a key factor in achieving coordination. Respondent E06 states:

... the key factor for inter-institutional coordination is that the responsible of coordination is not the responsible for program execution, right? The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health are who provide the services to the beneficiaries. The National Coordination gives administrative, technical, planning and evaluation support. This change, of not being judge and party, was also an innovation.

The coordination unit knows also which are their tasks. Interviewee E07 mentions:

...the coordination is responsible for selecting the beneficiaries, making transfers, which means receiving the information by sector and make the transfer listing. It is also responsible of the evaluation and monitoring of the program, and coordination, meaning getting everyone together to make things work.

Nonetheless, the participants also identified that one of the coordination weaknesses is that does not have the same or superior hierarchical level of the Ministries. In consequence, inter institutional coordination depends on achieving the will of each sector to comply with agreements since the risk is to guarantee the operation of the program but not reaching the objectives of the program, as respondent E09 state “... I can assure that prevailing coordination mechanisms, which is the subject you are interested, does not guarantee, do not hinder either, but they do not guarantee the full participation of each sector for the development of capacities”.

b) Bodies for mandatory consultation and negotiation

The institutional design of Oportunidades led to the creation of two bodies of mandatory consultation for the program’s coordination. On the one hand, when the Program was implemented, the Council of the National Coordination of Progresá was

created its function was: a) to authorize policies of coordination, monitoring, supervision and evaluation; b) to define strategies and guidelines for the operation and monitoring of the program; c) to review progress reports and the compliance of the program and evaluate the program's results and impacts in order to make recommendations for its better functioning, and since the creation of the Technical Committee in 2000, the function of reviewing and, if necessary, modifying the decisions of the Technical Committee.

The Technical Committee has the objective of "being responsible of Program supervision; monitor that the entities and agencies involved in its operation comply with their responsibility; make decisions by consensus about the characteristics of the Program that enable a more efficient and transparent operation" (SHCP, 2000:35).

Both instances were created as mandatory consultation bodies to monitor the Program's operation. Respondents recognized this as the function of the National Council and the Technical Committee, mentioning that given the availability of information, discussions revolve around the Program's objectives and goals. Interviewee E05 mentions "In the Technical Committee you discuss about the operative problem you face in that moment...". Also, respondent E06 states "innovations (in the Program) are based on evaluation results and experience. Hey, you know what, the way we are doing this is not working, let's do it this other way...".

Another subject of discussion in this consultation bodies was the addition on new elements to the program. To do this new rules of operation have to be defined previous its implementation for establishing the responsibility of each sector. Interviewee E01 mentions:

...when the new element "youth with Opportunities" (jóvenes con Oportunidades) was proposed there was a dicussion about how to implement it. I mean, establish the rules before its implementation. It was established how the program was going to control it, manage it and

which institution would make the payments, everything was agreed upon while the project was in discussion.

There is also consensus that discussions are based in the program's results based on established goals. Respondent E07 states:

It is a very technical discussion. I mean, if you see what we are negotiating, we are discussing lists of localities with approximate coverage, I'm focusing in this topic of coverage, but other issue was the quality of the services, that was another good one...

Finally, there is consensus that there is readiness and willingness from all the sectors. Respondent E09 mentions "... it was really nice to go to those meetings because discussions were very friendly and always constructive". The same idea was confirmed by interviewee E10 who mentions "I believe that there was always the willingness to negotiate something, at least in the years I went to the meetings, there was always something to improve, really these meetings were very good, everything was documented".

Finally, the dimension of hierarchy the subcategory *joint decision systems* aims to identify groups of actors where all the players are physically or legally unable to reach their objectives through unilateral action and where joint action depends on the unanimous acceptance of all parties. The interviews showed that this type of coordination occurs in the following coordination bodies for the program's operation:

- a) Intra-sectoral coordination
 - b) Coordination between levels of government
- a) *Intra-sectoral coordination*

The interviews showed that in addition to the National Council and the Technical Committee of Oportunidades, the sectors involved in the Program's operation create sub-committees to discuss issues related to their sector prior the meetings of the National Council and the Technical Committee. These sub-committees are useful "to have

approved agreements by sector prior Technical Committee meetings" (Interview E03). Also, respondent E03 mentions that each sector create a subcommittee to discuss issues related to their sector and states that:

...we had our committee of education with the participation of people from the undersecretaries of primary and secondary education and also people from the undersecretary of planning which was very important to verify the installation of services, CONAFE and sometimes even INEA [...] the same thing happened in the health sector, there were participants from IMSS-Oportunidades, the health ministry and from the health ministry maybe the area of communication or planning and the popular insurance.

The interviews showed that prior to a Technical Committee meeting each sector agreed on its position on a particular topic or in the proposal that would be presented at the meeting so decisions were made previously by consensus.

b) Coordination between levels of government

To achieve coordination among the states and the Federal level of government Local Technical Committees were created with the purpose of monitoring the program's implementation in the states and to be the link with the National Coordination of Oportunidades. Its function is critical since the program depends on the provision of health and education services in addition to answering the complaints of the beneficiaries.

The respondents agreed in pointing out that Local Technical Committees monitor the program's operation in the states. In addition, being a program where the service providers are at the local level, these coordination units are necessary for its operation. Due to this situation the National Council and the Technical Committee agreed on the need of detailed rules that describe the program's operation. Respondent E07 states "...that is why is so important to have detailed rules, so no one in a Local Technical Committee invent another program".

However, besides the existence of detailed rules, the National Coordination monitors what happens in each Local Technical Committee:

... the National Coordination has a detailed follow up of everything that happens at the Local Technical Committees and we give guidelines of what should happen in a Local Technical Committee and we asked the ministries of health and education to do the same with their local counterparts to make the program work.

This institutional design was mentioned as a success by the majority of the respondents as noted by interviewee E04 “There are also these committees, lets say local coordination committees that take place and meet on permanent basis every two months to monitor the program’s operation... That is a very interesting and functional formula”.

4.1.2.2 Networks

The *networks* dimension seeks to identify coordination instruments based on voluntary and cooperative actions among organizations. Coordination occurs horizontally and depends on negotiations among the participants, which are based on mutual trust and goodwill created over time from repeated interactions. Information needs to be shared among the actors to achieve coordination and coherence.

The interviewees showed that this type of coordination occurs mainly in the interaction on the inside of the bodies of negotiation of the National Council and the Technical Committee at the Federal level, since despite the fact they were created from laws and internal regulations, there are no coercive instruments that oblige the actors to make decisions, and none of the participants has a higher hierarchical level. Most of those interviewed agreed in stating that negotiations inside these bodies of coordination are based on administrative management and on the actors' desire to cooperate. Interviewee E05 said: "...I think it's a topic of administrative management of the program.

I mean, it's the capacity to convince the other sector to work for you and to work together, and achieving that is skill and a virtue." He added:

That's why the role of the Council should be so important, since the Council is made up of equals and presided over by equals. Well, by the Social Development Ministry, but with equals. So that opens the possibility for equal treatment; that's why coordination is an art -- the power to negotiate with secretaries and get what you want to get.

The interviews showed that inside both bodies of coordination, the category *type of negotiated agreement* that identify coordination achieved through negotiations of the parties preventing losses to wellbeing occurs in the following subcategories:

- a) Problem-solving
- b) Positive coordination

a) *Problem-solving*

The *problem-solving* subcategory seeks to identify negotiations that seek creation of value from design of public policy, where the central objective is joint design of the best solution. In these types of negotiations, distribution problems are arranged and the parties only seek the best solution for their shared interests.

The interviews showed consensus that these types of negotiations occur inside both the National Council and the Technical Committee, since most of the time the sectors tried to come together or to solve problems identified in the operation of a program component. In this way, interviewee E03 said that when the SEP had its planning sessions, considerations were made as to where the Oportunidades program would expand its coverage "to install services if they were missing." The same interviewee reiterated: "...yes, efforts were made for things to happen. Efforts were made to convene people for planning. Efforts were made to truly support the program..."

At the same time solutions to the operative problems of the program are sought, proposals for the improvement of the program's operation are also proposed, seeking to

offer better alternatives to the beneficiaries. This is evident when Oportunidades included a new option for the certification of co-responsibility of the program for young adults who receive the Oportunidades scholarship, since one constant criticism is that they always have to go to listen to the same talks year after year, so the education sector proposed the following alternative:

For example, we have a program called summer community tutors, where kids in high school or university go to communities where there are community education services to help kids during vacations with a special program to bring them up to speed because they get bad grades. We negotiated with Oportunidades so that high school kids could participate in this component and in this way they could certify their high school co-responsibility for some time. We have this idea, we negotiated with Oportunidades and by the next summer it was already implemented.

In addition, interviewee E05 said that coordination with both health and education has been achieved and in a valuable manner:

So for you, as a sector, it's also a good idea to ally with me because together it's very likely that we'll get better results, while if we do not work together, we're not going to achieve it, and that's something I believe has happened in Oportunidades, and to a great extent.

The interviewee said that with both sectors, databases of beneficiaries have been exchanged to try to cover families that qualify for the program but for some reason don't have the support.

On the other hand, the interviews also showed that despite the willingness to negotiate by the actors, there are also difficulties when making changes, mainly because making modifications to the program is time-consuming. One recurring case in most interviews was the modification to the formula for dietary supplement, where Interviewee E08 said:

It took 4 years to get the food formula moving between Liconsa, Sedesol and the Health Ministry, to change a formula that no one liked, at a cost of 600 million per year. So problem-solving sometimes doesn't have that agility.

The interviewee said the main problem in this case in particular was that the person who represented the health sector in the Technical Committee did not have the profile and hierarchical authority to manage changes inside the sector, and once the right person was approached, the necessary changes were made.

b) Positive coordination

The subcategory positive coordination identifies negotiations where actors agree on topics of implementation and design. Transaction costs are very high in these types of interactions. For the case of Progres-Oportunidades, positive coordination occurred mainly in the first stage during program creation, or at the time when a new component was incorporated into the program resulting from identification of a necessity.

The interviewees agreed that the initial program design took a long time and that it was a negotiation and convincing stage among all parties. Interviewee E09 said: "There was a lot of analysis and debate among the main participating ministries: the Treasury, Sedesol, Health and SEP..." The interviewee also mentioned there were serious doubts over "how to operate a program of such dimensions and with so many tactical difficulties." However, the strength of the academic program packaging was what finally convinced the main actors, which Interviewee E04 reiterated, saying:

This whole concept that is behind Oportunidades was a concept that was analyzed and worked on for years; definitions and documentation were made on this, and finally the structure was built and it was defined as to how the program would operate.

Once the program is designed, positive coordination also occurs when a new element is incorporated in the program, since in these situations the rules must be defined and resources must be obtained prior to implementation. Interviewee E01 referred to the component Jóvenes con Oportunidades (Youth with Opportunities), which required negotiations to define:

...how it would be implemented. In other words, establish the rules before execution. It was established as to how they would be controlled, managed and through which institution would make the payments, which was also agreed upon at the time the whole project was to be integrated. Finally, when those rules are consolidated and take shape, they go up in level; their budget is also negotiated.

Likewise, Interviewee E02 mentioned the preparation of a project implemented in coordination with the Health Ministry and INEA, which sought to attend to children who missed the school year because they were in the hospital. They jointly created a program for community spaces in hospitals, which let children continue attending school:

So there was a project between Health and INEA. So Health did what it was supposed to do and INEA did the same, but the combination of both enriched [the program]. If they reported 3 pesos and we reported 2 pesos, that was good, but those 3+2 became 10...

4.1.2.3 Markets

The *markets* dimension identifies coordination instruments based on market principals to balance supply and demand. In other words, they are based on legal frameworks that regulate the exchange between buyers and sellers, where the exchange occurs only in the final product -- i.e., implementation, and there is no need for formal ties among participants. The interviews showed that these types of interactions occur mainly in the existing relationship between the Health Ministry and IMSS.

Three interviewees (E06, E07 and E08) said the introduction of IMSS to provide health services in areas where the Health Ministry could not offer services created internal competition between both institutions, which led it to improve the quality of health services. The *type of unilateral action* that occurred between both departments was in the *negative coordination* subcategory, where there is a regulatory framework that imposes limits on actors to prevent harming each other and where it is not possible to affect policy design, so it occurs only during the implementation phase.

When the Oportunidades Program coverage was expanded to urban areas, the Health Ministry could not meet the service demand, so IMSS' help was requested to

provide services. The package of services to be offered was already defined by the Program's regulations, so IMSS' existing infrastructure was used only to offer services to the population. This created internal competition between both entities in the quality of services offered. Interviewee E06 said: "(They were doing) the same thing and there was competition of who innovated and who did more things and who...had better results, better user satisfaction."

Interviewee E07 said that IMSS participation in providing health services to Oportunidades beneficiaries resulted in institutional competition inside the health sector seeking to bring IMSS' participation to a minimum, and added:

It came out exactly. And it improved everything. I mean, we also increased the coverage capacities of the state health ministries in urban [areas]. I mean, IMSS did not provided all the urban coverage, but just by adding IMSS into the equation we were able to get the missing pieces. Since, the costs changed and the costs were in the Health Ministry's budget, because it is the health sector, so there was an incentive for "we do it, we do it" -- well ok expand your coverage and get IMSS participation to the minimum. Because what IMSS is going to do is going to be more expensive. It's nice, right?

Finally, Interviewee E08 said that in most evaluations on services quality, IMSS was always evaluated better as a services provider than the Health Ministry. However, in this case in particular, one cannot say that a market was created for offering in health services for program beneficiaries; the instrument that was used to provide incentives for coordination among different offices was based on a market mechanism, by introducing a competitor into the Health Ministry, which finally resulted in improved services quality and better use of the program's financial resources.

4.1.3 Strengths and weaknesses of the Progres-a-Oportunidades program

The interviews added a group of dimensions, categories and subcategories to this study, which can be summarized in two groups: strengths and weaknesses of the Oportunidades program. These elements arose from interviewees' reflections on the

program's operation after nearly 14 years since it was first implemented. Most of the interviewees agreed on identifying the following categories: continuity factors, elements that facilitate coordination and problems with Oportunidades.

4.1.3.1 Continuity factors

The category continuity factors seek to identify characteristics of the program that favor or have favored the permanence of the program. In general, these factors can be grouped into two subcategories:

- a) Internal factors
- b) External factors

a) *Internal factors*

Internal factors are those related to program design that have led it to its institutionalization. There is consensus that the selection process of beneficiaries through clear targeting mechanisms, as well as evaluations performed by external organizations that yielded good results, were important elements for its permanence. In addition, the increase in the number of beneficiaries throughout the years also plays an important role; on the one hand, there are 20 million beneficiaries from whom the support cannot be taken away arbitrarily; in addition, this makes the program "politically profitable" (E02).

Regarding the first aspect, the interviewees agree the program was a pioneer in targeting beneficiary selection processes, since when Oportunidades was first implemented a definition of poverty did not exist in the country, "which is why Oportunidades is so important and makes so many major changes" (E04). Interviewee E08 offered a similar opinion, saying that Oportunidades meant:

... a paradigm shift for a lot of reasons. At the time, implementation wasn't complicated because of the program itself; it was complicated because there were many unresolved issues in which Mexico was innovating -- the beneficiary identification system, the attention system...

The second important element was in the program's institutional design, which included formal evaluations and the fact that based on the results of these evaluations; adjustments were made to the program. This also helped the institutionalization of Oportunidades. As Interviewee E06 said, "Innovations occurred based on the results and on experience." One example that several interviewees mentioned was the modification to the formula of the dietary supplement of Oportunidades. This was consequence of the results of a Program evaluation. E05 says:

... so when you tell the sector that its formula, based on the evaluators, I mean, [is] not our opinion. I repeat in Oportunidades everything is based on facts, [the formula] does not work... I mean it had to with their experts... Imagine -- people from the National Nutrition Institute, the Mexican Pediatrics Institute -- it was a complete aggression for its stars, but the reality was that the formula was not working and it had to be changed. This led to a program that began as an imposition but when you start to see results it convinces you that the program works.

Finally, the fact that it is a program with a large number of beneficiaries makes it difficult for any government administration to eliminate it. In this regard, Interviewee E06 says:

...that's why, when the party in the government changed and wanted to eliminate it, they realized it was impossible, since there were just over two million. They said, well, if we eliminate it, two million people are going to be up in arms and they're going to ask me: 'why are you taking this away from me – if you said it was the best'...

b) External factors

External factors are those that have helped the program's continuation; however, they have nothing to do with the program's design or its operations. The first are external actors who have protected the program through provisions in the Federal Spending Budget (PEF) and loans from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The second element is its institutionalization over the years, which has created among public officials a sense of appreciation for the program.

Beginning in 2001, the IDB gave loans to the Federal Government for the Oportunidades program's operations. Interviewees' perception is that this helped the program's duration during the change of Federal administration in 2001. In the words of Interviewee E08, "the reason the loan was made in 2001 was because at the beginning of that administration, there was a risk that the program would not survive, and that is why the IDB approved the loan to generate additional counterbalance." Interviewee E04 had the same perception: In 2000, Oportunidades signed an agreement with the IDB, and "these elements shielded the program during changes of presidential administration". There is also a provision in the Federal Spending Budget that establishes that the resources allocated for the Program cannot be reduced, Interviewee E10 says. "...Instead, I think that what makes it successful is not the shared budget but the that it is protected, you know? I mean, the next year they couldn't take resources away from recipients; rather, the budget had to be increased...."

On the other hand, the program's institutionalization, with 14 years in operation, has led many public officials to comment "they have appreciation for the program." That's what Interviewee E03 says: "...general directors of CONAFE and the directors of the area of compensatory actions from CONAFE promoted Oportunidades because they believed in the program..." In the same way, Interviewee E10 says:

I think everyone that was in the meetings. If not, 90% of those who attended the meetings were aware as to what poverty is, you know? And regarding the program's benefits, I think everyone had the intention to cooperate." Finally, Interviewee E04 said that after 14 years in operations, Oportunidades ...is now bigger than the ministries-- I mean, with the budget the program has now....

4.1.3.2 Elements that facilitate coordination

The subcategory elements that facilitates coordination seeks to identify the factors of the Oportunidades Program that make easier inter-institutional coordination.

Interviewees generally agree the program has the following elements that have been key in achieving coordination among the actors:

- a) Adequate staff
- b) Budget

a) *Adequate staff*

Adequate staff identifies if staff working inside Oportunidades or in sectors involved in the program's operation are public officials with the adequate profile and motivation to promote the good operation of the program, in addition to seeking coordination with other sectors. There was consensus among interviewees that people who work in the Oportunidades program and the staff from sectors involved in its operation has the adequate profile as the motivation to promote the good operation of the program. Interviewee 04 says Oportunidades has "expert people and people who are truly innovative people -- intelligent people -- that's what I'd say. There is also the political will."

Interviewee E05 said likewise, in mentioning that political will, along with a "perfectly, well-support technical aspect makes this program successful." The interviewees agree that sensitivity toward poverty has made the personnel involved in the program operation seek, on their own initiative, that the program works. In the interviewee's words: "...when you visit someone in the sector and convince him to get his hands dirty -- that's when he says, 'we have to get to work.'"

Finally, Interviewee E10 agrees that the human factor has been key for the program operation. In addition to the topic of sensitivity toward poverty, they have a high level of academic preparation or a commitment to the program: "...I think the human resources of Oportunidades are of high quality for two reasons -- they have a master's degree and know what poverty is -- I mean... they're truly committed..."

b) *Budget*

Budget seeks to identify if the budget of Oportunidades Program is sufficient for the good operation of the program. Interviewees agree that the program's budget is sufficient for the adequate operation of Oportunidades, and that this budget cannot be used for anything else than program operation. Interviewees agree that this helps the program's operation and coordination, since with a specifically allocated budget there isn't any reason to not implement the program. Interviewee E02 says that ministries had resources and people to implement the program. Likewise, Interviewee 05 says the Oportunidades budget is generous and "...sufficient amounts to be able to operate with ease..."

Finally, Interviewee E10 cites physical resources as a key factor for the operation of the program, since this has allowed "... to have networks at the Federal, state, municipal and community levels." In addition to having a good program operation, the sufficient budget has also made possible to have the necessary resources to make evaluations, which in the case of Oportunidades are essential.

The category "problems for Oportunidades" emerged from the interviews and addresses the areas of opportunity and the challenges the program has after 14 years of operation. Interviewees identified different issues that were grouped in the following subcategories:

a) Operating problems

b) Design problems

a) *Operating problems*

The subcategory *operating problems* seeks to identify situations mentioned by interviewees as problems they have identified in the program operation. Interviewees agree that Oportunidades' main problem is basically the commitment of the state- and

local-level authorities for the operation of the program, which is basic to ensure the quality of the services offered. In this regard, Interviewee E01 says although the program works well at the Federal level, some regions lack the commitment of local officials "to transmit this commitment to the executors -- I'm referring to teachers, doctors, nurses, mainly, you know?"

The topic of commitment and quality of local executors is also related to the lack of attention capacity; as Interviewee 05 says, on the one hand there is the validation of health and education services since there are clinics and schools; however, this does not guarantee having the capacity for attending the beneficiaries. This situation is directly related to the quality of service, since as the same interviewee says: "Another problem, like inter-institutional coordination, is requiring from partners quality in delivering services, so the program could have better results if the quality in provision of services was better."

The problem of quality in the provision of services was a recurring remark by all interviewees -- it was identified as a "fundamental problem" of the program (E07). To which Interviewee 09 says: "...if this program does not offer good health services and education services, it becomes more of a program of cash transfers than one of generating skills."

b) Design problems

Finally, the subcategory design problems identifies program design aspects that the Oportunidades Program needs to attend to as part of future challenges. In general, there was consensus that the main problem of the program's design is and has been the lack of linkage to other social programs as part of a comprehensive strategy to combat poverty.

Interviewee 01 mentions that once Oportunidades recipients graduate from the program, they don't know what to do with the new skills they've acquired. Interviewee E02 says the same:

...children are promoted to reach secondary school, so when a boy with secondary education looks for work but he did not have work training he looks for a job and the question is what can you do?, and he answers, well...

However, they also agree that although Oportunidades' challenge doesn't just depend on the program achieving this linkage, but on the design of an inclusive policy above Oportunidades program. Interviewee E04 says:

...we need to include those actors including the Economy and Labor ministries, essentially...I would have to add... the Environment and Natural Resources Ministry as the main actors, but not of Oportunidades, but of the Social Development Ministry, to design the policy for social development.

Interviewee E05 believes the same -- that this duty corresponds to the social development sector and not to Oportunidades, since the latter "is unable to do so." The same interviewee says this link is necessary because:

...you can't assume that people can escape poverty by simply developing their skills. I mean, you have to take advantage of developing your skills. How? By placing them in the labor system that allows them to be self-sufficient and not to depend on government aid.

4.2 Results of the minutes from the Board and Technical Committee of the National Coordination for the Education, Health and Dietary Program (Oportunidades).

Since the creation of the Education, Health and Dietary Program (PROGRESA), now Oportunidades, the National Coordination Office Council was created as the collegiate body for decision-making and program coordination. This body had to meet in an ordinary manner every three months and extraordinarily as often as necessary. However, when the Decree transforming Conprogesa to the Oportunidades National

Coordination was amended, the frequency of the Council's ordinary sessions was changed to just twice per year.

This research analyzes the minutes of the Board meetings held from 1997 (when the program was created) to 2006. In total, 15 sessions were held -- 14 ordinary and 1 extraordinary. This shows that the Council met on average 1.6 times per year -- that is, there were fewer sessions than required by law.

Table 4.2 Sessions of the Oportunidades National Council, 1997-2006

First session	November 6, 1997
Second session	February 2, 1998
Third session	July 13, 1998
Fourth session	November 18, 1998
Fifth session	July 12, 1999
Sixth session	December 13, 1999
Seventh session	May 22, 2000
Eighth session	November 23, 2000
Ninth session	February 12, 2001
Tenth session	October 26, 2001
Eleventh session	September 3, 2002
Twelfth session	March 18, 2003
Thirteenth session	December 16, 2003
First extraordinary session	April 19, 2004
Fourteenth ordinary session	November 15, 2006

Participants in the Oportunidades Board meetings are the Ministers who participate in the operation of the Program. The Social Development Ministry chairs the meeting.

In addition, the Technical Committee was created in 1999 as a support body for the Program's National Coordination office. This collegiate body is comprised of representatives of the Social Development, Treasury, Public Education and Health ministries and the Mexican Social Security Institute, and its mandate is to meet at least six times per year; its operations are subject to the Internal Regulations of the Technical Committee, issued by the Council.

In this research, the minutes of Technical Committee sessions held from 1999 to 2006 were analyzed. A total of 45 sessions of the Technical Committee were held, 10 of which were extraordinary sessions. The Technical Committee met 6.4 times per year -- or 0.4 times more often than the regulatory framework provides. Below are the sessions that were held from 1999 to 2006.

Table 4.3 Sessions of Oportunidades' Technical Committee, 1999-2006

First Ordinary Session	April 05, 1999
First Extraordinary Session (1999)	April 26, 1999
Second Ordinary Session	August 9, 1999
Third Ordinary Session	November 10, 1999
Fourth Ordinary Session	May 23, 2000
Fifth Ordinary Session	July 21, 2000
Sixth Ordinary Session	September 19, 2000
Seventh Ordinary Session	February 15, 2001
First Extraordinary Session (2001)	March 8, 2001
Eighth Ordinary Session	May 28, 2001

Table 4.3 – *Continued*

Second Extraordinary Session (2001)	June 4, 2001
Third Extraordinary Session (2001)	July 12, 2001
Ninth Ordinary Session	August 6, 2001
Tenth Ordinary Session	October 16, 2001
Eleventh Ordinary Session	December 13, 2001
Twelfth Ordinary Session	March 7, 2002
Thirteenth Ordinary Session	April 29, 2002
Fourteenth Ordinary Session	July 9, 2002
Fifteenth Ordinary Session	August 26, 2002
Sixteenth Ordinary Session	October 29, 2002
Seventeenth Ordinary Session	December 19, 2002
Eighteenth Ordinary Session	April 9, 2003
Nineteenth Ordinary Session	June 3, 2003
Twentieth Ordinary Session	August 26, 2003
First Extraordinary Session (2003)	September 24, 2003
Twenty-First Ordinary Session	December 9, 2003
Twenty-Second Ordinary Session	March 16, 2004
Twenty-Third Ordinary Session	May 4, 2004
Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session	July 13, 2004
First Extraordinary Session (2004)	August 6, 2004
Second Extraordinary Session (2004)	September 2, 2004
Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session	September 21, 2004
Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session	November 29, 2004
First Extraordinary Session (2005)	February 2, 2005

Table 4.3 – *Continued*

Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session	March 9, 2005
Twenty-Eighth Ordinary Session	April 26, 2005
Twenty-Ninth Ordinary Session	July 5, 2005
Thirtieth Ordinary Session	September 6, 2005
Thirty-First Ordinary Session	November 8, 2005
Second Extraordinary Session (2005)	December 5, 2005
Thirty-Second Ordinary Session	April 3, 2006
First Extraordinary Session (2006)	May 3, 2006
Thirty-Third Ordinary Session	June 13, 2006
Thirty-Fourth Ordinary Session	September 12, 2006
Thirty-Fifth Ordinary Session	November 14, 2006

As already mentioned in the results part of the interviews, this research is based on two assumptions:

1. Despite the adoption of new public management principles, in Mexico the dominant model of public administration and public management is hierarchical-bureaucratic. The Human Development Program works under this model of public administration.
2. Despite the prevalence of a hierarchical-bureaucratic model of public administration, the process of coordination among actors within the Program is through formal and informal mechanisms of markets, networks and hierarchy.

4.2.1 Predominantly hierarchical-bureaucratic institutional framework in the Human Development Program Oportunidades.

The results from the analysis of the minutes of the Oportunidades' Board and Technical Committee show the dimensions that could be identified in reference to the first

research assumption were the existence of a defined hierarchical structure, a written system of rules that includes the rights and responsibilities of officials, and the existence of written processes for handling labor situations. The dimensions, categories and subcategories regarding the work division based on the specialization, promotion and selection of staff based on technical skills could not be identified, since the topics discussed in these sessions are related to program implementation in communities and not on the selection process of staff already working on the program.

Regarding the defined hierarchical structure, the minutes show that the characteristics of work organization inside the Oportunidades Board operates under the logic of the subcategory organizational chart , by defining that the "Main Directors" must be the Ministers of the government offices who participate in the program operation. The Underministers, on the other hand, are the "Alternate Directors," authorized to make decisions only if the Main Directors are absent. The regulations also provide that the "Decisions must be adopted by at least three of the members" (DOF, 2002). Decree article 5, amending another [executive order] creating the National Coordination Office of the Education, Health and Dietary Program, provides that the Board must be comprised of the Ministers of Social Development, Finance, Public Education and Health, as well as by the National Coordinator who will serve as the Technical Secretary. It also provides that the "Heads of said Government Offices will name their respective alternates, who must have the character of Underminister" (DOF, 2002).

The Technical Committee's Internal Regulations details their integration as follows:

Table 4.4 How Oportunidades' Technical Committee is comprised

Chair (Voice and Vote)	Underminister of Planning and Evaluation of the Social Development Ministry
Members (Voice and Vote)	Underminister of Spending of the Finance Ministry
	National Commissioner for Social Protection in Health
	Chief Officer of the Public Education Ministry
	General Director of the Mexican Social Security Institute
Technical Secretary (Voice)	National Coordinator of the Oportunidades Human Development Program
Monitoring Office (Voice)	Delegate of the Public Affairs Ministry before the National Coordination Office of the Human Development - Oportunidades'
Guests (Voice)	Public Officers whose presence enriches the Technical Committee

Source: Prepared by the author with information from the Technical Committee's Internal Regulations

These regulations provide that the Technical Committee must meet once every two months with the majority of its members with voice and vote (50% + 1). The regulations also provide that "Public officers who serve as members may appoint their respective alternates, who will have the position of immediately lower hierarchical subordinate." Thus, it can be seen that both the Board and Oportunidades' Technical Committee base their operations on the subcategory of organizational chart.

The dimension system of written rules including the rights and responsibilities of public officials is present in the category institutional characteristics, since some of the duties of the Board of Oportunidades include: I. Authorizing coordination policies, monitoring, follow-up, supervision and evaluation of the Program; II. Defining the

guidelines and strategies for program operation, monitoring and follow-up. In other words, the Board is in charge of defining the laws and specific regulations that define the rights and responsibilities of public officials as part of the collegiate bodies and as participants in the operation of the Progres-a-Oportunidades Program.

The Technical Committee's duties include "Approving the draft of the Program's Operating Rules, as well as the modifications submitted by the National Coordinator". In addition, reviewing "compliance of responsibilities of the government offices, agencies and entities that participate in the Program". Thus, both collegiate bodies have a clearly defined organizational structure with established authorities and obligations, in addition to having the duty of supervising that the other agencies and offices that participate in Program operations comply with the responsibilities and duties they have been entrusted with, based on the regulations and respective legislation.

The subcategory formal written rules was present in the majority of the minutes of the Board, whether to define the responsibilities of new actors involved in the operation of the program, to define the rules of the National Coordination Office's Technical Committee, or to define the Program's operating rules.

During the Council's Eighth Session, one of the Agreements that was made was that the Board had the pending task of defining the "role of the municipal links and the promoters," since "they have gained increasing presence in the operation of the program and which might represent some difficulties". Likewise, during the Council's Eleventh session, point 10 on the Agenda referred to "Presentation of the Technical Committee's Internal Regulations," since in the words of the National Coordinator of Oportunidades, one of the duties of the Board was to "approve the Technical Committee's Regulations," which were already approved by the Technical Committee.

In the same way, the Technical Committee bases its operations on formal written rules, which was evident during the Committee's Third Ordinary Session, where:

The Finance Ministry expressed its disagreement over modifications to Operating Guidelines of Progresá, which involved applying 3 agreements; 17/ 09-08-99, 18/ 09-08-99 and 19/ 09-08-99. The Ministry said this practice violated the Program's standards, and that that decision was made without an agreement with the Finance Ministry. It insisted the Decree was very clear regarding the Committee's authorities, which cannot change the rules of an Executive order.

During the analysis of the Technical Committee's minutes, it was also made clear that each sector had its duties and responsibilities that were well defined in regulations and guidelines. Such was stated in the Technical Committee's Thirty-Fourth Session in relation to the Health Sector responsibilities in the states.

... it suggested that the information sent by the Oaxaca Technical Committee should be documented and validated by the Health Sector Coordinator, in order to be able to consider the request. The [...] said that the Health Ministry's task was to generate the evidence and know the scope of the situation and committed itself to obtain and send this information to the National Coordination, as well as bring the topic to the attention of superior authorities of the Sector.

The minutes from the Oportunidades' Board Sessions are a clear example of the dimension written procedures for handling work situations. Thus, the category rules for conflict resolution and decision-making is present in all of the Board's minutes. The subcategory process manuals is present in the Board's minutes, in defining the general guidelines and operating rules for Program operations, as well as the procedural manuals for different aspects of its operations.

It was proposed during the Council's Fourth Session that:

...the Budget Decree draft that was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies considers that the Social Programs should have rigorous Operating Rules published in the Federal Official Gazette. In PROGRESA's case, having Rules for the operation of the program will help to know how to include a family to the program, when payments should be made and when not, maximum payment amounts, etc. This must be defined in January or February and published in the Federal Official Gazette.

Likewise, during the Council's Sixth Session, the National Coordination is said to have the manuals and documents that "comprise the methodological basis for the actions entrusted to the National Coordination Office." The documentation governing Program operations is listed below:

- Education, Health and Dietary Program -- Concepts
- Marginalization Index 1995, 1998.
- Marginalization index for Communities Subject to Receiving Progresa Support.
- Geography of Marginalization and Progresa Development.
- Operating Manual of Progresa's Health Component.
- Operating Manual of Progresa's Education Component.
- Procedural Manual of Telegraphs issued by Telecomm.
- Technical Appendix of the Collaboration Agreement Signed with Telecomm.
- CONPROGRESA Organizational Manual.
- CONPROGRESA Procedural Manual.

These documents comprise the Program's operating foundation, and in the case of questions or doubts about the Oportundiades' operation or for decision-making, implementers go to this documentation.

Likewise, the Technical Committee issues the Operating Rules of Oportunidades, which provide the specific operating procedures for program implementation. The following operating processes included in the rules were reviewed during the Technical Committee's twenty-first session on modifications to the Program Operating Rules:

The [...] submitted to the consideration of Technical Committee members for their validation, the proposal of modifications to the 2003 Operating Rules, mentioning their relevant aspects: Item A-1. Criteria for attending to the demand of incorporation of beneficiary households, 2. Updates to the active registry, 3. Suspension of benefits, 4. State Technical Committees; Item B.-1. Recertification, 2. Actions with other programs to prevent duplications, 3. Spending Exercise of the Health Component

and 4. List of communities incorporated into the Program. This topics were necessary to discuss to be able to begin operations in 2004, and that all necessary adjustments to the 2003 Operating Rules would be made later...

4.2.2 Forms of coordination within the Oportunidades Human Development Program

The second research assumption proposes that the coordination process among actors inside the Program occurs through different coordination instruments based on market mechanisms, networks and hierarchy. Since the minutes of the Board and the Technical Committee are the results of a predominantly bureaucratic public administration model, most of the instruments are based on hierarchy; however, the use of network instruments for coordination among the main actors in program operations are also identified.

4.2.2.1 Hierachy

The minutes of the National Coordinating Council show that the category hierarchical interaction of the hierarchy dimension is present based on the following subcategories:

The subcategory *Authority/Subordination* is mainly present from the following instruments:

- a) Objectives, goals and services clearly defined by laws and regulations
 - b) Established operating processes leading to the creation of routines to achieve coordination
 - c) Allocated budgets
 - d) Centralized information systems
 - e) Express orders from a higher authority
- a) *Objectives, goals and services clearly defined by laws and regulations*

The minutes from both the Council and the Technical Committee showed that all sectors involved in Program operations were clearly aware of their duties, thanks to laws

and regulations. Likewise, the Program's coverage goals and objectives are proposed each year, which must be complied with. The Council's Eighth Session included a proposal to reach 2.56 million beneficiary families, and during the next Council Session -- number Nine -- participants in Program implementation clearly knew that for 2001,

...CONPROGRESA would face new challenges compared to previous years, since an additional 750,000 new households to receive support must be added to the 2.6 million households currently covered. More penetration into semi-urban and urban areas would be sought, and in the education component, recipients would receive scholarships up to the high education level.

In addition to having clear Program goals, the involved sectors would also have clarity on their duties when incorporating new elements into Progres-Oportunidades. Thus, in the Technical Committee's First Extraordinary Session (2001), a proposal was made on the Jóvenes con Oportunidades (Youth with Opportunities) component:

...the Operating Rules must include content that sufficiently clarifies the policies with which Progres-Oportunidades is going to approach this new element. Its model and components, regardless if there is a Provision including all technical aspects reflecting three or four points that the taskforce analyzed on how and under what procedure the issue of co-responsibility will be confirmed with the suggestions made in this meeting. As well as considerations to who the support will be directly given to -- whether to the student or family -- anticipating that the majority of the beneficiaries will be in semi-urban regions and who will make the decision to go study somewhere else than the student's place of origin. Therefore, it is necessary to have a document that clarifies the direction and position of this program in regards to this element. Even though in March 15 the operative details of this new component does not appear in the document we have to begin working with as soon as possible to make decisions regarding the list of beneficiaries, payment and liquidation modalities, and policies of the Public Education Ministry.

b) Established operating processes leading to the creation of routines to achieve coordination

The minutes of the Board show that the operation of Progres-Oportunidades's components became standardized and routinized as program coverage expanded and as standardized operating processes were established at the national level to face new

situations, such as how to handle emergency situations in states where natural disasters occurred or amid political conflicts that complicated the operation of the program. Also, as the coverage expanded, the transition from rural regions to semi-urban regions and finally to urban regions was documented so that standard defined processes were available for national operation.

The Council's minutes show that at the beginning of program implementation, some states were obliged to adapt the program. In the Council's first session, proposals were made on the need to:

...in some communities, the Program can be operated in accordance with general established procedures; in indigenous communities, it is essential to work and operate the Program through specific mechanisms in line with the specific customs of the communities themselves.

However, the procedures were standardized as records of these situations were kept. Thus, during the Council's Third Session, the importance of the following was set forth:

...make sure that the Program is just one, requiring that the operating model corresponds to that which was approved, since if it is adjusted to the specific needs of communities, single guidelines will not be available. This led the Council to make the following agreement:
The support given to beneficiary families, through the Oaxaca State DIF, during the months of July and August, must have validation with the assistance to health centers. CONPROGRESSA commits to standardize operations soon, so that by October PROGRESA is operating in Oaxaca under the approved nationwide Operating Guidelines.

Likewise, operations of the components of health and education were standardized based on rules and formats mentioned during the Third Council session, which stated:

Monthly verification of attendance to education services will be done through a single format in which, based on the educational level and grade, the students of beneficiary families are listed and the total number of unexcused, individual and monthly absences are listed.

As the Program faced new situations, such as natural disasters, the specific operational processes were defined. This is demonstrated in the following request of the National Coordination Office to the Board in reference to the emergency situation that some states were facing:

...the National Coordination Office of the Health, Education and Dietary program ask to exempt certification from attendance to Health Centers to the families who live in Municipalities identified as a disaster zone in the states of Hidalgo, Puebla, Oaxaca, Tabasco and Veracruz (victims of earthquakes and torrential rains) and authorizes CONPROGRESA to proceed to deliver the monetary aid without need to certify attendance...

On that occasion, the situation was handled as a case of exception but later this topic was incorporated into the Program's operating rules (number 4.3) as an operating procedure in case of natural disasters or in the case of a political conflict that complicated the program operation.

This was stated during the Twenty-Second Technical Committee Session, upon signing the following agreement due to the political conflict in the State:

...the Technical Committee of the National Coordination of the Oportunidades Program, based on 4.3 of the current Operating Rules, and with the intent to not harm the families who were affected by the social contingency to certify their attendance to health services during the January-February period in the states of Guanajuato and Coahuila. On this single occasion the Technical Committee authorized the delivery of the support of the corresponding two-month period for the families transferred in 2003 from the Mandatory Regime of the Mexican Social Security Institute to the Local Health Services, certifying their attendance in the month of March.

Other clearly established processes that were made routine as the program was became permanent the process for services validation in the states and the incorporation of beneficiary families. Therefore, during the Twelfth Council Session:

...the General processes for Program Operations state that Oportunidades need to validate the access and attention capacity of health and education services in the selected regions based on "the National Population Council criteria (number 4.1.1 of the 2003 Operating Rules). This should be done before including those areas to the program and once these requirements are met and before incorporating new

families, based on points 6.2 of the General Processes for Program Operations. Local Technical Committees define and validate the geographic scope and responsibility of each of the institutions that will attend the Program's beneficiary population, in relation to the number of families incorporated or to be incorporated ...

c) Allocated budgets

The Board and Technical Committee minutes show that having allocated budgets helped the Program. Each government agency and department that participates in its operation has a special budget that must use for the implementation of the program and cannot be used for anything else. In addition, during the Board and Technical Committee sessions, the government agencies and departments must inform how much of their budget they have used and if they would need additional resources to make the request to the Finance Ministry or in case of having economies decide how these resources will be used, but always within the Program.

Therefore, in the Third Technical Committee Session the budget for each government office participating in Program's operations was reviewed:

The Program Budget released as of September 30 was presented. The progress in the exercise in the three government offices is 90.65%: the Social Development Ministry at 84.12%; the Health Ministry, 74.5%; and the Public Education Ministry at 100%. It was requested to the Ministry of Public Education a report on the use of Progresa resources. This is because its budget suffered a reduction of more than 500 million pesos and the Guidelines expressly state that the resources allocated to Progresa must be applied on program's actions. Not doing so is cause of legal responsibility in case resources were allocated to activities non related to the Program.

On the occasion when spending economies occur, the government agencies and departments involved in Oportunidades operations had to request authorization from the Treasury to use resources for other things within the same Program. This was stated during the Eleventh Technical Committee Session, where:

It was reported that the Finance Ministry was asked about the ability to increase the chapter of Personal Services, transferring resources of other expense chapters; a negative response was obtained due to the

Federal Spending Budget Decree of 2001 specifying that this chapter in particular cannot be expanded.

In this case, an expansion of the budget for “personal services” was necessary to gather information in urban areas, so temporary staff had to be hired.

Regarding the fact that the provision of Oportunidades resources can only be used for the Program, it was expressly stated in the Twenty-First Technical Committee Session that:

...this request for deposit was already made by the General Department of Registry and Liquidation and 151 million pesos are pending deposit. There is concern on what this resources were used for [...] Since the Federal Spending Budget for 2003 establishes that program resources cannot be used for other purposes; second, that the Operating Rules also specify this; and third, what will the Program do with those children to whom the Program will not be able to pay the scholarship.

Finally, in addition to the protection provided by the Federal Spending Budget in relation to the budget allocated to the Program, it also has provisions so that each year the Technical Committee reviews its Operating Rules and the amounts allocated to each component is updated for publication in the Federal Official Gazette after authorization from the Finance Ministry and from the Federal Commission for Improved Regulations (COFEMER). In fact, the First Extraordinary Session (2005) was carried out with the purpose of:

...fulfilling the provisions of articles 52 and 64 of the 2005 Fiscal Year Federal Spending Budget and approve the draft to modifications of the Operating Rules, which will be sent to the Finance Ministry and to the Federal Commission for Improved Regulations (COFEMER) for the corresponding authorization and report, and in this way, be able to publish them in the Federal Official Gazette by February 18th, 2005 at the latest, as provided in said Decree.

Based on the analysis of the minutes of the Board and Technical Committee records, it is clear that the budget topic was a constant in each session, whether to present the spending exercise of each government agency or department, the deficit for

operations of a component or for the use of the economies of the allocated budgets to each agency or department. What stands out in budget management is that each one had to inform the other government agencies or departments involved on how the resources would be used and beyond that, they had to agree to request new resources from the Treasury since the National Coordination Office had to participate in operations since it was responsible for informing the Treasury in writing on the deficit and making requests for resources. In addition, as the Program became more institutionalized, the same offices requested implementation of locks for program protection in budget matters, as proposed in the Eighteenth Committee Session:

...an agreement will be made to review the budgets and for a document to be signed by the Ministries of Health, Education, Social Development and IMSS to confirm the commitment to not take resources of Oportunidades for other purposes and request the Treasury the requirements for 2004, with the purpose of keeping the Program safe.

d) Centralized information systems

The minutes also show the existence and the use of centralized information systems that help participants identify problems and their joint solution, in addition to decision-making. Since the Program began activities during the Board meetings, the participating sectors shared operating information, and as operations were standardized, the processes to collect and share information became more technical with the use of information technologies. In the Eight Council Session, comments were made on monitoring of Program indicators and the information was gathered through "Sentry Points":

...the first round of 1000 Sentry Points has ended. The second round will begin operations during the first week of December as a normal operating system, which will be launched to be able to offer important information about the Program's evaluation.

Later on, the use of information technologies was incorporated through the Oportunidades web site, which "contains information on payment points in Progresia

communities and transfer delivery, as well as updated indicators” (Seventh Session, Technical Committee). What is important about this resource is that all participating sectors in the operation of the Program have access to these databases, as provided in the Twelfth Technical Committee Session

...design of the data base is being prepared, which is going to permit information sharing. In terms of information, the quantity is immense [...]. It is necessary to define the information that will be available for the general public but complete access was requested for those who participate in the Program.

The program continued working in information systems, seeking to offer information sectors more decentralized information in greater detail. During the Thirteenth Session, the following was mentioned:

...the Operative Monitoring System sought to systemize the information of indicators and on the other hand facilitate sharing this type of information in a more disaggregated manner. It was presented the proposal of a system with disaggregated information of municipalities and localities with registrations and removals of beneficiaries, as well as information on the Oportunidades operating process, mentioning that there is already information at school and clinic levels. It stated that the objective is to deliver to sectors an accessible database so that they work with the same information.

e) Express orders from a higher authority

Finally, the minutes showed that there are also express Executive orders for establishing coverage goals and adding new program components. During the Council's First Extraordinary Session a proposal was made for the need to incorporate 760,000 families to reach 5 million beneficiary families of the Program to: “...fulfill the commitment with the Presidential Goal ...”. In the same session, the following was agreed:

The Council instructs the National Coordination Office to perform the operating processes necessary to incorporate up to 400,000 families into the Program's Active Registry beginning during the July- August period, so that they receive immediate transfers, in compliance with the 2004 Presidential Goal agreed with SEDESOL.

Later, in March 2002, during the Twelfth Technical Committee Session, the Program changed its name from Progresa to Oportunidades by presidential order and the “launch of the new profile, new name, growth and transformation of Progresa in the Human Development Program Oportunidades” were announced. Therefore, in the Twentieth Technical Committee Session, it was stated that “the President of the Republic indicated that if there are budgetary conditions, the program must grow to 5 million households and achieve the six-year term goal in the year 2004”.

Finally, another express Executive order from the President was the addition of new elements in the program without prior identification of a specific need. The elderly aid component also occurred by presidential order. During the Thirtieth Technical Committee Session, it was stated that incorporating into the:

...Program a new component to aid senior citizens, who are incorporated into Oportunidades. If this component is authorized, the National Coordination Office must operate a series of transfers and co-responsibilities in health for the population over 70 years and the presidential order is to begin operations beginning in January 2006.

In the same way that the elderly aid component was added, the Oportunidades' Savings Mechanism for Retirement (MAROP) was also implemented, by order of the National Social Security Council, which announced during the Thirty-Second Technical Committee Session:

... said that the Technical Committee members were aware that on March 23rd, during the First Session of the National Council for Social Security, a Decree was signed establishing the Oportunidades' Savings Mechanism for Retirement (MAROP), which was published in the Federal Official Gazette (DOF) on March 27th

The Board and Technical Committee minutes show that within the dimension of hierarchy, other instruments used for coordination is based on the subcategory *mandatory negotiations*. The minutes show the role that the Program's National Coordination Office plays to promote coordination between participating sectors, and on

the other hand show the interaction that occurs within these coordinating bodies created specifically to achieve coordination between sectors:

- a) Coordinating unit
- b) Bodies for mandatory consultation and negotiation

a) *Coordinating unit*

The Board and Technical Committee minutes clearly state that the National Coordination has among its main duties seek coordination between sectors and levels of government. Its activities include update information systems to allow coordination between program participants, working with Program budgets along with sectors, in addition to working operating aspects of the Program when necessary.

In the Third Technical Committee Session it was stated that the National Coordination Office works before Committee meetings in taskforces with the sectors to resolve operating problems of the Program to be able to come to concrete proposals at Committee Sessions:

Conprogesa presented the agreements of the work meeting held on October 26th in its offices, to define the mechanisms for attention to beneficiary families in communities affected by rain and earthquakes in the 5 states identified. It expressed that the topic had merited many work meetings for its conclusions to be presented as only points of agreement.

In relation to the coordinating efforts between levels of government during the Ninth Technical Committee Session, the National Coordination Office asked the sectors to exert some pressure to their local counterparts to increase the time of training sessions to their personnel:

For example, it mentioned that in the negotiation procedures to increase training times in the education sector, efforts have failed to grant 30 or 45 minutes of training, instead of 15 minutes for teachers in each one of the states. In relation to the health sector they are already late in delivering the materials to local implementers. It mentioned that it is not only Conprogesa's task, but that of all sectors involved must comply with their responsibilities. Conprogesa responsibility is to coordinate and

exert pressure to the Federal and state sectors, which complicates and multiplies work.

In reference to budgeting, the National Coordination Office worked with sectors to establish the budgetary requirements for the annual operation of the Program. During the Thirty-first Session, it was stated that:

... the Health Ministry informed the National Coordination Office of the existence of a budget deficit for the production of teaching materials. Therefore, on October 10th, 2005, a work meeting was held in which the National Coordination Office was convened to support the production of some of these materials for up to 4 million pesos and the Health Ministry would absorb the remaining expenses. Likewise, when a budget deficit was identified for the implementation of a component, the National Coordination Office must work with the sectors. The members of the Technical Committee instructed the Health Ministry, the Mexican Social Security Institute and the National Coordination Office to hold a work meeting with the participation of representatives of budgeting areas of the Health Sector and the National Coordination Office, as well as representatives of the General Departments of Planning and Budgeting "A" and "B" of the Ministry of Finance, in order to review the update process of the ceiling of the Oportunidades Health Component for the 2007 fiscal year.

b) Bodies for mandatory consultation and negotiation

The bodies for mandatory consultation and negotiation created specifically for the coordination of the Progres-Oportunidades Program are the Board and Technical Committee. The minutes of both coordinating bodies show that monitoring was made on the operation of the Program and solutions for operating problems were sought; likewise, these advisory groups are responsible for defining guidelines or operating rules to implement new components into the Program, as well as to review their operating rules and budgets on annual basis. To reach an agreement in the bodies for mandatory consultation the decision system of consensus was used but if this was not achieved then decisions were taken by majority vote.

During the Second Technical Committee Session, the topic on aid for school supplies to the beneficiaries of Progres-Oportunidades was presented and each Sector expressed its point of view, reaching the following agreement:

The Ministry of Public Education recognized the validity of observations in the sense that, if the complete aid for school supplies is given at the beginning of the academic year, there is the risk that families won't dedicate sufficient money for the school supplies for the complete school year. But it was emphasized the importance that the aid for school supplies should be given in the second bimester. Conprogesa asked to accept the request from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Public Education and sustain the practice of making a second delivery for the replacement of school supplies, monitoring that the calendar is adequate.

Most of the time, agreement between the sectors was reached in a dialogue form and relatively easy, but on occasions when there were differences of opinion there was a specific mechanism designed to achieve consensus. This was demonstrated during the Third Committee Session, where it was established that:

...the Committee gives sustenance and support to the decisions that are made. That is the Program's operating model. On that occasion, when there was no agreement, a vote was taken and that procedure was approved in the Committees operating rules and actions were taken in strict adherence to the same.

When incorporating new elements to the program, the sectors discussed the way to implement them. The following is an example on verification of co-responsibility of scholarship recipients of the component "Jóvenes con Oportunidades" (Youth with Opportunities), since an agreement was not reached between the sectors and for that reason it was submitted to vote, achieving the following agreement: "The Board Technical Committee, by majority vote, authorizes that in the higher secondary education scheme, compliance of co-responsibility of scholarship holders is considered based on the mechanisms set forth by the Ministry of Public Education ..." (Eight Technical Committee Session)

Likewise, the Technical Committee also monitored Program implementation, requesting that the modifications to Oportunidades were not done without previously notifying its members and requesting authorization. This situation arose during the Tenth Committee Session, where it was agreed that:

The members of the Technical Committee instruct Conprogesa so that the agreed goals for program coverage expansion committed for the rural, urban and semi-urban regions are not modified without prior notification to this Committee; authorization from the members must be obtained to be able to make any changes thereto.

Finally, the procedure to annually review the Program Operating Rules continued the same dynamics of decision by consensus, and if no agreement was reached, by majority of votes. During the First Extraordinary Session (2005), this decision-making process was detailed as such:

...it indicated that the Technical Committee's Internal Regulations provides that the agreements are taken by majority vote of the main members that the procedure seeks to try to establish agreements of consensus and, if they do not occur, seek the mechanism to resolve them and which would be approved by majority of vote.

The last subcategory within the hierarchy dimension is systems of joint decision. The minutes showed that these decision systems are done primarily in Subcommittees, which are inter-ministerial coordination bodies; in other coordinating bodies that arise from the Technical Committee or the Council for review of specific topics in coordination that occurs among levels of government.

- a) Inter-sectorial Sub-committees or coordinating bodies
 - b) Other coordinating bodies for specific topics
 - c) Coordination among levels of government
- a) *Inter-sectorial sub-committees or bodies of coordination*

The Council and Technical Committee minutes show mentions of the existence of Sub-committees over the course of the sessions. In general, there are mentions of work

previously done by Sub-committees before Technical Committee meetings to present specific proposals; specific tasks were also assigned during sessions to be approached for their presentation during the following session. For example, during the Twenty-First Session, the following agreement was reached:

The Technical Committee members ratified the Sub-committees' approval of proposals to modifications to 2003 Operating Rules, presented in the Twenty-first Ordinary Session in the document: "Relevant Aspects of Proposed Modifications to Operating Rules to Take Effect in 2004," with the clarification that new redaction will be done to point 3, item B.

In the second case, the Sub-committees have the task of reviewing the external evaluation process of the Progres-a-Oportunidades Program to review it later, and if applicable, approve it during Committee sessions:

The Technical Committee members approve in general the Terms of Reference presented by the National Coordination Office for the impact external evaluation of 2005 and instruct the National Coordination Office so that through specific meetings with the participation of Sub-committees of the Health and Education components and the National Coordination Office to analyze in detail the activities to prepare and to identify the priorities in the framework of the 2005 impact evaluation agenda (Twenty-eighth Session).

In this way, the duties of Sub-committees are to reach an agreement before or after the Technical Committee sessions on specific topics for presentation of a common proposal by sector.

b) Other coordinating bodies for specific topics

The minutes also showed that on topics where consensus is not achieved, or in the participants' opinion, require more revision, specific coordinating bodies are assigned to discuss those topics. This situation occurred when budget reviews should have been done or when evaluating different proposals to have sufficient elements to make decisions. During the Second Extraordinary Session (2001), the presence of a Taskforce to review the external evaluation of Conprogres-a was mentioned:

...the taskforce has met twice to review the terms of reference proposal presented by Conprogesa...In the meeting held today, the Taskforce reached a consensus in general on the document adopting the recommendations of the sectors, so it considers that the final version can be sent next Thursday for publication in the Federal Official Gazette.

Likewise, the following agreement reached during the Tenth Technical Committee Session evidences the instruction to create a taskforce: "The Technical Committee members instruct Conprogesa so that it creates a sub-taskforce to review and act as a counterpart to the work done by the National Public Health Institute".

c) Coordination among levels of government

The last type of coordination within the subcategory joint decision systems is the one that occurs among different levels of government for the operation of the Program. This type of coordination is achieved through agreements or meetings held with state and municipal representatives. For this type of coordination, the Local Technical Committees perform an important role as the link with the Federal government. During the Fifth Technical Committee Session, with the intention of providing monitoring and follow-up on the program, work was done with these bodies of coordination to collect operative information of the Program:

With the objective of systematizing the levels of non-fulfillment on a bimonthly basis, Conprogesa has sent documents to health and education authorities asking the Local Technical Committees to analyze the causes of low levels of compliance.

Coordination with state and Federal levels has allowed some of the operating problems in the implementation of Progesa-Oportunidades to be monitored and resolved. This was evident in the following agreement:

...the Technical Committee instructs the National Coordination Office to present the evaluation of the operative process of the Program. During the first half of April, the information collected from the 2001 Second Panel of Sentry Points were integrated on a national level, to prepare the corresponding results' report. States have been reviewing these reports in each Local Technical Committee from both from the first and Second

Panel 2001, which include targeting incidents by service unit, which has allowed to take preventive and attention measures (Thirteenth Session).

4.2.2.2 Networks

The networks dimension inside the mandatory advisory bodies, such as the Board and Technical Committee, occurs mainly when participants seek to improve the implementation of a component or when they want to add a new component to the program that arises from the identification of a necessity. In this way, the category type of negotiated agreement occurs through the following subcategories: problem-solving and positive coordination.

The minutes show that the *problem-solving* subcategory occurs mainly in the Board or Technical Committee meetings when the sectors work together to solve operative problems of the Program or to improve the implementation of a component that already exists within the program.

During the Thirteenth Committee Session, a proposal was made on the idea to enrich the Oportunidades Health component, incorporating the beneficiary population to the recently created Seguro Popular (Popular Insurance). Likewise, it was sought to improve “the topic of fulfillment of co-responsibilities and health discussions that are already exhausted”.

Another example of the problem-solving subcategory occurred when the education sector proposed a new model for the recognition of secondary education under a new modality for the population who did not have access to formal education. So, during the Fifteenth Technical Committee Session, the following agreement was reached:

The Technical Committee members instruct Conafe to present a proposal that includes the equivalence of community post- primary in academic levels and the implementation of the co-responsibility for students. Conafe developed an alternative education model called “Rural Community Post-Primary” that was directed to population with high levels of marginalization who lack access to normal education systems as a way to complete their basic education.

The Board and Technical Committee minutes show that positive coordination subcategory occurs mainly during the initial design phase of the program or when a new element is added. During initial Board meetings, the Program showed difficulties in its implementation, which were discussed during the Board to find better ways to operate the Program, which were later given shape in the operating guidelines and rules. During the first Board meeting the Health Sector stated that:

...with the purpose of overcoming this situation, we have thought of a series of strategies to obtain the desired coverage expansion. We have considered mobile units during the first phase. Also, the suitability of using this type of equipment in the next stages of the program is being analyzed with the objective of optimizing existing resources and being able to ensure the desired coverage.

In this phase, the Health Sector coordinated the participation of the Ministry of Health and IMSS to be able to satisfy the needs of the program.

The implementation of new components as a result of the identification of a need involved the participation of different sectors for its design and implementation. During the Fourth Committee Session, the proposal of visual and audio aids for Oportunidades beneficiaries was discussed, in which:

The participants agreed that the project had a very clear objective, which was to support children of Progresá requiring visual aid, to attend to the problem of disabilities and raise the capacity of children with visual and hearing impairments. Six states were selected for a implementing a pilot: Campeche, Chiapas, Chihuahua, Puebla, San Luis Potosí and Tabasco. The objective was to change the perspective from the attention to sickness to the prevention of sickness.

The joint work of the sectors to implement a new component is stated in the following agreement reached in the Seventh Technical Committee Session, in reference to a new Program component called "Jóvenes con Oportunidades" (*Youth with Opportunities*):

The Technical Committee members agree to integrate a new taskforce in charge of defining the operating scheme for high school education. This group must analyze the viability that the beneficiary young adult, who is

in high school, is directly responsible for the certification of his/her attendance to school, to determine and select the place he/she wishes to continue studies, as well as the suitability that he/she directly receives the scholarship. The maximum limit that each family with children in high school can receive and the implications this would have for families with children who leave their home to study in another community must also be analyzed and determined.

Over the course of the Technical Committee Sessions, one can see different elements that were sought for inclusion in the program, and based on joint work of the sectors a decision was made on whether to incorporate them or not. The component of the above example, Jóvenes con Oportunidades, was added to the Program; however, there were elements that despite their analysis, a decision was made against its incorporation into the program. One example of this was that during the Fourteenth Technical Committee Session, when members agreed to review a mechanism to grant scholarships to migrant children. A pilot study was even carried out; however, this project was not materialized.

4.2.2.3 Markets

The markets dimension was not identified in the analysis of the Board and Technical Committee minutes. Normally, coordinating instruments of this dimension are informal and do not involve an exchange among the actors. However, the existing relationship between the Health Sector and IMSS will be analyzed in greater detail in the following chapter, since the minutes showed that although institutional competition led to an improvement of quality services, in reality, the Health Sector was the one that coordinated the offer of health services inside the Program. This contradicts the principle of the markets dimension.

4.2.3 *Strengths and weaknesses of the Progres-a-Oportunidades Program*

Based on the analysis of minutes of both the Board and Technical Committee, two new dimensions were identified: strengths and weaknesses of Oportunidades.

Analysis of the minutes showed that certain topics can be grouped in the following categories: continuity factors, elements that facilitate or promote coordination and problems and weaknesses of Oportunidades

4.2.3.1 Continuity factors

Continuity factors of the Oportunidades program can be classified in internal factors, which are proper to the Program's design and operation, and those that protected the Program but were external factors and which have nothing to do with its conceptual and operative design:

- a) Internal factors
- b) External factors

a) *Internal factors*

The internal factors subcategory is related to the program's conceptual design, the selection process of beneficiaries and the incorporation of evaluation since the beginning of the program.

The beneficiary selection process is identified as a strength of the Program as it is considered to be a transparent procedure since the implementation of Progres-Oportunidades. During the Third Council Session, it was mentioned that: "in all cases, incorporation of families has been done based on individual evaluation and through a community assembly, where in joint agreement with the representatives, selection of beneficiary families is done". In addition, it was said that: "... it must be ensured that identification of beneficiary families is done with methodological rigor."

Once the Program expanded to semi-urban and urban regions, one recurring topic in both coordinating bodies was the need for one single national system for beneficiary selection. In the Thirteenth Technical Committee Session this system was presented "...the new points system, which unlike its predecessor, is a single national

system that uses regional systems which were underused that results in an homogeneous model at the national level”.

Another factor that was identified as a continuity factor considered since the initial design of the Program is the evaluation of Oportunidades. During the Second Council Session it was said that:

...the evaluation aspect is critical for PROGRESA and although from its beginning Program evaluation has been conceptualized, it is the interest of CONPROGRESA to have increasingly better coordination in the evaluation process with different institutions and government offices, with the purpose of preventing duplications.

Another important aspect about the evaluation process is not only that it was done since the beginning but that there was a commitment that evaluation should be done by an external institution “It was also expressed the need to maintain the same selection criteria, emphasizing that the evaluation must be done by a third party, since results obtained by [that] who operates and evaluates are unreliable” (Third Session, Council).

Later, the need to evaluate the program became a requirement established in the Federal Spending Budget, as demonstrated in the minutes of the 2001 Third Extraordinary Session of the Technical Committee, where it was established that:

...compliance would be given to the provisions in article 70 of the 2001 Fiscal Year Federal Spending Budget, which states the Program must be evaluated by academic and research institutions, expressing the importance that academic institutions are both public and private.

b) External factors

The subcategory external factors are factors that helped the Program's permanence but which have nothing to do with its design. The main factor that helped the continuity of the program was the loan agreement signed with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in 2001. During the Eleventh Council Session, the IDB financing proposal was presented, mentioning “the advantages for the country are important, since

new financing outlooks are available, in addition to having permanent technical advising provided by experts on topics that related to the good performance of Progresa”.

After the IDB agreement was signed, it was evident during the Board and Technical Committee meetings, that the international agency had put “locks” on the program to ensure the operation of Oportunidades. So, during the Seventeenth Technical Committee Session:

... stated the concern regarding the Loan Agreement signed with IDB, since a budget ceiling must be presented to ensure the operation of the program, which have to be authorized each year by the Congress. The Health Ministry budgetary ceiling will be deficient, since it is less than in 2002.

4.2.3.2 Elements that facilitate coordination

The minutes showed that within the category *elements that facilitate coordination*, the main factors that have led to Program coordination include:

- a) International recognition
- b) Operation rules

a) *International recognition*

International recognition seeks to identify if the prestige achieved at the international level by the Program Progresa Oportunidades facilitates coordination. In general, the minutes of the Board and Technical Committee showed that as the Program became institutionalized and obtained international recognition, the sectors involved in its operations felt increasingly committed to work in favor of the Program and to make it work better, which led to improvements both its design and operation.

In the Seventh Council Session, one of the participants “said that he was in Dakar a few weeks ago and during the meetings, people said the Program was an example at the international level of what is possible to favor education in poor areas. Likewise, it was mentioned that “the Program has international influence, which means

greater responsibility; there are five countries in Latin America that are considering implementing programs similar to Progresas”.

The Program’s recognition led participating sectors and particularly public officials involved in its operations to feel appreciation for the Program, motivating them to seek better results. During the Twenty-First Committee Session, one participant said:

...an internationally renowned body of researchers has analyzed what we are doing in Mexico with Oportunidades; they have compared it with things other countries are doing or trying to do in other Latin American countries or elsewhere, but basically in Latin America, and which demonstrate the [program’s] innovative, serious, pioneer nature; no one else is doing anything similar that’s even close in size, coordination capacity, and with provable results as what we are doing in Mexico. So, like I said here, I feel proud as a Mexican and as a public official ...

Finally, in the Eighth Council Session, it was said that the Progresas-Oportunidades was mentioned much more frequently “as an example around the world; now the World Bank has promoted it, the IDB is promoting it, everyone wants to support it and everyone wants to finance it...” which finally led to the agreement with IDB and guaranteed its existence.

The operating rules seek to identify if the rules are an important factor to achieve coordination among sectors. Analysis of the minutes showed that thanks to operating rules, the sectors were able to reach agreements. During the Tenth Technical Committee Session, it was stated the existence of rules are those that demand reaching coordination agreements both with state governments and ministries that participate in the program operation at a Federal level: “...it reported that based on the provisions contained in the Operating Rules, the coordinating agreements must be updated with all state governments by participating ministries of the Federal government.”

In addition, the provision contained in the PEF that the Operating Rules of the Oportunidades Program must be authorized by all Technical Committee members obliges all sectors to agree on program operation and implementation, since the rules

grant responsibilities to the sectors that they must fulfill. In this way, the sectors must discuss any change to the program components or the addition of an element, because it must be included in the rules, and as provided in the Twelfth Technical Committee Session: "...the PEF (article 67) specifies that all Technical Committee members must authorize the Rules..."

Finally, the operating rules also offer a guide for state-level coordination based on specific rules, such as the Regulations of the Local Technical Committees, which is stated in the following agreement reached during the Technical Committee's Twelfth Ordinary Session:

After the proposal is presented by the National Coordination Office is reviewed, the Committee members approve including the text contained in point 5.1.1, which states: "With the goal of reaching an agreement among the actors who participate in the Program, Local Technical Committees are created, which operate under the coordination of the corresponding Federal authorities and based on these Rules."

4.2.3.3 Problems with Oportunidades

The dimension problems with Oportunidades seeks to identify, based on an analysis of the Board and Technical Committee minutes, the most recurring problems during the history of the Program's operations. In general, two recurring issues arose through program operations, which include:

- a) Linkage between Oportunidades and other social programs
 - b) Monitoring systems
- a) *Linkage between Oportunidades and other social programs*

The problem of linkages between Oportunidades and other social programs is considered in the category design problems, which seeks to identify aspects that the design of Oportunidades needs to take care of as part of its future challenges. The minutes showed there is the need to link the program with other social programs as part

of a poverty-combating strategy. The Tenth Council Session marked the "need for next year to link Progresá with other Social Programs of the Social Development Sector."

It was also stated during the Technical Committee's Second Extraordinary Session that:

... one cannot expect that a single program will solve such a complex problem as poverty in Mexico, and Progresá should not be meant to solve it because it's only going to focus on the dietary, education and health aspects. For this, strategies that include more political, economic or social instruments must be implemented, and which are targeted on the same regions to enhance the impact on defined areas while operating the best as possible, making rural highways, FONAES (National Fund to Support Solidarity Firms) and the entire package.

The second recurring problem throughout the Board and Technical Committee

minutes is in the subcategory *operating problems*, which seeks to identify problems in the implementation of the Oportunidades program.

One constant sign throughout Board and Technical Committee sessions was the response capacity based on existing monitoring systems. In general, operative monitoring was a recurring topic in the agenda of both the Board and the Technical Committee. During the Eleventh Technical Committee, the taskforce was asked to analyze the:

...operative times and levels for corrections and attention to deficiencies reflected in Sentry Points. Meetings were held based on the results of the first and second panels of 2000 to analyze the problems and define solution strategies. As a result, joint visits with the health sector were made to different states to review the situation of the delivery of the dietary supplement, removals and additions of coverage and quality of service, among the most important aspects. Work with the education sector has been done in particular on the topic of training.

In general, a recurring operating problem was the distribution of the dietary supplement, which was not given a proper solution on time. This was stated during the Twentieth Technical Committee Session:

In this regard, the [...] expressed concern for high percentages of program beneficiaries who do not receive the dietary supplement. For example, in Chiapas, from January to July of this year, more than half of children do not received the dietary supplement; in the state of Coahuila, 53%; in the state of Tlaxcala, 35%; in Jalisco, 43%. It said that this topic

has been reiterated many times and that it has not been resolved. Despite this indication during the Twentieth Session, this topic was mentioned again when stating that "in relation to the information on the distribution of food supplies, which even though they have been a topic of recurring discussion in the Technical Committee for more than two years now and actions have been carried out to try to resolve the problem of distribution, unfortunately good results have not been produced, since there are still a quarter of malnourished children. Half of pregnant women do not receive the dietary supplement.

This is evidence that despite the existence of monitoring systems to improve program operations and with the intention of giving a response to the problems identified on different occasions, these monitoring systems are insufficient.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS

This chapter analyzes the results of both the interviews and minutes of the National Coordination Board and Technical Committee. This chapter is structured in the following sections: the first part analyzes the results to conclude whether the first research assumption is fulfilled. The second part analyzes the second research assumption; however, this part was divided into two sections: the first studied in a general manner the operation of the Oportunidades program and the second identified in detail each instrument used for the coordination of the program based on three coordination mechanisms: hierarchy, networks and markets. The third part presented the dimensions, categories and subcategories that arose based on the analysis but that were not identified a priori, which are the main strengths and weaknesses of the program. Finally, a synthesis of the analysis and the main results was done using as a point of reference the dimensions, categories and subcategories identified a priori versus the results obtained.

5.1 First research assumption: a hierarchical-bureaucratic dominant model of public administration and public management

The first research assumption proposed that the prevailing institutional framework and under which the Human Development Program Oportunidades operates is the hierarchical-bureaucratic model of public administration. Based on the analysis of the interviews and minutes of the National Coordination Board and Technical Committee, we can say that this assumption is confirmed. Below is a comparative analysis of the results, both from the interviews and from the minutes, contrasting the results with what is

established in the theory on dimensions, categories and subcategories, to analyze why we can affirm that the first research assumption is confirmed. We also present a summary chart prior to the analysis with the objective of clarifying the main findings and give structure to the analysis of the data.

Table 5.1 Summary chart of the results of the first assumption a dominant hierarchical-bureaucratic model of public administration and public management

Dimensions	Categories	Subcategories	Where analyzed
Work division based on specialization	Degree of specialization of the agencies/departments	Departments with clearly defined attributions and duties	Interviews
Defined hierarchical structure	Characteristics of work organization	Organizational chart	Interviews Minutes
System of written rules that include the rights and responsibilities of officials	Institutional characteristics	Formal written rules	Interviews Minutes
Written procedures for handling work situations	Rules for conflict resolution and decision-making	Process manuals	Interviews Minutes
Promotion and selection of personnel based on technical skills	Selection and promotion of personnel	Specialized professional career	Interviews
		Member of the elite	Interviews

For the analysis of dimensions, categories and subcategories of the work division based on specialization and promotion and selection of personnel based on technical skills only the results from interviews and contributions of the theory will be taken into consideration since, as it was stated in the results section, both dimensions are absent in the minutes. The reason these dimensions are not analyzed in the minutes from the Board and Technical Committee sessions of the National Coordination Office is because these meetings focus on topics based on the operating nature of the program.

Analysis of the interviews of the dimension work division based on specialization sought to identify if the agencies and positions are based on a defined area of competency and if personnel working in the area is there based on its technical skills and education. The results showed that most people working in the Oportunidades program have a professional degree, and in some cases, post-graduate studies in line with the positions they hold. The only case where this does not occur, a professional experience of more than 15 years in government in areas related to the job position justified the access to the post. Therefore, it can be confirmed that work division is based on specialization. Weber affirms that superiority of bureaucracy resides in “specialized professional knowledge”; in the case of the Oportunidades program, the professions of personnel working in the program are proof of a high degree of specialization.

Likewise, in relation to the subcategory departments with clearly defined attributions and duties that sought to identify if the duties and obligations of the positions are defined in writing. Most of the interviewees confirmed that when they were hired, their attributions and duties were clearly defined; however, in cases where the department or position was of new creation, they were the ones with the job of defining the attributions and duties of the position, which became formalized on in a series of written rules.

The dimension defined hierarchical structure allowed analysis of the results of the interviews and the National Coordination Office Board and Technical Committee minutes. This dimension sought to identify the existence of a rigorous administrative hierarchy with a defined chain of command. The results from the interviews clearly showed that all participants clearly identified their hierarchical superior and the category “characteristics of work organization” showed that the position they were performing was totally regulated by laws and regulations. Finally, there was consensus in affirming that the program has defined chain of command based on an organizational chart.

Weber establishes that one of the basic principles of legal domination with bureaucratic administration is the existence of a rigorous administrative hierarchy defined as: the order of fixed “authorities” with the power of regulation and inspection and the right for the subordinate officials to appeal to their higher authority (Weber et al. 1964,p. 174). In addition to having rigorously set competencies. Both the analysis of the interviews and the minutes show that the Oportunidades program operates under a clearly defined hierarchical structure.

The minutes of the Board and Technical Committee also showed that the program operates based on an organizational chart. The internal regulations define that officials with voice and vote and with the authority for decision-making regarding the program are those with a higher hierarchical level in the organization. They also may appoint an alternate in case of absence but only for an immediately inferior hierarchical level. In the Board, it is clearly specified that public officials who participate as alternates must have the position of under-minister, since participants to the meetings must be the ministers of the same of the Ministries participating in the program.

The dimension “system of written rules” that includes the rights and responsibilities of officials specifies the existence of a clear definition of the rights and

responsibilities of public officials based on the category “institutional characteristics” that identify the existence of rules defining the rights and responsibilities with the subcategory formal written rules. Analysis of the interviews showed that all officials recognized that their positions were governed by the existence of precise rules establishing their rights and responsibilities.

Likewise, the results of the analysis of the minutes from the National Coordination Office Board and Technical Committee showed that one of the duties of these bodies of coordination is to define and review each year the Program’s operating rules. These rules established, among other things, the rights and responsibilities of the officials involved in their operation. In this way, both the analysis of the interviews and the analysis of the minutes confirm the existence of formal rules defining and establishing the boundaries of the rights and responsibilities of public officials who work in Oportunidades.

Analysis of the minutes also showed that not only are public officials clear as to which are their rights and responsibilities, but also members of the sectors that participate in the operation of the program are aware of their duties and their responsibility on the operation of the program. According to Weber (1964), officials must have a clearly defined set of duties and services limited by a distribution of functions; in this way, it is yet again confirmed that in the operation of the Oportunidades Program, the hierarchical-bureaucratic public administration paradigm predominates.

The dimension “written procedures for handling work situations” sought to identify, based on the existence of the category rules for conflict resolution and decision-making, if conflict resolution and decision-making are based on previously established processes. This dimension is based on what Weber (1964) identifies as the “principle for legal domination” in which the administrative principle that will govern is based on written

documents (the files). In this way Weber states that the file and the continued activity of public officials is what constitutes the office.

Analysis of the interviews showed consensus that conflict resolution and decision-making are based on previously established processes. Therefore, different officials involved in program operations confirmed that, if confusion arose based on program operations or the responsibility of each sector, they consulted the established procedural rules to define who does what and who is not negotiable. In the same way, they highlighted the importance of the existence of the subcategory of “process manuals” to define how far responsibility of each sector goes, not only at the Federal level but also at the local level, which facilitates to a greater extent – according to the interviewees – the operation of the program.

Analysis of the minutes also showed the importance of the existence of rules for conflict resolution and specific process manuals for handling labor situations. Analysis of the minutes even allowed the researcher to see how these process manuals were created. The first minutes from the Board and Technical Committee showed that in the beginning, many processes for the implementation of the program were not clearly defined, but as the operation of the program became standardized, these processes were converted into process manuals that facilitated the standard implementation of a national program.

Finally, the dimension “promotion and selection of personnel based on technical skills” sought to identify whether personnel working in the program are professionally trained through successfully performed tests. In this case, only interview results provided elements for the analysis, since this topic was not addressed in National Coordination Office Board and Technical Committee minutes.

The results from the interviews showed that in most cases “selection and promotion of personnel” working in Oportunidades was accomplished based on the type of legal dominance that Weber (1964) proposes: only a person who has demonstrated an adequate technical training is qualified to be a member of the administrative staff of such an organized group, and hence only such persons are eligible for appointment to official positions. In other words, hiring is based on the subcategory “professional career service.” However, the interviews also showed that in positions with a high level of trust, personnel was also hired based on their relationship with the leader based to a greater extent on traditional dominance from the subcategory “member of the elite,” where the administrative staff is hired due to personal relationships of trust with the leader (Weber, 1961). This dimension is the only case where we can clearly identify the presence of another dominance model based on Weber’s typology. In other dimensions, the type of legal domination with bureaucratic administration was heavily predominant, so there are elements to confirm the first assumption on which this research is based: the institutional framework that prevails in the Human Development Program Oportunidades is the hierarchical-bureaucratic model of public administration.

Finally, as part of the analysis, the software “Hyperresearch” was used to confirm that the results of the interviews showed theory saturation on the assumption of a predominantly bureaucratic model of public administration in the Oportunidades Program. This method cannot be applied in the analysis of the Board and Technical Committee minutes, since, despite efforts to identify these elements, the type of documents forced us to analyze what was already written without offering flexibility to propose specific questions, as in the case of interviews. However, analysis of the minutes and of the regulations associated to these bodies of coordination allowed us to appreciate a predominantly bureaucratic management model.

The use of the “Hyperresearch” software allowed us to identify that in 9 of the 10 interviews the five dimensions of the hierarchical-bureaucratic management model were identified. The only exception was the dimension “promotion and selection of personnel based on technical skills” for cases where selection of personnel was the result of the relationship of trust of public officials with the leader. However, the use of the tool led us to conclude that effectively, in most cases, saturation of the theory was achieved.




Figure 5.1 Predominantly hierarchical-bureaucratic management model

5.2 Second research assumption: forms of coordination inside the Human Development Program Oportunidades based on market, network and hierarchy mechanisms

The second research assumption proposed that despite the prevalence of a hierarchical-bureaucratic institutional framework, coordination among actors inside the program occurs through different instruments, both formal and informal, based on markets, network and hierarchy. This section analyzed the results of the interviews and minutes on the National Coordination Office Board and Technical Committee with the purpose of identifying how coordination inside the Oportunidades Program occurs and

based on which instruments. We sought to identify how, despite the program operating under a hierarchical-bureaucratic management model, coordination instruments can be based either on market, network or hierarchy mechanisms.

Given the complexity of the analysis, this section will be organized into two parts: the first will analyze in an overall manner the operation of the Oportunidades Program from its initial design until the consolidation phase to be able to offer a general view of the use of coordination instruments based primarily on hierarchy and networks. However, it will not study in detail each instrument used for the coordination of the program. The second part will identify, independently of the phase in which the program was, the coordination instruments used based on the three macro-mechanisms identified to achieve coordination: in first place, hierarchy as a predominant mechanism and later networks and markets.

5.2.1 General Outlook of the operation of the Oportunidades Program

The Oportunidades Program began operating in 1997 and was the result of an inter-ministerial agreement among the government offices that participated in its operation: the ministries of Social Development, Public Education, Finance and Health, the Conapo and IMSS. Before the official launch of the program, in 1995, a pilot was implemented in the state of Campeche under the name Basic Dietary Support for the Wellbeing of the Family. The goal was to evaluate the operation of the program. The results of the pilot and the work of the agencies that participated in its operation led to the joint design of the Oportunidades program by the participating government departments and agencies. This initial design, in the words of the actors involved in this phase, led to the creation of an horizontal program that cut through the areas of competency of the government agencies and departments participating in its operation.

The results of the interviews showed that in the initial design phase of the Oportunidades Program, the coordination mechanism among the actors were *networks*, since negotiations occurred from voluntary and cooperative actions among the actors, resulting in a horizontal program that depended on a greater extent on participants' desire to negotiate. These prior meetings occurred informally and resulted in the program design that set the basis for its initial implementation. The primary coordination mechanism was hierarchy with the creation of specific rules and guidelines of operation; in the words of interviewee E08:

So what was sought with the rules – that's why they are so extensive – was to try to reduce as much as possible the conflict *ex post* by setting the rules *ex ante*. Instead of leaving a large amount of details on operations and mechanics, they were discussed over time and were resolved with administrative instruments later on, which tried to have just one discussion and give shape to the rules then. The rules of the game were set *ex ante* to reduce the conflict.

The same interviewee said that during this phase of program design meetings, there was “much involvement from different parties but it was informal.” The result of this coordination work, before the initial implementation of the program, was the creation of operation guidelines and rules as well as coordination structures for its operation. Based on this previous work, instruments were created based on the mechanism of hierarchy for the operation of Oportunidades, such as: the National Coordination Office, the National Coordination Office Board, and the general operation guidelines.

The program's implementation was based to a greater extent on the hierarchy mechanism for its initial operation according to what was defined in the design phase. From this point, the program began to operate on two levels: on the one hand, coordination that occurred at the Federal level, among the government offices participating in the operation of the program. Specifically inside the National Coordination Office Board and in the National Coordination Office itself where interaction among the

actors was based to a greater extent on network instruments to define and solve operative and implementation problems that occurred at the beginning of the program but with organizational structures based on hierarchy to achieve coordination. Therefore, when consensus could not be reached inside the coordination bodies, they turned to specifically designed mechanisms to resolve disagreements and achieve consensus. The clearest example of this type of instruments was decision making by majority of vote in case consensus was not reached.

On the other hand, since the implementation program, specifically the offering of education and health services, depended on the states and municipalities the predominant coordination mechanism between the local and the Federal level was hierarchy. Based on the analysis of Board and Technical Committee minutes, it is clear that the objective was to create a homogeneous, national-level program that would apply the same rules of operation with the same selection and exception criteria in all cases, so the states and municipalities only had to abide by the rules and formats for the implementation and operation of the program and, in case operating problems arose, escalate the information to competent authorities for decision-making.

Figure 5.2 on the on the coordination mechanisms inside the Oportunidades Program shows how in the design phase coordination by networks predominated; later, in each implementation phase of the program, coordination became more and more hierarchical. However, coordination meetings of the National Coordination Office Board and later the Technical Committee since its creation in 1999, the internal predominant coordination instruments were based to a greater extent on networks, although their very existence was based to a greater extent on hierarchical coordination instruments.

The results from interviews and minutes showed that interaction inside the Board and Technical Committee always had the basic elements for coordination by networks:

trust among actors, frequent meetings, shared information and communication among participants. Frequency of meetings, mainly in Technical Committee sessions, made participants clearly aware of what their duties were and what the program objectives were. Likewise, the results obtained from the program over time caused that public officials who participated in its operation to have appreciation for Oportunidades; this led that the interaction became increasingly based on a relationship by networks. However, the ultimate purpose was to generate instruments for its implementation based mainly on hierarchy mechanisms.

Finally, a repeated factor in the interviews and which was confirmed during the analysis of the minutes was that another element that facilitated the program's operation and its coordination was the hierarchical level of public officials who participated in meetings, both of the Board and the Technical Committee, since they had the decision-making power to make necessary modifications to the program. In addition, the horizontal design of Oportunidades, with all officials having the same hierarchical level, forced actors to coordinate with each other and not to seek imposing their authority on one another. In most cases, interaction occurred based on networks, unlike the type of coordination that existed between the Federal level and the state and municipal levels, which, as shown in Figure 5.2, was based to greater extent on hierarchy.




Figure 5.2 Coordination mechanisms inside the Oportunidades Program

5.2.2 Identification of macro-mechanisms: hierarchy, networks and markets

This section applies the results of the interviews and minutes of meetings to analyze and identify the instruments used for program coordination based on markets, networks and hierarchy. The instruments based on hierarchy were identified first, followed by analysis of networks and markets. With the goal of facilitating reading and to give structure to the each section, a summary chart is presented at the beginning of each macro-mechanism detailing what was found in the results, followed by the analysis.

5.2.2.1 Hierarchy

The *hierarchy* dimension is based on the idea of using authority and power to achieve coordination among actors. Both in the case of interviews and in minutes of the Board and Technical Committee, hierarchy was the predominant macro-mechanism to achieve coordination among the sectors for the operation of the program. The

subcategories identified through which coordination by hierarchy are achieved include: authority/subordination; mandatory negotiations, and joint decision-making systems.

Below is a summary chart of this macro mechanism

Table 5.2 Summary chart of Hierarchy Dimension

Dimension	Categories	Subcategories	Instruments	Source
Hierarchy	Type of hierarchy interaction	Authority/ subordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Objectives, goals and services clearly defined by laws and regulations Established operating processes leading to creation of routines Allocated budgets Centralized information systems Express order from a higher authority 	Interviews Minutes
		Mandatory negotiations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordination unit Mandatory advisory groups 	Interviews Minutes
		Joint decision-making systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inter-sectorial coordination Coordination among levels of government 	Interviews Minutes
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bodies of coordination for specific topics 	Minutes

Subcategory: authority/subordination

The subcategory authority/subordination is based on the use of organizational structure in the organization's chain of command based on standards, regulations and procedures to achieve coordination. The results of interviews and minutes of the Board and Technical Committee show that this type of coordination is frequently used in daily program operations. In general, instruments used to achieve coordination within the authority/subordination category can be grouped in the following manner:

- a) Objectives, goals and services clearly defined from laws and regulations
- b) Established operating processes leading to creation of routines
- c) Allocated budgets
- d) Centralized information systems
- e) Express orders from a higher authority

a) Clearly defined objectives, goals and services

The results from interviews and minutes showed consensus when confirming that sectors clearly know what their job is, thanks to the existence of specific laws and regulations that detail their participation in the operation of the program. Interview results showed that participants identified the rules as a key factor for program coordination, as well as the existence of a clear objective that guides the actions of different sectors. The existence of clearly defined objectives, goals and services were helpful in the case of a change in the administration or personnel working in the program. The new public officials only had to consult the administrative chart to see "what they have to do." However, although this was an aspect generally considered to be positive, it was also mentioned that although all sectors did what they were supposed to do, this did not guarantee that the program operated at its maximum capacity. In other words, based on

the rules, the minimum requirements are met for program operation, but that does not guarantee fulfillment of the program's real potential.

This denotes what Scharpf (1997) identified as the problem of actors' motivation within the hierarchical model, since individual interest and lack of information for decision-making limits the effectiveness of administration by hierarchy. This was stated when identifying the problem of quality in the services of education and health, since one of the recurring issues in interviews and minutes was the indication of the need of "selling better the program to states and municipalities" for its better application in the communities. The results from the minutes showed that a recurring topic was quality, due to the lack of motivation of the doctors, professors and nurses to offer good services to the beneficiaries of the program. This shows that although administration by hierarchy, given its inherent limitations, is efficient in reducing transaction costs of joint action, it does not achieve maximization wellbeing.

b) Established operating processes leading to creation of routines

Results from interviews and minutes showed that other instruments used within the subcategory authority/subordination were operating processes that led to the creation of routines. The existence of defined operating processes provides certainty to actors involved in program operations on how to do things. One of the interviewees even described the program's operations as a permanent cycle where everything has to happen just on time or "the machine stops" (E07).

Likewise, the frequency with which processes are carried out also facilitates coordination. Therefore, each year the budget process begins based on the coverage goals to validate the services provision with the sectors and finally operate the program with the processes established for each implementation phase. Results from minutes showed these processes were documented throughout program operation; in other

words, based on daily operations and by resolving the operating problems that occurred, the processes were formally defined or routines were created on how to do things.

This documentation and formalization of processes and the creation of routines generated stability in program operations. North (2006) confirms that stability in organizations is achieved through the existence of formal rules in a hierarchy and informal limitations that have become part of habitual behavior. We can say that the stability of the Oportunidades Program is reached through this combination of rules and formal processes of operations, as well as informal operation routines that have become part of daily program operations. However, as North (2006) also establishes, the fact that program operations are stable does not mean that program functioning is efficient; it simply means that stability and constancy have been achieved. At the same time, knowledge created by the routines reduces uncertainty and facilitate coordination.

c) Allocated budgets

An important instrument of coordination based on the subcategory “authority/subordination” that was reiterated, both in results from interviews and minutes, was budget allocation specific to sectors for the program operation. The budget narrative has a clause that establishes that it cannot be used for anything else that is not for the Oportunidades Program. The limitation imposed for the use of the budget was specified on several occasions by the interviewees as a factor that protects the operation of the program and which prevents, to a certain extent, conflicts among sectors, in addition to facilitating program implementation. Interviewee E03 said that if there are budget resources for the program operation there was no problem in implementing Oportunidades.

Results from Board and Technical Committee minutes also showed that the allocated budget forced sectors to discuss on how resources from economies in the

exercise of expenses would be used. In other words, the sector by itself cannot decide on how to use the resources; this had to be discussed in Technical Committee sessions, reaching agreements with the other sectors, and requesting authorization from the Ministry of Finance through intermediation of the National Coordination Office. This denotes that the use of budgets was a strongly hierarchical coordination instrument forcing sectors to agree on how and on what to use resources. In addition, another part was the responsibility of sectors to report on the exercise of spending in Technical Committee and the Board meetings, and if sub-exercise occurred, questions were asked on why budgets were not being used. In the same way, in the case of a budget deficit, work meetings were scheduled that involved the sector, the National Coordination Office and the Ministry of Finance to define what to do.

The importance of budget allocation for the Oportunidades program lay, not only in each sector having a specific budget for the exclusive operation of Oportunidades, but also in compelling the sectors to coordinate with each other on budget matters.

d) Centralized information systems

The results from the interviews showed consensus that another factor that helped coordination of the Oportunidades Program was the existence of centralized information systems allowing sectors to have information regarding the operation of the program. Other comments were that the availability of information facilitated meetings of both the Board and Technical Committee, which facilitated decision-making.

The availability and existence of shared information systems, at the Federal level, for the operation of the program helped prevent what Scharpf (1997) identified as the information problem in an administration by hierarchy. The results from the minutes showed that the responsibility for the development of information systems, so that information was available to the sectors, was of the National Coordination Office. The

National Coordination worked with the state and municipal levels to gather information on specific indicators to later share them with the sectors. At the beginning, this information was shared in print but later information systems were developed and available on the Internet, which facilitated the access to the information.

Scharpf (1997) proposes that one of the primary limitations of the administration by hierarchy is the available information to higher levels of the organization and that these tend to make decisions based on asymmetrical information. However, he also mentions that in the case of the government, if the existing inter-dependencies inside the organization, whether they are pooled, sequential or reciprocal, are more important than exterior interactions, this would allow structuring these interactions within the units and subunits of the organizations.

Going back to the literature review chapter, it defined the three types of inter dependencies among organizations. According to Mulford and Rogers (1982) these are: pooled, where each organization or unit contributes to the final objective in the public sector; sequential, when the outputs of an organization serve as inputs of another, and reciprocal, when the outputs of each unit are inputs for others.

In the case of the Oportunidades program, the interactions which occur within the program are primarily sequential; that is to say, the outputs of one organization or unit serve as the inputs of another. According to Scharpf (1997), planning and operational design are needed in the beginning, but once processes are defined, the need for intervention is greatly reduced. In the case of reciprocal interaction, which occurs in the lower levels of the organization, the program has efficient information systems which allow information to reach the upper levels and the coordination bodies which are designed for problem-solving. In this way, the problem of information within the administration by hierarchy is minimized at Oportunidades.

e) Express orders from a higher authority

The last instrument identified within the authority/subordination subcategory is that of express orders from a higher authority. Both the results of the interviews and the analysis of the Board and Technical Committee minutes show that these orders are based on the use of the organizational structure and the chain of command for the incorporation of new elements into the program. The use of this instrument indicates the use of the hierarchy as defined by Alexander (1995), where express orders, in this case from the President, limit the decisions of organizations and make them take actions that otherwise they would not have been taken.

The results of the interviews show that different elements were added to Oportunidades due to direct instructions from the President, and that this had to be done even though it was neither based on an identified need of the beneficiary population nor on the result of an assessment of the components of the program. Consequently, some of these components were eliminated shortly after being implemented due to having little or no impact. Some interviewees agreed in pointing out that many of these elements were added to the program due to political pressure.

The results from the minutes show the way in which sectors, involved in the operation of the program, were informed that they needed to add a new component or element to the program by presidential instruction. The minutes also reveal that another presidential order was the annual coverage target of the program, which led, on some occasions, to an accelerated growth of Oportunidades and as a consequence to recurring operational problems due to lack of capacity. Nevertheless, in most cases the existing coordination structures within the program allowed the operation to continue in such a way that problems could be resolved without risking the sustainability of the program.

Subcategory: mandatory negotiations

The subcategory “mandatory negotiation of the dimension of hierarchy” seeks to identify intentional structures created to manage negotiations between a set of formally established actors. These actors have agreed to respect certain positions of interest in order to attain their objectives and to follow certain interaction processes. The instruments identified within this subcategory are: coordination units -- in this case the creation of the National Coordination Office of Oportunidades and the mandatory advisory groups, such as the National Coordination Office Board and Technical Committee.

a) Coordination Units

b) Mandatory advisory groups

a) Coordination Units

Coordination units are identified as those entities that were intentionally created with the objective of monitoring and coordinating horizontal policies in an inter-organizational structure. The coordinating power of this body resides in laws and specific regulations and their final goal is to facilitate, monitor and control the implementation of a policy (Bouckaert et al., 2010).

The results of the interviews show that the creation of the National Coordination Office, whose objective was to coordinate the implementation of the Oportunidades program, was an innovation for Mexican social policy. In addition, interviewees emphasized that an important factor was that the Coordination Office exclusively dealt with administrative and coordination activities since it was not responsible for providing services to the beneficiaries. This was considered key factor to be able to achieve this coordination among the sectors, which did have a role in the provision of services. The National Coordination Office acts as a facilitator so that the other groups involved in the

implementation of the program can do their part. The results from the minutes even show that the National Coordination Office is the organization responsible for providing formats, information, setting budgets in coordination with other entities, and the selection of beneficiaries - that is to say, all the work behind the operation of the program besides providing services to the final beneficiary.

Nevertheless, Bouckaert et al (2010) establish that coordination bodies should have a higher hierarchical level, in the case of Mexico, the National Coordination Office would depend directly from the Presidential Office. But this is not the case with Oportunidades. The National Coordination Office is a decentralized organ of the Ministry of Social Development with technical autonomy, and whose objective is to formulate, coordinate, and evaluate the execution of the program. The results of the interviews show that one of the weaknesses of this coordination body is that it is at the same hierarchical level of the other entities that it needs to coordinate; and one of its greatest challenges is achieving the will of the other sectors to cooperate.

The results of the minutes also showed that the work of the National Coordination body is facilitating the implementation of the program, being in charge of the available information systems, the annual preparation of budgets, and monitoring and follow-up of operational and implementation problems. Furthermore, it is clearly shown that one of its main functions is to settle disputes between the sectors involved in the operation of the program.

b) Mandatory advisory groups

The results of the interviews show that both the Board and the Technical Committee were created in order to monitor the program, define operational guidelines, and take decisions in agreement with the groups involved in the operation of the program. In addition, the interviewees showed consensus that meetings of both

coordination bodies were, in general, very productive and that the sectors involved had the willingness to work. The elements identified for this type of meetings were the availability of information and the objectivity of the sessions centering the discussion on specific issues such as the addition of a new component, the program's results and challenges. It was also pointed out that the participants had the willingness to make the program work.

Bouckaert et al (2010) identify two types of inter-organizational groups as instruments of coordination: on the one hand, bodies for negotiation or consultation, and on the other hand groups for collective decision-making. The main difference between these two is in the process of decision-making, the compulsory participation, and most importantly the binding nature of the agreements reached. Both the Board and the Technical Committee function as entities for collective decision-making, given that the agreements that they reach are binding. In addition, the same author states that decision-making groups facilitate the work process and joint planning since actors are forced to reach agreements.

In this respect, the instrument of "mandatory advisory groups" is classified as collective decision-making by groups as defined by Bouckaert et al (2010), since both have established processes for decision-making and furthermore their decisions are binding on their participants. The results from the minutes show that these bodies monitor the operation of the program and also look to resolve operational problems. Another basic function is to review and update annually the program's rules of operation to include added components and update the transfer amounts of the program components to the beneficiary families. Both coordinating bodies have internal operational procedures which detail the process of joint decision-making - consensus is sought at first, and if it is not possible to reach consensus, decisions are made by majority vote.

Subcategory: joint decision systems

The last subcategory within the hierarchical dimension is that of “joint decision systems,” which seek to identify groups of actors where parties are physically or legally inhibited from achieving their goals through unilateral action and in which joint action depends on unanimous action from all parties. Although these coordination bodies have similar characteristics to mandatory consultation groups, the main difference is that in mandatory consultation groups, each group does what they are supposed to do and their operation does not depend on the actions of others. In addition, the indicators of each group are evaluated individually, so the health sector could receive a good evaluation while education not, and vice versa. In this case, joint decision systems are made up of the following: a) groups created for the intra-sectorial coordination of the program at a Federal level, and b) groups created for the coordination between levels of government; within the Oportunidades program these groups are the State Technical Committees.

The results of the interviews showed the existence of both systems of joint decision. However, the results of the minutes added a new coordination body, which are c) ad hoc groups formed in the Board and Technical Committee meetings with the objective of resolving specific problems that remained without resolution in the meetings. Thus, if the health sector presented a problem and consensus was not reached or a solution was not found, they were instructed to form a specific taskforce with the groups involved with the problem in order to find a solution, which should be presented to the next meeting of the Board or Technical Committee.

a) Intra-sectorial Coordination

The results of the interviews show the existence of intra-sectorial coordination bodies so that the departments that make up a sector can reach an agreement before the meetings of the Board and Technical Committee and have a common position on specific

topics. Thus the education sector, for example, formed an education subcommittee which incorporated the Undersecretary of Basic Education, the Undersecretary of Secondary and Higher Education, the CONAFE, and even the INEA in order to reach an agreement on educational issues related to the operation of the program and have a unified voice before the mandatory consultation groups.

The basic difference between these coordination bodies and the mandatory consultation groups is that in this case, all of them are interdependent in providing educational services to the beneficiaries. In the same way, the health sector to be able to offer services to all the beneficiaries of Oportunidades and because they did not have enough capacity they request the participation of IMSS-Oportunidades and the IMSS Obligatory System, in order to fully offer program coverage. Nevertheless, as was pointed out in several meetings of the Technical Committee, even though three different institutions offer the service, its indicators are reported in an aggregate manner without differentiating which beneficiaries were seen by which institution. Because of this, each sector must be coordinated within in order to offer education and health services since, the institutions conforming each sector, depend on each other to meet the goals established in the program.

The results from the meetings show that prior to the meetings of the Technical Committee, the issues to be discussed in the session are sent out to the sector's subcommittees so it can be evaluated and analyzed separately. The subcommittees even analyze, prior to the meetings, the modifications to the program's rules of operation and the external evaluation methodology and if there are no objections within the Technical Committee, they are approved and then sent for review to the Board. The results of the interviews show that the decisions within these intra-sectorial coordination bodies are made by consensus.

b) Coordination among levels of government

The results of the interviews show that coordination between levels of government principally occurs through the State Technical Committees, which are the ones that give follow up for the program at the state level and act as the link with the National Coordination Office. These coordination bodies base their operation on detailed internal rules, as there was a need to precisely delimit what their function was. One of the interviewees even commented that this need arose "so that no one even think in a State Technical Committee to invent a new program," and given that implementation occurs at a local level, the function of the Local Technical Committees was crucial for the smooth functioning of the program.

The results of the minutes show that the Local Technical Committees worked to provide information requested at a Federal level, i.e. by the National Coordination group of Oportunidades. Through them, solutions to operational programs were effectively channeled, thanks to the program's key performance indicators. Decisions within these coordination bodies are made by consensus, but if consensus cannot be reached, the matter is put to a vote under the condition that there is enough attendance for a quorum, and in the event of a tie, the State Technical Committee Chairman acts as a tie-breaker. Finally, with the aim of maintaining a voting balance between groups, the health sector and the educational sector can cast a maximum of two votes per sector.

Scharpf (1997) establishes that in this type of coordinating body, decisions are binding and can only be modified by the agreement of all parties. The internal rules for the functioning of the Local Technical Committees states "the agreements of the Committee will have a solving character, being binding on members to deal with and report on matters in which they have made commitments" (DOF, July 2008). Therefore, coordination between government levels is based on what Scharpf (1997) defines as

"joint decision systems," since actors are interdependent and a decision-making process exist based on consensus or majority vote, and the agreements reached are binding on all parties.

c) Coordination bodies for specific issues.

Finally, another instrument, identified through the analysis of the minutes, in the mandatory consultation group subcategory was the existence of specific, ad hoc coordination bodies for analyzing issues in greater detail. When Technical Committee participants, for reasons of time or lack of consensus, think they require a more detailed analysis. The results of the minutes from the Technical Committee show that inter-sectorial taskforces are formed in order to discuss or review specific issues that could not be analyzed in detail within the Technical Committee. These groups worked on proposals that were approved by consensus within the coordination bodies so that they could be later presented to the Technical Committee and, if there were no objections, be approved. Nevertheless, although numerous mentions of these ad hoc coordination groups created during Technical Committee meetings, there was very little information available about their inner functioning and their decision-making processes. The minutes of the Technical Committee show that some of the issues which led to the creation of coordination bodies for specific issues were: external evaluation of the program, budget issues per sector, and selection of key performance indicators.

5.2.2.3 Networks

The dimension of networks sought to identify instruments of coordination based on voluntary and cooperative actions between organizations (Bouckaert et al., 2010). Coordination occurs horizontally and depends on negotiation between participants and is based on mutual trust and goodwill that develops over time from repeated interactions. There is the need to share information between actors in order to obtain coordination and

consistency. Below is a table that summarizes the main results based on the analysis of the interviews and minutes:

Table 5.3 Summary chart of Network Dimension

Dimensions	Categories	Subcategories	Instruments	Source
Networks	Type of agreement negotiated between the actors	Problem Solving	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interaction within the mandatory advisory bodies 	Interviews Minutes
		Positive coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interaction during the design phase of the program Interaction within the mandatory advisory bodies 	Interviews Minutes

As mentioned in the literature review chapter, a definition of networks is more or less stable patterns of cooperative interactions between interdependent actors on specific issues of policy or administration (Bouckaert et al, 2010). Interactions occur horizontally and are largely based on negotiation, resource sharing, and mutual cooperation (Bouckaert et al, 2010).

Coordination by networks in Oportunidades occurs within a hierarchical administrative structure. This type of coordination mainly occurs in the relationships between participants in the Technical Committee meetings and to a lesser extent in the Board meetings. Even though the structures in which the actors meet are hierarchical, the form of coordination that predominates on certain issues occurs through networks due to the characteristics with which negotiation is carried out. In addition, as is established by Bouckaert et al (2010), the instruments of coordination are not decisive

but depend also on the type of interactions between actors, and can be predominantly based on the mechanisms of market, networks, or hierarchy.

Some of the elements in the interaction of the actors within these coordination bodies are based on network instruments. This is due to the existence of goodwill and mutual trust between actors and because of repeated interactions. Therefore, the category of type of negotiated agreement aims to identify if losses of well-being can be avoided through the negotiation and distribution of these losses. The results of the interviews and the minutes show that in the operation of Oportunidades, problem-solving occurs within the Technical Committee as much as within the Board in certain topics where participants seek a better way of doing things. Positive coordination occurred primarily in the design phase of the program and also occurs in the Technical Committee meetings, although much less frequently due to high transaction costs and the assigned nature of the budget, which inhibits the flexibility of sectors to add new components into the program.

Subcategory: Problem Solving

The subcategory of problem-solving seeks to identify those transactions where the design of public policy is under discussion. The principal objective is to create value through the joint creation of better solutions. In this type of negotiation the distribution issue is already settled and parties only seek the best solution for their interests. In this case, the costs are already distributed among the actors and cannot be modified, only the design of the policy, which is why the negotiations focus on how to make the program work better.

The results of the interviews show that after several years of operation, the Oportunidades program generated goodwill towards the continued existence and smooth operation of the program, and because of this there was interest in the good functioning

of the program by the sectors who participated in its implementation. There was consensus on the part of those interviewed in pointing out that sectors, on some occasions, not only did what they were supposed to do but also sought to merge with the program in order to enhance results of both for their sector as well as for the program. Also, if there was the possibility to improve the operation of the program by finding new ways of doing things, sectors proposed alternatives in Technical Committee meetings and later in the Board so that they could be evaluated. In the case that they would effectively improve the operation, they were approved in order to provide better services to the beneficiaries.

Another important factor shown in the results of the interviews was the importance of information sharing among sectors, not just related to the operation of Oportunidades, but also information about their sector to be able to find connections, fill in coverage gaps, and avoid redundancy. Scharpf (1997) establishes that one of the bases of problem-solving is communication and availability to discuss or evaluate possible solutions. He also notes finding better solutions depends on the will, good communication and mutual trust between actors. The results from the minutes coincide in indicating that the groups have the willingness to solve problems and seek alternatives to improve the operation of the program. The minutes show that improvements to the program came from the interest of actors in improving or easing the functioning of the program for its beneficiaries.

Subcategory: Positive Coordination

The positive coordination subcategory sought to identify when actors negotiate issues of design and implementation. This subcategory has very high transaction costs that increase along with the number of participants in the negotiation. The results of the interviews showed that this type of negotiation mainly occurred in the design phase of the

Oportunidades program and with informal forms of coordination where meeting minutes were not kept.

Scharpf (1997) identified positive coordination in order to describe taskforces of inter-ministerial nature that were created to solve problems that affected different jurisdictions or departments with the aim of developing innovative solutions that were acceptable for everyone in the areas involved. This was the case during the design phase of the Oportunidades program; the results of the interviews and the minutes show that at the beginning, during the design phase, negotiation and convincing all the sectors involved of a new social policy model that had never been attempted in Mexico took a lot of time. The interviews also show that the academic background and the theoretical support of the program were an important element that involved and added the sectors. Nevertheless, as Scharpf (1997) also establishes, that in this type of negotiation transaction costs are very high and this is shown in the time that the design of the program took. In the words of one of the interviewees, "Oportunidades was a concept that was discussed and worked on for years..."

Although positive coordination was much less common once the program was designed and an operational structure was defined; the results of the interviews and the minutes also show that those elements that were added to the program thanks to the identification of a need or by the proposal from one of the sector, their design and implementation were negotiated before their implementation. This includes budgetary issues, its implementation in the localities and the definition of the rules of operation. This phase is also a long process of discussion and analysis between sectors about budget calculation and what participants are supposed to do. Nevertheless, being part of a coordination body with well-defined processes for decision-making facilitates the achieving consensus. As Scharpf (1997) also establishes, the institutional framework

where negotiation takes place makes a great difference in facilitating or hindering positive coordination.

5.2.2.3 Markets

The market dimension identifies those instruments of coordination based on the principles of the market to equilibrate supply and demand that are based on the existence of a legal framework to regulate exchanges between buyers and sellers. The exchange happens only in the final product (implementation) and there is no necessity for formal links among participants (in this case those who supply services). Below is a table that summarizes the market dimension, based on the analysis of interviews and minutes:

Table 5.4 Summary chart of Market Dimension

Dimension	Category	Subcategory	Instruments	Source
Markets	Type of unilateral action	Negative coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incentives for generating competition between the suppliers of services 	Interviews Minutes

The category of unilateral action sought to identify if the actors do not cooperate in the design phase of public policy and only compete or negotiate for the final product in the implementation phase, which leads to losses of well-being. Thus, within the category of unilateral action, the subcategory of negative coordination identifies the existence of a regulatory framework that imposes limits on the actors to not harm each other.

Bouckaert et al (2010) establish that market-based instruments can be used for the coordination of the public sector where the main function of the government is to regulate the market. Given that markets are unpredictable, a central authority should

structure incentives in order to produce the outcomes desired by the government. Thus, market-based mechanisms within the public sector can take various forms: regulated quasi-markets and economic incentives so that actors coordinate themselves and improve their collective performance.

Subcategory: negative coordination

The results of the interviews show that in the operation of the Oportunidades program, the only market-based instrument for the coordination of public sector units is negative coordination. However, it is important to clarify that even though they are classified as markets, they do not have all the elements established in the theory to be considered pure market instruments.

The results of the interviews show that within the health sector, the relationship between the Ministry of Health and the IMSS Obligatory System is coordinated by market mechanisms. Once Oportunidades expanded its coverage to the urban sector, the Ministry of Health could not cover the demand for services and requested the help of the IMSS Obligatory System to cover those families who could not be directly attended by the health sector. This led to an internal competition between the two institutions, mainly for resources and quality of services, since even though IMSS provided the service, the cost had to be covered by the budget assigned to the Ministry of Health for the operation of the Oportunidades program. This meant that the Ministry of Health had to pay the IMSS Obligatory System for each family they took care of. The results from the minutes show that the cost per family of the supply of services by IMSS was more than twice what it cost to the health sector, which gave an incentive to the Ministry of Health to improve their coverage in order to reduce the participation of the IMSS Obligatory System to the minimum.

The interviews show that the institutional competition which was generated by introducing a third party for supplying health services led to two things: an improvement in the quality of services and an increase in coverage by the Health Ministry in order to lower their costs. Bouckaert et al (2010) establish that in a regulated market the government must assure competition between service providers and the freedom for the users to choose their service provider. This last part is not fulfilled by the Oportunidades program, and even though the issue was raised in meetings of the Technical Committee; in the end users were not given the possibility to choose their provider due to the fear of saturating some of the providers (especially IMSS) and because of the difference in the costs of attention per family between one provider and another. Nevertheless, the results of this analysis consider that it does have enough elements from the mechanisms of the market to consider that this relationship was based, during the participation of the IMSS Mandatory System, in market instruments which at the end led to an improvement in the quality of services and better coverage by the Ministry of Health. In this way it coincides with what the theory establishes in regards to creating the incentives to achieve the result the government wants, in this case was to force the Ministry of Health to increase their coverage in urban areas.

Hyper-research software was used to confirm the analysis of the results. The use of the software to analyze the interviews confirmed that in 10 cases the participants confirmed the existence of mechanisms based on hierarchy and networks for the coordination of the Oportunidades program. However, only five of the interviewees could confirm the existence of market-based mechanisms for the coordination of the program.

In the case of the analysis of the minutes, given the constraints of analyzing the data and information without being able to ask questions about what has already been written, the simultaneous presence of hierarchical and network mechanisms could be

confirmed in 30 of the 59 cases. Market-based mechanisms could only be identified in 12 of the 59 minutes as part of the coordination of Oportunidades. Even though the identification of market-based mechanisms had been more limited since the beginning of the analysis, they were included in the results because in spite of being mentioned much less frequently than hierarchical or network mechanisms, they have still been considered to be an important element in the coordination of the program - mainly in the supply of health services, and that they furthermore had an important impact in the improvement of the quality of these services.

Finally, we can also confirm theory saturation of the second assumption of this research that established that the coordination between actors within the Program occurred by means of various instruments, formal and informal, which included market-based, network, and hierarchical mechanisms.

5.3 Main strengths and weaknesses of the Oportunidades Program

The last part of the analysis identifies the main strengths and weaknesses of the Progres-Oportunidades program. The results of the interviews and the minutes gave important elements that led to the creation of the following dimensions: strengths of Oportunidades and weaknesses of Oportunidades

5.3.1 Strengths of Oportunidades

The aspect of the Strengths of Oportunidades seeks to identify those elements that have helped its permanence despite the change of government. The category of factors of continuity identifies those characteristics of the Oportunidades program that have favored its continuity. Both the results of the interviews and the minutes show that these factors can be classified in the subcategories of external and internal factors. Below is a table summarizing the results of the analysis of the strengths of Oportunidades:

Table 5.5 Summary of the Strengths of Oportunidades

Dimension	Category	Subcategory	Instruments	Source
Strengths of Oportunidades	Continuity Factors	Internal Factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Beneficiary Selection Process 	Interviews
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assessment of External Bodies 	Minutes
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Program Coverage 	Interviews	
	Continuity Factors	External Factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inter-American Development Bank Loans 	Interviews
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Earmarks in the Federal Spending Budget 	Minutes
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Goodwill of civil servants toward the Program 	Interviews	
	Elements that Facilitate	Operating Elements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Adequate Staff Sufficient Budget 	Interviews
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rules of Operation 			Minutes	
Coordination	Elements of Results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> International recognition 	Minutes	

5.3.1.1 Continuity Factors

Subcategory Internal Factors

The subcategory internal factors identifies elements of the program design that have led to its institutionalization through the years it has been in operation. The results

of the interviews and minutes show consensus in identifying the beneficiary selection process as one of the factors that has allowed the permanence of the program. The interviewees agreed in identifying the transparency of the process for the selection of beneficiaries protected the program from politically motivated attacks. Also, the results of the minutes show that within the meetings of the Board and the Technical Committee, one of the recurring subjects was the beneficiary selection process and, as the program expanded its coverage, the process was refined and adapted to only have a single national system for beneficiary selection in agreement with all the sectors participating in the operation of the program.

The results of the interviews and minutes also show consensus in identifying evaluation by external institutions as another factor for the continuity of the program. The interviews showed that the aspect of the evaluation of the program was thought since its initial design to be a key factor for the permanence of the program. Periodic evaluations of the impact of the program allowed Oportunidades to show that the program was achieving its objectives as well as providing elements to improve its operation. The results of the minutes also show that evaluations were an essential factor of the program and later they became a requirement of the Federal Spending Budget for the continuation of the program.

Finally, the results of the interviews show a third factor which, in this case, does not appear in the minutes: the beneficiary coverage of Oportunidades. The interviewees were in agreement in pointing to the coverage of 5 million families as a continuity factor, as it is not easy to eliminate such a large-scale program.

Subcategory External factors

The subcategory of external factors identifies the factors which have helped the permanence of the program, but which have nothing to do with the design of the program

but with external elements. Based on the results of the interviews, a loan made by the Interamerican Development Bank in 2001 was identified as a key factor in securing the continued existence of Oportunidades during the change of the presidential administration. Also, the role played by the Secretary of Finance in earmarking the Federal Spending Budget was another mechanism that protected the program.

The interviewees agreed in identifying the loan of the Inter-American Development Bank as something that helped the continued existence of Oportunidades during the change of government in 2001. The results of the minutes show that the loan included budgetary locks to ensure the implementation of the program by establishing in the contract the condition that the program had budgetary ceilings to ensure its operation. The results of the interviews also showed that the Federal Spending Budget added provisions to secure program resources for the following year, and that resources assigned to Oportunidades could not be reduced in comparison with the previous year.

Finally, the results of the interviews show that another factor that led to the institutionalization of the program was the feeling of goodwill on the part of public officials who worked on its operation and implementation, especially at the Federal level. The interviewees were in agreement in pointing out that after 14 years, a good portion of the staff has raised awareness of the issue of poverty and believe in Oportunidades, which generates appreciation for the program.

5.3.1.2 Elements that facilitate coordination

The category of “elements which facilitate coordination” targets the elements of the Oportunidades program which facilitate inter-institutional coordination. The results of the interviews and minutes identified two subcategories: operative elements and results elements. The operative elements are features of the functioning of the program and the

elements of results are consequences of the operation of the program based on the results obtained by Oportunidades.

Subcategory: Operative Elements

Within the subcategory of operative elements which seeks to identify those elements of the operation of the program which facilitate coordination, we can identify the following instruments:

- a) Suitable Staff
- b) Sufficient Budget
- c) Rules of Operation

a) Suitable Staff

The instrument of suitable staff shows that the personnel who work for Oportunidades or in the sectors involved in its operation are civil servants with the profile and necessary motivation to promote the program's functioning and look for coordination with other sectors. The interviewees agreed that the staff members involved in the operation of the program are highly trained, and that furthermore their experience has generated a compromise to ensure its smooth operation. In the words of one of the interviewees, the staff of Oportunidades are "experts and truly innovative people, intelligent, and furthermore I'd have to say that they have a total political will."

b) Sufficient Budget

The budget of Oportunidades is sufficient for its smooth functioning on top of having features for preventing its use for other ends. The interviewees agreed in identifying that the operative budget of the program greatly eases coordination because of its exclusive nature for the program operation. therefore the sectors do not have, or should not have, any problem in implementing the program.

c) Rules of Operation

The rules of operation are an important factor in achieving coordination between sectors. The results of the minutes show that the rules of operation make it easier for actors to reach agreements. In addition, some of these rules of operation created mechanisms through which actors have to reach consensus. The fact that the rules of operation must be reviewed annually in the Technical Committee and be ratified by the Board, because of the regulations and provisions in the Federal Spending Budget, forced sectors to coordinate operational aspects of the program each year.

Subcategory: Results Elements

Finally, the subcategory of elements of results looks to identify those elements that make coordination easier and are based on the results of the program. The results of the minutes show that international recognition has been a factor that has eased coordination within Oportunidades.

International recognition identifies that the prestige achieved at an international level by Oportunidades facilitates the coordination of the sectors that participate in its operation. The minutes of the Board and Technical Committee show that as the program became institutionalized, it obtained international recognition, which generated a feeling of appreciation by the staff involved in its operation, as well as a personal interest to ensure its smooth implementation. The minutes show that participants in the meetings felt proud of the program when it was recognized on an international level, which motivated sectors to seek better results.

5.3.3 Weaknesses of Oportunidades

The category of main problems identifies the areas of opportunity and the challenges facing the program after 14 years of operation. The results of the interviews and minutes identify that the program has two types of main problems: operational

problems and design problems. Below is a table that summarizes the results based on the analysis of the interviews and minutes:

Table 5.6 Summary of the Weaknesses of Oportunidades

Dimension	Category	Subcategory	Instruments	Source
Weaknesses of Oportunidades	Main problems	Operational Problems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commitment at the local level • Quality of services 	Interviews
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ability of solution or response to solve problems 	Minutes
		Design problems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Links with other programs and policies 	Interviews Minutes

Subcategory: operational problems

The subcategory of operational problems identifies problems in the implementation of Oportunidades. The results of the interviews show that one of the main operational problems is the level of commitment of public servants at the state and municipal level. This has caused that the quality of educational and health services to become a problem. The interviewees agreed in pointing to the quality of services as a recurring problem, and while local implementers do not commit with the implementation of the program, the quality of the services cannot be guaranteed.

The results from the minutes show that another operational problem of the program is the ability to resolve or respond to operational problems, even though they

have worked on information and monitoring systems in coordination with the state and municipal levels. Solving operational problems is slow and occasionally complex, and so is indicated as one of the future challenges for the program.

Subcategory: design problems

The subcategory of design problems identifies those aspects of the design of Oportunidades that need to be fixed as part of its future challenges. The results of the interviews and minutes showed that the main problem and challenge for Oportunidades is the lack of links to other social programs as part of a comprehensive strategy to fight poverty. Respondents agreed that although this issue is identified as a challenge of the program, it is not the responsibility of Oportunidades to create these links, but that it is nevertheless necessary to promote this links with other social policy programs and other sectors so that it does not become a permanent subsidy to the families.

The results of the minutes also show that the lack of links between Oportunidades and other social programs is a problem. In addition, it was pointed out that it's not only necessary to build links with other social programs, but also to implement strategies with social or economic policy instruments to take full advantage of the program's potential.

5.4 Synthesis of the analysis

The analysis showed that the research assumptions were confirmed: the Oportunidades Human Development program operates under a predominantly hierarchical-bureaucratic model of public administration, and coordination within the program occurs through instruments based on hierarchy and networks, and to a much lesser extent on markets.

Some of the dimensions, categories and subcategories identified based on the literature review were confirmed though the results and analysis left out others. In

addition, a new dimension was included based on the analysis of the interviews and the minutes. The tables that summarize each one of the dimensions, presented throughout the chapter, show the main results. Afterwards, a synthesis will appear which compares the dimensions, categories and subcategories identified a priori with the results obtained.

The dimensions, categories and subcategories identified a priori of the first research assumption were based on Weber's three types of authority (1964). What we tried to analyze was, based on each one, which model of authority predominates in the administration of Oportunidades through the analysis of the interviews and minutes.

The results showed that for each dimension and category, the predominant management model was the subcategory corresponding to the hierarchical-bureaucratic model of public administration. All the subcategories related to traditional and charismatic types of authority did not appear in the results except for the dimension of promotion and selection of personnel based on technical skills, in which the subcategory member of the elite also appeared for the recruitment of staff. This occurred in those cases where it was a high level position with a high level of trust, or if it was a political post. In every case the President makes the appointment. (see Table 5.1).

The second research assumption suggested that the process of coordination between actors within the Program occurred by means of various instruments, formal and informal, which included market-based, network, and hierarchical mechanisms. The results allowed the identification of specific instruments based on these three macro-mechanisms for the coordination of the program.

The general conclusion of the analysis of the second research assumption is that program coordination at the Federal level has, to a great extent, a dynamic of coordination through networks, even though is embedded within a structure that is predominantly hierarchical. In those cases where coordination by networks is not

sufficient to reach consensus, hierarchical instruments exist to facilitate the process of reaching an agreement. Thus, the interaction that occurs within both the Board and the Technical Committee of the National Coordination Office allows, through coordination by networks, to create hierarchically based instruments for the operation and implementation of the program.

The analysis of the results allowed us to categorize the instruments, based on hierarchy, markets, and networks, used for the coordination of Oportunidades. The dimensions, categories and subcategories identified a priori serve as a basis for their classification. The results also show that some of the a priori subcategories were not present in the analysis of the interviews and minutes. Thus, within the market dimension, only negative coordination is used in the interaction between actors. Table 5.8 shows the dimensions, categories and subcategories identified a priori, and later on in Table 5.9, the findings of the analysis is shown.

The results of the analysis of the network dimension shows that it basically occurs through problem-solving and positive coordination subcategories and does not include momentary contracts and distributive negotiation. Momentary contracts does not occur because each sector does what is supposed to do and take or leave positions normally are not common during the Board and the Technical Committee meetings. The second, distributive negotiation, does not occur because of the assigned budget nature of the program and the actors do not have the freedom to negotiate distribution of costs.

Finally, in the hierarchical dimension, the only subcategory not identified was binding decision by majority vote. The analysis showed is an instrument used within the coordination bodies to reach consensus. This instrument is especially used in the Board and the Technical Committee meetings within the subcategory of mandatory negotiation and joint decision systems, such as groups for intra-sectorial coordination between levels

of government bureaucracy and ad-hoc groups. Nevertheless, the analysis showed that it was used more as an instrument of coordination within the hierarchical dimension.

In addition to the dimensions, categories and subcategories defined a priori, the analysis also identified two new dimensions Strengths and Weaknesses of Oportunidades. These two dimensions arose from interviewees' reflections on Oportunidades after 14 years of operation. The analysis of the minutes also provided valuable elements for enriching the identification of categories and subcategories for both dimensions. Thus, it was identified that one of the strengths of the program has been the elements that have helped to its permanence as well as the elements that have make easier the coordination process (see Table 5.5). Finally, the dimension of Weaknesses of Oportunidades identified that the main problems of Oportunidades have been operational and design problems. The main operational problems identified were the commitment of local implementers, quality of services, and the capacity to solve or respond to operational problems. Meanwhile, the main design problem identified was the lack of linkages with both: other social programs and a comprehensive policy strategy to combat poverty (see Table 5.6).

Table 5.7 Dimensions and a priori categories and subcategories compared with the results obtained in the analysis of the first research assumption

Dimensions and a priori categories and subcategories			Results	
Dimension	Category	Subcategory	Subcategory	Type of domination based on Weber (1964)
Division of labor based on specialization	Degree of specialization of agencies/departments	- Departments with clearly defined functions and powers.	- Departments with clearly defined functions and powers.	Legal - Bureaucratic
		- Agencies/Departments based on institutional tradition		
Defined hierarchical structure	Characteristics of work organization	- Ad-hoc structures defined by a leader	- Organizational chart	Legal - Bureaucratic
		- Organizational chart		
		- Historical institutions		
		- New institutions		



Table 5.7 – *Continued*

<p>System of written rules covering the rights and responsibilities of public officials</p>	<p>Institutional characteristics</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Formal written rules - Publicly known formal and informal rules - Informal rules created ad hoc 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Formal written rules 	<p>Legal – Bureaucratic</p>
<p>Written procedures for the handling of work situations</p>	<p>Rules for conflict resolution and decision-making</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Process manuals - Historical patterns of conflict solution and decision making - Decision-making and conflict solution by the leader 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Process manuals 	<p>Legal – Bureaucratic</p>

Table 5.8 Dimensions and a priori categories and subcategories of market, network, and hierarchy mechanisms

Dimension	Category	Subcategory
Markets	Type of unilateral action	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mutual adjustment - Negative coordination
Networks	Type of negotiated agreement between actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Spot contracts - Distributive negotiation - Problem Solving - Positive coordination
Hierarchy	Type of hierarchical interaction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Decisions by majority vote - Authority/subordination - Mandatory negotiations - Joint decision systems

Table 5.9 Dimensions, categories, subcategories and instruments identified based on the analysis

Dimension	Category	Subcategory	Instruments identified in the analysis
Markets	Type of unilateral action	Negative coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Incentives for creating competition between service suppliers
Networks	Type of agreement negotiated between actors	Problem Solving	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Interaction within the mandatory consultation bodies
		Positive coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Interaction within the mandatory consultation bodies ▪ Interaction during the design phase of the program
Hierarchy	Type of hierarchical interaction	Authority/subordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Objectives, goals and services clearly defined by laws and regulations ▪ Established operating processes leading to creation of routines ▪ Allocated budgets ▪ Centralized information systems ▪ Express order from a higher authority
		Mandatory negotiation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Coordination unit ▪ Mandatory advisory groups

Table 5.9 – *Continued*

		Joint decision systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Intra-sectorial coordination▪ Coordination among levels of government▪ Coordination bodies for specific issues
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this research study was to analyze a seldom-studied aspect of the Human Development Program Oportunidades. Specifically, it sought to identify how inter-institutional coordination occurs in a program with a horizontal design that involves the participation of agencies and departments of the same hierarchical level. Therefore, the first part of this research was focused on explaining the relevance of the subject and why it was worth studying coordination, specifically as it occurs in social programs. It was emphasized that poverty is a multidimensional problem that cannot be addressed based on a vision of just one ministry or agency; it requires a comprehensive approach that makes the administrative theme topic a key element for social policy programs, and especially for programs that combat poverty.

Once it was identified that the topic of poverty requires a multidimensional approach, it was stated that until Oportunidades the programs implemented in Mexico to combat poverty did not have rigorous methods for beneficiary selection and were constantly attacked as programs for political manipulation. As was established in the introduction, Oportunidades represented a break with previous anti-poverty programs. However, although Oportunidades has been repeatedly evaluated, a topic that has been neglected is its administrative structure and operative characteristics, which were the main focus of this research.

The Education, Health and Dietary Program (PROGRESA), now Oportunidades, was officially implemented in 1997, although the planning process began in 1994. Progresa-Oportunidades is the only program designed to combat poverty in Mexico that

has been in existence for more than 14 years and has survived several changes of Federal administration. It also continues to operate during the change of political party after 71 years in power in 2000 -- a historical moment for the Mexican State -- Progres-Oportunidades was chosen as the case study to try to respond to the central question of this research: How does inter-institutional coordination in the Human Development Program Oportunidades occur among the different ministries, agencies and departments that participate in its operation at the Federal level?

6.1 Summary of research study

With attention to the goal discussed in the section above, the introduction presented a brief overview of the Oportunidades program. Then it analyzed why it is worthwhile to study the coordination process in social programs, a topic that has seldom been addressed, mainly in the Latin American region. The last part of the introduction stated the research questions this dissertation tried to answer.

The second part of this research, the *literature review*, sought to explain: what do we understand as coordination? How does coordination occur inside of governments? What has been written about coordination? And how has coordination been studied and based on which models? Thus, the first part of the literature review posed briefly why the study of coordination is relevant to later defining the key concepts that were used in preparing this research.

Another element in this literature review was to define the concept of coordination based on what the theory says. An important discovery was that there is no consensus on the theoretical definition of the concept of coordination and that confusion abounds with other related concepts such as collaboration and cooperation. However, based on the analysis of different related concepts in definitions of coordination, this research used the following definition of coordination: as the *process* "where two or more

organizations create and/or use existing decision rules that have been established to deal collectively with their shared environment” (Rogers & Whetten, 1982, p.12), and as a result, “in which policies and programmes of government are characterized by minimal redundancy, incoherence and lacunae” (Peters, 1998. p.296).

Once coordination was defined, it was identified through which mechanisms inter-institutional coordination is achieved. The theory showed consensus in the identification of three macro-mechanisms to achieve coordination in public, private and non profit entities: markets, networks and hierarchy. Each of these macro-mechanisms has specific instruments to achieve coordination that can be either formal or informal.

The third part of this research, *methods*, defined how this research studied coordination in the Human Development Program Oportunidades. The first part of the methods section explained why the qualitative paradigm of research was chosen over the quantitative one. In synthesis, the qualitative method was chosen because the author considered it to be more suitable with the topic of research. In addition, the question this research sought to answer was: how does coordination occur? This is why the most adequate approach to the topic was a qualitative one that allowed analyzing the perceptions and point of view of the actors who participate in the operation of the program.

Once the qualitative research paradigm became the research method, it was specified what qualitative methodological strategy was used in this research -- the case study. A case study was defined as:

...a qualitative approach in which the researcher explores a single case or multiple cases through a detailed, in depth data collection, involving multiple sources of information that ends with a detailed description of the case and the themes that derived from it (Creswell, 2007, p.73).

Later, the researcher defined why the Human Development Program Oportunidades was chosen as the case study for this research and identified it as a unique, instrumental and embedded case study. It was defined as a unique case study

given its dimension, scope and organizational structure; instrumental, since we were interested in studying the coordination process within the program and not the program itself, and finally, embedded because it has several units of analysis (Yin, 2009; Stake, 1998).

The techniques for data collection chosen for this research were documentary analysis based on laws and regulations; also, a request for information was made to the Federal Institute for Access to Public Information (IFAI) to provide the Board and Technical Committee minutes from the National Coordination Office from its creation until 2006. The analysis was done based on complete governmental periods; since this six-year presidential term is still in office, the last six-year period that the program has been operation was excluded.

Finally, interviews with key participants in the operation of the program were conducted. The selection of participants was done based on the following strategies: criterion, stratified purposeful and the snowball or chain according to the sampling strategies identified by Miles and Huberman (cited in Creswell, 2007). Using the criterion strategy, participants were chosen based on their participation in the meetings of the National Coordination Office Board and Technical Committee; these officials were considered key informants. The stratified purposeful strategy was also used to choose a public official from each ministry or department who participated in the implementation of the program. Finally, the snowball or chain technique was used based on the recommendation of people chosen with the first two strategies to people who were considered key in the development of the research.

The methods section also included the model of analysis used for the information analysis. The researcher also identified, based on the theory, the relevant dimensions, categories and subcategories based on the results of interviews and the documentary

analysis of the minutes. The identification of dimensions, categories and subcategories was based on the following two research assumptions:

1. Despite the adoption of new public management principles, in Mexico the dominant model of public administration and public management is hierarchical-bureaucratic. The Human Development Program works under this model of public administration.
2. Despite the prevalence of a hierarchical-bureaucratic model of public administration, the process of coordination among actors within the Program works through formal and informal mechanisms of markets, networks and hierarchy.

It needs to be clarified that based on the analysis of the results of the interviews and the Board and Technical Committee minutes, the dimensions, categories and subcategories identified a priori were modified based on the results, as explained in the analysis section. Finally, the last section of this chapter presented a *description of the Human Development Program Oportunidades* so that the reader had a general outlook on the case study of this research.

The fifth chapter of this research presented *the results* organized into two sections: the first presented the results of interviews organized based on the first research assumption identifying the mechanisms, categories and subcategories, The second part of this chapter did the same based on the second research assumption.

Finally, the sixth chapter presented *the analysis* of the results of the interviews and minutes based on the two research assumptions. The following section defines to what extent the research assumptions were fulfilled.

6.2 Were the research assumptions fulfilled?

The first research assumption posited that the Human Development Program Oportunidades operates under a predominantly hierarchical-bureaucratic public administration model. However, it is important to remember there are no totally pure models, and as was proposed in the methods section, the researcher sought to identify whether organizations tend to have a predominantly public administration model, even though they may have other elements from different models.

In the case of Oportunidades, the results from the interviews showed that effectively this program works predominantly under the hierarchical-bureaucratic model. Based on the dimensions identified by Hall (1963), it is evident that Oportunidades operates with: a) division of labor based on specialization; b) defined hierarchical structure; c) system of written rules covering the rights and responsibilities of public officials; d) written procedures for handling work situations; and, most of the time, e) promotion and selection of personnel based on technical skills.

In the last dimension of this first research assumption, we clarified that in most cases, since the interviews showed that for positions at a high level of trust, staff selection is done based on Weber's (1964) traditional type of organization, where staff selection is done based on the personal relationships of trust with the leader. However, except for this dimension, the analysis showed that the assumption is confirmed based on the analysis of the 10 interviews conducted. Also, the analysis of the minutes, laws and regulations showed that a majority of the dimensions from the hierarchical-bureaucratic management model of public administration are present in the operation of Oportunidades. However, in the analysis of the minutes and documents, use of the two dimensions, *division of labor based on specialization* and *promotion and selection of personnel based on technical skills*, was not confirmed.

This limitation occurred because in the minutes these topics were not addressed, and the laws and regulations for the program operation did not establish how to recruit the administrative staff; rather, they defined how the Oportunidades program should be operated and implemented. Therefore, based on these results and on the analysis, we can conclude that effectively the Oportunidades Program operates under a predominant hierarchical-bureaucratic public administration model; the National Coordination Office, the Technical Committee and the Board minutes themselves are clear examples of the dimension *written procedures for handling work situations*.

The second research assumption proposed that, despite the prevalence of a hierarchical-bureaucratic model of public administration, the process of coordination among actors within the Program is through formal and informal mechanisms of markets, networks and hierarchy. The analysis showed that Oportunidades had different phases, from an initial design that based its operations mainly on network mechanisms for coordination, then, once its operative structure was designed and the program's operative guidelines were defined, it began to operate on two levels. At the Federal level, the program operated more based on instruments based on networks; however, when consensus was not achieved, there were hierarchical instruments to achieve coordination; and at the state and local levels, program operation was based to a greater extent on hierarchical instruments based on regulations and processes established for their implementation.

In the initial design phase, the main structures for the operation of the program were created, including: the National Coordination Office, the National Coordination Office Board and the general guidelines for program operations. These are identified as coordination instruments of the hierarchy mechanism. Based on the first phase of program implementation, in 1999, a key structure was created for inter-organizational

coordination at the Federal level of Oportunidades: the National Coordination Office's Technical Committee. Both coordinating bodies – the Board and the Technical Committee – were identified in the analysis within the hierarchical dimension in the mandatory negotiation subcategory, since both have interaction processes established for decision-making. However, although many of the decisions and interactions are based on the hierarchical mechanism, for some specific topics the dynamics inside these systems of joint decision-making were based on the network coordination mechanism.

Analysis of the interviews and minutes showed that once the program began to operate and became more institutionalized upon obtaining national and international recognition, the participants involved in its operation sought to improve the operation of the program. The results from the interviews and minutes showed that the sectors participating in the operation of Oportunidades had the goal of the good operation of the program; trust was also created among the sectors so that each party did what it was supposed to do to make the program work better. These features are key elements for coordination by networks: mutual trust among participants of the network and the goodwill that develops over time due to repeated interactions (Bouckaert et al., 2010).

The results from the minutes and interviews showed that the sectors had interest in strengthening the operation of the program, since it was favorable for both Oportunidades and their own sector; therefore, the ministries, by their own initiative, began to share information with the network's participants. Likewise, being involved in the operation of the program and over time the knowledge attained on their sector and on the program led them to propose alternatives as to how to improve the program's operation in some areas.

However, although thanks to the interest of the sectors, some operative aspects were improved, there were also problems identified based on the evaluation of the

program that were difficult to resolve; for this, hierarchy-based instruments were used to a greater extent to resolve these problems. In summary, we can affirm that internal functioning of both the Board – but mainly of the Technical Committee – was a hybrid between network-based instruments and hierarchy-based instruments, depending on the topics in question. This confirms what the theory establishes in the sense that coordination instruments are not determinant but rather dependent on the characteristics of actors' interactions, which can be predominantly based on markets, networks or hierarchy (Bouckaert et al., 2010).

Finally, the presence of market mechanisms was confirmed in the relationship between the Health Ministry and the IMSS Mandatory System, although in this relationship only some elements of coordination based on market mechanism were identified. Since in the case of the Oportunidades program, a service-provider market regulated by the providers does not exist; instead the government, depending on the offering capacity of each agency or department, regulates this market. However, the end user -- in this case the beneficiary -- is not entitled to choose his/her provider given the system's limitations. However, results from interviews and minutes showed that based on the introduction of the IMSS Mandatory System, the necessary incentives were generated to improve the quality of health services offered by the Health Ministry and in IMSS-Oportunidades and which also mainly obliged the Health Ministry to comply with the coverage that the National Coordination Office requested in the urban sector. This was due to the cost of services per family, which was much more in the IMSS Mandatory System. In this way, we concluded that despite not having a market per se in the health sector, the incentives and instruments do reflect market mechanisms.

Therefore, we can conclude that inside the Oportunidades program, coordination occurs mainly based on hierarchy-based instruments, but coordination also occurs based

on networks and to a much lesser extent on the markets. However, having identified in the results of the interviews and the minutes the presence of the three macro-mechanisms;, this study confirms its second research assumption.

6.3 Main contributions

This research demonstrated that despite the trend toward new public management, in Mexico, the hierarchical-bureaucratic public administration model predominates in the most important program to fight poverty. In addition, under this administrative model, the program has achieved coordination and has been able to operate efficiently to obtain positive results. Since it is a horizontally structured program where different agencies and departments are responsible for its operations, and in addition the entity responsible for its coordination, the National Coordination Office, is not at a superior hierarchical level, it is important to identify what factors have facilitated the program's inter-institutional coordination leading to its efficient operation.

The results from the interviews agreed that the design prior to the implementation of the program was a key factor for its future operation, since it laid the foundation for its functioning. The institutional structure created for its implementation is also one of the operative bases. The results of the interviews also showed that adequate personnel and sufficient and allocated budgets have been key factors for the successful operation of the program. When capacity and resources are sufficient, the sectors do not have problems in operating the program.

Likewise, one of the main contributions of this research is to emphasize the importance of the institutional structure for program operation, since this has been the basis for its continued operations. On the one hand, the structures were specifically created for the program coordination, and on the other hand, the protective measures in budget matters shielded Oportunidades. Once the structures began to function -

specifically the Technical Committee - it transformed into a group of actors whose interaction was based more on the characteristics of a network. This led to a duality in the highly hierarchical structure that operated as a network internally, but which, when it required decision making, hierarchical instruments obliged actors to make agreements. This resulted in a highly efficient network with relatively low transaction costs, since there existed hierarchical incentives to minimize them.

Finally, the topic of rules of operation has been another key factor, since these define, as far as possible, how the program operates; in addition to the efforts made since the beginning for Oportunidades to be a single national program with the same criteria for targeting, beneficiary selection and support delivery, which have resulted in implementation based on clearly established processes. As an interviewee said, the program operates based on the “just in time” principle; otherwise, it would not work. The challenge is that this does not occur inside of just one government agency or department, but that it is based on sequential inter-dependency relationships that involve education, health, IMSS and the National Coordination Office. The design itself and the definition of processes have led to the creation of clearly established operation routines being one of the key factors for the operation of the program.

In general, the main contribution of this research was to identify how the Oportunidades program has achieved coordination, taking into consideration the number of agencies, departments and ministries that participate in its operations and how the program works efficiently so that each family receives the Oportunidades support every two months.

6.4 Recommendations

The results from the interviews and minutes provided to this research two new dimensions with their categories and subcategories. The dimensions *strengths and*

weaknesses of Oportunidades are the result of reflections by interviewees about what has worked well in the program and what remains to be done after 14 years in operation. The results from the minutes allowed us to identify the most recurring problems addressed in these sessions from the creation of the program to 2006. This data allowed the researcher to identify the main problems of the program.

Despite efforts by the National Coordination Office for the program to monitor operative indicators, which are the inputs to be able to detect and resolve specific problems in the implementation of Oportunidades, the institutional capacity of the structure to resolve them is very time-consuming. It has been noted that perhaps the centralized nature of the program and the desire to make one single homogeneous program at the national level make it difficult to adapt to regional and local necessities, thereby complicating the identification of specific needs. However, the fact that there is a unified criterion for program implementation is also one of its strengths. After 14 years in operation, it is perhaps necessary to seek hybrid models that allow both homogeneity at a national level of the program; and the specificity of the regions. In the analysis section, the researcher specified that the relationship between the Federal level and the state and municipal governments is based on hierarchical coordination. One option is to seek increasing the involvement of these levels of government so they have better capacity for operative response.

The need to have a more flexible program will allow information to flow and will give way to a more flexible solution to problems. The results from minutes showed that information does flow between the municipal, state and Federal levels. In other words, problems are identified thanks to information systems; however, the problems are not resolved in the proper time and manner. The lack of capacity for prompt problem-solving

indicates that perhaps it is time to seek alternative coordination models among levels of government.

Identifying the response capacity to operative problems is also linked to the lack of commitment of the final implementers. In other words, as long as personnel providing the service to the end user are not committed to the program, much of Oportunidades' potential is lost, since this topic is closely tied to quality and services. The Oportunidades program operates well from an administrative perspective. However, the aspect of services quality was a recurrent topic in interviews, minutes, and also program evaluations. In other words, we know the program is reaching its objectives to increase school enrollment and beneficiaries' attendance to health centers, but the question now is: Are the capacities and skills of beneficiaries actually increasing? Fourteen years after its first implementation, what are Oportunidades' beneficiaries doing? As some interviewees said, it is clear that a program to develop skills and capacities cannot solve the problem of poverty. However, we need to consider what is next for Oportunidades. The institutional and operating structures allow an efficient operation of the program, but efficient operations do not guarantee the program will achieve its true potential.

However, it is also important to take advantage of the existing structures within the program. That is, the dynamic among the sectors in the coordination bodies represents an opportunity for the program to achieve more things and for each sector to do more than what it is entrusted to do. The institutions and organizations are already created; all that is left is to strengthen them and to bring more flexibility into the system to truly take advantage of what can be done with a consolidated structure such as Oportunidades.

Finally, another recommendation is the need to seek a connection with other programs and/or social, economic and labor sectors to make true changes on people's

conditions. Despite this need, it is worth clarifying that this task does not belong only to Oportunidades but to the Federal government. There is need of a comprehensive vision that includes at the negotiating table missing actors, such as the labor and economy sectors.

According to evaluations, Oportunidades is attaining its objectives despite sustained poverty levels in Mexico, so the need for a comprehensive strategy involving other actors to solve the problem is clear. As established by the public officials involved in its initial design, Oportunidades is not a program to combat poverty; it is a program for the creation of capacities and skills, and without a comprehensive strategy that link it to other social programs to provide beneficiaries the means to exit poverty, it will do little to reduce poverty levels in Mexico. However, what Oportunidades can take advantage of is its institutional and operative structures which have already proven to be efficient.

6.5 Limitations

The research focused its analysis on the coordination occurring at the Federal level among the agencies and departments involved in operation of Oportunidades. Specifically, the researcher sought to analyze the institutional structure involving several sectors and their coordination mechanisms at the Federal level. Although there was interest in analyzing many more aspects of the topic of coordination, available time and capacity limited this research to coordination at the Federal level.

However, there are many more pending topics to analyze on the topic of coordination, specifically in the Oportunidades program. One topic – although it was mentioned on repeated occasions as an area of opportunity to improve program operation – is coordination among different levels of government. This research identified the existence of State Technical Committees, which are the link with the National Coordination Office, but more analysis needs to be done to assess whether there are

other channels of coordination. In addition, the indication of a lack of commitment of local implementers puts emphasis on why it is important to study coordination among levels of government. This research showed that coordination at the Federal level works among sectors; however, more analysis needs to be done on this other part of coordination, which is essential for good program functioning.

Likewise, although this research addressed how inter-organizational coordination occurs among sectors, the researcher did not specifically analyze what types of problems are resolved based on market, network, and hierarchy mechanisms. Now that the predominating mechanisms and instruments for the coordination of the Oportunidades program have been identified – the main objective of this research – it would be worth analyzing what problems are more easily resolved with instruments of these three macro-mechanisms. The development of a typology would help to create an institutional structure or the necessary incentives to be able to resolve these types of problems more efficiently.

Finally, one question that needs to be answered is how coordination occurs among each level of government. That is, at the Federal level, much of the coordination is based on networks, but in the state and municipal levels coordination may be more hierarchical. The question that needs to be asked is: Is this true? Or does it work like the Federal level, where instruments of the markets, networks and hierarchy converge among the sectors involved in program operations in the state and municipal levels of government.

This research showed that inter-institutional coordination among different agencies and departments is possible by creating the structures and incentives necessary to achieve that agencies and departments work together. In addition, given the permanence, objectives and purposes that Oportunidades pursues, it achieved

something that very few public programs have achieved: the political will of its actors. This political will helped and facilitated program operations. It is important to identify what has worked and what is missing to be able to take advantage of these strengths and replicate them in other public programs. However, one must also analyze its weaknesses to be able to avoid them within a comprehensive strategy to fight poverty in Mexico, an urgent topic for the country but which is still pending on the government's agenda.

APPENDIX A

PUBLIC OFFICIALS BY ATTENDANCE AT THE TECHNICAL
COMMITTEE MEETINGS OF THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
OPORTUNIDADES (1999-2006)

Public Official by Attendance at Technical Committee Meetings of the Human Development Program Oportunidades (1999-2006)

Public Official	Position	Ministry	Attendance
Dr. Javier Cabral Soto	General Coordinator IMSS-Solidarity	IMSS	42
Dra. Maria Farrell Campa	General Director of Administration and Finance	PROGRESA	37
Ing Ramiro Ornelas Hall	General Direction of Census	PROGRESA	37
C. Rogelio Gómez-Hermosillo Marín	National Coordinator	PROGRESA	31
Dr. Carlos Rodríguez Ajenjo	General Director of Sectoral and Regional Coordination	Oportunidades	29
Lic. Antonio Sánchez Díaz Rivera	Undersecretary of Regional Development and Technical Committee Chair	SEDESOL	27
Dr. Roberto Morerira Flores	General Director CONAFE	SEP	23
Lic. Reynaldo Terán Rodríguez	Social Development Sector Subdelegate	Contraloría y Desarrollo Administrativo	23
Dr. Santiago	Undersecretary of Expenditure	SHCP	22

Levy Algazi			
Lic. Ramón Cardeno Ortiz	General Director of Planning, Programming and Budgeting	SEP	19
Lic. Evelyne Rodríguez Ortega	General Director of Agricultural Planning and Budget, Supply, Social Development and Natural Resources	SHCP	17
Lic. Concepción Steta Gándara	General Director of Planning and Evaluation	Oportunidades	16
Dr. Fernando Córdova Calderon	Coordinator of Public Education	Oportunidades	15
Ing. José María Fraustro Siller	Undersecretary of Planning and Coordination	SEP	15
Dr. Héctor Hernández Llamas	General Director of Regional and Sector Coordination	PROGRESA	13
Lic. Rafaela Merecías Sánchez	Assistant Director responsible for the educational component of the program Oportunidades CONAFE	SEP	13
Act. Mónica Orozco Corona	Coordinator of Advisors of the National Coordinator	PROGRESA	12

Arq. Jorge Escamilla flores	representing the Director General for Social Development, Labour and Economy, which in turn comes on behalf of Mr. Paul Reyes Pruneda	SHCP	12
Lic. Laura Martínez Ampudia	Deputy Director General for Science, Technology, Culture and Sport	SHCP	12
Ing. Ramón de la Peña Manrique	General Director	INEA	10
Lic. Angélica Castañeda Sánchez	Deputy Director General Care and Monitoring Service Department and Operation Opportunities	Oportunidades	10
Lic. Carlos Márquez Pérez	Coordinator of Compensatory Programs Unit of the National Council of Educational Development	SEP	10
Lic. Débora Schlam Epelstein	Director General of Census and Settlement	PROGRESA	10

APPENDIX B

PUBLIC OFFICIAL BY ATTENDANCE AT BOARD
MEETINGS OF THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
OPORTUNIDADES (1997-2006)

Public Official by attendance at Board meetings of the Human Development Program
Oportunidades (1997-2006)

Public Official	Position	Ministry	Attendance
Mtro. Daniel Hernández Franco	General Director of Planning, Evaluation and Monitoring	PROGRESA	8
Dr. Carlos Mancera Corcuera	Minister of Planning and Coordination	SEP	7
Dr. Juan Ramón de la Fuente Ramírez	Secretary	Salud	7
Lic. Evelyne Rodríguez Ortega	General Director of Planning and Budget, Social Development and Natural Resources	SHCP	7
Dr. Héctor Hernández Llamas	General Director of Regional and Sector Coordination	PROGRESA	6
Dr. José Gómez de León Cruces	National Coordinator	PROGRESA	6
Dr. Manuel Urbina Fuentes	General Director and Coverage Extension	Salud	6
Dr. Santiago Levy Algazi	Undersecretary of Expenditure	SHCP	6
C. Rogelio Alberto Gómez Hermosillo	National Coordinator	PROGRESA	5

Lic. Josefina Vázquez Mota	Secretary	SEDESOL	5
Dr. Rigoberto Quintero Torres	General Director of Regional Operations and Social Control	Secretaria de la Contraloría y Desarrollo Administrativo	4
Dra. María Farrell Campa	General Director of Administration and Finance	PROGRESA	4
Lic. Antonio Sánchez Díaz de Rivera	Undersecretary of Regional Development	SEDESOL	4
Lic. Eduardo Escalante Macín	General Director of Planning and Budget on Health, Education and Labor	SHCP	4
Lic. Francisco Gil Díaz	Secretary	SHCP	4
Lic. José Ángel Gurría Treviño	Secretary	SHCP	4
Lic. Miguel Limón Rojas	Secretary	SEP	4

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW GUIDE

Interview Guide

Identify whether the services offered by ministries that participate in the operation of Oportunidades were clearly defined.

1. Is there a common objective that integrates the actions of the various ministries?
2. In this context, do the ministries have a margin for negotiation?
3. Is there a common goal that guides the actions of Oportunidades? Which one?
4. Do the ministries have clearly defined services (products)?
5. What association exists between these services (overlap, antagonism, complementarity)?
6. What margin of adjustment does services have?
7. Do rules prevent the confrontation between players?
8. Is the relationship between actors given according to established rules or is it an informal agreement?

How does negotiation take place (horizontal)?

9. Does the actors in the network are not willing to negotiate their options (all or nothing / take it or leave it)?
10. Does implementation costs of the program can be distributed among actors (give and take)?
11. Does the actors agree for designing a solution in which everyone wins (Pareto optimal)?
12. Does the actors negotiate the design and implementation seeking mutual gain (positive sum)?

How does the negotiation take place (vertical hierarchy)?

13. Does the negotiation is done through authority and power?

14. Does the negotiation is done through the institutional structure?
15. Does the negotiation is done through administrative management?

Identify whether the work in Progres-a-Oportunidades is specialized and based on professional training.

16. What is your professional training (Bachelor, Master or PhD)? In what?
17. What was your position in the Oportunidades program?
18. How did you get the job (test /public recruitment, recommendation, internal promotion, other)?
19. Did you have previous experience in public administration? How many years?

Identify if there is a clear line of authority with defined responsibilities

20. Did you know who was your superior?
21. Does your responsibilities were clearly identified?
22. Does the chain of command was respected on internal processes?

Determine if the public official knows his job (functions)

23. Upon entering office, your responsibilities where clearly established? Does a job description was provided?

To know if day to day activities are a routine.

24. What proportion of your day consisted of the same activities?
25. Which were your 3 to 5 most frequent activities?
26. Is there a record of such activities (minutes, memoranda, etc.)?
27. From 1 to 10 in what detail does this record was kept?

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