

“INVASION” OF THE POOR: BELIEFS AND THE ATTITUDES OF THE  
RECEIVING COMMUNITY

by

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ABSTRACT

“INVASION” OF THE POOR: THE BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES OF THE RECEIVING  
COMMUNITY

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Housing policy as one of the tools for eradicating poverty remains a critical arena for debate, especially in light of the dire situation of impoverished inner cities and growing inequalities between communities in the U.S. Policies aimed towards ameliorating the negative effects of these inequalities on impecunious residents include deconcentrating poverty through the dispersion of public housing residents into more affluent neighborhoods. The logic behind this approach is the assumption that removing barriers and obstacles from low income families by integrating them into middle class neighborhoods will increase the

life chances of the low income families. These policies are often met with resistance by the receiving community, perhaps impeded by the ideological debate of how involved the government should be in correcting inequalities when it infringes on the rights of other individuals.

This dissertation explores the ideological aspects of residential mobility policies from a multi-dimensional, theoretical framework of liberty and Lefebvre's "right to the city." Liberty is an assumed basic right of all Americans. Yet liberty is not perceived in the same way by everyone, and an application of the concepts of positive and negative liberty are explored as a basis for what the receiving community believes is an ideal form of liberty. A theoretical framework based on Lefebvre's concept "right to the city" analyzes the receiving community's perceptions of diversity in their community, the rights of the entering community compared to their own and their prioritizing of exchange and use values of the city (Lefebvre 1996; Logan and Molotch 1987). This approach can provide new insights into the relocation of the poor, the current dominant policy strategy in the U.S. for ameliorating the harmful effects of concentrated poverty. To date, there has been no focus on the ideological basis for the receiving community's opposition and the effects that might have on policy outcomes. Data from a survey conducted in a Southwest City and Dallas community where mixed income developments have been located is analyzed to discover the effects these mixed income developments have on the receiving community's attitudes toward race, poverty, gender issues, mental illness, sense of community and ideal policy solutions. Results indicate that both ideology and attitudes provide insight on the homeowners' opposition to mobility programs.

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## CHAPTER 1

### DECONCENTRATING POVERTY: ISSUES AND STRATEGIES

Housing policy as a tool for alleviating poverty remains a critical arena for debate, especially in light of the dire situation of impoverished inner cities and growing inequalities between communities in the United States. Since the 1970s U.S. housing policy has focused on strategies to deconcentrate poverty in the inner cities (Goetz 2003). The battle of civil rights leaders against a long history of discriminatory housing policy coupled with an awareness of the growing perils of concentrated poverty in deteriorating inner cities led policy makers to take action to remedy the injustice that was occurring in the housing field.

Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, also called the Fair Housing Act, helped instigate the move toward deconcentrating poverty by encouraging racial and economic integration and providing some housing choice to public housing tenants (Kleit 2001). The Act gave the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) the mandate of promoting fair housing. Part of Title VIII stated that it is unlawful “to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin” ( Fair Housing Act, Sec. 804. [42 U.S.C. 3604]). This

statement had implications for many groups that faced housing discrimination at the time, including public housing residents. Public housing residents were segregated by race and economics by being predominately located in black, high poverty areas (Gray and Tursky 1986). The Fair Housing Act was to eliminate such race based discrimination in all areas of housing and promote fair housing practices across the U.S.

It was not clear what legislators meant by “fair housing” because they did not provide much direction on how to achieve favorable outcomes in housing integration (Vernarelli 1986). Federal judges made affirmative interpretations of the mandate by ordering the desegregation of public housing through mixed income developments or housing vouchers in more affluent, white neighborhoods (Shuck 2002). In addition to mandates, research on the negative consequences of concentrated poverty encouraged HUD to further its efforts at relocating low income families to low poverty areas. The deconcentration strategy reflects the *geography of opportunity model*, a theory developed by Galster and Killeen (1995) who contended that an individual’s habitat played a significant role in his or her life chances and opportunities. In an attempt to disperse poverty, several mobility programs have been implemented that involve relocating low income families into more affluent communities via mixed income developments where policy makers believed their life chances and opportunities would improve.

### 1.1 Mobility Programs

In order to systematically relocate low income families into working and middle class neighborhoods, and thus deconcentrate poverty, housing administrators began to implement mobility programs in the 1970s. Mobility Programs are housing programs that move public

housing residents into low poverty areas of a city or suburb (Goetz 2003). Strategies for deconcentrating poverty include housing vouchers, where residents are able to use their vouchers to move into market rate private housing and tenement placed programs, where mixed income apartments are scattered around the city, containing subsidized and market rate units. Both of these strategies are aimed at relocating residents into low poverty areas where they can have access to environments with better schools, employment opportunities and other community amenities lacking in the inner cities (Kleit 2001). Many mobility programs have been implemented over the past several decades, including the seminal Gautreaux Demonstration, which served as a model for later mobility programs.

The 1976 Gautreaux Demonstration, a result of the 1967 *Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority* (ND Ill.1967), was HUD's first large-scale attempt at reversing a history of discriminatory housing practices (Vernarelli 1985). In the *Gautreaux* case, public housing tenants sued the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) for segregating public housing based on race. Federal courts found both the CHA and HUD liable for segregating public housing through site selection and tenant placement. The CHA was forced to desegregate its public housing in the city limits, and a later ruling mandated that HUD implement a metropolitan-wide desegregation plan. Residents were allowed to use Section 8 certificates to move to low poverty, mostly white neighborhoods and suburbs. Additionally, the CHA had to build a percentage of its new housing developments in low poverty areas (Rubinowitz & Rosenbaum 2000). This ruling was unprecedented and allowed public housing residents to become pioneers in suburban frontiers.

Moving to Opportunity (MTO) is a more recent example of a mobility program that was inspired by the Gautreaux Demonstration. MTO programs, implemented in the early 1990s, provided Section 8 vouchers to public housing residents so that they could move into low poverty areas (Goetz 2003). The goal of the programs was to examine the impact of the new neighborhoods on the life chances of participants. The main difference between Gautreaux and MTO was that MTO used an experimental design (Goering 2003). Participants in the MTO demonstration were randomly assigned to three different situations. The experimental group was given Section 8 vouchers and had to move to neighborhoods with less than 10 percent poverty. They received counseling during their relocation. A comparison group received Section 8 vouchers, but was not restricted to low poverty areas and was not given counseling. Finally, a control group remained in their current public housing situation (Goering 2003). Five cities were selected to participate in MTO, including Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles and New York City. Examples from the results of the experiments will be discussed in Chapter 2.

Hope VI was another program instigated in the early 1990s. The Hope VI program was not intended to be a mobility program; it focused on demolishing existing developments and replacing them with low density, mixed income units. However, in some ways it was similar to the other mobility programs because the number of units reserved for the public housing tenants were smaller than the number living in the old developments, and some relocated residents were unable to return (Goetz 2003).

Despite the different strategies each mobility program presented, they all shared the end goal of deconcentrating poverty. The majority of studies on mobility programs focus on

the success of deconcentration in terms of how the relocated families are doing in their new neighborhoods. The focus of this dissertation is on the homeowners in the receiving neighborhoods. The low poverty areas that are the target of these mobility programs are predominately white, middle class neighborhoods. Housing authorities had not often placed public housing in these areas in large part due to the response or flat out refusal from the white suburbs or neighborhoods (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000, Goetz 2003). The homeowners in these areas were generally not supportive of the attempts at economic integration any more than white middle class homeowners were of racial integration following the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000).

### 1.2 Neighborhood Opposition

Despite the Civil Rights movement, the 1980s were peppered with cases of resistance to neighborhood desegregation including burning crosses and white attacks on black homes post integration (Goering 1986). The message implicit in these attacks was that white homeowners did not want “those” people in their neighborhoods. Research on neighborhood preferences, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2, attempts to explain Whites’ aversion to black neighbors. The focus of these studies is on white neighborhoods and what drives their desire for exclusivity. The present study looks at middle class homeowners’ aversion to public housing residents moving into their neighborhoods. Racial and economic compositions of a neighborhood may present different responses from the middle class; however, there is evidence that opposition similar to that which occurred with racial integration may be similar to what has occurred with economic integration attempts (Low Income Housing Coalition NIMBY reports 1995-2006). Moreover, it is difficult to separate



the racial and economic components as the public housing residents are predominately minorities.

The National Low Income Coalition's NIMBY (Not-in-my-backyard) reports from around the nation reveal that not much has changed since the attempts at racial integration in terms of the struggle to oppose forced neighborhood integration (National Coalition for Low Income Housing Reports 2001-2005). Resistance to integration continues. Although considerably less violent, the message is still clear (Goetz 2003). In most cases, resistant homeowners seem to be worried about what the desegregation, both racial and economic, will do to their neighborhoods. This fear seems to be a natural occurrence among the white middle class and has helped propel the retreat of this group to far ends of the city and now suburbs in order to maintain their middle class, predominately white enclaves (Lipsitz 1998; Massey and Denton 1993).

Opposition by the white, middle class communities to minorities or low income families moving into their private enclaves has kept public housing out of these neighborhoods for many years and reinforced concentrated poverty. The federal government had sanctioned this discriminatory behavior for years with discriminatory housing policies (Lipsitz 1998; Massey and Denton 1993; Goetz 2003). In the 1960s, it began to reverse its own actions by promoting fair housing policies and integration, which made resistance to the change inevitable (Goetz 2003). Responses from the receiving community included forming picket lines and submitting angry editorials to the local newspapers (Goetz 2003). Most of the opposition has played out in the media, and it is not clear how representative the negative response is of the neighborhood at large. There has been little, if any, empirical research

conducted on the beliefs and attitudes of the members of the receiving community with regard to the entering public housing residents or mobility programs in general. That is, the underlying causes of the opposition have not been studied. It is important to study this angle because it is possible that an adverse response from members of the receiving community could affect the outcomes of the mobility programs. By examining how individuals from the receiving communities perceive different characteristics of the entering community and mobility programs, empirical insight on the opposition might emerge as well as policy implications.

The focus of this study is on two particular locales of resistance to deconcentration efforts in the Southwest. The notorious Walker case started in the Dallas area in 1985 when seven public housing residents sued the Dallas Housing Authority (DHA) for relegating public housing residents into dilapidated, crime and drug invested buildings (Abt 2000). DHA was court ordered to desegregate its public housing. Homeowners in targeted areas sued in order to stop the construction of mixed income developments in their neighborhood. In another Southwest City<sup>1</sup> (SWC), the razing of a downtown public housing development resulted in the Southwest City Housing Authority (SWCHA) having to find new homes for the inhabitants. The SWCHA decided on an affluent neighborhood, which residents of the community viewed as an infringement on their private property rights.

There were key differences between the two communities, which served as meta-variables for the study. The Dallas case was infamous in that it resulted in a lawsuit that has

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<sup>1</sup> The name of the city has been omitted for purposes of confidentiality. Unlike the Dallas case, this city's case did not reach the courts, and therefore, did not get the same public attention nationwide.

lasted nearly 20 years. In Southwest City the city voluntarily desegregated its public housing. While both groups of homeowners were upset, the Dallas community was focused on stopping the construction of an apartment complex in a community of detached single homes; Southwest citizens had already lived next to an apartment complex, so their focus was on who was moving into an existing complex. The analysis will examine differences between the cities and control for the different scenarios.

The purpose of this work is to examine the beliefs and attitudes of members from these receiving communities with regard to the deconcentration of poverty through mobility programs. *The main research question is how do the receiving homeowners' existing ideologies (beliefs) about liberty, poverty and civic rights relate to their attitudes toward different characteristics of the relocated, low income individuals, such as attitudes toward single mothers, persons with a mental illness and sense of community?*

### 1.3 Ideologies, Attitudes and Hypotheses

The following section describes the major theoretical concepts in the study. Statements of how the concepts are hypothesized to be related are also included at the end of the section.

#### *1.3.1 Ideology*

The concept of liberty and the degree of intervention the government should be allowed is pertinent to housing policy. This is especially the case with mobility programs where government is not just intervening by redistributing dollars, but space as well. According to Kemeny (1992), housing research needs to be grounded in the state. "A central task in housing research must therefore be to begin to develop an understanding of the role of

the state in the housing market in relation to vested interests in housing and in wider society” (Kemeny, 48, 1992). For the present study, it is necessary to examine how ideology influences people’s feelings toward the state’s role in housing. The ideology inherent in current housing policy may clash with the dominant ideologies of homeowners and contribute to the opposition of mobility programs by white homeowners. In order to explore this potential mismatch of ideology and policy, this dissertation examines the ideologies that homeowners hold about individuals and society.

The concept “ideology” has many definitions. For example, in critical social theory, the term is often associated with Marx’s (1846) beliefs that ideology is a tool for legitimizing the state, however, many different definitions have evolved across and within different disciplines (Boudon 1989). While there is no agreement upon a definition of ideology, there are several definitions useful to the current study. Eagleton (1991) explores the various popular definitions of ideology; one of which he defines as neutral, “a body of ideas characteristic of a particular social group or class” (1). This approach allows the observer to gather information on a group, in this case, middle class homeowners, and compare their observed beliefs to assumptions commonly held about their belief structures. The neutral approach is appropriate for this dissertation because this work attempts to measure specific ideologies people might hold about individuals and society. For instance, rather than assuming that the homeowners believe that poverty is caused by individual fault, the study will infer their ideological stance based on their answers to a series of statements. The intent is to paint a picture of the receiving communities based on the ideology of the individual homeowners.

While retaining the neutral framework for understanding the ideology of the homeowners, it is necessary to give the definition of ideology more direction and structure for the specific purpose of this research. Kemeny's (1992) definition is useful for this purpose. He defined ideology as "a loosely organized set of ideas defining human nature (the individual), the principles underlying the organizations of social life (civil society), and the values that govern the political order (state)" ( 87). In this study, the ideology of homeowners in the receiving community will be inferred by their beliefs about the role of the state, attributions about poverty and civic and community rights. Specifically this work attempts to infer ideology by examining homeowners' beliefs held about society including their beliefs about liberty and "right to the city" and their beliefs held about individuals including what they attribute to poverty and stereotypes they associate with low income individuals.

Underlying the decision to relocate public housing residents and the responses of the affluent homeowners are the ideologies that frame the age-old debate of how involved the government should be in people's lives. This debate revolves around a person's view of liberty. Americans value liberty and their individual rights to own and protect property. Relocating low income families into more affluent communities might be seen by the receiving community as an infringement on its property rights. The relocation policy reflects a more regional, communal solution to ameliorating the plight of the impoverished than the traditional market model, which predominately advocates mobility patterns based on individual preferences. Moreover, relocation policy conflicts with the dominant free market ideology and the individualist spirit of Americans (Kluegal and Smith 1986).

Presumably, mobility programs aim to improve the lives of public housing residents, which policy makers believe will effectively increase their opportunities to thrive by relocating them to a more affluent neighborhood. In their new neighborhoods, their liberty is increased because they are free from the barriers that were limiting them, such as high crime, few job opportunities and poorer education. On the receiving end, homeowners in the communities might claim that mobility programs take away their liberty by infringing on their property rights. Mobility programs attempt to make up for some of the economic inequality that has occurred in the lives of the minority poor by increasing their liberty to pursue opportunities, yet some homeowners see the remedy as unfair and as an infringement on their individual liberty to private property and exclusive communities (Goering 2003). These two angles represent different views of liberty, positive and negative, respectively, which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.

There is more to this debate than government intervention and individual liberties. Within the city, housing authorities can select which neighborhood is best for a mixed income development. Placement decisions are based on a number of variables, which, due to federal mandates, are not supposed to be discriminatory. From the perspective of the housing authority, there is no compelling reason not to locate a mixed income development in an affluent neighborhood. It is unlikely that affluent homeowners are against public housing developments per se; the opposition more likely comes from not wanting public housing in their backyards and not believing that public housing residents have the right to live in their neighborhoods. The potential spatial conflict surrounding the relocation may merit a sociospatial approach.

The sociospatial perspective is one that takes into consideration the racial, class, gender, political and economic issues surrounding issues that deal with transforming space (Gottdiener 1994). Mobility programs relocate individuals into more affluent spaces to where they otherwise would not be able to move. A sociospatial framework is used to analyze mobility programs through an extension of spatial rights in urban affairs, Henri Lefebvre's right to the city.

The "right to the city" discussion was inspired by a manifesto of Lefebvre's, and states that all individuals in the city make up the whole and that each person should have an equal say in community decision making and outcomes. It rejects segregation and exclusivity and further indicates that individuals should have a right to live and participate in all parts of the city. Right to the city is useful for this dissertation in that it focuses on what individuals believe about their rights to space versus the rights of others. Specifically it will be applied to address the extent to which the members of the receiving community believe that economic diversity is an important characteristic of a community, whether the entering community's right to space and participation is equal to their own and whether they value the private property of a city over its public uses. Right to the city seeks to answer questions such as do homeowners believe that their neighborhood should be protected more so than other neighborhoods, or that their rights are more important than the rights of others?

It may be that the ideologies people hold about liberty and right to urban space, which are ideologies based on beliefs about society, conflict with housing mobility policy. A dimension that underlies one's beliefs about society is one's beliefs about individuals. Whether residents believe that government should be involved in ameliorating the negative

effects of poverty or whether they believe that public housing residents have the right to live in their neighborhood may be influenced by their beliefs in the causes of poverty, such as individual fault or discrimination. Thus, this dissertation will also determine the degree to which the members of the receiving community attribute poverty to individual factors and structural factors as well as determine their beliefs about low income individuals in general.

### *1.3.2 Attitudes*

This dissertation further seeks to examine if there is a widely held middle-class ideology about liberty and rights that predicts attitudes about the entering community. Attitudes are defined as the feelings and perceptions members of the receiving community have about mobility programs and characteristics of the relocated public housing neighbors. Characteristics of the public housing residents may elicit attitudes and perceptions of the homeowners. “The characteristics of the participating communities- their race, class, gender (such as single-parent, female-headed families), and family size...may affect the responses of the communities as well as landlords” (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000, p 9). Research indicates that people’s attitudes are strongly correlated with their behaviors (Cozzarelli et al., 2003), however limited conclusions may be drawn about a direct causal relationship between the two concepts (Eiser and Pligt 1988). The assumption of this dissertation is that attitudes are not just reactions to a given scenario. Individuals make specific evaluations about whether an issue or situation is good or bad to the point that it becomes their truth until they are convinced otherwise (Eiser and Pligt 1988). This work examines attitudes homeowners have about low income, single mothers and persons with mental illness living near them. Perceptions homeowners have of the potential effects of subsidized housing, whether the low



income neighbors are part of the community and whether they are perceived to have the same values as the rest of the community, are also examined.

Attitudes individuals from the receiving community have about specific policy solutions meant to ameliorate poverty are also explored. The primary focus will be on the extent to which respondents support or oppose mobility programs. While the main purpose of the dissertation is to explore how ideology relates to policy support, the relationship between feelings and perceptions and support for mobility programs will also be explored.

### *1.3.3 Hypotheses*

In order to carry out exploratory research, the theoretical concepts will be operationalized and organized into several hypotheses. The hypotheses include:

- 1. Ideologies about individuals are related to ideologies about society*
- 2. Ideologies about individuals and society are related to perceptions and feelings members of the receiving community have toward public housing residents as neighbors and about mobility programs.*
- 3. The perceptions and feelings of the members of the receiving community are related to their support of mobility programs*
- 4. Ideologies about individuals and society will have a stronger relationship with support for mobility programs than perceptions and feelings*

### 1.4 Contribution

This dissertation has several implications for cities seeking to implement change via housing mobility strategies, because it is often the case that relocation policies are met with great resistance from their host community, a group that has to date not received much

attention in the literature (Rubinowitz and Rosenbam 2000; Goetz 2003). This work seeks to fill a gap in the housing mobility literature on the perspective of members of the receiving communities. By studying the ideology and attitudes of homeowners it may be possible to get a better understanding of why NIMY-ism occurs in middle class neighborhoods in relation to mobility programs. Moreover, it is important to understand all sides involved in any policy, especially the key target populations (Schneider and Ingram 1997).

The members of the receiving community are indeed a key target population that has been neglected. Furthermore, gaining in-depth insight into the perspective of the middle class receiving community might improve the implementation of future relocation policies. The perspective sought after is the receiving community's homeowners' beliefs on liberty, under-served populations and civic rights. Their beliefs, which inform their ideology, may influence their demonstrations against relocation policies as well as the overall success of the programs. If the community is adversarial, the long-term success of this policy could be impeded. The current study contends that ideological factors such as definition of liberty, beliefs about poverty and perceptions of civic and community rights are related to how the receiving community homeowners feel about the entering community as a whole and as individuals. The theoretical foundation of this study aims to capture the issues of opposition that the members of the receiving community might have had, as well as the extent to which opposition persists.

This study differs from other studies of housing mobility policy in several important ways. Most research on mobility programs has focused on the public housing residents. When the receiving community has been studied, the focus has been primarily on financial

impacts, with other aspects of the community effects secondary, if explored at all. The present study takes a deeper look at the receiving community by focusing on variables, such as ideologies and attitudes. In addition, other studies of receiving communities have been located in eastern U.S. cities, whereas this study is located in a southern region where rapid demographic changes reflect the trend occurring across the U.S. This dynamic geographic setting could influence policy outcomes. Black and Hispanic individuals have been systematically excluded from social institutions for over a century. Racism and discrimination have been pervasive in neighborhoods and housing, and it is necessary to see to what extent the entering community is subjected to race and class based discrimination (Massey and Denton 1993, Lipsitz, 1998).

Finally, the receiving community is broadened to include local officials from a Southwest City, who inevitably impact the policy. “Implementation of mobility-based programs depends heavily on community reactions- including those of public bodies and officials, such as mayors, city councils, school officials, and police departments, as well as private institutions, organizations, and individuals” (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000, 8). The entering community comes into contact with businesses, schools and government employees. Several officials from the Southwest City were interviewed to ascertain their assessment of the relocation and its impact on the community. Additionally, they were asked what went well with the relocation and what they would/should have done differently. The few interviews were just a step toward including the important perspective of the broader community. Future studies should include a more comprehensive analysis of additional members from the receiving community who may impact mobility program outcomes.

## 1.5 Summary of the Chapters

Mobility programs have been widely adopted around the nation with mixed results. More research needs to be conducted in order to comprehend all the consequences and impacts of this policy (Galster et al. 1999). This chapter was meant to provide an overview of the current study and orient readers to the major concepts described in the following chapters. Chapter 2 provides a historical analysis of neighborhood segregation. Next, it introduces two waves of neighborhood integration, racial and economic. It outlines perspectives on the causes of segregation and also the different theories for why it has been sustained despite efforts at desegregation with an emphasis on neighborhood preferences and their impact on segregation. It then focuses on homeowner opposition as a current obstacle to economic integration.

Chapter 3 provides an in-depth look at the theoretical concepts, including the ideologies about society and individuals and the perceptions and feelings individuals have about mobility programs and the characteristics associated with their low income neighbors. The major theoretical foundations of liberty and right to the city are explored, along with their respective impacts of society as ideologies. Next, attributions about poverty and stereotypes about the poor are presented as ideologies about individuals. Finally, concepts related to neighbor characteristics of mobility programs, such as low income, single mothers and persons with a mental illness along with potential policy solutions are presented.

Chapter 4 describes the methodology used in the study. This chapter includes a detailed analysis of the demographics of the respondents. It also explains the operationalization of variables and describes the survey instrument.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 provide the results of the descriptive and inductive data analysis. Chapter 5 focuses on the preliminary hypothesis and tests the relationship between ideologies about individuals and ideologies about society. Chapter 6 discusses the relationship between ideologies about individuals and society and feelings and perceptions. The relationship between feelings and perceptions and mobility programs is explored in section I of Chapter 6. Section II combines ideology and feelings and perceptions into a single model to explore which variables have a greater relationship with support for housing mobility programs. Chapter 8 presents a summary of the findings and explores policy implications based on the findings of the study.

## CHAPTER 2

### CHANGING PARADIGMS IN NEIGHBORHOOD INTEGRATION

Residential segregation, both racial and economic, is still the norm rather than the exception in United States cities despite several decades of federal policy changes and initiatives to achieve more diverse neighborhoods (Goering 1986, Massey and Denton 1993, Lipsitz 1998). This chapter examines the policies and history that led to extreme racial and economic segregation and discusses literature pertaining to two phases of housing integration. The first phase is the race based integration where policies aimed to promote affirmative housing practices. The second phase refers to the economic integration that is occurring around the nation via mobility programs such as mixed income developments. These two phases-racial and economic- are not completely distinct from each other as the public housing residents are disproportionately minorities (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000); however, the addition of class considerations makes the integration attempts even more complex (Yinger 1986, Briggs 1997). Next, the chapter takes a look at opposition occurring as a result of the second phase of integration with a focus on two cases occurring in

the Southwest. Finally, the chapter presents a survey of the limited, existing studies of receiving communities.

### 2.1 Mobility Programs: A Merging of Two Spheres

Purchasing a house is a market transaction for most individuals (Veseth 1983). They seek houses that meet their needs, and they pay accordingly. People make both financial and non-financial investments in their neighborhoods (Briggs Dorden and Aidala 1999). The physical dwelling is important, of course, but the surrounding neighborhood is just as, if not more so, important. Schools, proximity to work, property values, cleanliness, crime rates and other neighborhood amenities are factors that go into the consumer's decision to buy or rent property in an area (Yinger 1986, Emerson, Chai and Yancey 2001). Another factor, which is not as often voiced or listed on real estate sites, is the racial make-up of the neighborhood (see for instance Zubrinsky and Bobo 1996, Emerson, Chai and Yancey 2001). The preference of white homeowners to live in overwhelmingly white neighborhoods has helped perpetuate racial and economic segregation (see for example Massey and Denton 1993, Lipsitz 1998 and Ihlanfeldt & Scafidi 2004).

Public housing residents typically don't have as many choices in where they reside, nor do their preferences seem to shape the urban or suburban landscapes. Their fate is left up to federal housing policy and limited housing availability. As discussed in Chapter 1, the choice to live in private, market rate complexes has been made available by the housing voucher programs and mixed income sites located in middle class neighborhoods and suburbs. These programs allow public housing residents to move into neighborhoods where

they have in the past been excluded. In some respects, these programs provide choices for public housing residents in that they can live in low poverty areas and send their children to middle class schools (Kleit 2001). The attempts at economic desegregation have brought low income and middle income neighbors together in what market model theorists see as unnatural and disruptive to the market (Dreier et al. 2001). Similar to the past attempts at race based integration, economic integration is antithetical to the American way in that the government interferes with the sacred realm of private property. Unlike racial integration, economic desegregation juxtaposes not only receiving and entering residents' skin color but also their means and resources. Low income families and affluent families share grocery stores, parks, schools and retail outlets, yet to what extent do they share power, communication or real connections? Are both likely to be members of the PTA? Are both active in council and neighborhood meetings? While this study does not directly answer these questions, it does examine how the ideologies and attitudes of the white homeowners<sup>2</sup> conflicts with the goals of residential integration, which could ultimately affect how integrated residents become.

## 2.2 A Brief History of Residential Segregation

Recent housing mobility policies are not congruent with a long history in the United States of relegating low income individuals to areas where they were hidden from the rest of society. Vale (2000) explores the historical development of attitudes toward housing the poor from “love thy neighbor” to poverty containment. He describes how in colonial times there was a collectivist feel to the villages in that people looked after each other. At first,

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<sup>2</sup> This study is limited to homeowners in the receiving community. The implications for renters are not discussed here; future studies may want to incorporate this group for comparative purposes.



controlling destitute newcomers was easy, as each village was responsible locally for their few indigent. However, external events such as King Phillip's War in 1675 caused an influx of homeless refugees that the town could not handle without regional support. As regional support became more prevalent, the towns began to adjust their views of the poor (Vale 2000). Vale (2000) contends that once the population in U.S. cities increased and the number of indigents also increased, community policies shifted towards containment, primarily because of a fear that being poor was somehow contagious. This policy approach of isolating the "other" in the U.S. was first used with poor immigrants, then after the Civil War, Blacks, and in the 21<sup>st</sup> century to all who were living in poverty (Lipsitz 1998, Massey and Denton 1993, Dreier et al. 2001).

The abhorrent condition of early tenement dwellings during the Progressive Era instigated a national housing movement (Fairbanks 2000). This was due to reformers' concern about the effects of substandard conditions on tenants. However, for non-reformers, housing was seen and still is seen as a private issue. Having to provide housing to people who can not afford their own is believed by many to be antithetical to the foundation of American values. "At the core, the controversy over public housing is a debate about the form and purpose of state-subsidized neighborhoods in a society that places ideological value on individual homeownership and the unfettered operation of private markets" (Vale 2000, 6). Subsidized housing lacked institutional support as well as popular support.

The Great Depression helped instigate a structure of public housing for the "deserving poor" of that unique time (Curley 2005). Federal involvement was seen by the majority as a temporary necessity during this time, and governmental authority stepped into areas that

were fiercely private realms (Meyer 1999, Vale 2000). Yet most of the funds went to help the unemployed with public works projects, designed to help the “worthy” poor (Meyer 2000, Curley 2005). Moreover, with regard to housing policy, the federal government focused on strategies that aimed to improve home ownership among the white middle and upper class home buyers such as highway development, Federal Housing Authority (FHA) loans and other pro-suburban policies (Meyer 2000, Lipsitz 1998, Bauman, Biles and Szlvian 2000). The FHA loans went to white home owners, effectively leaving black families in underdeveloped areas in the city with little federal spending (Lipsitz 1998). These federal policies and programs are often cited as the main cause for residential segregation (Kain 1986).

The effects of relegating the poor and neglected began to manifest and affect urban life. Urban areas became crime-ridden and worn down (Wilson 1989). Many authors have described the negative outcomes that occur in these neighborhoods including social isolation, poor education, decreased job opportunities and sense of hopelessness (see, for example, Wilson 1989; Ellen and Turner 1999, Massey and Denton 1993). The white, middle class exodus began as white people gained the resources to escape the “publicness” of the city to the suburbs where they could form new, private communities. Government policies that facilitated white homeownership in the suburbs, transportation corridors and jobs in the suburbs, accelerated white flight (Dreier 2001, Lipsitz 1998). Once the communities were in place, institutional structures such as redlining and steering helped to ensure that white communities remained predominately white (Kain 1986, Orfield 1986, Lipsitz 1998, Keating 2000).

### 2.3 Causes of Segregation

There is a debate in the literature over what has caused and sustained residential segregation, including contrasting views of what created the current conditions of the inner cities and their persistent segregation. One distinction between the views is that one side is critical of the causes of segregation, while the other perspective defends the causes as a natural occurrence in society. Authors supporting the critical view argue that structural racism in the form of direct and institutional discrimination has led to extreme segregation as well as the sub par environment of the inner city (Massey and Denton 1993, Lipsitz 1998, Meyer 2000).

“The ghetto is part and parcel of modern American society; it was manufactured by Whites earlier in the century to isolate and control growing black populations, and it is maintained today by a set of institutions, attitudes and practices that are deeply embedded in the structure of American life” (Massey and Denton 217, 1993).

Massey and Denton (1993) contend that there was a deliberate attempt at keeping Blacks out of white neighborhoods through federal policies and white neighborhood preferences. This theme is popular in the segregation literature. Lipsitz (1998) notes that the Federal Housing Act of 1934 had racist components that encouraged lending practices that favored the suburbs over inner cities. This ultimately led to state sanctioned segregation for several decades. Meyer (2000) outlines the “reign of terror” that occurred in the South when Blacks entered white neighborhoods. Bombing black homes and other unconscionable acts by Whites were attempted before Whites decided to flee to the suburbs, a strategy used

earlier by northern Whites (Meyer 2000). Once Whites were “safely” in the suburbs measures were taken to keep the neighborhoods white. Freeman (2005) asserts that the two driving causes for sustained neighborhood segregation were that Whites wanted to keep Blacks out of their neighborhoods and that lending institutions assumed that Blacks could not be trusted to pay back loans. The former cause will be examined in greater detail later in the chapter.

In addition to the discriminatory behavior of individuals, research suggests that other variables such as institutional discrimination in the economy can be attributed to the race based residential segregation. Wilson (1989) in his seminal work, *The Truly Disadvantaged*, pointed out that other factors such as economic changes, which left the market challenging for unskilled laborers, contributed to the segregation and concentration of low income Blacks in urban centers. The economy shifted from production based to service based industries, leaving unskilled workers in a market void. This trend coupled with the de-industrialization of inner cities dramatically increased unemployment rates. Wilson did not mean to discount the role of blatant discrimination, but rather attempted to illustrate how discrimination is inextricably linked with the economy. Moreover, the economic climate is also linked to discrimination, because employers tend to exhibit more discrimination during economic downturns (Wilson 1991). What underlies and connects these critical views of segregation is that the poor and disenfranchised are not poor due to solely individual factors; society has had some responsibility. This critical perspective further implies that government intervention is needed to reduce the inequalities that have been perpetuated by its people and institutions.

An opposing, defensive view of segregation would be held by public choice theorists (e.g. Buchanan & Tullock 1962, Ostrom 1991, Tiebout 1956) who would argue that segregation could be caused by natural market outcomes, which are the most efficient outcomes for society. In Buchanan and Tullock's *Calculus of Consent*, the authors argue that individuals are driven by their self-interests, including policy makers (1962). Their view contributed to the market model of society where individuals are assumed to calculate decisions rationally and pursue their self-interests. As Stone (2002) points out, the market model is not just applied to "systems where goods and services are bought and sold" (10). Just as in the traditional market, the seeking of public goods and amenities can be explained by the same rational behavior of the atomized individuals maximizing their utility. Thus, societal institutions are the result of individuals going after their self-interests and maximizing their utility. According to public choice theorists, an efficient allocation of resources results from the collective self-interests of residents. In order for this theory to hold, residents need to be able to pursue their self-interests. According to Tiebout (1956)'s classic discussion of public goods, individuals are able to make decisions about what public amenities they want by moving to areas that provide their preferred amenities. People are inclined to move to an area that fits their needs. From this logic, even if the end result is segregation, it is based on the choices of individuals, rather than external structures.

Public choice theorists consider the fragmentation and segregation of different groups to be a natural development. The public choice model infers that the differences between communities with regard to schools, parks, institutions and other amenities are based on different tastes or preferences rather than inequalities in society (Logan and Molotch 1982).

“This natural pattern, a product of rational choice, makes possible strong communities, centered on extended families as well as churches, schools, and civic organizations” (Rockwell, 1994 57). Thus, people’s individual, rational choices could have resulted in concentrated poverty. The market perspective would contend that moving low income families into more affluent neighborhoods distorts market signals, creating an inefficient allocation of resources (Schneider & Ingram 1997). This logic calls for a reduction in government intervention and an increase in the reliance on a market model for community decision-making. With regard to government redistributive policies, the public choice critique is reminiscent of Murray’s (1984) contention that welfare fosters dependency (Schneider & Ingram 1997). From this perspective, it could be argued that the public housing provided to inner city residents caused them to become dependent on the assistance to the point that they were unable to move out of the inner cities. To public choice theorists, a combination of preferences and government intervention in the form of welfare could explain residential segregation.

#### 2.4 The First Wave: Racial Integration

Neighborhood integration programs inherently conflict with the dominant view of society, which aligns more with public choice theorists and their free market perspective. So why did forced integration occur? The first attempts at neighborhood integration were race based and an attempt to combat segregation perpetuated and condoned by discriminatory federal government policies (Goering 1986, Keating 1994). Following Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, or specifically the Fair Housing Act, egregious housing discrimination was outlawed and affirmative housing policies were implemented. This Act was ambiguous

and subject to different interpretations (Vernarelli 1986). According to Orfield (1986) one interpretation was that the Act called for open housing but had no end goal predetermined. In other words, an outcome of racial segregation was fine as long as discrimination in housing policies was not to blame. A second interpretation was that the goal of the policy was to have more diverse neighborhoods through affirmative programs such as housing counseling. The ambiguity of the law made integration attempts more complex and perhaps not as successful as they could have been.

The underlying rationale for the Fair Housing Act was that it would decrease the prejudices between the races (Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004). In theory, individuals living next door to each other would learn more about each other, and their prejudices and stereotypes would decrease (Massey and Denton 1993, Keating 1994). This belief was supported by Allport's (1954) contact theory. Allport (1954) contended that minority and majority groups living side by side would effectively decrease racial prejudices. His main contention was that "segregation markedly enhances the visibility of a group; it makes it seem larger and more menacing than it is" (1954, 269). Allport's study of racial residential integration found that different groups' attitudes toward each other were more favorable over time. The hostility that occurred before neighborhood integration eventually subsided. There has been a lot of modern research conducted on Allport's contact hypothesis that has supported the hypothesis given specific conditions of interaction, which will be discussed in more detail in a later section (see Pettigrew 1998, Wittig & Grant-Thompson 2004 and Dixon & Rosenbaum 2004 for examples of contact theory research).

#### *2.4.1 What has Sustained Segregation?*

In addition to the differing views of the causes of segregation, the literature is divided over the reasons why segregation exists after several decades of integration attempts. An early study of contact theory may shed some light on the theories of why segregation has remained persistent. Past studies have supported contact theory; that is, they have found that Whites' attitudes toward Blacks do improve when they are living near black neighbors (Robinson 1980). Robinson (1980) conducted a study to see if residential proximity was related to Whites' attitudes about Blacks. He examined secondary data of white respondents' General Social Survey (GSS) answers from 1972 to 1977. The GSS database was large and the questions about race were mixed with many other categories of questions, so individuals may have been more likely to answer without a social acceptability bias. Robinson used a much larger data set than previous studies of contact theory, collecting data on 9000 cases. Statements such as “laws against interracial marriage” (327) were used to gauge the respondents' racial attitudes, the dependent variable. The independent variable was how many blocks/miles respondents lived from the closest black family— self-reported on a scaled item. Robinson (1980) discovered that proximity to Blacks was a mild predictor of Whites' racial attitudes toward Blacks, even after controlling for political ideology and demographic variables, such as age, gender and region. The importance of this study was that it found that physical/social contact were more important than socioeconomic variables and other preconditions, which earlier studies had found to be important (Robinson 1980). The policy implication was that contact hypothesis was effective and that, perhaps more



importantly, segregation may be detrimental to race relations. The problem was that many Whites preferred to live in homogeneous areas. Thus, the argument would go, Whites' attitudes toward Blacks, reinforced by separation, sustain segregation.

Residential preferences have become a major focus of the segregation literature. “The extent to which Americans prefer racially homogeneous, segregated neighborhoods is the first piece of attitudinal puzzle necessary to assess the strengths and directions for racial residential harmony” (Goering 1986, 142). Not all scholars have been convinced that white preferences are at the root of segregation. One theory that has emerged in recent years is that segregation persists, because Blacks prefer to live in predominately black neighborhoods (Patterson 1997, Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1996). Krysan and Farley (2002) conducted an advanced analysis of black neighborhood preferences and the causes underlying their preferences. Their purpose was twofold: to determine what neighborhood racial composition Blacks found most attractive and what neighborhood racial composition into which Blacks would be willing to move. They collected quantitative data and asked open-ended questions of 2,040 African Americans who were identified through the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI), which is a database drawn from the metropolitan areas of Atlanta, Boston and Los Angeles. The participants were handed cards that depicted varying degrees of neighborhood racial composition. They were asked to rank neighborhoods in order of attractiveness (first dependent variable) and then rank them in the order of how willing they'd be to move to the neighborhood (second dependent variable). Participants were asked open-ended questions about why the neighborhood they ranked first was most attractive to them. Most of the respondents avoided the segregated neighborhoods, white or black. Many found

the 50 percent black and 50 percent white composition most attractive, but when it came to where they'd be willing to move, most of those respondents were only willing to move into a higher density black neighborhood. "These results show a desire for integration coupled with an aversion to pioneering..." (Krysan and Farley, 2002, 950). Respondents wanted to move into more integrated neighborhoods; something was holding them back from making the move.

Past studies have stopped here and assumed that Blacks' preferences were the cause of segregation. Krysan and Farley (2002) decided to explore the nuances behind those preferences. One conclusion they drew was that Blacks preferred to live in a 50 percent black and a 50 percent white neighborhood, but since there were not many neighborhoods with those demographics, segregation persisted. Another interesting finding was that a little over 50 percent of respondents cited a fear of white hostility for the reason why they were not willing to move into all white neighborhoods. The authors suggested that the attention should be turned to white neighborhoods and the preferences of Whites, who do not want the same levels of diversity. Ultimately, Whites have to be willing to accept a more diverse neighborhood. "While it is important to root out continuing discrimination in the housing market, speeding integration is also contingent on Whites' reassuring Blacks that they are welcome in all residential areas, that their children are welcome to their schools, and that they will be treated with respect, not suspicion" (Krysan and Farley 2002, 970). If Blacks cannot exercise their preference to live in a more diverse neighborhood, doesn't that essentially take away their choice? Pattillo (2005) made a poignant argument by claiming that it is the ideology of Whites that should be examined, as Blacks are not able to exercise

their rights to fulfill neighborhood preferences. She argued that “if racial integration is the remedy to various racial disparities, then the more fruitful endeavor may be to study the ideologies, practices, and cultures of white neighborhoods, rather than black ones” ( 305). There have been studies of Whites’ preferences, which may shed some light on white, middle class ideology.

Recent studies of Whites concluded that segregation has been sustained by Whites' preference to live in segregated communities. Authors such as Bobo and Zubrinsky (1996) and Farley et al. (1978) asserted that Whites’ aversion to Blacks in their neighborhoods was evidence of racial prejudices. An early study by Farley et al. (1978) examined the causes of racial segregation in cities and suburbs, or what they referred to as “chocolate cities” and “vanilla suburbs.” One of the research issues they focused on was the extent that Whites were accepting of or willing to live by Blacks. Their interest was driven by a paradox in society that was reflected in national polls showing Whites as more accepting of black neighbors of equal income and education, while, in reality, segregation had not decreased. Farley et al. (1978) drew samples of Whites and Blacks in the suburbs and in the central city of Detroit. They showed participants cards, which diagrammed houses in hypothetical neighborhoods with varying amounts of black and white households. There was evidence that Blacks preferred to live in mixed neighborhoods, consistent with past studies. Whites generally preferred more segregated neighborhoods. Overall, the tipping point for what percentage of Blacks Whites would accept in their neighborhood was 30 percent. When asked why they would move out of neighborhoods with greater percentages of Blacks, white participants provided answers that indicated they were afraid their property values would fall. The

authors concluded that the preferences of Whites should be considered a cause of segregation.

Zubrinisky and Bobo (1996) conducted a partial replication of the Farley et al. (1978) study almost 20 years later with data from the Los Angeles area. They included interviews with Latinos and Asians in addition to Blacks and Whites and referred to cities as prisms of race and cultures rather than “chocolate and vanilla.” Their results also supported the hypothesis that racial segregation is caused by discrimination and prejudice. This was especially the case for Blacks, who were at the bottom of the hierarchy when participants were asked about potential neighbors by whom they would prefer to live. Whites were on top, followed by Asians, then Latinos and, finally, Blacks. Across racial lines, white neighborhoods were consistently scored as the highest preference and black neighborhoods were scored as the lowest. Zubrinisky and Bobo (1996) pointed out the psychological complications that are associated with a hierarchical structure in society. All respondents seemed to have been aware of this hierarchy of preferences, which Zubrinisky and Bob (1996) contend is evidence that they have adapted to it. With such shared awareness of preferences, it is not difficult to see how it became a part of the institution of American neighborhoods.

Several other recent empirical studies have found evidence to support the conclusion that prejudice and discrimination are the leading causes of residential segregation. Farley (1995) conducted a study of segregation in the St. Louis Metropolitan area, an area he described as becoming more segregated with black families living in the city and white families in the suburbs and outer rings of the city. He found that segregation is still largely

based on race, not class. He wanted to see how much socioeconomic differences could account for the segregation in the city. He compared 1990 Census data with past years by creating indices of segregation and exposure to Blacks and Whites. Based on individuals' tenure in a neighborhood and housing costs, he created expected racial compositions for the different Census tracts and compared them to the actual racial composition of those tracts. The index of dissimilarity revealed that in every income group Blacks and Whites were segregated. He concluded that race matters above and beyond the socioeconomic differences between the races. Moreover, he contended that because economic disparity between the races was decreasing and segregation was not, race was becoming even more significant a factor in sustaining segregation.

Emerson, Chai and Yancey (2001) examined Whites' residential decisions when presented with hypothetical neighborhoods of varying racial compositions of Blacks, Hispanics and Asians. They conducted a nation-wide randomized telephone survey with a factorial design. The authors controlled for racial proxy variables, such as crime rates and property values. Their research differed from past research in that they used racial composition as an independent variable, included a larger scope of control variables and drew from a national sample. Surveyors placed respondents in the hypothetical situation of buying a home in random types of neighborhoods. They asked respondents to imagine they had found a home they loved near schools and work. Results indicated that racial composition did not matter when it came to Hispanics or Asians, but the composition of Blacks did matter significantly, even after controlling for socioeconomic variables, which were the variables Whites often used as excuses for why they would not move into a black

neighborhood. Moreover, respondents said they would be unlikely to move into a neighborhood that was more than 15 percent black. Evidence from the study suggested that race itself matters more powerfully than other variables (Emerson, Chai and Yancey 2001).

Inlanfeldt and Scatidi (2004) attempted to explain Whites' preferences for racial composition in their neighborhoods and also the factors that affected their preferences. They analyzed data from the Multi City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI) database. Face to face interviews were conducted from 1992 to 1994 with a sample of 984 Whites. Interviewers showed participants cards of varying racial composition. They asked respondents to say how comfortable they would be living in the different hypothetical neighborhoods and also how willing they would be to move to each type of neighborhood. They used the answers to these questions to create an index of residential preferences (RPI). The RPI became one of the variables included in the model that predicted the percent of Blacks in a block group. The RPI variable was very significant in the model, and the authors concluded that Whites' preferences for predominately white neighborhoods were greatly associated with the racial compositions of the neighborhoods in which they chose to live.

Other authors agreed that Whites preferred white neighborhoods, but they differed with respect to the reason. They categorized the previous studies as supporting a "pure racism" hypothesis and departed from this hypothesis by insisting that people were not averse to neighborhoods based on race alone, but that people associated deteriorating conditions with predominately minority areas. According to Orfield (1986), middle-class Whites were predisposed to think of black families, even black families of higher income, as "harbingers of the neighborhood's rapid racial transformation and decline and not as assets

for the neighborhood culture” (Orfield, 1986, 21). Orfield (1986) claimed that the fear of neighborhood deterioration is the underlying cause of white flight--white families assumed that black families moving in would harm their property values, so Whites moved out, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. Harris (2001) supported Orfield's claim in that he found support that Whites were reacting out of fear for their neighborhood rather than having a blatant racist response. He contended that researchers were not adequately measuring the socioeconomic causes of segregation. He noted that past research had found that Blacks had similar preferences for not wanting to live in a predominantly black neighborhood, yet that the explanation behind this phenomenon has been explained by assuming that Blacks sense the “greater good” of diversity. He suggested that this phenomenon was indicative of another underlying cause, namely that both Whites and Blacks associated black neighborhoods with social problems such as high crime rates. He purported that other factors were involved in neighborhood preferences other than “pure racism” and developed the “racial proxy hypothesis” to encompass them. While most literature suggested that racial prejudice underlies neighborhood preferences, Harris (2001) attempted to differentiate between pure racism and the racial proxy hypothesis.

The racial proxy hypothesis contended that neighborhood preferences were influenced by the concentration of social problems in predominantly black neighborhoods (Harris 2001). In order to test this hypothesis, Harris distinguished racial from non racial factors and determined how much they influenced neighborhood satisfaction, the dependent variable. He contended that the vignette approach that other studies used could have produced a bias, whereas in his study participants were asked about neighborhood

satisfaction, which would not likely be associated with racial preferences. Harris (2001) looked at telephone survey data collected from the Chicago Area Survey Project from 1990-1993. Independent variables included how big of a problem participants felt different social problems were in their neighborhood and the percent poverty and percent black in each neighborhood. He found support for the racial proxy hypothesis and claimed that previous studies suffered from an omitted variable bias by leaving out class and social composition. There was support for the pure racism hypothesis, but the strong correlation between race and non-racial independent variables suggested a bias in the strength of race when the other variables were not entered.

Harris also found evidence that both Whites and Blacks were less satisfied with predominately black neighborhoods. Most important to the hypothesis, once the nonracial variables were controlled, the relationship between neighborhood satisfaction and racial composition was greatly diminished and only significant for Whites living in neighborhoods that were 24-50 percent black. Variables that were significant included crime, neighborhood deterioration, and perhaps most interesting for the present study, the percent poor in a neighborhood.

Ellen (2000) advanced a hypothesis similar to the racial proxy hypothesis, the “race based neighbourhood projection” (1513) hypothesis, which stated that residential preferences were not based on racial composition, but on what individuals project would happen to a neighborhood over time. Her study used a unique data set linking household level census data with the Urban Institute Underclass database. Obtaining access to 1980 and 1990 data, she was able to track mobility decisions over time. She modeled the decisions of nearly



10,000 households from 34 metropolitan areas. She used different neighborhood characteristics to predict the race of a given household. Specifically, she was able to develop probabilities that a household would be black or white, that a black household would replace a white household or a black household and that a white household would replace a black or white household. Independent variables in the model included the percentage black in a neighborhood, whether the unit was public housing, location and poverty rate, among others.

While the model made several unrealistic assumptions, such as the assumption that all households would be occupied, it was able to provide evidence to support Ellen's hypothesis. According to her findings, Whites were not necessarily averse to entering a mixed neighborhood based on race; they were more concerned with the future of the neighborhood with regard to property values, schools and other amenities. This finding was supported by a complimentary finding that Whites with children were less likely to move into integrated neighborhoods. She also found that homeowners were more in tune with the racial composition of a neighborhood than were renters. One of the conclusions Ellen made was that Whites exited a neighborhood out of a concern for the perceived structural changes they believed would occur, however, racial composition itself was more important when it came to entering a community rather than exiting.

The previous paragraphs just scratched the surface on neighborhood segregation research. Dawkins (2004) did a much more thorough review of the literature describing the different hypotheses of neighborhood segregation. He reviewed recent literature on residential location choices and summarized and critiqued the major hypotheses that have emerged in the segregation literature, including non-raced based hypotheses and race based

hypotheses. He organized the literature by the different hypotheses they supported. The non-race based included income differences between the races and housing preferences. Race based included the races not having equal access to housing information, racial prejudice and housing discrimination. Dawkins (2004) concluded that the literature finding racial prejudices and housing discrimination to be major caused of segregation dominated, with the other hypotheses having less support. While there did seem to be evidence that both Whites and Blacks preferred segregated neighborhoods, he found that the literature predominately supported the claim that Whites had stronger preferences for segregation.

The present study extends the ideas underlying the race based and racial proxy hypotheses, because these hypotheses seem to be more pertinent to economic integration. With economic integration, income differences are a given and access to housing information is taken out of the equation. Rather than just race based, class based considerations are made as well as “class proxy” variables. Are adversarial homeowners in the receiving community prejudiced against low income individuals or is it the neighborhood effects they associate with low income communities that bother them? Racial and economic segregation both may have been perpetuated by white residential preferences and shared a similar history, but economic segregation and attempts at economic integration warrant a separate discussion, due to some key differences discussed in the next sections.

### 2.5 Second Wave: Economic Integration

The goal of the early Gautreaux program was racial desegregation; later mobility programs focused on economic desegregation as their main purpose (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000). Many would argue that these goals are inextricably linked when it comes

to public housing, because of the severe segregation that has resulted in exclusive neighborhoods (Kleit 1999). Despite the attempts at racial integration, affluent suburbs remain predominately white due to the economic differences between Whites and minorities in America (Keating 1994). Economic segregation increased to the point where it became as pervasive a problem as racial segregation, or rather more pervasive (Dreier et al. 2000, Meyer 2000). Economic integration originated from the same place as racial integration, the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (Goering 1986). One theory of why racial integration has not been very successful is that people associate racial integration with economic integration.

...the unwillingness or inability to distinguish between race and income as causes of racial segregation, and the massive concentration of black households in American cities, produces programs that yield disappointing results when evaluated in terms of their success in reducing racial segregation (Kain, 1986, 100).

If economic and racial segregation cannot be separated, then racial integration will continue to face a steep, upward battle. When they can be disentangled, racial integration is probably more politically acceptable than economic integration. Although the two have similar pasts, economic integration has a distinct impetus. For economic integration, there was not the strong foundation of the Civil Rights movement that instigated racial neighborhood equality, at least not in the sense that it resonated with the receiving communities. It is one thing to argue for racial equality, but moving people into a community that they cannot otherwise afford to live in is even more controversial (Yinger 1986). Moreover, a person's race and economic status are very distinct concepts; race is not self-inflicted or something that can be changed, while poverty is seen as a mutable trait. Further, there does not seem to be as much concern by policymakers with different income groups

getting along, as was the case with the racial integration based on contact theory. As mentioned earlier, Allport's contact theory assumes that different racial groups living side by side would help decrease prejudice. The necessary conditions for contact theory to be applicable to economic integration may not exist (Yinger 1986, Kleit 2001). Wittig and Grant-Thompson (2004) point out that contact theory has specific conditions that must be met in order for it to be successful. They list the following conditions in their work:

- program support by authority figures
- equal status of participants within situation
- cooperative interdependence among participants across groups
- individualized contact having the potential for friendships across groups (798).

Mobility programs generally do not meet these conditions. For example, public housing residents do not tend to have equal status with the receiving community, nor do they have significant friendship interactions with their more affluent neighbors (Kleit 2001). Rather than placing a direct focus on individual contacts and the dispelling of prejudices, economic integration focuses on the way the neighborhood itself impacts individuals.

In the 1980s and 1990s housing research turned its focus on the effects neighborhoods had on residents (Curley 2005). The theory that one's physical environment affects the quality of one's life has been explored in the urban poverty literature. The general consensus in recent literature has been that "neighborhood matters" (Curley 2005; Dreier et al. 2001; Galster and Killen 1995). Urban studies of neighborhood influence are not new. Oscar Lewis' (1968) culture of poverty theory contended that a person's early socialization and environment instilled a culture in him/her that persisted throughout his/her life, regardless of a change in environment. The values and mores of individuals, caused by their

impoverished surroundings, were the reasons for their lack of achievement rather than structural problems. Bulman (2002) explored an interesting angle of how pop culture has perpetuated Lewis' theory. He researched Hollywood depictions of the “culture of poverty” by examining movies set in urban schools. The themes in the movies were similar—disadvantaged students struggled to attend school in a hopeless crime ridden, drug invested world without the belief that their lives could amount to anything more. Next, an idealistic teacher or principal arrived who guided them to their full potential and a sense of self-worth by making them reject the notions that their futures were unchangeable and taught them to embrace individualism. Hard work and discipline were the answers to their problems. Most of the movies ended up reinforcing the idea that it was up to the student to change his/her values and attitudes in order to succeed, rather than attributing some of the problem to structural and institutional problems.

Galster and Killen (1995) also contended that poor neighborhoods had an adverse effect on residents. They depart from Lewis’ classical model by including opportunity, specifically the “geography of opportunity.” The geography of opportunity model argued that an individual’s neighborhood affects his or her opportunities to succeed and that by leaving an impoverished neighborhood, he or she would be able to thrive. The extent that people had control over their lives and a strong sense of self-efficacy was related to their neighborhoods. That is, the place where individuals resided affected what they believed they were capable of achieving as well as what they were actually able to achieve. This theory contrasted with Lewis’ in that it allowed for the “social buffer” hypothesis that Wilson (1989) described. Wilson (1989) contended that by removing barriers, such as high unemployment rates, high

crime rates and poor role models by relocating low income individuals to a low poverty environment, the low income individuals were more likely to thrive. In their new environment, there was access to better jobs, better schools for their children and other amenities that contributed to a family's well being (Wilson 1999). Individuals were seen as disenfranchised by the physical and social conditions/structure they were born into and constrained by these barriers and lack of opportunities. Rather than seeing the effects of an individual's environment as immutable, the geography of opportunity model contended that new opportunities could ultimately create healthier and better lives. Galster and Killen (1995) described two dimensions of opportunity. One was the "opportunity of structure" which was made up of "markets, institutions and service delivery systems" and their interactions with individuals (Galster and Killen 1995, 9). The second was the prospect dimension which referred to the socioeconomic outcomes people perceived would happen given the decisions they made within the structure. In a new environment, free of barriers and constraints, individuals would be able to fulfill their potential, but perhaps more importantly, they would know that their actions and decisions affected change in their lives. In the middle class environment it was assumed that people would have role models and reason to believe that they could make choices that would effect positive changes in their lives.

The rise of literature on social capital has also contributed to a recognition of the importance of neighborhood, specifically the association of social ties and networks and a person's well-being (Putnam 2000). Briggs (1998) contended that social capital consisted of "social support" and "social leverage." Social support was the networks people have that help them "get by," such as being able to confide in someone, borrowing emergency cash or

having someone who could provide childcare in a pinch. Social leverage referred to the contacts that allowed them to “get ahead” (Briggs 1998). These contacts provided job information or resources for school or other opportunities for advancement. The geography of opportunity model assumed that when families moved into their new neighborhoods they would have access to both types of social capital, although there was some concern that their existing social ties would be broken in the move. According to Briggs (1998), low income individuals traditionally had good social support, but it was the lack of social leverage that maintained the impoverished state. Both types of social capital are important, and it is necessary for research to determine both the extent to which social leverage is increased as well as the changes in social support in the new neighborhoods.

#### *2.5.1 Evaluation of Economic Integration*

The jury is still out on whether economic integration is a sustainable option for communities. Some studies have shown that a move from an area of concentrated poverty to a more affluent community can be very positive for families in terms of greater economic opportunities, better schools for children and a reduction in crime (Varady and Walker 2003). However, not all of the studies have shown positive results. Programs including the Gautreaux Program and Moving to Opportunity (MTO) described in Chapter 1 have been evaluated, and while there have been promising results in both cases, there has also been evidence of negative results that should be evaluated in future research.

The Gautreaux program allowed participants to move with private sector housing vouchers beyond the barriers of inner city Chicago to the suburbs and non-impacted city areas (Rosenbaum et al 2002). The Gautreaux studies were set up as a quasi-experimental

design (Rosenbaum 1991). Participants were quasi-randomly assigned to city housing or housing in the suburbs. When suburban housing was available, residents were assigned to it, otherwise they were moved to a city location and placed in the comparison group. The comparison group in the city was considerably different from the original housing development, however the neighborhoods were similar enough to use for comparative purpose. Although the city housing was considerably better than the original developments, it still served as a comparison group for the study. The suburbs were new terrain for many black families at the time, and certainly for low income, black families. The assumption was that there would be better jobs in the suburbs and greater opportunities for youth in terms of education and employment. There were also concerns of discrimination and concerns that the public housing residents did not have much work experience to prosper financially in their new communities. The Gautreaux study provided a means to explore the results of the relocation on the “pioneers” (Rosenbaum 1991).

Rosenbaum and Popkins (1988) studied the effects the relocation had on adult employment and children's education. They conducted 95 interviews with relocatees in addition to collecting employment and education data. They found that the people living in the suburbs were 25 percent more likely to have a job than the urban comparison group. Suburban movers were also more likely to say that they had better jobs and that the suburbs motivated them to do better.

Suburban movers also stated several barriers they faced in their new homes, most notably transportation and childcare problems. Some suburban participants also contended that they were not getting certain jobs due to discrimination or that the jobs they did get were



more menial. Others noted that white people dominated the managerial and other higher up positions.

The effects of the relocation on children's new schools were also studied. Children in the suburbs were in smaller classes, were more satisfied with their teachers, and had better attendance. It was also noted that some of the students found the schools in the suburbs more challenging than their former schools. Rosenbaum (1991) conducted a follow-up study seven years later to examine other educational outcomes. The suburban schools had higher reading scores than the urban. The dropout rates were lower in the suburbs (5% compared to 20%). Suburban children were more likely to be employed after graduation (75% compared to 41%). Suburban students were more likely to be enrolled in college (54% compared to 21%).

Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum (2000) compared the sense of community and fear of crime of Gautreaux suburb movers and city movers. City movers had a much greater fear of crime and were twice as likely to be victims of crime. However, despite the lower crime rates in the suburbs, some suburb movers had to contend with racial violence and threats. Social ties were also not as strong in the suburbs at first. Early findings found that 74 percent of suburb movers reported having one friendly neighbor and 26 percent reported none. Despite the increased racial harassment and decreased social ties, a decade later there were little differences in social ties between suburb and city movers and the discrimination had decreased over time.

MTO took place in five cities and had a more rigorous, controlled design than Gautreaux (Rosenbaum 2001). The Gautreaux quasi-experimental design could not control for selection effects or other threats to internal validity, whereas the MTO project could.

Results from MTO have supported the claim that relocation offers greater opportunities for the participating families (Goering 2003; Rosenbom 2000; Harris 2001). Rosenbaum and Harris (2001) used three data sources to examine MTO participants in Chicago. They accessed the Urban Institute Underclass Database to obtain 1990 Census data for the receiving and origin communities, data from HUD's baseline survey given before the move, and a telephone survey conducted after the move. They compared the MTO experimental group (the counseled group that had to move to low poverty areas) with the Section 8 comparison group (the group that moved to low poverty areas but did not receive counseling). From the Census data, the researchers could tell that all movers were located in better neighborhoods. In fact, there were significant improvements in terms of safety, services and youth risks for both groups compared to the origin tracts. However, the group who was forced to move to low poverty tracts had more significant gains in terms of neighborhood improvement and associated characteristics. In addition to positive changes, there were challenges associated with the low poverty areas, such as problems with access to public transportation.

Hanratty, McLanahan and Petit (2003) examined the findings of the Los Angeles MTO site. They conducted telephone surveys or in-person interviews with 285 families in the MTO experimental group, the Section 8 group and the control group. Similar to what Rosenbaum and Harris (2001) found, the participants in the MTO and Section 8 groups moved to higher SES neighborhoods and perceived MTO residents greater safety in their new neighborhoods than the control group residents. There were no significant differences in employment rates between the groups, but of the employed, the MTO and Section 8 groups

had significantly higher salaries, and the Section 8 group worked significantly more hours per week.

There were mixed results on the social capital measures. Adults in the MTO and Section 8 groups had fewer ties to family and friends compared to the control group. The parents were as involved in their children's lives and the children had the same number of friends in their neighborhoods as the control children. The authors looked at church attendance as another indicator of neighborhood integration. They found that the members of the MTO and Section 8 groups did not attend church as often as they had in their old neighborhoods. Hanratty et al. (2003) contended that since church involvement was a more intimate connection to a neighborhood compared to school or other organizations, the experimental group participants might have faced a barrier to integration in their new neighborhoods. Incidentally, involvement in school and other organizations remained the same.

In a study of the Yonkers relocation, Briggs (1998) studied the effect of mobility on social capital. Yonkers, NY, was a diverse and highly segregated city of New York in terms of residence and schools. The Department of Justice and a local chapter of the NAACP sued the city for purposefully segregating public housing. In 1985 the court sided with the plaintiffs and claimed that the city was indeed trying to “protect” white homeowners by concentrating its public housing in high poverty and high minority areas. Moreover, the extent to which schools were segregated violated equal education opportunity laws. Busing was immediately implemented to ameliorate the school inequalities. Scattered site public housing buildings, designed by famous architect Oscar Newman, were built around the city

in low poverty areas. The design of the Yonkers mobility program differed from the Gautreaux project in several ways. Rather than using vouchers to disperse families, the Yonkers program relocated families to more concentrated sites around the city. Another difference was that while the Gautreaux families moved to suburbs where their children attended new school districts, the Yonkers families moved within the same school district and attended the same schools as the comparison group in their old neighborhoods.

Briggs (1998) examined social ties at an early age by surveying 132 African American and Latino youth ages 13-18. The sample was half “movers” and half “stayers.” Some of his positive findings included that social support for movers was not diminished, because they were not cut off from family and friends and that parents of movers were not as worried about neighborhood risks. While social support remained strong, social leverage did not seem to improve in the new neighborhoods. He found that relocated individuals did not have significant connections to the white, receiving community, similar to Kleit’s (2001) findings. Another notable finding was that one quarter of children did not know a person who could give them advice on jobs or careers (Briggs 1998). Although the findings were preliminary, the lack of social tie differences between the movers and stayers suggested that the perceived benefits of relocating families in terms of the social leverage dimension of social capital may be exaggerated. The design of the scattered site may have had something to do with the findings, as the movers remained in contact with their old neighborhood and their scattered sites were “microneighborhoods” isolated from the surrounding white homeowners (Briggs 1998, 210). Future studies may want to compare social ties between different types of relocation sites.

For the most part, the studies have reported positive results of the mobility programs. However, there is mounting negative evidence in the literature, which may warrant more attention. For instance, there have been some reports of individuals moving back to the city or complaining of racism in schools and neighborhoods (Runinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000). Goetz (2004) notes that the relocation policies could be impeded by implementation problems which may lead to the attrition back to the inner cities. One problematic finding is that minorities have been disproportionately moving back to high poverty areas after relocation (Goetz 2004), a finding that may support the idea that race and economics can be disentangled.

In addition to problems of attrition, Goetz (2004) notes that recent results from MTO studies have shown little difference in baseline and mobility outcomes. This observation departs from the long string of positive results of other studies. Goetz also warns that the voluntary programs such as MTO participate in creaming and ensure that only those motivated to succeed in their new environments relocate and others relocating into new areas can lose significant resources from their support networks (Goetz 2003). These obstacles might limit the extent of the impact mobility programs have on concentrated poverty. Moreover, as Goetz (2003) pointed out, “mobility programs face a paradox—they must remain small to remain politically viable, but smallness ensures they will never address concentrated poverty adequately” (17). With smaller numbers of public housing residents moving into a neighborhood, it is easier to hide the fact that they are there at all. To what extent will social interaction occur in such an environment? The extent that an entering community interacts with a receiving community is inextricably linked to the success of an

integration program, according to the theories underlying their implementation. With the political and social components weighing so heavily on the success of mobility programs, attention must also be turned to the opposition from predominately white, middle class neighborhoods.

Several authors have called for an examination of the white neighborhoods (Yinger 1986, Pattillo 2005, Kleit 2001). This dissertation intends to add to and extend the literature on white neighborhoods that are the target of mobility programs. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to opposition spurred by receiving communities of low income groups and the studies that have attempted to evaluate the impact of these relocations on the receiving communities.

### 2.6 Cases of Opposition to Economic Integration

Around the country, desegregation attempts have been met with resistance by receiving communities. Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum (2001) described how implementation of the Gautreaux scattered site program made little progress within the first two decades of the federal mandate. In part, the stalling of the scattered sites was due to the resistance by the receiving communities who vehemently opposed the sites. This race and class based resistance was not coming just from the residents in the communities, but by political and administrative leaders as well. “The CHA, Mayor Daley, the City Council and organized residents combined to prevent the program from getting started on a timely basis, thus establishing a pattern that plagued the program for many years” (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2001, 28). The 1980s continued to see resistance by the community as residents feared the detrimental effects public housing could have on their neighborhood. Lawsuits were filed to

block construction, but eventually the scattered sites were implemented as mandated and resistance from the receiving community decreased after the relocations took place.

In 1986, the Yonkers court case mandated that the city desegregate its public housing. Briggs (1999) described the intense resistance that occurred when the judge ordered scattered sites to be built in white neighborhoods. Similar to the Gautreaux opposition, homeowners feared a “decline in property values, white flight, increase in crime, and even a weakening of the social fabric” (Briggs 1999, 32). The Yonkers City Council also opposed the scattered sites and held out as long as they could on construction until the fines issued by the judge were too steep. Opposition and attempts of homeowners to derail relocation plans are recurring themes in the attempt to deconcentrate poverty.

In addition to the above high profile cases, the Low Income Housing Coalition publishes NIMBY (Not in my backyard) reports every month that showcase opposition to the mixed income developments around the nation. In Alexandria, Virginia, the public housing authority demolished a large public housing project and relocated its residents into newly built market-rate developments. The neighbors in these communities were angry that the public housing was being located in their neighborhoods and cited fears of over-concentrating poverty, despite the scattered nature of the plan. Residents in the community attempted to buy the property where one development was going to be located, but did not succeed. They were able to get a reduction in the number of units that would be designated public housing (Allen 2002).

In Milford, Ohio, which is less than 10% minority, residents were upset about the construction of an affordable 28 unit apartment complex which would have nine units

reserved for low income tenants. Some residents stated concerns about the impact this dense development would have on schools in the area. Others were upset that affordable units would be in their neighborhood and planned to circulate a petition to stop development. The town has a history of Nimby-ism; in the mid-1990s residents managed to get the city to abandon an affordable homeownership program, which they feared would result in Latino or African American neighbors. A lawsuit was filed based on the Fair Housing Act, and the city agreed to reinstate the program, along with other affirmative integration strategies (Allen 2005). In Gilbert, AZ, a “master planned” community was angry with developers due to a proposed affordable apartment complex on a neighboring lot. The developer planned on building a complex with 336 units; the majority of which would be reserved for low income families and individuals. Homeowners claimed that the developer said it would only build luxury apartments in the area, and they were afraid that their property values would fall. They associated the affordable housing units with drugs, crime and loitering. One solution they discussed with legal representation was requiring a wall between their community and the apartment complex to “protect” their community from affordable housing residents (Allen 2005).

The above cases are just a sample of recent cases of opposition to mobility programs and their fears and demands associated with the relocations. The present study looks at two cases, which present several similarities to other cases occurring around the nation. Although each case is unique, there was a theme in the homeowner opposition; they wanted to protect their neighborhoods from what they were sure would lead to detrimental consequences.



### *2.6.1. Current Cases*

The two cities that have been selected for the present study have stories similar in theme to the above cases. Through a search of newspaper archives, one can trace the overt attitudes of the outspoken members of the receiving communities and perhaps how they have altered, or at least appeared to have altered over time. An analysis of newspaper articles before and after the relocations outlines the resistance in the Dallas neighborhood. The SWC story is told with the help of interview notes collected by public officials directly and indirectly involved in the relocation. Similar to the cases discussed above, members of the receiving community attempted to stop the deconcentration plans, which they were sure were detrimental to their neighborhoods.

#### *2.6.1.1 A Southwest City*

A public housing development was located on the banks of a river, a lush, prime real estate spot downtown. The housing authority decided to sell the property. The former residents of the development were dispersed into the other areas of the city, including into an apartment complex in an affluent, white urban neighborhood. Although a number of neighborhood homeowners were vehemently opposed to the relocation, the political and administrative support of the relocation ensured that it would take place, despite the opposition. This study takes place three years after the relocation took place.

Some homeowners were upset because the housing authority did not tell them early-on of the intent to purchase an existing nearby apartment complex. In fact, the news was leaked out before the housing authority could approach the residents, further fueling the fire

(council member interview<sup>3</sup>). Homeowners' spoken fears included increased crime rates, lowered property values and overcrowded schools (public housing authority (PHA) official 2005). The homeowners and local business outcry overwhelmed city and housing authority officials who did not seem to anticipate such a response. From taking over public hearings to marching on the mayor's lawn, residents expressed their deep concerns and disapproval with the proposed sale. Additionally, residents on a neighborhood committee threatened political backlash and offered to pay the \$315,000 earnest money if the housing authority would back out of the deal (PHA interview). Yet city officials and the housing authority board stood firm and maintained that purchasing the complex was a good business deal (PHA interview). The housing authority negotiated with the homeowners, such as agreeing to form an oversight committee and reducing the number of units designated for public housing residents in half from 116 to 58 (out of 583 units) (PHA interview).

The sale went through, and the first wave of displaced public housing residents moved into their new homes. Following the move, articles continued to make mention of the relocation whenever an incident related to the residents was brought up or to report how the residents' relocation was going. The official said that even positive articles evoked a negative response from homeowners. One article provided a hopeful outlook for the residents and community (PHA interview). While there was skepticism cited by one homeowner association member who was unsure that the SWCHA would continue their close watch of the property in five years, there was no denying that the crime rates and property values were stable. PHA residents seemed to feel welcomed in their new locations and no major problems

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<sup>3</sup> Names were omitted because all interviews were conducted with a confidentiality agreement.

were reported (PHA interview). After the relocation, when criminal activity occurred, some residents in the receiving community were concerned that there was a link between the incidents and the PHA residents. For instance, the 2004 kidnapping and murder of a university professor not far from the apartment complex sent rumors flying about a possible connection to the nearby public housing residents (Police officer interview). The suspects were in no way connected to former public housing residents, but the response of neighboring homeowners nonetheless intimated that fear of the low income neighbors still existed two years post-relocation.

#### 2.6.1.2 Dallas, TX

The Dallas case was a bit more complicated and a lot more drawn out than the previous story. The power and influence of Dallas homeowners had successfully kept housing developments out of their backyards for years after the federal government took steps to desegregate poverty (Tomsho 1989). This power was disrupted in 1987 when seven women filed a suit against the Dallas Housing Authority (DHA), claiming that the DHA was purposefully segregating Dallas public housing. This suit, known as the Walker case, instigated a legal battle that lasted over 10 years. The Dallas Housing Authority, the City of Dallas and HUD were all defendants at some point in the case. A federal judge found the City of Dallas to be an accomplice in segregating public housing and ordered that public housing be built in white, more affluent parts of the city (Flourney 1995). Attempting to comply, DHS found a location for townhouse in an affluent, predominately white neighborhood in Far North Dallas. Over 1000 homeowners, with the support of then US House Majority Leader Dick Armey (R-Irving) sued and enjoined construction. “In

upholding the white homeowners' standing to sue under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Circuit recognized the homeowners' alleged twofold injury: (1) purposeful discrimination based on race, and (2) the threat of specific injury, including 'decreased property values, increased crime and population density, environmental problems, and diminished aesthetic values of the neighborhood'"(Anderson 2004, n76). This decision was eventually over-turned in a higher court, and the federal judge ordered the DHA to work with the homeowners by forming a neighborhood advisory committee to assist with the relocation (Flournoy 1995).

Public housing residents moved into Frankford Town homes uneventfully. Initially, property values dropped slightly, most likely due to the negative publicity and the changing nature of the community, including the addition of a Wal-Mart. Similar to the previous case, the Dallas Morning Star ran stories about how well the public housing residents were doing and how some of the key opposition leaders admitted that the complex was a welcome addition to the neighborhood (Flournoy 1995).

Both of these cases illustrate not only the fears and opposition of receiving communities, but their apparent acquiescence once the consequences turned out to be negligible. The articles cited fears of the stereotypical slums with dilapidated buildings, drugs and gunshots, supporting the racial proxy hypothesis described earlier in the chapter. Yet was this the underlying fear of homeowners? Residents from the Southwest City and Dallas vehemently denied that their opposition was about race (Flournoy 1992). They contended that it was based on economics and the fear of falling property values. The current study takes a deeper look into what instigated such a response by examining the beliefs and attitudes of the receiving community several years later. If the homeowners' fears were

assuaged by the lack of negative consequences, do they support policies such as these and have they more positive views of low income individuals in general? It is predicted that their ideology will be a better indication of their attitudes rather than the lack of consequences that occurred in these neighborhoods. Unfortunately this study could not include a pre-test of what the homeowners' beliefs and attitudes were before the relocation. Rather, the present study is a snapshot of the homeowners' present perspective about mobility program, years later, which provides pertinent information for policymakers, because the policy and program do not end after the move takes place. The long-term success of the programs may depend on changing ideologies or attitudes of the receiving community members.

### 2.7 Recent Studies of the Receiving Community

As stated earlier, there has been little research on the effects of the relocation policies on the “destination communities” (Johnson et al. 2002). Existing research focuses primarily on individual economic effects such as property values after relocation (see for example Galster 1999). Before policy implementation, the receiving community envisions increased crime rates, decreases in property values and threats to the “social fabric” of their community (Briggs, Darden and Aidala 1999). Briggs, Darden and Aidala (1999) conducted one of the first, if not the first, study of a receiving community from both a financial and non-financial perspective. Their study took place in Yonkers, New York, home to one of the more hostile contesting of a housing mobility program in the United States. Local political leaders as well as homeowners fought the court- mandated desegregation of public housing into the suburbs. They warned of falling property values and an exodus from the middle class neighborhoods. Briggs et al. (1999) analyzed real estate data of the entire city and conducted phone surveys

of households near the seven scattered sites as well as households farther from the sites. They asked homeowners questions that concerned their plans to move, reasons for moving, sense of community and satisfaction in their neighborhoods. While they did find that Nimby-ism (Not-In-My-Backyard) was common, not only race based, but class-based, they did not find the results of impending doom spouted by protesters. The data suggested that the sales and prices of houses near the sites were not atypical of those of the entire city. Further, the responses of homeowners near the sites did not suggest that people were unhappy with neighborhoods and the majority of respondents even recommended their neighborhood to others.

The Innovative Housing Institute (IHI) (1998) conducted a study of property values in mixed income neighborhoods of Montgomery County, Maryland and Fairfax County, Virginia. The study found that proximity to subsidized housing did not affect the property values in the counties. IHI also did interviews with 50 homeowners in non-subsidized housing. Residents were found to be mostly satisfied or very satisfied with their neighborhoods, and any complaints were about items such as congestion and teenagers, not directly related to public housing units. There were also interviews with real estate agents who sell in the counties. Some of these agents did not see the subsidized units as causing a decline in property values, although a few mentioned that the houses closest to the units sold at lower values (IHI 1998).

Galster et al. (1999) looked at the relationship between Section 8 housing and the property values of surrounding single family homes in Baltimore County using an econometrics model. They did not find a decrease in property values. They also conducted

focus groups with nearby residents in four demographically different neighborhoods.

Residents in “vulnerable” neighborhoods, those with low to moderate house values that have already been steadily declining in the past decade, were more concerned with the effects of subsidized housing. Residents in the least vulnerable areas were either not aware of the Section 8 housing or were not concerned that Section 8 housing could impact their neighborhood significantly.

The above studies indicate that mixed income housing is not detrimental to receiving communities in terms of property values and neighborhood satisfaction. They do not look at perceived effects or an in-depth look at the members of the receiving community.

Specifically, the previous studies are more concerned with how the receiving community has been impacted in terms of economics and satisfaction, while the current study examines the beliefs and attitudes of the receiving community to see how they might impact the success of policy implementation. There are clues as to why opposition occurs in mobility programs, yet to date there has been little, if any, empirical attempt to ascertain the underlying cause of the opposition.

## 2.8 Summary

While the cause and reasons as to why segregation has been so persistent is debated, the fact remains that racial and economic segregation continues to be a problem in U.S. neighborhoods. The great opposition to integration, both racial and economic, seems to have influenced this pattern, although limited research on the predominately white, middle class neighborhoods exists. Data on Whites’ preferences for neighbors and neighborhoods suggest that attitudes toward minorities, class aside, influence their neighborhood choice. However,

little, if any, research has been conducted on the ideological basis for these preferences. If Whites do indeed prefer to live in economically homogeneous enclaves, then how can integration occur, particularly economic integration which generally brings in both economic and racial diversity? Chapter 3 will describe ideologies people may hold about individuals and society in an attempt to understand why homeowners on the receiving end of mixed income developments may or may not be opposed to programs that bring economic diversity to their neighborhoods. It will further discuss the attitudes and perspectives about mobility program neighbors that may be influenced by the ideologies people hold.



## CHAPTER 3

### IDEOLOGY AND ATTITUDES OF THE RECEIVING COMMUNITY

Prior research indicates that the fears of the receiving community with regard to property values and decreased neighborhood satisfaction may be unwarranted to the extent that the negative effects, such as decreased property values and increased crime rates, do not generally occur. Do homeowners decide that mobility programs are not so bad once they realize the fallout is negligible? Or are there other underlying causes that sustain the opposition years after implementation? The initial concerns and opposition of the receiving community may be indicative of an ideological mismatch between mobility policies and beliefs homeowners have about liberty, rights and individual characteristics of public housing residents. To gain a better understanding of what underlies the opposition or support of mobility programs, it may be insightful to explore their beliefs and feelings about low income individuals, assistance, rights and different policies aimed at ameliorating poverty.

Section I of this chapter begins by exploring ideologies people may hold about society that may be pertinent to what they feel about mobility programs, such as their beliefs about liberty and whether public housing residents should have the right to live in more

affluent spaces. Section II provides an exploration of ideologies held about individuals such as what they attribute to poverty, which could influence ideologies held about society. Finally, Section III explores the potential consequences of these ideologies, or rather the perceptions and feelings people have about low income individuals.

### 3.1 Ideologies Held about Society

“Government is not the solution for all problems, in fact government is the problem”  
(anonymous survey respondent, 2005<sup>4</sup>).

Ideologies about society include what individuals believe about liberty and what they believe about right to the city. These two concepts are discussed in depth in the following subsections.

#### *3.1.1 Liberty*<sup>5</sup>

Liberty is the cornerstone of America’s political foundation and ideology. There are, however, competing conceptions of liberty, which drive policy debates. In fact, debates over policy may have more to do with the clashing of the two conceptions of liberty rather than a specific policy. The right to liberty has been fought for by many groups since the beginning of recorded history. Two examples in U.S. history—the U.S. Declaration of Independence and Martin Luther King Jr’s battle for racial justice- assume different definitions of liberty. On the eve of the American Revolution, the founders demanded freedom from a government institution they found oppressive. They struggled to form a government that had minimal intervention in the lives of its citizens. King sought government assistance in order to ensure

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<sup>4</sup> This quotation is almost exactly the words used by President Ronald Reagan during his 1981 inaugural address—a nice example of indoctrination.

<sup>5</sup> The words “liberty” and “freedom” will be used interchangeably throughout the dissertation

liberties for all, not just a select few. These two struggles seemingly contradict each other in that one calls for freedom from government intervention and the other calls for more intervention to ensure freedom. Liberty, as conceived by the founders, was defined by self-rule and limited government. Ultimately, this led to an exclusive form of liberty whereby elite rule and limited government oppressed the liberty of certain groups, such as African Americans. The liberty King called for was more government intervention so that all individuals would have the freedom to exercise the rights established years ago by the founders.

This distinction in the definition of liberty can be extended to modern housing policies. In the case of the housing mobility programs, homeowners fought for liberty from a policy they believed would harm their neighborhood. The public housing residents and their advocates fought for the liberty to live in a neighborhood that was safe and had better educational and vocational opportunities. Is it possible to reconcile these different perspectives? Should society choose one over another? The following sections discuss the different views of liberty as an ideology and the implications each view has for society.

Liberty is an important dimension to policy making since it is central to the debate on government intervention (Stone 2002). How liberty is to be defined has been debated by philosophers and scholars for centuries. Two schools of thought on the meaning of liberty include the dichotomous concept of liberty as “liberty to” and “liberty from,” which in the literature are respectively referred to as positive and negative liberty. Berlin (1969) further clarifies the distinction between these two concepts. In response to criticism that they are specious, he posed two questions, “by whom am I governed and how much am I governed”

(xlili), to summarize positive and negative liberty. As is playing out in current housing policy, when the “liberty from” and the “liberty to” perspectives coincide, there is inevitably conflict.

#### 3.1.1.1 Negative liberty

Negative liberty, labeled “negative” due to its lack of government intervention, embodies the classical works of authors such as Berlin (1969), Hobbes (1651), Locke (1689), Hayek (1960) and Mill (1879). These scholars view liberty as the absence of coercion or intervention by the government in individuals’ personal and economic lives, regardless of any inequalities or other consequences that arise (Grant 1999). Berlin contended that interfering in an area where a person could otherwise act on his/her desires or wishes is a coercive act which ultimately leaves a person less free. Negative liberty is concerned with the extent to which an individual can act within a certain range without a collective of some sort creating barriers or obstacles to the act. This sphere of action protected by negative liberty principles is limited to actions that do not interfere with other individuals’ spheres, both economic and personal (Stone 2000).

Recognizing that liberty without any restraint would effectively negate all liberty, negative liberty theorists acknowledged the need for some constraints solely in order to prevent individuals from harming each other. This concept of liberty with some constraints is reflected in Locke's (1689) *Two Treatises of Government* where he established the need for self-rule in order to protect individuals from trespassing in each other’s lives. A sovereign, according to Locke, in the form of self-rule was necessary for maintaining order in society. For the most part, individuals can survive in a state of nature without rule, but a governing

structure in the hands of the citizens can ensure protection from individuals who do not respect the natural rights of others. Locke's theory was a "liberty from" argument in that he asserted the need for government to protect individuals from each other. His theory of liberty advocated limited intervention of government in the lives of its citizens.

The idea of limited government was notably expressed by Mill in his seminal work *On Liberty*. "The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant" (Mill 1879, 80). Mill, like Locke, held liberty as an ideal state where authority of the self-governed existed solely to protect individuals from harming each other. In this state of liberty, Mill asserted, a person can fully develop him/herself and decisions are not made on a person's behalf by anyone else. "Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign" (Mill 1859, 81). In addition to freeing an individual from government intervention, this view held each individual accountable for his or her own actions. Each person, according to Mill, had a responsibility to better oneself. One can achieve betterment through self-determination, an integral part of negative liberty thought (Smart 1991). Mill's ideas on individuality and the limited role of government were extended into the economy. Individual and economic liberties are intertwined in that negative liberty theorists assume government should be limited in both realms.

The negative liberty ideology has been reinforced in society through neoclassical economic policy. Neoclassical economists assumes that each individual is rational and self-interested. Policies based on this perspective promote limited government intervention in the

market. The classical concept of limited government has been embedded in the government's role in regulating the economy. One notable contribution was made by Hayek (1960) who called for the liberation of the market and claimed that government's limited role in society was to ensure business competition. In other words, the role of government in the economy was to make sure that businesses were free to conduct exchanges and thus promote an individual's liberty in pursuing wealth. The negative liberty sphere protected a firm's freedom to pursue profit, because government was limited in how it could regulate business practices. Further, the laissez faire approach of government tried to ensure that the wealth of the individual and firm were protected from redistributive policies financed by exorbitant taxes. Hayek's views helped lead to free market thinking that dominated Britain and the U.S. in the 1980s (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998). This time marked a period of limited government restrictions on the market and more responsibility on the individual to succeed financially. These economic views embodied the neoclassical view of economics where each individual was assumed to be rational and self-interested. In accordance with negative liberty principles, government was to be limited and self-determination and the freedom to pursue one's personal utility were considered laudable qualities.

The neoclassical model does acknowledge that the market is not a perfect entity and results in market failure, such as what occurs when there are public goods (goods that cannot be efficiently produced by the market), externalities, monopolies and transaction costs, which inevitably must result in a limited amount of government interaction. This conception of market failures is congruent with the idea of Mill's harm principle. One of the classic public goods is national defense. National defense is a public good because no one within the US is

excluded from its defense regardless of whether he/she pays taxes, and it would not be profitable for the market to provide such a large scale defense of the nation. The government raises taxes and provides defense in order to prevent harm from external forces.

Other examples of market failures justify government intervention in the market, albeit a limited intervention which ultimately protects individuals' or firms' freedom to pursue their wealth and utility. For instance, consider a monopoly. When a business becomes a monopoly, it infringes on the rights of others to enter or remain in the market. Government intervention is necessary to prevent businesses from infringing on the rights of other businesses to also pursue wealth. A third example is negative externalities. A negative externality is a byproduct of market activity, which may inflict harm or infringe on another's rights, such as when a factory emits dangerous levels of pollutants near a residential area. Government may intervene by fining the factory or requiring its emission levels to be lower.

Public choice theorists (e.g. Buchanan & Tullock 1962, Ostrom 1991) expanded the neoclassical economic ideas of the market to the public sector, building on the underlying theme that government should be limited. In Buchanan and Tullock's *Calculus of Consent*, the authors argued that self-interest and rationality drove a person's motivation in the public sector as well as the private sector (1962). Rather than pursuing the public interest, the authors believed that decisions should be made based on individuals pursuing their self-interests, as they did in the market. By not interfering with the self-interests of its citizens, government could be sure that a collective interest would emerge, one that would lead to an efficient allocation of public resources. One way to limit government and to allow citizens to

pursue public amenities as if they were private was to privatize government operations and to treat public resources as if they were private goods when possible.

Government's role in housing, a predominately private sphere, conflicts with the public choice tenets, because housing is a highly competitive market that classical economic theorists would leave to the market for optimal efficiency (Quigley 1991). Further, if public choice theorists believe that intervention in the low income housing market distorts market signals, one can imagine they'd be even more against mobility programs, which have the added interference in the homeowners' property values and housing decisions.

To summarize, individuals with a negative liberty perspective advocate a limited government, one that allows individuals to carry out their actions free from intervention, economic or social, within a specific sphere, as long as it does not encroach on another's sphere. In the event that such encroachment occurs or is likely to occur, government would have the authority to act. When government actions infringe on the rights of individuals, such as actions that could decrease the value of a house, negative libertarians would consider it a loss of liberty for the homeowners.

#### 3.1.1.2 Positive liberty

In contrast to negative liberty, positive liberty is a more proactive definition of liberty that requires active intervention by government to ensure that everyone has the right to pursue liberty (Stone 2002). Authors such as Kant, Hegel and Marx notably fall on the positive side of the liberty spectrum (Berlin 1969). They assume that there are barriers, both external and internal, that stand in the way of a person's path to liberty. It is usually the case that government has to intervene in order to help individuals overcome these barriers.



Kant's categorical imperative (1964) is a classic underpinning of positive liberty, which focuses on the process leading to liberty rather than the outcome itself. In order for a collective to act on the best interests of others, there must be a universal morality upon which decisions can be made. Frederickson (1997) notes that Kant believed that “humankind can only find morality in a state of freedom” (162). This morality is a natural force that does not need to be checked by a sovereign, as negative liberty theorists would argue (see for instance Hobbes or Locke). Rather, the sovereign is able to use morality to guide their pursuit of the public interest and guide individuals in pursuit of what is best for society. Frederickson (1997) uses this philosophy to contend that government administrators should actively seek the public interest. He was not arguing this premise on the belief that human nature is good, but that individuals can do good under the right conditions. The positive liberty ideology legitimizes government intervention and provides a basis for redistributive policy.

Positive liberty theorists paint a normative role of government in providing liberty for all. They advocate for intervention to ensure that individuals have the resources to reach their true potential in society (Reed 1980). Several authors equate positive liberty with a person being able to pursue self-actualization (see for instance Reed 1980, Smart 1991). According to Berlin (1969), positive liberty theorists attempt to help individuals reach their true potential by acting on what the government believes to be their best interests, which, incidentally, individuals may not recognize or agree to be in their best interests. He contends that this type of action has been criticized for its patriarchal tendencies in assuming that government knows what is best for an individual.

“But what gives such plausibility as it has to this kind of language is that we recognize that it is possible, and at times justifiable, to coerce men in the name of some goal (let us say, justice or public health) which they would, if they were enlightened, themselves pursue, but do not, because they are blind or ignorant or corrupt” (Berlin, 1969,132-133).

Implicitly, the positive liberty ideology assumes that the government is capable of determining what the public interest is. To that end, government needs to intervene to ensure that the public interest is being pursued. The public interest, in this case, is the opportunity for all individuals to reach their full potential. For instance, when a city razes a public housing development, the decision is touted to be made in the best interests of its inhabitants. Positive libertarians place a faith in civil society that it will provide individuals with the opportunity to pursue liberty and that it will do what is best for its citizens. The affirmative intervention in the lives of citizens differs from negative liberty in that negative liberty theorists ask for measures to be in place that will prevent government intervention.

Positive liberty assumes that there are external and internal barriers in the market that prevent individuals from obtaining resources and opportunities necessary for liberty. Marx’s view of liberty embodies this perspective and calls for government interaction to free individuals from the chains of negative liberty thinking. Marx would call negative liberty a “false liberty.” Lovell (2005) summarizes one of Marx's critiques of “false liberty”:

Under capitalism individuals appear to be free, but they are not. They are not only isolated from each other, in a false type of community, but they are allotted a separate realm of “freedom” in the state. Once this separate realm is abolished, and individuals recognize their connections, genuine freedom can begin to be established (635).

To Marx, human emancipation was inevitably connected to the market. Workers under capitalism were not free as long as they were forced to sell their labor on the market. Liberty for Marx was more of a social freedom. The external constraints of the market limited the free time of the workers as well as their time to be creative and explore what one's true potential was. Moreover, workers did not receive the profits from their labor; they were forced to work beyond the time it took to pay for their wages, ultimately limiting their resources to pursue opportunities as well as free time.

The economic oppression also led to internal constraints, according to Marx. When individuals were economically oppressed and were not free to realize their own dreams and desires, their self-determination was limited. Moreover, by selling their labor on the market, they became commodities subject to the same forces as the material commodities they produced. A person was made to feel detached from the fruits of his/her labor and became isolated (Lovell 2004). This isolation became an internal barrier wherein a person felt helpless. Marx contended that by democratizing the means of production by providing control to the community and workers, individuals would no longer be alienated from their labor, and they would have the freedom to pursue and excel at their interests (Smart 1991). Specifically, the merging of state and civil society would lead to liberty, or rather an "organic whole" as Berlin speaks of in reference to positive liberty. In this state of freedom<sup>6</sup>, the government would be able to ensure that residents had the opportunities they needed to pursue their true potential.

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<sup>6</sup> Marx was more ambiguous about what a state of freedom would actually look like. The emphasis was placed on the process that would lead to freedom, rather than the outcome itself. It is the process component that places him in the positive liberty camp.

The merging of state and civil society can occur at different extremes. During the Great Depression, John Maynard Keynes advocated for government intervention in the form of deficit spending. This spending helped to provide resources to impoverished individuals. Positive liberty theorists would argue that without this proactive form of government intervention, the liberty of citizens would have been compromised, because some lacked resources to pursue opportunities. There are also present day economists, such as Robert Reich, who call for more positive liberty intervention by government in society. Reich (1991) points out the growing economic divide between those he labeled “symbolic analysts” (the top earners in society) and the rest of Americans. This divide seems to be reinforced by the federal government, which has decreased its fiscal support in education and welfare and increased support in areas that benefit symbolic analysts such as convention centers and corporate parks. Rather than providing resources for individuals to have opportunities (positive liberty), tax cuts were made to protect the affluent from being infringed upon in their financial sphere (negative liberty). Moreover, the money spent on convention centers was meant to enhance market competition and further decrease the role of government. Education and welfare benefits are examples of positive liberty intervention by government, because those resources are meant to help individuals meet their needs so that they have the opportunity to reach their full potential.

According to Reich (1991), symbolists do not depend as much on the less fortunate for their own economic interests with the increases in technology and decreases in cost of transportation and information. In fact, society seems to be splitting even further between the

“haves” and “have nots.” The split can be bridged when symbolic analysts feel that they should help the unfortunate in society based on a sense of patriotic loyalty.

What do we owe one another as members of the same society who no longer inhabit the same economy? The answer will depend on how strongly we feel that we are, in fact, members of the same society (Reich, 1991, 201).

According to Reich's perspective, individuals would have to believe not only that liberty means having certain resources and opportunities, but that they have a responsibility to help provide those resources (via government intervention). Reich's positive liberty suggestions, or what he referred to as positive economic nationalism, included spending public money “within each nation in any manner that enhanced the capacities of its citizens to lead full and productive lives” ( 207). He listed examples, such as providing extra money to poor primary and secondary schools and requiring businesses to provide health care benefits. Most of these positive liberty solutions require government to intervene in the form of redistributive policy. This inevitably infringes on the financial liberty of others, namely individuals or firms who would have to be taxed to fund the programs.

To summarize, positive liberty theorists advocate for more proactive involvement in the government in order to remove external and internal barriers to freedom. They would have government interfere and limit the liberties of some in order to achieve a more equitable society where everyone at least has the opportunity to reach their full capacity as human beings. This perspective is the philosophy underlying mobility programs, where public housing residents are supposed to be given such an opportunity.

Table 3.1 Two Dimensions of Liberty

	<i>Positive Liberty</i>	<i>Negative Liberty</i>
Definition	Having the opportunity to reach one's true potential	Protecting individual choice and promoting self-determination
When should government intervene?	To provide resources and opportunities	Limited to prevent harm to others
Mantra	Freedom to	Freedom from restriction

### 3.1.1.3 Reconciling negative and positive liberty

After reviewing the two perspectives on liberty, perhaps it is clearer how and why they may clash with regard to policy implementation. With negative liberty, the limited government intervention leaves the burden on an individual to pursue his/her own liberty. By not intervening, certain groups of individuals may be limited in the resources and opportunities they would need to exercise their freedom, such as is the case of public housing residents living in inner cities. If they were to stay in their impoverished areas, they would be subjected to the poorer schools, public amenities and other adverse effects of concentrated poverty. On the other hand, positive liberty requires that government infringes on the liberty of some in order for others to reach their true potential. In the case of housing mobility programs, homeowners are infringed upon financially via the redistributive nature of the policy as well as spatially with the encroachment of the public housing residents into previously homogeneous neighborhoods.

Positive liberty, according to Stone (2002), is a more proactive definition of liberty that requires active intervention by government to ensure that everyone has the right to pursue liberty. While negative liberty is concerned with an imaginary sphere of space around an individual's life that cannot be infringed upon, positive liberty looks at the control

individuals have over their range of actions and choices and the material resources they have to act on their choices (Stone 2002). Negative liberty assumes that government responsibility to ensure liberty stops at that sphere—it is up to individuals from that point on to make decisions on their actions. Positive liberty contends that individuals may not be able to make proper decisions or have the opportunity to make good decisions on their own behalf.

Stone (2002) clearly sees positive liberty as the ideal liberty to strive for in matters of equality. “A society that maximized liberty would be one that equalized the prerequisites to liberty—power, wealth and knowledge” (Stone, 129, 2002). In stark contrast to praising government intervention, Berlin warned that positive liberty would lead to a society where individuals would coerce others through government authority and power. This organic society “leads to a splitting of the self where one begins to see oneself as part of the whole, an organic unit” (Berlin, 1969 135). Once this happens, according to Berlin, individuals in authoritative positions, or rather the “brain” of the organism, will begin to make decisions for the whole as they see fit, which can easily lead to corruption or despotism. In fact, Berlin views positive liberty as doing more harm than negative liberty, despite the “negative” connotations of the label. He contends that positive liberty leads to tyranny and ultimately restricts liberty (Berlin 1965). Taylor (1979) defends positive liberty and criticizes negative liberty. Negative liberty is the absence of external controls, but not internal controls. Taylor (1979) contends that a person cannot truly be free if he/she is not able to realize his/her own potential. Positive liberty attempts to remove such internal constraints as well as the external. For instance, if a person is addicted to drugs, he/she may not be able to pursue a job or education. Positive liberty theorists would argue that the addiction is an internal barrier that

would need to be removed before a person could reach his/her true potential and that negative liberty theorists fail an individual by not intervening to stop him/her from harming his/herself.

Negative liberty can also restrict liberty from a critical perspective. If individuals are allowed to act without constraint, they can indirectly inflict harm on others. For instance, the unfettered expansion of suburban growth deteriorated inner cities, which in turn, caused harm to the inner city inhabitants, as discussed in Chapter 2. Moreover, social ills such as poverty and discrimination are not deterred by negative liberty and to some extent are believed to have been caused by a lack of intervention in individuals' choices, e.g. unfettered exclusionary growth tactics. Stone (2002) contends that in order to have social order and a functioning community, certain freedoms have to be restricted, regardless of whether they are preventing direct harm to individuals. According to Stone, one cannot just think in terms of harm to individuals, one must also think of harm to communal life and institutions. For instance, if one person is discriminated against based on race, the effects of that discrimination go beyond harm to the individual. The individual's family, other members of the minority group and society itself will be harmed because the discrimination perpetuates injustice and inequality and sets a precedent (Stone 2002).

Most policies deal with the extent to which government can legitimately coerce citizens without infringing on the very rights that Americans have internalized as important (Stone 2002). Stone explains the dilemma, "sometimes curtailing individual liberty may be necessary to preserve a community in which individuals can thrive and exercise free choice" (108, Stone 2002). The irony of American freedom has not gone unnoticed by Berlin. "The



dilemma is logically insoluble: we cannot sacrifice either freedom or the organization needed for its defense, or a minimum standard of welfare” (Berlin, 1969, 39). Berlin calls for a “logically untidy, flexible, and even ambiguous” (39) compromise that allows for variation between situations. The balance between liberty and a minimum standard of welfare is where the dilemma arises. America was founded on the notion of negative freedom, where individuals realized that they had to enter into a Social Contract in order to protect that freedom. Social Contract Theory (Hobbes (1651), Locke (1689)<sup>7</sup> aligns more with the negative concept of liberty, where individuals give up certain rights in order to be protected by state mechanisms. Individuals were assumed to come together under the pretense of being as free as their rules would allow. There were certain freedoms individuals were willing to give up, such as the right to harm others or the right to no taxes (necessary to fund the protection) in order to have a “civilized” society. Yet as society has evolved, an array of social problems such as discrimination and inequality has made it necessary for government to become more involved and to create institutions to address the problems, such as the Social Security Act of 1935 (Stillman 1999). To that end, positive liberty actions in the form of the New Deal policies, affirmative action and other redistributive policies have been implemented, although support for these policies is not steady (DiNitto 2006). Can we conclude that one form of liberty is better than the other? Both ideological perspectives of liberty exist in some respect. The nation was founded on negative liberty principles and dominant economic thought relies on less government intervention. Yet policies based on positive liberty tenants also exist. For instance, housing mobility programs are based on

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<sup>7</sup> The different takes on contract theory by these philosophers will not be expanded; this dissertation will be limited to the common theme that justifies state intervention

positive liberty ideals. The clash between the dominant negative liberty ideology and the positive liberty policy might explain some of the homeowner opposition.

If government intervenes in an attempt to ameliorate one group's harm and ends up harming a second group, should the intervention take place? Weighing the different harms and deciding which liberty should be protected is a difficult task and in large part depends on the subjective opinions of individuals. "Harms to others are not objective phenomena, to be discovered or documented by science, but rather political claims, which are granted more or less legitimately by government" (Stone, 2001,114). Stone's reasoning suggests that underserved individuals' liberties will be less protected due to their lack of political clout. It may be helpful to delve into this case a little deeper by examining Mill's harm principle in greater detail as it applies to mobility programs.

#### 3.1.1.4 The harm principle in housing policy

The negative and positive labels of liberty are not necessarily sufficient to describe the deeper dimensions of the concept. As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, Mill contended that government should only intervene when it was necessary to prevent harm to others. However, Mill's definition of "harm to others" is clearly subjective. Stone (2000) explores the different connotations of "harm" that can be construed from Mill's principle and contends that there are different types of harms that can happen to an individual including emotional, psychological and material harms. These different notions of harm can be used to explore any given intervention by the government. For example, housing mobility programs are justified in part by the "emotional and psychological harms" that some individuals claim concentrated poverty causes. Several authors have noted the potential harm that results from

living in concentrated poverty (see for example Ellen & Turner 1997, Wilson 1989). Wilson contended that concentrated poverty in the inner cities left low income Blacks in a state of “social isolation,” which has the potential to be psychologically damaging and limiting to those living in such an environment. This isolation occurred after middle class Whites and Blacks left the inner cities for the suburbs. The opportunity to have social ties with individuals who were thriving became rare, and individuals living in these impoverished conditions were left without support structures or networks needed to find economic opportunities. Wilson (1989) argued that this isolation left individuals without the resources or role models needed to make any positive change. The harm caused to these communities could warrant intervention from the negative liberty perspective if “harm” is defined as emotional or psychological harm.

In addition to the harm that helps to justify the redistributive policy of relocating low income families into affluent neighborhoods, there is the potential harm that could happen to the affluent homeowners in those neighborhoods, namely “material harms.” There is evidence that the members of the receiving community are worried about harm to property values, vandalism and property theft when low income families move into their area (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000). Even if the real threat to their property is limited, there is evidence that a self-fulfilling prophecy could occur and individuals could move based on the fear alone.

For the purposes of this study, liberty is defined as how the receiving community perceives liberty, whether positive or negative (see Table 3.1 for a summary of the dimensions). Persons with a positive perspective of liberty will believe that it is necessary for

government to interfere in the lives of some in order to ensure that everyone has the resources and opportunities necessary for an equal degree of liberty. Persons with the negative perspective of liberty will believe that in order to have liberty, government may only interfere to prevent harm to others. Whether those with a negative liberty perspective perceive concentrated poverty as a harm that should be prevented by the government is one question explored in this study. Later in the chapter, what individuals attribute to poverty will be discussed and will help determine if individuals perceive concentrated poverty as a harm caused by society or due to individual traits.

### *3.1.2 Le Droit a la Ville*

They do have the right, not the money (anonymous survey respondent, 2005).

In the face of this pseudo-right, the right to the city is like a cry and a demand (Lefebvre,

*Right to the City*)

The different conceptions of liberty play a pertinent role in analyzing attitudes about housing policy and mobility programs. Using the concept of liberty is limited, however, in that it does not quite embody the sociospatial angle of the policy. Mobility programs move public housing residents into new spaces in a city; spaces they have not necessarily been welcomed to in the past. Beliefs about liberty do not reveal what homeowners believe about the public housing residents' right to live in the more affluent neighborhoods. For instance, an individual might believe that government should intervene in a positive liberty manner but might also take issue with policies that lead people to his/her backyard. Likewise, an individual might believe that government should be limited, but he/she might also believe that external barriers are unjustly keeping low income individuals out of his/her

neighborhood. These perspectives may not seem likely, but without a deeper look at what people believe about the right to urban space, it is not possible to understand some of the nuances involved in opposition or support for mobility programs.

### 3.1.2.1 The rights principle in housing policy

There are two broad concepts of rights, according to Stone (2000). The first are classified as positive rights, because they are rights that are backed by the legal system. The right to vote and the right to free speech would both be considered positive rights. These are rights that people have only when they claim them, and when they do claim them, they have the backing of the state (generally). The second type of rights are normative rights. These are the rights people ought to have that do not come from the state's power. Like positive rights, normative rights are not always claimed or sought. Unlike positive rights, normative rights are not backed by the state (Stone 2002). For example, children have the normative right to attend safe schools, although many children who attend unsafe schools will not claim that right.

French sociologist Henri Lefebvre's concept of the "right to the city" would be classified as a normative right. Lefebvre (1996) asserted that all people should have an equal say in community decision-making, benefit from the use value of the city and have the right to live in a diverse community. Currently not everyone has the opportunity to claim these rights. For instance, as discussed in Chapter 2, the Fair Housing Act of 1968 was supposed to ensure that all people could move into neighborhoods free from race based discrimination. Despite this right and despite the fact that some Blacks may prefer to live in a more diverse neighborhood, white preferences and discriminatory actions have kept this from occurring

(Massey and Denton 1993, Lipsitz 1998, Ihlanfeldt and Scatidi 2004). The housing relocation programs intend to take steps in providing public housing residents with such a right. The following analysis illustrates how this right is inextricably linked to the members of the receiving community's beliefs about the new residents' "right to the city."

### 3.1.2.2 Affluent neighborhoods: The new contested terrain

Since the 1970s, housing authorities began relocating public housing beyond the realm of the inner cities, and in effect, transformed urban spaces. These mobility programs would have been applauded by Lefebvre (1996), who called for a radical transformation in the way space was used in cities as well as who had the right to participate in that transformation. The right to live and participate in urban space was especially pertinent to the affluent neighborhoods of a city, which were the new contested terrain for housing. Lefebvre noted that the center of the city was no longer the most appealing location to live and that those with resources looked to the artificial open spaces beyond the high density of the inner city. The same reasoning can be used to explain why residential mobility programs began moving public housing residents into affluent neighborhoods within city limits—the inner city was no longer seen as the best location for individuals living in public housing. Moreover, from a jurisdictional perspective, outer neighborhoods were just as viable options for public housing sites as any other part of the city. Further, federal regulations and court mandates have made them mandatory options for public housing.

According to Mitchell (2000), the right to housing is implicit in the right to the city and involves more than just a new physical dwelling. "The right to housing, the right to inhabit the city, thus demands more than just houses and apartments: it demands the

redevelopment of the city in a manner responsive to the needs, desires, and pleasures of its inhabitants, especially its oppressed inhabitants” (Mitchell, 21). It is the contention of relocation policy proponents that the more affluent neighborhoods will allow disenfranchised groups to have access to needs and desires that were limited in areas of concentrated poverty (Dreier et al. 2001). The right to live in a safe neighborhood with access to social, occupational and educational opportunities appears to occur on the surface of the mobility programs, yet to what extent do the members of the receiving community affect the right of the entering public housing residents? The ideological basis that led to the formation of these homogeneous enclaves might conflict with the goals of policy makers.

The white, middle class exodus from the inner city was a state sanctioned restructuring of society that helped to protect the sacred notion of private property rights (Lipsitz 1998, Meyer 2000). Lefebvre states that “suburban disorder harbors an order” (1996, 80). The sporadic sprawl that has led to several societal ills such as segregation and congestion at the same time protects its inhabitants’ way of life. “Without order, the argument goes, liberty is simply impossible” (Mitchell 2003, 17). The self-imposed order and control of neighborhood associations is one way the middle class struggles to maintain its right to private property and homogeneous enclaves, which, incidentally, are actions that reinforce negative liberty principles (McKenzie 1994).

Historically, private property was one of the fundamental rights that instigated the initial structure for protecting rights in the U.S. (McKenzie 1994). Post revolutionary citizens needed a way to ensure their property rights would not be taken away and needed a legal contract to support it. They entered into a social contract with a governing structure in

exchange for the protection of their rights. Similar Lockean behavior is mirrored in the new suburban type neighborhoods in cities (McKenzie 1994). Neighborhood and housing associations were developed in order to protect property and community values. The housing associations restrict resident's freedom but in return protect property values and guard against deviance (McCabe 2005). People in these neighborhoods want to guard their "right" to live in gated communities with neighbors who share the same economic background as well as beliefs and values (McKenzie 1994). The struggle to maintain the status quo of people with similar values, cultures and beliefs and their property rights has been on the forefront of affluent neighborhood associations and their communities (McKenzie 1994). To that end, the rights of certain people to live in the suburban extensions of the city are restricted if they are perceived to have values and beliefs different from the exclusive neighborhood.

Affluent neighborhoods across America have established Common Interest Developments (CIDs) or Homeowner Associations (HOAs) to protect their private property and to ensure that certain people do not move into these communities (McKenzie 1994). In doing so they have agreed, some unwittingly, to be governed by a body that substitutes for city services such as security and rule making. In return, the communities give up a range of freedoms such as being able to paint their house a certain color, the height of their hedges, and in some cases, even the color of their curtains. "They place a high value on the restrictions, feeling that the infringement on one's own freedom is a small price to pay for protection from the potential misdeeds of one's neighbors" (McKenzie 1994, 14). Some freedom is sacrificed in order to protect the exchange or profit value of their private property.



Relocating low income families into these neighborhoods, which homeowners believe will cause their property values to plummet and crime rates to soar, is antithetical to the concept of these enclaves. The right to the city conflicts with ideology underlying these neighborhood associations in that it asserts that all individuals living in the city should have the to right to participate in the uses of the neighborhoods as well as a right to live in a diverse community. It further asserts that the great emphasis neighborhoods place on their property values should not take precedence over the right people have to live in a decent neighborhood.

### 3.1.2.3 The right to the city defined

Lefebvre (1996) implored the world to understand that cities were made up of diverse groups of individuals who all had a right to participate in physical and political public spaces. He argued that “the city is an oeuvre—a work in which all its citizens participate” (Mitchell 2003,17). The city contains this vast, diverse network that should be embraced, rather than continue to be made homogeneous or segregated (Lefebvre 1969). There has been a struggle for the right to public space for decades in urban spaces. The right to vote, the right to march and the right to sleep on park benches are all battles that have been fought in urban public spaces (Mitchell 2000). The right to live in a low poverty neighborhood is currently being sought as public housing residents move into affluent neighborhoods. The right to live in these affluent communities is also the right to live in a diverse environment. Diversity is perhaps the cornerstone of Lefebvre's argument, since it is the segregation that has led to an uneven distribution of resources and opportunity to participate. Chapter 2 described the causes of segregation, including that many Whites prefer to live in homogeneous neighborhoods. Lefebvre called for an end to this segregation and a re-creation of the city

with the input of diverse interests. Segregation limits the right people have to space, not only physical space, but political space as well.

The discrimination that has limited the right to the city for racial minorities threatens to impede the successful integration of different income groups as well. For decades, policies have encouraged relegating low income families into derelict parts of town. Recent policies have attempted to counter these past policies, yet some members of the receiving community are steadfast in their resolve to impede any change (Massey and Denton 1993). In order for change to occur, the “right to the city” ideology may first need to be embraced by the residents in the receiving community. “The right to the city legitimates the refusal to allow oneself to be removed from urban reality by a discriminatory and segregative organization” (Lefebvre 1996, 195). Lefebvre used “urban reality” to illustrate how some groups are excluded from the production and use of spaces—spaces where decisions about the city are made and spaces where there are better opportunities. The current fragmentation of urban spaces, perpetuated by decades of discriminatory housing practices, has led to an urban environment that prohibits diversity and impedes the rights of individuals to equal opportunities to public amenities, such as schools and safe parks and private amenities, such as employment opportunities. According to Lefebvre, the true essence of a city is made up of all its inhabitants, not just the wealthy or the powerful. He believed that the city needed to be “reborn” to reflect the diversity and daily lives of all who inhabited its space. The right to the city is implicit to all those who inhabit the city, and Lefebvre (1996) contended that new urban spaces should be created using the diverse perspectives of the residents.

In addition to the underlying theme of diversity, right to the city is actually twofold. Purcell (2003) summarizes the right as “(1) the right to *appropriate* urban space; and (2) the right to *participate* centrally in the production of urban space” (577, emphasis in the original). Appropriation refers to the right to utilize the city’s use value without the city’s exchange value taking precedence (Purcell 2003). Cities do not evolve in an autonomous state, but rather by the drive of industrialization and other exogenous forces that have resulted in a favoring of spaces for exchange value over use value (Lefebvre 1996, Logan and Molotch 1982, Harvey 1973). That is, property rights and profit generating property have historically taken precedence over public spaces. Lefebvre (1969) calls for a change in cities that includes placing an emphasis on a city's use value. The use value of a city is its creative, imaginative uses by the residents, which have not been usurped by exclusive capital generating activities. How all residents live, play, communicate and spend their daily lives dictates the use value of a city. Urban spaces hinder or encourage such uses (Lefebvre 1996).

Ferrel (2001) demonstrates how urban spaces discourage the use value for “gutter punks” and other street people while encouraging the exchange value of space for middle class consumers. He describes a street in Tempe, Arizona, where developers decided to build upscale retail shops in the advent of Super Bowl XXX. The street was known for its role as a hang out for gutter punks and other people the city deemed bad for business. In order to attract the middle class consumer, changes had to be made. As Ferrell (2001) states “of course, this sanitization and homogenization of the local business climate requires a certain cultural sanitization as well” (169). Ultimately, the culture of one group was sacrificed for

another group's profit. The daily routine of the people on Mill Avenue was what Lefebvre was talking about when he referred to the use value of a city. The people on Mill Avenue were not there to shop; they were there to "hang," to play and to create and share culture. The new Mill Avenue discourages this type of activity and promotes the exchange value of space—the profit-seeking, consumer driven space that is appealing to profit-seeking interests, such as businesses, real estate and Super Bowls and middle class consumers who are attracted to the trinkets and trendy shops they see in every shopping center they visit. Public spaces, where people can congregate, communicate and create culture seem to be dwindling around the nation as decision makers prioritize the exchange value of these spaces (see, for example, Ferrell 2001, Mitchell 2003 and Kohn 2005).

The exchange value partitions space in such a way that makes it suitable for sale in the real estate market (Molotch 1993). "The conception of urban space as private property, as a commodity to be valorized (or used to valorize other commodities) by the capitalist production process, is specifically what the right to appropriation stands against" (Purcell 2003, 103). When it comes to use and exchange values, housing goes beyond the physical structure of a house itself. People pay based on locational aspects as well as the physical condition and amenities of the house itself. They will fight to keep the location's exchange value intact by maintaining neighborhood stability (Logan and Molotch 1987). Low income individuals are seen as threats to the exchange value of a neighborhood (Logan and Molotch 1987, Briggs 1998, Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2001). This threat conflicts with public housing residents moving into middle and upper income neighborhoods and having access to what Logan and Molotch (1987) refer to as the "daily round," which includes decent

shopping, schools, childcare, health services and other amenities. There is an inherent conflict in property as an investment and property as a home and a place where people live out their daily activities, because there exists the need to control who lives in the neighborhoods as well as the activities those residents carry out. When housing is referred to first and foremost as an investment, affluent communities will organize to protect their property values, and there is little low income individuals can do to ensure their right to the use value of a neighborhood, in part because they lack the political organizational skills of the more affluent (Logan and Molotch 1987).

Because the exchange value of a city is predominately given priority, public places have been neglected and turned into places to be avoided. According to Mitchell (2003) public spaces are treated as hostile places by the middle and upper classes, particularly where one finds deviant behavior. In these urban public spaces, the rights of residents (homeowners) supersede the rights of those defined as deviant to “live” in public spaces (Mitchell 2003). For instance, the right of the homeless to sleep on a park bench was abolished so that more affluent classes could have the right not to see indigents in their parks. In this sense, rights are not concrete. The rights of the middle class and above are given precedence over those of the homeless. Rights are reified in such a way that favors those in power. Mitchell (2003) provides an example of how “rights talk” can be usurped by the wealthy when convenient. “That is, rights often protect privilege and domination instead of the oppressed and minorities, as when commercial speech or the ability of rich donors to buy candidates in an election is “guaranteed’ by the First Amendment right to speech” (Mitchell 2003, 23). Thus, the reification of rights helps to reinforce the existing power that more

affluent residents have in a community. In essence, power, through economic influence tends to shape rights. One may argue that mobility programs force the more affluent communities to share their right to the better spaces in the cities. However, based on the precedent set by middle class power structures, isn't it possible that the prioritizing of private space causes members of the receiving community, including public officials, to hide the fact that “publicness” has crept in and encourage a low profile of the entering community in their new homes? Moreover, to what extent does occupying the physical space of a neighborhood guarantee one the right to participate significantly in that space, both politically and socially?

The second part of the right to the city, participation, is inextricably linked to the first part. As public spaces diminish, the spaces for public participation are also compromised (Kohn 2004). Participation refers to having a significant role in decision-making. “The right to centrality thus involves both a right to take a leading role in decision-making as well as the right to physically occupy, to live in and shape the central areas of the city” (Purcell 2003, 578). Thus, when certain groups are marginalized and the “center” is composed of just a few powerful key players, the right to the city is largely diminished for everyone else and particularly those who are not able to participate in the exchange value activity of the city in any significant manner. Lefebvre contends that the poor and working class must “contribute to the reconstruction of centrality destroyed by a strategy of segregation” (154). If any true transformation and integration of community is to occur, marginalized groups need to be included in the process or else the integration is meaningless.

Lefebvre’s right to the city implies that all inhabitants have a direct say in any decision that affects urban space, both state decisions and private decisions (Purcell 2003).

Taken to the extreme, this dimension of the right calls for a radical change in policy-making and urban participation. Lefebvre is not clear as to what scale this concept should be applied (Purcell 2003). Within a city, it makes sense that all residents should have a say in economic development decisions or housing relocations. However, at a greater scale, it might be more difficult to imagine this right being exercised. For instance, if City A plans to close its parks which will in turn send its citizens to the parks of City B, should the citizens of City B have a say in the decision to close the parks? The decisions of City A affect the urban space of City B. This dilemma does not stop at neighboring cities, but can be applied to smaller scales such as neighborhoods and much larger scales such as nations. One weakness of Lefebvre's theory is that it may not be realistic or ideal for everyone to have a say in every policy that indirectly affects his/her space. Perhaps there is some middle ground between the institutions currently in place and Lefebvre's more radical view of participation. At the city level, community associations work to protect the rights of homeowners. They also serve as a vehicle for expressing the concerns/desires of the neighborhood.

The right to the city is not limited to one group. Although it may be necessary to increase the right to the disenfranchised, the right would also implicitly belong to the more affluent groups. Should the homeowners of a neighborhood have a say in whether low income individuals are relocated into their community? The relocation and building of subsidized units affects the homeowners' space. Lefebvre contends that everyone should get the opportunity to participate, but by what means will this right be guaranteed to all? It seems logical that those with existing powers and participatory rights would have to "buy in" to the theory before it can be realized. Thus, this study will also assess the extent to which the

receiving community sees the entering community as having an equal right to participation is relevant.

The receiving community’s perspective of “right to the city” will be assessed in this study. To summarize, “the right to the city”, for the purposes of this study, is defined as the extent the receiving community believes diversity is positive for their community, use value is more important than exchange value and that the entering community should have an equal right to space and participation as the receiving community (See Table 3.2 for a summary of the right to the city dimensions).

Table 3.2 Right to the City

Dimensions	Description
Diversity	The extent to which residents value an economically diverse neighborhood
Exchange vs. use value	The prioritizing of private space over public space
Rights of the receiving and entering community	The extent one group believes another group has the same right to civic participation as it does

### 3.2 Ideologies about Individuals

Underlying ideologies held about society are the ideologies people hold about individuals within society. Specifically, the attributions individuals make about poverty and the stereotypes they hold about low income individuals in general may contribute to their beliefs about society. This proposition is the basis for a preliminary hypothesis. Hypothesis 1: *What people believe to be the cause of poverty and the stereotypes people hold about low income individuals are related to what people believe about liberty and other people’s right to the city.*



### *3.2.1 Attribution of Poverty*

What one believes to have caused poverty can affect the extent one believes that society has an obligation to ameliorate poverty. If a person believes that poverty is caused by individual traits such as laziness and lack of motivation, he/she might be unwilling to expect the government to intervene on behalf of the poor. How people perceive the causes of social ills (in this case poverty) will affect their beliefs about poor people as well as policies they support (Kluegal and Smith 1986).

Past research has shown that Americans, particularly white, upper class Americans, predominantly perceive individualist factors as the causes of poverty (Feagin 1975; Hunt 1996). Kreidl (2000) discusses the stratification ideology that persists in Western nations. “In compliance with the dominant ideology, wealth is perceived as a product of one’s exceptional effort and talents, whereas poverty is caused by a lack of these attributes” (Kreidl 2000, 153). Individualists maintain a perspective of internal attribution about poverty, which locates “the causes of achievement within the individual person, in ability, efforts, or other characteristics such as personality traits and educational achievements” (Kluegal and Smith 1986, 75). The dominant individualist ideology assumes that people start off in equal positions without barriers to their potential success (Kluegal and Smith 1986). It is then up to the individuals to work hard to reach their respective levels of success

Starting off in equal positions is a necessary condition for the individualist theory. Without this assumption, it is difficult to believe that individuals are responsible for their own situations. “In fact, the dominant ideology almost requires the elimination of

discrimination and other such barriers to opportunity, for concrete reasons of self-interest” (Kluegal and Smith, 1986, 31). In order to keep society functioning at an efficient level, people need to work hard and know that working hard will improve their situation and life chances. In that regard, individualism does not preclude equal rights in and of itself. People may support civil rights and aid to the disabled and elderly, realizing that these are necessary for people to work hard and for society to function smoothly. Without these structures in place, individuals would not see themselves or others as having an equal starting point. Moreover, in order for people to continue to support a system of stratification, they may have to believe that internal attributes are the reason that people are in their respective life positions (Smith and Stone 1989). Providing aid to the “deserving poor” such as the blind, elderly and disabled is supported because the external causes of poverty are more visible.

Although individualism has remained the dominant ideology in the U.S., there are competing ideologies that exist as well, including the theory of collectivism (Triandis 2001). Collectivists attribute external causes to people’s life chances, such as institutional discrimination and economic determinism (Anthony and Rosselli 2003). Rather than attributing poverty to individual traits, they maintain that school systems, neighborhoods and other political and social institutions impact people’s lives and significantly influence one’s situation in life. This dissertation will refer to the collectivist perspective as structuralism due to the structural factors it shares with Feagin’s (1975) attribute classification. Feagin (1975) contends that there are external social and economic influences in society that are beyond the control of individuals and that “cannot be remedied by moral conversion” (Feagin 1975, 96). Smith and Stone (1989) conducted a study of public opinion data to see which

“metatheories” of attributions about poverty were most supported. While individualism clearly dominated in attributes about why people were poor, there was evidence that strong minority theories including structuralism were supported. Studies of beliefs about poverty have discovered that people do not tend to respond along one dimension of either individual or structural causes (see for example Feagin 1975, Kluegal and Smith 1986, Hunt 1996).

Welfare programs and affirmative action programs would be examples of policies that structuralists would support in that these policies attempt to compensate for poverty caused by societal conditions. Affirmative action provides minorities and women with a more equal footing in education and workforce and serves to make up for past and present discrimination, poor schools and downturns in the economy. Various welfare programs assist people in times of economic downturns or inadequate education, training or wages. These policies contradict the dominant ideology by providing entitlements to certain individuals who did not “earn” them in the market sense (Kluegal and Smith 1986). The relocation of low income individuals to more affluent neighborhoods would fall under an affirmative action approach, which Kluegal and Smith (1986) claim “have been widely viewed as calling for equal outcomes and hence violating the necessary relationship between inputs (hard work and talents) and outcomes” (31). Homeowners who subscribe to individualist views about poverty may not support mobility programs, because they would not see public housing residents as earning the right to live in these neighborhoods. Individuals with more structuralist beliefs may support the mobility programs, because they believe that societal factors have contributed to the plight of the poor, and thus believe that society should correct

for the inequalities. It will be interesting to see what level of support homeowners with both structural and individualist beliefs have.

### *3.2.2 Race Dimension*

Race is an important dimension to studies of housing policy because of the race based discrimination that has occurred. Exclusionary practices by the white, dominant class are historically embedded in public policy (Massey and Denton 1993, Lipsitz 1998, Meyers 2000). From colonialists to suburbanites, the dominant class has systematically worked to exclude Native Americans, immigrants and minorities from their habitats and secure institutions that restrict their rights, choices and access to the American Dream (Lipsitz 1998). Discrimination and race based segregation have perpetuated the problems of inner cities and their inhabitants. “Civil rights groups and advocates have the goal of promoting residential racial integration so that one day it might be a common occurrence. However, people looking to buy a house probably do not keep this in mind” (Leigh and McGhee 1986, 33). Even though people’s decisions on where to purchase a home are based on many factors, there is still ample evidence that racial demographics play a role (Massey and Denton 1993, Harris 2001). In order to glean any racial overtones, a person's belief in what causes the disenfranchisement of Blacks and Hispanics, structural or individual factors, were added as an additional dimension to the more general structural and individual concepts.

### *3.2.3 Stereotypes about Low Income Individuals*

Regardless of what people believe to be the cause of poverty, their beliefs about low income individuals in general may be insightful. Perception of poverty is defined as the extent to which the receiving community believes positive and negative stereotypes of low

income individuals. Stereotypes about low income individuals include that they have too many children, are lazy and unmotivated (Cozzarelli et al.2001). Cozzarelli et al. (2001) contended that there has been little research on attitudes toward the poor, despite abundant research in recent years that has revolved around welfare policies. In their 2001 study of college students, they found that predominately negative stereotypes of the poor, such as “laziness” were endorsed. Participants from their study also believed that some positive characteristics, such as “friendly” were characteristic of the poor. Beliefs about low income individuals may influence how respondents feel about having them as neighbors. To that end it is necessary to understand what beliefs the members of the receiving community have about low income individuals in general.

Stereotypes add a more superficial layer to beliefs about individuals. This concept is distinct from the structural and individualist concepts in that it is concerned with stereotypes of individuals rather than causes of poverty. Even if a person believes that structural causes have created poverty he/she might still have negative stereotypes about low income individuals. Likewise, a person who believes individualist factors led to poverty might still adhere to some positive stereotypes of low income individuals.

### 3.3 Attitudes Associated with Mobility Programs

This section explores the attitudes homeowners in the receiving community may have about neighbors in public housing and other factors associated with mobility programs. Specifically, it explores the characteristics of public housing residents as potential neighbors and attitudes toward policies that aim to ameliorate poverty. Hypothesis 2: *The main hypothesis of this study is that an individual's ideology about individuals and society will*

*influence his/her perceptions and feelings toward characteristics of potential neighbors and policy solutions.*

### *3.3.1 Perceived Effects of Subsidized Housing on Receiving Neighborhoods*

When mobility programs are implemented, the impact on the receiving community should be considered and evaluated. The literature indicates that members of the receiving community worry about the impact the public housing will have on their property values and crime rates (Harris 2001, Briggs 1998). These fears correspond with Harris' (2001) racial proxy hypothesis, which states that individuals associate negative housing consequences with minority neighborhoods, rather than pure racism against minorities.

This logic can be extended to the placement of public housing and the reaction of the members of the receiving communities. When homeowners balk at the influx of residents are they exhibiting racism, since the public housing residents are predominately minorities? Are they exhibiting classism because of to the economic status of their new neighbors? Or, are they responding to an association of public housing in general with deteriorating buildings and high crime rates? The implications for mixed income integration are at least twofold. First, if the receiving community is afraid of the negative effects of subsidized apartments rather than some deep-seeded ideological reasons for not wanting low income neighbors, policy implementation can work to assuage those fears. Second, rather than merely placating the members of the receiving community with assurances that controls will be in place to protect their neighborhoods, perhaps there needs to be some sort of promotion explaining how economic diversity can be good for a community as well an explanation of the ample evidence that shows there are no adverse effects on other neighborhoods that have received

subsidized or public housing. This dissertation defines perceptions of neighborhood effects with the negative effects that homeowners seem to fear the most: falling property values and climbing crime rates.

### *3.3.2 Neighborhood Characteristics*

Neighborhood characteristics such as sense of community and attitudes toward low income single mothers or persons with a mental illness may indicate how the receiving community feels about having public housing residents for neighbors.

#### *3.3.2.1 Sense of community*

One of the main objectives of the relocation policy is to increase the social capital of the entering community. As discussed in Chapter 2, Briggs (1998) contends that social capital consists of “social support” and “social leverage.” For the most part, studies have looked at variables such as the number of friends and families public housing residents have in their new communities (social support) and the contacts they make that might lead to career information (social leverage) (Briggs 1998, Kleit 1999). These variables are important and telling, but really only get at one side of the story. The current study looks at the members of the receiving community and their attitudes about sense of community and particularly the sense of community they feel toward the members of the entering community.

In order for residential mobility policies to meet their objectives, the entering community needs to be part of the new community. The extent this will occur is inextricably linked to the extent the receiving community is amenable to the idea. There is evidence that ownership of private property actually creates a culture of isolation and an indifference

towards the surrounding community (Mackenzie 1994). It is possible that the homeowners in a receiving community may not feel a sense of community with other homeowners, let alone with the public housing residents living in nearby complexes. Sense of community is defined as the extent the receiving community feels connected to their community in general, and the extent that they feel the entering community is part of that community.

#### 3.3.2.2 Low income, single mothers

The fastest growing population in poverty are single mothers with young children (DiNitto 2006). The Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) reflects public perceptions of welfare recipients, predominately single mothers on welfare (DiNitto 2006). The programs have gone from entitlement to work-based programs—the public perception of welfare recipients being lazy and not working enough helped drive these changes. Women in poverty are more likely to be seen as having multiple children and poorer sexual habits than other women (APA 1998). Cozzarelli et al. (2002) corroborated this finding with their study on the different perceptions people have of poor men and poor women. For the most part, respondents seemed to associate more favorable characteristics with poor women compared to poor men. However a negative characteristic for women was that they were seen as having too many children. Cozzarelli et al. (2002) contended that it is possible that respondents associate more children with more public funds. They argue that Americans tend to believe that welfare mothers will have more children in order to receive more assistance. Welfare reforms implemented programs that limited the assistance recipients could receive as well as stricter work requirements.



In addition to shifting benefits from entitlements to limited assistance based on work status, reforms also attempted to influence familial arrangements, such as providing marriage incentives (Fitzgerald and Ribar 2004). For example, the Bush Administration is focusing money on promoting marriage through programs and incentives, specifically aimed at low income families who it believes will have greater advantages with a two-parent household (Catless and Artis 2004). No longer is assistance aimed at providing mothers with direct resources to help raise their children, instead welfare-to-work reforms aim to move mothers into the workforce. The entering communities of relocation programs largely consist of single mothers and their children. Negative stereotypes and other beliefs may influence how members of the receiving community feel toward poor, single mothers. Moreover, feelings about low income, single mothers may influence attitudes about mobility programs.

#### 3.3.2.3 Persons with a mental illness

Persons living in areas of concentrated poverty are more likely to suffer from some form of mental illness, such as depression, substance abuse or schizophrenia (Fauth, Leventhal and Brooks-Gun 2004). Members of the entering community have come from such concentrated areas and often have a mental health problems that are subject to stigmatization from non-public housing residents and other members of the receiving community (Salzer 2000). Past research has found that the general public fears people with mental illnesses and tends to find them dangerous (Martin, Pescosolido and Tuch 2000). Persons with a mental illness have also been the target of NIMBY-ism. Attempts to integrate persons with a mental illness into the community via group homes has been met with great resistance (see for example, Low Income Housing Coalition, Lee, Farrell and Link 2004 and Corrigan et al.

2003). It is possible that members from the receiving community oppose housing relocations due to their fear of persons with a mental illness. Negative beliefs and perceptions of persons with a mental illness may affect how the public housing residents are doing in their new neighborhoods (Salzer 2000). Attitudes toward persons with a mental illness are defined as the feelings the receiving community has toward living next to persons with a mental illness.

### *3.3.2 Policy Solutions*

In addition to determining the perceptions and feelings of the members from the receiving community, the policy solutions they would support will be examined. “..People’s beliefs about the reasons for poverty and need have practical implications for the legitimacy and viability of specific types of anti-poverty policy” (Oorschot and Halman 2000, 3). There are several approaches to low income policies. This section evaluates policies utilizing the market model and Geography of Opportunity models of policy making.

The free market model of local policy-making is based on public choice theory. Public choice theorists (e.g. Buchan, Tulluck 1962 & Ostrom 1991) contend that the most efficient allocation of city resources is left to the devices of the market. The major tenets of public choice theory include the focus on self-interested, rational individuals as the determinant of public policy in lieu of the public interest. Public choice theorists argue against government being invasive and instead contend that the market can guide policy more efficiently. This perspective combines the concepts of negative liberty and individualism by assuming that people are accountable for their own situation and that government policy should not interfere. The market model viewpoint is aligned with the American individualist spirit of “pulling oneself up by their bootstraps.” Believing that

people can change if they want to, policies need only provide the opportunities for employment, and motivated, rational individuals will choose to work. Policy recommendations from this framework would include economic development strategies such as tax incentives for businesses that would ostensibly stimulate the market and provide more job opportunities.

In contrast, there is literature that sees human nature as less driven by selfish, rational motivation and more affected by community or environment and institutions, including the culture of poverty and geography of opportunity models. The culture of poverty based solution would combine individualism and positive liberty. Despite the environment clearly having caused the culture of poverty at some point, the theory downplays the structural causes of poverty by focusing responsibility on the individual (Curley 2005). Poverty as a culture assumes that people have poor morals and values, which have been perpetuated by living in impoverished conditions. These ingrained values become a way of life. From this perspective, perhaps the only way to help people escape this culture is by providing resources to schools in order to stop the “cycle” at an early age. Spending more money on low income schools would be a policy the model would support.

Geography of opportunity solutions combine structuralism and positive liberty tenets. Individuals are held back in society by their geographic barriers and by removing those barriers they are able to thrive. A policy under this model would advocate relocating low income individuals into new neighborhoods where they can access opportunities and resources.

To summarize, using urban poverty models, this study looks at three categories of policies. “Individual policies” are based on the free market model and promote giving resources to businesses that will indirectly aid low income individuals by providing them opportunities to help themselves. “Place based policies” are based on the culture of poverty model and include those policies that provide more resources to individuals in their current environment. “Other place based policies,” based on the geography of opportunity model, are policies that actually relocate low income individuals into more affluent communities.

There are two final hypotheses that are derived from the ideologies, attitudes and policy solutions presented in the previous sections. These hypotheses are exploratory in that they attempt to disentangle the influence of ideologies and attitudes on mobility programs. Hypothesis 3: *The perceptions and feelings of the members of the receiving community are related to their support of mobility programs.* Hypothesis 4: *Ideologies about individuals and society will have a stronger relationship with support for mobility programs than perceptions and feelings*

### 3.4 Summary

Two levels of ideology may help frame the beliefs the receiving community have about the mobility programs and characteristics of their new neighbors. Ideologies held about society provide a perspective on liberty and rights. Liberty has multiple definitions, such as positive and negative. A negative liberty perspective calls for limited government intervention in cases where harm to others might occur. Positive liberty advocates contend that government should intervene to provide opportunities and resources to individuals in need. A person’s perspective on liberty may affect what policies he/she supports. In addition

to liberty, a person's belief about whether people have the right to live in their neighborhood might be important. Right to the city refers to the extent the receiving community values diversity, believes low income residents have an equal right to participation and whether they value private property over public property in their community.

Ideology about individuals, such as attribution of poverty and stereotypes of low income individuals, are likely to be inextricably linked to ideologies held about society. What a person believes causes poverty will no doubt determine what role he/she believes society should play in assisting the poor. Further, views about race could play an important role in why people believe Blacks and Hispanics are disenfranchised. Section 3 explored characteristics of low income neighbors which may elicit attitudes and perceptions, both positive and negative.

The reason for the negative response of receiving communities to relocation programs may be determined by examining the feelings and perceptions residents have about their new low income neighbors. It is possible that they do not feel that the new neighbors are part of their community or that they have the same values as the rest of their community. They may feel that negative effects will befall their neighborhood, such as crime. Relocation programs generally consist of low income, single mothers and oftentimes persons with a mental illness; negative perceptions and feelings about these groups may be associated with relocation programs. Due to the different contingencies that can be formed by the independent variables, this study provides for several possible ideologies given the different perspectives and intricacies of the human mind. Several hypotheses were presented based on the literature.

This research is exploratory in that the “mapping” of the receiving community will provide an insight into the minds of an important target population of relocation policies.

## CHAPTER 4

### METHODOLOGY

In order to ascertain the receiving community's beliefs and attitudes about low income individuals, society, low income neighbors and policies, cross-sectional data was collected from neighborhoods in Dallas, Texas and a Southwestern City. This chapter outlines the methodology used in the study including a description of the demographics of the participants and how data was collected. It also details how each theoretical concept was measured.

#### 4.1 Participants and Data Collection Methods

The participants of the study were 153 homeowners from Dallas and Southwest City receiving communities that were the target of a public housing authority owned mixed income housing development. Cross-sectional data were collected through mail surveys. A total of 600 surveys were sent; 300 to Dallas and 300 to Southwest City. Surveys were sent to households within 600 meters of a development in the Southwest City neighborhood and to households within 700 meters in the Dallas development. A total of 153 surveys were returned, yielding an overall response rate of 26 percent. More Southwest City citizens (86) returned surveys than Dallas citizens (67), yielding a sample that weighted slightly more to Southwest City (56%) (see Table 4.1 for a breakdown of the response rates by city).

Table 4.1 Survey of Response Rates

	Total Participants	Dallas	Southwest City
Total Mailed	600	300	300
Total Undeliverable	10	5	5
Total Returned	153	67	86
Response Rate	25.5%	22.3%	28.6%

#### 4.1.1 Survey Instrument

The survey instrument contained 46 close-ended scaled questions and one open-ended question. The items on the survey were designed to represent eight scales and 16 additional variables including the demographic variables. The instrument was three pages long and included a cover letter explaining the research (see .instrument in Appendix A). The instrument was pre-tested with students in several graduate level courses and one undergraduate course. A total of five pre-tests were conducted. Items on the scales were eliminated and changed as necessary before each subsequent trial.<sup>8</sup>

#### 4.1.2 Participant Selection

The selected neighborhoods were two of several locations that had received public housing residents. In both the Dallas and Southwest City sites the opposition received great publicity. Moreover, the chosen sites had developments which were more integrated into

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<sup>8</sup> An error at the printing press is most likely responsible for a sizable amount of data missing from the second page of some surveys. (n= 32; 21%). The survey was supposed to begin on the backside of the cover letter; however, it was started on a second, separate sheet, which caused some participants to skip over the backside of the second sheet. Although this left the data rather messy, the backside did contain parts of the liberty and “right to the city” scales, which allowed averages to be computed for the items that were answered so that more cases could be included in the analysis. Unfortunately the entire race and poverty stereotype scales were housed on the second page, so fewer respondents answered these items.



single family home areas. Other relocation sites were either farther away from single family homes or were in less affluent parts of town.

All street names within a certain area around the housing development were entered into a spreadsheet. A list of homeowners was procured by searching the counties' appraisal district Web Sites. In order to get a diversity of households from different streets, half of the homeowners from each street were selected. For example, if there were 10 houses listed on "Street A," the first five names were selected. This was done until the target number (300) was achieved. In Dallas there were not as many streets, so all households from the selected streets were included in the sample.

#### *4.1.3 Demographics of Respondents*

More male citizens completed the surveys (76, 54%) than females (65, 46%). Twelve participants did not indicate a gender (8%). Overall, 84 percent of participants were Caucasian, but there were differences between the cities in terms of race. The Dallas sample was more ethnically diverse than the Southwest City sample, with only 67 percent Caucasian as compared to Southwest City's 93 percent. These proportions are similar to the Census data shown in Table 4.2. Table 4.3 also illustrates the difference in income levels by city. The median income level is much higher for the sample data than the Census data. The sample data was limited to homeowners, which could explain some of the incongruity in the numbers.

Table 4.2 Participant Racial/Ethnic Makeup by City

	Dallas	Fort Worth
African American	5.9% (4)	1.2% (1)
Asian	8.9% (6)	1.2% (1)
Caucasian	67.1% (45)	92.9% (79)
Hispanic	7.5% (5)	3.5% (3)
Other	5.9% (4)	--
Missing	4.5% (3)	2.4% (2)
Total	67	85

Table 4.3 Neighborhood Census Data and Sample Data

	Dallas neighborhood	Dallas sample	Southwest City neighborhood	Southwest City sample
Medium income	\$39,960	\$101,000-\$150,000	\$52,014	\$101,000-\$150,000
Black	13.9%	5.9%	.9%	1.2%
Hispanic (any race)	12.8%	7.5%	3%	3.5%
White	72.9%	67.1%	95.3%	92.9%
Source: US Census 2000				
<i>Note:</i> Sample data is limited to homeowners, so comparisons are limited.				

The income of participants was divided into four categories, which were each well represented in the sample. For both Southwest City and Dallas the median income category was “\$101,000-\$150,000.” However, there was diversity in the income distributions. Southwest City had a greater percentage of participants with an income over \$150,000 (33.3% as compared to 19.4%), and Dallas had a higher percentage of participants in the

“101,000-150,000” category (38.7% as compared to 18.7%). Southwest City also had a higher percentage in the “Under 50,000” category (17.3% as compared to 8.1%)<sup>9</sup>. As can be seen in Table 4.3, the Census Data for the two tracks shows that the Southwest City neighborhood was more affluent.

The overwhelming majority of participants have a bachelor’s or a graduate degree (46% and 40%, respectively) and another 11.3 percent (17) had some college or an associate’s degree and only four (.03%) participants had just a high school diploma. The number of years participants lived in their communities ranged from 0 to 50. This variable was divided into four categories, in order to control for outliers.

The majority of respondents were married/cohabiting, 9.5 percent were widowed, 8.1 percent were single and 7.4 percent were divorced. Seventy-six percent of respondents answered “yes” to having children. Of the respondents who had children, 49 percent had at least one child under the age of 18 at the time of the survey. Table 4.4 summarizes the demographic variables.

Table 4.4 Selected Demographic Data of Participants

<b>Variable</b>	<b>ALL</b>	<b>Dallas</b>	<b>Southwest City</b>
<b>Total</b>			
Participants	153 (100%)	67 (43.8%)	86 (56.2%)
<b>Gender</b>			
Male	76 (49.7%)	36 (53.7%)	40 (46.5%)
Female	65 (42.5%)	28 (41.8%)	37 (43%)

<sup>9</sup> Due to the high affluence in the Southwest City neighborhood, it is probable that the participants in the “Under50” income category are retirees.

Table 4.4- continued

Missing	12 (7.8%)	3 (4.5%)	9(10.5%)
<b>Marital Status</b>			
Married/cohabiting	111 (72.5%)	50 (74.6%)	61 (70.9%)
Divorced	11 (7.2%)	2 (3%)	9 (10.5%)
Single	12 (7.8%)	9 (13.4%)	3 (3.5%)
Widowed	14 (9.2%)	4 (6%)	10 (11.6%)
Missing	5 (3.3%)	2 (3%)	3 (3.5%)
<b>Education</b>			
High school degree	4 (2.6%)	2 (3%)	2 (2.3%)
Some college	12 (7.8%)	6 (9%)	6 (7%)
Associate of Technical degree	5 (3.3%)	2 (3%)	3 (3.55)
Bachelor's	69 (45.1%)	34 (50.7%)	35 (40.7%)
Grad/MD/JD	60 (39.2%)	22 (32.8%)	38 (44.2%)
Missing	3 (2%)	1 (1.5%)	2 (2.3%)

#### 4.1.4 Differences in the Sample Based on Demographics

Cross-tabulations of the cities and other demographic variables revealed a more detailed analysis of respondents. Dallas and Southwest City (SWC) differed in terms of race, income, having children younger than 18 years old, how long they lived in the neighborhood and awareness of the subsidized apartments in their neighborhoods. SWC residents were significantly less diverse in terms of race compared to Dallas.  $\chi^2 (1) = 14.95, N=153, p < .001$ . SWC and Dallas residents also differed by their income. Although the median category was the same for both cities, there was a significant difference in the income categories by city. Respondents from SWC had higher incomes than the Dallas respondents.  $\chi^2 (2) = 9.69, N=137, p < .05$ .

SWC residents also had lived in the neighborhood significantly longer than Dallas residents ( $\chi^2(3)= 30.98$ ,  $N= 147$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and were more likely to be aware of the subsidized apartments in their neighborhood  $\chi^2 (1) = 5.35$ ,  $N=152$ ,  $p < .05$ . There was a significant difference in the number of years people lived in their neighborhood between people who were aware (mean=12, SD= 11.5) or not aware (mean= 6, SD= 9.8) of the subsidized housing in their neighborhood. People who were aware of the subsidized housing had lived in their neighborhoods a significantly longer time.  $t (145)= 2.01$ ,  $p < .05$ . After limiting the examining to residents who had lived in the community less than five years, SWC residents were more likely to be aware of the subsidized housing than Dallas residents  $\chi^2 (1)= 6.9$ ,  $N= 145$ ,  $p < .05$ .

Having a child under 18 was also significant with number of years in the neighborhood  $\chi^2 (3) =22.59$ ,  $N= 153$ ,  $p<.001$ . Marriage was associated with having a child under 18  $\chi^2 (1) = 7.18$ ,  $N= 153$ ,  $p < .001$  and was also significant with income. Married respondents were more affluent  $\chi^2 (2)= 26.34$ ,  $N=153$ ,  $p< .001$ . Finally, respondents from SWC were more likely to have a child under 18  $\chi^2 (1), = 7.7$ ,  $N=153$ ,  $p < .01$  (see Table 4.5 for a breakdown of demographic differences by city).

Table 4.5 Differences in Demographics by City

Variables	Dallas	Southwest City	Total
<b>Race</b>			
White	45 (36%)	79 (64%)	124
Non-White	22 (76%)	7 (24%)	29
$\chi^2 = 14.95^{***}$ , $\Phi = .31^{***}$			
<b>Years in residence</b>			
Five years or less	29 (59%)	20 (41%)	49
6-11 years	31 (58%)	22 (42%)	53
12-18 years	6 (33%)	12 (67%)	18
Over 18 years	0 (0%)	27 (100%)	27
$\chi^2 = 30.97^{***}$ , $p < .001$ , Cramer's $V = .46^{***}$ ; $t(145) = 5.61^{***}$			
<b>Income</b>			
Under \$50,000	8 (%)	5 (%)	13
\$51,000-\$100,000	21 (%)	23 (31.3%)	44
\$101,000-\$150,000	24 (%)	12 (35.8%)	36
Over \$150,000	12 (%)	25 (17.9%)	37
$\chi^2 = 9.7^*$ ; Cramer's $V = .27^*$			
<b>Awareness of Subsidized Housing</b>			
Yes	54 (40%)	80 (60%)	134
No	12 (67%)	6 (33%)	18
$\chi^2 = 5.35^*$ ; $\Phi = .19^*$			
<b>Have a child(ren) under 18</b>			
Yes	42 (38%)	70 (62%)	112
No	23 (64%)	13 (36%)	36
$\chi^2 = 7.2^{**}$ ; $\Phi = .22^{**}$			

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$

## 4.2 Operationalization of Variables

### *4.2.1 Ideologies Held About Society*

#### 4.2.1.1 Perception of Liberty

There is no known “negative vs. positive ideology scale” in the literature. There are political ideology items that ask questions regarding government intervention (see for example, General Social Survey 2000). However, existing items did not adequately meet the needs of the present study. In order to measure participants’ views of liberty, respondents were asked how strongly they agreed (on a scale from 4, “strongly agree” to 1, “strongly disagree”) with statements that reflected beliefs about the key tenants of positive or negative liberty. Items were recoded so that higher scores reflected a belief in positive liberty tenets.

The positive liberty items measured the degree participants felt that government should interfere in order to ensure participation and resources for all. The following statements were used to measure positive liberty: 1) “Government needs to intervene in people’s lives to ensure that everyone has the resources and opportunities necessary for freedom”; 2) “Freedom means having the resources and opportunity to participate in public decision-making.” The negative liberty items measured the belief that government intervention should be limited. The following items were used to measure negative liberty: 1) “The government should not intervene in people’s lives unless it is to prevent harm;” and 2) “Freedom means limited government interference.”

The positive items did not both work well as an independent scale (alpha coefficient=.35). The two recoded negative liberty items and one of the positive liberty items (“Government needs to intervene in people’s lives to ensure that everyone has the resources

and opportunities necessary for freedom”) worked well as a single, continuous scale which produced a composite liberty score ( $\alpha=.78$ ), with higher scores denoting an affiliation to positive liberty beliefs. All three of these items mentioned the role of government, whereas the second positive liberty question did not, which could have resulted in low construct validity for that item. It is possible that participants could have believed that freedom meant “having the resources and opportunity to participate in the community” without also believing that government should help people obtain that freedom. Forty-six percent of the participants who answered these questions answered this way, lending support to this assumption. The liberty items were weighted equally, and an average score was calculated for each participant with a possible score of 1 (believes in negative liberty) to 4 (believes in positive liberty).

#### 4.2.1.2 Right to the City

“Right to the city” is a concept measured in terms of one’s belief that diversity is good for their community, that the entering community has an equal right to space and decision-making and that use value is more important than exchange value to a city. In order to develop a “right to the city” scale, questions measuring these three dimensions of the concept were developed and tested. The coefficient alpha (.77) was sufficient for the study. Negative items were recoded so that higher scores were associated with a higher “right to the city” orientation. A composite “right to the city” score was determined for participants based on how much they agreed (on a scale of 1 to 4 with 4 being “strongly agree” and 1 being “strongly disagree”) with the statements illustrating each dimension of the variable.



The first dimension of right to the city was diversity, which measured the degree participants were amenable to having a diverse neighborhood in terms of economics. The following items were used to capture this dimension: 1) "Having persons of diverse racial and economic backgrounds is good for my neighborhood" and 2) "I prefer that people in my neighborhood have backgrounds similar to my own."

The second dimension measured the degree participants believed that their rights are superior to those of low income individuals. Statements measuring this idea included 1) "Low income people should have the right to live in any neighborhood they want" and 2) "People with higher incomes should have more of a say in community decision-making because they contribute more financially to society."

The final dimension of prioritizing exchange value over use value measures to what extent participants valued the monetary value of property and space over the inherent qualities of property and space. Items used to measure this dimension included 1) "Maintaining my property value is more important to me than low income families having greater access to decent housing, schools and parks" and 2) "Development of private property is more important to my community than the development of public space."

#### *4.2.2 Ideologies Held about Individuals*

##### *4.2.2.1 Individualist and Structuralist Causes of Poverty*

In order to determine whether people attribute individual traits or structural factors to poverty, Feagin's (1975) scale was adapted slightly to fit the needs of the present study. Participants were asked how important they believed each item was as a cause of poverty on a scale of 4("very important) to 1 ("not at all important"). The individual items that were

included were “spending money unwisely,” “lack of effort by poor to help themselves” and “loose morals, alcoholism, drug abuse.” The structural items included “discrimination,” “failure of society to provide good schools for all” and “failure of the economy to provide enough jobs.” As separate scales, the structuralism/independent scales had internal consistency ( $\alpha=.75$  for each). Together, however, the scale lacked consistency. Many participants could not be classified as either structuralists or individualists. Thus, the degree of structuralism and individualism are separate variables for the purposes of this study. The individual items were weighted equally, and an average score was taken for each participant for the respective scales. Higher scores indicated a greater degree of structuralism or individualism.

#### 4.2.2.2 Race Dimension

There have been multiple scales used to measure racism (see for instance McConahay 1986). Racism is often inferred by asking people if they believe that discrimination and other obstacles exist in modern society. This dissertation was interested in discovering what the members of the receiving community attributes to the disenfranchisement of African Americans and Hispanics. The same individual and structural questions were asked separately about African Americans and Latinos. The questions were adapted from the General Social Survey (GSS 2000) and included questions about discrimination, opportunity for high quality education and motivation. Participants were asked how important each item was in explaining why, on average, Blacks and Hispanics have worse jobs, income and housing than white people. The structuralist statements included 1) Discrimination of Blacks/Hispanics 2) Most Blacks/Hispanics don't have the opportunity for high quality

education and the individualist statement was 3) Most Blacks/Hispanics don't have the motivation or will power to pull themselves up.

The above racial dimension items did not work well as a continuous scale ( $\alpha < .70$ ). In order to include a racial component in the analysis, the individualist statement for Blacks and Hispanics were combined to create an “individualist belief about race” scale, which did have internal consistency ( $\alpha = .82$ ). The new scale contained the following items: 1) Most Hispanics don't have the motivation or will power to pull themselves up and 2) Most Blacks don't have the motivation or will power to pull themselves up.

#### 4.2.2.3 Perceptions of poverty

Participants' perceptions of poverty were measured by finding out to what extent they subscribed to positive and negative stereotypes about low income individuals. Cozzarelli et al. (2001) developed a list of 38 attributes that they gleaned from the poverty literature. In the interest of having a shorter survey instrument, 10 items were selected. The 10 items were selected based on their pertinence to mobility programs. Specifically, the chosen items were characteristics one might desire or not desire in a neighbor. Each negative item was paired with a corresponding positive item that was somewhat related, although not always an antonym. Participants rated the attributes on a 5 point scale, with 1 being not very characteristic of low income individuals at all and 5 being extremely characteristic of low income individuals. Positive characteristics included “hardworking,” “family oriented,” “responsible,” “moral” and “friendly”, while negative characteristics included “lazy,” “have too many children,” “undecided,” “immoral” and “criminal.” A factor analysis confirmed that the positive and negative items loaded well on two factors. “Uneducated” was the only

item excluded from the scale due to its lower reliability. It was not surprising that this item did not fit as well with the other negative items because “uneducated” may be construed to be caused by either societal factors or individual fault. It was difficult to distinguish if participants believed that being uneducated was a negative stereotype. Positive stereotypes included hardworking, family oriented, responsible, moral and friendly (alpha=.83) Negative stereotypes included immoral, lazy, have too many children and criminal (alpha= .76). The negative items were recoded in order to create a single scale for stereotypes about low income individuals (alpha=.76) where higher scores indicated a belief in positive stereotypes about low income individuals and lower scores indicated a belief in negative stereotypes.

#### *4.2.3 Dependent Variables*

##### *4.2.3.1 Effects of subsidized housing on neighborhood (Racial Proxy)*

Past literature has suggested that members of receiving communities were afraid of what low income housing would do to their property values and crime rates (see, for example, Briggs 1999). This aligns with the Racial Proxy Hypothesis introduced in Chapter 2, where people associated minority neighborhoods with low property rates and high crime rates (Harris 2001). In order to control for the reactions participants might have had based on perceived threats to their neighborhood, participants were asked how much they agreed or disagreed that subsidized apartment complexes would (1) lower their property values and (2) increase crime rates in their neighborhood. The two items were combined to form the “Neighborhood Effects” scale (alpha = .84).

#### 4.2.3.2 Feelings about Public Housing Residents as Neighbors

The concept of how the receiving community felt about low income individuals as neighbors was measured with 4 point scales ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” Participants were asked the following items to measure their sense of community toward their low income neighbors: “I consider the low income families who have moved in as part of my community” and “Low income people have different values than the other people in this community.”

In addition to whether they felt the entering community was part of their community, participants were also asked how they felt about specific attributes of low income individuals, including being low income single mothers or persons with a mental illness. In order to measure participants’ feelings about low income single mothers and persons with mental health problems, the following items were asked: “If you learned that there were low income single mothers living in your neighborhood, how much would that bother you?” and “How welcoming do you think your neighbors would be to the low income mothers?” “If you learned that a person with mental health problems was moving into your neighborhood, how much would that bother you?” and “How welcoming do you think your neighbors would be of persons with mental health problems?” Question responses were scaled from 4 (very much) to 1 (not at all). These items first measure how much participants were bothered as individuals and then asks for their perceptions of how welcoming their neighbors would be. These are two different dimensions that could not be turned into one scale.

#### 4.2.3.3 Policy Solutions

In order to measure which policy solutions the participants would be willing to support, the following questions were asked. The first two questions are from the General Social Survey (GSS 2000). The last three were developed to reflect issues of the relocation policies.

1) “Giving businesses and industry special tax breaks for locating in poor and high unemployment areas” (Individual based); 2) “Spending more money on the schools in poor neighborhoods” (Other place based); 3) “Relocating low income families to more affluent neighborhoods” (place based); and 4) “Providing incentives for low income single mothers to marry” (Individual based)

#### 4.2.4 Control Variables

The control variables consisted mostly of the demographics described earlier in the chapter. They included gender, city, the number of years one lived in the neighborhood, education, income, marital status and the number of children under 18 living in the household. In addition to demographics, two other variables were used as controls: 1) Whether participants were aware of the subsidized housing in their neighborhoods and 2) the respondents' sense of community in their neighborhood. Varying degrees of “connectedness” with neighbors could have influenced how respondents felt about individuals from the entering community.

#### 4.2.4.1 Awareness of Subsidized Units

In order to determine if participants were aware of the housing mobility program in their community, the first question they were asked on the instrument was “Are you aware that there are public housing residents living in apartments in your neighborhood?”

Respondents could check “yes” or “no” to indicate their awareness.

#### 4.2.4.2 Sense of community

The Sense of Community Index (SCI) was first published in Perkins et al.(1990). Long and Perkins (2003) did a confirmatory factor analysis of the dimensions within the Sense of Community index. Three items were selected from three dimensions of the scale. 1) community values 2) needs fulfillment and 3) social connections. Two of the statements were derived from items on the original SCI: “I recognize most of the people who live on my block,” (social connection) and “People on this block share the same values” (needs fulfillment). The third statement was a face validity item added by Long and Perkins (2003): “I feel a strong sense of community with others on my block.” The three items were used to measure the extent participants felt a sense of community within their community. The reliability of the scale was similar to the reliability found by Long and Perkins (2003) (alpha=.84).

### 4.3 Interviews

In addition to surveys of homeowners in the receiving community, informal interviews were conducted with public officials in order to ask questions about their views of the relocation policy. This group included an administrator in the local housing authority and city officials from Southwest City. Interviewees were a police officer, the council member of

the receiving community at the time of the relocation and a Public Housing Authority official. Other members of the community, such as the neighborhood association president and a prominent developer in the neighborhood, were not contacted for reasons mentioned later in the discussion. Questions included “What do you think of the relocation of public housing residents into the more affluent neighborhoods?” and “How have they impacted the community?” “Has the policy been successful?” The interviews were conducted in late November and early December of 2005. The interviews took place in the interviewees’ place of employment and lasted approximately one hour.

#### 4.4 Summary

This chapter described the methodology behind the data collection as well as the demographic characteristics of the respondents. A total of 600 mail questionnaires were sent to the neighborhoods, and 153 (24%) were returned. The Dallas and Southwest City communities were distinct in terms of their diversity in racial and income distributions, with the Dallas community being more economically, racially and ethnically diverse. Overall, respondents tended to be highly educated, married or cohabiting, affluent and living in their communities an average of 10 years.

Theoretical concepts described in Chapter 3 were operationalized in the form of scaled items on a survey instrument. The items on the survey instrument made up five independent variables, 11 dependent variables and nine control variables. Most of the variables were measured on a 4-point scale. Eight of the variables were made up of more than one item on the survey, including right to the city, liberty, structuralism, individualism,



stereotypes of the poor, individualist beliefs about race, neighborhood effects and sense of community.

In the following three chapters, the survey results will be presented. Chapter 5 tests the preliminary hypothesis that ideologies held about individuals are related to ideologies held about society. Chapter 6 tests the main hypothesis that a person's ideologies held about individuals and societies are related to their perceptions and feelings about low income individuals as neighbors. Chapter 6 tests the hypothesis that a person's perceptions and feelings about low income individuals as neighbors are related to whether s/he supports housing relocation policies. A second hypothesis addressed in Chapter 6 states that when controlling for ideologies and perceptions and feelings, the ideologies will have a greater relationship with support for mobility programs than perceptions and feelings.

## CHAPTER 5

### BELIEFS ABOUT INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the relationship between individuals' ideologies and their perceptions and feelings toward different characteristics of the housing mobility program that took place in their neighborhood. As described in earlier chapters, the independent variables consisted of two tiers of ideological variables, including ideologies held about individuals and society. There were also 11 dependent variables describing respondents' perceptions and feelings and seven demographic variables that made up most of the control variables. The next four chapters explore the relationships between all of these variables as outlined in the hypotheses. The aim of this chapter is to present descriptive details of the independent variables and to explore the preliminary hypothesis that *ideologies held about individuals are related to ideologies held about society*. The chapter begins by providing the results of descriptive statistics, t-tests and Pearson's R tests of the independent variables. Next, ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression results are explored in order to determine the relationship between the ideologies held about individuals had on the ideologies held about society.

## 5.1 Descriptive Results of Independent Variables.

### *5.1.1 Ideology Held about Individuals*

#### 5.1.1.1 Structuralist view of poverty.

The degree to which respondents attributed structuralist factors to poverty was measured on a continuous scale with higher scores indicating a greater belief in external causes. On average, respondents had a structural score of 2.7 (SD= .76) on a scale of 1 (not at all important) to 4 (very important). The distribution of scores for structuralism was about the same for both cities, although slightly more skewed to the non-structural side for Dallas respondents.

In addition to a composite score, respondents were classified into two categories for this variable. Ninety-four (61%) participants were classified as having a structuralist perspective, and 58 (38%) participants were classified as not having a structuralist perspective.

Seventy percent of all women and 52 percent of all men were classified as structuralists. Seventy-two percent of all non-Whites and 59 percent of all Whites were structuralists. Fifty-six percent of all non-married respondents and 67 percent of all married respondents were structuralists. Seventy percent of the respondents from Dallas were structuralists, while only 55 percent from the SWC. Of the respondents who were classified as structuralists, 87 percent had at least a Bachelor's degree, 52 percent had an income greater than \$100,000, 78 percent were white, 53 percent were female and 40 percent had children under 18 living at home.

The difference between these percentages for structuralists and non-structuralists was not significant for any of the demographic variables except for gender. Women were more likely to be classified as structuralists than men  $\chi^2 (1) = 4.55, N=140, p < .01$ . In general, women (mean= 2.89) also had significantly higher structuralist scores than men (mean= 2.48).  $t (138) = -3.3, p < .001$ . This finding is not necessarily consistent with the literature, which has not found many gender differences in structuralists and individualists (Kleugal and Smith, 1986 and Cozzarelli et al. 2001).

#### 5.1.1.2 Individualist view of poverty

Another independent variable was the degree to which participants attributed individual factors to be important causes of poverty. On average, participants had an individualist score of 3.2 (SD= .65) on a scale of 1 (not at all important) to 4 (very important). The distributions for both cities were skewed to the high individualist direction.

The skewed distribution of scores and the classification of respondents as individualists or not, revealed that the overwhelming majority of respondents were individualists. One hundred thirty-one participants (86%) were classified as having an individualist perspective, while only 21 participants (14%) were classified as not having an individualist perspective of poverty (see Table 5.1).

Eighty-nine percent of the male respondents were individualists and 81 percent of the women were. Eighty-eight percent from Dallas, 84 percent from SWC were individualists. There were little differences between the races, which differs from past research (see for example Cozzarelli 2001 and Hunt 1996). Again, however, the sample for this study was not representative of the entire population. A high percentage of Whites (86%) as well as non-

Whites (83%) were classified as individualists. Of all individualists, 66 percent didn't have a child under 18 living at home and 72 percent were married.

While none of the demographic variables was able to distinguish between who was more likely to be an individualist, there were some that had significant differences in the degree of individualism. Demographic variables that differed significantly on individualist scores were being married and having at least one child under 18. Respondents who were married had lower individualist scores (mean=3.18) than respondents who were single, divorced or widowed (mean=3.42).  $t(150) = -2.07, p < .05$ . Respondents who had children under 18 had significantly lower individualist scores (mean=3.1) than respondents who did not have children under 18 (mean=3.32).  $t(150) = -1.99, p < .05$ .

Table 5.1 Attribution of Poverty Variables

Variable	N	High	Low
Structuralist view of poverty	153	61.8% (94)	38.2% (58)
Individualist view of poverty	153	86.2% (131)	13.8% (21)

The individual and structural scales were not mutually exclusive. Seventy-eight participants (51%) were classified as both structuralists and individualists and five participants (5.8%) were classified as neither. Sixteen respondents (11%) were only structuralists and 53 (35%) were only individualists (see Table 5.2). Respondents were significantly more likely to score higher on the individualist scale (mean=3.2, SD= .64) than the structuralist scale (mean= 2.7, SD= .76).  $t(151) = -6.49, p < .001$ .

An additional open-ended question was asked on this scale which allowed participants to name other factors they believed were important causes of poverty. Thirty-five

(23%) respondents provided a response to this question. Dallas participants mostly gave individualist answers such as “Lack of motivation-remaining in same neighborhood, close to family and childhood friends,” “unwillingness to take any job to establish an income,” “lazy people looking for handouts,” and “lack of involvement in church or religious orgs.” Only two structuralist reasons were listed by Dallas respondents, including “educational opportunities” and “government programs are too broad and inefficient, and a failure.”

Southwest City respondents had more of a balance of structural and individual responses. Individualist responses included “Not taking advantage of opportunities provided”, “lack of American traditional beliefs-consign many to poverty”, “oppressive feelings”, “physical and mental problems.” Structuralist answers included “Failure to provide affordable housing”, “lack of reliable transportation” and “Health problems, lack of good health care.”

Table 5.2 Attribution of Poverty by Group and Gender

Variable	N	Structuralist Only	Individualist Only	Both	Neither
All respondents	152	16 (11%)	53 (35%)	78 (51%)	5 (3%)
Female respondents	64	8 (13%)	15 (23%)	37 (58%)	4 (6%)
Male respondents	76	7 (9%)	35 (46%)	33 (43%)	1 (1%)

### 5.1.1.3 Race Dimensions

Participants were asked two questions that determined how much they believed structural causes explained why Blacks and Hispanics are disenfranchised. Sixty-four (42%) participants were classified as having a high structural score, 12 (7.8%) were neutral and 42 (27%) were classified as having a low structural perspective. Respondents had an average

score of 2.6 (SD= .80) on a scale of 1 (not at all important) to 4 (very important). Women were significantly more likely to be classified as structuralists than men.  $\chi^2(2) = 10.04$ ,  $N=140$ ,  $p < .001$ .

Participants were asked one question to ascertain their belief in an individual cause for why Blacks and Hispanics are disenfranchised. Sixty-five participants (42%) were classified as having an individualist belief about race and poverty, 15 (9.8%) were in the middle and 42 (27%) were classified as not subscribing to the individualist belief about race and poverty.

Table 5.3 Beliefs about Race and Poverty

Variable	N	High	Middle	Low
Race based Structuralist	123	53% (64)	10% (12)	38% (47)
Race based Individualist	122	53% (65)	12% (15)	34% (42)

The items pertaining to race asked about how important each was as cause for Blacks and Hispanics on average having worse jobs, income and housing than white people. Fifty-nine percent of respondents answered that discrimination was “very important” or “somewhat important” and 68 percent answered that motivation was “very important” or “somewhat important” for Blacks’ disenfranchisement. A slightly smaller percentage, 46 percent, answered the same way for educational opportunities.

Interestingly, the answers differed when participants were asked the same questions about Hispanics. Sixty-two percent of respondents answered that a lack of education opportunities was “very important” or “somewhat important” to Hispanics. Fifty-six percent answered the same way to discrimination and only 53 percent answered the same way for motivation (see Table 5.4)

Table 5.4 How Important Participants Perceived Structural/Individual Factors as a Cause for Black and Hispanic Disenfranchisement

	Very important	Somewhat important	Not very important	Not at all important	Total	Missing
Blacks-discrimination	15% (18)	44.2% (53)	29.2% (35)	11.7% (14)	100% (120)	33
Blacks-poor education	19.8% (24)	36.4% (44)	27.3% (33)	16.5% (20)	100% (121)	32
Blacks-motivation	27% (33)	41% (50)	19.7% (24)	12.3% (15)	100% (122)	31
Hispanics-discrimination	16.3% (20)	39.8% (49)	31.7% (39)	12.2% (15)	100% (123)	30
Hispanics-poor education	20.5% (25)	41.8% (51)	20.5% (25)	17.2% (21)	100% (122)	31
Hispanics-motivation	13.4% (16)	39.5% (47)	28.6% (34)	18.5% (22)	100% (119)	34

The race dimension questions did not work well with a scale and were too highly correlated with the structuralist and individualist questions, particularly the structural questions ( $r=.67$ ). In order to keep the race dimension in the preliminary model, the individual questions about Blacks and Hispanics were combined to form an individualist view of why Blacks and Hispanics are disenfranchised ( $\alpha = .82$ ). Higher scores indicated that people believed that individual factors, such as motivation and willpower, were



important causes for why Blacks and Hispanics are not doing as well as Whites in the areas of employment, housing and income. Sixty-five (53%) participants were classified as scoring high on this scale, 15 (12%) were in the middle and 42 (27.5%) scored low (see Table 5.5). There were no significant differences between any of the demographic variables when it came to individualist racial beliefs.

Table 5.5 Beliefs in Individual Causes of Black and Hispanic Disenfranchisement

Variable	N	High	Middle	Low
Individualist Racial Beliefs	122	65 (53.3%)	15 (12.3%)	42 (34.4%)

#### 5.1.1.4 Stereotypes of the poor<sup>10</sup>

Table 5.6 presents the means and standard deviations for all of the items on the positive and negative stereotype scale. Recall that the scale ranged from 5 (highly characteristic of low income individuals) to 1 (not at all characteristic of low income individuals). On average, participants rated both negative stereotypes (mean= 3) and positive stereotypes (mean= 2.9) neutral, or rather not very characteristic or extremely characteristic of low income individuals. The negative stereotypes that received the highest scores were “uneducated” (3.68) and “have too many children” (3.58). The highest scoring positive items were “family oriented” (3.13) and “friendly” (3.02). For the most part, respondents did not answer in extremes. Most of the answers fell close to “neutral” with the exception of few mentioned above. However, as can be seen in Table 5.6, “uneducated” (20%) and “having

<sup>10</sup> There were quite a few participants (n=42) who left these items blank because this scale fell on the side of the survey that was missed by some of the respondents (see Chapter 4 for full explanation).

too many children” (26%) did receive higher percentages of “extremely.” The extreme response to “having too many children” is consistent with other studies of stereotypes of low income women. (Cozzarelli et al. 2002).

Table 5.6. Descriptive Results for Respondents’ Beliefs about Stereotype of the Poor

<i>Stereotype</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Total Mean (SD)</i>	<i>Female Mean (SD)</i>	<i>Male Mean (SD)</i>	<i>% Extremely</i>	<i>% Not at all</i>
hardworking	109	2.99 (1.01)	3.21 (.93)	2.79 (1)	3.9	9.2
immoral	106	2.49 (1.02)	2.34 (1.11)	2.54 (.97)	.7	15
family oriented	106	3.13 (1.09)	3.29 (1.06)	2.98 (1.14)	6.5	5.9
uneducated	106	3.68 (1.18)	3.43 (1.22)	3.82 (1.14)	19.6	3.9
responsible	108	2.81 (.95)	2.95 (.97)	2.61 (.90)	2.6	5.9
moral	102	2.77 (.91)	2.93 (.88)	2.56 (.89)	1.3	7.2
lazy	107	2.75 (1.06)	2.68 (1.01)	2.81 (1.08)	6.5	9.3
have too many children	106	3.58 (1.19)	3.41 (1.12)	3.68 (1.19)	25.5	7.5
friendly	107	3.02 (.92)	3.10 (.94)	2.95 (.95)	2.6	7.5
criminal	106	2.75 (1.06)	2.47 (.85)	2.95 (1.17)	6.6	11.3
Valid N (listwise)	95		37	49		
<i>Note: Scale was from 5 (extremely) to 1 (not at all)</i>						

The positive and negative items made up a continuous score with higher scores indicating that respondents scored positive stereotypes more characteristic of low income individuals than negative stereotypes. Respondents had an average overall score of 2.9 (SD=.61).

Women (mean= 3.12) tended to score higher positive rankings than the male (mean= 2.81) respondents  $t(98) = -2.5, p < .05$ . See Table 5.6 for a breakdown of the item means by gender.

Several respondents wrote unsolicited comments that implied they could not make stereotypical generalizations, such as “cannot answer for all individuals,” “some are, some aren't—too general,” and “this could be any group of people.” The comments are consistent with the majority of respondents who answered close to the neutral center of the scale.

### *5.1.2 Ideologies Held about Society*

#### *5.1.2.1 Liberty*

The higher the score on the liberty scale, the more respondents subscribed to positive liberty tenets. Lower scores on this scale indicated a negative orientation toward liberty. In other words, respondents with higher scores believed that government should intervene to ensure liberty, while lower scores meant that respondents believed that limited government intervention was necessary for liberty. The one positive liberty item and two negative liberty items were averaged for each respondent. The majority of respondents (122, 80%) fell below a composite score of 2.5, which classified them as subscribing to negative liberty. Twenty-seven participants were classified as positive liberty supporters, and two participants were in the middle. On average, participants tended to believe in negative liberty principles with a mean score of 1.86 ( $SD=.72$ ) on a 4-point scale. The liberty distribution is greatly skewed to the negative side. This was the case for both Southwest City and Dallas participants. Respondents who scored high on the positive liberty scale were not significantly different demographically from those who scored low.

Pearson's R tests were conducted to test the correlation between the ideologies held about individuals and the ideologies held about society (See table 5.8 for the results of the Person's R test). Believing in positive liberty was positively associated ( $r=.36$ ) with believing

that structuralist factors were causes of poverty. Positive liberty was negatively associated with individualism ( $r=-.26$ ) and individual beliefs about race ( $r= -.19$ ).

When the continuous scales of right to the city and liberty were compared, believing in right to the city was positively correlated with believing in positive liberty ( $r= .39$ ). Cross-tabs of the two ideology of society variables' categories (high and low) imply that there are nuances to the concepts, which may warrant future research (see Table 5.7). Although not significant, the classifications implied that respondents' answers to the two variables were not always consistent. Thirteen percent (17) of respondents were classified as a high belief in right to the city and positive liberty. Almost six percent (7) believed in positive liberty and had a low belief in right to the city. Thirty-four percent (44) of individuals believed in negative liberty and had a high belief in right to the city. This finding was interesting in that it implies that although respondents may have believed that government intervention should be limited, they believed that low income individuals should have the same right to space as more affluent individuals. The ambiguous nature of Mill's harm principle in negative liberty belief may factor into this view. As discussed in Chapter 3, what constitutes harm to another individual is subjective. It is possible that some respondents who subscribed to negative liberty tenets believed that low income neighborhoods were harmful to residents and that government intervention was necessary to ameliorate the harm.

Not surprisingly, adding a layer of high and low structuralist perspective to the cross-tabulation revealed that most respondents who answered this way (80%, 35) were high structuralists. Finally, 47 percent (61) had a negative liberty perspective with a low belief in right to the city.

Table 5.7 Cross-Tabulations of Ideology about Society Variables

	High Right to the City	Low Right to the City	Total
Positive Liberty	13% (17)	47% (61)	24
Negative Liberty	34% (44)	5% (7)	105
Missing=34	61	68	129

### 5.1.2.2 Right to the City

The higher a person's right to the city score, the more he/she aligned with the right to the city tenets, including believing that low income individuals should have the right to live in more affluent neighborhoods. The six items were weighted equally, and an average of the six items was calculated to produce a composite score for each participant. Sixty-three participants (41%) had a high right to the city score, 19 (12%) were in the middle and 68 (44%) scored low on the measure. On average, participants had a right to the city score of 2.4 (SD=.65) on a scale of 4 (strongly agree with right to the city tenets) to 1 (strongly disagree with right to the city tenets). The distribution of right to the city scores was normal for both cities. There was no significant difference between the scores of Southwest City and Dallas.

Male participants had lower right to the city scores (mean=2.3, SD= .62) than female participants (mean=2.6, SD=.63).  $t(138) = -2.4, p < .05$ . Male respondents were less likely to believe that the low income individuals had the right to live in their community than female respondents. Thirty-three percent (25) of the men sampled were classified as having high right to the city scores, whereas 48% (31) of the women sampled were classified as having high right to the city scores. Income, length of residence, whether participants had children

under 18, education, race and marital status were not associated with right to the city or positive and negative liberty scores.

Table 5.8 Beliefs about Society Variables

Variable	N	High	Middle	Low
Positive Liberty	150	27	2	121
Right to the city	151	64	19	68

Believing that low income individuals had a right to the city was positively associated with believing in positive stereotypes about low income individuals ( $r=.31$ ). These relationships are expected as one's beliefs about individuals are connected to ones feelings about society (Kluegal and Smith 1986, Cozzarelli et al. 2001). Believing in right to the city was negatively related to being an individualist ( $r= -.33$ ) and individualist racial beliefs ( $r= -.32$ ). (see table 5.9 for correlations of all ideological variables).

Table 5.9 Correlations of Ideologies about Individuals and Society

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Structuralist view of poverty	1					
2. Individualist view of poverty	-.04	1				
3. Belief in Positive Liberty	.36**	-.27**	1			
4. Belief in right to the city	.44**	-.39**	.39**	1		
5. Individual Racial Beliefs	-.15	.38**	-.19*	-.32**	1	
6. Positive stereotypes of the Poor	.23*	-.27**	.13	.31**	-.39**	1

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\*Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2 tailed).

5.2 The Relationship Between Ideology about Individuals and Ideologies Held about Society:  
OLS Regression Results

Hierarchical regression analysis was used to examine the extent of the relationship between the ideological variables, controlling for gender. Table 5.10 provides a description of the variables included in the model. Liberty and right to the city were both regressed on the model in order to determine how ideology about individuals was related to ideology about society. Gender was included in the model, because there were significant differences between male and female respondents with regard to their ideologies. The following tables display the coefficient results for these variables.

Table 5.10 Variable Descriptions for OLS Beliefs about Individuals Model

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Description</b>
Female	Dummy; 1=female, 0=male
Structuralist beliefs about poverty	Higher scores indicate a belief in structuralist causes of poverty
Individualist beliefs about poverty	Higher scores indicate a belief in individualist causes of poverty
Individualist racial beliefs	Higher scores indicate a belief that minorities are poor due to individual factors
Positive stereotypes of the poor	Higher scores indicate a belief in positive stereotypes of the poor

Table 5.11 OLS Model Results for Belief about Right to the City

<i>Variable</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Std Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Female	.09	.1	.08
Structuralist view of poverty	.41***	.06	.54
Individualist view of poverty	-.19*	.08	-.21
Individualist racial beliefs	-.06	.06	-.1
Positive stereotypes of the poor	.06	.08	.07

F = 14.22, N= 99

ADJ R Square = .40

\*significant at the .05 level, \*\*\*significant at the .001 level

The ideology held about individuals model explained a moderate amount (adjusted R square= .40) of the variance in respondents' views on right to the city (see Table 5.11 for regression results). The degree respondents held a structuralist belief about poverty was the most relevant variable in determining a respondent's belief in right to the city. Believing that people are poor due to structural factors was related to the belief that low income individuals had the right to live anywhere in the city. It is possible that respondents who placed the blame of being poor societal factors, such as discrimination, believed that low income individuals had the right to live in a more affluent community. Moreover, the relationship between structuralism and right to the city seems to imply that respondents were more likely to be willing to share their physical and civic space with people from a different economic background as long as they believed those people were victims of discrimination, poor education and a downturn in the economy.



Although not as relevant as structuralism, individualism was related to right to the city. The relationship was negative. Respondents who believed that poverty was caused by individual factors such as morals and motivation did not believe that low income individuals had the right to live in a more affluent area or have the same rights to space as they did. There are other variables that will be explored over the next chapters that illustrate how a person's view on right to the city is related to their specific feelings about low income individuals.

Table 5.12 OLS Coefficients for Belief in Positive Liberty

<i>Variable</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Std Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Female	.19	.14	.13
Structuralist view of poverty	.39***	.09	.40
Individualist view of poverty	-.18	.11	-.17
Individualist racial beliefs	-.04	.08	-.05
Positive stereotypes of the poor	-.03	.12	-.03

F = 6.04, N=98

ADJ R Square = .21

**Note: Liberty was measured on a 4 point scale with higher scores indicating a belief in positive liberty**

\*\*\*significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)

Believing that structural factors were important causes of poverty had a strong and positive relationship with believing in positive liberty (see Table 5.12). Respondents who saw poverty as caused by structural barriers were more likely to believe that government should be proactive in providing resources and opportunities. These findings are consistent

with past studies that found people who believed that low income individuals were poor due to structural factors were more likely to want the government to help make up for the disparity through intervention (Kluegal and Smith 1989, Cozzarelli et al. 2001).

Interestingly, respondents' views on stereotypes of the poor did not significantly relate to their views on liberty or right to the city in the model. This variable became superfluous once controlling for structuralist and individualist attributions about poverty. These results might clarify the distinction between attribution of poverty and stereotypes about the poor. The individualist and structuralist variables measured attributions about poverty, while stereotypes measured beliefs about poor individuals. It makes sense that beliefs about the causes of poverty are associated with beliefs about society, because if the poor were at fault for their own situation, people may not believe that society has as much an obligation to help. Stereotypes about low income individuals may more likely be associated with specific characteristics of the relocated public housing residents, which will be explored in the next chapter.

### 5.3 Summary

Several of the independent variables varied with the demographic variables, especially gender. An analysis of the demographic variables revealed that women believed in structural causes of poverty more than men, believed in more positive stereotypes of the poor and were more likely to believe that low income individuals had a right to live and participate in their neighborhood than men.

Structuralist and individualist beliefs about poverty and the stereotypes about the poor variables were positively related to the right to the city and liberty variables, however the relationship was not relevant in the regression model. Having a structuralist view of poverty was especially relevant in the model predicting beliefs about liberty and right to the city. Whether a person believed in positive or negative stereotypes about the poor was related to their belief in low income individuals' right to the city, but was not significant in the model. Finally, the individualist beliefs about race were positively related to both positive liberty and right to the city, although it was not significant in the model. One probable explanation is its high correlation with structural and individual beliefs about poverty. The high correlation between these variables indicates that disentangling race and economics in the study will be difficult.

In the next chapter, most of the independent variables will constitute a second model that will determine the extent ideologies held about individuals and society are related to respondents' perceptions and feelings about low income individuals as neighbors.

## CHAPTER 6

### THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDEOLOGY AND PERCEPTIONS AND FEELINGS

*The main hypothesis of this study is that a person's ideology about individuals and society is related to their perceptions and feelings toward characteristics of potential neighbors and the policy solutions they support.* Section I of this chapter examines the relationship between the ideological model on the perceptions and feelings respondents have toward low income neighbors. Section II examines the relationship between the ideological model and policy solutions for poverty. Each section begins with a description of the dependent variables followed by multivariate OLS regression analysis.

#### 6.1 Neighborhood Characteristics

##### *6.1.1 Descriptive Results for Dependent Variables*

###### 6.1.1.1 Perceived effects of subsidized housing on the neighborhood

Previous studies have illustrated how residents are afraid of the effects low income housing could have on their neighborhoods (Briggs 1999). In the present study, participants were asked how much they agreed or disagreed that subsidized apartment complexes would lower their property values or increase crime rates in their neighborhood. Seventy-six percent (N= 114) of all participants answered “strongly agree” or “agree” to “apartment complexes

with rent subsidized residents will lower my property values,” and 71 percent (106) answered “strongly agree” or “agree” that “apartment complexes with rent subsidized residents will increase crime rates in my neighborhood.” The combined neighborhood effects variable illustrated that 69.1 percent (N=103) of participants agreed or strongly agreed that both effects would occur, 11.4 percent (N=17) were split (agreed one effect would and one would not occur) and 22.9 percent (N=28) either disagreed or strongly disagreed that either effect would occur.

It is interesting that the majority of the residents perceived that mixed income housing developments would have detrimental effects to their property. The wording of the neighborhood effects items was in future tense. It is possible that homeowners believe that these effects will happen over time or that it is possible for the effects to happen if not for structural factors in place. Comments written on the survey instrument gave a little more insight into how some of the respondents felt about this topic.

“We covered most of these questions three years ago while fighting to not have low income housing moved into our neighborhood. Of course, the city won. We have not had any problems with the new residents. Also property values have not gone down. We are not aware of any crimes committed since they have moved in either. Are you aware that we are in a gated area where no one can just walk in? If this was a regular city block there might be a difference. I feel this is a big reason we do not notice any difference in our neighborhood at all.”

This participant believes that the gates around the neighborhoods were responsible for the lack of effects. From a policy perspective, does it make sense to integrate public housing around gated neighborhoods? Briggs’ social capital study referred to mixed income developments as “microneighborhoods,” because they are like islands in the white, affluent

neighborhoods. Social integration does not seem to be encouraged with these structures. Another respondent said “depends on whether or not they [the complexes] are well maintained.” This respondent’s comment supports Harris’ (2001) racial proxy in that the respondent is not making comments based on individuals, but on the physical structure of the developments. From a policy perspective, well-maintained developments may protect property values and perhaps ease the fears of the neighboring homeowners. Both of these comments indicate a focus on the physical structures, rather than actual people.

Whether respondents were aware of the mixed income housing in their neighborhood was related to their perception that negative effects would occur in their neighborhoods. People who were aware of the low income housing tended to agree less (mean=5.9, SD=1.6) than people who were not aware (mean=6.7, SD=1.1) that crime rates would increase and property values would decrease due to the public residents living in their neighborhoods.  $t(152) = -1.98, p < .05$ . People aware of the public housing were probably also aware that few, if any, negative effects had occurred in their neighborhoods. Those who were not aware were more likely to agree that negative effects would occur because this is what they perceived would happen to a community. Perhaps this implies that negative perceptions can be reduced or that there is a change in an individual’s perception after relocation. This implication is speculative as people who were unaware of the subsidized housing did not serve as a good approximate for a comparison group, because there were so few respondents in this group (N=18).

The participants from Dallas (mean=6.6; SD=1.2) were significantly more likely to agree on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree) that apartment complexes

with rent subsidized residents would lower their property values and increase crime rates in their neighborhoods than participants from Southwest City (mean=5.6;SD=1.7).  $t(147) = 4.2$ ,  $p < .001$ . These differences could be due to several factors. Southwest City residents have more recently received an entering community and perhaps they were more likely to realize that their properties were not affected in an adverse way; conversely, the Dallas community has had more time to have other neighborhood changes since the relocation affect their property values. Respondents may associate the external variables with the arrival of public housing residents. Moreover, the affluent, gated nature of the Southwest City receiving community might have made respondents feel like their property was protected.

In addition to the Southwest City homeowners living in a gated community, the entering community's apartment building installed a gate guard. Further, the different roles the city officials played could have influenced the results of these questions. Dallas officials supported the residents' opposition, which might have led them to believe their fears were warranted, whereas the Southwest City residents did not have the support of the city in their opposition attempts.

#### 6.1.1.2 Feelings about Low Income Individuals as Neighbors

Several ordinal variables asked about different attitudes participants had about potential neighbor characteristics. The following tables display the distribution of participants' answers. When asked if they considered low income families to be part of their community, 49 percent of participants said they "disagree" or "strongly disagree." Fifty-four percent answered "disagree" or "strongly disagree" to "low income people have different values than the other people in this community." The neighborhood samples are split on

these issues, indicating a diversity of feelings in the receiving community about the low income, entering community (see Table 6.1).

Table 6.1 Sense of Community toward Public Housing Residents

	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Total	Missing
Low income values	11.3% (17)	34.7% (52)	42.7% (64)	11.3% (17)	100% (150)	3
Low income community	5.9% (9)	45.3% (67)	29.1% (43)	19.6% (29)	100% (148)	5

Participants were fairly evenly split on how much they would be bothered by low income single mothers and persons with a mental illness moving into their neighborhoods as well as how welcoming they thought their neighbors would be (see Table 6.2). The majority of respondents answered “somewhat” or “not very much.”

Table 6.2 Attitudes toward Low Income Neighbors

	Very much	Somewhat	Not very much	Not at all	Total	Missing
Low income single mothers- how much would it bother you	11.8% (18)	30.1% (46)	41.2% (63)	17% (26)	153	0
Low income single mothers-how welcoming would neighbors be	4.6% (7)	39.1% (59)	41.7% (63)	14.6% (22)	151	2
Persons with mental illness-how much would it bother you	22% (33)	37.3% (56)	34% (51)	6.7% (10)	150	3
Persons with mental illness-how welcoming would neighbors be	4.7% (7)	43.9% (65)	31.8% (47)	19.6% (29)	148	5



There were significant demographic differences in the respondents with regard to the neighbor characteristics. For instance, there was a gender difference in the degree that respondents agreed or disagreed that low income people have different values than other people in their community; male respondents (mean=2.6; SD= .87) agreed more than female respondents (mean=2.3; SD=.79).  $t(147) = 1.97, p < .05$ . Fifty-two percent (39) of male respondents agreed or strongly agreed that low income people had different values than other people in their community, whereas only 38 percent (25) of female respondents answered the same way. Education also had a significant relationship with feeling that low income neighbors had different values. The more educated respondents were the less likely they believed that low income neighbors had different values ( $r = -.17, p < .05$ ). White respondents were not as likely to agree (mean= 2.4, SD= .8) that low income people had different values than other people in their neighborhood than non-white respondents (mean= 2.8, SD= .9)  $t(148) = -2.5, p < .05$ .

Respondents who had at least once child under age 18 were less bothered (mean= 2.13; SD= .8) by low income single mothers than respondents who did not have children under 18 living at home (mean= 2.5; SD= .9).  $t(147) = -2.5, p < .05$ . This could imply that people with children have more of a tolerance for children in general and perhaps more empathy for single mothers. The other demographic variables including income, marital status and length of residence did not have significant relationship with perceptions and feelings.

As illustrated in Table 6.2, the city samples were split on the neighbor characteristic issues indicating a diversity of feelings in the receiving community about the low income,

entering community. It could be the case that some members of the receiving community did not oppose the relocation, or perhaps it's that their feelings have changed since the relocation took place. The current methodology does not distinguish between the feelings before or after the relocation. However it does provide insight on how respondents' ideologies are related to how they felt about the low income individuals after the relocation. The next section will examine what ideologies are related to these perceptions and feelings.

### 6.1.2 Ideologies and Feelings and Perceptions : OLS Regression Results

OLS Multiple Regression analysis was used to determine the relationship between ideological variables and the perceptions and feelings of respondents (see Table 6.3 for a description of the variables). Gender was included in the model due to its relationship with several of the independent variables. The other demographic variables did not have a significant relationship with the independent variables, but they will be brought back in later chapters. At this point, the demographic variables' affect on the dependent variables was not taken into consideration, because each dependent variable was different and would have warranted the inclusion of different variables, and thus different models. For comparative purposes, the model was kept consistent between the dependent variables. Other variations of the model were tested; only results from the best fitting model were included in the following sections.

The individualist racial belief variable was excluded from the model due to its high correlation with other variables in the model. It also did not interact well with the other independent variables in the model and may not have been a good enough measure to

distinguish between race and economics. It is possible that the nuances of race could not be captured in an OLS regression model.

Table 6.3 Variable Descriptions

Variable	Description
Female	Dummy; 1=female, 0=male
Structuralist beliefs about poverty	Higher scores indicate a belief in structuralist causes of poverty
Individualist beliefs about poverty	Higher scores indicate a belief in individualist causes of poverty
Positive stereotypes of the poor	Higher scores indicate a belief in positive stereotypes of the poor
Right to the City	Higher scores indicate a belief that low income people have a right to the city
Positive view of liberty	Higher scores indicate a positive belief in liberty, that government should be proactive in providing resources and lower scores indicate the negative liberty belief that government interference should be limited.

Table 6.4 OLS Coefficients For Perceived Effects of Subsidized Housing on a Neighborhood

<i>Variable</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Std Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Female	.03	.27	.00
Structuralist view of poverty	-.39	.22	-.21
Individualist view of poverty	.51*	.21	.23
Positive stereotypes of the poor	-.78**	.22	-.33
Right to the City	-.29	.29	-.11
Positive view of liberty	.01	.20	.01

Table 6.4-continued

F = 7.82, N= 99

ADJ R Square = .29

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\*significant at the .05 level, \*\* significant at the .01 level

The literature shows that members of the receiving community seem to often state property concerns for why they are against public housing residents moving into their communities. Harris' (2001) racial proxy hypothesis attempted to differentiate between pure racism and racial prejudices associated with socioeconomic factors such as crime rates and property values. Most of the studies on residential preferences have controlled for socioeconomic factors to tease out relationships between preferences and racism. In the present study, the negative effects variable is the dependent variable at this stage of the model. It may be insightful to determine what ideological factors are related to what residents perceive will happen to their neighborhoods (see Table 6.4).

The results of the model provide some insight as to why fears of falling property values and crime rate increases exist. The model was a moderate fit in explaining the variation in respondents' beliefs that subsidized housing would cause their property values to go down and crime rates to increase. Respondents who believed poverty was caused by the individuals themselves were more likely than others to perceive that subsidized housing would have negative effects on their neighborhoods. In other words, respondents who believed that poverty is due to factors such as loose morals and poor choices were more likely to perceive that subsidized apartments would decrease their property values and increase their crime rates. This relationship makes sense in that if one believes that low

income individuals have negative qualities that led to their financial situation, then one might assume that the negative qualities would carry over into the new neighborhood.

Respondents who held more positive stereotypes of the poor were less likely to believe that subsidized apartments would harm their property values or increase their crime rates. This finding indicates that people's negative beliefs about low income individuals could be contributing to their fear that the public housing residents will adversely affect their neighborhoods. Conversely, people who see the poor in a positive light are less likely to be concerned. Neither belief about right to the city nor positive liberty contributed significantly to perceptions about effects of subsidized housing.

Table 6.5 OLS Coefficients for Feeling That the Low Income Individuals Were Part of the Community

<i>Variable</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Std Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Female	-.056	.15	-.03
Structuralist view of poverty	.15	.12	.13
Individualist view of poverty	-.04	.12	-.03
Positive stereotypes of the poor	.13	.12	.10
Right to the City	.76***	.16	.53
Positive view of liberty	-.16	.11	-.14

F = 8.59, N=97

ADJ R Square = .32

\*\*\* significant at the .001 level

In earlier chapters the hypothesis that neighborhoods significantly impact their residents was explained and support from empirical studies was presented. One theoretical assumption underlying the relocation programs is that low income residents will become integrated into their new community, both physically and socially. One may contend that belonging to a community is contingent upon whether the other members of the community perceive you as being a part of their community. This study asked respondents whether they felt that low income families could be part of their community. Earlier descriptive results indicated that the sample was divided over this feeling. OLS results shed some light on both perspectives.

As can be seen in Table 6.5, the model is a moderate fit. Right to the city was the only significant variable in the model and had a strong, positive relationship with feeling that the public housing residents were part of the community. Respondents who felt that public housing residents were part of their community believed that the public housing residents had a right to live in any community, that their property values were not as important as the public housing residents having access to the healthier neighborhood and that they believed economic diversity was good for their neighborhood.

Before right to the city was entered into the model, structuralism was significant and positively associated with believing low income families were part of the community. In part, the disappearance in the significance of this variable after right to the city was entered can be explained by the strong association between right to the city and structuralism. However, it also makes sense that right to the city would be a stronger predictor for this variable. Structuralists acknowledge that societal institutions contribute to poverty, but even if one

believes this, one may not feel that people living in poverty belong in their community. This is also the case with liberty. Individuals who believe in positive liberty might believe that government should intervene and help low income families, but they do not necessarily believe that the intervention should lead people to their backyards. Moreover, even if respondents believe in positive liberty and are structuralists support the belief that low income families have a right to live in their neighborhood, they still may not feel they are part of their community based on proximity alone.

Table 6.6. OLS Coefficients for Feeling That the Low Income Individuals Have the Same Values as Other Members of the Receiving Community

<i>Variable</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Std Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Female	.16	.16	.10
Structuralist view of poverty	-.00	.12	-.00
Individualist view of poverty	.07	.12	.06
Positive stereotypes about the poor	-.13	.13	-.10
Right to the City	-.66***	.16	-.46
Positive view of liberty	-.12	.11	-.11

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F =6.53, N=97

ADJ R Square = .25

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\*\*\* significant at the .001 level

Another component of sense of community is whether people have a set of shared values (Douglas and Long 2003). The extent to which members of the receiving community felt that the public housing residents had the same values as the rest of the community was measured.

Similar to the previous sense of community variable, right to the city was the only significant variable in the model. Whether respondents believed that low income residents had different values than other people in their neighborhood was moderately explained by the model. Individuals with higher right to the city scores did not feel that low income families had different values. Conversely, respondents who did not believe in right to the city tenets agreed that low income values were different from other neighbors' values. Of course, this is logical: residents who believed that low income people did not have the right to live in their neighborhood and who didn't value economic diversity could use their feelings about people having different values as an excuse for their beliefs.

As was the case with the previous variable, structuralism was significant until right to the city was entered into the model. The relationship between what a respondent attributed to poverty and feelings about low income values is not surprising, because respondents might have assumed that poor values caused a person to be in poverty in the first place. In other words, the very fact that a person was poor must have meant that they had different values. Yet the dominance of the right to the city variable implies that right to the city may go a step further by believing that an individual may not be “worthy” to live in a neighborhood because of poor values.

Table 6.7 OLS Coefficients For Being Bothered by Low Income Single Mothers

<i>Variable</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Std Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Female	.00	.17	.00
Structuralist view of poverty	-.15	.14	-.13



Table 6.7-continued

Individualist view of poverty	.09	.13	.06
Positive stereotypes about the poor	-.21	.14	-.14
Right to the City	-.61**	.18	-.38
Positive view of liberty	-.08	.13	-.06

---

F = 7.54, N= 99

ADJ R Square = .29

---

\*\* significant at the .01 level

In addition to the sense of community variables, right to the city was related to most of the neighborhood characteristic variables. One neighbor characteristic that was measured was how much respondents would be bothered by living next to low income, single mothers (see Table 6.7). Interestingly, right to the city was the only variable significant in the model. Respondents who were more bothered by low income single mothers living in their neighborhood also had lower right to the city scores. Respondents who believed in right to the city tenets were not bothered by low income single mothers living in their neighborhood. The relationship with right to the city indicates that respondents may be bothered due to their not believing that economic diversity is good for their neighborhood. The “low income” part may have been the cue that bothered them the most.

It is interesting that whether one was a structuralist or individualist did not influence feelings toward low income women as neighbors. Regardless of whether respondents believed the mothers were in their situation do to their own fault or societal ills, the belief

that low income single mothers do not have the right to live in the neighborhood was most relevant. Moreover, it is interesting that negative stereotypes did not have a relationship, given the extreme answers to the “having to many children” item.

Table 6.8 OLS Coefficients for How Welcoming Neighbors Would Be to Low Income, Single Mothers

<i>Variable</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Std Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Female	.03	.16	.02
Structuralist view of poverty	-.17	.13	-.17
Individualist view of poverty	-.00	.13	-.00
Positive stereotypes about the poor	.16	.13	.13
Right to the City	.49**	.17	.37
Positive view of liberty	.07	.12	.07

---

F = 2.7, N=98

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ADJ R Square = .09

---

\*\*significant at the .01 level

In addition to reporting on their own feelings, respondents were asked to consider their neighbors' feelings about the entering community. Specifically, they were asked how welcoming they felt their neighbors would be toward low income, single mothers. The model was not as good a fit with this variable as it was with the previous ones, explaining only a small amount of variance (see Table 6.8). Nonetheless, right to the city was the only significant variable in the model. The greater the belief respondents had in right to the city,

the more welcoming they felt their neighbors would be. It is interesting that individuals' beliefs in right to the city was related to whether they believed their neighbors would be welcoming to low income single mothers. This indicates that respondents who believed public housing residents had a right to the city also believed that their neighbors felt the same way.

Table 6.9 OLS Coefficients for Being Bothered by a Person with a Mental Illness

<i>Variable</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Std Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Female	-.05	.18	-.03
Structuralist view of poverty	-.27	.15	-.23
Individualist view of poverty	.41**	.14	.29
Positive stereotypes about the poor	-.34*	.15	-.23
Right to the City	-.06	.19	.04
Positive view of liberty	-.03	.13	-.03

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F = 5.03, N=98

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ADJ R Square = .20

---

\* significant at the .05 level, \*\* significant at the .01 level

As mentioned in Chapter 3, In addition to single mothers, persons with a mental illness are likely to relocate with mobility programs. In this case, right to the city was not significant (see Table 6.9). The ideology about individuals variables were more relevant than ideologies held about society when it came to mental illness. This finding is consistent with attribution model research with mental illness. Studies have found that individuals who hold

persons with a mental illness responsible for their illness will have fear and avoidance issues (see for example Camgon et al. 2003, Pescosolido et al. 1999). Respondents who had high individualist beliefs were more bothered by living next to a person with a mental illness. Respondents who subscribed to negative stereotypes about the poor were also bothered by the thought of having a person with mental health problems as a neighbor.

Table 6.10 OLS Coefficients for How Welcoming Neighbors Would be to Persons with a Mental Illness

<i>Variable</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Std Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Female	.11	.19	.07
Structuralist view of poverty	-.21	.15	-.18
Individualist view of poverty	.04	.16	.03
Positive stereotypes about the poor	.31*	.15	.22
Right to the City	.49*	.19	.32
Positive view of liberty	-.18	.14	-.15

---

F = 2.65, N=98

---

ADJ R Square = .09

---

\* significant at the .05 level

Respondents were also asked how welcoming their neighbors would be to persons with a mental illness moving into their neighborhood. Similar to the previous item asking about neighbors, the model only explained a small part of the variance in the variable. Interestingly, in addition to positive stereotypes about the poor, right to the city was positively associated with how welcoming respondents felt their neighbors would be toward

persons with a mental illness (see Table 6.10). When asked about their neighbors' actions, respondents with a high belief in right to the city felt that their neighbors would be more welcoming. These results suggest that respondents distinguished between their own feelings and those of their neighbors when it came to attitudes about mental illness. Their beliefs about individuals mattered in both cases, but when it came to answering for other people, the societal variable, right to the city, was important.

## 6.2 Policy Solutions

Participants were asked how strongly they supported or opposed several policy solutions for low income individuals. There were three categories of policies. Individual based policies were ones that indirectly benefited low income individuals. Giving money to businesses so that they would relocate to low income areas is one example of how low income individuals would indirectly benefit through individual-based policies. Providing incentives for low income women to marry is another individual-based policy. The place based policy was giving money directly to impoverished areas, in this case low income schools. Giving more money to low income schools aligns with “culture of poverty” in that it assumes that more money in a school will help children break away from a disadvantaged life before it's too late. Finally, other place based policies match the geography of opportunity model and physically move low income families into more affluent communities with more opportunities. This policy was stated in two different ways to see if the purpose behind the relocation made a difference in respondents' support. One stated that “relocating low income families to more affluent neighborhoods where they'll have access to better schools, jobs and public services.” The second stated “relocating low income families to

more affluent neighborhoods where they'll learn better values by having middle class role models.”

Table 6.11 Support and Opposition for Policies for Ameliorating Poverty

	Strongly favor	Favor	Oppose	Strongly oppose	Total	Missing
Business incentives	36.7% (55)	50% (75)	7.3% (11)	6% (9)	100% (150)	3
Spend more money on poor schools	33.6% (50)	44.3% (66)	14.1% (21)	8.1% (12)	100% (149)	4
Relocation for better amenities	3.5% (5)	21.7% (31)	44.1% (63)	30.8% (44)	100% (143)	10
Marriage incentive	9% (13)	20.8% (30)	40.3% (58)	29.9% (43)	100% (144)	9
Relocation for better values	1.6% (2)	16.% (20)	44% (55)	38.4% (48)	100% (125)	28

There was overwhelming support for “giving businesses and industry special tax breaks for locating in poor and high unemployment areas.” Eighty-seven percent said they would “strongly favor” or “favor” this individual-based policy. The second most popular policy was “spending more money on schools in poor neighborhoods.” Seventy-eight percent said they would “strongly favor” or “favor” this policy. The remaining three policies were not well supported. “Relocating low income families to more affluent neighborhoods where they'll

have access to better schools, jobs and public services” was supported or strongly supported by just 25.2 percent of participants. Respondents seemed amenable to redistributive measures that did not involve their own space being infringed upon, implying that it is more than the government intervention that caused them to oppose the relocation policies (see Table 6.11).

Education level and support for relocation programs were positively correlated. This was the case for relocation for better amenities and relocation for better values ( $r=.25$  and  $.29$ , respectively,  $p<.01$ ). Otherwise, education was unrelated to support for policies.

There were gender differences in the support for policies, particularly policies that involved redistribution. Women (3.3,  $SD= .81$ ) supported giving money to poor schools more than men (2.8,  $SD= 9.4$ ).  $t(145) = 3.11$ ,  $p < .001$ . Women (2.14,  $SD= .73$ ) also supported mobility programs for the purpose of better amenities significantly more than men (mean= 1.79,  $SD= .83$ ).  $t(137) = 2.5$ ,  $p < .05$ .

There were differences between Whites and non-Whites with support for the two least popular policies. White respondents (mean= 2.02,  $SD= .89$ ) were significantly less supportive of the marriage incentives than non-Whites (2.42,  $SD= 1.1$ ).  $t(142) = -2.0$ ,  $p < .05$ . White respondents (mean=1.72,  $SD= .72$ ) were also less supportive of relocation policies with the purpose of instilling middle class values than non-Whites (2.24,  $SD= .83$ ).  $t(123) = -2.9$ ,  $p < .01$ .

Several respondents wrote comments next to the policy solution items, frequently qualifying their meaning of the item. For instance, when asked about giving more money to poor schools, two respondents wrote “As long as you don't decrease money spent at other schools” and “No Robinhood! If it doesn't take away from other schools.” Others questioned

the efficacy of the relocation programs “what do we do with the poor neighborhoods?” “Moving people does not solve the problems of poverty, all it does is hide the problem.” And, “the problem of poverty is much larger than which neighborhood you live in.” Finally, next to the relocation for the purpose of improving values item, respondents wrote “it really isn't about having a role model,” and “ridiculous, no neighborhood provides role models in our society-they came from faculty/sports/business.”

Other interesting comments that respondents made spoke to the forced nature of relocating low income families into more affluent neighborhoods. For example, two respondents wrote, “They should have choices, not forced” and “Government should provide the opportunities and leave the freedom of choice to those in need.” These comments provide some evidence that respondents were not only concerned with their own liberty, but the liberty of the public housing residents as well.

### 6.2.2 Support for Policy Solutions: OLS Regression Results

Overall, the model statistics were significant for three of the policy variables. The two independent policies, business incentives and marriage incentives were not significantly predicted by the model.

Table 6.12 OLS Coefficients for Support for Spending on Impoverished Schools

<i>Variable</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Std Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Female	.25	.19	.13
Structuralist view of poverty	.51**	.15	.41



Table 6.12- continued

Individualist view of poverty	-.27	.14	-.18
Positive stereotypes about the poor	.00	.15	.00
Right to the City	.07	.19	.04
Positive view of liberty	.05	.14	.04

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F = 6.4, N=97

ADJ R Square = .25

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\*\*significant at the .01 level (2 -tailed test)

Giving more money to poorer schools is a way to provide resources for low income individuals without changing their residential environment. This policy reflects a desire to provide assistance while keeping the poor at a distance. Believing that poverty was caused by structuralist factors was positively associated with supporting this policy (see Table 6.12). People who believed that poverty was caused in part by factors such as poor schools and discrimination were more likely to support improving schools, consistent with past literatures (Kluegal and Smith 1989). Right to the city was not significant in this model, most likely because the policy does not call for respondents' space to be encroached upon. However, it is still a redistributive policy, so it is a little surprising that sense of liberty does not seem to matter. Liberty being infringed upon monetarily seems distinct from infringing on spatial liberty as can be seen in Table 6.12.

Table 6.13 OLS Coefficients for Support for Mobility Programs  
(Better Amenities)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Std Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Female	-.11	.12	-.07
Structuralist view of poverty	.36***	..09	.34
Individualist view of poverty	-.22*	..09	-.18
Positive stereotypes about the poor	.12	.10	.09
Right to the City	.28*	.13	.20
Positive view of liberty	.38***	.09	.34

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F = 21, N=95

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ADJ R Square = .56

\*significant at the .05 level, \*\*\*significant at the .001 level

The variables associated with supporting mobility programs were of particular interest as respondents had been the target of such a policy. There were two items addressing housing relocation programs. The first one asked if people would support or oppose relocating low income families so that they could be next to better schools, jobs and public services. There were several significant variables explaining respondents' support or opposition for relocating low income families into more affluent neighborhoods. As illustrated in Table 6.13, structuralism, individualism, right to the city and liberty were all significant in the model and explained a fairly large amount (adjusted R square= .56) of the variance in the way respondents answered.

Structuralism was the most important variable in the model. Respondents who attributed structural factors to poverty were associated with supporting mobility programs so that low income families could receive better neighborhood amenities, in other words, better structural opportunities. Consistent with the idea that attributions about poverty are related to policy support, individualism was negatively associated with supporting relocation policies. Respondents who believed low income individuals were at fault for their situation were more likely to oppose the policy. It seems that a necessary condition for supporting mobility programs might be that one must believe that society has some responsibility for why people are poor.

Positive liberty was almost as important as structuralism. With previous variables, the degree to which respondents believed in positive liberty did not matter, or at least the model did not find evidence that it mattered. This finding implies that although feelings about low income families as neighbors were not explained by a respondent's sense of liberty, whether the policy itself was supported was related to feelings about government involvement. Specifically, the more respondents believed that liberty meant providing resources and opportunities to people, the more they supported relocating them into new environments to have access to better resources and opportunities.

Right to the city has consistently been an important variable for most of the dependent variables. Underlying the philosophy behind the mobility programs is the idea that public housing residents can be placed in any part of the city. The degree to which people believe this, represented by their right to the city score, is pertinent to supporting the policy. Right to the city is also about believing that people with lower incomes have the same right

to participate as more affluent residents and that economic diversity is good for a neighborhood. Conversely, respondents who did not have high right to the city scores did not support the policy. This model provides some insight into why some homeowners may have opposed the relocation so vehemently.

Respondents were also asked if they supported or opposed housing relocation programs where low income families would learn better values by having middle class neighbors. The model was significant at .05 ( $F= 2.2$ ), but none of the variables within the model were significant. It seems that respondents might have identified the relocation of low income families with better amenities rather than better values. Or it may it is simply have been that the ideological variables included in the model were not directly relevant to beliefs about values.

### 6.3 Summary

Ideology was an important predictor in how participants felt about different aspects of the mobility program. Right to the city was especially important and significant to all but one of the sense of community and neighborhood characteristic variables. Where right to the city was important, respondents' beliefs about structuralist or individualist causes of poverty did not appear relevant. Rather than beliefs about individuals being important, these variables seemed to be related to beliefs held about society and who should have the right to space in a neighborhood.

The ideology model was a fairly good fit for two of the policy solutions, spending money on impoverished schools and relocating families into wealthier areas to increase public amenities. Right to the city, liberty and individualist and structuralist views of poverty

were all related to supporting or opposing mobility programs. The next chapter focuses on the relationship between respondents' perceptions and feelings and the two variations of the mobility policy.

## CHAPTER 7

### SUPPORT FOR MOBILITY PROGRAMS

When a receiving community protests the implementation of a mobility program, the focus seems to be on their fear of rising crime rates and low property values (Briggs 1999, Goetz 2005). These perceptions and other feelings the members from the receiving communities may add a different dimension from the ideologies explored in earlier chapters. Section I of this chapter explores the extent the different feelings and perceptions that respondents have about low income housing relocation programs are related to their support for or opposition to relocating low income families into affluent neighborhoods. It examines the third hypothesis, *the perceptions and feelings of the receiving community are related to their support or opposition for housing relocation programs*. This model excludes the ideological variables in order to isolate the effect of the perception and feelings variables. Section II will bring the ideological variables back into the model in order to see which variables are related to the support or opposition of housing mobility programs when all are included. It explores the final hypothesis, *once ideologies and perceptions and feelings are*

*controlled for, the ideological variables will have a stronger relationship with support for housing relocation programs than perceptions and feelings.*

This chapter begins by introducing two additional control variables that may be related to respondents' perceptions and feelings. These additional controls, along with the original demographic variables, were tested for a relationship with the perception and feelings variables. Finally, hierarchical regression analysis is used to regress the perceptions and feelings model onto feelings about housing mobility programs.

### 7.1 Additional Controls

In addition to the demographic variables mentioned in Chapter 3, two additional control variables were measured: 1) awareness of the mixed income housing in the neighborhoods and 2) the sense of community individuals in the receiving community felt. These variables were included as controls because whether a respondent was aware of the low income housing in their neighborhood might have been related to how they felt about their low income neighbors. Their sense of community in general could have affected their feelings about low income individuals being part of the community. These additional control variables also flesh out some of the differences between the Dallas and Southwest City communities.

#### *7.1.1 Awareness of subsidized apartment complexes*

One question that was inherently important to this study was whether the current homeowners were aware of the subsidized apartment complexes. The overarching goal was to determine perceptions of the relocation policy by the receiving community, and it was important to determine if being aware of such developments had an impact on perceptions.

The overwhelming majority (88%, N=134) of the residents from Southwest City and Dallas were aware that public housing residents were living in apartment complexes in their neighborhood. Eighteen percent (N=13) of the residents from Dallas were not aware of low income housing nearby, while seven percent (N=6) of the participants from Southwest City were not aware.

Although both relocation cases were high profile, the Southwest City relocation was more recent than the Dallas project, which might have contributed to the greater awareness. As discussed in Chapter 4, the average number of years that Dallas respondents lived in their community was 6.6 years (SD=3.8), while in Southwest City it was 16 years (SD=13.7). It was the case that persons who were aware of the low income housing had lived in their neighborhoods significantly longer than those who were not aware.  $t(151) = 2.09, p < .05$ . It is very likely that more Southwest City participants were living in their communities at the time of the relocation than were Dallas participants. The Dallas relocation occurred seven years before the surveys were sent, while in Southwest City, the public housing residents had lived in the receiving community for three years. The average sense of community was significantly higher for participants who were aware of the low income housing.  $t(149) = 3.04, p < .01$ .

Although not prompted to do so, respondents wrote comments such as “the apartments are too far from our housing area” and “our street is very far removed.” Some participants did not feel that the apartment complexes were close enough to their homes to make them part of their community. Another participant pointed out that the gated community separates residents from the subsidized apartments. An interesting question



would have been to see how people define their communities—house, street, subdivision, grocery stores, community space, etc. The communities of Dallas and Southwest City were spatially distinct from one another in that the Southwest City community consisted of gated housing, although not all sampled houses were gated. Given the anonymous nature of this survey it is not possible to tell if the returned surveys were from gated or open communities.

### *7.1.2 Sense of community*

The higher a person's sense of community score the more they agreed that they lived in a community of shared values, shared space and familiar faces. On average, participants had a sense of community score of 2.9 on a scale of 1 to 4 (SD= .75). Participants from Dallas (mean=2.6; SD=.73) had a lower sense of community than participants from the Southwest City (mean=3.2; SD=.61).  $t(147) = -6.20, p < .001$ . This difference could be attributed to the affluent, gated community of the Southwest City, which may be an environment conducive to fostering community. Dallas residents are more racially and economically diverse; perhaps the greater homogeneity of Southwest City contributes to this finding as well. Years living in the neighborhood and sense of community were also related ( $r = .27, p < .01$ ); however, this relationship between time in neighborhood and sense of community was no longer significant when city was controlled.

## 7.2 Correlations between Perceptions and Feelings

Table 7.1 Correlations of Perceptions and Feelings

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Negative effects of subsidized housing	1						
Low income families part of the community	-.24**	1					
Low income families have the same values	.34**	-.22	1				
Bothered by single mothers	.53**	-.43**	.35**	1			
Neighbors welcoming to single mothers	-.07	.34**	-.18*	-.27**	1		
Bothered by persons with mental illness	.29**	-.25**	.16	.40**	-.23**	1	
Neighbors welcoming to persons with mental illness	.00	.22**	-.03	-.08	.59**	-.31**	1

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2 tailed).

Many of the feelings and perceptions had significant relationships, which is to be expected given the similarities they share (see Table 7.1). While they did not correlate well enough to combine items into scales, there were expected relationships between most of the variables. For instance, perceiving that negative effects to the neighborhood would be caused by subsidized housing was negatively related to feeling that low income families were part of the neighborhood, positively related to feeling they have different values and positively related to being bothered by low income single mothers and persons with a mental illness.

Feeling that low income families were part of the community was negatively related to feeling that their values were the same as others in the neighborhood. Feeling that low income families were part of the community was also negatively related to being bothered by low income single mothers and persons with a mental illness. In general, respondents who had negative perceptions of low income families did not feel that low income families were part of the community or that they had the same values as the rest of the residents in the neighborhood.

The items that asked respondents to answer how welcoming they felt their neighbors would be of low income single mothers and persons with a mental illness had a high correlation with each other ( $r=.57$ ). These items asked respondents to think about their neighbors' reaction rather than their own, so rather than exclude one of the variables, both variables were left out of the model. All remaining items in the feelings and perceptions model focused on the respondents' feelings and perceptions.

### 7.3 Perceptions and Feelings of Support for Mobility Programs: OLS Regression Results

Table 7.2 Description of Variables for Final OLS Regression Model

Variable	Description
Female	Dummy; 1=female, 0=male
Awareness of subsidized housing	Dummy; 1=aware, 0=not aware
White	Dummy; 1=white, 0=other
Southwest City	Dummy; 1=Southwest City, 0= Dallas
Education	Continuous; high scores =more educated
Child(ren) under 18	Dummy; 1=has child under 18, 0=does not

Table 7.2- continued

Perceived effects of subsidized housing	Higher scores indicate agreement that property values will decrease and crime will increase
Low income individuals as part of community	Higher scores indicate agreement that low income individuals are part of family
Low income individuals have the same values	Higher scores indicate agreement that low income individuals have different values
Bothered by single mothers	Higher scores indicate bothered by single mothers
Bothered by persons with mental illness	Higher scores indicate bothered by persons with mental illness

TABLE 7.3 OLS Coefficients for Relocating Low Income Families for Better Amenities

<i>Variable</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Std Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Female	.12	.12	.07
Awareness of subsidized housing	-.17	.17	-.07
White	-.28	.16	-.13
Southwest City	-.00	.13	-.00
Education	.11	.07	.12
Child(ren) under 18	-.08	.12	-.05
Perceived effects of subsidized housing	-.12*	.05	-.23
Low income individuals as part of community	.08	.08	.08
Low income individuals have the same values	-.14	.07	-.15
Bothered by single mothers	-.32**	.09	-.36
Bothered by persons with mental illness	-.01	.07	-.01

F=9.2, N=124  
Adj R square= .43

\* significant at the .05 level, \*\*significant at the .01 level

The perceptions and feelings model was a fairly strong fit. Two of the perceptions and feelings variables were significantly associated with supporting or opposing relocating low income families to more affluent neighborhoods (see Table 7.3). Not surprisingly, people who perceived that their neighborhoods would be harmed by the mixed income housing were not likely to support the policy. The racial proxy hypothesis would predict such a finding by asserting that respondents were not directly opposed to the race of low income families, but rather they were reacting to the negative effects that they associated with low income minorities living in a neighborhood (Harris 2001). While comparative conclusions cannot be drawn between the current study and the neighborhood preference studies examined in Chapter 2, there is enough exploratory evidence to warrant future research in racial and economic issues of mobility programs.

The most important variable in this model was being bothered by low income women moving into the neighborhood. Respondents who were bothered were less likely to support the policy. This neighbor characteristic finding was not surprising considering that right to the city was strongly associated with both being bothered by low income single mothers and with supporting relocation policies. The next section will hopefully shed some light on which, ideology or attitudes, will have the stronger association with the relocation policy.

The second relocation policy variable, which focused on relocating to pass on middle class values, was also regressed on the perceptions and feelings model (see table 7.4). As with the previous relocation variable, being bothered by low income, single mothers was associated with opposing the relocation policy. Being white was even more important in

predicting a lack of support for this angle of the policy. Education was also significant in this model; the more education a respondent had, the more he/she supported this policy.

Interestingly, perceived effects of subsidized housing was not associated with opposing relocation policy in this case. The differences in the two variations of relocation policy helped distinguish how respondents felt about the different purposes for relocation. While race and being bothered by low income single mothers was significant for both variables, the model had a stronger fit with the relocation for better amenities variable. One explanation could be that respondents related better to relocating to receive better amenities, as it is a reason that is commonly stated for the policy. Relocating to instill better values has more complexity to it, in that respondents may or may not believe that the low income families have different values and they may or may not see themselves or their neighbors as good role models.

TABLE 7.4 OLS Coefficients for Relocating Low Income Families for Better Values

<i>Variable</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Std Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Female	-.04	.13	-.03
Awareness of subsidized housing	.12	.21	.05
White	-.50**	.19	-.24
Southwest City	.16	.15	.11
Education	.28**	.08	.30
Child(ren) under 18	-.06	.14	-.04
Perceived effects of subsidized housing	.04	.06	.08
Low income individuals as part of community	.08	.09	.09
Low income individuals have the same values	.15	.08	.17
Bothered by single mothers	-.33**	.10	-.39
Bothered by persons with mental illness	-.01	.09	-.01

F=4.06, N=113  
Adj R square= .23

\*\*significant at the .01 level

#### 7.4 Ideology and Attitudes and Support for Mobility Programs: OLS Regression Results

The main hypothesis of this study was that the ideology of a person, including their stance on liberty, attribution of poverty and beliefs about “right to the city” is related to their attitudes toward race, poverty, characteristics of potential neighbors and the policy solutions they would support. This section brings together all of the variables into a single model with ideologies and attitudes. This final model includes 15 independent variables. In order to increase the sample size for the model, positive stereotypes of the poor was excluded. The number of respondents who skipped this set of questions greatly reduced the sample size. Although the sample size is below what is ideal (Spicer 2005) omitting the stereotype variable increases the sample size from 95 to 123, and the model shows no signs of omitted variable bias.

TABLE 7.5 Ideology, Attitudes and Relocating Low Income Families for Better Amenities

<i>Variable</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>St Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Female	-.03	.13	-.02
Awareness of subsidized housing	-.16	.19	-.07
White	-.15	.17	-.07
Southwest City	.02	.14	.01
Education	.09	.07	.11
Child	-.07	.13	-.04

Table 7.5- continued

Perceived effects of subsidized housing	-.05	.06	-.10
Low income individuals as part of community	.06	.09	.07
Low income individuals have the same values	-.06	.08	-.06
Bothered by single mothers	-.30**	.09	-.29
Bothered by persons with mental illness	.00	.08	.01
Right to the city	.06	.17	.05
Positive view of liberty	.26**	.09	.23
Structuralist view of poverty	.28**	.11	.26
Individualist view of poverty	-.11	.12	-.09
F= 11.45, N=123			
ADJ R Square = .60			

\* significant at the .05 level; \*\*significant at the .01 level

Three variables were significant in the model, the structuralist view of poverty, belief in positive liberty and being bothered by low income, single mothers. In the end, an attitude was the most important variable in the model. Respondents who were more bothered by low income single mothers were associated with being opposed to the relocation policy. Having a structuralist view of poverty was nearly as important in the model. Respondents with a structural perspective on poverty and a belief in positive liberty were associated with supporting mobility programs. Mobility programs are policies with a high degree of government interference, so it makes sense that respondents who believed that government



should be limited (lower positive liberty scores) did not support the policy. Also, people with structural attributes about poverty might have found that relocation helped eliminate the inequalities that structural factors such as discrimination have caused.

The results show that respondents had both general and specific reasons for supporting mobility programs. From a general perspective, two of the ideological variables mattered. Liberty and structuralist beliefs about poverty were significant instead of right to the city. Right to the city is closely associated with the attitude variables, so it is possible that their effects canceled each other out. The results indicate that respondents were opposed to the policy due to their being bothered by low income single mothers being their neighbors. This neighborhood characteristic is perhaps most closely associated with mobility policies as entering communities predominately consist of single mothers. Again, limited conclusions can be drawn, given the small sample size.

Table 7.6 Ideology, Attitudes and Relocating Low Income Families for Better Amenities

<i>Variable</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>St Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Female	-.12	.14	-.08
Awareness of subsidized housing	.13	.21	.05
White	-.43*	.19	-.21
Southwest City	.22	.16	.12
Education	.27**	.08	.32
Child	-.04	.14	-.03

Table 7.6- continued

Perceived effects of subsidized housing	.06	.06	.13
Low income individuals as part of community	.05	.08	.06
Low income individuals have the same values	.20*	.09	.23
Bothered by single mothers	-.29**	.10	-.35
Bothered by persons with mental illness	.01	.09	.02
Right to the city	.12	.16	.10
Positive view of liberty	.04	.10	.04
Structuralist view of poverty	.15	.11	.15
Individualist view of poverty	-.02	.13	-.02
F= 3.3, N=113			
ADJ R Square = .24			

\*significant at the .05 level

As was the case with the previous model in Chapter 5, when relocation policy was stated with “so that they can have better values” at the end of it rather than better amenities, the model did not predict nearly as much of the variance in policy support. However there were several significant variables leading to suggestive.

Education was significant in the model; higher education was associated with supporting the policy. Being non-white was related to supporting the policy. The only other significant variables in the model were attitudes. As with the previous relocation variable, respondents who were bothered by low income single mothers were not associated with being supportive of relocation policy. Although again only limited conclusions can be drawn

given the number of variables in the model, it is interesting that when the policy was worded this way, ideology did not matter anymore.

### 7.5 Summary

As predicted, feelings and perceptions did relate to respondents' support for mobility programs. The intent of the mobility program, relocating for better amenities or relocating for better values, did seem to make a difference in how respondents answered in that a person's ideology had a greater relationship with the former than the later.

When all of the variables were together in a model, two of the ideological variables and one of the attitudes variables were significant in predicting respondents support for mobility programs with the purpose of improving public amenities of low income families. However, when the purpose of the relocation was altered, attitudes were more important, indicating that how policy makers frame the issue or purpose of mobility programs may make a difference in why respondents support or oppose the policy. The demographic variables that were significant in the relocating for better values variable may also provide some insight on who would support the policy given a specific framing. The low sample size did not allow for confidence in the final model's results.

## CHAPTER 8

### CONCLUSION

Housing mobility programs are currently the dominant housing strategy in the United States. As the trend moves toward desegregating the different socioeconomic groups, it becomes more important that studies of economic and racial integration take place. This study looked at homeowners at the receiving end of two relocation programs. Although many studies have focused on how public housing residents are doing in their new communities, few studies, if any, had taken such an in-depth look at the homeowners as a target group. The purpose of this dissertation was to explore how homeowners' ideology affected their perceptions and feelings of different factors associated with housing mobility programs such as neighbor characteristics and support for the policy itself.

The causes of segregation and reasons why it has been so persistent have been debated in the literature. However the majority of the research seems to point toward discrimination and socioeconomic fears associated with low income individuals and minorities playing major roles. Data on Whites' preferences for neighbors and neighborhoods

suggest that attitudes toward minorities and low income individuals are related to neighborhood choice. However, little if any research has been conducted on the ideological basis for the opposition that occurs when integration occurs. This research was exploratory in its attempt at providing insight for an important target population of mobility programs.

Economic segregation has become a pervasive problem, and mobility programs purport to counter this trend. As was the case with racial integration, economic integration disrupts the homogeneous, middle class neighborhoods, which have more or less been left alone for several decades. Mobility programs conflict with the ideology sustaining these segregated neighborhoods, and great opposition to their implementation has occurred around the nation. The main reasons stated for opposition have been fears about property values falling, crime rates increasing and schools becoming overcrowded (Briggs 1999). Most literature on receiving communities of subsidized housing has found these fears unwarranted. This dissertation proposed a different cause for opposition, namely an ideological mismatch between the beliefs of the homeowners in the receiving community and the ideology underlying the mobility programs. Moreover, it attempted to ascertain what feelings and perceptions affect support or opposition of mobility programs. Further, the relationships between ideology, feelings, perceptions and policy support were explored to provide evidence for why opposition has occurred in receiving communities and to determine if opposition persists.

Survey data were collected from Dallas and the Southwest City (SWC) homeowners in neighborhoods that were the target of apartments with subsidized housing. Data revealed significant differences between the cities. Dallas and Southwest City communities were

distinct in terms of their diversity in racial and income distributions, with the Dallas community being more diverse. Overall, respondents in both cities tended to be highly educated, married or cohabiting and affluent

. This study contributed to the literature by providing a theoretical and empirical basis for examining the ideology and attitudes of homeowners in receiving communities.

### 8.1 Key Findings

The main hypothesis of this study was that the ideology of an individual including his/her stance on liberty, attribution of poverty and beliefs about “right to the city,” was related to their perceptions and feelings toward characteristics of potential neighbors and the policy solutions they would support. The results of the study support this hypothesis in varying degrees for each dependent variable.

Ideology, inferred by the beliefs of the homeowners, was an important predictor in how participants felt about different aspects of the mobility program. Two tiers of ideology were explored—ideology about individuals and ideology about society. Ideology about individuals, including structuralist and individualist causes of poverty and stereotypes about the poor were strongly related to the ideologies about society, including right to the city and liberty. What individuals believed were important causes of poverty and what stereotypes they subscribed to low income individuals was related to what they believed about government intervention and low income individuals’ right to urban spaces.

The dominance of right to the city in the model provides some insight on why homeowners opposed the relocation that took place in their neighborhood. Right to the city was defined as the extent to which homeowners believed public housing residents had the

right to live in their neighborhood, that public property had a higher priority than private property, and that low income individuals had the same right to participation as more affluent residents. The right to the city ideology seemed to be a good predictor of the sense of community homeowners felt toward public housing residents living in their neighborhood as well as characteristics that are generally associated with public housing residents. Believing in a right to the city was related to believing that low income families were part of the community and the feeling that they have the same values as the rest of the community. It was also related to not being bothered by low income, single mothers or persons with mental illness.

Right to the city was relevant to all but one of the neighborhood characteristic variables. For many of the dependent variables, when right to the city was relevant, structuralist and individualist beliefs did not appear relevant. It is difficult to disentangle the degree to which the beliefs in structuralist and individualist causes of poverty mattered because its strong association with right to the city might have diminished some of its relationship with the other variables. Although there was a relationship before the ideology about society variables were included in the model, the dominance of right to the city implies that it was a better fit. It may be that right to the city better captured the societal nuances that go into mobility programs, especially the sociospatial angle of the policy.

The following unsolicited quotation from a respondent provides some evidence on how he conceived this complex right. He supported policies that help the poor, but not ones that allow public housing residents to live above their means. This concept seems to be

distinct from the “not-in-my-backyard” feeling because it has more to do with the right to live in a community based on economics.

Society has an obligation to care for those who cannot (vs. will not) care for themselves. Poverty exists in all societies, in all communities. Those with much have a moral, civic and social obligation to help those with little. The 'right to live where you want', though is also linked to what one is able to do. I may want to live in the Plaza Hotel, but I cannot afford it. respondent, 2005

Support for relocation policies was predicted by several of the ideology variables. Individuals who believed in a right to the city and positive liberty supported mobility programs when presented as a means to improve the opportunities of the poor. The redistributive and sociospatial nature of mobility programs seemed to conflict with the negative conception of liberty, which advocates limited government. Moreover, those who did not believe in a right to the city opposed a program that brought low income individuals into their neighborhood.

Attributions homeowners made about poverty were also relevant in predicting support for the policy. Individuals who had a structuralist view of poverty supported mobility programs, while individuals with an individualist view opposed the policy. This is especially interesting, given that the structuralist and individualist beliefs were not mutually exclusive.

Perceptions and feelings also turned out to be good predictors of how people felt about mobility programs, including mobility programs with the purpose of relocating low income families so that they could have access to better amenities and mobility programs with the purpose of relocating low income families so that they could learn better values. For both spins on the policy, individuals who were less bothered by single mothers were more likely to support the policy. Individuals who did not perceive that subsidized housing would



have an adverse effect on their neighborhood supported a policy that provided better amenities for the poor. Surprisingly, being more highly educated and being non-white was associated with supporting mobility programs so that low income individuals could learn better values.

Wilson (1989) advocated relocating low income minorities so that they could have access to role models and better amenities, yet results from this dissertation indicate that individuals may not view the different framing of the policy in the same way. While support for both of these framings depends on an underlying belief that individuals can change, it is interesting that respondents answered differently depending on the purpose, implying that the policy has multiple dimensions that elicit different attitudes.

The final model also provided evidence that individuals view the two framings of the policy as separate policies. When the ideology and attitude variables were together in a model, two of the ideological variables and one of the attitudes variables were significant in predicting respondents support for mobility programs with the purpose of improving public amenities of low income families. However, altering the stated purpose of the relocation resulted in attitudes being more important, indicating that how policy makers frame the issue or purpose of mobility programs may make a difference in why respondents support or oppose the policy. Taken together, ideology was more important for the amenities angle and attitudes and demographics were more important for the values angle.

One final interesting finding was the gender differences between several of the variables. Women had higher right to the city scores, were more likely to believe in structuralist causes of poverty, were more likely to subscribe to positive stereotypes about the

poor, and were less likely to believe that low income individuals had different values than they did. Although gender was not significant in directly predicting support for mobility programs, most of the variables gender was associated with were also associated with mobility programs.

The racial proxy hypothesis could not be supported in the traditional way, although it was clear that people were concerned about their property values and crime rates. Respondents perceived negative effects due to having negative stereotypes of the poor and believing in individualist factors as a cause of poverty—this doesn't support a proxy hypothesis, but perhaps a class based hypothesis.

The sample size of this study was not large enough to do any advanced categorical data analysis, however there was evidence that homeowners did not always answer consistently. For instance there were respondents who believed in negative liberty and structuralist views about poverty. It could be that these respondents believed that the harm that government should prevent is the harm caused by societal institutions. The differences in how people answered such questions could not be statistically addressed; however the evidence warrants that attention should be given to these nuances.

## 8.2 Policy Implications

This study was important because it provided insight on a neglected target group of mobility programs. The receiving community may not have been neglected in terms of economics—many studies have been conducted on the impact of low income housing on adjacent property values. However, there is limited, if any, insight into the underlying causes of opposition by receiving communities. The policy of relocating public housing residents

into more affluent parts of town is widespread, and yet current feedback on the outcomes of the public housing residents and receiving community is still limited. While obviously extremely important, the perspective of the entering community paints only part of the very complex picture of the implementation of a mobility programs. The members of the receiving community are inextricably connected to the successes, failures and opportunities of the entering community. Mobility programs have a large impact on a city in terms of spatial distribution and housing allocation. They also go against dominant ideologies. Opposition in the integrated neighborhoods has far-reaching implications for public housing residents.

The literature on racial and economic segregation focuses on the interactions people have in their new neighborhoods. The findings of this study pose a potential problem for this assumption as many respondents did not feel that the public housing residents were part of their community or that they shared the same values. One could deduct that these respondents would not want to interact with the public housing residents. As one commented, “We do not have any interaction with the [apartment] complexes.” This goes against the assumption that public housing residents would have access to role models and other social ties needed in order to “get ahead.” Not all respondents felt this way. Many did view the residents as part of the community.

There is evidence that despite the frequency of negative liberty and individualism in individuals' ideology, right to the city plays a significant role and is a much more diverse concept than the other concepts in the study. The results seem to confirm the theoretical assumption that members of the receiving community would have to “buy in” to right to the city ideals before accepting public housing residents as neighbors. From a sociospatial

approach, this would mean that policy makers should recognize the multiple implications that are involved with mobility programs.

For the policy itself, the other ideological variables were also important, indicating a strong and complex ideological foundation backing people's support or opposition to the mobility program. Opposition is not just based on one factor, but on several ideological issues. The differences in the larger models are interesting because individuals' ideology mattered in one case, while their attitudes mattered in the other. For policy implications, this may indicate that framing the issue matters. Individuals care about why a policy is being implemented, and their support may be stronger for one. How individuals felt about the policy and the characteristics of the neighbors differed, indicating that individuals differentiated the policy and characteristics associated with the policy.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, future studies should look at the entire receiving community. The current study did a few journalistic interviews with three different public officials in order to provide a more in depth look at the controversy behind the Southwest City relocation as well a look at what the officials believe has sustained the implementation and what they believed should have been done differently. The responses of the officials provided more insight on how ideology is reflected in the mobility policies.

An interview with a police officer covering the area where the SWC development was located affirmed that the neighborhood was extremely affluent and had a very low crime rate. He noted that he is especially mindful of the area, so he would notice if crime was a problem. Whenever a crime does occur in the area, people do suspect the public housing residents. He contended that the development has to work extra hard to avoid the stigma of public housing

and that extra money goes into public relations. He serves on a Neighborhood Advisory Committee, which meets bi-monthly to evaluate the development. Developers, neighborhood association presidents, apartment manager, police officer, a housing authority official and other citizens quarterly to examine the money spent on landscaping, and advertising. The committee also verifies that the occupancy rates are maintained.

The police officer's duty is to present crime data to the committee and to discuss any concerns the committee members have regarding crime or other activities relating to the residents of the development. For instance, he makes sure the criminal background checks are conducted on public housing residents placed at the development. He says the main concern residents have are for crimes occurring in shared space, such as vehicle theft. Residents are not as worried about their personal property because of the gates. He says that the key to a successful relocation program is accountability, which is why the committee is important. He believes that the committee is the glue holding the foundation of the neighborhood together. The committee seems to quell fears, but it does not seem to modify attitudes of the receiving community members. It helps assuage the fears of the homeowners, yet the majority of people still perceived subsidized housing as making their property values lower. The neighborhood effect items were written in future tense and referred to public housing in general. The respondents still felt that property values would go down in general even though their own community was protected by "safeguards." As one respondent said "if [apartments] are well maintained I believe the tenants will be happier and less likely to vandalize out of boredom or need."

The city council member who was interviewed went through an extremely difficult time during the relocation. When asked about the response of the community, the first thing this member did was open a drawer full of “hate emails.” The council member had to avoid certain grocery stores and dry cleaners in the neighborhood—hostility seemed to surround the member during those days. The council member believed the relocation was the right thing to do and that it was ultimately successful. One thing that would have made the policy less controversial was telling constituents before it was leaked by a political opponent.

This sentiment was also expressed by the housing authority official. The residents found out in a less than favorable manner, and the official said involving the residents from the beginning would have helped. The assumption by all three public officials was that the homeowners were racist and scared of public housing residents. It is interesting that these beliefs led them to try to implement the program before the residents could find out. The whole thing appeared sneaky and unethical, despite the fact that everything all members of the community did was legitimate. The officials said they knew there would be opposition by the community; they expected it. They were not, however, ready for the intense response. They seemed to take a defensive stance, claiming that homeowners were acting on irrational fears and that it would all “blow over” eventually. The results of this dissertation indicate that the wounds are still fresh. The more overt response of the community may have settled into a silent opposition, yet an opposition remains, despite the low crime rates and steady property values. In some cases, the battle continues out in the open as in Dallas where another suit by homeowners was filed as recently as 2005 (Anderson 2005). The ideology of the receiving community cannot be ignored, as it is associated with the opposition. This dissertation

provides more insight on that opposition—it is not just driven by fear and prejudice—there are at least two major theoretical concepts that seem to matter.

First, liberty was important when it came to the policy itself. This is not surprising given the redistributive form of the policy and what the homeowners believed to be an infringement on their physical and financial space. From a policy implementation perspective, providing homeowners with the opportunity to address their concerns would not only provide a civil venue for addressing concerns, it would provide an outlet for participation in local affairs where all target groups could come to the table. By bringing together public residents and the homeowners, misconceptions could be resolved and both sides of the stories and concerns could be explored. Ihlanfeldt and Scafaldi (2002) supported a similar position for racial integration, “by reassuring Whites that integrated or racially changing neighborhoods will not result in neighborhood decline, Whites will be less adverse to living with Blacks ” (356). Although few respondents had a positive view of liberty, there were some. For instance, some homeowners also expressed concern for the public housing residents' situation and made suggestions for government intervention, such as “We need more Head Start programs so that mothers have a safe place for their children during working hours.”

The ideology right to the city also has implications for mobility programs. From what the public officials said, the three components of this theory are not currently being addressed in mobility programs. Valuing economic diversity in a neighborhood is not upheld when public housing residents are sneaked into a neighborhood and attempts are made to control exposure. Some would argue that these measures are in place to protect the rights of

the public housing residents—why should they be spotlighted when no one else in a community is (Goering 2003, Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2001)? This point is certainly valid. However, it is often the case that homeowners find out and oppose, so attempts at discretion may not always work. Moreover, by acting like a relocation is a dirty little secret, it becomes one. If mixed income housing is to become a feasible option in neighborhoods, then perhaps the merits of such housing needs to be expressed in land use and planning. Orfield (1986) suggested making public housing commonplace throughout a city and its suburbs so that economic integration becomes second nature. Moreover, individuals will not be able to flee from a location if it becomes widespread enough.

The second component of right to the city, prioritizing public over private space, is also useful. The post-implementation neighborhood advisory board mentioned earlier is an example of how a priority has been placed on protecting private space. When such safeguards are taken to prevent property values from falling, the priority is placed on private property over public community. Affluent neighborhoods are private enclaves where retail and housing for profit cluster. Private space discourages participation, which in turn discourages attempts at integration (Kohn 2005). “There are other places to develop public space, our community was already here” (anonymous survey respondent, 2005). A promotion of public space could open up neighborhoods to greater integration by increasing social integration as well as physical.

Finally, right to the city ideology assumes that low income individuals have the same right to participate as the more affluent members of the community. The SWC neighborhood advisory board does not contain any members of the entering community, which seems to



reinforce the opposite of this tenet. The policy implementation itself should provide an outlet where public housing residents and members from the receiving community can participate on a level playing field. Power and money should be taken out of the equation. The issue of unequal participation is a problem at a much larger scale in society, which goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, the basis for mobility programs is the idea that public housing residents will become integrated into a community. If Allport's contact hypothesis is correct, then it is necessary to find a way for public housing residents to gain somewhat of an equal hold in a community in order for attitudes to change. Ideology may be more difficult to change, but the relationship between attitudes and ideology implies that changing one will change the other- future studies of ideology and attitudes must examine this assertion vis-à-vis evaluating mobility programs.

Ideology had a strong relationship with supporting mobility programs along with attitudes associated with mobility programs. If policy makers continue to advocate mobility programs, it may be necessary to alter ideology. Eagleton provides insight in this process, “it follows, for instance, that ideology cannot be substantially transformed by offering individuals true descriptions in the place of false ones- that it is not in this sense simply a *mistake*” (30, emphasis in the original). He notes that it would take “a material change in that reality itself” (30). Material change can take place by integrating the communities. Yet how they are currently integrated may not be the solution. The housing authority official mentioned that any mention made of the public housing residents in the media, positive or negative, resulted in angry calls from some of the residents. The official said that the homeowners did not need reminders and that by ignoring the issue, it would eventually get

better over time. Again, this logic goes against contact theory and the idea of social integration which is the basis for the mobility programs. The policy of downplaying low income families in the neighborhoods may not be conducive to forging ties that can result in real change.

If the negative liberty and “negative” right to the city ideologies have been ingrained, in part due to housing policy, then it is only logical that new policies could affect change. Mobility programs certainly counter the traditional model of limited government intervention and go a step further by adding a spatial element to the mix. Yet if change is truly going to occur and economic segregation is going to be possible, then policy implementation needs to take into consideration the views of all targets of the policy and implement in such a way that reflects the goals of the policy.

Individuals cannot be taken out of the equation. They can make or break policies, and the first step to implementing a mobility program should be to understand the members of the receiving community's beliefs, attitudes, fears and desires. As Ellen said, “their policies must be built on a solid understanding of how citizens will behave, since such individual decisions ultimately determine any programme's success” (1529).

If the goal is social and political integration, the implementation will have to do more than physically place people into the neighborhoods. We cannot just settle for getting people to “lie low” and assimilate into a new culture or at least keep quiet and stay hidden. Shouldn't the goal of the policy be a bit more affirmative in the same vein that racial integration started? Lefebvre's right to the city was very much affirmative and called for an open, active process for redeveloping urban space. According to Lefebvre, public leaders needed to

promote and actively seek out participation by all residents by providing public space. Policy makers, planners, administrators can instill the ideology of right to the city by placing a non-monetary value on public space, encouraging diversity and promoting participation.

An important aspect of right to the city is that all citizens should have a say, as mentioned in Chapter 3. If these two groups had been given a say, the relocation would have never occurred. How do we determine who should have more power? How can we inspire an equal venue for participation in neighborhoods? This feat is certainly not easy, and again is reflective of a much larger problem in society. Lefebvre does not give us the solution. It is more matter of fact that the right should be given to all.

Perhaps a new definition of liberty would be useful to complement Lefebvre's demand. Positive liberty assumes that public officials know what is in the public's interest and negative liberty leaves the public interest up to each individual. A third conception of liberty grounded in participation may be necessary. This "neutral" liberty would promote participatory democracy. It would guard against tyrannical fears that positive liberty presents as well as the uneven distribution of power that negative liberty allows.

Exclusionary policies are perpetuated through space. Segregation is a blatant statement by society which says that inequality is justified. Are we doing enough to combat segregation by slowly deconcentrating public housing residents into new neighborhoods? The policy may be widespread, but it seems to be happening at a slow pace due to the political ramifications of placing developments in white neighborhoods. If real change is to occur, policy makers may need to be aware of how the process of implementation itself reinforces or discourages different ideologies.

### 8.3 Limitations

One limitation of this study has to do with the methodology. Survey research is limited in that one can not be sure how respondents perceive a question (Babbie 2002). In some cases, as in the current example, respondents write on the survey and provide more insight into their thought processes. For instance, one of the right to the city items was “Low income families have the right to live in any neighborhood they want.” Comments that were written alongside this item include “provided they can afford to without subsidy,” “if they can afford it,” “depends if they can pay for it-if not, it should not be subsidized,” “They do have the right not the money,” “Without subsidies...I agree,” “as long as they work and pay,” and “provided they can afford to live where I live.” By adding these comments, respondents altered the meaning of the item and those who “agreed” after the addition of their comments, actually “disagreed” with the original statement. Since not many respondents wrote comments by the item, there's no telling if more people answered with similar thoughts in mind.

Content validity may have also been a problem associated with the survey instrument. In order to keep the survey to two pages, many variables had limited items. Content validity was low for many of the variables, especially the ones with just one or two items. Many of the theories have multiple, complex dimensions, which is always a challenge when selecting which attributes to include (Babbie 2002).

Another limitation was the sample size of the study. In order to keep answers completely anonymous, only one batch of surveys was sent without any identification that linked survey and household. If another “reminder survey” had been sent, it would have gone

to all the same 600 households, which would have been costly. Therefore, it is difficult to know how representative the sample was to the neighborhoods. Some comparisons can be made to the census track, but limiting the sample to households might have skewed the data. Moreover, the response of some of the Southwest City homeowners may indicate that respondents who were more irate were underrepresented. Although no direct contact was made to the author or the school, it was made clear to the author that some of the residents in the Southwest City neighborhood were angered by the survey. The housing authority official believed that it was too soon after the relocation for the survey to be conducted because the issue was too sensitive. The neighborhood association complained to the city manager's office and the housing authority. This is a community that had fought vehemently to oppose this relocation from taking place, and perhaps this survey reminded them of what they lost. Additionally, the questions were hard to answer in some cases. For instance, consider one of the right to the city scale items, "Maintaining my property value is more important than low income families having greater access to decent housing, schools and parks." While they had the chance to agree or disagree with this statement, several found it difficult to answer. Certainly members of the community could have felt like they were being accused of this, having denounced the relocation. The response of these homeowners brings up an interesting methodological dilemma—is there a place for value-laden research?

#### 8.4 Future Studies

As mobility programs continue to be the dominant housing strategy, studies should continue to explore the pros and cons of the policy as well as the different target groups affected by the policy. This dissertation has introduced a new angle to research, but it was

very much an exploratory study with limitations in its findings. There is a limited scope to a survey instrument, and the issues that the members of the receiving community go beyond what was asked. As one respondent wrote “these questions didn’t really express or address the real concerns and care our neighborhood feels and has tried to keep in the nearby [apartments],” implying that there was more she could have expressed and that the community does care about the entering community in some way not captured by the survey. Focus groups may provide more insightful discussion and more in-depth information on how the homeowners feel. Survey instruments can not always detect the nuances behind such complex concepts. As one respondent said:

“These questions are hard to answer. Yes, it’s true that in most low income neighborhoods there is a higher crime rate, lower property values and lack of respect for your home and surroundings, but it is not true of every low income family. I have answered these questions on large majority of low income housing produced but again, is not reflective of all families.”

Another change in design could be the addition of a comparison group and/or a baseline measure of a community before a mobility program is implemented. It may also be insightful to look at receiving neighborhoods of varying racial and economic composition, as is often done in studies of neighborhood preferences.

Future studies should also include a broader definition of the receiving community. Public housing residents moving into new neighborhoods come into contact with businesses, public services and apartment managers and other members of the community. The success of mobility programs may have to do with the entire community. Studies should also include the perspective of renters for comparative purposes.

Despite the limited scope of this dissertation, it serves as a spring board for more research into the complexities of housing mobility policy and neighborhoods. As we move into a more integrated society-through choice or policy- it is useful to find ways to ease conflict and promote social integration as well as physical integration.

APPENDIX A

SURVEY INSTRUMENT



Dear Dallas/Fort Worth Homeowner:

I am a doctoral student at the School of Urban and Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Arlington. As part of my dissertation research, I would like your opinions on some issues concerning your neighborhood. The questions that follow this letter refer to opinions you have of your neighborhood, neighbors, potential neighbors and your rights as homeowners. The following survey has been mailed to approximately 600 homeowners in your neighborhood and a neighborhood in Dallas.

The information collected from these surveys will be kept strictly confidential; your answers will not be linked with your name or anything that can identify you. You have a right to privacy, and all information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain confidential as far as possible within state and federal law. The research is a simple survey; there are no likely risks to participating.

Your participation in this survey is voluntary, and you are in no way obligated to participate in this survey or complete the survey once you have started. If you agree to participate please return the following survey in the stamped envelope included for your convenience. By participating in this survey, I anticipate your benefit to be the opportunity to give your opinions about your community and policies that affect your community.

If you have any questions or if you would like to be kept informed of the results of this study, please email me at [jdd9880@uta.edu](mailto:jdd9880@uta.edu), call at (817) -272-3351 or contact Dr. Edith Barrett at (817) -272-3071. If you have any questions regarding your rights as a subject participating in this study you may contact Office of Research Compliance at (817)- 272-0834. Thank you for your participation in this important research!

Sincerely,  
Joanna Duke, PhD (ABD)  
Graduate Research Associate  
School of Urban and Public Affairs  
University of Texas at Arlington

**1. Are you aware that there are public housing residents living in apartment complexes in your neighborhood?**

Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_

**2. How much do you agree with the following statements?**

	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
a. Apartment complexes with rent subsidized residents will lower my property values	4	3	2	1
b. Apartment complexes with rent subsidized residents will increase crime rates in my neighborhood	4	3	2	1
	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
c. I recognize most of the people who live on my block	4	3	2	1
d. I feel a strong sense of community with others on my block	4	3	2	1
e. People on this block share the same values	4	3	2	1
f. I consider the low income families who have moved in as being part of my community	4	3	2	1
g. Low income people have different values than the other people in this community	4	3	2	1

**3. The following questions ask about potential neighbors.**

	Very much	Somewhat	Not very much	Not at all
a. If you learned that there were <b>low income single mothers</b> living in your neighborhood, how much would that bother you?	4	3	2	1
b. How welcoming do you think your neighbors would be to the <b>low income mothers</b> ?	4	3	2	1
c. If you learned that a person with <b>mental health problems</b> was moving into your neighborhood how much would that bother you?	4	3	2	1
d. How welcoming do you think your neighbors would be to a person with <b>mental health problems</b> ?	4	3	2	1
<b>4. In your view, how important is each as a cause of poverty?</b>				
	Very important	Somewhat important	Not very important	Not at all
a. Spending money unwisely	4	3	2	1
b. Discrimination	4	3	2	1
c. Loose morals, alcoholism, drug abuse	4	3	2	1
d. Failure of society to provide good schools for all	4	3	2	1
e. Lack of effort by poor to help themselves	4	3	2	1
f. Failure of the economy to provide enough jobs	4	3	2	1
Other				

5. In your view, how important is each as a cause for black people on average having worse jobs, income and housing than white people?

	Very important	Somewhat important	Not very important	Not at all important
a. Discrimination of blacks	4	3	2	1
b. Most blacks don't have the opportunity for high quality education	4	3	2	1
c. Most blacks don't have the motivation or will power to pull themselves up	4	3	2	1
How important are these for Hispanic people?				
	Very important	Somewhat important	Not very important	Not at all important
d. Discrimination of Hispanics	4	3	2	1
e. Most (Hispanics) don't have the opportunity for high quality education	4	3	2	1
f. Most (Hispanics) don't have the motivation or will power to pull themselves up	4	3	2	1

6. On a scale of 1 (not at all characteristic) to 5 (extremely characteristic) rate the following factors on how well they describe **low income individuals** by circling the numbers to their right.

- |                    |                  |
|--------------------|------------------|
| a. Hardworking     | f. Moral         |
| b. Immoral         | g. Lazy          |
| c. Family oriented | h. Have too many |
| d. Uneducated      | i. Friendly      |
| e. responsible     | j. Criminal      |

7. How much do you agree with the following statements?				
	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
a. Having persons of diverse economic backgrounds is good for my neighborhood	4	3	2	1
b. Government needs to intervene in people's lives to ensure that everyone has the resources and opportunities necessary for freedom	4	3	2	1

c. Low income people should have the right to live in any neighborhood they want	4	3	2	1
d. People with higher incomes should have more of a say in community decision-making, because they contribute more financially to society	4	3	2	1
e. Freedom means having the resources and opportunity to participate in the community	4	3	2	1
f. I prefer that people in my neighborhood have economic backgrounds similar to my own	4	3	2	1
g. The government should not intervene in people's lives unless it is to prevent harm to others	4	3	2	1

	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
h. Development of private property is more important to my community than the development of public space	4	3	2	1
i. Freedom means limited government interference in people's lives	4	3	2	1
j. Maintaining my property value is more important than low income families having greater access to decent housing, schools and parks.	4	3	2	1

<b>8. The following are steps that the federal government might take to deal with the problems of poverty and unemployment. Please indicate how strongly you would favor or oppose each policy.</b>				
	Strongly favor	Favor	Oppose	Strongly oppose
a. Giving businesses and industry special tax breaks for locating in poor and high unemployment areas	4	3	2	1
b. Spending more money on the schools in poor neighborhoods	4	3	2	1
c. Relocating low income families to more affluent neighborhoods where they'll have access to better schools, jobs and public services	4	3	2	1
d. Providing incentives for low income single mothers to marry	4	3	2	1
e. Relocating low income families to more affluent neighborhoods where they'll learn better values by having middle class role models				

9. The following questions will be used to provide a demographic analysis of your neighborhood. The information will be kept strictly confidential.

a. Male      Female

10. Do you have any children? Yes    No

10a. If yes, how many under 18? \_\_\_\_\_

**11. What is your gross household income?**

- a. under \$50,000
- b. \$51,000-\$100,000
- c. \$101,000-\$150,000
- d. over \$150,000

**12. How long have you lived in this neighborhood?**

- a. Less than 6 months
- b. Less than 1 year
- c. Less than 5 years
- d. More than 5 years

**14. What is your marital status?**

- a. divorced
- b. married/cohabiting
- c. single
- d. widowed

**15. What is your highest level of education completed?**

- a. high school degree
- b. some college
- c. Associate's degree, technical college
- d. bachelor's degree
- e. graduate degree/JD/MD

**13. What is your race/ethnicity? (circle as many as apply)**

- a. African American
- b. Asian
- c. Caucasian
- d. Hispanic
- e. Other

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